NOTE

This Microfiche meets the quality requirements of the American National Standard for Microfiche of Documents (ANSI PH5.9-1975). However, because of imperfections in the document from which it was made, it contains images that are illegible or difficult to read. The source document for this microfiche is the best copy that could be obtained prior to filming.

CIS

Congressional Information Service Inc
Washington D C

S. Hrg. 99-1083

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 16; NOVEMBER 14, 19, 20, 21; DECEMBER 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 1985

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-690 O WASHINGTON : 1987

S 201-8

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, *Chairman*

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
GORDON J. HUMPHREY, New Hampshire
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
DAN QUAYLE, Indiana
JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina
PETE WILSON, California
JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama
PHIL GRAMM, Texas

SAM NUNN, Georgia
JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi
GARY HART, Colorado
J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
ALAN J. DIXON, Illinois
JOHN GLENN, Ohio

JAMES F. MCGOVERN, *Staff Director and Chief Counsel*
ARNOLD L. PUNARO, *Staff Director for the Minority*
ALAN R. YUSPEH, *General Counsel*
CHRISTINE C. DAUTH, *Chief Clerk*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

OCTOBER 16, 1985

Page

Locher, James R. III, Study Director and professional staff member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, accompanied by Rick Finn, majority staff member, Committee on Armed Services; and Jeff Smith, minority counsel, Committee on Armed Services 13

NOVEMBER 14, 1985

Weinberger, Hon. Caspar W., the Secretary of Defense 73

NOVEMBER 19, 1985

Meyer, Gen. Edward C., U.S. Army (Retired) 149
Train, Adm. Harry D. II, U.S. Navy (Retired) 157
Dougherty, Gen. Russell E., U.S. Air Force (Retired) 160

NOVEMBER 20, 1985

Schlesinger, Hon. James, former Secretary of Defense 198
Brown, Hon. Harold, former Secretary of Defense 205

NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Moorer, Adm. Thomas H., U.S. Navy (Retired), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 277
Jones, Gen. David, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 288
McDonald, Adm. Wesley L., U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command 317

DECEMBER 4, 1985

Vessey, Gen. John W., Jr., USA (Retired), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 340
Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew J., USA (Retired), former Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command 355
Long, Adm. Robert L.J., USN (Retired), former Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command 361
McBride, Gen. William V., USAF (Retired), former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 365

DECEMBER 5, 1985

Wickham, Gen. John A., Jr., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 495
Watkins, Adm. James D., Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy 502
Kelley, Gen. P.X., Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps 513
Gabriel, Gen. Charles A., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 520

DECEMBER 6, 1985

Taft, Hon. William H. IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense 580
Marsh, Hon. John O., Jr., Secretary of the Army 585

Page
Lehman, Hon. John, Secretary of the Navy 594
Aldridge, Edward C., Jr., Under Secretary of the U.S. Air Force 606

DECEMBER 11, 1985

Laird, Hon. Melvin R., former Secretary of Defense 649
Korb, Dr. Lawrence J., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel 654
Odeen, Philip A., former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, chairman of the Georgetown CSIS Defense Organization Project 657

DECEMBER 12, 1985

Crowe, Adm. William J., Jr., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 691
Rogers, Gen. Bernard W., USA, Commander-In-Chief, U.S. European Command 741

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1985

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m. in room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Warner, Humphrey, Wilson, Denton, Gramm, Nunn, Stennis, Hart, Exon, Levin, Bingaman, and Dixon.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Patrick A. Tucker, counsel; Robert F. Bott, Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, William E. Hoehn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, and Gordon G. Riggle, professional staff members; Russell C. Miller and Patricia L. Watson, research assistants; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory P. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Edwin S. Jayne, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; and Chris Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Goldwater. Generally this committee starts right on time, but the ranking Democrat, Senator Nunn, is presiding at a prayer breakfast and there has never been a time in the history of the country when the Senate needed prayer so badly. So I am going to wait for him.

[Pause.]

Chairman Goldwater. The meeting will come to order.

This morning the committee meets to receive a report from the staff on their study of organizational and procedural problems in the Department of Defense and the Congress. Our witnesses will be Jim Locher, Rick Finn, and Jeff Smith of this committee's staff.

This project was begun more than 2 years ago by Senators John Tower and Scoop Jackson. They recognized that there were problems in the Department of Defense and Congress that needed to be addressed.

In January of this year, Senator Nunn and I redoubled the effort and in May established a task force to examine the problems in more detail. In the truly bipartisan nature of this undertaking, Senator Nunn and I jointly chair the task force. We directed Jim Locher to lead the staff effort. We also directed Jim and other staff to serve the task force and the committee in a completely bipartisan fashion, and they have done so.

The Constitution gives the Congress the responsibility to raise and maintain the armed services, specifically the Army and the Navy, because that is all they knew when they wrote the Constitution. But the Constitution also gives us, the Congress, oversight responsibilities, and I believe we have not paid enough attention to that responsibility, particularly in respect to organizational problems in the Department of Defense. It has been almost 30 years since the Congress last seriously reviewed the structure of our military establishment.

At the outset of this hearing I would like to make four important points.

First, the problems in the Department of Defense are not entirely of its own making. Congress contributes to the problems. As much as fundamental changes are needed in the Department of Defense, fundamental changes must also be made in the Congress.

Second, our armed services have improved a great deal in the last few years. They are now better equipped, better trained, and better led than they have been in a very long time. The success last week in capturing the terrorists who hijacked the Italian cruise ship is dramatic proof of that fact.

It is worth noting that this operation by essentially a single service—the U.S. Navy—went well. There are other examples of outstanding single service performance, such as the 1973 Air Force airlift to Israel, and all of the individual services would qualify for an all-star team.

Despite superb individual talent, all-star teams do not usually do well enough because they do not practice together. Just like all-star teams, our services are put together just before the big game. They have different signals, different plays, different strategies, and different skills.

We cannot rely on a patchwork all-star team. We need a team that can win the World Series, and that means a team that works year round to produce an effective, integrated effort. The individual services do well in limited circumstances under the current structure, but there is no major defense mission that can be performed without an effective all-service team. That is the focus of our concern.

Third, this study is not a criticism of any administration or individual. The problems reach back as far as the Spanish-American War and have been evident in many military operations in this century, such as Pearl Harbor, Leyte Gulf, the Vietnam war, the *Pueblo* seizure, the Iran hostage rescue mission, and Grenada.

As members of the committee will see from this morning's hearing, the staff study is blunt and candid. The floor statements that Senator Nunn and I made were blunt and candid. We have tried to give praise where praise is due, but we also have criticized where criticism is due.

Just as I mentioned, the last major changes in the organization of the Department of Defense occurred in 1958. That is nearly 30 years ago. In that period, the threat has changed greatly. Our military capabilities have changed greatly, and the nature and complexity of the world has changed greatly.

However, our national security organization has not kept up with these changes. Our men and women in uniform deserve a better system than we now have. Change is needed in both the Defense Department and Congress, and I am hopeful this process will lead to that change.

Fourth, this is a bipartisan effort, which has as its sole object the strengthening of our military. It began in a bipartisan spirit and I intend to see that it concludes in a bipartisan spirit.

Let me say a word about the staff study. It is a product of the staff, not the committee. Although the task force has reviewed the entire study, neither Senator Nunn nor I, nor any member of the committee, has endorsed it. I agree with former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, who said it was the best work he has ever seen on the subject.

As the members know, Senator Nunn and I convened a meeting of committee members and a group of outside experts on October 5 and 6 at Fort A.P. Hill in Virginia to review the staff study. It was an extremely productive session. We benefited greatly from the comments of the experts and some changes were made in the staff study as a result of their comments.

Most of them agreed with the basic analysis of the staff study. The consensus of the group was that there are serious problems that need to be solved and that the staff's analysis of the problems was sound and correct. Many of them thought the recommendations were also sound. Of course, not all of the experts agreed with all of the recommendations. The staff study is an excellent starting point for the committee to begin hearings and the drafting of needed legislation.

Beginning in early November, we will hold a series of hearings on the issue of defense organization. These hearings will examine the analysis and the conclusions and recommendations contained in the staff study. It is my hope that the committee will be able to draft and consider legislation early in January of next year. Senator Nunn and I have set an unyielding goal of enacting necessary legislation before the end of this Congress. We must begin the task of correcting the serious organizational deficiencies now.

We have been in touch with Congressman Aspin, Congressman Dickinson, and Congressman Nichols of the House Armed Services Committee, who are also considering this issue. I believe it is important to try to work together with the House as we each address this very important issue.

We have also met with Secretary Weinberger and with the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management chaired by David Packard. We intend to work with both the administration and the Packard Commission as our deliberations progress.

We want to work in a spirit of cooperation, not confrontation. All of us have the same objective: the strengthening of the American military capabilities. I hope that everyone will keep this fact in mind and will work to be part of the solution and not a part of the problem.

Oh, there will be those who say the system ain't broke, so don't fix it. However, it is broke, and we need to fix it. If we do not, our military effectiveness will be seriously impaired. If we have to fight tomorrow, these problems will cause Americans to die unnecessarily. And even worse, they may cause us to lose the fight. I might remind you that we have lost our last two wars.

I believe that if we are able to correct these serious organizational deficiencies in the Department of Defense, it may be the greatest contribution to the national security that many of us will make in our lifetimes. I feel that strongly about it.

As we face an era of declining defense resources and increasing threats, we must reorganize the Department of Defense to produce the maximum amount of military capability possible. It is vital to our national security that the job be done, done well, and done soon. Changes are essential, they are overdue, and we must begin now.

I look forward to the hearing this morning and to the exchange between the members of the committee and the staff.

Senator Nunn, I would ask if you care to make an opening statement?

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome the opportunity to receive a report from the staff this morning on their rather lengthy and very thorough study of the serious problems in defense and congressional organizations and decisionmaking. Let me begin by saying that I second the key points that you have already made.

I also want to point out what this effort is not. First, this effort is not an attempt to cut the defense budget or reduce our military. This is not an assault by two key Senators on the military, as some recent headlines suggested. Just the opposite is true. As you said, Mr. Chairman, this is an effort by our committee to strengthen the military.

Second, we are not pointing the finger of blame at any individual or administration. This is not a referendum on Secretary Weinberger's stewardship. We are looking at organizational problems that have plagued our own services for decades. And although some improvements have occurred in recent years and those improvements should be acknowledged, further improvements are absolutely essential.

The recently departed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Vessey, was absolutely correct when he said our military is more capable today. Our forces have improved a great deal in the last few years. I know that all Americans are extremely proud of the job our Navy did in capturing the hijackers of the cruise ship at the end of last week. They were ready, they were well-trained, and they were successful in carrying out a difficult operation.

Also, we should not underestimate the role of our intelligence services. Many times our intelligence community gets blamed when things go wrong, and sometimes they should be blamed. Very seldom do they get the kind of credit they deserve when things go right. Key and timely intelligence were the secrets of success, and the connectivity between the military and our intelligence community last week was superb.

Chairman Goldwater and I are interested in making these all-stars, as he called them, from the individual services more effective and capable, especially when they are called on to play on a joint service all-star team. And in any large contingency today—as was observed years ago in the fifties by General Eisenhower, any large contingency or even medium contingency in the military arena will require more than one service. And that will happen more often than not, because very few major defense missions can be performed by only one service or even two services.

My next point, Mr. Chairman, is to repeat your statement that the staff study which will be presented to us this morning is a staff product. No member of the committee has endorsed its recommendations. However, the staff in my view has done an excellent job of analyzing the problems, reaching conclusions, and evaluating alternative solutions. We felt it would be much more valuable for the committee for specific solutions to be forthcoming from the staff. We can focus on those solutions and we also focus on alternative solutions.

Most of the outside experts who met with us during our weekend meeting in Virginia had high praise for the study. As was expected, not everyone agreed with every recommendation. Although the majority of experts felt changes are needed, a few believed that no major changes are necessary.

The staff study includes a summary critique of the views of these outside experts. We had a very good meeting with them. In my view, the staff study and the summary critique of the staff study report—and this is the critique of the experts—is an excellent starting point for our hearings, deliberations, and drafting of committee recommendations and legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I have an open mind on the solutions as we begin the final phase of this 3-year effort. However, I do not have an open mind on whether or not there are serious deficiencies both in the Department of Defense and in the Congress that must be corrected. As you have already observed, I reject the view that the system is working fine, so do not change it.

As we pointed out in our floor statements, the facts overwhelmingly established that there are real problems that must be addressed. In Grenada, the Army forces ashore could not talk to the Navy ships afloat. Their radios and procedures were incompatible. There were numerous other inter-service communication problems. These are well documented in all the DOD after-action reports.

In another major problem, the Army ground commander was never told about the existence of a second dormitory where 244 American students were located. We only found out about that second dormitory when the students telephoned him to report they were surrounded and in great danger.

That was after they had already captured the first dormitory. Even then it took them many, many hours, to the following day, to mount an operation and to rescue these students. Thank God they were successful. And this is in no way a criticism of the brave individuals who did carry out that successful mission.

Mr. Chairman, both of these problems have their roots in organizational shortcomings. Another current example of organizational deficiencies was revealed in a recent hearing by Senator Wilson and Senator Glenn in their Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee on the adequacy of wartime medical readiness planning.

The subcommittee learned that the Pentagon's own review by Admiral Zimble of the medical support given to the marines in the wake of the bombing in Beirut disclosed that if "the ratio of killed to wounded had been reversed," so that "over 200 casualties had required treatment rather than fewer than 100, the medical system might well have failed. Such is the measure of our medical readiness today."

You can imagine what a full-scale Persian Gulf contingency might produce. Mr. Chairman, if 200 casualties would cause the system to break down, what would a war do? How many Americans would die as a result of poor inter-service cooperation?

What is more, Mr. Chairman, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr. William Mayer, told the Subcommittee on Manpower he had been unsuccessful in getting the services to conduct the joint planning and cooperation that are necessary to avert medical disasters, although he has been trying for over a year and a half and he is supposedly in charge, at least on an organizational chart, although in reality we all know from experience it does not work that way.

In light of such evidence, it is beyond me to see how anyone could say that there are no problems. It is for these reasons and others that I believe we must move forward on the course that you, Mr. Chairman, have charted for us to correct these problems.

Before we begin these hearings and hear from the staff, I would like to address just a few words to my committee colleagues on the leadership that our chairman has shown on this project. Chairman Goldwater announced early in this Congress that he would be retiring at the end of this Congress. He could have rested on his significant accomplishments and taken it easy.

But he did not. That is in keeping with his whole pattern of leadership. Instead, he took the lead and took on the most complex and difficult issue the committee has ever dealt with. He did so even though there were numerous pressures and continue to be numerous pressures, I am sure, on him to back off.

In each generation there are a few giants, men and women whose wisdom, courage and vision propel them to national leadership. Barry Goldwater is such a man. For over 40 years, he has served this Nation selflessly as an airman, statesman, and a Senator.

The fact that he has spoken out so eloquently about the need for change in the Department of Defense and in the Congress means that we had better all listen, because here is a man who knows what he is talking about from years of experience. I know that he is dedicated, more than anyone I know, to making the necessary changes to improve our Armed Forces.

I can think of no finer legacy, nor one that he would treasure more, than a revitalized Department of Defense, able to meet the best challenges of our generation and the next one. Mr. Chairman, I am sure I speak for all of us on the committee when I say that we will join in this bipartisan task and we look forward to continuing the work under your wise leadership.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Are there other members of the committee who would like to speak? I will ask Senator Warner to lead off if he has anything.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I share the sentiments of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Nunn. Indeed, it is my privilege to have been associated with you several years on this committee and the many years before that when I was in the Department of the Navy.

I admire your candor, but sir, I must say respectfully, I disagree with the bluntness in your statement that the system is broke. It is not broke. We are about to take under consideration this morning the incisions to perform open heart surgery on the Department of Defense, and I think we have got to proceed with extreme caution and care.

Candor, yes, but we must moderate our bluntness because this defense structure is protecting us today and our allies as much as it was yesterday and will tomorrow. And until we can come up with our own assessment to take into consideration the views of others, I would suggest we proceed with caution.

Yesterday I was with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins, a man whom I have known many years and respect greatly. And he said the following: Today we have the finest Navy in the world bar none. We are more capable of fulfilling our national security objectives than at any other time during the past 40 years. I could not have said this just 5 years ago.

I happen to agree with Admiral Watkins and his assessment that 5 years ago we were facing some uncertainties with respect to the direction and the capabilities of our national defense posture. But there has been considerable improvement in these 5 years.

And, while I share with you, Mr. Chairman, the belief that there is a need to make some substantial changes, particularly in the area of procurement and others, I would suggest that we not characterize the whole system as broke, but that we proceed in a manner that will maintain the high morale of the men and women of the Armed Forces, and also bear in mind that we are laying the foundation for the next budget which will be sent up, and that will be a tough one in view of the fiscal realities; and bear in mind that as yet the Congress has not finished action on this budget. All of these things interrelate and impact on one another.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I want to assure my friend that we have never criticized the men in uniform, and I would agree that we have a first class Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps.

Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

I got to the Senate just as the storm was beginning to settle when this original act was passed, so I know how vital and important this is, and I am very much interested. But I have no recommendations to make. I came to learn. I am delighted to be here.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I am grateful for having the opportunity to work under your leadership and Senator Nunn's leadership in this important area. I have followed this issue as closely as anyone has on the committee, except possibly our two cochairmen of the task force.

I attended the retreat with outside experts where we looked at the findings of the staff and debated the issues, and I think it's important to set this whole debate within the proper frame work.

First of all, so far as I am aware, when the issue was raised about the current state of the American military, about current organization, about current interoperability, about our current commitment to joint exercises, I think I am correct in stating that there was not a person at the retreat, either members of the committee or outside experts, who did not agree that, while there is always room for improvement, while there clearly are still problems, we have made great progress in the last few years, and that in fact the state of readiness of our military is at an alltime high.

The degree of interoperability is greater than it has ever been. We have a larger commitment to joint operations and the merger of the capacities of the services than we have ever had in the past. And we have made gigantic strides in the last 5 years in improving the quality of personnel in the military, the quality of equipment we are using, and the degree that those people can work together in a joint operation.

So while we are here to talk about improvement and I believe improvement can be undertaken, Mr. Chairman, I think we should strengthen the unified commanders. I think we should decentralize the Pentagon and give the Service Secretaries greater responsibility. I think we should strip away layers of Federal bureaucrats in the Defense Department and then use that as a model for other agencies of Government.

But I would have to agree with one point made by our distinguished colleague from Virginia, Senator Warner, and that is it is vitally important in debating how we can make the Pentagon better that we not allow those who want to reduce spending in the Pentagon, to spend money in other areas in the Federal budget, to use this debate to discredit the very real progress that we have made.

So far as I am aware, no one has argued that we can save money by reorganizing the Pentagon. No one is arguing that we have not made great progress in the last 5 years and that we are no better in virtually every respect today than we were 5 years ago.

Our problem is that the potential enemy is better than the potential enemy was 5 years ago. The threat is greater. So what we are debating here is how can we do the job better, how can we be more efficient in operating the Pentagon and carrying out both the peacetime and potential war-fighting capacity of the military services. I think in that context that we have an opportunity to make great progress here.

I am concerned, however, that our effort to improve on a system that is already improving, a system that has made great progress in the last 5 years, will be used by some to try to discredit that progress and try to simply create in the public's mind that we have a bunch of incompetents in the Pentagon who cannot do anything right.

The truth is, we are doing more right today than we have ever done. What our distinguished chairman wants to do is to do better than we are doing now, to improve the system and learn from our mistakes of the past, and to build on the progress of the last 5 years. And within that context, I strongly support this effort.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I want to join you and Senator Nunn in congratulating the staff for carrying forward this effort. I think it is an historic effort and a vitally needed one.

I became convinced of the need for basic reforms in our military institutions 8 or more years ago, and was instrumental in helping form the Military Reform Caucus 5 or 6 years ago. That caucus now has over 100 members of both Houses and spans the ideological spectrum.

Mr. Chairman, I hope in the effort to focus attention on the organization of the military superstructure that we do not forget the necessity to reform the way we think about defense. And I hope that when we undertake to review the staff study of the military superstructure that we go beyond that and look at the question of whether we are training and promoting officers for the right reasons, whether our combat personnel are being trained and maintained in the right way, whether our strategy and tactics and doctrine themselves need questioning, and whether we are buying the right kinds of weapons.

I am always amazed at how people will attack one bureaucracy in the Government, but protect another one. Bureaucracies are inherently inefficient, whether they are military or civilian, and we have got to be willing to scrutinize and criticize inefficiency in bureaucracy wherever we find it, whether it is the Defense Department or the Health and Human Services.

But I hope in our search for efficiency we do not overlook effectiveness. The question is not what is the most efficient Pentagon. The question is what is the most effective defense.

I believe we have gone beyond the days when we automatically assumed, just because we spend more money, that we are stronger. I hope we ask ourselves some kind of historic questions based in situations where vastly inferior forces have defeated vastly superior forces, forces with more weapons and greater numbers of men under arms, primarily because they outthought them and were smarter than their superior opponents.

These are the kind of reforms that I think many of us would like to see undertaken, and I think this is a very, very important beginning and I congratulate you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you, Senator Hart.

Senator Denton.

Senator **Denton**. I want to congratulate you and Senator Nunn, Mr. Chairman, for speeches that I heard on the floor. In terms of balanced criticism, especially as it deals with congressional-DOD relations and what has been wrong and what might be done to improve those relations and procedures, I found it a very fortunate time to have been on the floor.

I think that before you, Senator Tower and Senator Jackson, rest his soul, probably started a very needed work, in that, as the staff pointed out in here, George Washington indicated that when you are going to organize such a complex organization for such imperative and complicated tasks, once you organize it you should not stand pat on that organization after many years of experience indicate that which might be changed for the better.

In that general spirit, I am entirely with this effort, sir. And I also have the trust that, since you say the committee has done a job and I think certainly a positive and constructive contribution to a discussion of the subject, that this is not yet—while the staff had done it, it is not yet a committee position.

And I hope and trust that we will be somewhat searching and deliberate, although I have heard on television that we intend to offer legislation next year. Perhaps that is not too soon, certainly, for some legislation.

It happens that the last 4½ years I was in the service, I was in a position in which I was commandant of the only school in the United States which looks directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I was coming out of that longer than anyone having had it. I will not say that I feel that I became an expert on the subject, because if you ask 40 lifetime economists one question you will get 40 different answers. So I do not believe my answer, if I were forced to give one, would be necessarily as good as the one the staff has put together here.

However, I do have a number of questions, a number of differences in points of view, which I will offer as this thing proceeds, many times in the form of questions, in order to make what contribution I can to this, having been a member of the services for 34 years and knowing where some of the skeletons were buried, and agreeing with many of the points here that are made in terms of fundamentals.

But rather than take up more time than I rate at this point, I will offer incremental comments as we go along, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Thank you very much.

Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thanks to you and Senator Nunn, we are on the verge of an extremely important set of deliberations that directly affect the security of this country.

I have been on this committee for almost 7 years now. I participated in the task force that you and Senator Nunn have put together, and I am convinced that the security of the United States continues to be threatened by inadequate coordination of our armed services. Our history over and over again has shown that, from the Spanish-American War right down to Grenada.

We have made some unnecessary and often tragic mistakes in the field because of the lack of adequate coordination of our armed services. Our joint commanders do not have the kind of control that they must have over their components. They cannot control personnel practices, they cannot control logistics.

Back channels are open up through the chain of command in their own services that question the joint commander and the decisions of that joint commander on personnel and other issues. We find the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not just the Joint Chiefs of Staff; they are also the separate chiefs of staff. They have two roles, and sometimes those roles are in conflict.

And we have to try to find a way to eliminate the conflict between those two roles so that truly we have a Joint Chiefs of Staff that is not at the same time trying to represent, and indeed by training and instinct trying to represent the service from which they have made their careers.

Individual service goals sometimes conflict with the needs of the whole. That is the bottom line. We have to face it. We have to face it, as Americans and as patriots, that sometimes the needs of the individual services and the needs of the whole, the entire military operation, are often in conflict.

Mr. Chairman, these problems are not new. They are old. They are nagging problems, and that is more reason why we should continue to work to correct them.

Our task force has not prejudged the solution. What we have determined is to find those solutions. And I want to congratulate our chairman and Senator Nunn, who have really taken an extraordinary and courageous step together, in a bipartisan way, to make sure that we to the best of our ability carry out our oath as Members of this Senate and members of this committee to find solutions which can improve the security of this country.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join in the congratulations to you and Senator Nunn for the excellent leadership you have provided, and also congratulations to the staff and Jim Locher in particular for the tremendous work they have done in this staff report.

I do think it is a high-quality report which brings together and focuses attention on a lot of problems that need attention. This is one of the rare instances where we have the Government trying to get out in front of a problem and address a series of problems before they jump up and bite us, and that is a credit to you and to the committee staff.

You made an analogy to baseball and indicated that we not only needed to have an all-star team, we needed to be in a position to win the World Series. I hope the World Series is not scheduled, but I agree with your basic point.

I think it is particularly important that this be done now, because I think we are going through a very significant change in our dealings with the defense budget in the next several years. The first half of this decade has been a period of relative honeymoon in that we have had growing defense budgets.

I think that the last half of this decade may be different, in that it will be difficult for the Congress, considering the fiscal problems of the country, to hold the line and maintain our commitment to defense, our resource commitment.

In light of that, I think it is crucial that these issues be addressed and that we do all we can to ensure the greatest possible effectiveness for all services. So I have enjoyed working on the task force. I look forward to working with the committee on this important series of issues.

Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much.

Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to add my name to the long list of our colleagues who have congratulated you and Senator Nunn on the excellent series of speeches recently presented on the floor of the Senate regarding the need for Congress to review the operations of the Defense Department.

As both of you have stated, this study began back in 1983 under the direction of Chairman Tower and another outstanding member of this committee, the late Senator Scoop Jackson. I congratulate the staff, Mr. Chairman, for the long, hard work they have done to produce the report we begin studying today.

I look forward to the proceedings we will be having over the next few months as we hear from witnesses regarding the need for reorganizing the Department of Defense. As Mr. Locher points out in his letter submitting the report to you, Mr. Chairman, this study represents only a starting point for inquiry by the committee.

I am concerned about reports that some individuals have seemed to feel that this report is the final word on what our committee intends to do regarding reorganization of the Defense Department. My hope is that all who want our country to have an outstanding military organization will mute their harsh rhetoric and read the staff report, listen carefully to the witnesses who will present both sides of this issue, and then review the final product that will come before this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I want the record to indicate that I join you and my ranking member, Senator Nunn, in stating that whatever the committee decides to do should not be viewed as a negative response to this administration or to previous administrations. Our objective will be to modernize a vital institution of our Government so that it can provide a strong national defense for years to come.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much.

We do have a very unusual task, and I want to make this observation, that the only purpose of America is freedom. It is not economics, it is not welfare, it is not unemployment; it is freedom. And we want an armed force sufficiently trained and organized to ensure that freedom, properly backed by civilians who are over the military.

We are the only country that I know of in the world that has four air forces, a Navy with an airforce, and an Army with a navy and an air force. In the Air Force, we do not have any boats yet: we have not been around long enough. But we do have multiple problems and we want to get this all ironed out so that they are properly directed.

We are not taking a point against any service. I agree with everything that has been said about the men in uniform. In my lifetime, I have never known them to be better.

Now I am going to introduce Jim Locher, who has supervised this entire study. I think I am safe in saying, this is the first thorough study that has ever been made of the subject. It has probably been 200 years since anybody thought about it. The last one who gave it real thought was George Washington when he nearly lost the Revolutionary War because the Congress got too active in it.

So Jim, the show is all yours.

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. LOCHER III, STUDY DIRECTOR AND PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, U.S. SENATE, ACCOMPANIED BY RICK FINN, MAJORITY STAFF MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES; AND JEFF SMITH, MINORITY COUNSEL, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Nunn and other distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of the staff members who have participated in this effort, I have the honor of submitting for your consideration a staff study entitled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change."

As the title indicates, the study concludes that substantial organizational and procedural changes are required in the Department of Defense. Equally necessary, however, are major changes in the practice of congressional review and oversight of the defense program.

Before I proceed with our presentation, I would like to recognize the members of the staff who have contributed to this undertaking. Joining me here at the witness table are Rick Finn of the majority staff and Jeff Smith of the minority staff. They have served as my principal assistants in the full range of tasks associated with preparing the staff study.

There are four other staff members who also made substantial contributions: Alan Yuspeh and Pat Tucker of the majority staff and John Hamre and Colleen Getz of the minority staff. Finally, I would like to recognize my staff assistant, Barbara Brown, who handled much of the administration of this massive effort, including the typing of nearly the entire manuscript, all 645 pages, through its many drafts.

Mr. Chairman, in January of this year you and Senator Nunn instructed the staff to conduct this study on a fully bipartisan basis. As I believe is evident from our work over the last 9 months, we have firmly adhered to your direction. The study that we submit to you today is a bipartisan staff project.

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this study is to strengthen the Department of Defense. As has been mentioned, the capabilities of U.S. military forces have been improved over the last 5 years. The full potential of this revitalization cannot, however, be realized under current structural deficiencies.

The study does not suggest that this revitalization of American military capabilities should be slowed or that defense spending reductions should be made. On the contrary, substantial force improvements will continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future. The study does, however, see the need for a parallel revitalization of antiquated organization arrangements.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to submit our prepared statement for the record and turn to a briefing that has been provided previously to the task force, Secretary Weinberger, and to the Packard Commisison.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Thank you.

[The staff study, "Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change," is retained in committee files.]

Mr. **Locher**. I think a key point is that this is just a staff study. We have titled it "Defense Organization: The Need for Change" because it is our view that there are substantial changes needed, that the greatest focus of our effort was to identify the problems in the Department of Defense and the Congress and to identify their contributing causes.

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

The Need for Change

A STAFF STUDY FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

As has been mentioned, the study was initiated in June 1983 by Senator John Tower and the late Senator Scoop Jackson, and it was their determination at that time that it be undertaken on a fully bipartisan basis. In the summer and fall of that year, 12 hearings were held in which 31 witnesses testified.

The first draft of this staff study was completed in April 1984. In January of this year, Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn redoubled the effort and made additional staff resources available to conduct the work. In May of this year, a task force on defense organization was formed. Reflecting its bipartisan spirit, it was jointly chaired by both Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn.

This task force has been active. It has met 10 times to review progress on the staff study and to discuss the various issues; and it then scheduled a weekend retreat with outside experts down at Fort A.P. Hill.

BACKGROUND

1. STUDY INITIATED IN JUNE 1983 BY SENATOR TOWER AND THE LATE SENATOR JACKSON - FULLY BIPARTISAN
2. 12 HEARINGS - 31 WITNESSES - SUMMER AND FALL 1983
3. FIRST DRAFT OF STUDY - APRIL 1984
4. REDOUBLED EFFORT BY SENATOR GOLDWATER AND SENATOR NUNN - JANUARY 1985
5. TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE ORGANIZATION - MAY 1985

SENATOR GOLDWATER	- CO-CHAIRMEN -	SENATOR NUNN
SENATOR COHEN		SENATOR BINGAMAN
SENATOR QUAYLE		SENATOR LEVIN
SENATOR WILSON		SENATOR KENNEDY
SENATOR GRAMM		

- MET 10 TIMES TO REVIEW STUDY PROGRESS AND DISCUSS ISSUES
- WEEKEND RETREAT WITH OUTSIDE EXPERTS

There are a number of important introductory comments, the first of which is that serious problems exist both in the Department of Defense and the Congress. The problems have existed for a long time, many dating back to the Spanish-American War, and they have been evident during a number of operational deficiencies within the last 40 years.

Given the long-term nature of these problems, the staff study is not a criticism of the present or past administrations, nor of current or former civilian or military officials. The Department of Defense is the largest and most complex organization in the free world. It is easy to understand why finding effective solutions to the problems of this large organization is very difficult.

We do recognize in the study that trends in defense organization and procedures are moving in the right direction, but in our view much more remains to be done, especially in light of anticipated fiscal constraints. As I have mentioned, in no way does this study suggest reductions in defense spending. It is an effort to strengthen the Department of Defense.

The study represents only a starting point for inquiry by the committee. It has not been endorsed by the Senate Committee on Armed Services nor any of its members.

Mr. Chairman, a key point that needs to be made is that only a small portion of the study's 91 specific recommendations would be appropriately implemented through legislation. A large number of areas were addressed so that the committee would have a comprehensive context in which to make decisions on necessary legislation.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

1. SERIOUS PROBLEMS EXIST BOTH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE CONGRESS
2. PROBLEMS HAVE EXISTED FOR A LONG TIME, MANY DATING BACK TO THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
   - o WERE EVIDENT DURING PEARL HARBOR, LEYTE GULF, VIETNAM WAR, *PUEBLO* SEIZURE, IRAN RESCUE MISSION, AND GRENADA
3. NOT A CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT OR PAST ADMINISTRATIONS, NOR OF CURRENT OR FORMER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY OFFICIALS
   - o DOD IS THE LARGEST AND MOST COMPLEX ORGANIZATION IN THE FREE WORLD
4. TRENDS IN DOD ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION; BUT MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE
   - o ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF ANTICIPATED FISCAL CONSTRAINTS
5. IN NO WAY DOES THIS STUDY SUGGEST REDUCTIONS IN DEFENSE SPENDING
   - o AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN DOD
6. STUDY REPRESENTS ONLY A STARTING POINT FOR INQUIRY
   - o NOT ENDORSED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES NOR ANY OF ITS MEMBERS
7. ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE STUDY'S 91 RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE APPROPRIATELY IMPLEMENTED THROUGH LEGISLATION

Mr. Chairman, in testimony before this committee in November 1983, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger made the following comment, and we think that it is a key summary of the situation that is facing us. He said at that time:

> In the absence of structural reform, I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements.

We have underscored this sentence because we believe it is really very important:

> Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation.

COMMENT - FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER

"...IN THE ABSENCE OF STRUCTURAL REFORM I FEAR THAT WE SHALL OBTAIN LESS THAN IS ATTAINABLE FROM OUR EXPENDITURES AND FROM OUR FORCES. SOUND STRUCTURE WILL PERMIT THE RELEASE OF ENERGIES AND OF IMAGINATION NOW UNDULY CONSTRAINED BY THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS. WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, I FEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL OBTAIN NEITHER THE BEST MILITARY ADVICE, NOR THE EFFECTIVE EXECUTION OF MILITARY PLANS, NOR THE PROVISION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES COMMENSURATE WITH THE FISCAL RESOURCES PROVIDED, NOR THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE POSTURE AVAILABLE TO THE NATION." (EMPHASIS ADDED)

Mr. Chairman, before turning to the problem areas that we have identified in the study, it is I think very useful to discuss a concept that we have developed, and that is the concept of what we call mission integration. We see mission integration as the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense, and we have defined it as the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four services to prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military missions.

In our view, mission integration is required both at the policymaking level—the Washington headquarters of the Department of Defense—and the operational level—the unified and specified commanders. Without effective mission integration, in our view unification of the four services as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947 means little.

Mr. Chairman, the National Security Act of 1947 created a framework in which mission integration should take place. But the kind of organizational arrangements, relationships and mechanisms have not been developed to enable effective mission integration either at the operational level or at the policymaking level of the Department of Defense.

In talking about mission integration, we have defined six major missions for the Department of Defense, three of which are worldwide and three of which are regional. The first of these is nuclear deterrence, maintaining essential equivalence with the strategic and nuclear theater forces of the Soviet Union.

The second is maritime superiority, controlling the seas when and where necessary.

The third is power projection superiority, deploying superior forces to distant world areas which are outside the traditional system of Western alliances.

The three regional missions are: defense of NATO Europe, including both the northern and southern flanks; defense of east Asia, particularly northeast Asia; and defense of southwest Asia, especially the region's oil resources.

In our view, Mr. Chairman, effective mission integration is critical to U.S. national security because none of the six major missions can be executed alone by the forces of any single service.

PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONAL GOAL OF DOD: MISSION INTEGRATION

1. MISSION INTEGRATION -
   - o INTEGRATION OF THE DISTINCT MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE FOUR SERVICES TO PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT EFFECTIVE UNIFIED OPERATIONS IN FULFILLING MAJOR U.S. MILITARY MISSIONS.
   - o REQUIRED AT BOTH POLICYMAKING AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS.

2. WITHOUT EFFECTIVE MISSION INTEGRATION, UNIFICATION OF THE FOUR SERVICES MEANS LITTLE

3. SIX MAJOR DOD MISSIONS:

WORLDWIDE	REGIONAL
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE	DEFENSE OF NATO EUROPE
MARITIME SUPERIORITY	DEFENSE OF EAST ASIA
POWER PROJECTION SUPERIORITY	DEFENSE OF SOUTHWEST ASIA

4. EFFECTIVE MISSION INTEGRATION IS CRITICAL TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY BECAUSE NONE OF THE MAJOR MISSIONS CAN BE EXECUTED ALONE BY THE FORCES OF ANY SINGLE SERVICE.

Mr. Chairman, as I discuss missions in the remainder of this briefing, it is these six missions that I have in mind.

The next slide shows the six fundamental problems that we will present in our briefing today, and I will just provide an opportunity for you the members to read through those, and then we will have a slide to go into each one of these fundamental problems in detail.

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS

1. INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY PATTERN OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
2. LIMITED MISSION INTEGRATION AT POLICYMAKING LEVEL OF DOD
3. IMBALANCE BETWEEN SERVICE AND JOINT INTERESTS
4. INTER-SERVICE LOGROLLING
5. INADEQUATE JOINT ADVICE
6. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT OF UNIFIED COMMAND
   - LIMITED MISSION INTEGRATION AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF DOD
7. PREDOMINANCE OF PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING
8. INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE
9. GENERAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
10. INSUFFICIENT POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The first problem that we have focused upon is what we call the inconsistent and contradictory pattern of congressional oversight. In our view, the form of the Department of Defense will prove imperfect again without fundamental changes on Capitol Hill. The basic problem is that the Congress reinforces divisions in the Department of Defense and inhibits development of a coherent and integrated defense program.

To a great extent, the Congress dwells on conflicts and tensions in the Department of Defense. It has traditionally favored independent subordinate offices in the Department of Defense in order to maximize congressional leverage. At the turn of the century, this was the Bureaus of the War and Navy Departments. Now it has a tendency to be the military departments in the unified Department of Defense.

To a great extent, Congress focuses on inputs, not on outputs. It maintains a single service orientation in its work. It rarely looks across service lines. The inconsistencies in the way that the various committees conduct their business tempt factions in the Department of Defense to export their conflicts to Capitol Hill.

The second problem originating with the Congress is the substantial budget and program instability that it causes for the Department of Defense. The congressional budget process is dominating the legislative agenda. The Congress has been forced to rely more and more on continuing resolutions, creating many difficulties for the Department of Defense.

In addition, the Congress has been focusing more on looking at the defense activity in single fiscal year increments—a very shortsighted approach.

In addition, the Congress is involved in substantial micromanagement of the Department of Defense. As Senator Nunn said in a statement on the floor, the Congress has become preoccupied with trivia; it is not fulfilling its broad constitutional responsibilities.

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to interrupt Mr. Locher's presentation, but in order just to ask a passing question occasionally?

Chairman Goldwater. Go right ahead.

Senator Hart. Mr. Locher, could you give us an instance of the statement that Congress dwells on conflicts and tensions in the DOD? What do you have in mind there?

Mr. Locher. Yes, sir. What I essentially mean there is that the Congress has a tendency in conducting its work to look for disagreements; disagreements between the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries, between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, differences between the services.

They look for those conflicts and tensions, and put a great deal of emphasis on investigating them, despite the fact that it causes problems in creating a coherent and integrated defense program.

Senator Hart. Does focusing on those differences cause the problem, or is that the evidence of the problem? In other words, if the disagreement is there, is Congress' focusing on that disagreement causing the problem or is it just recognizing that a problem exists?

Mr. Locher. Sir, the basic point is that often the Congress can be well served by understanding disagreements in the Department of Defense, and the point that we are making here is that too often Congress goes to the extreme in doing that, in that after a coherent program has been put together and the various compromises have been made in the Department of Defense, the decisions, the priorities established by the Secretary of Defense and the President, that the Congress goes back in and gives priority to the interests of subordinate organizations, whether they fit into the coherent whole of the defense program or not.

Senator Denton. Mr. Chairman, if questions are in order as we go through these charts, it would probably save time and concentration.

Chairman Goldwater. If you have a question on the presentation, we were going to wait until the end, but I think it is proper that you go ahead.

Senator Denton. OK. These are very brief. That does seem to be a candid list. Is that the complete list of inconsistent and contradictory pattern of congressional oversight? Is that your chart on that or are you going to have more?

Mr. Locher. No, sir, that is the only chart that we have.

Senator Denton. You find no congressional influence on procurement or program development which is adversely influenced in terms of the interests of national defense because of constituent interests on the part of individual Members of Congress? I find that amazing——

Mr. Locher. You are saying Senator Denton, that we have not——

Senator Denton. I have seen hundreds of examples since I have been here of Members of Congress going for programs because in that particular program their State or district benefits. I have seen hundreds of examples of procurement programs being pushed because of the same interest.

I would ask you again if you see any military aid or policy programs which are based not on national defense interests, but on either political interests or insufficient awareness, in that Members of Congress in general have 8,000 issues out there in front of them and, although the most important mandate and most important responsibility of Government is to survive for the country, they do not have a proportionate knowledge enabling them to properly vote for or in regard to legislation on military aid or just policy programs regarding what is being done—basing questions, close-down questions, military construction questions.

I see those very much affect adversely to the national interests many, many times, and I am amazed that you did not note that.

Mr. LOCHER. Senator Denton, in this study the two themes that you have stated are well identified. They are identified on this chart, although not in specific terms. The first point that you are making, about local politics playing a very heavy role, we have noted in the study that that has been a tradition in the Congress in terms of its relationships with the Department of Defense.

That point is made here in the chart in our discussion of the fact that the Congress favors independent subordinate offices in the Department of Defense in order to maximize congressional leverage, because it is through that——

Senator DENTON. In order to maximize what?

Mr. LOCHER. Local leverage. It is through that mechanism that that is carried through.

Senator DENTON. Favoring independent subordinate offices in DOD to maximize congressional leverage? You don't mean in respect to the adverse influences I mention here, do you?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, I do. We are talking about the maximized congressional leverage for whatever interests they may be, whether they are local or other.

The second point as to the knowledge of the Congress on some of the issues that you had mentioned: military construction, military assistance. I think the basic point, and the point that Senator Nunn made in his speech on the Senate floor, is that Congress is preoccupied with trivia, that it is into far too many details: and some of the fundamental issues that you were talking about, that they do not have sufficient knowledge; they are not able to fulfill their broad constitutional responsibilities.

INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY PATTERN OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

1. DOD REFORM - IMPERFECT WITHOUT CHANGES ON CAPITOL HILL
2. CONGRESS REINFORCES DIVISIONS IN DOD AND INHIBITS DEVELOPMENT OF A COHERENT AND INTEGRATED PROGRAM
    - DWELLS ON CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN DOD
    - FAVORS INDEPENDENT SUBORDINATE OFFICES IN DOD TO MAXIMIZE CONGRESSIONAL LEVERAGE
    - FOCUSES ON INPUTS, NOT OUTPUTS
    - MAINTAINS SINGLE SERVICE ORIENTATION
    - INCONSISTENCIES TEMPT DOD FACTIONS TO EXPORT CONFLICTS TO CONGRESS
3. BUDGET AND PROGRAM INSTABILITY
    - HEGEMONY OF BUDGET PROCESS
    - CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS
    - SINGLE FISCAL YEAR INCREMENTS
    - MICRO-MANAGEMENT
4. PREOCCUPIED WITH TRIVIA - NOT FULFILLING BROAD CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Mr. Chairman, the next problem area that I would like to discuss, going back to our discussion of the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense, is the limited mission integration at the policymaking level of the Department. And here by "the policymaking level" we are talking about the Washington headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military departments.

But in particular, we are focused on the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where we see that it is focused exclusively on what we call functional areas—manpower, research and development, installations and logistics—and that has produced a tendency to focus on functional efficiency or management control of functional actvities in military departments.

Because of this functional structure, the sharp focus on missions is lost in the functional diffusion. Material inputs, not mission outputs, are emphasized, particularly in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Strategic planning is inhibited by the absence of organizations who can affirmatively represent strategy and strategic goals of the Department.

In addition, because of the functional structure, there are no major organizations that are fully attuned to the requirements of the operational commanders. We see a tremendous amount of micromanagement of the services by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense was expanded in 1953 and six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense were added. They were added to mirror image the services. The Secretary of Defense wanted to be able to get better control on what was going on in the functional activities of the services.

But that organizational arrangement has led to a lot of duplication of effort, in that the Office of Secretary of Defense ends up duplicating what is going on in the services rather than focusing on the broader issues that should be of major concern to the Secretary and his staff.

One of our basic conclusions is that there is a need for a more appropriate balance in the Office of the Secretary of Defense between functional and mission perspectives. We are not saying that the functional perspectives are not necessary. We are saying that there needs to be organizations that represent the mission aspect.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Was that ever outlined in the legislation that created the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. LOCHER. No, sir. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is not actually created in the law. Various positions are created. There are five Assistant Secretaries of Defense which are specified in the law, two Under Secretaries of Defense. But for many of these offices, the number of officials are specified, but the actual offices themselves are not.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense came into existence when the position of Secretary of Defense was created in 1947. But the Office itself does not exist in law.

Chairman GOLDWATER. It was previously the Secretary of War?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, there was a Secretary of War and a Secretary of the Navy in the twenties.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Locher, before we leave the Office of the Secretary of Defense, you said in your opening briefing that this was not intended as a criticism of the present or past administrations. Then you said only a small portion of the study's recommendations would be appropriately recommended in legislation.

Now, I have known, as members of this committee have, Secretaries of Defense—Melvin Laird, Elliott Richardson, Jim Schlesinger, Harold Brown. They were not men of weak heart. Why did they not on their initiative, since Congress does not have to act, implement some of these things heretofore?

Mr. LOCHER. Senator Warner, I cannot speak for those gentlemen and why they did not take actions at that time. In testimony before this committee and in private discussions, they have indicated that they see the need for substantial changes, particularly on this issue that we have addressed, the inadequate focus on missions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

It is possible that they will be appearing before the committee in the hearings that Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn have scheduled in November. It might be useful to question them at that time as to why they did not make the changes then. I do not have any knowledge.

Senator WARNER. Implicit in what you are saying is that any one of these on their own initiative could have done much of what you recommend in this report?

Mr. LOCHER. With respect to the Office of Secretary of Defense, they have a fair amount of leeway in terms of reorganization.

LIMITED MISSION INTEGRATION AT POLICYMAKING LEVEL

1. FOCUSED EXCESSIVELY ON FUNCTIONAL AREAS - MANPOWER, R&D, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS - AND ON FUNCTIONAL EFFICIENCY
2. SHARP FOCUS ON MISSIONS IS LOST IN THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFUSION
3. MATERIAL INPUTS, NOT MISSION OUTPUTS, ARE EMPHASIZED
4. STRATEGIC PLANNING IS INHIBITED
5. SERVICE INTERESTS, NOT STRATEGIC NEEDS, DOMINATE
6. NOT FULLY ATTUNED TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
7. OSD MICRO-MANAGEMENT
8. NEED A MORE APPROPRIATE BALANCE IN OSD BETWEEN FUNCTIONAL AND MISSION PERSPECTIVES

Mr. Chairman, very briefly, the management specialist Peter Drucker made the following comment about functional structure, and I think it is important to read through it because, while he is talking here about businesses, I think that we can see a lot of the problems he mentions have application particularly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Drucker said:

"The functional principal of organizational design, for instance, has great clarity and high economy, and it makes it easy to understand one's own task. But even in a small business, it tends to direct vision away from results and toward efforts"—in other words, away from mission outputs and toward functional inputs—"to obscure the organization's goals"—and we have heard a great deal of criticism of the strategic planning of the Department of Defense—"and to self-optimized decisions." We have often seen that decisions are made on a functional or service basis.

"It has high stability, but little adaptability. It perpetuates and develops technical and functional skills, that is middle managers, but it resists new ideas and inhibits top management development and vision."

COMMENT - FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE

PETER DRUCKER

...THE FUNCTIONAL PRINCIPLE [OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN], FOR INSTANCE, HAS GREAT CLARITY AND HIGH ECONOMY, AND IT MAKES IT EASY TO UNDERSTAND ONE'S OWN TASK. BUT EVEN IN THE SMALL BUSINESS IT TENDS TO DIRECT VISION AWAY FROM RESULTS AND TOWARD EFFORTS, TO OBSCURE THE ORGANIZATION'S GOALS, AND TO SUB-OPTIMIZE DECISIONS. IT HAS HIGH STABILITY BUT LITTLE ADAPTABILITY. IT PERPETUATES AND DEVELOPS TECHNICAL AND FUNCTIONAL SKILLS, THAT IS, MIDDLE MANAGERS, BUT IT RESISTS NEW IDEAS AND INHIBITS TOP-MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT AND VISION.

Mr. Chairman, the next problem area that I would like to discuss is one that we have entitled "imbalance between service and joint interests." In our view, the military departments and services currently exercise overwhelming power and influence which is completely out of proportion to their statutorily assigned duties.

That is not the fault of the services. They are performing the function that was set for them in the National Security Act of 1947. They are vigorous advocates for service capabilities and programs.

The problem comes about because of the weaknesses of the joint organizations that should be a counterbalancing influence to look at the needs of the Department of Defense on a joint or a mission basis. Essentially, those are the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is dominated by the services, and the unified commands, which also have a great deal of restrictions coming out of the services. The unified commanders are very weak. He has service component commanders who have considerable power.

As I just mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we see that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is not appropriately structured to also be able to serve as a counterbalancing influence to the services on the basic issues of strategy, policy, and resource allocation.

The overwhelming power and influence of the services works at cross-purposes to what we have defined as the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense—mission integration. To a great extent, service interests rather than strategic needs dominate.

Mr. Chairman, while we believe that there are organizational changes necessary to correct this imbalance, it is also important to note that there is a problem within the attitudes and orientations of the professional officer corps. We have found that many officers at all levels will make decisions to promote service or branch interests, while losing sight of broader and more important national security interests, and when they make those decisions they believe that their behavior is correct.

So some changes need to be made at the top. But as to the point that Senator Hart made, there are also going to have to be some changes in terms of education, training, and assignments if these attitudes and orientations are to be moved in the proper direction.

Senator WARNER. Before we leave that, Mr. Locher, the statement the services exercise overwhelming power, what do you mean, the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations? Because the service is looked at from both perspectives.

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, we are talking about the combined power of both, the civilian and military people. But I must say that most of that is on the military side because of their participation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator WARNER. I wish to emphasize that, because the Secretary of the Navy cannot tell a single ship commander where to run that ship or how to operate it. That is done down through the unified commanders.

So wherein does the Secretary of the Navy, say, exercise power that makes less than efficient the operation of the fleet?

Mr. LOCHER. Senator Warner, the Service Secretaries can be very effective spokesmen for service interests in the various decisionmaking councils of the Department of Defense. And essentially what we are saying is that they have done exactly what was intended for them.

The problem is that the counterbalancing organizations and officials who should be looking at things on a joint basis are weak or they do not have the proper staff support to enable them to carry out their responsibilities. So it is not a criticism of the services, the service chiefs, or the service Secretaries. They are doing exactly what was intended for them.

But we see some imbalances in terms of the capabilities to look at joint.

Senator **WARNER**. Well, is that imbalance due to the personalities occupying the offices at certain times, or because of the law and the regulations? Because I have witnessed strong service Secretaries, indeed, who have been able to, through lobbying power perhaps, direct how fleet units should be deployed, but certainly they do not have that authority under the law or the regulation.

Mr. **LOCHER**. Senator Warner, obviously better people in some of these positions would have helped on occasion. But I do not think that the committee is going to be forced to choose between good people and sound structure.

Senator **WARNER**. Well, we cannot do that.

Mr. **LOCHER**. But we should focus on both of those things, and it is our view that, while better people would have helped, that a better organizational arrangement, particularly in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would have given these joint mission perspectives the kind of support that they needed.

IMBALANCE BETWEEN SERVICE AND JOINT INTERESTS

1. SERVICES EXERCISE OVERWHELMING POWER AND INFLUENCE

2. NOT THE FAULT OF THE SERVICES
    - WEAKNESSES OF OJCS AND UNIFIED COMMANDS
    - INEFFECTIVE OSD ORGANIZATION

3. WORKS AT CROSS-PURPOSES TO MISSION INTEGRATION
    - SERVICE INTERESTS DOMINATE

4. ATTITUDES AND ORIENTATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL OFFICER CORPS

COMMENTS - IMBALANCE BETWEEN SERVICE AND JOINT INTERESTS

CHAIRMAN'S SPECIAL STUDY GROUP (1982)

...THE PROBLEM IS ONE OF BALANCE. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SERVICE INDEPENDENCE IS HEALTHY AND DESIRABLE, BUT THE BALANCE NOW FAVORS THE PAROCHIAL INTERESTS OF THE SERVICES TOO MUCH, AND THE LARGER NEEDS OF THE NATION'S DEFENSES TOO LITTLE.

PROFESSOR HUNTINGTON (1984)

...SERVICE INTERESTS, SERVICE NEEDS, AND SERVICE POWER, HOWEVER, HAVE DOMINATED U.S. DEFENSE STRUCTURE, WARPING AND FRUSTRATING EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH RATIONAL SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, FORCE DEVELOPMENT, AND COMBAT COMMAND.

Very quickly, Mr. Chairman, there have been numerous studies that have identified this imbalance between service and joint interests going back over the last 30 or 35 years. We have selected a couple to quote from. The Chairman's Special Study Group in 1982, which was done for Gen. David Jones, said:

> The problem is one of balance. A certain amount of service independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the services too much and the larger needs of the nation's defenses too little.

Prof. Samuel Huntington in an article published in 1984, made a similar comment:

> Service interests, service needs, and service power, however, have dominated U.S. defense structure, warping and frustrating efforts to establish rational systems of strategic planning, force development, and combat command.

INTER-SERVICE LOGROLLING

1. GREATER PROBLEM THAN INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY
2. LAST 20 YEARS, SERVICES SUBMERGE DIFFERENCES ON CENTRAL ISSUES
    - UNITED FRONT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OTHER HIGHER CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES
3. CONSEQUENCE
    - HEIGHTENING OF CIVIL-MILITARY DISAGREEMENT
    - ISOLATION OF OSD
    - A LOSS OF INFORMATION CRITICAL TO EFFECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
    - POLITICAL WEAKENING OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
    - LESSENING OF CIVILIAN CONTROL
4. INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY ON LESSER ISSUES
    - SECRETIVENESS, DUPLICATION, LACK OF UNDERSTANDING, AND INCONSISTENCIES

Mr. Chairman, related to the problem that I have just discussed is another problem that we call interservice logrolling. While there is a great deal of discussion about interservice rivalry, in our view interservice logrolling is a greater problem than interservice rivalry.

In the first 15 to 20 years after World War II, the rivalry among the services was so bitter that its continued existence has been assumed. But within the last 20 years, we have found that the services have a tendency to submerge differences on central issues of concern to them, primarily to provide a united front to the Secretary of Defense and other higher civilian authorities.

This basically occurred when Secretary McNamara created an independent expertise in the Office of the Secretary of Defense through the planning, programming, budgeting system and systems analysis capabilities which enabled him to effectively challenge the requirements and programs of the services.

In the third or fourth year of Secretary McNamara's tenure, we saw this tendency of the services to move into a position of noncompetition on the central issues of concern to them. In our view, the consequences of interservice logrolling are a heightening of civil-military disagreement. Prior to Secretary McNamara's tenure, the Secretary of Defense could count on the natural competition among the services to produce the kind of information that he needed to make decisions among competing programs. Now the Office of the Secretary of Defense must bear this burden of challenging service programs by itself.

To a great extent, we also see an isolation of the Secretary of Defense, a loss of information critical to effective decisionmaking. In addition, we see a political weakening of the Secretary of Defense. And the overall impact of this tendency of the services to logroll is a lessening of civilian control.

We still do have interservice rivalry on lesser issues and at lower levels of organizational activity, which denies us the kind of coordination and cooperation that is necessary to produce efficient, integrated fighting teams.

COMMENTS - INADEQUATE JOINT ADVICE

GENERAL JONES

> "...THE CORPORATE ADVICE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IS NOT CRISP, TIMELY, VERY USEFUL OR VERY INFLUENTIAL."

SECRETARY SCHLESINGER

> "...THE PROFFERED ADVICE IS GENERALLY IRRELEVANT, NORMALLY UNREAD, AND ALMOST ALWAYS DISREGARDED."

Mr. Chairman, the next problem area that I would like to discuss is one that we have entitled "inadequate joint advice," and I would like to introduce this discussion with two comments, one from General Jones and one from Secretary Schlesinger.

Of the advice that is provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones said: "The corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential." Secretary Schlesinger, talking about JCS advice in fiscal and force design matters, said: "The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded."

INADEQUATE JOINT ADVICE

1. JCS SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN CAPABLE OF ADEQUATELY FULFILLING ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO SERVE AS THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISERS TO THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2. SYMPTOMS OF INADEQUATE JOINT ADVICE FOUND IN

   - STRATEGIC PLANNING
   - PROGRAMMING
   - OPERATIONAL PLANNING
   - FORCE EMPLOYMENT
   - SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS
   - REVISION OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
   - ORGANIZATION OF UNIFIED COMMANDS
   - DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT DOCTRINE

3. BASIC CAUSE -- "DUAL-HATTING" OF SERVICE CHIEFS
   - INHERENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST
   - INSUFFICIENT TIME TO PERFORM BOTH ROLES

Mr. Chairman, our basic view is that the JCS system has not been capable of adequately fulfilling its responsibility to serve as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. We have found symptoms of inadequate joint advice in strategic planning, programming, operational planning, force employment, service roles and missions, revision of the unified command plan, organization of the unified commands, and the development of joint doctrine.

The basic problem is the dual hatting of the service Chiefs, where they must be the military leaders of their services and then also serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In many regards, what has been asked of the service Chiefs is unrealistic.

Senator DENTON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman, about the last thing on the previous chart, a very strong statement quoting Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, whom I respect and like very much. He said: "The proffered advice of the Joint Chiefs is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early years of Vietnam was truly disregarded, all right, and it was at the Secretary's level and at the political level at which that advice was discarded. And in my view and in the view of a lot of people who have studied the situation, it is too bad that that advice was disregarded and that we did not break the will of a very weak enemy early on and obviate the great difficulties which have stemmed from that disregard of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It seems to me to be begging the question to say that their advice is bad because it is almost always disregarded.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow on that observation, which is absolutely correct about that period, because I happened to have been there in a place where I could observe. I think that the relationship between the President and the Chairman of the JCS and the service Chiefs is exactly what the President wants to make it or not want to make it.

And there have been instances where the President has sought on a one on one basis the advice of the Chiefs, and that was done in the case of Grenada. I know that the President spoke with each one and received their input on that operation.

In the most recent operation, the Chief of Naval Operations was in the network of communications, which is extraordinary in and of itself, how in a period of just 2 hours the President, Secretary of State, Defense, Chief of Naval Operations, and indeed our ambassadors were linked together to make those decisions.

So the flow of advice between the uniforms and the President is basically dependent upon what the President wants and how he chooses to treat these individuals. But if I look at the collection of recommendations here, it seems to me that you are relegating a chief of service to the role of honorary chairman of the board. You are literally stripping his epaulets right in front of his troops, and little is left for him to do other than to be maybe a functionary.

Now, would you care to disagree with that?

Mr. **Locher**. Yes, sir, I would. But if I might respond to Senator Denton's comment first and then come back to the two points that you made, Senator Warner.

Senator Denton, it may be that the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was disregarded during the Vietnam war. But essentially, we have found in our interviews and our reading that Secretaries of Defense desire to have independent military advice out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that advice was disregarded when the Secretaries of Defense found it inadequate and then they were forced to turn to civilians for advice, which those civilians were not qualified to provide.

And so the point is here, we believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any succeeding organization has a very powerful and useful role to play in the Department of Defense in advising the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council. It has been advice that has been sought. But because they have found it not to be useful, it has been advice that has been disregarded.

The point that I would like to make to you, Senator Warner, is that these comments are talking about the formal advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have received testimony and in our discussions we have heard that when informal advice is offered by the corporate body or by the Chairman or by the service Chiefs, that it has generally been given high marks.

But here we are talking about the formal advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which plays an important role in the decisionmaking of the Department of Defense. As to whether our recommendation to disestablish the Joint Chiefs of Staff and put the service Chiefs back solely as the military leaders of their services—I would disagree with your point, Senator Warner.

I think that their role as service Chiefs is a critically important one. It is one that they now devote most of their time and attention to, and we are not relegating them to any lesser position. We are relegating them to a position that is going to demand the full time and attention of a very talented military officer.

Senator DENTON. Without wanting to prolong this, Mr. Chairman, I expect, Mr. Locher, there are times in which the responses of the Joint Chiefs are somewhat ambiguous because of the interservice difference, which causes that ambiguity, more or less like the sort of veto implication in the United Nations, which has its pluses and minuses.

But I do believe that in cases in which there is a question of how to wage war, the Secretary of Defense and his civilian advisors, who are more from the field of management, while perfectly capable or executing the mandate of our people for the civilians to control the military and thereby to exercise control during peacetime, in wartime, although the President must make the decisions and the Secretary of Defense must pass on that which the Joint Chiefs and the others recommend—I do believe that there is a dilemma in that very many times with respect to the military aspects the Joint Chiefs are pretty much in agreement, but the Secretary of Defense does not hear what he wants to hear.

And he does not hear what he wants to hear, because that which he wants to hear is based on less knowledge than they have. Therefore, he turns to others to hear what they have to say, sometimes officers just under the Joint Chiefs, as in the case of Vietnam.

I do not want to dwell on it, but the big guys said, and they were right, they said: Hit them decisively, end this thing mercifully, and be over with it. Down beneath that echelon, when the Secretary did not want to make that a big issue nationally and did not want to see the United States involved in a war, but sort of a military action, they wanted to do it gradually, and they got some career officers to tell them down at lower echelons that, with this or that amphibious device that the Army was coming up with, or this or that brilliant aircraft that the Navy was coming up with, they could sort of practice over there and there was no problem about victory, we would eventually get it.

Those guys were wrong, the Joint Chiefs were right, the Secretary was wrong, and this Nation is still suffering from that. And there are a number of other examples like that I can give you, which are so critical as to scarcely justify your generalization about it in my opinion.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I think the Senator has put his finger on what is going to become one of the essential parts of the study. Not that we have to agree at this time, but it was perfectly obvious throughout the conduct of the Vietnam war that there was some misunderstanding about the relationship of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs, the CIA, the whole 19 members of the intelligence family, the State Department.

I can recall President Kennedy asking the combined Joint Chiefs for an opinion on Laos. He did not like it. He asked the individual members and he got a much better answer.

I think out of this study one of the best things that we can produce will be an understandable chart and flow of information from the organizations I have mentioned to the President, because, God knows, he needs it, and the Secretary of Defense was never designed to be a war-making individual.

Mr. LOCHER. Mr. Chairman, if I might just offer one more additional comment to Senator Denton.

Sir, what you are proposing is exactly what we have in mind in this study. We are looking to get the kind of professional military advice to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council that they deserve. They have not gotten it in the past, and on occasion they have disregarded the advice that has been provided.

We have the same objective. I understand from your comments that you probably disagree with our approach, but what we are essentially saying is that professional military advice has not played the role that it should in decisionmaking, and we are looking for ways that we can provide that kind of advice to the Secretary of Defense and other higher civilian authorities.

Senator DENTON. There is much in detail and generality with which I agree in what I have already read. I am concerned if we buy the whole set we may be breaking something more than it is already broken, if we want to say it is broke.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Locher, there is no way we can assure that any President is going to follow the advice of the military commanders, I do not care what kind of title or caption you give them. But you have stressed a good deal about rivalries here, and I see one building to an inferno level.

If you have a Chief of Naval Operations, a four-star, and then you have another four-star sailor who is a member of the new Joint Military Advisory Council, what is the relationship between those two men? And which one gets to talk to the President? Because there is an old saying around this town: Whoever has got the President's ear has the power.

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, the relationship between those two gentlemen is that the service Chief would be working on the administrative side of the Department of Defense, the manning, equipping, supplying, and training side.

The naval officer who would be a member of this suggested Joint Military Advisory Council would primarily be focusing on the operational side. He would be involved in the formulation of strategy that would be used in the resource allocation process. But he would be the representative of the operational commanders out in the field.

So these two gentlemen would have complementary positions in the Department of Defense.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, may I make just a suggestion here? I think Senator Warner's question is very key and I think that is something we are going to want to get into in great depth, both in this hearing and in later hearings. But I do not think you necessarily have to come to the conclusion that staff has come to in order to support the basic problem that they have pointed out, that is the basic cause.

The staff has not laid out yet the solutions they have proposed. And you have talked about one of those solutions. But I suggest that before we get bogged down too far into the staff recommendations, that we make a clear effort to dwell on the problems that they have identified. And there are a number of different approaches to the same problem in terms of solutions.

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir. And Senator Warner, we have developed those in the study, where we have come out with recommendations for each of the problems that we have identified. We developed as many feasible alternatives as we could identify.

Chairman GOLDWATER. If you will proceed. Let us keep our questioning now to the end.

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT OF UNIFIED COMMAND

1. UNIFIED COMMANDS -- LOOSE CONFEDERATIONS OF SINGLE SERVICE FORCES
    - EVIDENCED BY OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCIES -- VIETNAM TO GRENADA
2. UNABLE TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE UNIFIED ACTION ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF MISSIONS
3. UNIFIED COMMANDERS
    - WEAK AUTHORITY OVER SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS
    - LIMITED INFLUENCE OVER RESOURCES
    - LITTLE ABILITY TO PROMOTE GREATER UNIFICATION

The next problem area, Mr. Chairman, is what we have titled "The failure to adequately implement the concept of unified command." Going back to our discussion of the principal organizational goal of mission integration, this problem could be retitled "limited mission integration at the operational level."

The unified commands essentially remain loose confederations of single service forces. The problems with these confederations have been evidenced by operational deficiences from Vietnam to Grenada. In the view of the staff report, the unified commands are unable to provide effective unified action across the spectrum of military missions.

The basic problem is that the unified commanders have weak authority over service component commands, limited influence over resources, and little ability to promote greater unification. Of all of the issues that were discussed with the outside experts at Fort A.P. Hill, this problem area and the need to do something about it is one in which there was almost complete agreement.

COMMENTS - UNIFIED COMMANDS

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER (1958)

"BECAUSE I HAVE OFTEN SEEN THE EVILS OF DILUTED COMMAND, I EMPHASIZE THAT EACH UNIFIED COMMANDER MUST HAVE UNQUESTIONED AUTHORITY OVER ALL UNITS OF HIS COMMAND....TODAY A UNIFIED COMMAND IS MADE UP OF COMPONENT COMMANDS FROM EACH MILITARY DEPARTMENT, EACH UNDER A COMMANDER OF THAT DEPARTMENT. THE COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY OVER THESE COMPONENT COMMANDS IS SHORT OF THE FULL COMMAND REQUIRED FOR MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY."

BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL (1970)

"THE NET RESULT IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN WHICH 'UNIFICATION' OF EITHER COMMAND OR OF THE FORCES IS MORE COSMETIC THAN SUBSTANTIVE."

A couple of comments on the unified commands. President Eisenhower identified the same problems that we have focused on in 1958. In a message to the Congress he said:

> Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I emphasize that each unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his command. Today a unified command is made up of component commands from each military department, each under a commander of that department. The unified commander's authority over these component commands is short of the full command required for maximum efficiency.

While certain changes were made with respect to the chain of command, the concepts that President Eisenhower put forth in 1958 for the unified commands have not been adequately implemented by the Department of Defense. That was recognized by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970 when it said:

> The net results is an organization structure in which unification of either command or of the forces is more cosmetic than substantive.

We see the same situation today, Mr. Chairman.

PREDOMINANCE OF PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING

1. TOO MUCH TIME AND ATTENTION ON RESOURCE DECISIONS
2. INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO
    - STRATEGIC PLANNING
    - OPERATIONAL MATTERS, INCLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS, JOINT DOCTRINE, JOINT TRAINING, AND ALLIANCE ISSUES
    - EXECUTION OF DECISIONS
3. ALSO REFLECTED IN OFFICER DEVELOPMENT
    - WARTIME SKILLS - RELATIVELY LOW PRIORITY
    - TECHNICAL, MANAGERIAL, AND BUREAUCRATIC SKILLS - EMPHASIZED
4. LACK OF CLARITY OF STRATEGIC GOALS
    - LOSS OF BENEFIT OF THIS UNIFYING MECHANISM

The next problem area that I will discuss is one that we have called predominance of programming and budgeting. In our view, too much of the time and attention of the Department of Defense and its senior leaders is focused on resource decisions.

The problem with this is it leads to insufficient attention to a number of other important tasks, including strategic planning, operational matters, including the development of contingency plans, joint doctrine, joint training, and alliance issues, in addition to insufficient attention to the execution of decisions.

We spend 1½ or 2 years deciding how resources are going to be allocated and then we do not spend sufficient time worrying about what actually happens. To a great extent, the system is too forward-looking. Decisions were made as if they were missiles that could be fired and forgotten.

We see this predominance of programming and budgeting also reflected in officer development, particularly in the Army. Wartime skills have a tendency to receive relatively low priority. Technical, managerial, and bureaucratic skills are emphasized.

Going back to the point of insufficient attention to strategic planning, we see the lack of clarity of strategic goals denying a unifying mechanism to the Department of Defense. If the strategic goals can be clearly articulated, the entire organization can have a sense of direction. The Department through its lack of clarity of strategic goals loses this clarifying mechanism.

INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

1. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE -- INHERENT IN LARGE ORGANIZATIONS AND MILITARY PROFESSION
2. IN DOD, MAGNIFIED BY SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS
    - "OFF-LIMIT" SERVICE AGREEMENTS
    - PREDOMINANT SERVICE INFLUENCE
    - INTER-SERVICE LOGROLLING
    - ABSOLUTE SERVICE CONTROL OVER OFFICER PROMOTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
3. TO A GREAT EXTENT, DOD HAS BEEN UNABLE TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES ON ITS OWN
    - DEFEND STATUS QUO
    - INSUFFICIENT SELF-CORRECTING AND SELF-MODIFYING MECHANISMS
    - UNDESIRABLE RIGIDITY
4. INADEQUATE FEEDBACK
    - NO WELL-ESTABLISHED TRADITION OF COMPREHENSIVE, CRITICAL EVALUATIONS

Mr. Chairman, the next area is what we have called insufficient mechanism for change. The Department of Defense is like all organizations and like the military profession in general in that it has an inherent resistance to change.

But in the Department of Defense we see this resistance to change magnified by systemic problems, the first of which is that service agreements are off limits. And here I am talking about the Key West agreement on service roles and missions, the unified command plan, JCS publication 2 on unified action/Armed Forces. Those things are put into a drawer and they are not frequently opened.

Another systemic problem is predominant service influence. We have also discussed interservice logrolling, which has a tendency to dampen mechanisms for change. In addition, the services have absolute control over officer promotions and assignments, including those in joint organizations that should be studying the need for change.

To a great extent, the Department of Defense has been unable to correct deficiencies on its own. A great deal of energy is spent in defining the status quo. The Department does not have the self-correcting and self-modifying mechanisms that it needs, and that leads to undesirable regidity.

A key point in discussing the insufficient mechanisms for change is the inadequate feedback in the Department of Defense. That is in the resource allocation process, but it is also in the larger context. There is no well-established tradition of comprehensive critical evaluation in the Department of Defense, and that denies the Department the kind of information that it needs to make the kinds of changes that are necessary.

GENERAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

1. UNNECESSARY STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

2. INADEQUATE QUALITY OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND JOINT DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL
   - NOT FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN GOOD PEOPLE AND SOUND STRUCTURE

3. FAILURE TO CLARIFY THE DESIRED DIVISION OF WORK

4. EXCESSIVE SPANS OF CONTROL
   - SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - 41 OFFICIALS
   - ARMY CHIEF - 42
   - CNO - 48
   - AF CHIEF - 35
   - COMMANDANT - 41

Mr. Chairman, I will very briefly mention four general management problems that we have identified in the study. The first of these is that we see the existence of two separate staffs, the service Secretary and the military headquarters staff in the military departments, as leading to unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort; and we propose that those two staffs either be fully or partially integrated.

The second problem is a people problem. We have seen inadequate quality of political appointees and insufficient attention to developing military personnel for joint duty assignments. Here I have mentioned the problem that we were discussing previously, in that this committee is not going to be forced to choose between good people and sound structure. Both of them shoud be emphasized.

The third general management problem that we have identified is the failure to clarify the desired division of work in the Department of Defense. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is micromanaging the services. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services are doing much of the work of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We have not been able to get an objective review of the unified command plan, so we maybe do not have the necessary division of work between the unified commands. Service roles and missions have not been looked at adequately since 1948. If the Department could more clearly state the desired division of work and enforce it, it would cut down on much of the complexity and friction within the Department.

Mr. Chairman, the past general management problem is one that we have identified as excessive spans of control. We found at many levels of the Department of Defense senior managers have an excessive number of subordinates reporting to them. The Secretary of Defense has 41 officials reporting to him, and we have listed here the large number of officials that report to the service Chiefs.

Senator HART. Mr. Locher, in the case of points No. 1 and No. 4, distinguish between uniformed and civilian? And to the degree these are uniformed layers, to what degree is that a function of a surplus of flag officers, a disproportionately high number of flag officers looking for something to do?

Mr. LOCHER. Senator Hart, in the first problem area, the unnecessary staff layers in the top management headquarters of the military departments, essentially there is a civilian staff, although it has a substantial portion of military officers in it. And there is a military staff which is predominantly military officers, but does have some civilians.

We have not in our study identified that this problem was created by a surplus of officers. I know that people have focused on that in other layers below these in the military departments. But our basic view is that this arrangement came about as a holdover from the era in which the service Secretaries headed up independent executive level departments.

And the second problem is that the service Secretaries have failed to get control of the military headquarters staffs, and so they have maintained or expanded a civilian secretariat in order to try to provide that control.

Now, in the answer in terms of the excessive spans of control, almost all of the officials who report to the service Chiefs are military officers. With respect to the Secretary of Defense, I would say that roughly two-thirds of those are civilians, many of them within the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the defense agencies.

Senator HART. But the fact of the matter is, in the services we have a lot more flag officers, senior military commanders today in relation to the overall size of our forces than we have had at virtually any time in our recent history. Is that not the case?

And therefore those people have to find something important to do.

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, there could be a connection. In our study efforts we have not been able to identify that connection in these top management headquarters that we have been focusing upon.

INSUFFICIENT POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. NOT FORMAL STATUTORY AUTHORITY - FULL MEASURE OF POWER
2. EMANATES FROM POWERFUL ORGANIZATIONAL FORCES PURSUING OWN AGENDAS
    - CONGRESS - REINFORCES DIVISIONS IN DOD
    - OSD - FUNCTIONAL SPECIALISTS; INDEPENDENT POLITICAL BASES
    - JCS - LOGROLLING; SEEK INDEPENDENCE
    - SERVICE SECRETARIES - SERVICE ADVOCATES; NOT DOD MANAGERS
    - FEW ALLIES AND FEW OFFICIALS WHO SHARE SECRETARY'S PERSPECTIVE
3. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IS CONFRONTED BY POWERFUL INSTITUTIONAL FORCES THAT UNDERMINE HIS AUTHORITY AND OFFER HIM LITTLE HELP IN CARRYING OUT HIS VAST RESPONSIBILITIES.
4. DOES NOT MEAN THAT INCREASED CENTRALIZATION IS NEEDED.

Mr. Chairman, the last problem area that we would like to present is one that we have called insufficient power and influence of the Secretary of Defense. And we are not talking about his formal statutory authority, where he has a full measure of power.

We see that his insufficient power and influence emanates from powerful organizational forces pursuing their own agendas: The Congress which, as we have mentioned, reinforces divisions in the Department of Defense; the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is filled with functional specialists who are pleaders for their functional areas, and often they are individuals who can pursue a separate agenda due to their independent political basis.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have had a tendency to logroll and traditionally have sought independence from the Secretary of Defense. The service Secretaries more often than not have focused upon their role as being service advocates, not as Department of Defense managers.

In our view, the Secretary of Defense has few allies and few officials in the Department who share his perspective. Our basic conclusion is that the Secretary of Defense is confronted by powerful institutional forces that undermine his authority and offer him little help in carrying out his vast responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman, while we make this point, it should be absolutely clear that we're not talking about increased centralization. The exact opposite is true. We are looking to eliminate these bureaucratic obstacles which have diffused the power of the Secretary of Defense so that he may more effectively decentralize the Department of Defense.



KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SHIFT CONGRESS TOWARD BROAD OVERSIGHT AND AWAY FROM MICRO-MANAGEMENT
2. ESTABLISH THREE MISSION-ORIENTED UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE WHILE STREAMLINING THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3. DISESTABLISH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; ESTABLISH A JOINT MILITARY ADVISORY COUNCIL CONSISTING OF A CHAIRMAN AND A 4-STAR MILITARY OFFICER FROM EACH SERVICE ON HIS LAST TOUR OF DUTY
4. STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS
    - TO CONTROL SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS
    - TO INFLUENCE RESOURCE DECISIONS
    - TO PROMOTE GREATER UNIFICATION
5. FULLY OR PARTIALLY INTEGRATE THE SECRETARIATS AND MILITARY HEADQUARTERS STAFFS IN THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

Mr. Chairman, the last slide I have to present are the five key recommendations of the staff study. The first of these is that Congress must shift its attention toward broad oversight and away from micro-management.

The second recommendation that we make is to establish three mission-oriented Under Secretaries of Defense, while streamlining the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is to create the balance between the mission and functional perspectives within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Our third recommendation is to disestablish the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have the service Chiefs spend their full time being the military leaders of their services; and to establish in its place a joint military advisory council consisting of a chairman and a four-star military officer from each service on his last tour of duty. Our view is that the members of this joint military advisory council should have substantial joint experience.

Our fourth recommendation is to strengthen the authority of the unified commanders to enable them to control service component commands, to have greater influence on resource decisions, and to promote greater unification within their commands.

The last key recommendation is one that I have just briefly mentioned, and that is to fully or partially integrate the secretariat's and military headquarters staffs in the military departments. We propose that in the Army and in the Air Force that the staffs be fully integrated, but within the Department of the Navy we are proposing only a partial integration, and that is because of the dual service structure of the Department of the Navy and because the structure does not allow us to fully integrate there.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our briefing. We would be glad to answer any questions you might have.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Mr. Locher.

We expect to vote around 11 o'clock, but we will try to stagger the Members' voting so that we can continue questioning. The members will now be allowed to ask questions, and we will have a 10-minute rule on the first go-round.

We will start with Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. On that last point, on the chart, when you said, Mr. Locher, that you want to integrate the staffs of the services and the secretariat, what you are really saying there is you want to eliminate in large part one staff in each service except the Navy?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, and in the Navy we believe that substantial reductions can be made in the total size of those staffs. Basically our view, Senator Nunn, is that that duplication of effort creates more paperwork, more levels of review, more manpower than is necessary.

Senator NUNN. Is the goal of that particular recommendation primarily efficiency in terms of saving money or is it primarily effectiveness in terms of being able to have a smoother operation?

Mr. LOCHER. Our first purpose in that regard, Senator Nunn, is on effectiveness. We believe that that integrated staff can better serve the needs of the Service Secretary. But in addition, I think there would be some side benefits in terms of reduced manpower, reduced paperwork, and the things associated with that.

Senator NUNN. One of your key recommendations—and I suppose the one that will attract a good deal of attention—is the one about really changing the nature of the Joint Chiefs by having the service Chiefs take on their service role only and then having a special advisory group that would plan jointly and advise the Secretary of Defense on joint matters.

Now, that grows out of the problem that you identified, that the staff concluded, and that was that there was an inherent conflict on dual hatting, having a service Chief responsible for the service as well as rising above the service when joint advice was required. Are there other approaches?

I think you had in your staff study several other suggestions in terms of the way to deal with that problem that are short of eliminating the Joint Chiefs as we know them now. What are those other alternatives?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, most of the other alternatives focus on strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making the joint staff work for him, enabling him or authorizing him to present military advice in his own right, giving him additional support so that he could represent the joint perspective.

So most of the other alternatives focus upon the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and strengthening his stature and authority.

Senator NUNN. Just so we can identify the various people, there have been a good many studies made of this and a lot of knowledgeable people commented on the specific suggestions. Where does Gen. Dave Jones, who used to be the service Chief and also was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where do his recommendations fit in here?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, his recommendation is basically the one that I had mentioned, in that he would focus upon strengthening the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, giving him the joint staff to work for him, giving him additional authority and stature.

Senator NUNN. What about Shy Meyer, when he was the head of the Army? He made a suggestion. Where does his suggestion fit in?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, General Meyer's recommendation would fit closer to the recommendation that the staff has proposed. He has proposed the creation of a group. I am not certain what title he gave it, but it's essentially the joint military advisory council that we have proposed, although I think he had in mind a large membership, maybe as many as 10 members.

Senator NUNN. Now, if you did create this new body, would they operate under the rule of unanimity, as the Joint Chiefs do now, or the informal rule?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, one of the recommendations that we make is that the civilian authority should be informed of all legitimate alternatives. Currently we find that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while it is supposed to be an advisory body, often takes on the flavor of a decisionmaking body because they make the decision and forward essentially one recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

And we would try to make—whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain in existence or a new joint military advisory council is created, we would want to return them to a purely advisory role, in that all legitimate alternatives should be brought to the attention of the decisionmaking body.

Senator NUNN. In other words, you don't visualize a system whereby whoever on the Joint Chiefs representing individual services, either way, individual services would be represented, one by active service Chiefs, the other by outsiders from that service role but people who have come through the service system—do you visualize that the service representatives on the joint body, whatever that body might be, will continue to have the right to dissent and have their dissent known to the Secretary of Defense and the President when appropriate?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir. It is our view that dissent is what the Secretary of Defense needs to hear about, that he should get all of the views when he is making a decision, and that is currently denied to him.

Senator NUNN. But you are saying that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would not have to get unanimity to present his views to the Secretary of Defense. He could speak for himself and he would be speaking in effect for the Chiefs, but each Chief would have the right to make his views known on matters that they thought were critical enough to dissent, is that right?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. So you are not saying you want unanimous views and you do not want to shut out the service representatives from their views. You are saying that you want them to be able to dissent, but not require unanimity, which many times, according to everything that I have heard at least, results in sort of the lowest common denominator approach.

Mr. LOCHER. That is correct, sir. We are looking to get additional views to the Secretary of Defense to enable him to make more effective decisions.

Senator **Nunn**. Mr. Locher, I am interested, as a priority item—we have talked and had a lot of debate and a lot of studies on the Joint Chiefs, and I am sure there are going to be a lot of suggestions and critiques of this report in that respect, as well as many positive suggestions.

But the thing I think is so critical in this report is the whole question of who fights, and it is obvious that the unified commanders out there in the field are the ones who are supposed to do the fighting. They are the ones that are supposed to basically unify the various services and go to war in the event we have to go to war; is that right?

Mr. **Locher**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Nunn**. And is it accurate that one of your major thrusts is to find a way to strengthen their hand?

Mr. **Locher**. Yes, sir; it is. And I think that in our discussions with outside experts we have had almost complete agreement on that point.

Senator **Nunn**. Who creates these unified commands?

Mr. **Locher**. They are created by the Secretary of Defense and the President, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator **Nunn**. And who do they report to under the present structure?

Mr. **Locher**. Sir, under the present structure the operational commanders, both the unified and specified commanders, report through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and the President. But the actual chain of command is from the operational commanders to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

Senator **Nunn**. So they go through the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body?

Mr. **Locher**. No, sir. They go through the Joint Chiefs solely for administrative purposes. The actual chain of command is the President to the Secretary of Defense to the operational commanders.

Senator **Nunn**. Through the Joint Chiefs, though?

Mr. **Locher**. But they do that only in terms of transmitting orders and commands.

Senator **Nunn**. Is that by law or by regulation, going through the Chiefs?

Mr. **Locher**. That is by regulation. The law specifies the President to the Secretary of Defense to the operational commanders. But by Department directive, they go through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And that point has produced considerable confusion because it is really not understood what "through the Joint Chiefs of Staff" means.

Senator **Nunn**. For instance, on the Marine tragedy in Beirut, where was the chain of command in establishing that Marine presence in Beirut? We had marines there and who did they report to? How did that work under the present structure?

Where was the responsibility in terms of up the chain of command?

Mr. **Locher**. Sir, the marines ashore in Lebanon reported to a naval task force offshore, which reported to the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, which reported to U.S. Naval Forces Europe located in Naples, which reported to the U.S. European Command, General Rodgers, which reported back through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

Senator NUNN. How many tiers is that that they reported through?

Mr. LOCHER. We have been told that it was eight tiers in total.

Senator NUNN. All right. Where did General Kelly fit into that? He is head of the Marine Corps service. He is also one of the Joint Chiefs. Where was he on that chain of command?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, General Kelly was not in that chain of command, except as one of the corporate members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the Commandant of the Marine Corps, he is not involved in operational matters.

Senator NUNN. Now, this recent successful forcing down of the Egyptian plane with the terrorists on board, have you had a chance to go into that enough to know how the chain of command worked on that one?

Mr. LOCHER. No, sir; we have not.

Senator NUNN. Well, how should it have worked in theory under the present structure, or would you prefer to take a look at that one later?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, in theory it would have worked very similar to what happened in Lebanon. It would have gone from the President to the Secretary of Defense, or to the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the U.S. European Command in Europe, to the U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and eventually to the operating forces.

Senator NUNN. Where would Admiral Watkins as the Chief of Naval Operations have fit into that chain of command?

Mr. LOCHER. He would not have fit into the chain of command at all, except as he was involved as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the Chief of Naval Operations, he would not have had a direct role.

Senator NUNN. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Well, I spoke with him yesterday and he was very much involved. But we will wait until the record can correctly reflect just how that was done, because I do not think it is fully under discussion.

The rule of unanimity in the JCS, whose rule is that? Is that not the incumbent Chairman, how he wishes to operate?

Mr. LOCHER. No, sir. One of the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in title 10 of the United States Code is to inform the Secretary of Defense and possibly the President when the Joint Chiefs of Staff have failed to agree.

Some people believe that that is part of the pressure on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to come to agreement on issues. Other, basically senior, military officers believe that their advice will carry more weight if they speak with one voice.

The problem with that is that often the voice they have spoken with in terms of the lowest level common assent has been advice that has not been heeded by the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, or the President, and they have sought advice elsewhere.

Senator WARNER. And Congress—is that our responsibility, to change that?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, I think that that is one of the things that should probably be removed from the law and that some substitute provisions should be put in there about higher authority being informed of all legitimate alternatives.

Senator WARNER. Which means dissenting views?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Now, you have portrayed the Secretary of Defense rather dramatically, as an individual who is really substantially weakened by virtue of this entanglement of law and regulation and precedent; is that correct?

Mr. LOCHER. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. And one of the things you cite is that the services control the promotions. Now, my recollection is quite different, and indeed in my involvement I had in a recent promotion it seemed to me that what I learned confirmed the practice of prior years, namely that, specifically with three-star appointments and four-star appointments, the service Secretary submits at least two recommendations, often three, to the Secretary of Defense; and it is he, the Secretary of Defense, who makes that decision.

Mr. LOCHER. Senator Warner, you are absolutely correct. Some of the key positions, three- and four-star level and above, those final decisions are made by the Secretary of Defense. But we are talking about military officers as a whole, whether they are serving in joint duty billets or not, that their promotions and assignments are determined by the parent service.

Senator WARNER. Not the three- and four-star promotions. That is still Secretary of Defense.

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator WARNER. And often he is involved with other flag and general officer promotions below that level.

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. So you cannot make the categorical statement in here that you do, that the services control it. That is an inaccurate statement.

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, we are talking about a handful of positions compared to all.

Senator WARNER. But you are talking about the key top handful of positions. The real power is in those two-, three-, and four-star ranks.

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir. But those two-, three-, and four-star ranks are supported by joint staffs, whose future promotions and assignments are determined by their services. And that is where we have put our focus, that somehow there needs to be the kinds of incentives that those people need to operate in truly independent military staffs.

Senator WARNER. Now, we have been in session here for nearly 2 hours, and yet it seems to me we have not devoted much time to what I regard as the most serious problem confronting the Department of Defense today, namely, the improvement of the procurement.

How does your set of recommendations improve that situation?

Mr. **Locher**. Senator Warner, in doing this study we decided to divide the acquisition area into two parts. One is those problems that have an organizational base; and those problems that we consider to be management-related. And we have focused on what ended up being the relatively few number of problems that we thought had their origin in organizational deficiencies.

The management problems are the subject of the subcommittee that Senator Quayle heads. In addition, they are receiving considerable attention from the President's Commission on Defense Management. The kinds of recommendations that we have in our study are along the lines of having the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff play a larger role in validating military requirements that are depended upon by the services.

So our study does not have a great deal of conclusions and recommendations in the area of the acquisition process.

Senator **Warner**. Turning back to the new creation known as the Joint Military Advisory Council, again I wanted to clarify as to who gets to talk to the President. Is it the Chief of Naval Operations or the four-star admiral that is on that particular panel?

Under the law now, the Chief of Naval Operations has a direct responsibility to the President as the President's chief naval advisor; am I not correct?

Mr. **Locher**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Warner**. Now, do you intend to change that law?

Mr. **Locher**. Sir, the law that exists with respect to the Chief of Naval Operations is unique. None of the other service Chiefs have that responsibility in law, and I would think that there would be at least a move to make the law consistent, that all of the service Chiefs would be treated equally.

Basically, who gets to talk to the President is a decision that the President will make, no matter who the Congress specifies as the principal military advisors. It is our view that if the service Chiefs are removed from the institution that provides joint military advice, they would still have powerful channels in which to make their views known, both to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

Senator **Warner**. So you would make the unique statute applicable today to the Navy uniform to all three services, or would you include the Marine Corps?

Mr. **Locher**. The Marine Corps is like the other services in that the commandant does not have a special status.

Senator **Warner**. Would you suggest that legislatively we change it so each of the service Chiefs, including the Marine Corps Commandant, could report directly to the President as one of his principal advisors?

Mr. **Locher**. No, sir, we would not recommend that.

Senator **Warner**. Well then, put aside the Marine Corps. Would you recommend it for the Army and the Air Force?

Mr. **Locher**. No, sir.

Senator **Warner**. Then I am mistaken in what you said earlier. There is now a law that says the Navy Chief is the principal advisor to the President on naval matters, correct?

Mr. **Locher**. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Now, what do you wish to do with that law? Expand it or delete it.

Mr. LOCHER. Delete it.

Senator WARNER. Delete it?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Therefore, the Chief of Naval Operations henceforth under these proposals would not have a direct statutory responsibility as an advisor to the President, and it would be on a selective basis as to whether this President or future Presidents would consult of the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to military matters?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, that is correct. The Chief of Naval Operations now has a special status which is not accorded to the other service Chiefs. The other service Chiefs as a corporate body are the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense.

The Chief of Naval Operations, separate from that responsibility, has a special responsibility to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Senator WARNER. And implicit in these recommendations that statutory authority would be abolished.

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Then it comes down to the four-star admiral that is on the Joint Military Advisory Council and he would be the one who would have access to the President primarily on the operational questions?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir; he would.

Senator WARNER. Then what position does that put the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] in with respect to that other admiral? Is there not a built-in conflict right there?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, as I mentioned before, we see the positions there as being complementary.

Senator WARNER. Now let us be explicit. Where?

Mr. LOCHER. The Chief of Naval Operations has primarily responsibilities on the administrative side, the man, train, equip, supply side. The member of the joint military advisory council would have the responsibilities on the operational side, the needs of the field commanders, the development of joint doctrine, the development of strategy, all of these sorts of issues.

Senator WARNER. Well, then, a service Chief is back to the role that we used to say, beans, blankets, and bullets, and the other four-star of that service would then be primarily responsible for the implementation of the forces throughout the world?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense he would.

Senator WARNER. And you say that that change of status would not result in just making a service Chief an honorary chairman of the board?

Mr. LOCHER. No, sir, it would not.

Senator WARNER. We disagree.

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, we have found in our research that the position that most military officers aspire to be is the chief of their service and the responsibilities that go with that, not the responsibilities associated with being a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; that they consider being the military leader of their service as their most important responsibility and where they spend the bulk of their time and attention.

Senator WARNER. That is under the current framework alone, but not under the proposed changes that are implicit in these recommendations.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I certainly will be brief in what I have to say.

Testimony here this morning brings in review and memory a lot of things that have happened. I am certainly not qualified to be one of the chief ones to try to rewrite the present rules.

But I do want to emphasize that I believe a system has got to be adopted that will fully explain and, if I may use the word, expose the deficiencies of our present operation. And then, within our committee or within the membership, they try to put together a substitute plan. I do not believe we will ever get at it unless we ask some of the group to come back with a substitute plan or proposed plan and then explain it, and then see if we can adopt it.

Now, I say that, not complimenting anybody. We have Senator Warner here who is a member of our body, and I remember him as one of the outstanding men that has been in the Pentagon. I remember when he was Secretary of the Navy and so forth.

We have others with special competence on the committee. But this is the biggest undertaking, I believe, that Congress is confronted with now, except for the overall economy. I think a special study of a lot of the incidents that have come along under the present system—I will not go into any details—the Bay of Pigs—the Bay of Pigs was no small matter, and one of the gravest things that helped, I think—I remember there I thought that President Kennedy showed real wisdom in his response.

I just say in passing, too, I was here when the present law was first adopted, and the thing was so intense that we just had to suspend things for a while. But that was back in time when it was so easy to hear people saying Mr. Truman did not know what he was doing and did not know what he was talking about on these matters. And he turned around and a little later, why, he is known as a wise man, a man of good judgment in lots of matters.

So this is just that big, this problem. So if I may call it a suggestion to those of you that have done so well in taking the lead in this matter on the problem and presenting it, eking it out and presenting it, go on now and put together a package.

I have not consulted with anyone about this, but that is my idea about it—a package that they can recommend based on their judgment, and in that way get it before the Congress. Otherwise--and I do not want to look on the darker side of this thing—I do not see how we will ever get anything fixed.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I might say, Senator, that is our plan.

Senator STENNIS. I did not know that.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Complete hearings of all interested parties before anything is done.

Senator STENNIS. Yes, I know that; and then coming back with a package of your own that you could look at.

Chairman GOLDWATER. It will be wide open.

Senator NUNN. We hope it will be a committee package, Mr. Chairman. That is what we hope.

Senator STENNIS. Well, it may not be. It may not be possible to be. The reaction to this thing is going to be terrific. You already know that.

Senator NUNN. I think you are right.

Senator STENNIS. But it is an impossible task, almost. But we are the ones that have got to cope with it. I think you can get up a lot of wisdom from what Mr. Eisenhower said, I want to mention that. I heard him testify on this problem when he was General Eisenhower, General Eisenhower testifying, not in command of anything, just between—beyond his military commands.

And I heard him testify, too, as President of the United States. I will tell you, there is a lot of valuable testimony there and good things he said on these matters, as well as others.

So I think this frankly has been put off and put off from year to year. But you are getting it started now and gotten in it and well along with it. That is my recommendation. I will not be having a lot of advice to give, but I want to reserve the right to release some things that happened that I happen to know about.

I thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator, I can say this to my old boss: We are going to follow your advice.

Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Locher, in some ways the most depressing or perhaps I should say frustrating pages in your book are 624 to 627, under a subheading called "Insufficient Mechanisms for Change."

You properly, appropriately quote a whole range of people throughout recent years about how difficult it is to make big institutions change, starting with a dictionary quotation of the popular military maxim: "Any change, even for the better, is to be deprecated." And then the military historian: "The only thing harder than getting anything new into the military mind is to get an old one out."

On to David Jones. "By their very nature, large organizations have a built-in resistance to change." The Steadman Report: "There is a natural tendency in military institutions to be comfortable with what one understands and knows will operate and natural skepticism to accept theoretical assertions of improvements."

The quotations go on. Edward Luttwak: "The path of self-reform which a healthy institution would achieve informally by an entire pattern of disinterested decisions is rigidly blocked." And so forth and so on. And Mr. Luttwak again: "There was no agonizing reappraisal after Vietnam, no reform of any kind, let alone the drastic reform so obviously needed."

If that really is the way big institutions operate—and I think most of us feel they do, whether it is the Congress or, as I say, the civilian bureaucracies or the military bureaucracy—there is enormous resistance to change. What hope do we have?

If the committee got behind some of these proposals—let us say we came up with a committee recommendation that was a refinement of what you have proposed, and say everybody on this committee supported it—what hope would we have of making some changes in the Pentagon, even at the upper superstructure level that you have recommended?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, it is our view that the organizational arrangements that we have proposed go after some of the systemic problems that we have mentioned, which have denied the Department the self-correcting and self-modifying changes that they need; that if the Secretary of Defense can get a truly independent source of military advice, he can look objectively back on deficiencies in military operations and he can make the required changes; that he can look at strategy and see where it has been faulty; that he can get the kind of support that he needs to focus on mission areas; and that changes can be made in the field, in policies, in Washington, to produce the necessary improvements.

So it is our view that, while there will continue to be resistance to change, we can make organizational changes that will give the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials in the Department of Defense the kind of information they need to move in needed directions.

Senator HART. I do not think those quotes that you have in the book and that I have mentioned talk about lack of information. They talk about lack of will.

Senator Warner talked about, why have not some of the good Secretaries of Defense undertaken some of these reforms? Why is it that members of the Joint Chiefs or senior military officers only criticize the institutions once they are out?

We are aware of this phenomenon of people jumping out of the office, where they are out of command, or out of the civilian side and suddenly saying: What a mess; we have got to change this situation. I do not think you can reform an institution by imposing reforms from the outside. I think self-reform is the only way it does happen.

What can we do to change the mentality, not information? Not information. We are not going to shuffle some boxes around and hand them a chart and say: The Senate Armed Services Committee recommends that you change the Pentagon this way.

We have got to change the way people think, and what can this committee do to change that?

Mr. LOCHER. Senator Hart, my first comment is that not only is it a lack of will, but it is a lack of information; that the Secretary of Defense and other key decisionmakers do not have the kind of comprehensive, critical evaluations of performance in many areas that they need to set the new directions for the Department. So it is both a lack of information and a lack of will.

As to why people have not spoken out now, there have been very few people in the Department of Defense—General Jones and General Meyer being exceptions—who have spoken out. And the basic problem is that the system prevents them from doing so; that if they are going to be effective in their current positions——

Senator HART. They have to play the game?

Mr. LOCHER. They must try to work in the system that they currently have.

Senator HART. Admiral Zumwalt, there is the pattern. After you leave, then you write your book about what needs to be done to change it. But they have no power after that.

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir. Now, Admiral Zumwalt did push for a number of changes while he was serving as Chief of Naval Operations. But you are absolutely correct, that to a great extent it has been after people have departed, whether they are Secretaries of Defense or Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or service Chief or unified commanders.

Senator HART. Well, I think the best evidence——

Senator WARNER. If the Senator will yield, to his credit, he never felt confined and he spoke up. I may have disagreed with him on occasion, but he spoke up very forcefully for all types of change.

Chairman GOLDWATER. He sure did.

Senator HART. But he made a lot of his fellow admirals angry.

Senator WARNER. And he made me angry as hell, too. But nevertheless, there was one man who did have the courage to speak out. But he did it in a way, in most instances before he left, to privately confide in service Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense.

Senator HART. Well, I guess what concerns me is, as Senator Nunn in his opening remarks and I think Senator Goldwater, too, I think it is this focusing on rearranging the boxes at the top that concerns me. Because, you know, this management approach, which is really basically what this document is about, is a management approach, really I do not think addresses the problems of Grenada or the Bay of Pigs or Vietnam in the sense of what wins in conflict.

And I can see a situation where this committee and the Pentagon adopted this report verbatim and there was a future Grenada where the same kinds of screw-ups occur, just because of the same kind of rivalries, the same kind of inadequate preparation and training.

That is what really worries me a lot, that the best evidence and information is what you learn in combat, and we have not been doing very well in combat. And I just wonder the degree to which rearranging the boxes at the top will change things, that is all.

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, I think the quote that we were mentioning from Secretary Schlesinger is important in that regard, where he said: "Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements."

You are absolutely right, people have to start thinking about these problems differently than they are now. Rather than thinking about them as joint problems. Rather than focusing on functional inputs, they need to focus on mission outputs.

And we believe that these organizational changes will foster different thinking, that within the unified commands people will begin to worry about interoperability problems, understanding each other's doctrine, and how they are going to proceed, those sorts of things.

So you are absolutely correct, and we have tried to identify that. In some instances, the changes that we have proposed will improve the system, but they are going to be insufficient by themselves, without additional changes in terms of attitudes and orientations, particularly of the professional officer corps.

Senator HART. All I can say is, I am all for it. I think that Senator Nunn and Senator Goldwater have done a fantastic job, and all of you as well; and I just hope that somehow we do not make the traditional mistake of confusing efficiency with effectiveness.

And I know that Senator Nunn and others have talked about that distinction. It is an important distinction. We can have the most efficient Pentagon in the world or Military Establishment in the world and still not be effective in combat. And it is that difference that I hope we focus on as well.

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Nunn, as a final comment in that regard, when we started this study it was the term "effectiveness" that we had in mind. That was our entire focus.

Senator HART. You can have a really efficient Pentagon and still lose wars. That is the problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First let me congratulate you and Senator Nunn. I went to Senator Tower a couple of years ago and expressed concerns about the organization and the fact that I thought it would be healthy to undertake a reexamination. I hoped that there would be a response, but the comprehensive nature of this response, candidly, exceeds anything that I had hoped for then.

I think this is a good thing that this is going on, and I think you are quite right in noting that it is high time. The fact of the matter is it takes place in a setting in which two circumstances dictate that we be engaged in this kind of reexamination.

The first of those is obviously the unprecedented Soviet military buildup, which bespeaks a willingness and an ability to spend and devote almost unlimited resources for that purpose. And to take Senator Hart's comment for a moment with respect to efficiency, I hope that we recognize that organization not be confused with resources.

We are finding that the second circumstance that dictates this reexamination is our own situation here with ballooning deficits that require restraint of a kind that the Soviets do not know.

In contrast to what they are doing, we are required not only to get more bang for the buck, but to face the unpleasant reality that some of the spending which we think necessary for defense may yield to other military priorities and in the larger scheme of things military spending may not receive the full allocation of resources that we would otherwise wish, simply because of the necessity to impose fiscal discipline on our economy.

That being the case, I think we are constrained to look at organization first, as has been said, to assure that when young men and women are in a combat situation that they are not impaired, that the kind of training, the kind of equipment, the kind of leadership that all have noted have markedly improved, is not all for nothing because of inabilities to communicate, because of functional differences between the services.

For that reason, I think that the chapters that focus upon the problems of the unified commanders are perhaps those of the greatest immediate interest and concern. But I congratulate the staff on a truly comprehensive examination. I do not know that I agree with all their conclusions or recommendations, but they have performed a valuable service, as have the chairman and the ranking member, in providing us with a document that will be the basis for, I think, perhaps the most enlightened and thorough examination the subject has had in a very long time.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will pass on questions, because unfortunately I will be required to be in another hearing room in about 5 minutes. But I think that the experience that we had at Fort A.P. Hill indicates that this subject is one that is going to receive from the membership of the committee the kind of attention that the effort of the staff deserves.

So I thank them and I thank you.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Thank you, Senator Wilson.

Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me add my voice to others that congratulate you, Senator Goldwater, and you, Senator Nunn, for your leadership in this area. I also congratulate the staff.

We had a very interesting, indepth study of this organization a weekend or so ago which brought lots of things to light to this member of this committee. I think that the main message that we should send out is highlighted by the chart that I have here. It says, "A need for change."

I would only add to that, that it is time for a change. And I believe that the future hearings we are going to hold on this are tremendously important. But the fact is, I think the message has to go out loud and clear that the majority of the members of this committee are not satisfied with out present command and control structure, and that we are not blaming anyone. We are simply saying we think it is time for a change.

How much did you take into consideration in putting together your recommendations in the study that I served on, entitled "Toward a more effective defense," which was a product of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies? I thought there were a lot of good suggestions in that effort and I assume that part of their recommendations, if not a substantial part, were taken into consideration as you prepared this report for us.

Mr. **Locher**. Yes, sir; they certainly were. We believe that that study was very well done and the ideas that it presented have considerable merit. As we were conducting our work, we very carefully reviewed not only that final report, but many of the papers that were provided in preparing that report.

Senator **Exon**. Jim, thank you very much.

It seems to me that there are wise heads around this table that have been through many, many of these things, and I yield to their leadership on the details of this plan. I think, though, that we had better keep our focus on how far we can go toward legislating the attitudinal changes that some of us think are necessary.

Is it not true that basically the reason for this report and the reason for a need for a change is the fact that, above all else, we are worried about the interservice rivalries and how those influence military operation in time of crisis?

Has not the fact that there has been significant evidence that we have not had the necessary command and control structure due to these interservice rivalries? How much do you think we are going to influence this attitudinal problem? To what extent can legislative changes influence attitudes?

Is that an integral part of the concern that you had in developing this report?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir. I think that some of the structural changes that we have proposed will begin the process that is necessary within the Department of Defense. But there are a lot of other things that have to be done in terms of attitudes and orientations—the increased emphasis on interservice cooperation and coordination, different education and training programs, assignments between the services.

All of those things are going to have to take place. But we think that, in addition to the benefits of these structural changes, they will also promote some of these attitudinal changes that are necessary. And so while a lot of that cannot be done in legislation, I think the legislative history that is created and whatever report that this committee might decide to release could clearly indicate its intention in terms of changes in those areas as well.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, Jim. How much have we learned from history, not only our own military history but the military history of other countries?

I have been warned ever since I have been on this committee that never ever do we want to have a unified command such as the German staff system of previous wars. From my study of those previous wars, it seems to me that to a large extent the German Army high command, at least, was pretty effective.

I suspect that in World War II the main difficulty that the Germans had was the civilian leadership of Adolf Hitler, who frequently made decisions that hurt their overall war effort under the circumstances. But that is the way it is supposed to be, and that is why we have the President of the United States, the elected President, the Commander in Chief.

But talking about structure, how do the Soviets exercise command and control? I understand that they have a much more theater-oriented command system. How often do they change their theater commander or whatever they have that is in that particular title?

What do our NATO allies do, the British, the French, these other military powers? How much have we learned about and how much have you put into this report on what other leading military organizations have done to streamline and make more effective their structure.

Mr. LOCHER. Senator, we have not pulled lessons from other countries and tried to apply them to the United States. When we first started this effort, we did examine five other countries: The Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada. We found that the similarities between the organizational needs of the United States and Great Britain and Canada were the greatest.

The other powers are what we would call continental powers, in which one service has a tendency to dominate. And looking at the

Soviet Union, it is the army; and we have found that within the Soviet system there is much more community, much more centralized control, than we have within our system, where we have roughly three equal services and we have a lot of competition between them and a fair amount of independence within the services.

Senator EXON. That is a key point, Jim. We have three services. I think we must keep it that way. But I think it is the feeling of the majority on this committee that we have got to make those three services serve as one and eliminate, as much as possible, interservice rivalry.

So thank you for your report, and I am looking forward to the further hearings on this matter, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Just so everybody will recognize we are not abolishing one service, I think we have four.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, I was just making that in reference to Great Britain and Canada to simplify, where we have the maritime service, the air and land.

Senator NUNN. I understand exactly. I just did not want that to get out.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just ask Jim, if I could, to bring us down to a real concern that I have got and that has been expressed in this committee quite a few times. We have budgets presented to us, like this year we had a budget presented on February 1 by the Secretary of Defense where he asked for about a 6 percent growth in real terms in defense for 1986 and something over an 8 percent in 1987 and 1988.

And we have passed now a budget resolution indicating that we are having no real growth this year and perhaps 3 percent next year and 3 percent the year after. We have also passed Gramm-Rudman, which says we are going to do a lot less than 3 percent of real growth for the next 2 years.

The problem I have with that is that as we change those numbers and scale back those projections, we do not cancel any programs. We canceled the DIVAD this year, but that was the Secretary of Defense who did that.

We in the Congress do not seem to be very capable of canceling programs, and I just wonder if anything in your recommendations begins to get at that problem of us having plans made which seem to remain in place in spite of the fact that the resources available to carry out those plans turn out to be significantly less. I think that is one of the real problems we are going to have.

I know one of the first points that I heard Chairman Goldwater make when I got on this committee a couple of years ago was the fact that we have 16 production lines for naval aircraft and the inefficiency in that has to be addressed. It does not seem to ever get addressed very effectively in the budgets we receive.

Are these problems that your recommendations begin to help us with, or are these outside the scope?

Mr. LOCHER. No, sir, they are issues that we have looked at in the study and we have proposed some ideas. But the basic problem that we are talking about is that the Department of Defense starts out with unrealistic fiscal guidance, that they are assuming substantial real growth in the out years, greater than ever can be sustained throughout the budget process.

That produces this tendency for built-in growth and to start programs in the budget year which cannot be sustained in the out years. The problem is that the Department has a very highly structured planning, programming, and budgeting system that spreads over a 15-month period, where they go through and make very deliberate decisions as to what is going to happen.

But that process starts off assuming a rate of real growth of defense spending that cannot be sustained, and they go all the way through that cycle and when they get near the end it becomes obvious that either the President or the Office of Management and Budget or the Congress is going to reduce that spending. And very often some short-sighted financial decisions are made to push the problem out into the future.

For example, if we look at the 5-year defense plan in March 1981 and compare it in terms of what it was projecting for defense spending in each fiscal year to what the Congress eventually approved, it would be a total reduction of $159 billion.

So that means that programs that people were planning in March 1981 could not be sustained, and most of them have not been cut. The problems have been pushed out into the future.

And the point, Senator Bingaman, about the Congress is that in the last 3 years 70 percent of the reductions that the Congress has made have been to defer programs to the future, either through stretchouts or delays in terms of the starts.

It is a problem that we recognized. But part of it is the differences between the legislative and executive branches on national priorities. We believe that the process has got to start out with fiscal guidance that is much closer to the levels that are expected to be the result.

Senator BINGAMAN. And your recommendations will help us get a more realistic fiscal guidance to the Defense Department or to the various services who are drawing up their budgets as you see it, or not?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir; but again, that is something that probably cannot be accomplished through legislation. We have suggested that there be earlier Presidential review of the defense budget, so that he can get his input as to the top line of the Department, that the Department redo its budget when it gets a clear indication of congressional intent.

But these are all management things that will have to be done within the executive branch and probably cannot be mandated by the Congress.

Senator BINGAMAN. One of your five key recommendations is to shift Congress toward broad oversight and away from micromanagement. And then on page 611 and 612 of the study, you are more specific in your recommendations.

I know the first of those recommendations, about adopting a biannual budget process, was done in the defense authorization bill. Senator Nunn put an amendment on this year to require that that go forward in the submission that comes to us.

And the rest of those things that we can do without passing any laws, we just internally can fix that, at least in this committee; or what are you recommending we do in order to get the Congress to do its part of this job at least in a way that makes sense?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, I think that you are absolutely correct in that the vast majority of the recommendations that we have made in the chapter on congressional review and oversight could be done by management initiatives, many of them within this committee, in terms of the structure of the committee, in terms of the hearing process, and in terms of the level of detail that the committee will get into.

A lot of those could be done without changes in Senate rules or any legislation.

Senator BINGAMAN. That is all I had, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much.

I want to point out right now that the committee has not accepted or approved the staff study. It is open to debate. There will be no decisions made until we have had adequate hearings, allowing the Pentagon, members of defense, and academic types, to come in and discuss this.

I am sorry that Senator Hart had to leave, but he asked what the chances were of our accomplishing anything in a legislative way. If he were here and he were a betting man and I were a betting man, I would want odds.

Just to point out, Edward Luttwak concludes in his book: "Such is the paralyzing effect of long-decayed military bureaucracies that even the widest consensus on the need for reform does not yield any substantial remedy." Not that we necessarily buy that as conclusive, but it might solve our problems.

Now, Mr. Locher, in our speeches on the Senate floor, Senator Nunn and I made it clear that the Defense Department has already made some changes to strengthen the Joint Chiefs of Staff system and the unified commanders. In light of these improvements, why should Congress direct any further changes?

Mr. LOCHER. Mr. Chairman, it is our view that, while some improvements have been made, they fall far short of the kinds of changes and improvements that are necessary in the Department of Defense. There have been some improvements in terms of the analytical capability available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in terms of the inputs of the unified commanders into the resource allocation processs. But we believe that these changes are relatively minor compared to the much more substantial changes that are needed in the Department of Defense.

We are not denying that the trends are in the right direction. We are just saying that more needs to be done.

Chairman GOLDWATER. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff will undoubtedly receive a great deal of our consideration.

It seems to me that the advice of professional military officers has often been neglected. Is that correct?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, it has.

Chairman GOLDWATER. How would your recommendations affect the influence of the professional military advice?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, our recommendations are to strengthen the professional military advice that is offered to higher civilian authority. We are looking for ways that the quality of that advice can be improved and that the best possible advice can be provided to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. So our objective is to overcome this problem that we have had in the past, that professional military advice has not received the kind of consideration that it should.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Would that be true both in peace and in war?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, it would.

Chairman GOLDWATER. But more particularly, it has been in war in the last several instances?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, I would say because of the nature of these operational problems that the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally during crises has probably gotten more attention than their formal advice during peacetime. But we are essentially saying that we would like to improve the advice that is offered in both peacetime and in wartime situations.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Some people may get it in their heads that the staff, and particularly the chairman, might be opposed to the idea of the civilian being dominant. And I just want to read from page 25 on civilian control of the military. This is going to dominate our thinking, I am sure:

> An examination of the soundness of civil-military relations is essential to any study of the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense. More than any other institutional issue, the relationships between civilian and military authorities on the United States military establishment are key to sustaining American democracy.
>
> Since the founding of the nation, civilian control of the military has been an absolute and unquestioned principle. The Virginia Declaration of Rights of June 12, 1776, stated this principle as follows: "In all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by civil power." The Constitution incorporates this principle. Both the President and the Congress were given power and responsibilities to ensure civilian supremacy.
>
> Despite the importance of the concept of civilian control, it remains ill-defined and poorly understood. As Samuel Huntington stated in 1957 in his book, 'The Soldier and the State': "The role of the military in society has been frequently discussed in terms of civilian control. Yet this concept has never been satisfactorily defined."

I might say to the staff and my brother members of the committee that I am hopeful that after the hearings on this subject, regardless of what happens, the American people will take a better interest in their relationship to the military and the problems that the overbearing influence of civilian control can have and has had during war.

I consider this to be a very important subject. I am merely bringing these things up so that we can establish at the outset some of the basic parameters that I see.

Another important topic that we are going to be discussing is mission integration. And I read from page 80 of the book:

> "Mission integration" can be defined as the efforts by joint organizations, those that have a multi-service perspective—Office of the Secretary of Defense, organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other unified commands—to aggregate the capabilities of the four services in a manner to provide the most effective combat forces to fulfill the major military missions of DOD.
>
> In his paper "The United States Military Chain of Command," Present and Future; General W.Y. Smith, United States Air Force Retired, cites the need for mission integration as follows: "To be prepared to defend United States interests, however, the separate services must be melded together in an integrated fighting team."

I am bringing that up at this time to the staff, the committee as a whole and to the public, that we are a rather unusual military nation in that we have to worry about four separate commands, each one of them performing sometimes dual, sometimes triple, sometimes quadruple missions. The problem before us is going to be to a major degree the proper integration.

Mr. Locher, almost everybody seems to agree that there are too many layers of bureaucracy and command in the Defense Department. What did you conclude in this area?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, we agreed with the views that have been expressed in numerous other studies and in books, that there are too many layers, both in the bureaucracy, on the administrative side, and in the command side. One of our proposals is to remove one of the three layers in the top management, headquarters of the Department of Defense, by integrating the service Secretaries and the military headquarters staffs.

One of our recommendations with respect to the unified commands is removing the service component commanders from the operational chain of command, which would shorten the chain of command and put the unified commander more directly in control of the operating forces.

So our study recognizes this criticism and agrees with it, and many of the proposals that we have put forth would seek to solve these problems.

Chairman GOLDWATER. We have often discussed in committee the need for better management in our procurement area. The Navy, I must say, has done a very fine job, and the other services are following. It has been suggested that we assign a field grade officer to management responsibilities, and that we assign only those people who want to volunteer for that service. He would remain in that capacity throughout his career, but his promotions would average that of the rest of his class or staff.

Would that have any bearing on what you have been talking about, or is it something we should consider later?

Mr. LOCHER. Those kinds of initiatives with respect to program management and other military officers in the acquisition process were not addressed in this study. They are referenced in an appendix to our chapter on the acquisition process, but we feel that they are more appropriately addressed by Senator Quayle's subcommittee on the acquisition process. So we have not given them attention in this study.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I might point out that, while we have not gone into the acquisition process as deeply as some people think we might have or should have. It is not really one of the major problems that confront the defense in my estimation.

[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene immediately in executive session, and continued the hearing at 11:50 a.m.]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. First I would like to say, you know of my great respect for you and Mr. Nunn, and I hope I have not been too obstreperous today. But I purposely have stayed out of the study so that I could be a free agent and to offer constructive criticism.

And I pay respect to you, Mr. Locher, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Finn. As our Harry Truman said, if you can't take the heat, get out of the kitchen. You have taken the heat. You have taken it admirably. But we may disagree.

Let us start with integrating the staffs of the service Secretaries and the CNO. Are you suggesting that a service Secretary and the CNO share a mutual and common staff?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, we are.

Senator WARNER. Who is going to select that staff?

Mr. LOCHER. Essentially, the staff will be selected by the service Secretary.

Senator WARNER. Then you have really stripped the service Chief down to his skivvy drawers, because that is the source of his power, is his staff. And there is a strong competitive force between those two staffs, and that, in my judgment inures to the benefit of the overall service.

But this is a discussion that will take too long for us to thrash out. I just want to make it clear that you have that in mind.

Let us go back to the——

Mr. LOCHER. Senator Warner, in that regard, I believe that almost all of those appointments in the military headquarters staffs, while they may be the recommendations of the service Chiefs, eventually have to be approved by the service Secretary.

Senator WARNER. Well, there is some mutuality there. But the service Secretary has four assistants, one for manpower, one for science, and so forth, and their counterparts in the uniformed side. And indeed, the service Secretary usually acquiesces as a matter of courtesy when the Chief of the service asks that a certain flag or general officer be designated his counterpart for manpower and the like.

But the consolidation of one staff to represent those two men I think has the seeds of some very strong dissension. But let us go back to the question of the example you gave of the operation in chain of command in connection with the tragedy of the loss of the marines in the barracks there in Beirut.

I studied that, and you are accurate about the decision, the way it works its way up. How would your set of proposals change that, using loss of marines as an example, that tragedy?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, essentially our proposals do not address the specifics in terms of the lower elements of the chain of command. What we have essentially proposed is that the unified commander be given the authority to create the chains of command and the unification, additional joint subordinate organizations as he feels are necessary to carry out the missions that are facing him.

So in that regard, while we have recognized the considerable criticism of the lengthy chain of command in operational matters, we do not specifically propose solutions other than to clarify the authority of the unified commander to arrange his command in the most appropriate manner.

Senator WARNER. Well then, that means the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have a different organizational structure, basically, than the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir, he could.

Senator WARNER. Given then the flexibility to devise the number of reporting chains and layers that each desires?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. And then as that office is rolled over, which it is every 3 years roughly, the new incumbent could go back to the old system or change it again from his predecessor?

Mr. LOCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. We would have constant change depending upon who was designated Commander in Chief, Atlantic Forces and Pacific?

Mr. LOCHER. Not only would we have change based possibly upon the individuals who occupied those positions, but we also might have change based upon changes in the threat.

Senator WARNER. Well, I was interested in Senator Hart's observation about whether or not we are trying to set up here and legislate how people act and what they can do, and we all know that we cannot do that. But sometimes it seems to me that if we have the right man in the right place at the right time, under the existing framework I think they can do a credible job. And indeed, we saw that in the Mediterranean this week.

I think there is much to be said about some examination of changes, Mr. Chairman and Senator Nunn. And we are proceeding I think in a very constructive way, and I commend the Chair and the ranking minority member.

But we have singled out the *Pueblo*, we have singled out certain other chapters which are not distinguished in our military history, but nevertheless this system has given us 40 years of peace in Europe, which has been historically the principal battleground on which this Nation has suffered its greatest losses, that together with the Pacific war. And if you go back in history, in all probability Vietnam and Korea, the unsatisfactory portions of that were written by the politicians and not the military.

And here we go. Let us wish us all luck, and see if we can do it in a manner that can be constructive and helpful.

Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. With respect to the Senator's remarks about Beirut, I remember when the President said he was going to send the Marines over, and I called him up and I told him I thought he was making a mistake. I did not get very far. He wanted to know why, and I said, you are not sending enough. And that turned out to be right.

Senator WARNER. Well, this whole question of the advice and what is followed and what is not followed is implicit in these recommendations. And certainly the Presidents have had the flexibility to reach down and talk to whomever they wish.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Well, he outranks me.

Senator WARNER. He is the Commander in Chief.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I have only got two stars. He has got 10.

Senator WARNER. You are implying that the present law and regulation impedes the free flow of advice from senior military to the decisionmakers, namely the Secretary of Defense and the President?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, what we are saying is that the advice that is provided to the senior decisionmakers is not the best possible advice.

Senator WARNER. Why? In a short sentence, is it the law?

Mr. LOCHER. It is not the law, although there are aspects of the law that contribute to it. But basically, we are talking about the organizational arrangements which inhibit the development of clearly independent joint military advice for the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Senator WARNER. So it is not the law, it is not the regulation; it is the organizational structure?

Mr. LOCHER. To the extent that the law creates the Joint Chiefs of Staff as five equals, pulling the service Chiefs as dual-headed members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you could say it is the law that is the problem.

But essentially we are talking about the system, a system that asks the service Chiefs to do something which in our view is often very unrealistic.

Senator WARNER. Well then, looking at the doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and legislative branch, what authority do we in the legislative branch have in telling the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President, that his organizational structure is broken?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, we have the responsibilities under the Constitution to provide for the rules and regulations of the Armed Forces. All of the positions—the Department of Defense is a creation of the Congress. All of these positions are specified in law, and the Congress has essentially specified the current organizational arrangements.

Senator WARNER. But your outline says very little of this is subject to needed legislation.

Mr. LOCHER. So what we are essentially saying is that this study is very broad, as Senator Tower and Senator Jackson directed that it be, and that we were looking at many areas that are inappropriate for legislation. We have done so simply to provide to the committee a comprehensive context in which to decide what needs legislation and within that area what is to be done.

For example, our entire investigation of the planning, programming, and budgeting system, most of it is the internal decisionmaking process of the Department of Defense and we think it would be inappropriate for the Congress to tell the Secretary how to organize that process. But we have examined it because in that process many of the organizational deficiencies have been evident.

Senator WARNER. Well, I have had my fair share.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Let me just follow that up. I really think in this whole subject we will find that the Commander in Chief has the power to do a lot of what we want to do.

Senator WARNER. And what we are doing is serving as an advisory panel?

Chairman Goldwater. That is about it.

Senator NUNN. We may advise through changes in the law. [Laughter.]

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Nunn, this outline said on page 3: "Only a small portion of the study's 91 recommendations could be properly implemented through legislation."

Senator **Nunn**. Now let me just give you an example there. I do think a lot of it is beyond the reach of legislation, but I think an awful lot of results may flow from 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 maybe less than 10 changes in the statute.

Let me give you an example now of the way I see it, and this is the unified command structure out there. I do not think we ought to specify the exact chain of command between the unified commander and the component commanders, but I do believe we ought to take a look at the regulation which is in writing, that has flowed since 1948, the so-called Unified Action Armed Forces, the UNAAF.

And let me show you what a commander-in-chief out there in the field, remember, these are the guys, these are the Bernie Rodgers and the other people around the world, who have to fight. Here is what his relationship is with his component commanders, meaning the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. This is by regulation:

> Operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the service component commanders or through the commanders of subordinate commands established in accordance with the procedures and criteria set forth herein. Unless authorized by the establishing authority, the unified commander will not also act as the commander of any of the service components or other subordinate commands.

Now, they have given him authority over them and they have taken it away, all in three sentences. Now, let me go further:

> In exercising operational command, the unified commander shall take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibilities of his service component commanders. Commanders of service components will communicate directly with their respective chiefs of service on matters which are the responsibilities of the military departments and services.

That is the most bizarre set of instructions that I have ever seen given to anybody, civilian or military. The first sentence is rendered absolutely negatory by the rest of the paragraph. And this is the fellow or these are the fellows around the world that have to fight, and they have got to fight with those service component commanders. And this is an example.

Now, I do not think we ought to set forth in the statute, for instance—I do not know what Mr. Locher and Mr. Smith and Mr. Finn think about this. I do not think we ought to write that, but I think we ought to direct that it be rewritten.

And that is the difference between what I consider legislating the details of this and saying, look, there is a problem, this is mind-boggling, sit back down and rewrite it, tell us what it really means.

Senator **Warner**. I share the Senator's view on that. I think that is a very constructive piece of criticism.

Senator **Nunn**. I have a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Go right ahead.

Senator **Nunn**. You and I and Senator Warner have about worn everybody else out here.

Congressional problems. You went through examples of what is wrong, and of course I agree. I think we are micromanaging and overlooking the broader picture. We are not serving as the kind of board of directors that we ought to be.

But now, what specific changes are you recommending in the way we go about congressional oversight of the Pentagon?

Mr. LOCHER. Senator Nunn, I think the most important change that we have recommended is going to a 2-year budget, which would give the Congress the opportunity in the out year to spend a considerable amount of time in conducting oversight of the Department of Defense and its policies and strategy.

The other changes that we have recommended to a great extent can be carried out by management initiatives of the leadership in the Congress, whether they are subcommittee chairmen, full committee chairmen, and ranking minority members, the leadership in the two bodies. We are talking about a shift of focus in terms of the subcommittee structure, in terms of the hearings that are held, in terms of the amount of detail that the committee goes into, in terms of the number of questions that are proposed for the record and the number of reports that are requested from the Department of Defense.

Sir, it is those management initiatives where we see the greatest potential for correcting the problems of the Department of Defense.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Locher, in fairness to you, since you have got three people sitting at the table, as they used to say when they polled a jury, you are going to be shot at, and I want to ask Mr. Smith and Mr. Finn if they generally agree with these recommendations in the staff report. Mr. Finn?

Mr. FINN. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I generally agree, yes.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Locher, you now have company.

We have used a lot of examples. I have used some in terms of Grenada, and we have talked about the Iranian rescue mission, and we have talked about the *Mayaguez* and Vietnam and other things.

Is there a way to separate out how much of the problems that were experienced in some of those scenaries, how much of that is related to organization versus how much is related to simply the problems in any kind of war, the problems of confusion, too little time, human failure, those kind of things?

How do you separate out that in any kind of objective sense? How do we know, or why do you conclude, that changing the organization will make it better in the future as opposed to perhaps some other problems?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, there are some elements of the confusion of war that has created some of these problems. I think there is substantial evidence that some organizational changes would improve our ability to conduct joint operations. When we have forces from the Army and the Navy and they cannot communicate with each other, I think we are talking about problems that come from an organizational base.

We have seen that the current decisionmaking procedures at the policymaking level of the Department of Defense do not clearly identify the inter-operability needs of our forces in the field. They do not identify critical gaps in war-fighting capabilities because they are not focused upon missions.

They do not devote the funding that is needed for joint training. We are not developing that kind of joint doctrine. So we have forces out there in the field that do not understand how each other operate, and cannot communicate with each other. The forces are not inter-operable since they cannot communicate.

Senator NUNN. Now where are you getting this from? Is this from your own observations? Is this from conversations with people in the field? What is the evidence for that?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, it is based upon the record of operational deficiencies and upon the comments that we have received in our extensive set of interviews and all of the things that we have read.

Mr. SMITH. Senator Nunn, I might add that with respect to Grenada, for example, we have had access to the after-action reports of the services and those after-action reports thoroughly document the need for some of the changes that Mr. Locher suggests, and that many of these problems have their routes in organizational shortcomings.

Senator NUNN. Are those organizational shortcomings made clear in some of those reports?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Senator NUNN. For instance?

Mr. SMITH. Well, for instance, the lack of interoperability of communications can be traced to many of these things. I would quote General Nutting in a question that you asked him when he appeared before our committee in March 1985. You asked a question as to why there was a lack of communications interoperability between the services.

General Nutting, who was the commander in chief of the Readiness Command, said:

> It is a function of the way we prepare for war, and that is the fact the law charges each military department to organize, train and equip forces to operate in a peculiar environment for which it is responsible. That is too simple an answer, but that is where it begins, with the way we prepare for war.

So the services' themselves senior officers have recognized these problems.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Locher, if we got into some kind of global war, and I am not speaking of nuclear now, but a two- or three-front war around the world in the conventional sense, one of the roles of the services Chiefs, because they know where the resources are and they are responsible for the resources, the training, and so forth, one of their roles is to advise the Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief or President how you allocate those resources, whether it is the Pacific first or the Atlantic first, whether it is the Mediterranean.

And of course that goes back to World War II and even beyond. There were all sorts of problems even back then. But now, if there was no Joint Chiefs as we know it today, if you had the service Chiefs, not members of the JCS, who would make those recommendations on military advice as to how you allocate resources in a global kind of conflict?

Mr. LOCHER. Sir, essentially those recommendations would be made by this joint military advisory council that we have proposed.

And obviously the service Chief would be the most knowledgeable person on the capabilities and programs of the service.

But we believe that the members of this joint military advisory council could almost be as knowledgeable as the service Chiefs. Obviously they would have to spend a lot of time keeping current with what is going on in each service, but they will also have the joint staff that they could rely on.

The joint staff is continually getting information from the services as to their capabilities and programs. So our view is that that kind of advice that will be necessary in a global war for those sorts of tradeoffs and priorities could be received by the Secretary of Defense and the President from this joint military advisory council.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I will have a lot of other questions later, but that is all I have today.

I want to add my thanks to the staff for working overtime for about 2 years on this report. You have done a tremendous job. All of us reserve our judgment on the specific recommendations, but I think you have pointed out problem areas that must be addressed; and I think you have done not only this committee, but the Senate and the Congress and our national security, a great service.

So I appreciate the efforts of all of you, and your assistants who are not at the table this morning.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I want to join with Senator Nunn in commending the study that you have done. In fact, I think this book can well become a textbook in military schools and colleges. This is the first study ever that has gone into such detail of experiences and the results of those experiences of our military system.

After we hold the proper hearings, which we intend to do—if we get the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders to come over here, take off their military suits and become American citizens, I think we can get some answers that will result in making this thing work.

You have done a great job and I want to thank you, not as a Senator and a former military person, but as an American citizen, for what you have done.

With that, the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, East, Wilson, Denton, Gramm, Nunn, Hart, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, and Glenn.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Patrick A. Tucker, counsel; and Gerald D. Strickler, printing and documents clerk; John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., David S. Lyles, and Carl M. Smith, professional staff members; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; John L. Roddy, assistant to Senator East; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Fred Curtis Erixon, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Deforest Hamilton, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; William S. Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER

Chairman GOLDWATER. The meeting will come to order.

Today we begin a series of hearings on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense and the Congress.

As I have repeatedly said, this is one of the most important national security issues of our day. Earlier this fall, Senator Nunn and I delivered a series of speeches on the Senate floor describing organization problems in the Department of Defense and the Congress.

On October 16 the committee staff presented a lengthy staff study that represents nearly 2½ years of work and, in my view, is the most comprehensive study of the subject ever done in the 200-odd years of our history.

I know, Secretary Weinberger, that you have an early appointment this morning. Your statement implies that you have not completely studied the matter and will want to come back.

There are people around town that do not think we are serious about this, or that this is just another political gesture. I want to assure you that we are going to do this. It is our responsibility according to the Constitution, and I think the most important thing that the Armed Services Committee of the Senate has ever undertaken.

I only have 1 more year with this committee. I made the statement that it is the most important task I have ever undertaken and I am not going to leave here with this thing dragging its feet.

You might as well tell your boys over there to get ready because we are going to do all we can to help you reorganize.

As Senator Nunn and I said when the study was released, it does not represent the views of any member of this committee and we do not necessarily endorse any or all of its recommendations. However, it is my belief that the study is an excellent analysis and today we begin serious considerations of the recommendations made in that study.

Since the report was released, I have received a considerable amount of mail, nearly all of it favorable. Among them, the most satisfied are the letters from current and former servicemen and women who share the concern that the organization of the Department of Defense needs overhauling.

I do not intend to repeat all of the things I said on the floor or that I said in my opening statement prior to the release of the staff study. However, I would like to highlight that the problems we are examining today go back to the Spanish-American War. They were evident in World War II, the Vietnam war, the Korean war, the seizure of the *Pueblo*, the Iranian rescue mission and Grenada.

As I have said many times, and I know you disagree with me, the system is broke and needs to be fixed. I will say it is bent quite a bit. We just want to straighten it out.

As the former Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird said:

> This neglect of organizational issues particularly organization of the military command structure, is self-defeating. Without an effective command structure, no level of defense spending will be sufficient to meet the needs of the Nation's security.

The review we are conducting is an effort to look at the organization structure of the Department to see what changes should be made to improve the effectiveness of our military forces.

I am sure you will agree with me that in this dangerous world it is absolutely imperative that we have the strongest and most effective military force. Our men and women in uniform deserve it, our Nation must have it, and the free world must have it. Without it, we will have no free world and no United States.

We are privileged to have here this morning Secretary Weinberger as our leadoff witness in a series of hearings which will continue through the second week of December. The purpose of this hearing is not to debate the question, "Is the system broke?"

We have spent 2½ years reviewing that question and we are convinced the system is broken. The series of hearings we begin today will try to get at the more difficult question of how do we fix it.

Future witness will include the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the Service Secretaries, and a number of former military and civilian defense officials.

At the conclusion of these hearings we will draft legislation which we will introduce when Congress returns in January.

I might add, Mr. Secretary, that I feel that the President in his role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces can accomplish most of the things that we find deficit.

I propose, Mr. Secretary, that we conduct this process in a spirit of cooperation and not confrontation. I want to emphasize that this study is not directed at any Democratic or Republican administration. It is not directed at any particular secretary or any particular man in uniform.

As you know, it goes back years and years. It is nothing new. The air universities review this month was devoted to the constant need for reform.

I want to thank you for appearing before us this morning. I know you have to leave at 10:45, so I do not want to take any more time.

Before you begin, I would like to ask Senator Nunn if he has an opening statement.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I do not have a long statement, but I do want to make a few comments.

Mr. Chairman, you and I have spoken out in public many times on this issue. We have outlined the problems in the Department of Defense as we see them and have expressed our view that many of these problems have their roots in organizational shortcomings and in history.

We first stated that Congress is not without fault and indeed has created many problems for the Department of Defense.

It is our duty to try to straighten those out. It is our duty to try to take on the broader issues you have outlined. We have stated organizational changes are needed, both in the Department of Defense and the Congress to ensure that the superb young men and women we have in the military today have an organizational structure that enables them to maximize their contribution.

We have an excellent staff study that is the focal point of the hearings that we are beginning this morning. That staff study outlines many problems that go way back in history. I think we ought to commend our staff headed by Jim Locher, Rick Finn, and Jeff Smith for their diligent and excellent work over the last couple of years.

I completely subscribe to your statement, Mr. Chairman, that we have not endorsed the recommendations of the staff, but we did ask them to make recommendations because we do need a focal point and that is the beginning point, not necessarily the ending point where we will come out in terms of recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, let me repeat again briefly what our effort is not. It is not a referendum on the stewardship of Secretary Weinberger or any particular individual or any administration. It is not an effort to cut the defense budget.

Critics of the present level of defense spending should not seize on our effort to improve the effectiveness of the Department of Defense as a device to champion lower defense spending. That debate has to take place in the framework of the overall budget, deficit and fiscal problems, and so forth.

Certainly this reorganization effort is not part of any effort to cut the defense budget. It is an effort to make our dollars more effective. It is an effort to make our young men and women in the military more effective. It is an effort to get the all-star teams we have out there really to work together as one team.

We do have a lot of all-stars in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The real challenge is to pull them together and have them able to operate in small battles as well as large battles as a team, a smoothly coordinated team.

We need to strengthen the people in the overall Department of Defense that have joint responsibility. Mr. Secretary, you have joint responsibility. There are not many individuals that have that joint responsibility, but they need strengthening and they need to be able to carry out their duties and carry them out effectively.

Mr. Chairman, in recent years the Department of Defense has itself focused on some of these problems, not all of them, but some of them. During Secretary Weinberger's tenure there have been improvements and I think we ought to commend the Secretary and his colleagues for the improvements that have been made.

In particular, I have in mind the initiative of May 1984 between the Army and the Air Force to institutionalize a joint force development process. That agreement listed some 34 initiatives which are designed to increase Army and Air Force cooperation.

The Navy and the Air Force have also begun to coordinate more with respect to maritime and joint air operations and during the course of these hearings I want to go into some detail in that regard because the top level agreements are extremely important.

It is also important to see where the links are made at the lower level that is a key to whether the operations can work.

In addition, in the last few years the commanders in chief of the Unified Commands have been given an increased role in the Defense Resource Board and I think that is good, thus giving them an increased voice in the resource allocation process.

These are steps in the right direction. We have a lot further to go in that direction, but I think we should acknowledge that some progress has been made.

As you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, the committee does not necessarily endorse the recommendations of the staff study. We have an open mind as to what changes are needed. This series of hearings that we initiate this morning is important because we will hear from a distinguished list of current and former officials and other experts who will provide us their counsel as to what changes are needed.

I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership, vision, and courage as we begin this process. I am as dedicated as anyone can be in working with you in making sure that we not only introduce this legislaton, but that we complete this effort during your tenure in office here in the U.S. Senate.

I think it is very important that we get started early next year. I frankly believe this effort is just as important as the Defense authorization bill next year. If we have not completed the bill by the time the Defense authorization bill comes up, it seems to me it ought to be a part of that authorization bill.

I would hope, however, based on the progress that already has been made in the House—they have undertaken a similar effort. They have not gone into as much breadth and studied as many different factors of this issue as we have, but they have thoroughly addressed the issue of the Joint Chiefs and, in fact, they have been in front of that issue for the last 3 years.

They have a separate bill which has already passed their committee. It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, after our meeting with some of the House leadership yesterday that they will try to bring that bill up this year, perhaps in the next few days, and we will hope to have a separate bill so that we can join them in conference next year.

It is also my hope that the House will undertake some hearings on some of these broader issues like the Department of Defense, like the commanders in chief in the field, like the Service Secretaries and the staff.

All of these items need to be addressed, too, so that when we get a more comprehensive bill in conference, we will be on a parallel track with the House. I am hoping we will have a separate bill that will be able to pass the committee and the Senate early next year and I hope we will be in conference on that bill with the House.

Mr. Chairman, again thank you for your leadership. We look forward to hearing from Secretary Weinberger this morning.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. I have no statement.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Kennedy.

Senator **Kennedy**. No statement.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Gramm.

Senator **Gramm**. Mr. Chairman, we came here to listen to Secretary Weinberger, but I would like to make a few comments.

First of all, I would like to make it clear that it has been from the very beginning the uniform opinion of the people working on this problem that you, Mr. Secretary, are doing a better job in managing the Department of Defense than we have ever done before, and that we are better prepared today to defend America's interest and freedom than we have ever been.

Great progress has been made on interoperability. Our goal is to try to improve on the progress we have made in the last 5 years. I think there is unity of opinion here that the unified commanders who would have to fight a future war should be stronger, should have more ability in peacetime to participate in decisions that are made that affect their warfighting capacity.

I think there is concern here about trying to "de-McNamarize" the Department of Defense. There is great concern about duplication in the bureaucracy. There is concern about the service Secretaries and the duplication of functions that clearly have historically been assigned to them, recruitment training and supplies, and I believe that a move toward decentralization in those areas can benefit the Pentagon in terms of efficiency.

I think it is more important, Mr. Chairman, that we work together, that we have a unity of purpose. Our objective here is to make the American defense force the most effective that it has ever been, more effective than it is today, and I think that is a desire that we share with you and with the President.

I am hoping that we can have a unity of purpose, that we can develop a plan that all of us support, and that we can work together and try to see that not only do we get the maximum return on our defense money, but that we use the resources that we have in the most effective way.

Chairman GOLDWATER. John.

Senator GLENN. I have no statement.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Thurmond, do you have a statement?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and Senator Nunn for holding this series of hearings and to commend you both for the work you have done to complete a task that was begun by former Chairman John Tower and the late Senator Scoop Jackson.

In my more than three decades in the Senate, most of the problem areas identified in your report have been said at one time or another in discussions with senior military and civilian leaders within the Department of Defense, but never before have such painstaking efforts been taken to assemble and analyze these difficulties.

I feel that the analysis is sound. While we may disagree on recommendations for change, this report provides an excellent background for formulation of legislative initiatives.

Mr. Chairman, in your recent letter you indicated that this effort may be the most important contribution that we make to our Nation's security in our lifetime. I agree with you. In fact, I feel that this initiative is so important that I hope that you and Senator Nunn will agree to make completion of this effort the first order of business for the committee, even if it means setting aside consideration of the fiscal year 1987 Department of Defense authorization bill until the first time we completely review this matter.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say very briefly that I think we are fortunate if we are going to review the Department of Defense organization that we have two Senators, you and Senator Nunn, who have had so much experience from the point of view of the Senate and you, Senator Goldwater, from service experience, so well qualified to address the issue.

I think we have a Secretary of Defense who stands out from many over the past decades. In the last weekend I was with the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, former Secretary of State Haig, who had a career in the military, also one of the current chiefs of staff of the services. All three of them, as well as myself, from the relativity of observation of 34 years in the military, all of us agreed that Secretary Weinberger stands out.

So, I hope that we take advantage of this opportunity because we can always find ways to make improvement. I think all of us have enough common sense here not to want to make change for change's sake or act in haste and repent at leisure, and maybe add more bureaucracy.

I am not sure we were not in pretty good shape before 1946. We fought a pretty good war in World War II in terms of what the Secretary mentioned in his statement, centralized policy formation and decentralized operation and control.

I think since that time we have come away from that with disastrous results. I look forward to improvement. I hope it is with sufficient deliberation and time and sufficient consultation with enough witnesses with experience over the years in the Pentagon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Thank you very much.

OK. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary **Weinberger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is, as always, a great privilege and honor to appear before your committee and certainly as you commence your deliberations concerning the reorganization of our Department. I commend you for undertaking this critical review. I appreciate your staff's hard work.

I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for setting this meeting this early. We do have many, many meetings at the White House in connection with the preparations for Geneva, at 11 o'clock. I appreciate very much your indulgence in getting this early start here and, obviously, because of the importance of this subject matter, I will be delighted to come any time you wish and stay as long as you like to talk about and work on these matters because, of course, sound organization of the Department is vitally important to our Nation's security.

It is directly related to the effectiveness of the defense and peacekeeping efforts. We are taking, obviously, this initiative of yours very seriously. I think it is fully consistent with my early and continuing commitment and that of President Reagan which was to improve the capabilities and the effectiveness and the efficiency of our Armed Forces.

We will continue this effort in which we have been actively engaged since 1981. In these brief prepared remarks, I will try to provide our general reactions to the staff report which was released last month. We are in the process of reviewing each of the more than 100 recommendations contained in that report and, of course, we are pleased to participate in your own process of evaluation here.

As you indicated, we are not quite prepared at this time to discuss each of the specific recommendations in detail because they are very long and their scope is very wide, but I would like to report to you on our approach to it and how we are doing it.

We started our evaluation of the report immediately after it was first given to us on October 16. Our evaluation is still going on, but it has gone far enough to recognize there are many recommendations we support, some we can support with modification, some which we think are important enough to deserve further discussions and clarification or some adjustment before we can take a position, some we believe would have a net harmful effect on the Nation's security, so we would not be able to adopt those.

It appears that we may want to support a substantial number of the recommendations. For example, we concur with the recommendation to reduce micromanagement of Department business which has increased dramatically.

Between fiscal years 1970 and 1985 the number of reports and studies requested by the Congress increased from 36 to 458, an increase of almost 1,200 percent, with no apparent end in sight. It seems to go up almost exponentially.

We recognize that such oversight is appropriate where matters of broad policy and program accountability are involved. However, in many instances issues of this nature are not involved.

Many of these studies and reports are quite complex and time-consuming. Moreover, the time and energy devoted to their completion distract from higher priority projects within the Department.

We also agree that every effort should be made to reduce micromanagement attempts by the staff within the Pentagon, as well as in the Congress. Indeed, I would like to offer a challenge to you today which I am also prepared to accept.

The challenge is to make substantial reductions in the size of the Department staffs. However, this cannot be achieved unless we reduce substantially some of the hearing, reporting, and regulatory requirements imposed by Congress.

I will be willing to work with you over the next months to find constructive ways to meet this challenge for reductions on a man-hour for man-hour basis.

In other words, if we can eliminate so many of the reports, and so on, and reduce that number of man-hours, we would be delighted to reduce the staffs by that amount.

We will not be able to reach such a quick consensus on some of the other recommendations, such as those involving the provision of military advice to the National Command Authority, and the structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In these instances, we intend to give each recommendation careful consideration so that we can pursue these issues with you in the best interests of national security.

Our record of constructive change. Neither the Department as an institution, nor I, oppose change. Indeed, we favor change whenever it is called for. We have repeatedly demonstrated this by the changes through our innovation and initiatives over the last 5 years. We have made a lot of innovations and a lot of initiatives which started since that time.

Upon taking office, I necessarily adopted the management style and principles which I considered best suited to the complexities of the Department and its mission, and the unique requirements and necessity we faced to rebuild our defenses as quickly as possible, after a decade in which our military investment had declined by 20 percent.

I have stressed a management philosophy which tries to strike a proper balance between centralized policy formulation, and decentralized operations to ensure both accountability by those who are responsible for executing programs and the necessary authority to carry out these programs. This has been much criticized. A lot of people have taken the position that decentralization means that we hand over everything to several other people and walk away.

We believe this approach has contributed greatly to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department, and to the speedy execution of these large new tasks we have undertaken. We have tried to give people who have the responsibility the necessary authority. This emphatically does not involve not giving supervision and not giving direction and not setting policy in the first place.

We do all of these things. Once that is done, we do turn it over to people who have the responsibility, watch them very carefully, but give them the authority to carry it out. It is basically, Mr. Chairman, a philosophy and practice which I have used since I have had the opportunity to manage these large ventures.

I started with the Federal Trade Commission with that when we found the regional offices of the Commission had no authority whatever, not even to make a phone call, literally, without specific approval from Washington.

So, we have gradually tried to do a decentralization that involves giving authority to people who need it to execute policy, setting the policy centrally and supervising the execution centrally.

We have tried also to keep an appropriate balance of civilian and military advice. My key advisers include both military and civilian officials who are represented on the Armed Forces Policy Council, the Defense Resources Board, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council and other top-level management groups.

Both military and civilian leadership have personal access to my office and I listen to the advice of each with great interest and respect, and benefit greatly from it, and follow a great deal of it.

The quality of advice presented by the Joint Chiefs has been challenged. I have found their advice to be consistently timely and accurate and competent and innovative. This differs from some of the reports in your staff study, but I feel it incumbent on me to report to you my own experience with these gentlemen which has been extraordinarily good.

On change, we have made significant changes, as I have said. Some were planned and others were necessitated as a result of internal reviews or with the occurrence of specific problems.

For example, we redesigned and strengthened the strategic planning process. At the outset of this administrator, I worked with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to charter the Strategic Concepts Development Center, which provides expert advice to both of us on a confidential basis.

It was clear to me there was not going to be enough time for the Secretary and people in charge to do enough thinking long range. So, we charted this Strategic Concept Development Center, made up of the ablest academic people we could find and they provided expert advice to the Chairman and me and others on a confidential basis and it has been very useful.

We made significant improvements in the planning, programming, and budgeting process. Our new approach enhances participation to top DOD officials and service line managers, and ensures that the military advice of not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also the Unified and Specified Commanders, is heard and fully considered.

A major change in this regard has been the strengthening of the Defense Resource Board to include the service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff, with direct input several times a year from the Unified and Specified Commanders.

What I have tried to do is to incorporate in the defense budgeting preparation process the same techniques and methods I used when I was in the Office of Management and Budget which was to have regular and comprehensive hearings involving all of the people involved in proposing, spending, and considering the funds requested and to try to get from that process a synthesis of these opinions.

We have also conducted a comprehensive review of the acquisition process to make it more efficient, to get deliveries sooner, to improve program stability and to revitalize our industrial base.

We have also adopted a practice I used in the private sector, that is the performance reviews at frequent intervals to prevent overruns on each of our key programs and to address related management issues. We do this with all the major weapons systems. They are held about every 2 to 3 weeks. Basically, the agenda is only two questions: Are you on schedule?

Are you within budget and if not, why not?

I might say, Mr. Chairman, that just the basic preparation for those meetings has a very salutary effect on all the people concerned with the projection. We are able to identify anything that is going to cause an overrun very early.

That, I think, has been very vital in keeping these programs on budget and in reducing the cost increases that have been reported irregularly in the past with major weapons systems running around 13 to 15 percent annually. These cost increases on major weapon systems are now below 1 percent and in some cases are minus. That, I think has been useful.

I have also ordered major increases right from the beginning, almost the first week in our audit inspection and investigative capability. We have conducted the largest audits in the Department's history.

It was this that enabled us to discuss major and minor procurement problems, including spare parts acquisitions that have caused so much interest in so many other groups and have led some people to feel that perhaps ordering these large audits was a mistake because it seems to give so much scope to people who took advantage of the findings of these audits to indulge in heavy criticisms of things that we, ourselves, have found and now believe we have cured.

We established the Defense Council on Integrity and Management Improvement which continues to make valuable suggestions for additional reforms and improvements.

We strengthened all the management capabilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense by restructuring that organization.

We tried to separate out from research and engineering some of the acquisition and logistical tasks that previously went with it. We tried to confine that to the actual design and development and testing of a number of the new systems.

While it is clear we favor change and have put many changes in effect to correct problems, we strongly oppose, as you said, change for change's sake itself. We do not think any reform should be based on problems or practices of the past which have now been corrected and changed.

I noted many of the suggestions in recent weeks, not just from your study, by any means, seem to be talking about a Pentagon that was perhaps in existence before, which we do not fully recognize now.

We think that if the practices and problems of the past have been corrected, they should no longer furnish the basis for the assumption that change in that particular area may be required.

Our approach to this very complex and vitally important subject should be well reasoned and tough minded. We should have sound evidence for any conclusion or change and we should have demonstrated net benefit for any change.

Once that is established, we do not hesitate for a moment to support change. Evolutionary change should be preferred over more radical and untested measures and we would be reluctant to conduct drastic experiments with the Department's structure, particularly if the conditions complained of no longer exist because the potential cost of error can mean great damage to the Nation's security.

A responsible discussion of the recommendation for change cannot be conducted without first establishing some consensus on the present organization and operations, our mission, constitutional requirements and the desirability of alternative organizational philosophies.

First, we have the simple, but all important mission of ensuring security of the Nation and its allies in a turbulent and dangerous world.

The Department's unique features are not related solely to its size and scope. Its management must contend with high-risk and rapidly changing technologies; an unusually high degree of external influence from the press, special interests, the public, Congress, and the executive agencies.

This is particularly marked during times when there is great alarm about deficits and when there should be equal alarm about the potential threat facing us. At all times we operate with major constraints on our personnel practices and other activities.

Second, I would like to make a few comments about the constitutional influence on the fundamental structure and operation of the Department.

One of the most fundamental issues of Government is the military-civilian relationship. In the United States, we have developed a structure which effectively resolves the historic dilemma of democracies. How to be militarily strong without being militaristic.

Vesting military command in the elected Executive is a fundamental tenet of our Constitution and our philosophy which requires effective exercise of civilian control of the military. This depends upon:

The diversity and expertise of military advice.

The directness of civilian command and control.

The Executive's flexibility to adapt organizational structures to meet changing situations.

Decisionmaking, advice giving, policy formulation, and command arrangements should not be concentrated in a single military professional, but must be structured to ensure that authority and discretion are vested in the civilian leadership which is properly accountable to the electorate.

Otherwise, a most fundamental constitutional principle will be endangered.

I must tell the committee in all candor that I simply do not agree with the assumption behind the recommendations for fundamental changes in the JCS organization. That assumption is that each Chief is too parochial and is solely concerned with protecting his own service that he cannot serve the national interests. This is simply not the case with the Chiefs with whom I have worked.

It may have been in the past and it may be with others in the future. I have been extraordinarily blessed with the people with whom I have worked. I do not find they are either too parochial or they are concerned only with their own service.

Third, consensus on basic organizational philosophy is a prerequisite to meaningful resolution of the issues which will be debated in the evaluation process. For example:

While policy direction must be centralized, operations should be decentralized. We should continue to reverse the 40-year trend in the Department toward operational centralization which has been the source of many problems we face today.

The keys to effective decentralization of operations are initiatives and accountability. We should look to fewer management layers, less regulations, and less bureaucracy, rather than more. But we must also ensure, as we do, accountability by careful and continuing supervision.

Military advice will be of higher quality and credibility if it comes from military leaders who have operational accountability for implementing the resulting decisions.

Those organizational changes that are helpful should be accomplished, if possible, through administrative action rather than legislation, in order to preserve the Secretary's flexibility to adapt the Department to future changes in national security requirements.

No legislation which would diminish the current flexibility and authority of the Secretary of Defense should be enacted.

Finally, I would like to reemphasize my earlier comments that no proposed change should be implemented unless:

One, it effectively addresses a real and existing problem demonstrated by conclusive evidence.

Two, the change is consistent with our mission, constitutional fabric, and basic organizational philosophies.

Three, the change does not present risks or the potential for damage far greater than the problem it purports to solve.

COORDINATION OF ORGANIZATION INITIATIVES

I would also like to remind the committee that the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management is concurrently studying many of the same issues. It is important that the Nation obtain full benefit of all current and impending proposals before a commitment is made to a specific course of action.

Accordingly, it is the administrations view that action on any legislation should be postponed until that commission's work is completed. I do not think that will interfere in any way with your timetable, Mr. Chairman.

In conclusion, we will work closely with Congress to improve the organization and management arrangements in DOD; we will carefully consider each recommendation of your staff report, as well as the Blue Ribbon Commission's report; and we are eager to seize any credible opportunity for improvement in our continuing effort to strengthen national security.

We have adopted many of the suggestions made and we believe we have already adopted some of the ideas and certainly we want to work closely and cooperate with you because what we are interested in, all of us, is exactly the same thing, a better Department and the preservation of the security of the Nation and our allies.

I will be happy to answer any questions which you may have.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Weinberger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Good morning Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to appear before the committee as you commence your deliberations concerning the organization of the Department of Defense. I commend you for undertaking this critical review, and I appreciate your staff's hard work.

Sound organization of the department is vitally important to our Nation's security because it is directly related to the effectiveness of our defense and peacekeeping efforts. Therefore, we are taking your initiative very seriously. That initiative is fully consistent with my early and continuing commitment, and that of President Reagan to improve the capabilities, effectiveness and efficiency of the Nation's Armed Forces. We will continue this effort in which we have been actively engaged since 1981.

In these prepared remarks, I will provide our first general reactions to the staff report which was released last month.

EVALUATION OF THE STAFF REPORT

We are in the process of reviewing each of more than 100 recommendations contained in the report and are pleased to participate in the committee's similar process of evaluation. Although we are not prepared at this time of course to discuss specific recommendations in detail because of their length and scope, I would like to report on our approach to analyzing the report.

We started our evaluation of the report immediately after it was first given to us on October 16. Although our evaluation is still ongoing, it has progressed far enough to recognize that there are some recommendations which we can support, some which we could support with modification, some which deserve further discussion, clarification or adjustment before we can adopt a position, and some which we believe would have a net harmful impact on our national security, and therefore would not be able to adopt.

It appears that we may want to support a substantial number of the recommendations. For example, we concur with the recommendation to reduce micro-management of Department business which has increased dramatically. Between fiscal years 1970 and 1985 the number of reports and studies requested by the Congress increased from 36 to 458, an increase of almost 1,200 percent, with no apparent end in sight. We recognize that such oversight is appropriate where matters of broad policy and program accountability are involved. However, in many instances issues of this nature are not involved.

Many of these studies and reports are quite complex and time-consuming. Moreover, the time and energy devoted to their completion distract from higher priority projects within the Department.

We also agree that every effort should be made to reduce micro-management attempts by the staffs within the Pentagon. Indeed, I would like to offer a challenge to you today which I am also prepared to accept. The challenge is to make substantial reductions in the size of the departmental staffs. However this cannot be achieved unless we reduce substantially some of the hearing, reporting and regulatory requirements imposed by Congress. I will be willing to work with you over the next months to find constructive ways to meet this challenge for reductions on a man-hour for man-hour basis.

We will not be able to reach such a quick consensus on some of the other recommendations, such as those involving the provision of military advice to the national command authority, and the structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In these instances, we intend to give each recommendation careful consideration so that we can pursue these issues with you in the best interests of national security.

OUR RECORD OF CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE

Neither the Department as an institution, nor I, oppose change. Indeed we favor change whenever it is called for. We have repeatedly demonstrated this by the changes through our innovation and initiatives over the last five years.

Upon taking office, I necessarily adopted the management style and principles which I considered best suited to the complexities of the Department and its mission, and the unique requirements and necessity we faced to rebuild our defenses as quickly as possible, after a decade in which our military investment had declined by 20 percent.

I have stressed a management philosophy which tries to strike a proper balance between centralized policy formulation, and decentralized operations to ensure both accountability by those who are responsible for executing programs and the necessary authority to carry out these programs. We believe this approach has contributed greatly to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department, and to the speedy execution of these large new tasks we have undertaken.

In addition, we have tried to achieve an appropriate balance of civilian and military advice. My key advisers include both military and civilian officials who are represented on the Armed Forces Policy Council, the Defense Resources Board, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council and other top-level management groups. Both military and civilian leadership have personal access to my office and I listen to the advice of each with great interest and respect, and benefit greatly from it. Just a note about the quality of advice provided by the Joint Chiefs. I have worked closely and regularly with them for nearly five years now, and I have found their advice to be consistently timely, accurate, competent and innovative.

Getting back to our record on change: We have made significant changes, some of which were planned, and others which were necessitated by the results of internal reviews or by the occurrence of specific problems. For example:

We redesigned and strengthened the strategic planning process. At the outset of this Administration, I worked with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Charter the Strategic Concepts Development Center, which provides expert advice to both of us on a confidential basis.

We made significant improvements in the planning, programming, and budgeting process. Our new approach enhances participation of top DOD officials and service line managers, and ensures that the military advice of not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also the unified and specified commanders, is heard and fully considered. A major change in this regard has been the strengthening of the Defense Resources Board to include the Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff, with direct input several times a year from the unified and specified commanders.

We conducted a comprehensive review of the acquisition process to make it more efficient, to get deliveries sooner, to improve program stability, and to revitalize our industrial base.

I instituted regular Secretary's performance reviews at frequent intervals to review and prevent over-runs on each of our key programs and to address related management issues.

I ordered major increases in our audit, inspection, and investigative capabilities. We have conducted the largest audits in the Department's history, which enabled us to discover and cure major and minor procurement problems in acquiring spare parts and other related areas.

We established the Defense Council on Integrity and Management Improvement, which continues to make valuable suggestions for additional reforms and improvements.

We strengthened all the management capabilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff by restructuring that organization.

FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING FURTHER CHANGE

So, while it is clear that we favor change to correct problems and make improvements, we strongly oppose change for change's sake. In other words, no reform should be based on problems and practices of the past which have now been corrected and changed, or on assumptions of facts, or on unfounded assertions, no matter how often repeated, about the existence of problems.

Our approach to this very complex and vitally important subject should be well reasoned and tough-minded, demanding sound evidence for any conclusion and demonstrated net benefit for any change. Furthermore, evolutionary changes should be preferred to more radical and untested measures. We should be reluctant to conduct drastic experiments with the department's structure, particularly if the conditions complained of no longer exist, because the potential cost of error is unacceptable damage to national security.

A responsible discussion of the recommendations for change cannot be conducted without first establishing some consensus on the present organization and operations, the mission of the department, constitutional requirements, the desirability of alternative organizational philosophies, and where there are indeed real problems or need for improvements in some areas.

First, the Department of Defense has the simple, but all important mission of ensuring the security of the United States and its allies in a turbulent and dangerous world.

To accomplish this task, the Department necessarily is a complex, powereful, and dynamic institution, involving 4 million people, a $300 billion budget, and organizations and facilities that span the world many times.

But the Department's unique features are not related solely to its size and scope. Its managers must contend with high risk and rapidly changing technologies; an unusually high degree of external influence from the press, special interests, the public, Congress, and the executive agencies. This is particularly marked during times when there is great alarm about deficits and when there should be equal alarm about the potential threat facing us. And at all times we operate with major constraints on our personnel practices and other activities.

Secondly, I would like to make a few comments about the constitutional influence on the fundamental structure and operation of the Department. One of the most fundamental issues of Government is the military-civilian relationship. In the United States, we have developed a structure which effectively resolves the historic dilemma of democracies: How to be militarily strong without being militaristic. Vesting military command in the elected executive is a fundamental tenet of our Constitution and our philosophy which requires effective exercise of civilian control of the military. This depends upon:

The diversity and expertise of military advice;
The directness of civilian command and control; and
The executive's flexibility to adapt organizational
Structures to meet changing situations.

Decisionmaking, advice giving, policy formulation and command arrangements should not be concentrated in a single military professional, but must be structured to ensure that authority and discretion are vested in the civilian leadership which is properly accountable to the electorate. Otherwise, a most fundamental constitutional principle will be endangered.

I must tell the committee in all candor that I simply do not agree with the assumption behind the recommendations for fundamental changes in the JCS organization. That assumption is that each chief is too parochial and is solely concerned with protecting his own power at the expense of national interests. This is simply not the case with the chiefs with whom I have worked.

Third, consensus on basic organizational philosophy is a prerequisite to meaningful resolution of the issues which will be debated in the evaluation process. For example:

While policy direction must be centralized, operations should be decentralized. We should continue to reverse the 40-year trend in the department toward operational centralization which has been the source of many problems we face today.

The keys to effective decentralization of operations are initiative and accountability. We should look to fewer management layers, less regulation, and less bureaucracy, rather than more. But we must also ensure, as we do, accountability by careful and continuing supervision.

Military advice will be of higher quality and credibility if it comes from military leaders who have operational accountability for implementing the resulting decisions.

Those organizational changes that are helpful should be accomplished, if possible, through administrative action rather than legislation, in order to preserve the Secretary's flexibility to adapt the Department to future changes in national security requirements.

No legislation which would diminish the current flexibility and authority of the Secretary of Defense should be enacted.

Finally, I would like to reemphasize my earlier comments that no proposed change should be implemented unless (1) it effectively addresses a real and existing problem demonstrated by conclusive evidence; (2) the change is consistent with our mission, constitutional fabric and basic organizational philosophies; and (3) the changes does not present risks or the potential for damage far greater than the problem it purports to solve.

COORDINATION OF ORGANIZATION INITIATIVES

I would also like to remind the committee that the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management is concurrently studying many of the same issues. It is important that the nation obtain full benefit of all current and impending proposals before a commitment is made to a specific course of action. Accordingly, it is the administration's view that action on any legislation should be postponed untl that Commission's work is completed.

In conclusion, we will work closely with Congress to improve the organizational and management arrangements in DOD; we will carefully consider each recommendation of your staff report, as well as the Blue Ribbon Commission's report; and we are eager to seize any credible opportunity for improvement in our continuing effort to strengthen national security.

I will be happy to try to answer any questions which you may have.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We realize the shortness of your time. As I said before, we will undoubtedly have you back.

You have made a challenge to us. I will accept that challenge. I would like you to do me a favor because I have been concerned about the overburdening of the Defense Department by the calls from Congress for reports.

I would like to have an estimate of the amount of time that you spend each year on complying with these requests and the number of personnel that are engaged in it. That would be most helpful in your challenge to me because I have to have some tools to use.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Very good, sir, we have had 599,000 telephone calls last year. We had 123,130 written inquiries. We had 25,306 pages in our budget justification books.

I spent 55 hours last year and 38 hours so far this year testifying before congressional committees. We have had 555 different witnesses in other hearings giving 1,434 hours of testimony.

Mr. Chairman, none of this is to say that we resent this or this is not a perfectly good privilege for the Congress to ask. You have the ultimate oversight requirement for the people of the Nation, but it does constitute a very large amount of time.

If we can cut it down with you, I think it is in everybody's interest to do so. We will be delighted to furnish you the man-hours involved in this which are enormous.

[The information follows:]

The requested information is not readily available and has to be tasked to the DOD components who had primary responsibility for preparation of the subject reports. The data is currently being gathered and will be submitted as soon as possible.

Chairman GOLDWATER. We will do our best, Mr. Secretary.

In answer to your remarks regarding the other committee that is working in the area of procurement, their report will probably be finished about the same time our efforts are. We are working very closely with them.

I will submit these questions for your written answers.

Mr. Secretary, at this time I believe that the Nation will be best served by a thoughtful, comprehensive and deliberate review of the complex issues associated with the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense and the Congress.

I do not believe that this type of review will be facilitated by premature lobbying efforts which seek to polarize the debate. Now, my question has been prompted by my efforts to talk with some of your commanders.

I have been told they are not to say anything until the Secretary has testified. This not only applies to Washington, DC, but my almost weekly visits to commanders around this country.

What advice have you given to all elements of the Department of Defense in terms of its lobbying activities on Capitol Hill and defense industry on this issue?

Secretary WEINBERGER. With respect to the commanders of the Departments, Senator, we have indicated very clearly not to be lobbying. I do not know anybody who has interpreted this to mean they are not supposed to speak at all. We view that lobbying or presentation of departmental positions, as it is properly called, should be presented by the responsible Department officials.

Everybody has their own opinions and people express those opinions very freely. We do not object to that. We do feel when a departmental position is presented to you, it ought to be an authorized position in which we have had the opportunity to discuss the matter of sufficient importance for the President so that you will be getting an authoritative opinion and not one that has to be changed within 2 or 3 days because it was not authoritative.

Where industry is concerned, we have, as far as I know, observed the law very scrupulously which forbids, quite correctly, our attempting to encourage any presentation of pressures or viewpoints or anything of that kind by industry.

Whatever they do, they do on their own. We have not done anything at all to stir that up, nor should we. It is against the law, it should be, and we observe the law.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Would you make it clear to the members of the military that if they want to discuss this or any other issue with members of the committee that they can do so?

There have been very deep questions regarding this report and they are not all complementary. Many of them are critical. I would like to feel it is possible for me to go and talk with men I have known in the service, men I have watched grow up from second lieutenant to four star generals, and find out what their opinions are.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There has never been any limitation on that at all, nor should there be. The only problem we have is the number of people, 4 million people connected with the Department, uniform and civilian, and almost any variety of opinion within that band can be obtained.

We think you are entitled to know what the administration's and Department's views are. I have tried to present those, and will try to present those, regularly to you.

There has never been any limitation on anybody getting any personal opinions or anything of the kind. Incidentally, there is a lot of opinion that is not favorable to a lot of the recommendations in the staff reports. Any of it can come out as far as I am concerned.

The importance is to separate the official position from what somebody wants to say. I have always encouraged that. I have sat at this table and taken the opposite views of some of our uniform people because I have had different opinions.

We try to be as open on that as we can. When you want to know the official opinion of the administration, we will be very glad to furnish that. We suggest that it can probably be furnished by the appointed officials.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I appreciate that.

Before I close, you will be interested in the fact that my office alone receives thousands of letters, telegrams, and telephone calls on this subject. We have only had one critical comment which came from an active duty sailor. I thought that might interest you.

We have had many former servicemen who say: "Right on, we want to help you." All we want to do is make your job better. It is in the interest of all of us.

I will yield to Senator Thurmond who has to go to a meeting of the Judiciary Committee.

Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to have you here and I am glad to see from the statement that the Department of Defense will cooperate fully in review of the staff report.

Mr. Secretary, I want to say this to you. I think you have done an outstanding job as Secretary of Defense. I do not know any Secretary in the 31 years I have been here who has stood more firmly for a strong national defense, who understands the problems better and who seems to understand the goals of the Congress.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I have noted in your testimony your point about a 1,200-percent increase in congressional-mandated report requirements and I agree with you.

Would you care to submit for the record a listing of the reporting requirements in the fiscal year 1986 Department of Defense authorization bill which you feel are justified and which you feel are unjustified?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

[The information follows:]

The House, Senate, and Conference Committee reports on the fiscal year 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Bill contained a total of 243 reporting requirements and a listing of these follows. This represents an increase of 34 percent over the previous year. Fifty-one percent of these 243 requirements were contained in the law itself. Normally, this would suggest that Congress considered these sufficiently important to be included as statutory requirements. However, it should be noted that many originated as floor amendments and therefore became part of the law. Undoubtedly, few of these would have survived had they been subjected to committee scrutiny and processed in the normal fashion. The remaining reports identified were prescribed in report language only which could be interpreted as a sign of lessor urgency. Although, we respect the prerogatives of the Congress to levy requirements on the Department, we have to question whether many of these requirements are justified and if they in fact do not ultimately detract from mission accomplishment.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-81	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
32	M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle	Evaluation	Feb 1, 86	Army(P)	Feasibility of qualifying second source producer for ISU.
38	XM252 81mm Mortar	Plan	Before requesting additional authorization	Army(P) RE(S)	Long range mortar plan that adddresses requirements and acquisition strategies.
39	Bushmaster Weapon System	Justification	Prior to obligation	Army(P)	Award of sole source contract.
73	Aircraft Carrier, Service Life Extension Program (CV-SLEP)	Report	Not specified	Navy(P)	Cost effectiveness of alternate approaches to extension of the service life of USS Kitty Hawk.
77	Flexibility to Reallocate Funds	Inform	Not specified	Navy(P)	Specific reductions made in past -- Other Procurement, Navy.
89	Alternate Fighter Competition	Inform	Timely	Air Force(P) JCS/OTE(S)	Plans for competition.
90	MC-130H Tactical Aircraft (Combat Talon)	Report	With FY87 budget request	Air Force(P) ISA(S)	Review of acquisition strategy.
92-93	Flight Inspection Aircraft	Report	Prior to obligation	Air Force(P)	Overspecification and actions that downgrade mission area capabilities.
101	AGM-65D Maverick	Report	Prior to obligation	Air Force(P)	Resolution of quality control issues.
113 & 114	Overseas Procurement of Machine Tools	Results	Dec 31, 85	AL(P)	Tool procurement policy with emphasis on ability of industrial base to meet defense requirements in event of disturbance in Europe .
	Section 110-Encouragement of Construction in US Shipyards of Diesel Submarines for US Allies:				
118	a. Inhibiting Actions	Report	Prior to obligation	Navy(P) JCS/ISA(S)	No inhibiting actions are being taken.
118	b. Negative Impact	Report	Prior to obligation	Navy(P) JCS/ISA(S)	Diesel electric submarines could not be build in US without having a negative effect on construction of US nuclear submarines.
129	Consultants/Studies/Analysis	Report	Mar 31, 86	AL(P) PA/ Compt(S)	Management and control of these efforts.
130	Countermines and Barriers	Advise	Prior to obligation	Army(P)	Test results of mine flail test.
135	Mobility	Plan	Prior to FY87 budget request	Army(P) JCS(S)	Implementing new development program.
141	Computer Based Instructional Systems	Guidelines	Sept 1, 85	FMP(P)	Computer based instructional systems.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-81	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
204	Longer Training Program for Certain Reserve Units	Report	Periodic	RA(P) JCS(S)	Periodic update of the 1985 studies progress.
206	Report on Reserve Recruiting and Retention Resources	Report	Nov 30, 85	RA(P) JCS(S)	Analytically evaluate effectiveness of program.
206	Study of Present Method of Budgeting Selected Reserve Personnel	Report	Dec 31, 85	RA(P) Compt(S)	Benefits of using average strength versus end-strength and whether full-time manning personnel should be included.
212	Section 521-Extension of Certain Reserve Officer Management Programs	Legislation	Not specified	RA(P)	Restructure reserve officer personnel management system.
215	Aviator Requirements	Annual report	Dec 31, 85	FMP(P) JCS(S)	Evaluate method of determining and projecting both wartime and peacetime aviator requirements and require uniform policy.
216	Functions of the Joint Staff and Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff	Report	Dec 15, 85	JCS(P) Compt(S)	Compare size, organization and functions and reason for maintaining separate staffs.
157	Transfers Between Major Accounts	Consult	Prior to FY87 budget request	Compt(P)	Information and data explaining merits of transfers prior to incorporation in budget request.
169	Reliability Centered Maintenance	Report	Dec 31, 85	AL(P)	Report of four items that show effectiveness of program.
172 & 173	US Forces Caribbean	Report	Dec 1, 85	ISA(P) JCS(S)	Why command should not be disestablished.
176 & 177	Study of a Joint-Duty Career Specialty	Report	Six months after enactment of Approp. Bill	FMP(P) JCS(S)	Changes in personnel management and related policies and procedures to improve opportunities of military personnel assigned to joint duty assignments. Committees should be informed of study progress.
181 & 182	Section 305 - Clarification of DoD Support for Civilian Drug Interdiction	Report	Not specified	FMP(P) JCS/ISA(S)	Effective support provided.
184	Authorization of End Strength	Reports	Periodic	Army(P) Navy(P) Air Force(P) JCS/RA(S)	Efforts to increase reserve utilization and effectiveness.
194 & 195	Military Judges in the Navy	Report	Feb 1, 86	Navy(P)	Evaluating differences in promotion opportunity for Navy judge advocates who serve as military judges.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-81	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Tour Lengths:				
220	a. First Term	Report	Dec 1, 85	FMP(P) JCS(S)	Feasibility of lengthening first term tour lengths overseas as well as impact and cost savings.
221	b. DoD Directive Revision	Report	Jul 31, 86	FMP(P) JCS(S)	Revise appropriate provisions on lengths of overseas tours and rationale for granting exceptions.
221	c. Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Program	Report	Dec 1, 85	FMP(P) JCS(S)	Feasibility of extending program to include incentives and PCS and cost savings.
221 & 222	d. Training Moves	Report	Dec 1, 85	FMP(P) JCS(S)	Study of various aspects of PCS training moves.
222 & 223	Rotation of Ground and Air Combat Units to Europe and the Pacific to Reduce Number of Dependents	Report	Mar 15, 86	FMP(P) JCS/RA(S)	Cost and benefits as well as operations, security and economic considerations. Also impact on morale and welfare.
224	Household Goods Weight Allowance System	Report	Feb 1, 86 and periodically during test	Army(P) FMP(S)	Test of incentives to encourage members to ship less than maximum weight allowance.
	Section 632 - Special Pay For Nuclear Officers:				
230 &231	a. Continuation Bonus	Advise	Before increase	Navy(P)	Above $9000.
231	b. Incentive Bonus	Advise	Before increase	Navy(P)	Above $7200 or $3600 for officers with former enlisted training.
236	Section 644 - Reenlistment Bonus for Enlisted Members on Active Duty for Training and Administration of Reserves	Advise	Prior to change	Navy(P)	Before changes are made.
	Career Development Plan for Military Podiatrists:				
242	a. Requirements for non-physician providers	Report	Dec 31, 85	HA(P) FMP(S)	Additional podiatrists could reduce CHAMPUS and other contract care costs as well as freeup orthopedic surgeons.
242	b. Training Opportunities	Report	Dec 31, 87	HA(P) FMP(S)	Results of providing post graduate residencies.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-81	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Demonstration Project on Use of Peer Review Organizations:				
243	a. Sites	List	Dec 31, 85	HA(P) FMP(S)	Selection sites.
243	b. Demonstration Project	Report	Feb 1, 87	HA(P) FMP(S)	Results of demonstration on use of peer review organizations for CHAMPUS and direct care system.
244	Need for Better Information on How to Use the Medical Care System	Plan	Mar 1, 86	HA(P) JCS(S)	Improve flow of information available on military medical care.
245	Report on Health Care Enrollment	Report	Feb 1, 86	HA(P)	Details of how DoD will implement health enrollment system.
	Other Spouse Employment Initiatives:				
305	a. Self Employment at Home	Report	Mar 1, 86	FMP(P)	Details on how to ensure uniform implementation of plan.
306	b. Child Care Facilities	Report	Jul 1, 86	FMP(P)	Options for improving spouse employment opportunities at child care facilities at military installations.

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-41	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
21	TOW Missile	Report	Dec 1, 85	Army(P)	Assess the potential savings from establishment of second source.
25	M-1/BFV Subsystems	Report	Jan 1, 86	Army(P)	Feasibility and savings on these and other potential second source candidates.
27	25mm Bushmaster Cannon	Justification & Certify	Prior to obligation	Army(P)	Rationale of acquisition strategy and assurance that it is consistent with Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.
41	5-Ton Trucks	Request	Feb 1, 86	Army(P)	Relief from source selection deadline and request for extension.
	Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE):				
42	a. Outline	Plan	Prior to obligation of 1/2 funds	Army(P) C3I/JCS/RE OTE(S)	Outline of test program required to resolve uncertainties of MSE performance.
42	b. Modifications	Report	Jan 1, 86	Army(P) C3I/JCS(S)	Describe all modifications required prior to procurement and upgrades subsequent to initial procurement.
49-50	SH-60B Lamps MK III ASW Helicopter	Findings and Recommendations	Feb 5, 86	RE(P) Navy(S)	Review of unit costs under four different procurement plans.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-41	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
59	Mark-48 ADCAP Torpedo	Rationale	Feb 15, 86	Navy(P)	Explain why second prime contractor is not being recommended.
60	Deep Sea Mines	Plan	With FY87 budget request	Navy(P)	Identify funding plan to procure shortfall of CAPTOR mines.
66	Aircraft Carrier Service Life Extension Program	Certify	Prior to obligation (COMPLETED Jul 17, 85)	Navy(P)	Factors considered dictate this option as most cost effective.
73	Construction of Foreign-Designed Diesel-Electric Submarines in American Shipyards	Report	Prior to obligation (COMPLETED May 23, 85)	RE(P) ISP(P)	FY85 report on procedures required to permit allied or friendly nations to build diesel electric submarines in American shipyards.
97	Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)	Notify	Following review	Air Force(P) JCS/RA(S)	Intention to levy any undistributed reduction in aircraft procurement against CRAF.
98	Congressionally Mandated Tactical Mobility Study	Report	Feb 1, 85	PA&E(P) JCS(P) RA(S)	FY85 report examining future tactical mobility requirements and problems that might be encountered.
103	Small ICBM and Hard Mobile Launcher	Report	Sep 1, 85	Air Force(P) JCS/ISP(S)	Mobility tradeoffs to include lower hardness levels and more dispersed basing locations.
120	National Guard and Reserve Procurement	Report	Within 170 days of enactment	Army(P) Navy(P) Air Force(P) RA(S)	Items of equipment to be procured. Prepared by Chief of each Guard and Reserve Component receiving funding.
121	Procurement of C-130 Aircraft Study	Report	Dec 1, 85	Air Force(P) RA(S)	Possible savings that could be derived from procurement of C-130.
	C-130 Modifications:				
121	a. Intentions	Status	Jul 1, 85 (COMPLETED Jul 3, 85)	Compt(P)	Intentions for the program and test situation.
121	b. Concerns	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	RE(P)	Address committee's concerns about retiring aircraft in good condition and redistribution plan.
172	DoD Munitions Acquisition Plan	Plan	Feb 1, 86	AL(P) RE/JCS(S)	Master Plan that will establish an overall OSD acquisition strategy for these weapons and progress made toward standardizing planning and programming procedures used by services.
175	Tactical Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Interoperability	Directive	Prior to Obligation	C3I(P) JCS(S)	Updated revision of DoDD 4630.5 dealing with interoperability of tactical communications.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-41	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
133-134	LHX	Report	Feb 1, 86	Army(P) JCS(S)	Details projected development and procurement of LHX and identifies existing helicopters that might perform this mission.
142	Commonality in Aircraft Avionics	Report	Not specified	Air Force(P) Navy(P)	Feasibility of achieving 90% commonality and methods used to reach that goal.
143	Racer/Surface Ship Propulsion System (RGV)	Decision	During FY86	Navy(P)	Wisdom of further development.
148	Submarine ASW Stand-off Weapon	Letter	Jul 1, 85 (COMPLETED Jul 2, 85)	Navy(P)	Identifies intended date of IOC for ASW SOW and assurance to provide necessary funding to achieve that date.
152	Naval Gunfire Systems Improvement Program	Results	Apr 1, 86	Navy(P)	Address options available to improve Navy's gunfire capability not adequately previously discussed.
161	F-16/Sparrow Modification	Report	Feb 1, 86	Air Force(P)	Feasibility and costs of modifying F-16's to carry AIM-7 missile and which F-16's should be modified if program is approved.
178-179	U.S.-Soviet Military Exchange Visits	Plan	Beginning of FY86	ISP(P) JCS(P)	Establishment and operation of pilot exchange visit program.
179-180	Readiness Reporting	Annual Report	Mar 15, 86	FMP(P) RA/JCS(S)	Changes to Force Readiness Reports to include incorporating information from UNITREP and including theater readiness perspective.
181-182	Waterfront Security	Notify	Oct 1, 85	RE(P)	Transfer waterfront security mission.
202	Importation of Weapons from Grenade	Report	Not specified	DIG(P)	IG inquiry and recommendations.
	Sec 804, Cost Estimates for Major Defense Aquisition Programs:				
205	a. Criteria	Criteria	When waiver criteria developed	AL(P) Compt(S)	Copy of criteria.
206	b. Waiver	Report	Promptly	Army(P) Navy(P) Air Force(P) AL(S)	Waiver granted on should cost analysis.
208	Sec. 606, Improved Reporting and Disclosure for Former Employees of the DoD; Prevention of Conflict of Interest	Reports	Annually starting Apr 86	GC(P) FMP(S)	Concerning post employment of certain former DoD employees who accept jobs with defense contractors.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-41	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
213	Federal Government Procurement Intern Program	Report	Jan 1, 86	IMP(P) AI(S)	Projected recruiting of interns through 1990 and if it meets requirements.
214	Coordination of Audit Activities	Report	Jan 1, 86	OIG(P)	Actions taken to insure audit efforts are not duplicative.
229	Sec. 915, Restriction on the use of funds for the B-1B Bomber Aircraft Program	Notify	Prior to obligation	Air Force(P) DCS(S)	Specific purpose for which fund are proposed to be used and amount. Prepare for Secretary of Defense signature.

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
15	Sec 106 - NATO Cooperative Programs	Copy	Prior to obligation	ISP(P) RS/AI(S)	Funds may not be obligated until government-to-government agreements provided.
17 & 351	Sec 109 - Report on Reductions and Transfers	Report	Prior to program changes	Compt(P)	Program changes may not be implemented until report describes programs in which reductions made and sources.
	Sec 121 - Sergeant York Division Air Defense (DIVAD) Gun:				
17 & 352	a. Testing (see also S Report 99-41, p. 26 & 27 and H Report 99-81, p. 37)	Report	Prior to obligation	RE(P) OTE(S)	Initial production testing.
17 & 352	b. Evaluation (see also S Report 99-41, p. 26 & 27 and H Report 99-81, p. 37)	Report	Prior to obligation	OTE(P) RE(S)	Follow-on evaluation.
17 & 352	c. Performance (see also H Report 99-81, p. 7 & 37)	Certify	Prior to obligation	RE(P) OTE(S)	Testing reliably demonstrates that operational capabilities meet or exceed performance specs.
17 & 352	d. Guarantee	Report	Prior to obligation	Army(P)	Contractor guarantee of performance.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Sec 122 - Bradley Fighting Vehicle:				
18 & 352	a. Phase I	Report	Dec 1, 85	RE(P) OTE(S)	Results of Phase 1 testing program in classified and unclassified form.
18 & 352	b. Phase II	Report	Jun 1, 86	RE(P) OTE(S)	Results of Phase 2 testing program in classified and unclassified form.
19 & 352	Sec 123 - Conditions on Procurement of Certain Combat Vehicles	Report	With FY88 budget request	RE(P) OTE(S)	Testing of certain vehicles; classified and unclassified form.
	Sec 125 - Purchase of 5-Ton Trucks:				
20, 21, & 353	a. Test	Certify	Prior to obligation	Army(P) RE(S)	Truck engine has been tested.
20, 21, & 353	b. Multiyear Contract	Notify	Feb 1, 86	Army(P)	Why multiyear contract cannot be awarded.
	Sec 126 - Other Army Programs:				
21, & 353	a. Copperhead (see also H Report 99-81, p. 42)	Plan	Prior to obligation	Army(P)	Establish second production source. Prepare for Secretary of Defense signature.
21, 22 & 353	b. Pershing II	Report	Prior to obligation	Army(P)	Detailed plan for safety modifications.
22	Sec 132 - Navy Aircraft Procurement (see also H Report 99-81 p. 50)	Certify	Prior to obligation	Navy(P)	Wing of A6E is warranted for at least 4,000 hour life.
24 & 354	Sec 143 - Advanced Technology Bomber	Report	Feb 1, 86	PAE(P)	Total program cost for ATB.
24 & 312	Sec 144 - SOF HH-53 Helicopters	Certify	Prior to obligation	Air Force(P) JCS/ISA(S)	Sufficient funds have been programmed to sustain readiness for PAVE LOW HH-53 helicopters.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Sec 152 - Adequate Airlift for SOF:				
24 & 312	a. Immediate Requirements	Plan	Prior to obligation	ISA(P) JCS(S)	Plan for meeting immediate airlift requirements of JSOC.
24 & 312	b. 1991 Requirements	Plan	Prior to obligation	ISA(P) JCS(S)	Plans for meeting by 1991 airlift requirements of JSOC and SOF of unified CINC's.
24 & 312	c. FYDP	Certify	Prior to obligation	ISA(P)	Plans are funded in FY 87 FYDP.
26	Sec 203 - Authorization of Transfers of Prior-Year Funds	Report	Prior to program change	Compt(P)	Program changes may not be implemented until report describes programs in which reduction made and sources.
27 & 394	Sec 204 - Limitations on Army	Report	Dec 15, 85	Army(P)	Program plan for fuel-efficient modification for AGT-1500 tank engine and AIP system.
	Sec 205 - Limitations on Navy:				
27, 394 & 396	a. Low-Cost Anti-Radiation Seeker	Report	Dec 15, 85	Navy(P)	Program plan for Low-Cost Anti-Radiation Seeker Program.
27, 394 & 396	b. Submarine Advanced Combat System	Certify	Prior to obligation	Navy(P)	Certification re SUBACS.
28, 394 & 396	c. Rolling Airframe Missile	Certify	Prior to obligation	Navy(P)	Certification re Rolling Airframe Missile Program and NATO Sea Sparrow program.
29 & 399	Sec 207 - Limitations on Defense Agencies	Report	Prior to obligation	C3I(P) JCS(S)	Why feasibility of single JTIDS for AF and Navy is not practical. Notify of any JTIDS equipment modification plan.
30 & 399	Sec 208 - Testing of Anti-Satellite Weapons and Space Survivabilty Program	Certify	Prior to obligation	RE(P) ISP/ JCS/OTE(S)	Presidential certification re MHV anti-satellite warhead launched from F-15 (PL 98-473, section 101(h)).
30 & 400	Sec 209 - Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program	EIS	Prior to obligation	Air Force(P) ISP/JCS/ OTE(S)	Impact of such development and selection.
31 & 401	Sec 210 - AMRAAM System (see also S Report 99-41, p. 106)	Certify	Prior to obligation	RE(P) AL/OTE(S)	Certification re AMRAAM production is warranted.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Sec 211 - HARM Program (see also H Report 99-81, p. 9, 63, 120 & 131):				
31, 32 & 402	a. Navy Specifications	Certify or Report	Prior to obligation	Navy(P) OTE(S)	Performance specifications are met.
31, 32 & 402	b. Air Force Specifications	Certify or Report	Prior to obligation	Air Force(P) OTE(S)	Performance specifications are met.
33 & 404	Sec 222 - Deployment of SDI	Certify	Prior to deployment	SDI(P) ISP/JCS(S)	Presidential certification that system is cost effective and survivable.
	Sec 223 - SDI:				
33 & 404	a. Enemy Response	Report	With FY87 budget request	SDI(P) ISP/JCS(S)	Potential enemy responses to SDI and on RDT&E costs.
33 & 404	b. Cost Estimates	Report	ASAP	SDI(P) ISP/JCS(S)	Procurement and deployment costs. Not later than FY 89 budget request.
34, 35 & 404	Sec 226 - Strategic and Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses	Report	Feb 15, 85	SDI(P) ISP/JCS(S)	Results of study of feasibility and military value of early application of defenses against ballistic missile attack.
37, 416 & 417	Sec 307 - Limitations on ANG and AFR Flying Units	Notify	Prior to obligation	Air Force(P) RA(S)	Deactivate or divest any flying unit of its flying mission.
	Sec 502 - Managing Civilian Personnel by End-Strengths:				
40 & 420	a. Experience	Report	Feb 1, 86	FMP(P)	Experience re congressionally imposed end-strengths.
41 & 420	b. Funds Obligated	Reports	Quarterly	FMP(P) Compt(S)	Obligation of funds for civilian personnel.
42, 43 & 421	Sec 504 - Civilian Personnel Classification and Pay System	Report	Dec 31, 85	FMP(P)	Evaluation of effects of pay and classification systems on recruitment and retention of skilled personnel.
53 & 423	Sec 524 - Muster Test of Army IRR (see also H Report 99-81, p. 213)	Report	Feb 1, 86	RA(P) Army (S)	Results and findings of muster test of the Army IRR in time of war or national emergency.
61 & 428	Sec 614 - Allowance for Transportation of Baggage and Household Effects	Report	Sep 30, 88	FMP(P)	Operation of program which pays allowances to member who moves himself.
80 & 436	Sec 654 - Medical Casualty Investigations	Report	One year after enactment	HA(P)	Findings and recommendations of study on medical casualty investigations.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Sec 667 - Military Retirement System :				
81, 82 & 438	a. Proposed Changes (see also H Report 99-81, p. 249 and SASC Revised Markup, May 16, 1985)	Report	Sep 15, 85	FMP(P) JCS(S)	Report and draft legislation proposing two separate sets of changes in the military nondisability retirement system.
81, 82 & 438	b. Impact of Changes	Report	Sep 15, 85	FMP(P) JCS(S)	Effects on recruiting proposals re other elements of military compensation, dollar reduction impacts, plan to implement.
100 & 443	Sec 732 - Needs-Based Survivor Benefit Annuity Program	Report	Dec 31, 85	RA(P) FMP(S)	Plan for establishing a needs-based survivor annuity program for surviving spouses of certain retired reservists.
101 & 443	Sec 802 - Office of Family Policy	Report	Sep 30, 85	FMP(P)	Description of office and recommendations to enhance well-being of military families.
102 & 445	Sec 809 - Relocation and Housing	Report	Mar 1, 86	AL(P) FMP(S)	Desirability and feasibility of providing relocation assistance to military members and families through contractors.
103 & 446	Sec 810 - Food Programs	Report	Dec 31, 85	FMP(P)	Feasibility of DoD issuing food stamps to members stationed outside the US.
	Sec 812 - Miscellaneous Requirements:				
103, 104 & 446	a. Housing Availability (see also H Report 99-81, p. 304)	Report	One year after enactment	AL(P) FMP(S)	Availability and affordability of off-base housing.
104 & 446	b. Dependents in New Secondary Schools	Report	One year after enactment	FMP(P)	Administrative and legislative action to assist dependent children when transferring between secondary schools.
107 & 451	Sec 912 - Multiple Sources for Major Defense Acquisition Program (see also S Report 99-41, p. 204)	Report	With budget request each year	AL(P) JCS(S)	Prior to full-scale development, a report is required describing acquisition strategy for that program. Revisions to that acquisition strategy must also be submitted when applicable.
109 & 452	Sec 913 - Minimum Percentage of Competitive Procurements	Report	Annually by Apr 1	AL(P) JCS(S)	Goal for percentage of dollar value of contracts to be competitive procurements, and accomplishments of prior year.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Sec 914 - Regulations to Control Prices That May Be Paid For Spare Parts :				
110 & 453	a. Actions Taken (see also S Report 99-41, p. 215)	Report	Jan 31, 86	AL(P) JCS(S)	Actions taken and evaluation re management problems.
110 & 453	b. Congressional Assistance	Legislation	As required	AL(P) JCS(S)	If necessary to remedy any problems.
110 & 453	Sec 915 - Should-Cost Analysis (see also S Report 99-41, p. 205)	Report	With budget request each year	AL(P) Compt(S)	Plan for determining how much production of covered systems should cost.
	Sec 918 - Contracted Advisory and Assistance Services:				
113, 455 & 456	a. Accounting Procedure	Report	Six months after enactment	Compt(P)	Accounting procedure to aid in identification and control of expenditures for these services.
113, 114, 455 & 456	b. Identify Funds	Justification	With FY87 budget request	Compt(P)	Identify total amount requested for these services.
122 & 458	Sec 925 - Assignment of Principal Contracting Officers	Report	Jan 1, 86	AL(P) JCS(S)	Policy on mobility and rotation of principal administrative contracting officers.
123 & 461	Sec 935 - Subpoenas of Defense Contractor Records	Copy of report	Annually	Compt(P)	SecDef furnishes copy of DCAA report on exercise of authority.
124 & 461	Sec 951 - General and Administrative Overhead (see also S Report 99-41, p. 221)	Report	Sixty days after enactment	AL(P)	Views on prohibition of including G&A overhead expenses in computation of contractor profits.
124 & 462	Sec 952 - Use of Independent Cost Estimates for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (see also S Report 99-41, p. 225)	Report	Apr 1, 86	PAE(P)	Continued use of independent cost estimates in planning, programming, budgeting, and selection process.
125 & 462	Sec 954 - Suspension and Debarment of Defense Contractors	Report	180 days after enactment	AL(P)	Actions taken to implement IG recommendations.
125, 462 & 463	Sec 955 - Use of Competition Under Sec 8(a) Set-Aside Program	Report	180 days after enactment	AL(P)	Feasibility of using competitive procedures under the set-aside program of SBA, together with SBA.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
125 & 463	Sec 956 - Efforts to Increase Defense Contract Awards to Indian-Owned Business	Report	Mar 31, 86	AL(P)	Efforts to increase awards to Indian-owned businesses.
127, 128 & 465	Sec 1001 - Policy on Compliance with Existing Strategic Offensive Arms Agreements	Report	Feb 1, 86	ISP(P) JCS(S)	Projections, comparisons, assessment, recommendations in report from President. Also may include proposal to protect security of US. President should consult with Congress on no undercut policy.
128 & 465	Sec 1002 - Soviet Compliance With Arms Control Commitments (see also S Report 99-41, p. 224)	Report	Dec 1, 85 and each Dec 1 thereafter	ISP(P) JCS(S)	Classified and unclassified annual report with respect to compliance of Soviet Union with arms control commitments from President.
128, 129 & 465	Sec 1003 - Study of Arms Control Verification Capabilities	Report	May 1, 86	ISP(P) JCS(S)	Results of inter-agency study from President.
129 & 130	Sec 1005 - Exchange of Certain High-Ranking Military and Civilian Personnel With Soviet Union	Plan	Dec 1, 85	ISP(P) JCS(S)	Plan for a pilot program for exchange of visits.
130 & 466	Sec 1006 - Nuclear Winter	Report	Mar 1, 86	RE(P) ISP(S)	Nuclear winter findings and policy implications.
	Sec 1102 - NATO Cooperative Projects:				
132, 133, 467 & 468	a. Description of Agreement	Certify	Prior to agreement	AL(P) JCS(S)	Not less than 15 days before cooperative project agreement President shall provide numbered certification.
135, 467 & 468	b. Contract Award	Notify	Upon contract award	AL(P) JCS(S)	Each time a contract awarded to comply with a cooperative agreement.
135, 467 & 468	c. Waiver	Notify	Upon waiver	AL(P) JCS(S)	Each time waiver exercised.
	Sec 1103 - NATO Cooperative R&D:				
138	a. Intent	Notify	Prior to obligation	RE(P) JCS/OTE(S)	Intent to obligate.
138	b. NATO Member Systems	Report	Feb 1 each year	RE(P) JCS/OTE(S)	Systems produced by NATO members that were evaluated and obligation of funds.
138	Sec 1201 - Annual SARs (see also H Report 99-81, p. 7, 21 & 300)	Report	Annually	Compt(P)	Revision to SAR requirements.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Sec 1202 - Base Closures and Realignments:				
140 & 469	a. Plan (see also S Report 99-41, p. 217)	Notify	Prior to action	AL(P) Army(P) Navy(P) Air Force(P) RA(S)	Proposed closing or realignment and evaluation.
140 & 469	b. Exceptions	Certify	Prior to action	AL(P) RA(S)	President determines closure or realignment is for reasons of national security or military emergency.
142, 470 & 471	Sec 1203 - Computer System in Military Hospitals	Report	Prior to entering contract	HA(P)	Demonstration test of hospital management computer system of the VA.
145, 146 & 473	Sec 1207 - Military Health-Care Delivery System	Report	Six months after enactment	HA(P) JCS/A/N/AF (S)	Plan for revising organizational structure of the military health-care delivery system, including independent study results from each military department and the JCS.
146, 147 & 473	Sec 1208 - Guard and Reserve Equipment (see also H Report 99-81, p. 21 & 300)	Report	Annually	RA(P)	Requirements for inclusion.
	Sec 1209 - Franchise Agreements by Military Exchange Services:				
147 & 148	a. New Franchises	Report	Feb 1, 86	FMP(P)	Current and proposed commercial franchise business operations on military installations.
148	b. Intent to Contract	Notify	Prior to contract	FMP(P)	Contracts for construction or operation of a commercial franchise business.
149 &474	Sec 1210 - Air Force Shuttle Operations and Planning Complex	Report	With FY87 budget request	Air Force(P) JCS(S)	Program plan by which IOC date may be met.
149	Sec 1211 - Uranium Tetrafluoride	Certify	Prior to providing	Army(P)	Provision of uranium tetrafluoride to contractors for production of conventional ammunition.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Sec 1221 - Counterintelligence Polygraph Program:				
150, & 477	a. Plans to Expand(see also S Report 99-41, p. 222)	Report	Dec 31, 85	USP(P)	Plans to expand use of polygraph examinations in DoD.
150, 151 & 477	b. Use of Polygraph	Report	Dec 31, 86	USP(P)	Polygraph examinations administered during FY86.
151 & 477	c. Annual Result	Report	Each Dec 31	USP(P)	Results of research during preceding FY.
152 & 477	Sec 1222 - Security Clearance Backlog	Report	Apr 1, 86	DIS(P)	Level and manner of obligating funds and reductions of backlog achieved.
153, 154 & 478	Sec 1224 - Minimum Drinking Age	Report	Feb 1, 86	FMP(P)	Feasibility of selling drinks to members who have not attained minimum drinking age and recommendations.
157 & 480	Sec 1232 - Contracting Out	Report	Mar 1, 86	AL(P)	One-year extension of prohibition on contracting for performance of firefighting and security functions.
162	Sec 1302 - DIA Personnel	Regulations	Prior to implementation (COMPLETED)	DIA(P)	Regulations relating to benefits for certain DIA personnel.
167, 482 & 483	Sec 1401 - Transfer Authority	Notify	Promptly	Compt(P)	When transfers made under authority of Sec 1401.
167, 168 & 483	Sec 1404 - Revisions to Defense Budget Plan	Report	Sixty days after enactment	Compt(P) JCS(S)	Outyear budget plans at 3% increase and zero increase.
168 & 484	Sec 1405 - Two-Year Budget Cycle (see also S Report 99-41, p. 226 and H Report 99-81, p. 308	Report	Apr 1, 86	Compt(P) JCS(S)	Views on operating on two-year budget cycle, plans for converting and impediments.
168, 169 & 485	Sec 1406 - Budgeting for Inflation	Report	Sixty days after enactment	Compt(P) JCS(S)	Savings from lower inflation, proposals for new budget system for inflation allowance.
169 & 485	Sec 1407 - Unobligated Balances	Report	30 days after enactment; then 3 times a year	Compt(P)	Estimate of unobligated balances each year with President's Budget, with April Budget Update, and with Mid-session Budget Review. First report due 30 days after enactment.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Sec 1411 - Binary Chemical Munitions:				
170, 485 & 486	a. Plan	Certify	Prior to obligation	ISP(P) RE/JCS(S)	President to certify as to deployment and consultation with NATO prior funding procurement or assembly of binaries.
170, 485 & 486	b. Assembly	Certify	Prior to obligation	RE(P) ISP/JCS(S)	President to certify that national security necessitates final assembly.
171, 485 & 486	c. Consultations	Report	Oct 1, 86	ISP(P) RE/JCS(S)	Results of consultations with NATO members.
	Sec 1412 - Destruction of Chemical Agents:				
171, 172 & 488	a. Deferral	Notify	Upon deferral	RE(P) JCS(S)	Within 30 day after determination to defer destruction of stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions.
172 & 488	b. Environmental Protection (see also H Report 99-81, p. 301)	Plan	Mar 15, 86	Army(P) RE(S)	Comprehensive plan to carry out provisions of Sec 1412. Prepare for Secretary of Defense signature.
173 & 488	c. Annual Report	Report	Dec 15, 85 & each Dec 15	Army(P) RE(S)	Activities carried out under Sec 1412 during FY ended previous September. Prepare for Secretary of Defense signature.
174 & 488	Sec 1413 - Testing of Chemical Warfare Agents	Report	90 days after enactment	Army(P) RE/JCS(S)	Testing of diluted or undiluted chemical warfare agents. Prepare for Secretary of Defense signature.
175 & 176	Sec 1422 - Drug Law Enforcement Assistance Organizations	Report	Dec 1, 85	FMP(P) JCS/ISA(S)	Plans to enhance cooperation with civilian drug enforcement agencies.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
177 & 491	Sec 1424 - Use of E-2 for Drug Interdiction	Report	Sep 30, 86	Navy(P)	Results of study of use of E-2 aircraft of Navy to determine effectiveness of E-2 in drug interdiction.
	Sec 1426 - Restrictions on Certain Nuclear Programs:				
178, 491 & 492	a. Employment	Report	Prior to obligation	Navy(P) JCS(S)	Use of SM-2(N).
179, 491 & 492	b. Requirements	Report	Mar 1, 86	RE(P) JCS(S)	Requirements for special nuclear material through 1991.
179 & 492	Sec 1431 - Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense (see also S Report 99-41, p. 225 & H Report 99-41, p. 301)	Report	24 months after funding	Navy(P)	Changes report date for requirement in Sec 1536, PL 98-525.
179, 180 & 493	Sec 1432 - Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Base (see also H Report 99-81, p. 301)	Report	Jan 31, 86	Navy(P)	Industrial base for construction, overhaul, and repair of naval vessels.
180 & 493	Sec 1433 - Nuclear Reactor Components (see also H Report 99-81, p. 302)	Report	Prior to obligation 1/2 funds	Navy(P) JCS(S)	Industrial base for design and construction of nuclear components for SSN-21 class submarine.
180, 181 & 493	Sec 1434 - Aircraft Fuel Conservation	Report	90 days after enactment	AL(P)	Efforts since 1981 to reduce use of fuel by military aircraft.
181	Sec 1435 - Poseidon-Class Submarine	Report	Dec 15, 85	RE(P) JCS/ISP/ Navy(S)	Alternative uses of Poseidon-class submarine.
181 & 494	Sec 1436 - Meat in Military Commissaries Overseas	Report	6 months after enactment	AL(P)	Study of feasibility of providing US-produced meat in military commissaries overseas.
181, 182 & 494	Sec 1437 - Basic Point Defense Missile System	Report	Prior to removing	Navy(P)	Plans to replace Basic Point Defense Missile System on amphibious vessels with CIWS.
	Sec 1438 - Retirement Benefits of Philippine Scouts:				
183 & 494	a. Findings and Conclusions	Report	1 year after enactment	Army(P)	Study of effects of disparity between benefits received by Philippine Scouts and their U.S. Army counterparts during WWII.
183 & 494	b. Noncompliance	Report	ASAP	Army(P)	If cost for doing above excessive, report ASAP with justification for such determination.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
183	Sec 1439 - Report on Death Penalty for Espionage	Report	30 days after enactment	GC(P)	Study on desirability of reinstating death penalty for persons convicted of espionage.
183 & 495	Sec 1440 - Defense Industrial Base	Report	Jun 1, 86	AL(P)	Study on effects that foreign export subsidies have had on defense industrial base of the U.S.
184 & 495	Sec 1441 - Firing Tactical Missiles for Training Purposes	Report	Feb 1, 86	FMP(P)	Actions taken to develop standard criteria regarding firing of tactical missiles for training purposes.
184 & 495	Sec 1442 - Drug Testing Recruits	Report	Oct 1, 85	FMP(P) HA(S)	Feasibility of implementing a program to detect use of illegal drugs by persons who have been accepted for entry into Armed Forces.
186	Sec 1454 - Excess Personal Property for Humanitarian Purposes	Report	Annually by Jun 1	ISA(P)	Input to SecState on disposition of all excess supplies transferred by DoD to State under this section during preceding year.
187 & 498	Sec 1456 - Industrial Base for Textile and Apparel Products	Report	Annually for 5 years by Apr 1	AL(P)	Capability of domestic textile and apparel industrial base to support defense mobilization requirements.
190	Sec 1462 - Transfer Certain Aircraft	Certify	On occurrence	Navy(P)	Transfer of certain aircraft to institution leasing the aircraft.
202 & 516	Sec 1613 - Loss of Production Capacity of Critical Ferroalloy Products	Report	180 days after enactment	AL(P)	Study to determine effect loss of capacity to produce domestic ferroalloys would have on industrial base.
203 & 517	Sec 1622 - Persons Who Fail to Register for Selective Service	Report	Feb 1, 86	OPM(P) w/FMP input	Civil Service employment of persons who fail to register under the Military Selective Service Act.
204 & 518	Sec 1626 - Management of Military Records	Report	Mar 31, 86	Archivist of US(P) w/FMP input	Management of military records maintained by National Archives and Record Administration.
228	Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle (FAASV) (see also H Report 99-81, p.32)	Analysis	Prior to competition	Army(P)	Economic analysis justifying the advantages of a competitive multi-year strategy for FAASV.
229	M1/BFVS (see also S Report 99-41, p. 25)	Report	Jan 1, 86	Army(P)	Feasibility of establishing a second source manufacturer.
230	120mm Mortars	Plan	Not specified	Army(P)	After completion of plan.
232	Support Equipment and Facilities - XM-4 Carbine Rifle	Report	Prior to obligation	Army(P)	Prohibits obligation of funds pending a detailed report on total requirements and planned procurement objectives.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
250	Army, RPV - Aquila Program (see also S Report 99-41, p. 43 & 44)	Report	Dec 15, 85	Army(P) JCS(S)	Addresses restructuring of the program and proposed development of a family of RPV's.
251	Training Devices, Non-System (see also H Report 99-81, p. 21 & 48)	Report	Feb 1, 86	RA(P)	Report on total requirement and acquisition plans for National Guard and Reserves.
260	P-3C Aircraft (Orion)	Report	Prior to Obligation	Navy(P)	Address cost-effective allocation and supporting analysis of $120M for new aircraft.
261	SH-2F (Seasprite)	Report	Jan 15, 86	Navy(P)	Address feasibility, operational desirability, and cost of alternative systems of ASW Helicopter/Ship Systems.
263	E-6A Aircraft	Plan	With FY87 budget request	C3I(P) JCS/Navy(S)	Assure funding continuity for E-6A program.
277	DDG-51 - Helicopter Support Facilities (see also S Report 99-41, p. 67-68)	Report	Jan 15, 86	Navy(P) JCS(S)	Review options for expanding support facilities and furnish recommendations.
301 & 302	Communications and Electronics - AN/TTC-42 (see also H Report 99-81, p. 81 and S Report 99-41, p. 83)	Report	After test	C3I(P) OTE/Navy/Air Force(S)	Authorizes requested amount but directs expenditure of funds only for items requiring first article testing.
309	Bomber Force Study (see also H Report 99-81, p. 87 & S Report 99-41, p. 93)	Report	Feb 1, 86	RE(P) ISP/JCS(S)	Conferees confirm requirements set forth in the SASC and HASC reports.
312	EC - T-39 Aircraft (see also H Report 99-81 p.92)	Report	Mar 1, 86	Air Force(P)	Evaluate the feasibility and cost effectiveness of providing T-39 to ANG for ECM training.
321	AMRAAM	Results	Prior to obligation	RE(P) AL/OTE(S)	Production Readiness Review findings.
336	Range Improvements	Report	Jan 31, 86	FMP(P) AL/OTE(S)	Plans for range usage and improvement.
388	Electronic Warfare Programs	Plan	ASAP	C3I(P) JCS/OTE(S)	FY85 report to develop a comprehensive, coordinated electronic warfare plan.
389	Fleet Telecommunications	Report	Prior to obligation	Navy(P) JCS/C3I(S)	Requires certain specified actions relative to management responsibility, a new RFP, and status report.
392	Short Range Attack Missile II (see also S Report 99-41, p. 159)	Study	Feb 1, 86	Air Force(P) RE/JCS(S)	Provide additional information regarding the relationship between bomber force weapon and proposed SRAM II characteristics.
398	University Research Initiative	Report	Prior to obligation	RE(P)	State the resource commitment of non-DoD agencies to this initiative.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
	Small ICBM				
400	a. GAO Issues	Report	Oct 1, 85	Air Force(P) RE/ISP/JCS(S)	More information on implications of congressionally imposed weight constraint and additional issues raised by GAO. Prepare for Secretary of Defense signature.
400	b. Basing Options (see also S Report 99-41, p. 103)	Study	Prior to FY87 budget request	RE(P) ISP/JCS(S)	Independent review of small missile and basing options to be conducted by the Defense Science Board.
403	SDI Funding	Justification	With FY87 budget request	SDI(P) ISP/JCS(S)	Concerns about SDI program.
405 & 406	Presidential SDI Commission	Results	Not specified	SDI(P) JCS(S)	Results of Commission work.
415 & 416	Limitation on Use of O&M Funds (see also H Report 99-81, p. 159)	Study	ASAP	Compt(P) FMP(S)	Regarding the need for further changes in expense and investment criteria.
430	Increase In Weight Allowance for Transportation of Household Goods	Study	Not specified	FMP(P)	GAO and DoD to review the current allowance and analyze alternatives.
439	Selected Reserve Health Professions Scholarship	Report	Feb 1, 87	HA(P) RA(S)	Results of expanded scholarship authority.
447	Operation of Child Care Facilities	Report	Dec 1, 85	FMP(P)	Need for operating a 24-hour child care facility.
449	Allowable Costs	Report	90 days after enactment	AL(P)	Review allowable cost reform proposals and effect of proposals if enacted.
	Cost and Price Management in Defense Procurement:				
455	a. Evaluate	Study	Not specified	AL(P)	Evaluate all provisions and report appropriate adjustments.
455	b. Advise	Notify	Not specified	AL(P)	Inform Congress on activities, plans, successes, and difficulties.
455	c. Implementation	Report	Mar 31, 1986	AL(P)	Requires full report on implementation status.
465	Military Implications of Soviet Treaty Violations (see also S Report 99-41, p. 224)	Report	Jan 15, 86	ISP(P) JCS(S)	Address policy and programmatic responses, including possible weapons developments and procurements, designed to redress the implications of Soviet non-compliance.
468 & 469	Annual Selected Acquisition Report	Comments	With FY87 budget request	Compt(P) Army/Navy Air Force/JCS(S)	Recommendations for improving the acquisition reporting process.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS
FY 1986 DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL

PAGE NUMBER Rpt #99-235	SUBJECT	ACTION	DUE DATE	ACTION OFFICE	BRIEF
499	Establishment of Travel Offices or Acquisition of Travel Services	Report	With FY89 budget request	AL(P)	Ensure oversight of the Services competitive bidding procedures for the establishment of travel offices or acquisition of travel services; report results.
516	Civil Defense	Study	Mar 3, 86	USP(P) JCS(S)	Conduct an extensive and thorough review of national civil defense objectives, policies, and programs.

Senator **Thurmond**. I am convinced that DOD is loaded down with making reports, a great many of which I think should be abolished. I think we need to have reports to give us information we need, but nothing more.

I have been impressed with the statement you made about all the inquiries you have had to answer, and so forth. That takes an enormous manpower to do that. It is bound to be a burden. Of course, this being a democracy, we do have to answer the public's request.

Mr. Secretary, from time to time the Congress has added Assistant Secretaries of Defense. We have added several since I have been here. The Senate staff report indicates this can cause problems for you.

Would you give us your views on this? Do you feel you have more assistants now than you need or do you feel you need them?

I would assume in answering that question that you will come up and give us your idea of what changes should be made in the structure of the Defense Department which will be helpful to us.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We will certainly do that, Senator.

It is true that the Congress has added Assistant Secretaries to the Office of the Secretary of Defense which were neither requested by the Department nor supported by it during legislative deliberations. In fact, two such additions were made by the last Congress; namely, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, which is equivalent to an Assistant Secretary in every way except title.

Although we may have opposed these positions at the time, they are now working effectively as an integral part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and I would not propose to do away with them. The only problem is that each new Assistant Secretary broadens the Secretary's span of control and requires additional staff resources.

We are actively considering the possibility of consolidating a number of Assistant Secretaries under a new Under Secretary of Defense. In fact, one option an Under Secretary for Readiness, Sustainability, and Support, is suggested in the staff report. As proposed in the report, this official would be responsible for manpower, health affairs, reserve affairs, installations, and logistics; functions which are currently assigned to four separate Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Although I am not prepared to embrace this option without further study, it does appear to have merit and we will give it serious consideration.

In fact, the Department has proposed actions along similar lines in the past, but was unable to obtain congressional authorization for the statutory changes involved. If the Congress is now agreeable to supporting such an effort, we will actively explore the possibility of establishing a new Under Secretary position using the staff report recommendations as a starting point for further study and coopertive action. We will be glad to review this with you and to discuss any proposed changes that you may have or ones that we are considering.

We are agreeable to exploring any structural changes which promises to improve organizational efficiency and effectiveness. The maintenance of a manageable span of control and the consolidation of related functions under one executive are management principles with which I am familiar, and have used in the past. One problem, however, is that many of the actions which have been proposed in this regard, have the effect of increasing our staffing requirements. We are looking for options which would permit us to function with fewer, not more people.

Senator Thurmond. I want to say that I am open minded on this study. I think our distinguished chairman, Senator Goldwater, has done a fine job and our ranking member, Senator Nunn, has, too. We should study the matter carefully.

I think you are in a position to render a great service to this committee and to the country from your experience and telling us what you feel should be done. There is a lot that I think can be done and there are other things that do not need fixing.

Thank you very much.

Secretary Weinberger. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Goldwater. I am going to ask the members to confine their questions to 5 minutes because of the shortness of time.

I would ask the Secretary to confine his answers to 5 minutes. Senator Nunn.

Senator Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On page 6 of your statement you say: "I have worked closely and regularly with them for nearly 5 years now," meaning the Joint Chiefs, "and I found their advice to be consistently timely, accurate, competent and innovative."

Has that been a consistent pattern during your entire tenure?

Secretary Weinberger. It certainly has been better in the last 3½ years than at the very beginning. I think there has been possibly some, not necessarily confusion, but mixing of the kind of advice.

If you are talking about a straight military advice on what ought to be done and what would be the best course to follow in a particular situation, preparation of contingency plans, things of that kind, the advice, as I say, is timely and accurate and I think that it is very competent.

There has been some very imaginative and able suggestions all the way through. Sometimes staff reports take longer to get to you and sometimes they are not as helpful, as is the case with all the large staffs, but basically the advice of the Chiefs certainly in the past 3½ years fully lives up to that description I tried to give it.

Senator Nunn. Does that mean for a year or year and a half in your office you did not get timely and good advice?

Secretary Weinberger. Perhaps I did not know to ask the right questions.

Also there were people who had been there for many years in other areas, other concerns. But basically I do not have any large criticisms, Senator, even in that period.

You asked for any difference. I think from my point of view there has been an improvement in the last 3½ years, but before it was not all that bad. I am just trying to be as accurate as I can in response to your question.

Senator Nunn. General Dave Jones who was there during the first part of your tenure said, "The corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential."

Secretary **Weinberger**. That was not the only disagreement I have ever had with General Jones.

Senator **Nunn**. The advice you say was good, the Chairman who gave it to you is saying it was not good.

Secretary **Weinberger**. He has been there a long time. It was not until after he left that he made those statements. I do not know which period he is referring to.

Senator **Nunn**. He made several statements while he was there. He came out very forthrightly and criticized the Joint Chiefs.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Most of that criticism that I am familiar with came after he left.

Senator **Nunn**. Well, the record will reflect that.

Mr. Secretary, the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, has been rather vocal in his criticism of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. One of his main criticisms is his view that the current system suffers from overcentralization to the extent it adds 10 percent to the cost of the Defense Department. That would be almost $30 billion in round figures.

He has focused his criticism on the advice and authority of the multiservice organization, especially the Office of the Secretary of Defense and defense agencies. Quoting him, Secretary Lehman has stated:

> The Pentagon could be run at a 20 percent savings if we could get rid of those 6,000 bureaucrats in OSD who are accountable essentially to nobody.

Now, two questions. One is: Who are those 6,000 bureaucrats in OSD he is talking about? And second: Are not they directly under your control?

Secretary **Weinberger**. As I mentioned to the chairman, we have very complete freedom for all our people to express opinions at all times and we welcome those. The 6,000 have never been identified to me by name of function. I think there is a bit of hyperbole there.

There is no doubt that as we go through the exercise we talked about this morning in trying to reduce the number of inquiries and the length of the report we have to make, we could certainly reduce some of the people involved.

But the same basic statement could be made about all the structures within the Congress, within the executive departments, and within the Department of Defense.

Senator **Nunn**. You do not have to take the responsibility for the Congress.

What about $30 billion in savings that Secretary Lehman said could be made in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, saying there are 6,000 bureaucrats who work for you that could be terminated?

Secretary **Weinberger**. John has been very busy with a number of things and has not yet had an opportunity to furnish us with any specifics on how that could be specifically accomplished. That is why I think this was more or less a generalized statement.

Senator **Nunn**. How many bureaucrats do you have in the Office of the Secretary of Defense? Around 2,000?

Secretary **Weinberger**. There is something less than that actually. That is one of the reasons it is hard to identify specifically what he has in mind.

Senator **Nunn**. I suppose he must be talking about defense agencies, then.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I thought he was talking about all the offices of all the Secretaries of all three services.

Senator **Nunn**. One thing he says is that the defense agencies, especially the Defense Logistics Agency, and I quote him again.

> They are without question the worst managed of any enterprise in the Pentagon.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, not entirely. That is a long time desire of all Secretaries of the Navy to do all of their own purchasing. It does result in criticism of a centralized purchasing agency.

We have had a lot of problems that we uncovered when we first came with those very large audits I mentioned about the types of contracts that were signed, contracts that I think were not in the best interest of the Government.

We have changed those contracts. We now have, instead of a contract that in effect says a major supplier can supply spare parts and only he can supply them and he can supply them at any price he chooses to charge, those are terrible contracts for the Government, those are the kinds of contracts we found and those are the kinds of contracts we have changed and do not sign any more.

I do not think this is the fault of the Defense Logistics Agency now and I do not think that description is an adequate or fair one of the Defense Logistics Agency.

Senator **Nunn**. Are you thinking of abolishing that Agency or going back to the old system?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, I think centralized purchasing offers great opportunities for savings. I know that people whose purchases are being centralized do not like it. Nobody likes to be reorganized.

We still think that is a proper way to go. As I said, John is perfectly free to make the criticisms and the comments that he does and from them I think we all benefit, especially if we investigate them and find out that they are not fully justified.

Senator **Nunn**. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Indeed, listening to that exchange reminds me of my days when I was there. I would have been beheaded had I been placed in that role by three Secretaries under me.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Occasionally you have to take executory measures, but we try to limit them.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Secretary, let us turn to another very important aspect, the old question of the organization, that is, the role of the President.

You mentioned that the first responsibility is to provide for the security of the Nation, and, indeed, I agree. But corollary to that is the advice that you and the Joint Chiefs give to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States under the Constitution; namely, the President of the United States.

My question to you, sir, is, in the 4 years that you have been serving the President in that role, has he ever once complained to you that he is getting inadequate, biased advice, either from yourself or from the members of the JCS and the Department Secretaries?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, on the contrary, he has been extraordinarily complimentary. He paid us the ultimate compliment of following that advice. I would have to say that we have very regular meetings with the President and Joint Chiefs.

I have many meetings and the Joint Chiefs and I meet with the President quite regularly. It varies, of course, but a number of meetings, and the advice given to me seems to me to be crisp and to the point and follows the requests.

As I said, the President has been extremely complimentary and has given the Joint Chiefs a great deal of praise and the ultimate praise of following that advice.

He has never expressed to us any dissatisfaction with the system or with the advice given.

Senator **Warner**. Now, you have been very close to him throughout these 4 years; as a matter of fact, you have stayed in this position longer than most Secretaries. I presume from your answer, then, that he is satisfied with the system as it now works and is not urging that you proceed with any major reorganizational suggestion?

Secretary **Weinberger**. He has never given me any indication that he is not; no, sir.

Senator **Warner**. Does he speak directly from time to time with the various members of the JCS individually?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes.

Senator **Warner**. He is free to do that?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, indeed, of course.

Senator **Warner**. The service Secretaries?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes; fewer direct contacts with the service Secretaries because of their mission, as you know, having been a very able Secretary, to take care of training and readiness and the supply of the individual service. He does not have many direct contacts with the service Secretaries.

When he feels it is necessary, either I transmit his wishes or he can and does sometimes have direct meetings with them. The primary meetings that he has outside of those with me in the Department are with the Joint Chiefs.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Secretary, I am among those at the moment with an open mind and leaning toward preserving the JCS in some form. Changes, indeed, should be made.

Going back to the statement which Senator Nunn read from your testimony on page 6 in which you expressed satisfaction with their giving advice, is there any way you think the JCS should be strengthened now?

What are you possibly looking at as a means by which to strengthen the role of the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary **Weinberger**. There actually have been quite a bit. The Chairman meets regularly and always attends meetings of the National Security Council. I know one of the bills, I believe in the

House, would make him a permanent statutory member of the National Security Council.

To all intents and purposes, during the 4½ years, almost 5 years, I have been with the Department, he has attended all of those meetings, both General Vessey and now Admiral Crowe.

There is a provision for an automatic succession, so to speak. When the Chairman is out of town or away, a year in advance an Acting Chairman is designated by the Chairman so that there is never any gap or any very short-term period when the office is either vacant or you have to try to find a person to fill in.

Senator WARNER. Could you address what we hear very often, the issue that frequently they try to forge a consensus on a viewpoint and the result is so watered down that it may be of little value?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have heard that criticism as I heard the criticism that they are able to consider only their service interests. I have not experienced that.

The Joint Chiefs meet very frequently. I meet with them once a week regularly on Tuesdays, for 2, 3, or 4 hours. They meet every day, sometimes 2 or 3 times a day. In connection with some of the preparations for Geneva, they have met more often than that.

I am not aware of being given only a watered-down consensus. I am very well aware of the different views, and that all of them are extraordinarily able men who worked their way to the top in these very difficult and dangerous jobs within the services. They all have divergent viewpoints, of course, on many things. I am aware of those divergencies.

When I first came, I was told that they spent many hours trying to reach a consensus so that they would not have to send to me a divided issue on which, under the statute, I would have to make a decision.

In the recent years, one of the things I had in mind in my answer to Senator Nunn, was we sat down and explored with each other a lot of the differences and if a full consensus could not be reached, then I would report that to the President with my own recommendations, if it were a matter of that importance.

So, I have not been conscious of anybody giving up a lot of their own views in order to reach a consensus at a very low level of agreement.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Because the Senator from Virginia brought it up, the President has not been briefed on this study. We are going to brief the Vice President next Tuesday, and hopefully the President when he gets back from Geneva.

Senator NUNN. Also, it seems some indication that the President has an open mind on this subject by reason not only of the appointment of the Packard Commission, but it seems to me when he gives them a specific mandate to study the reorganization issue, he is at least looking at it.

Would you agree with that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, we are all looking for more and better ways of doing things. There is no slight suggestion that the President has taken any position on any of these matters.

The question to me from Senator Warner was whether or not he had ever expressed any criticism to me of either the Joint Chief's organization or the advice they have given him.

My answer is no. Quite to the contrary, he has been very complimentary about it.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, a former member of this committee, Stewart Symington, used to say there are three things that make a nation:

First, ability to deter aggression.

Second, a sound dollar.

And, third, the confidence of the citizens in the government.

On the question of the second, as you know, even as we discuss the possible reorganization of the Department, we are discussing the possible ways to reduce the deficit and make the dollar strong.

There are two plans presently before the Congress. You mentioned your own budget above $300 billion.

My question is this: Do those plans impact your Department?

Would they require you to reduce the level of spending that you have? If so, do you intend to comply with those plans if they become law?

Third, if you do comply, how do you intend to generally allocate reduction between strategic buildup and readiness of our defense forces?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Of course, the short answer would be that I am not prepared on any of those subjects because I was told the agenda today was only reorganization.

But we do take a natural interest in some of those subjects, so I will be glad to give you some generalized opinions on them.

First of all, we always comply with the laws of the United States.

Second, we believe that there is need for a strong dollar.

My impression was from some of the meetings I attended, was that one of the problems is ours is too strong.

Senator HART. Sound dollar?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Sound. Too many people want to acquire it and that pushes its value up.

With respect to the budget of the Department, we have submitted the budget that we think is needed. We faced many reductions in those submissions, more than anyone else.

We have contributed, as a result of reductions in the past, more to deficit reduction than any other Department. In fact, we now have worked out a syllogism that it is not really safe to cut the defense budget because every time we do, the deficit goes up. That is because with defense being cut, domestic spending rises.

We believe that the required budget of the Department which the President has said this year could be a zero increase after inflation followed by 2 years of 3 percent real growth each would enable us to take care of our military needs unless the world situation takes a very drastic change for the worse or unless other factors intervene, some of which we are investigating now.

We believe that those amounts are required and we believe they could be obtained if the Congress would act responsibly with respect to the reduction of domestic spending.

Senator HART. I will restate my question.

If either or both of those plans passed, will you reduce spending in the Defense Department? If so, how do you intend to allocate that general reduction?

Secretary WEINBERGER. As I understand it, Senator, neither of those plans would require actual reduction in defense spending or in other spending until the deficit left by the Congress is so high that the trigger action of those amendments comes into effect.

What I am saying is that responsible action could eliminate the need for the trigger to come into effect and there would not be any need to reduce defense spending.

I am a natural optimist and I assume the triggers should not come into effect. Should they come into effect and drastic reductions be forced upon us, we would face that question at that time.

Senator HART. You do not think responsible action by the Congress would be any reduction in the out years in defense?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am not in defense spending below the amount we have already taken in reduction. We have already taken out $300 billion of the 5-year plan we felt initially were essential.

Senator HART. The Congress will be writing a defense budget like that. I would hope that we proceed down this track. I think apparently it is the track we will be on.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would hope the Congress would write a defense budget consistent with the threat we face which, unfortunately, has not gone down as the deficit has gone up.

Senator HART. We face a $200 billion actual deficit.

On page 7 of your testimony you say:

> We conducted a comprehensive review of the acquisition process to make it more efficient.

Then you talk about regular Secretaries' performance reviews at frequent intervals to prevent defense overruns.

What overruns have been prevented?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have had the regular reports that are required to be submitted that cover the cost increases in our principal weapon systems. These were running at somewhere between 13 and 15 percent a year, increased in the years up to 1980 and 1981 and since, I think, 1982 and 1983 they have been dropping very rapidly.

In the last 2 years they have been under 1 percent. In some of the systems that are included in these reports we have been under the cost estimates. So, those cost overruns have been to all intents and purposes eliminated. These are the major weapon systems.

Senator HART. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, how many services were involved in the Grenada rescue operation?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We had the Army; Special Forces from the 82d Airborne; the Marines; and the Air Force. We also had some Navy activity in connection with the prelanding. A SEAL operation was used because time to plan the operation was short.

A role was played by all of the services.

If your next question is why did we do that? Did we only do that to give each of the services a piece of the action, a standard criticism, the answer is no.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

I would like to ask the questions because I have only 5 minutes. And I was not going to ask that question, as a matter of fact.

Could I ask you to look at the staff recommendation, and I will read it to you, which identifies as one of the major deficiencies of the Department of Defense the failure to improve the quality of the Joint Staffs. The report says:

> For the most part, military officers do not want to be assigned joint duty. They are pressured to march to loyalty by the service while serving on joint assignments, are not prepared by education or experience to perform joint duties and they serve only for a relatively short period once they have learned that job.

Do you disagree with that statement?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is one of the recommendations that I felt was based on experiences and practice of the past. We have changed that, Senator. We have a situation now in which the services are all specifically instructed to give particular credit to people who serve on the Joint Staff.

The limitation on time in service has been removed. If a man is doing a good job or a women is doing a good job on the Joint Staff, they can be kept on that assignment and it does not hurt them in their own service.

I think there was considerable justification of that criticism 3 years ago, but I believe most of those problems have been corrected.

Senator COHEN. What is the normal tour of duty for a flag officer on the Joint Staff?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not know if there is a normal tour. There are 3-year terms for some particular positions. When they are needed elsewhere, they are moved to operational commands. Sometimes it is only a year and a half. Sometimes it is a bit longer. It really depends on who is wanted in which place and there is full cooperative spirit.

For example, if a member of the Joint Staff is holding an important position, I would not hesitate to move him from there to a vacant command or vice versa.

I guess perhaps 3 years is an average we sort of strive for. It is a varying thing. It changes.

Senator COHEN. I am told that during 1985, for example, the officers in 9 out of 12 senior staff positions have been changed, and as a matter of fact, none of the general and flag officers who served on the Joint Staff during the Grenada operation remain in those positions.

Secretary WEINBERGER. On the Joint Staff?

Senator COHEN. Yes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. One thing you have to remember, in 1985 a new Chairman came in. Frequently a new Chairman will make changes at the top. It is quite proper for an incoming Chairman to have some of his own appointees.

I do not think there is any special significance in the fact that the people connected with the Grenada operation are no longer with the Joint Staff. Some of them distinguished themselves in that operation and moved on to other operational commands.

Senator COHEN. The point is that we have a great deal of turbulence of people moving in and moving out.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Not really turbulence. There are times when people come in and do not serve as long as a 3-year period. There are times when they serve two terms. It varies and depends upon whether their particular skills—many of our very best people are there—are needed for an operational command. If they are, the fact that they may have been on the Joint Staff for only 18 months or so would not lead me to think that I should not move them to an operational command, if that is where they were needed.

Both positions, both organizations are performing very valuable services for all of us. It is just a matter of making a decision at a given time when one can do a better job.

Senator COHEN. I take it, then, you would disagree with the report that was done by the JCS back in 1982 which said the general perception among officers is that joint assignment is to be avoided; in fact, in one service it is believed to be the kiss of death as far as continued military career is concerned.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I do not disagree with that at all. That is one of the reasons which led us to make the changes I talked about. We have made a lot of changes. That is why it seems to me a continued reiteration of that point and fails to reflect the changes that have been made as a result of that criticism.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Would the Secretary furnish a list of those changes that have been made that you are referring to?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

[The information follows:]

1. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have affirmed to the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs respectively, their policy that joint duty is of critical importance to the Department of Defense and to the parent service. As a result, the value of such joint service should be appropriately recognized by service selection boards through full and fair consideration. Progress has been noted in the statistics of the services 0-5/0-6 promotion boards for the last three years. The results indicated in every case with 10 or more eligibility, that officers in OJCS exceeded or equaled the Service-wide selection rate for those grades.

2. Increased emphasis has been placed on the nominative aspect of joint duty. If sufficiently well-qualified officers are not offered for duty on the joint staff, new nominees are requested. In the past, there was a tendency to accept the best of those officers "made available". However, with each additional "top performer" from every service assigned to a joint activity, the perception of joint duty has improved considerably and will continue to be enhanced since outstanding officers tend to attract other outstanding officers. The attraction of joint duty is definitely positive and this trend will certainly continue.

3. We have strengthened the policy concerning the utilization of graduates of the three joint schools which comprise the National Defense University. The primary assignment consideration for graduates of these schools must be joint duty. Should an initial joint assignment not be possible because of lack of billets, the next (second) assignment must have joint duty as the primary consideration.

4. A special course (called CAPSTONE) for newly promoted flag and general officers has been established at the National Defense University. The course is tailored to the employment of U.S. forces in joint and combined operations.

5. We have initiated the Joint Staff Officer Training System (JSOTS), a computer based instructional system developed to enhance the capabilities of officers in joint activities.

6. Other on-going efforts have improved the perception of joint duty: (a) increased inter-service exchange of officers; (b) emphasis on joint planning and operations as a

more important feature of Service staff school curricula; and (c) strict oversight of the requirement that new flag and general officers complete the equivalent of a joint tour prior to promotion.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you, sir.

Senator EXON. While I am not going to ask you questions about what Senator Hart had to say, there are those of us on this committee who are very much concerned about what that is going to do to the military buildup. I know you are concerned about that.

I think what Senator Hart was trying to alert you to was that the President had better understand that there is going to be a further reduction below the level that you and he believe to be necessary.

There is no chance, I suggest, of a 3-percent above inflation buildup of our armed services. All we are doing, I think, is trying to alert you to something that has been pretty much covered up or brushed over.

We are saying we want to work with you constructively on dealing with that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I appreciate that very much, Senator. I know that we cannot spend one nickel that is not authorized and appropriated by the Congress.

Senator EXON. I have joined in this effort to try to help restructure and make more efficient the command and control of the armed services. While I am fearful that you have been somewhat defensive, your opening statement does not necessarily say that and I thank you for that.

There is concern here about what we should do but our efforts are not aimed at you.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I understand.

Senator EXON. This is not aimed at the present Joint Chiefs of Staff either. What many of us are concerned about on this committee is that we may have waited too long to improve the command and control of our Armed Forces, particularly as we face some unknown future challenge to this country. I know that is your concern also.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is, indeed. I do not have any worries at all about anybody doing the kind of task that you are engaged in now. We welcome it. We need all the help we can get. We are all in it for precisely the same reasons. We are delighted to have all the suggestions.

I do feel it incumbent to point out that some of the assumptions do not seem to be correct. On the other hand, we believe we can adopt a very substantial number of these suggestions and recommendations.

Senator EXON. I thank you for that. I think that is a correct attitude. I compliment you.

Mr. Secretary, I am not sure that those of us in the U.S. Senate and many outside the U.S. Senate feel that the U.S. Senate itself is a model of efficiency and, therefore, some may think that with that lack of expertise in running our own organization as effectively and efficiently as we should, we should not be getting into the organization of the military.

Nevertheless, I follow the leadership of our distinguished chairman and our ranking member who I think are as concerned as you are about improving, if we can, some of our command and control procedures.

Let me ask you this question. From your knowledge of the Iranian rescue effort, the Grenada invasion and the difficulties in Beirut—there were foul-ups that occurred there without any question—do you believe that any part of the errors in those operations was due to deficiencies in our command and control organization?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. Sir, I was not here during the Iranian rescue attempt, so I would be talking almost entirely by hearsay on that. I would say that I think that was an entirely justified and noble endeavor.

My own feeling is, based on reports that I have read, the principal problem was not the advice necessarily, or the staff organization structure. It was primarily almost complete lack of resources.

For example, there were not enough helicopters. That is hindsight. The attempt was entirely proper.

Senator **EXON**. That was not the question, of course.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. I thought you meant what caused the failure. I do not think it reflected any necessary failure in the staff organizational structure.

Senator **EXON**. Excuse me for interrupting you.

If we did not have enough helicopters, whose fault is that?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. As I say, I am talking from hearsay. My own feeling is when you need 8 helicopters, you ought to take 20, because of the importance, and recognizing the difficulties to which this tempermental beast is subject.

With respect to Grenada, and I know you will think this is a difference and perhaps based on something other than the facts, my own feeling is that Grenada went extremely well and there were inevitably certain little things that went wrong.

For example, one of the radios of the special teams sent to liberate the Governor General's home residence did not work. But overall, the concept and the resources that were assigned to the task were proper for doing what we had to do, which was rescue 1,000 Americans in difficult circumstances with less than 48 hours' notice and to get out quickly.

We did all of those things. I think overall that was an extremely successful operation in every way. It may or may not reflect that the organization of the Joint Chiefs is proper. At least it worked. It worked in the case where we felt it had to.

Senator **EXON**. And Beirut?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. That was a suicide terrorist act which resulted in the death of many, many servicemen under particularly horrible circumstances. The presence of troops in that particular area and the mission they were asked to perform contributed considerably to the problem.

We did examine all of that very carefully in a departmental study under the Long Commission and concluded some changes needed to be made. Those changes have been made. I do not believe any of them, and I think the Commission agrees, would have prevented that suicidal attack from doing what it did.

I do not feel any of that terrible tragedy was the result of any organizational defect. The task of those marines was very difficult. They were put in an area on a peacekeeping mission. They were not allowed and could not move out and seize the higher ground that would protect them from artillery attack.

Even so, they protected themselves very well. They could not protect themselves from a person or persons willing to take their own lives by driving a truckload of explosives in the middle of their compound.

Again, I do not think that is an organizational problem any more than the fact that one radio may or may not have worked in Grenada.

Senator EXON. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Gramm.

Chairman GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me first thank you for your answer. I find it interesting that people who are opposed to getting control of the deficit are suddenly concerned about what doing that is going to do to defense. I welcome your concern.

I also rejoice in your statement, which I never doubted, that obviously the Department of Defense, as every other department of the Government, is going to abide by the law as we write it at the present time.

I take it, Mr. Secretary, that you believe that if the Congress is willing to set priorities, that we can meet our defense needs and avoid violating the goals set out in law to meet the deficit reduction and, therefore, avoid across-the-board cutting?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I will have to say, Senator, I am very strongly opposed to across-the-board approaches. If you will permit me to say so, it is not a good way to approach the priority needs of the Government. It assumes that all of the Government expenditures are on an equal footing.

I do not believe that is the case. I spent quite a lot of time when I was at the Office of Management and Budget and HEW trying to eliminate things that seem to be of lower priority. I still do in the Department of Defense.

Overall, the security needs of the Nation, particularly at a time when the President is engaged in very important and critical negotiations with the Soviet Union are paramount.

We have to recognize there are priorities and the ability of the President to have flexibility in setting those priorities is seriously weakened by any across-the-board reduction proposal.

Senator GRAMM. You do realize, however, that the across-the-board reduction can be made based on the priorities that have been agreed to and it would never occur if the President set priorities, if he sent a budget to the Congress that met the goal and Congress did its job?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We felt that the trigger of the Gramm-Rudman proposal would not come into effect. We felt that the congressional resolution of August which set defense spending and the others at appropriate levels for strict budget reductions was something that should be adhered to.

We have gone way below that on some of the defense proposals now and some of the proposals for defense cutting and way above it on some of the domestic spending. Something is needed to induce discipline into the system. I am bound to say a couple of things would do that.

One, of course, is the item veto for the President and the other would be the ability of the President not to spend everything that he is appropriated.

Again, I do not want to be autobiographical, but going back into the seventies, that is the way we were able to make very major reductions and reduce deficits at that time. It seemed very high to us, some as high as $10 billion, to get them down.

The latter method of not spending what it appropriated is no longer available. We need something like the item veto or something of that kind. The President's flexibility and discretion to assign national priority, one of the things for which he is elected, is essential to preserve.

Senator GRAMM. Do you believe that if the Congress is forced to choose within budget constraints, that the Congress will fund national defense?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I will only say I hope so because I cannot think of anything more important at this time that the Government has to do. None of the other things we are interested in on the domestic side potentially will be able to operate if we do not have the Nation's security protected.

Senator GRAMM. I am convinced we will protect national defense. We will set priorities. When we are forced to, some programs will go by the board, some will be funded. I believe national defense will be funded.

I want to ask two questions related to the topic we are here to talk about. I brought the other up only because it was brought up by others.

Let me first say that your point about paperwork and about bureaucracy is well taken. I want to assure you if you will provide us with the paperwork required in the Pentagon and the number of people to carry out those requirements, that in the next authorization bill I will offer the paperwork and bureaucratic reduction amendment and will try to do something about that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will get it up to you.

[The information follows:]

Certainly one area of continuing concern within the Department as discussed earlier is the growing number of reports requested by Congress. Since 1970 alone, the number has increased almost 1200 percent with no apparent end in sight. As an example, there were 458 requirements in the Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills last year and this figure is expected to exceed 600 before action is completed on these Bills for FY86. There are also another 231 statutory reporting requirements which must be furnished on a recurring basis. The Executive Branch has repeatedly tried to reduce these requirements and the result has been the Congressional Reports Elimination Acts of 1980 (PL 96-470) and 1982 (PL 97-375). More recently, OMB prepared a reports elimination legislative proposal and this was introduced in the Congress as S. 3080, on October 5, 1984, but the bill died with the 98th Congress.

Another target area to be considered for inclusion in any paperwork reduction effort relates to the documentation required in support of the Department's annual budget presentation at the direction of committee staff. In FY 1985, we provided to the Congress 25,306 pages of budget justification material as requested by the committees and in the required format. Then throughout the budget cycle we responded to thousands of congressional requests for fact sheets, position papers, capability statements, and so forth—all presented in justification of our budget request but at the direction of Congress. In addition, we have prepared testimony for the requested appearances of 555 different witnesses in 1,434 hours of testimony. We have reviewed this testimony and answered questions for the record which resulted in 27,918 pages of printed testimony for the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. In the instance of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee alone, in four posture hearings, we responded to a total of 1,006 questions for the record, 381 of these directed to the Secretary of Defense himself.

We are convinced that the above trends must be halted and some sort of discipline imposed upon the system. Your offer appears to be a step in the right direction. Certainly we are prepared to continue our efforts to reduce the tremendous amount of paperwork and associated effort required.

Senator GRAMM. Our problem is somebody comes along with a bad idea and we say why don't we study it, and we say that, God, we passed that.

A question. I am concerned about the proposal in the staff report that would separate command of the services from participation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My concern is that if you do not have the actual command in the service on the staff, you do not have their legitimate concerns represented in the process and if the people on the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not service Chiefs, they lack the knowledge and chain of command necessary to carry out their function.

Do you share that concern?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I not only share it, that is a much better phrasing than I can do. That is exactly the problem.

Again, taking the very valuable expertise of the Joint Chiefs is based on an assumption that somehow they cannot separate themselves from parochial service biases and prejudices. The fact that nobody on the Joint Chiefs really is there unless he has held joint command, and service on the Joint Chiefs, particularly under the last few Chairmen, has demonstrated the number of ways in which individual service interests have been subordinated.

I will be glad to put in the record a list of the number of joint activities and joint approaches as well as programs eliminated from one service so that it can be pursued in another which these Chiefs have specifically approved.

I think it is essential that the service Chiefs' expertise be part of the Joint Chiefs system.

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, just another supplement for the record. A list of the Joint Staff and those who have joint duty.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Joint Chiefs, I said.

Senator NUNN. I thought you said Joint Staff.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Many of the Joint Staff have had. I was speaking specifically of the Joint Chiefs. Ordinarily you do not reach the top of the service, become Chief of that service, without having some joint command experience. Admiral Crowe is an excellent example.

Senator NUNN. Could you list the Joint Chiefs and their previous joint duties and those who have it and who have not?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. I hate to ask you for another report.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. 599,002.

Senator NUNN. We will not call it a report, but verification of your testimony which is somewhat in doubt.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will furnish it for the Joint Chiefs.

[The information follows:]

JOINT EXPERIENCE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN—CJCS, October 1985–; Assistant Naval Aide to President, 1954-1955; Director, Office for Micronesian States Negotiations, Department of Interior, 1971-1973; Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), 1954-1976; Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy, and Operations (participated as a member of the Operations Deputies) as well as Senior US Military Representative to the United Nations, 1977-1980; Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe, 1980-1983, and Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, 1983-1985.

General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA—CJCS, June 1982-September 1985; Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, USA, 1975-1976 (participated as a member of the Operations Deputies); Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Korea), 1976-1979; Commander in Chief, ROK-US Combined Forces Command, 1978-1979; Vice Chief of Staff, USA, 1979-1982 (served as JCS member in absence of Service Chief).

General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA—CSA, June 1983–; Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, OJCS, 1968-1969; Staff Group, Office of the CJCS, 1970-1971; Deputy Chief of Staff, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 1971-1973; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1973-1976; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, USA, 1978 (participated as a member of the Deputy Operations Deputies); Director, Joint Staff, OJCS, 1978-1979; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, Korea, 1979-1982; Vice Chief of Staff, USA, 1982-1983 (served as JCS member in absence of Service Chief).

Admiral James D. Watkins, USN—CNO, July 1982–; Atomic Energy Commission, 1962-1964; Atomic Energy Commission, 1966-1967; Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 1979-1981 (served as JCS member in absence of Service Chief).

General Charles A. Gabriel, USAF—CSAF, July 1982–; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 1967-1970; Deputy Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/US Forces, Korea, 1977-1979; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Readiness, USAF, 1979-1980 (participated as a member of the Operations Deputies); and Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe/Allied Air Forces Central Europe, 1980-1982.

General Paul X. Kelley, USMC—CMC, July 1982–; Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, OJCS, 1971-1973; Executive Assistant to Director, Joint Staff, 1973-1974; Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1980-1981; and Assistant Commandant, USMC, 1981-1983 (served as JCS member in absence of Commandant).

General David C. Jones, USAF—CJCS, June 1978-1982; Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe/Commander, 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, 1971-1974; and Chief of Staff, USAF, 1974-1978

General Edward C. Meyer, USA—CSA, June 1979-June 1983; Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, OJCS, 1967-1969; Federal Executive Fellow, Brookings Institution, 1970-1971; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, USA, 1975-1976 (participated as a member of the Deputy Operations Deputies); and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, USA, 1975-1979 (participated as a member of the Operations Deputies).

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN—CNO, July 1978-July 1982; No joint assignments.

General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF—CSAF, July 1978-June 1982; Physicist, Los Alamos Laboratory, Atomic Energy Commission, 1954-1957; Space Technology Office, Directorate of Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1961-1965; Deputy to Director of Central Intelligence, 1973; Director, National Security Agency, 1973-1977; and Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, 1978 (served as JCS member in absence of Service Chief).

General Robert H. Barrow, USMC—CMC, July 1979-June 1983; Service with Chinese guerrilla forces, 1943-1945; Assistant Commandant, USMC, 1978-1979 (served as JCS member in absence of Commandant).

Information on the joint experience of officers of the Joint Staff is being compiled and will be forwarded when available.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

First, to get a correct answer on the Gramm-Rudman issue, do you oppose the Gramm-Rudman amendment as it is written in the Senate bill?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The Gramm-Rudman amendment as it left the Senate was quite different from the one the President endorsed. The one the President endorsed was one that did not have in it an amendment that is attributed to you which requires all of the reductions may be made at a ratable, proportional, equal amount across all of the accounts of all of the departments of Government.

Senator LEVIN. The question is, Do you oppose Gramm-Rudman?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I oppose the amendment as it left the Senate, yes.

Senator LEVIN. You pointed out this morning to a number of colleagues that we ask for a lot of reports. I agree with that. I think you will agree for the record the number of those reports cost manpower. I certainly concur in that request.

Would you also list for the record the number of reports submitted to us that we do not request?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Can you rephrase that? I do not understand the question.

Senator LEVIN. We requested, you say, I do not know how many reports. You are going to submit that for the record.

I would like to know how many reports the Department sends to us that are not submitted following our request, but at your initiative.

Secretary WEINBERGER. You mean reports you request that we do not send to you?

Senator LEVIN. No. The reports you send to us at your initiative that are not following our request, you voluntarily are sending to us.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will be glad to. I am not aware of any. Maybe you are including testimony or something of that kind. If there are a number of reports that we are sending to you that you do not wish to receive, then we will be very glad not to send them.

Senator LEVIN. Not the kind of reports you send we do not receive. The reports you send to us that we do receive that we have not requested.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I will see if there are any.

[The information follows:]

Generally speaking we have found that the Department does not submit reports to Congress unless specifically requested. As mentioned previously, the Congress in action on the FY 1985 Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills levied 458 requirements on the Department for reports or studies to be submitted to the Congress. And by the way, it appears that this number will exceed 600 for the FY 1986 bills.

The Congress has also imposed on us 231 statutory reporting requirements which are of a recurring nature and which are part of permanent law. Additionally, we are tasked to provide copies of self-generated items, such as audit reports. Many of these are made public under the Freedom of Information Act, and because of their high media visibility are subsequently requested by individual Members of Congress, their staffs and the committees. Finally, many reports and other documentation are furnished in support of the Department's annual budget presentation at the direction of committee staff members.

As you can see from the above, it would be unusual for the Department to furnish reports to the Congress that have not at one time or another been requested by bill or report language or by someone on a committee or Member's staff. There are situations where, for example, the House Armed Services Committee requests a report, and we in turn furnish the Senate a courtesy copy because we feel they should have the benefit of the same information although they did not request it. Certainly in those instances where a report is provided purely on a voluntary basis, it is furnished with the intention to supply Congress with reports that can be utilized in performing their oversight responsibility. We believe the number of such reports, however, is minimal.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, the Chiefs in their relationship to the chain of command is something that I am troubled by and question.

Are the Chiefs now in the chain of command down to the Unified Command? Are they in the chain of command?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; they are the Chiefs of their services. If the National Command Authority, specifically the President, makes a decision that involves use of the troops or carrying out particular missions such as Grenada, something of that kind, their task is to furnish the units, the well-equipped, well-trained, ready for various contingency plans, but they do not command them.

Senator LEVIN. They are not in the chain of command now?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe the Chiefs or the Chairman should be in the chain of command?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No.

Senator LEVIN. On integration, which is the heart of the report, I would like you to comment further on that. There were a number of reports that I think the Defense Department provided that there was inadequate interoperability of communications in Grenada.

Is that true?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, the proper answer to that question is that we can always improve things. We are trying to improve all the communications by, for example, the recent Army announcement of the multiple subscriber equipment which, in effect, will bring cellular phone capability to all the services.

In Grenada there was adequate interoperability to enable us to do the job that we had to do. It could have been improved, of course, and will be improved, particularly with this and other new equipment. But given the circumstances and given the mission, I think it was satisfactory for the purpose of interoperability of communication equipment in the sense that the units were able to communicate with each other.

There were some deficiencies, yes. I mentioned one. For example, one of the teams with the mission of freeing the Governor General's residence had an inoperable radio and they had to be reached by other means.

Basically, we had what we needed to do that job. It could have been improved, yes.

Senator LEVIN. My question is: Did not the lack of interoperability between the Army and Navy result in lack of the Army being able to call in what it needed in terms of naval fire power? Was that a problem?

Secretary **Weinberger**. It is not a problem. It could have been done more easily, but it was done and was done in time to get the fire power where it was needed when it was needed. It could have been done more easily, but we were able to do that task.

We learned lessons from each of the experiences. One of them, of course, is when you do things on very, very short notice, less than 48 hours' notice. You will have some problems that you would not have had if you had more time to prepare.

I would not deny for a moment there were lessons learned and things that will be better next time. Next time, should there be one, there will also be things that will go wrong inevitably.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you. My time is up.

We will be able to ask questions for the record. Will the record be kept open for questions?

Chairman **Goldwater**. Yes.

Senator Denton.

Senator **Denton**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to get down to some of the more important recommendations of the staff study, all of which I evaluate about the way you do. Some of the things look good, some look bad, some I am not smart enough to know right now.

The specific one to which I would address your attention is the disestablishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and permit the service Chiefs to dedicate all their time to service duties.

I see a couple of potential disadvantages there, one being that assuming we give the CINC's a great deal more voice and we demote the service Chiefs to giving their time in the service duties, are we not going to stand in danger as we address the missions and requirements which come forward from the CINC's, which now are processed by the Joint Chiefs, as they presently are composed, are we not going to stand in danger of overlooking in those decisions the knowledge of the logistics and the readiness stemming from the training responsibilities of the service Chiefs?

Do you understand the thrust of my question?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, sir, I do. I know that worry. The separation of the Chiefs of the services from the Joint Chiefs' deliberations and advice seems to me not a good change to make.

The point was made a moment ago by Senator Gramm that one of the great values to the Joint Chiefs' deliberations is the special knowledge of the Chiefs of the services of their capabilities and their resources. Based on that they are able to give very good, very informed advice on such matters as units to be used, forces to be deployed and additional training that may be needed.

It is very important to keep those skills together and have them reside in the same body that is called upon to give the military advice. That is one of the reasons for the point that I have made. The disestablishment of the Joint Chiefs and the substitution for it of some group of retired, or about to be retired officers, is not a good idea.

Senator **Denton**. The missions listed by the staff study, six major missions, are stated categorically and absolutely as if they are established, and they mention them in terms I have never seen before. I might agree with some and disagree with others.

Are you aware of where those particular six missions exist in present doctrine or planning?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Those missions?

Senator DENTON. Yes, nuclear defense, maritime superiority, power projection superiority, and regional missions, defense of NATO Europe, defense of East Asia, defense of Southwest Asia.

I found those in their exclusivity to be omissive. I have never seen that particular list in any DOD doctrine.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I agree with you on that. I do not think that is a reasonable categorization of all the requirements. Indeed, it is almost impossible to spell out by statute or otherwise, the missions that will be addressed by various groups because those missions change and they merge together and sometimes they are virtually eliminated.

We have certain priorities which we assign in the defense guidance and in the defense annual report. What you need really is essentially what we have now and that is a body of very expert, able men who have reached the top of these very difficult professions and who have familiarity, both with the resources and state of training and capability of the units under their direction as service Chiefs and who also are required under the Constitution to give advice to the President and to the command authority on various specific missions that might develop or might be needed. Their knowledge of their forces and of the details, the capability and resources of those forces is invaluable in helping them give advice on how and who should be employed for specific things the President may feel is necessary to do.

Senator DENTON. I am informed my time is up.

I will say in closing that since you agree with me that the missions are not properly enumerated, then the mission integration which they go on as the key to the other functional analysis is inappropriate.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Kennedy.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, if Senator Kennedy will yield for a brief moment.

In light of Senator Levin's question about communications problems in Grenada, my understanding of your answer was that there were not any serious problems, no problems that interfered with the operation.

I do not want to get into a debate on this now, but we have a classified report here from the Department of Defense, some is classified and some is not, Mr. Secretary, that in all respects directly contradicts your assessment of that situation. It goes into considerable detail.

I would suggest you take a look at it because it goes to the heart of some of the problems we are talking about.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am familiar with it, Senator. As I said, there were problems and there were deficiencies.

My statement to Senator Levin was that they were not of a nature that interfered with the success of the operation, they were not markedly different from problems or deficiencies that show up, particularly in very rapidly ordered operations where you have very little preparation time.

There are lessons that we do learn and there are corrections indicated that we are putting into effect. Overall they were not of the nature that interfered with the success of the operation.

Senator NUNN. That could be said about any problem that came up in Grenada if you put it in that light. It was successful and, therefore, you can say nothing happened in Grenada that interfered with the success of the operation.

It is almost a patent absurdity. The operations were hampered seriously by the communications problem. Your DOD report shows that in complete and vivid detail.

I rest my case there.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They were not hampered significantly.

Senator NUNN. That is directly contradictory of your own DOD report. Of course, part of it is classified. Therefore, you are making unclassified statements that are completely rebutted by classified material. I cannot go further into this than that.

That is the kind of thing you need to take a serious look at, Mr. Secretary; otherwise, you really will not know what we are trying to get at in this whole effort.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have taken a look at it. I am familiar with it. I have said many times lessons from it have been clearly set out for us which we believe we have profited from and changes which we have made.

There is not the slightest suggestion that everything was perfect in that operation. But to say that those communications problems interfered with the success of the operation is to fly in the face of the facts. They did not. They did indicate some things that needed to be done.

Senator NUNN. That is very crafty wording, the operation was successful; therefore, nothing interfered with the success of the operation because it was successful. That is ridiculous.

Secretary WEINBERGER. You have exactly the opposite, sir, with respect to the question that was put to me by Senator Exon which related to the Iranian operation. There things did happen which did interfere with the success of that operation.

What you have to try to separate is the magnitude of these things. This is not to say you should not profit from them or you should not make changes. But to say there was serious interference with the success of the operation is to misstate the facts.

Senator NUNN. Nobody used that term but you, Mr. Secretary. I will not play on the ballfield. That is a way of phrasing a question and answer which has no relevance to a critical and objective examination of what went wrong. That is a lawyer's phrase.

I congratulate you as a lawyer, but as Secretary of Defense, I do not think that is an appropriate method by which to proceed.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, you do a great disservice to the people who participated and to the equipment they had if you say this caused that kind of problem.

Senator NUNN. I did not say that. Your own reports say that, Mr. Secretary. It is not my knowledge. I did not do the analysis. It is your Defense Department's self-analysis that said the communications problems were very serious and hampered the operation. That is it.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. The report had to be made because a report is done after every operation. We want to find out everything that either went wrong or needs improvement or furnishes lessons for the future. We should and do that all the time.

The first report was critical of those actions because that was the direction given them. You have to look at the sense of proportion and keep a sense of proportion when you are considering whether or not there was anything in the system which caused those errors or if they are not simply inherent in any large-scale operation that is put together very, very hurriedly.

Senator **KENNEDY**. Mr. Secretary, I want to join in welcoming you here.

I think this discussion is focused on the real purpose of this hearing. During the course of the recommendation in the staff report, they reviewed in very careful detail a number of historical case studies going back to the Spanish-American War, Pearl Harbor, the *Pueblo* incident, Iran, and Grenada.

In those reviews they came up with a continuing source of conclusions. They talk about the organizational complexities, difficulties, interservice rivalries, and what I gather from the report, in reviewing those studies, is that there is a common strain that ought to be addressed.

What I hear from you, in responding on the question of the failed Iranian rescue mission or Grenada is that any time when American forces have been involved in these kinds of dramatic situations, that whatever comes out is the result of the circumstances that lend themselves to that particular occasion and that nothing additional can be learned through careful, thoughtful, and detailed review of the involvement of American Forces in a variety of situations over the period of recent history.

That is why I think the exchange with Senator Nunn is very instructive because, as I gather from your response on Beirut, your response on the Iranian rescue mission, 20 helicopters rather than 8, good radios rather than bad, you are missing the fundamental point of the report which focuses on a number of recommendations.

Your testimony and statement today addressed none of these studies. I think it is fair to say when we are reviewing the various recommendations of the report, that these various studies form the basis of the recommendations that are coming to you.

That is why I have felt that this kind of exchange which we have had today, addressing those recommendations, whether you agree with them or not, your responses really fall short of the mark.

Let me move on to particular areas. In response to Senator Levin's question on Gramm-Rudman, as amended by the Levin amendment, you indicated you opposed that as it left the Senate. Is that the administration's policy?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. Senator, I try to enunciate administration policy whenever I can.

Senator **KENNEDY**. If you can answer the question.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. First, before you go into that, I would like to address one of the points you made regarding the statement I made with respect to Grenada and Iran, and so on.

You said, if my notes are correct here, you gathered from me that I was saying nothing could be learned from any of those examples.

What I was saying was exactly the opposite, that we did learn from every one of them. That is why we do the self-examination, why we do the internal study and all the rest. We do learn from each one of those.

I was attempting to bring out some of the things we have learned, one of the reasons we are improving our communications equipment.

With respect to Gramm-Rudman, I have stated my views many times that the Defense Department and national security requirements of the country are such that they cannot be considered simply against the background of a deficit. They have to be considered against the background of national security.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you speak for the administration?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; I speak for the administration at this time.

Senator KENNEDY. Does the administration oppose Gramm-Rudman as it came out of the Senate, amended by Senator Levin's amendment?

I can give you five pages of hearings that we had in the Foreign Relations Committee where you still did not answer that question.

Could you give us a straight answer?

Secretary WEINBERGER. You might give me an opportunity to, Senator. I know this is one of your techniques.

Senator KENNEDY. This is one of your techniques.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would like an opportunity to develop the answer.

The answer is when the Gramm-Rudman went into the Senate the President endorsed it as a means of working the deficit down and took the position it was not necessary to make reductions below the amounts that had been promised to him for defense which was zero plus real growth this year and 3 percent next year on top of that and 3 percent on top of that the following year.

When Gramm-Rudman emerged from the Senate it had a number of changes made in it. I said publicly I opposed it at that time. I have said it again this morning.

Senator KENNEDY. Is that the administration's position?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The administration's position is as I have stated, we are trying to do anything we can to get the deficit down.

Senator KENNEDY. Is the administration's position the same as yours on opposing Gramm-Rudman with the Levin amendment? Yes or no?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am not aware of any difference between my position and the administration's on these matters. The President has said repeatedly and said it as recently as 2 days ago in pleading for bipartisan congressional leadership in the Cabinet room that whatever formula is adopted it is essential that the 0-3-3 growth for defense be preserved.

That is the position I have taken this morning. I have said anything that requires a ratable reduction, putting all accounts down, without any regard to priorities is not a good idea. We oppose it.

Senator KENNEDY. My time is up.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

During your tenure, how many times have you experienced a serious lack of consensus among the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It would be hard to say, but on major issues I think that there inevitably are a number of different viewpoints you get with a group of very able people assembled around the table on matters on which they are all very expert.

I cannot quantify it. I do not know, maybe 10 or 12.

Senator. WILSON. Have you reported these differences to the President when you have briefed him?

Secretary WEINBERGER. If they were matters that required being taken to the President, yes. I would say the Joint Chiefs are divided on this and here is what some say and here is what others say and here is what I think.

Senator WILSON. Has the President sought advice from individual members of the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary WEINBERGER. He has sought it collectively. I think at some of the meetings when they were all present he has talked on an individual basis with some of them.

I did not know that he had summoned them to his offices for conferences. He has had meetings with all of them on a regular basis, a large number of meetings. At those meetings there is free give and take in which he discusses individual matters with individual Chiefs.

Senator WILSON. So it would be your judgment that he is the recipient not only, as you are, of the advice of the Joint Chiefs in a corporate way, but also where there are serious differences and lack of consensus?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, indeed. As I say, on any matter I would say that the Chiefs are divided on this, one or two feel this way and two or three feel that way.

Senator WILSON. It would seem to me that history in your tenure illustrates very well the point that there may be valid differences and it is important for the President as well as for the Secretary to know that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Of course.

Senator WILSON. It would hardly seem to me that the value of that is offset by whatever concern there may be about parochial concerns.

I very strongly disagree with the recommendation of the study that there should be a change and that we should have some sort of separate priesthood divorced from the responsibility of daily administration of the services.

Do you agree, Mr. Secretary, with the recommendation of the staff that the Joint Staff should report exclusively to and work for the Chairman as opposed to working for all the Chiefs?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would oppose the rigidity that is implied in that recommendation. You have to bear in mind that the Chairman at the moment does have, to a very considerable extent is a matter of practice, sufficient direction and authority over the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff in theory, and on the organizational chart, works for the collegial body known as the Joint Chiefs, but the Chairman is the Chairman of that body. If he directs the Joint Staff to do something, that is done. If the Joint Chiefs as a whole direct that that be done, that is also done.

In practice, in actual practice, the Chairman has what I believe is sufficient authority over the Joint Staff. You will have the Chairman before you. He may have somewhat different views on that, I do not know.

Certainly in my observation there has never been a situation in which the Chairman has not been able to get the kind of action and activity and examination of the matter that he needs out of the Joint Staff.

Senator WILSON. I would think that is true, certainly where you have a strong Chairman, and I think most of them have been, would not the change that has been recommended have the effect of not giving needed additional authority to the Chairman perhaps, but rather of taking some of the authority away from the other members?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. The rigidity involved in it is one of the things that worries me. I greatly believe in flexible application of rules that permit that flexibility.

What you have now is a system in which the Chairman is there, he is the Chairman, he gets what he needs out of the Joint Staff. Other members either go to him and say they would like this done or they can in theory, and they sometimes do, go directly to the Staff, but it is coordinated through the Office of the Chairman.

I do not see any benefit to come from this proposed change that is not already obtained by the actual practice.

Senator WILSON. It would seem to me, Mr. Secretary, that the recommendation, but to create a separate body divorced from the requirement of actually administering an individual service and also the recommendation for an exclusivity of reponsibility to the Chairman on the part of the Joint Staff really weakens the whole concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If we are looking for not only consensus, but almost a single voice, that is one thing. It seems to me that is not what we are looking for. I think we are looking for some corporate voice where consensus can be reached and I think the President and the Secretary should know that.

It seems to me those considerations should be suspect. I would say at A.P. Hill those criticisms were voiced.

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Dixon I think is next.

Senator DIXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, first I would like to congratulate you for the bold step you took in canceling the Divad, air defense gun. I understand the institutional objections to that that were obviously present.

Mr. Secretary, the key evidence on the Divad came from the Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation. I am told that the DOD opposed creation of this organization.

I wonder whether you now support the existence of the Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation in view of the results on the Divad gun?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We certainly support the concept of testing. Testing under independent experts we are able to find to make very good appointments. There may be some argument you can make on the organizational structures involved, setting this up in a totally separate category and all the rest, but I have never objected to having tests of equipment.

I have strongly supported it. We are now able to work very well with the organizational structure that is provided by the Congress for this purpose. I would not have any change to recommend as it is working well. Certainly its reports are very valuable.

I am sorry it was necessary to cancel that particular system because we need that capability. We are not going to get the capability we needed and these tests certainly were very helpful in enabling us to reach that unhappy conclusion.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Secretary, following upon the question by Senator Kennedy, if Gramm-Rudman emerges with the Levin amendment which is in both the House and Senate bill, will you personally urge the President not to sign that bill?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I never disclose or discuss the views I give to the President on any matters. Those are entirely confidential for him alone.

I have to say it does not take a great deal of careful, detailed cryptographic work to figure out from what I have said this morning what that advice might be in this case.

Senator DIXON. I want to say that I am pleased you said you support the idea of centralized purchasing and believe it offers great opportunity for savings.

Now each of the services plus the Defense Logistics Agency and Secretary of Defense, exercise contracting authority and there is tremendous duplication. This committee has found that.

I would welcome your support for efforts to centralize purchasing of all major systems and major acquisitions and procurements.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I appreciate that very much and we favor whatever, on a nonideological basis, will save money. Normally, you get great savings from consolidation of various functions such as purchasing.

We do have an acquisitions office now that we have separated out from research and engineering for that exact purpose. They use the Defense Logistics Agency. There are some major systems in which we have found it is not cost effective to put them into that. Defense Logistics will buy a lot of smaller items, and so on.

When we are acquiring new weapon systems, when you are having some of the problems we had in acquiring new telephone equipment, things of that kind, that may not be the best place for it.

We are totally open to suggestions and all we can get in improving the acquisition and consolidation of those functions.

Senator DIXON. Is it your opinion, then, that the majority of major acquisitions and procurements could be done on a centralized basis without duplication between the services?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We can do more than we are doing. We are trying all the time, yes. I do not know that you can do it at all in some service unique items. Whether or not they are best to be put in a centralized system, I am not sure. There are many items that are not service unique and to whatever extent we can, we are trying to make savings that are inherent in consolidating those purchases.

Senator DIXON. Can we learn a lesson from the Divad gun to make sure all testing takes place early on before large acquisitions take place?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is not necessarily a lesson from Divad. It is what we try to do. You have to bear in mind that the critical test has to be in effect a battlefield test. In order to do that, you have to have a certain number of weapons produced to test.

Senator DIXON. Of course, we do not have a war going on now, thank God.

Do you not think simulated battle condition testing would be useful?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We do that. The point is you cannot test a Divad or anything if you do not have a working production, usable unit to test.

Senator DIXON. If I could interrupt, when I fired that gun at Fort Bliss that did not work, we already had 55 of them on the ground at that place. It seems to me we could have a little earlier on determined that the gun did not shoot straight.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The problem, of course, with the Divad was not so much that it did not shoot straight, it did not shoot far enough. I would not argue for a moment we need to do the testing just as early as we can with the minimum amount of equipment required before we go into full-scale production.

The numbers that we had ordered at that time were based upon the idea that it would indeed have to be tested. I did intervene much earlier in that process than actually canceling it to reduce very sharply the numbers that were to be acquired because we had not had the full-scale testing.

Again, hindsight. Yes, we probably could have reduced that number down from 50, perhaps to 30, but we did mean to have an adequate number to give a realistic, reliable test.

Senator DIXON. Thank you for your courageous act.

I thank the Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator East.

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wish to welcome you, Mr. Secretary. I am a great admirer of your work. On this matter of a Unified Command, do we have a great deal of comparative data on that that we might utilize in evaluating its utility?

If I am not mistaken, the Canadian Government a decade ago went to the Unified Command, same uniform. Now we are going back to separate services.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Right.

Senator EAST. I was somewhat interested in whether there is any value to be learned from that experience or any other experience in other countries that have tried the uniform versus a more diverse command system that we have.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am not familiar totally with the Canadian experience, but you certainly reported correctly what they did do and what their plans are.

One of the real difficulties here is that obviously you want full integration and full unity of command of all the forces needed in a given place at a given time. There are different functions, different things that different services do that are unique to those services.

In consolidating everything into one group you do lose some of the emphasis on those specialities which can weaken your overall combined results. I do not say that you cannot get more integration. We try to do that through the Joint Command, the Command in the Pacific and in the Atlantic and a number of other places where commanders have members from all the services under their command.

In the smaller units of those commands there is a great deal of integration, combined joint training and joint operations conducted all the time. I think this is a very good thing. We feel we should do more of it.

I have not felt we should consolidate all of the services into one and put it all under one man for a number of reasons. I think certainly one of them is that you lose a lot of the service unique capabilities that are very valuable in combining the operation and capabilities for some major operation.

Senator EAST. It seems to me your employing that overcentralization on occasion would potentially hurt your flexibility.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It would hurt flexibility. It would reduce the concentration or the development of expertise in service unique functions. You do not eliminate those by consolidating, but what you might do is eliminate sufficient emphasis on those features in a consolidated force so that you would weaken your capabilities in those particular areas, certain things the Marines do, certain things that Naval aviation does, certain things that the Air Force does, many things the Army does, that are important to do.

That is not to say that there are not things that all four services do together and are the same things and greater efficiencies and economies can be and are being obtained in those joint activities or those activities that are similar to each one.

My worry is losing the service unique expertise by overconsolidation.

I also have some worries about the ability to maintain proper civilian control under the consolidation of the more extreme kinds that has been suggested by some.

Senator COHEN. Will you yield?

Is there anything in the recommendation of the Senate staff study that calls for the consolidation of service functions?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have not seen anything of that kind, but there are some who have suggested that. There are other studies. I am just talking in general, sir. I am not attempting to criticize these staff findings at all.

Senator EAST. If I might ask a final question since I know my time is running out, I plead guilty that this is not particularly germane to the overall issue here, but I have heard a number of commentators say we should greatly regret your absence from the summit in terms of the arms control negotiations that will be going on there.

We are told this is a very serious problem if you are not there. Is that true?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I do not think it could be classed as a serious problem nor do I think my absence from any gathering could be classed as a serious problem.

Senator **East**. You are overly modest, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Glenn.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Mr. Chairman, I hate to interrupt, but I am getting awful close to the 11 o'clock meeting.

Chairman **Goldwater**. I know your problem. If you will keep your answers short, you can get out of here.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, several members of the committee have talked about their open-mindedness, they are not committed one way or the other on this. I put myself in that category. I am sure from your statement that you are in that same frame of mind particularly.

You close your statement on page 13 by saying, finally, you would like to emphasize earlier comments that no proposed change should be implemented unless, and one of the things you list is the changes consistent with our basic constitutional fabric and organizational philosophy.

That is what this whole thing is about, basic organizational philosophy. If you are ruling out anything in that area, we are at loggerheads.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I did not mean to do that. I am open and delighted to welcome these suggestions. As I told the committee, I think before you were here, that we expect to agree that close to half of the recommendations could be put into effect.

Senator **Glenn**. I am concerned, too, that in our reorganization if there is such a thing that comes out of all of this, that we get back to some basics of our whole defense organization and what it is supposed to accomplish.

I thought for a long time that our strategic goals or foreign policy do not get adequate consideration.

No. 1 is defense of U.S. territory.

No. 2 is procurement of U.S. strategic materials where they come from such as oil out of the Mideast, chrome, and so on.

No. 3, we have alliance with some 50 different nations through seven different treaties. It seems to me that that is what we should be considering, and then defining what kind of Defense Department we need instead of just the other way around.

I have spent a number of years on the Foreign Relations Committee. I think, frankly, we should combine this committee and that committee so that we are considering strategic and foreign policy matters and I think in the Defense Department the same thing occurs.

Now, I would be interested in your comment on what can be done to make certain that all these bigger concerns get addressed. I realize some of these things are out of date perhaps.

We are at the same time trying to dump Nicaragua under the Rio Treaty. We are supposed to be down there defending them against aggression according to the treaty. We have one group in one direction and one group in the other to defend them.

We need to consider the strategic concerns of this country as we set up our defense establishment.

How can we do that in any reorganization effort?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not disagree with your conclusion at all. I do disagree with the fact we do not have that kind of consideration and those points in mind. We do feel that we have a very large number of commitments which we have to have.

We have to look at the capability of the Soviets and we have to look at the other points where we may be threatened. We do believe the commitments we have, the treaties we have to try to strengthen our ability to defend ourselves and our allies are vital. We do not know of any commitments that can be given up.

I also believe very firmly that the request of the Defense Department and our resources are based entirely on what is needed to help us carry out those commitments and that we do not do it the other way around.

I am not aware of anybody who says that would be a nice weapon system to have, let us see where we can use it. It is the other way around.

Divad, for example, that additional air defense is vital. You have to protect your divisions wherever they may be from close in or even what is now becoming more medium-range capabilities of the Soviets to attack them in low level attacks from the air.

So, you get what you need to enable yourself to operate and to carry out commitments which you have to make. I do not deny at all that is the way it ought to be.

I do have some disagreement with you on the fact that that, as you say, is not the way. That is the way it is. We do have the priority commitments that are more or less forced upon us by the world as it is. We do what we can to equip ourselves to carry out those commitments. It is vital to do that.

Senator GLENN. I think there is a lot more that can be done in that particular area.

I would like your comment, too, on this mission-oriented reorganization.

Do you favor that or don't you favor that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have worries about that, Senator, because I do not think you are able to categorize and push into four or five little boxes all the missions that may arise. We certainly, however, would feel that it is proper to try to put together as many of the tasks as we can see under the leadership or under the direction of people who have to carry out the responsibilities in those areas.

We do that with the Commander in Chief, but they are not limited to particular functions within their areas of command. The commanders have full responsibility in the Pacific, for example, or the Atlantic, and we try to assign them the forces they need to carry out those responsibilities.

I would have difficulty with some of the mission-oriented reorganization that I have seen.

Senator GLENN. My time is up.

Grenada has been referred to several times here this morning. I think as a sort of an illustration of what we are trying to solve here, your defense of the Grenada operation, there was a question whether we needed to go into Grenada to begin with, to try to defend it when we took almost 2 weeks to overcome several hundred Cuban Seabees, and then point this out as a paragon of success of the United States of America is pretty far afield.

We have heard about all the bickering that went on in the JCS regarding that. Everybody wanted to get into the act. They wanted to be part of the action.

We had a unit in the U.S. Marine Corps organized to do exactly what was to be done if Grenada had to be gone into, a Marine Corps organized, all the elements of arms, a very simple operation. We had a force ready to do that within the 48 hours on a permanent 48-hour deployment schedule.

I think all this bickering did get into the way of Grenada from everything I have heard from talking with the people at the JCS level.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. You have heard a great deal that I did not hear. I participated in all the meetings and discussions. I take full responsibility for having what some have called too large a force to do the job. It was not because the Marines wanted part of it or the Army.

It was because I felt, and that feeling was shared by many, that we should have more than was felt to be needed in order to do the job quickly, efficiently and get out very quickly. It is a very difficult job to free 1,000 Americans under conditions that you do not have any idea whether the beginning of your attack is going to bring about hostile measures to them.

So, I have no doubt at all that what we did in Grenada was correct. While there were obviously more forces than we needed, I would not change one iota of the resources and the forces that were assigned to that task.

Senator **GLENN**. I hope you get some better radios, though. Change that one, too.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. We are getting better radios all the time.

Chairman **GOLDWATER**. The Secretary has an appointment at the White House. I am sorry we are going to have to cut off the questioning.

We will keep the record open until 5 o'clock this evening for any questions you would like to submit.

Thank you for coming over, Mr. Secretary. I have to be honest with you, you did not answer the questions, you have not approached this thing right. I think you had better go back and read this report of ours. We are going to get you back again. We want your answers.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. We are reading it very carefully. I will be glad to come back.

Chairman **GOLDWATER**. Read it again.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. Thank you very much.

[Questions submitted by the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to be answered for the record follows:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER

VIEWS OF GENERALS KRULAK AND PALMER

Chairman **GOLDWATER**. Mr. Secretary, a number of retired military officers have recommended a return to the World War II organizational arrangements for the U.S. military establishment. Most vocal in this regard have been General Bruce Palmer and General Victor Krulak.

General Palmer recommends that the Secretary of Defense be removed from the operational chain of command.

General Krulak also makes this recommendation, but goes even further: He believes that the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be eliminated.

What are your views on these recommendations?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not agree with either General Palmer or General Krulak, for two reasons:

First, just as we cannot wage tomorrow's wars with yesterday's technology and tactics, we cannot wage them using yesterday's organizational and command arrangements. It's a far different world today than it was 45 years ago and I believe that our defense structure has to reflect that difference.

Second, there is no evidence to suggest that the World War II structure, though well suited for conducting the war at that time, would have been equally suited to managing a peacetime defense establishment, even in the 1940s, to say nothing of the 1980s.

I believe the Secretary's presence in the chain of command is necessary in that it allows the President to maintain ultimate control and oversight of the military establishment without getting bogged down in the day-to-day matters required to coordinate the myriad activities of the Military Services and U.S. forces in the field.

The Chairman is essential for much the same reason. He relieves the Secretary and President of many of the day-to-day tasks involved in the coordination and development of military strategy and plans while remaining responsive and responsible to them for guidance and the quality of the end product. Furthermore, the nation's experience with a Chairman-less Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to 1949 clearly indicated the need for such a position.

QUALITY OF JCS ADVICE

Chairman GOLDWATER. Mr. Secretary, by law the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the responsibility of being principal military advisors. The term advisors suggests that their role is to forward all legitimate alternatives for decisions by higher civilian authority.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff advise you, do they inform you of all legitimate alternatives or do they only offer one recommended course of action for your consideration?

Secretary WEINBERGER. In offering advice to me through written recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide, with few exceptions, a single recommended course of action. However, a considerable amount of advice is provided in daily and weekly meetings between the JCS or the CJCS and myself which is not normally evidenced in the final written reports or position papers that the JCS submit. Advice which is provided in these meetings identifies a wide variety of alternatives for my consideration.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Mr. Secretary, despite its successful outcome, there were substantial interoperability problems for U.S. forces employed in Grenada.

Why did these interoperability problems occur and what actions have you taken to ensure that they do not recur?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would not characterize the interoperability problems as substantial. There were interoperability problems, but in the context of the entire operation, mission accomplishment did not suffer because of them. In fact, there are many more examples of good interoperability than problems in Grenada.

One problem was communications, which I have discussed elsewhere in my testimony.

Another interoperability concern involved fire support coordination. Fire support coordination was excellent in most areas. For instance, during operations to secure Point Salines airfield, both Navy A-7s and Air Force AC-130s joined the Rangers in destroying armored personnel carriers and neutralizing a Cuban force which had some Rangers pinned down. Throughout the entire operation Army-Air Force and Marine Corps-Navy fire support coordination was excellent. The Army had a difficult time coordinating for Naval air and gunfire support initially, but the problem was mainly related to planning rather than to equipment interoperability. Navy fire support teams deployed with the 82 Airborne did not initially have correct codes, frequencies and call signs. The Joint Application of Fire Power System (J-Fire) and increased joint fire coordination training will improve our fire support coordination.

Another interoperability problem concerned the ability of Army helicopter pilots to make ship landings. Army pilots did make ship landings during Grenada. There were procedural problems and differences in technique that were overcome by diligence and application of common sense. Our goal is to reduce the changes for error, therefore, the Army and the Navy are working together to train more Army aviators in shipboard landings.

The most important point I want to make about interoperability is, that it is an issue of long-standing concern to DOD and the Services. Our experience in Grenada served to support many ongoing joint initiatives and give them impetus, rather than break new ground.

QUALITY OF JCS ADVICE

Chairman GOLDWATER. Mr. Secretary, one area of advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that has consistently received low marks has been revisions to the Unified Command Plan. The most important revision that has occurred during your tenure was the creation of the U.S. Central Command. On this issue, the Joint Chief of Staff had a three-two split vote, but you selected an arrangement that was not recommended by any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

How would you characterize the quality of advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this issue?

Where did you turn for advice once you had rejected the inputs from the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Secretary WEINBERGER. In response to your first question, in my opinion, the quality of advice should not be measured by the final decision. Rather, it should be measured by the depth of analysis, the way the problem is framed in terms of national security, the total information provided, and the range of options and analysis of each option. The final decision does not necessarily have to reflect exactly one of the options, even though outstanding advice was provided in the process.

In the case of the U.S. Central Command, "the three-two split JCS recommendation" to which you refer was made in August 1979. Between that time and April 1981 when I made my decision, considerable activity occurred in Southwest Asia, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the continuation of the Iranian revolution, and the eruption of the Iran-Iraq war, that changed the situtation with which we were dealing. In early 1981, based on the information provided by the JCS, as well as by the OSD staff, I made the decision to establish the U.S. Central Command.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

QUALITY OF JCS ADVICE

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, on page 13 of your prepared statement you say:

"Military advice will be of higher quality and credibility if it comes from military leaders who have operational accountability."

Under the current system, which military leaders have operational accountability?

Do you believe that the corporate Joint Chiefs have that accountability?

If so, what is the role of the Unified and Specified Commanders?

Secretary WEINBERGER. In the context of my statement, the Service Chiefs are responsible and accountable, under careful and continuing supervision of the civilian authority, for organizing, training and equipping their individual Service worldwide. They are well placed to advise in the inevitable competition for military assets and to judge between alternative military solutions. Furthermore, these Chiefs, under their primary responsibility as JCS members, are responsible for developing war plans and for the strategic direction of operating forces. So, once decisions are made these same Chiefs are responsible for implementing the decisions and must see that the appropriate CINC receives the resources and support necessary to carry out his task. This insures continuity between policy-making and implementation and provides an appropriate balance between responsibility and accountability that would be absent in a group outside of the operational resource management structure. The accountability of the corporate JCS stems from the fact that it is made up of these individuals who are charged with organizing, training and equipping our forces. The Unified and Specified Commanders, as laid out clearly in law, are responsible for executing military missions assigned to them by me with the approval of the President. In addition, this administration has made a concerted effort to improve the influence of these commanders in the defense policy and resource decision-making process. Currently, the Unified and Specified CINCs appear before the Defense Resources Board twice yearly and provide me advice directly or informally, either at their command headquarters or here in Washington.

ROLE OF SERVICE SECRETARY

Senator **Nunn**. Mr. Secretary, the statutes which establish the Secretaries of the military departments are not uniform. Each one is unique. The staff study recommends that the inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of the Service Secretaries be eliminated.

Do you agree with that recommendation:

Secretary **Weinberger**. I am not aware of any specific policies, practices, or programs that have been affected by the existence of differing statutory formulations for each of the Service Secretaries; however, although current legislative provisions do not present a management problem, I agree that, to the extent possible, the statutes for each of the Service Secretaries should be consistent.

Senator **Nunn**. By law the Chief of Naval Operations is given the responsibility as the "principal naval advisor to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of war" (10 U.S.C. 5081).

None of the other Service Chiefs have this authority. For example, the Chief of Staff of the Army is not given independent statutory authority as the principal land-war advisor to the President.

Do you believe it is appropriate for a Service Chief to have the independent statutory authority as a principal advisor to the President?

Do you believe that the other Service Chiefs should have similar authority?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The military advice received by the President must be based upon the best available knowledge, experience and expertise in military matters and must present all feasible options from every viable military perspective. It should contain objective and thorough evaluation of the pros and cons of all options. The mechanism for developing and providing the advice should be structured in a manner which guarantees that decision making and policy formulation are actually (not just nominally) reserved to, and exercised by, the President.

We believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the best entity for providing such military advice to the President. As heads of their respective services, the JCS are most knowledgeable of the special and particular capabilities and capacities, as well as the state of training and readiness, of the forces under their responsibility. Furthermore, the JCS system ensures the continuity between policy making and subsequent implementation that is essential to success.

We also believe that the role of the Chairman of the JCS should be strengthened, provided it is clear that *he acts on behalf of the JCS* (emphasis added). If this latter provision is incorporated in statute, we believe that the independent authority of the Chief of Naval Operations to act as the "principal naval advisor to the President and to the Secretary of Navy on the conduct of war" (10 U.S.C. 5081) should be deleted from the statute.

If on the other hand, the statute is written to restrict military advice to that provided by the CJCS, without representation of the advice of the Service Chiefs, the provision should be retained and revised to include the Secretary of Defense as a recipient of such advice. Further, the statute should reflect a similar assignment of independent advisory responsibility to the other Service Chiefs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

GRENADA

Senator **Kennedy**. Do you agree with the staff study's analysis of the Grenada operation?

And what measures have been adopted to correct for the failures and problems that occurred during that operation?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The Joint Staff and the services have thoroughly examined Operation URGENT FURY over the last two years. Problems that have been validated have been or are being corrected. The Services continue to work together on problems that cross service lines in areas such as air space management; tactical missiles; intratheater airlift; logistics support; command, control, and communications systems; and helicopter pilot training, just to name a few.

Grenada was a unique operation in many respects. We have tried to focus on those lessons that have applicability to war fighting in general and to avoid overreacting to one-of-a-kind incidents that are not indicative of a systemic problem.

Senator **Kennedy**. After the F-14s had forced the hijackers down in Sicily—Sigonella Air Base—you held a press conference and stated that this operation demonstrated that, like the Grenada operation, U.S. Forces could work in coordination and could conduct joint exercises successfully.

I have a number of questions about the Sigonella operation.

What other service components were involved in that operation and what did they do?

Secretary **Weinberger**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Kennedy**. Who gave the order to land in Sigonella and at what point were the Italians informed of this?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The President, after conferring with me and the National Security Advisor, and based upon military advice of the Chairman of the JCS, approved the landing of forces at Sigonella. The Italians were informed just prior to the landing.

Senator **Kennedy**. Who gave the order for the plane load of troops to follow the Egyptian plane into the Sigonella Air Base and at what point were the Italians informed of that decision?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The President, after conferring with me and the National Security Advisor, and based upon military advice of the Chairman of the JCS, approved the landing of forces at Sigonella. The Italians were informed just prior to the plane's landing.

Senator **Kennedy**. We heard after the incident that a U.S. military commander followed the hijackers to Rome—where they were being taken by the Italian authorities—and in the process followed that plane without permission of Italian authorities and in violation of Italian air space. Did that occur?

Secretary **Weinberger**. That occured, except that it was a military staff officer, and not a commander, who was assigned the mission of assuring that the Egyptian 737 did not escape. In an effort to assure accomplishment of that mission, the aircraft took off without proper clearance.

Senator **Kennedy**. Who was responsible for that decision?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The President approved the request to follow the aircraft. The pilot was responsible for taking off without appropriate air controller clearance.

Senator **Kennedy**. Did you or the President know about in advance and approve:

(a) Sending in the U.S. military to Sicily?

(b) Sending a U.S. military officer to follow the hijackers to Rome in violation of the Italian air space?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Both the President and I knew and approved of these movements in advance.

INTEROPERABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS

Senator **Kennedy**. The Defense Department recently made a decision to award a very large contract to GTE to produce a Mobile Subscriber System (MSE) which would improve interoperability of forces on the ground in Europe. That system would interoperate with existing systems and, at the same time, achieve interoperability with the other NATO forces.

My question to you is this. Is there any plan or is anyone on a plan to achieve interoperability among the services—between the Air Force in the air and the Army on the ground, between the Air Force in the air and the Navy at sea, and between the Navy at sea and the Army on the ground?

This problem has been with us for twenty-five years, and as far as I know, there is no solution in sight.

Didn't the lack of interoperability do significant damage to our troops' ability to coordinate on Grenada?

Isn't this failure evidence of a serious problem in interservice coordination, in joint operations, and in unity of command in the field?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I am pleased to see that you have such a strong interest in interoperability. It is an important and complex issue; one that I can report we have been attacking vigorously at every level. The need for interoperability has increased sharply, given the demands to meet the threat with joint-service and even multinational forces organized into a cooperative, effective, synergistic whole. The challenge of providing it is made more difficult because we may well find ourselves operating in a high technology environment and facing an adversary who will attempt to confuse, disrupt and destroy any command and control or communications systems. Additionaly, we cannot afford the luxury of unnecessary duplication or expenditure of equipment, effort and other resources that can occur when interoperability is not given adequate consideration. In recognition of these fundamental requirements, we have been actively pursuing efforts to identify and ensure sufficient interoperability.

Recent publicity may have caused concern that, despite its position as a major initiative, interoperability has not been given the attention it deserves. However, the problems we face arise from decisions made many years ago on systems that, for the most part, are already fielded. Modifications to achieve additional modes of interoperability at such a late date can be very expensive and must be weighed carefully against expected benefits. It is in the area of future systems that we are making the most progress toward sufficiency in interoperability.

An important observation is that we do not need nor can we afford 100 percent interoperability in all categories of equipment. In fact, many of our most difficult issues in this area relate to identifying the level of interoperability sufficient and necessary for a particular system and its foreseen applications. That tough job falls to the CINCs and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) in the development and approval of Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs). Our primary goal is to provide command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) systems that maximize the performance of our weapons systems and the operability of our forces in terms of survivability, endurability, interoperability, and effectiveness.

The "plan" for achieving C^3I interoperability is described in two important policy directives. DOD Directive (DODD) 4630.5, which was recently revised and reissued on 9 October 1985, identifies the "key elements" and responsibilities that must be addressed to achieve C^3I interoperability. A draft Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Memorandum of Policy 160 (MOP 160) goes a level of detail further, prescribes policies and procedures for achieving C^3I interoperability, and identifies responsibilities for carrying out the policies and procedures.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (C^3I) (ASD(C^3I)) is my principal assistant for C^3I matters and ensures that all DOD components comply with DODD 4630.5. As such, he has overall authority to enforce interoperability requirements identified by the JCS or arising from other sources.

MOP 160 defines the general approach for achieving C^3I interoperability for the entire life cycle of a system. Requirements for C^3I systems are to be reviewed by all DOD components whether these requirements are for joint or single-service systems. Specific interoperability information is required in each statement of requirement. The Joint Tactical C^3 Agency (JTC^{3}A) is developing an overall framework for achieving C^3I interoperability in the form of a joint tactical C^3 architecture. JTC^{3}A will review requirements for their impact on the overall architecture. The OJCS will review requirements from a doctrinal and procedural perspective. JCS MOP 160 is expected to be approved from implementation in the near future.

On July 5, 1984, the JTC^{3}A was chartered by consolidating existing organizations. It has a timely and vital role in resolving interoperability issues. It is tasked to:

Develop and maintain a joint tactical C^3 architecture by defining the architecture for joint tactical communications systems (including nonstrategic nuclear forces C^3) and by defining interface specifications required to ensure interoperability and information flow among command and control systems in accordance with the guidance and direction provided by the JCS and the ASD(C^3I).

Develop, test and maintain technical and procedural interface standards to be used by tactical C^3 systems in joint or combined operations, and verify that such systems have implemented properly the approved interface standards.

Monitor and coordinate programs for which the JTC^{3}A has responsibility but which are included in the programs of other DOD components and agencies, and monitor other programs that may affect tactical C^3 interoperability.

With its activation, the JTC^{3}A has taken over program management responsibility for the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) Program. The JINTACCS Program was established by the JCS specifically to help achieve and maintain joint and combined interoperability by developing common message standards and procedures for critical command and control functional areas.

Initial interoperability efforts of the JTC^{3}A have focused on achieving early user capability and immediate assistance to the Commanders of the unified and specified commands. Since its establishment, the agency has been actively working with the CINCs to identify solutions to several C^3 problems in the near term. Additionally, it has begun efforts working toward the long-term joint tactical C^3 architecture that will become the road map for evolving C^3 systems.

Standards and procedures will be developed to support the architecture and they will form a basis for system development. The systems' joint interfaces will be tested and certified for use in joint operations and, when the required interoperability is verified, will be placed under configuration management to maintain that interoperability.

The Joint Exercise Program, sponsored by OJCS with participation by all the unified and specified commands, contains specific C^3 interoperability criteria to evaluate the success of our interoperability efforts, especially in the areas of procedures and training, and to identify additional interoperability requirements. A C^{3}I interoperability improvement program will be established to assist in implementing this approach by providing for an annual review, coordination, and prioritization of interoperability requirements, issues, funding, standards, and fielding plans.

It should be noted that the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) performs functions similar to those of the JTC^{3}A in the strategic and theater areas. Finally, the United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM) is tasked to develop joint tactics, techniques and training under the guidance of the JCS, which also contribute to interoperable procedures and doctrine.

In addition to joint efforts, there are international bodies addressing the problems of interoperability. Within NATO, for example, the Allied Data Systems Interoperability Agency (ADSIA) and the Tri-Service Group on Communications and Electronics equipment (TSGCEE) are responsible for certain aspects of combined interoperability. The JTC^{3}A assists in representation in these bodies, as does the DCA. Representatives are also drawn from the OJCS and OASD(C^{3}I) to present coordinated U.S. positions. The C^3 Review Council and its functional panels ensure that U.S. positions are fully coordinated.

There has been a good deal reported about the so-called lack of interoperability and communications problems in Grenada. As noted in "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," the staff report prepared for your committee, "The operation in Grenada was a success, and organizational shortcomings should not detract from that success or from the bravery and ingenuity displayed by American servicemen." The only disagreement I have with that quote is the insertion of the word "organizational." The root of those reported problems can be traced back in most cases to not having sufficient time and attention paid to a communications plan before the operation began. The extremely compressed timeframe for planning and "close-hold, limited-need-to-know" security procedures kept knowledgeable C^3 personnel out of the planning phase. These problems affected areas other than C^3 (e.g., fire support and logistics). While most certainly irritating in the stress of combat, they did not do "significant damage" to coordination between U.S. forces involved in the operation. They have been addressed and corrective actions are underway. The JCS and the CINCs are now acutely aware of the need to pay adequate attention to the communications plan and procedures before launching such an effort.

I have recently asked Don Latham, my ASD(C^{3}I), to perform an independent analysis to ensure that corrective actions taken for C^3 shortfalls during the Grenada operation, as a result of the classified after-action report of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), are appropriate and sufficient. Though not yet put in final form, the results of that review indicate that none of the problems raised cited the organization or structure of DOD or its components or inter-Service coordination as factors; nor does it indicate that the C^3 problems cited were evidence of serious problems in joint operations or unity of command. It does indicate a requirement for further scrubbing our planning and training procedures to ensure that we have done all we can so that another short-notice contingency will not recreate some of the same problems.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN

Senator GLENN. Mr. Secretary, you stated that a responsible discussion of the study recommendations for change cannot be conducted without first establishing some consensus on the present organization and operations, the mission of the Department and the desirability of alternative organizational philosophies.

I agree and firmly believe that a consensus is absolutely essential if constructive changes are to come from this review.

My concern and question is: Do you believe we can reach a consensus on the major elements?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I believe that substantial, although by no means complete, consensus regarding these elements can be reached; just as I am quite certain that some minor differences will always remain.

The process of self-evaluation that we are currently undertaking in DOD, the deliberations of this Committee which are being inaugurated today, continuing dialogue between the Administration and the Congress, the work of the President's Commission on Defense Management, and the debate which is taking place in journals and other respected fora dedicated to defense and national security issues, all provide a sounding board for ideas, facts, and opinions which will provide the basis for such a consensus. These are the necessary first steps. However, it will take time, effort, and an insistence on the strict substantiation of facts, for this process to work properly and to produce the mutual understanding and shared values which are essential to making sound organizational decisions.

If we rush to judgment, permit less than vigorous intellectual discipline, and rely on hearsay or outdated information in formulating our judgments, it is not likely that a working consensus will be reached and the quality of the organizational decisions which are ultimately made will suffer accordingly.

Senator **Glenn**. One of the major problem areas identified in the study was limited mission integration at DOD's policymaking level. The statement was made that no major element of the Washington Headquarters of DOD is organized along major mission lines.

The specific recommendation to address this problem was to establish three mission-oriented Under Secretary positions in OSD for (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) NATO defense, and (3) regional defense and force projection.

I would appreciate your comments on this recommendation since it would require a major change in your current organization.

Secretary **Weinberger**. As I indicated in my opening statement, we are currently reviewing all of the report's recommendations in detail and will provide a specific position on each at a later date. I think it is important, however, to understand that there are certain advantages to current organizational arrangements which should be acknowledged and which must be taken into account when evaluating whatever benefits a mission-oriented organization may possess.

First, the major mission areas identified in the staff's recommendation are given cross-functional focus and top management attention under the current OSD structure, by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Within his office, the Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy is responsible for strategic nuclear matters, NATO, and European affairs, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs handles general purpose forces and other regions of the world.

Second, there is currently a great deal of compatibility in the design of the Department's major headquarters and this compatibility contributes to the ability of the Department to coordinate its many and diverse activities. Even though the unified commands are mission-oriented, their headquarters staffs are organized along functional lines. The headquarters of the service component commands, which carry out the unified command missions, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is the Secretary's military staff, are structured in a parallel fashion. By the same token, OSD, which is the Secretary's policy and management staff, is organized in a manner which roughly parallels the staffs of the Service Secretaries, who are responsible for supporting the military forces assigned to the unified commands. The overall result is an integrated defense headquarters structure designed to support the Secretary of Defense in providing direction to the operating forces in the field, on the one hand, and as the manager of the programs and resources which support those forces, on the other.

Third, the functional approach to the organization of OSD provides a means of integrating the capabilities of the Military Services with as few people as possible and it provides a means of promoting economy and efficiency across mission lines.

As I have said earlier, the Department is willing to consider change, where the need for change can be established. But, in order to properly evaluate the alternatives, we must acknowledge the strengths of the current structure.

Senator **Glenn**. The study also identified lack of clarity of strategic goals as a major problem area.

In my opinion, this is potentially one of the most serious problems, since if this is true, it casts doubt on the validity of our annual defense budget requests.

For some time I have been concerned, as others have, over the relationship between our foreign policy, its translation into strategic goals, and finally into our defense budget.

After serving for several years on the Foreign Relations Committee and now Armed Services, I am convinced that our defense budget should more closely reflect our foreign policy.

Clarifying our strategic goals vis-a-vis DOD planing may be the catalyst.

I would appreciate your comments, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I could not agree more that today our foreign policy, strategic goals and defense budget need to be closely interrelated. Moreover, forging a consensus on defense policy, strategy, force and resource requirements among the Services, JCS, OSD, the Defense Agencies and other DOD components is indeed a difficult and necessary task. In recognition of this problem, one of this Administration's first steps was a thorough revamping of the Defense Department's strategic planning process. One of the major reforms is the development, under the leadership of the Under Secretary for Policy, of a mid- and long-range strategic plan (the *Defense Guidance*). This plan is based on the foreign and defense policies of the nation, including their translation into strategic goals, as established by the President and the National Security Council. It develops a national military strategy to achieve these goals and policies and the forces and resoruces that we need to carry out that strategy. From the *Defense Guidance*, the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System produces the annual Five-Year Defense Program and the Defense budget request. Thus, this initiative has helped us come a long way since 1981 in greatly improving the strategic planning process of the DOD and its function of interrelating our national policy and goals, and the defense budget.

To give even greater focus to strategic planning, I created a new position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources, whose principal function is leading the strategic planning (*Defense Guidance*) process. This solution to the problem identified by the SASC study was one of the options it sets forth. Thus, this problem has already been identified, and action has been taken to respond to it.

[Whereupon, at 10:53 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1985

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Wilson, Denton, Nunn, Hart, Exon, Bingaman, Dixon, and Glenn.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Patrick A. Tucker, counsel; Patricia L. Watson, Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Carl M. Smith, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, and Russell C. Miller, research assistants; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; William S. Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Goldwater. The committee will come to order.

This morning the Armed Services Committee continues its series of hearings on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense and the Congress.

Last Thursday we opened these important hearings by taking testimony from Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Today the committee will hear from four retired military officers with distinguished records of service to their country.

I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses at the hearing this morning. The first member of the panel is Gen. "Shy" Meyer who retired in 1983 after serving for 4 years as Chief of Staff of the Army. General Meyer's career in the Army included significant involvement in joint military activities, both as a Joint Staff Officer and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Planning.

In addition, he served as troop commander during the Korean and Vietnam wars leading all combat elements from platoon to division.

The second member of our panel of witnesses is Adm. Harry Train. Admiral Train's military record is similar to that of General Meyer in that he, too, took a combined tour of duty service with important assignments in joint activities. Before retiring as unified commander in charge of the U.S. Atlantic Command, Admiral Train served in the fleet as executive assistant to the JCS and as Director of the Joint Staff.

Our third witness this morning is Gen. Russ Dougherty who retired in 1977 as Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command. His distinguished record of service in the Air Force included assignments in a strategic air squadron, on the air staff, on the staff of the Secretary of Defense and as Chief of Staff of the NATO Headquarters.

Since his retirement General Dougherty has continued to actively participate in national security affairs and is currently serving as executive director of the Air Force Association.

Our fourth witness from whom we will hear today is Gen. Victor Krulak. General Krulak served his country for 34 years in the Marine Corps and is a veteran of World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. His last tour of duty before his retirement in 1968 was as commando general of the Fleet Marine Force in the Pacific.

Since his retirement, General Krulak has worked extensively on military affairs, including a provocative study of defense organizations entitled "Organizations for National Security."

Gentlemen, you obviously have a great deal of valuable experience and insight to offer this committee on the issue of defense organizations.

We greatly appreciate your taking the time to come here this morning. I consider this effort, the study and possible reorganization of the military, to be the most important venture that the Congress will undertake.

Before you make your opening remarks, I would like to ask Senator Nunn if he has any comments he would like to make.

Senator NUNN. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. I have known three of these gentlemen very well. I have read General Krulak's book, so I feel I know his views pretty well on the subject. They all have very distinguished military careers. They have been great leaders. They are uniquely qualified to speak to the issues that we are undertaking to study and to deal with in our reorganization efforts.

We have asked them today to talk about several features, including the JCS, the Unified Command and the organization of the Secretary of Defense's office and any others they would like to talk about.

We are fortunate, I think, to have both the House bill as a point for our discussions and also the Senate staff study. So, we look forward to hearing from them. We are, I think, blessed with this caliber of witnesses in terms of their experiences and their overall approach to the matters.

I have known them a very long time and have great regard for them. We are delighted to have them this morning.

Chairman GOLDWATER. We are going to start in the order of the Army and the Navy.

General Meyer, you can lead off.

STATEMENT OF GEN. EDWARD C. MEYER, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)

General MEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to be here. I am happy to testify on this issue because I believe, as you do, that this is one of the most vital issues facing our national defense effort.

In 1979 I came before Congress and I said we had a hollow Army. Since then with the help of Congress, with the help of the administration, we have been able to fix most of those vestiges of hollowness.

Today we have an element of hollowness which, in my judgment, is even more insidious: Our hollowness today is our inability to be able to link our strategy and forces together and to be able to explain to the Senate and the American people exactly how much more capable we are as a result of the dollars and resources we spend for defense.

So, the two questions that need to be answered are: Do we need a change? And if so, how much change?

There are those who say that nothing is broke and, therefore, we do not need to change. I believe that there is an elemental problem that needs to be corrected. That is that today's system fails to provide the quality of professional military advice necessary to ensure that both elected and appointed civilian leadership have an adequate understanding of the military impact of their decisions.

There are basically two reasons for this. The Chiefs of the services have inadequate time to focus on strategic issues as a result of other conflicting demands on their time and on their efforts. I have listed in my statement some examples of the constraints on time.

For example, in the preparation for the current Geneva conference, the OPDEP's of the various services have been almost exclusively focused for the last 2 or 3 months on issues that relate to strategic arms negotiations.

At the same time they are supposed to be putting together next year's budget. They are not able to do both as well as they must.

In SALT II, in which I was involved, we were able to come up with a final military determination that the treaty's effect would be modest, but useful. That may not be as well as we could do if we had been working on this critical strategic issue full time.

I have been accused by Strobe Talbot of being able to undermine the "walk in the woods" of Mr. Nitze as a result of my articulateness in the JCS. I would argue that if I were that articulate and able to so sway a decision for the reasons Mr. Talbot outlines that this is an indication that the rest of the JCS did not study the issues in sufficient detail to overcome my alleged parochial views.

In the case of the dense pack proposal for the MX missiles 2 years ago you will recall three of the five Chiefs failed to support the President and the Secretary of Defense. A prime reason for that lack of support was that they had not had sufficient time to review the issues. They were presented to them so late that many unanswered questions made them view the proposed approach as too risky.

I have listed other general areas, their role in strategy, their role in the military operations in which I believe that the conflicting demands of time on the Chiefs prevent them from being able to devote adequate time on crucial strategic operational military issues.

There are other conflicting demands. The need to develop resource constrained budgets is difficult for the JCS under the current organization. Every year the Congress asks the military how to cut $6, $7, $8, $9 billion out of the Defense budget. Every year the military refuses to answer.

There needs to be a better method by which the military is able to provide advice to the the Secretary of Defense so that we are able to explain, as I indicated before, how much more capable we are of meeting the challenge of the world with the resources that we have.

Senator **Nunn**. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt to ask General Meyer—General Meyer, are you summarizing now?

General **Meyer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Nunn**. You are good at that, but your statement and all the other statements are so important, I would suggest that, if you do not mind, we go through the statement.

Chairman **Goldwater**. I think it would be very helpful since these are the questions we are basically involved in.

Senator **Nunn**. I have not made that request before. I believe you gentlemen ought to take your time this morning and say what you want to say.

General **Meyer**. I wanted to save time for your questions. I can start about page 3, if I might, on the military role in the negotiations.

MILITARY ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS

Strategic arms negotations are a near all-consuming matter. It is not an issue for dabblers, civilian or military. The Chiefs and their Operations Deputies have been totally immersed in preparing and commenting on options that might be raised at the summit.

This is good and worthy work for the senior military of our Nation, but nuclear matters are such an arcane art that they consume the time of the Chiefs almost exclusively while back in the services the final work is being done on the 1987 budget.

Both demand the full attention of the service Chiefs. At the same time the Chairman, responsible for pulling together the negotiating proposals will be brought in later on the 1987 budget proposals with less time than necessary to meaningfully influence the joint aspects of the proposals.

In SALT II the Chiefs concluded after 5 months of detailed and time consuming research that the military effect of SALT II was a near wash and that it provided a "modest but useful" step toward improving our strategic nuclear balance.

Could more time have aided in their ability to explain more precisely the military impact of SALT II? What impact did the time-consuming sessions have on their ability to influence the 1980 service defense budgets?

In the dense pack proposal for basing the MX, three of the five Chiefs did not support the administration's proposal. The prime reason for the lack of support was insufficient time to assess the various technical aspects of the proposal.

In the Theater Nuclear Forces negotiations it is charged that when Ambassador Nitze took his "stroll in the woods" that I was able to scuttle the proposal for parochial reasons. Whether my reasons were parochial—for example, defense of the Pershing—is not germane.

What is germane is the inference that the Chiefs as a body were so unprepared to address such a fundamental issue that one member of the JCS could sway the decision on the issue for "parochial" reasons.

MILITARY ROLE IN STRATEGY

Past Secretaries of Defense have nearly unanimously indicated that they turned elsewhere than the JCS for strategic advice. Secretary Weinberger set up a strategy group at the National Defense University to provide strategic alternatives.

In Lebanon the JCS consistently recommended against the involvement of U.S. forces. Yet the President, based on advice of those outside the military, chose to put our forces into Lebanon.

This is not to argue that the civilian leadership should always support the military recommendations, but rather to argue that perhaps with senior leaders focusing full time on such a matter, perhaps the second and third order impact of the involvement would have been better explained to the President and his decision might have been different.

A maritime versus a continental strategy continues to be argued as the basis for the development of our Nation's Armed Forces. I am not here today to argue for one or the other, merely to indicate that this is one issue on which military advice is essential if we are to prioritize the resources required for the years ahead. If not resolved, we will budget our way into strategy, a strategy which may not meet the challenge of the future.

The tradeoff between conventional and strategic forces is at the heart of any strategy-related decision that is taken today. Again due to a lack of focus, the Chiefs have been unable to bring much in the way of military advice to this issue.

MILITARY ROLE IN OPERATIONS

If the Chiefs had spent more time and I was one of those Chiefs, reviewing the rescue mission into Iran in 1980, it might have been successful or not recommended. Clearly such a mission deserved full-time review by the senior military responsible for its execution.

At that time all the Chiefs were busy in their annual testimony before Congress, in February and March 1980—a near all-consuming effort for 2 months at that time of the year.

The chain of command for the forces in Lebanon was criticized by the Long Commission. With greater and full attention, the

Chiefs should have been more aware of some of the flaws discovered by Admiral Long and his group.

The role of the military and the lower end of the spectrum of warfare is under serious challenge from several sources today. That is counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The JCS have not resolved this issue regarding our counterterrorist and counterinsurgency forces. With sufficient time and effort, such issues should be resolved.

With regard to the second issue—conflicting demands other than time—the following examples are proffered.

The Joint Chiefs have been unable to develop useful resource constrained joint budgets and programs. A major reason for this shortcoming is that the service Chiefs' focus in the development of the annual budget is on the needs of his service, and properly so, because the Chiefs are in fact spokesmen for their services.

The commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands who must conduct operations with forces provided by the services play a secondary role in the development of the requirements to the Chiefs of the services who control the resources. This, in many instances, precludes the most effective use of forces in joint operations.

Because of service focus on service needs, there is a lack of attention to such important force multipliers as airlift, sealift, and interoperable communications for joint command and control. These interservice force multipliers tend to be afterthoughts in the development of service budgets.

The command of ground forces ashore has been a sticky issue for as long as I have been associated with joint and combined operations. From all accounts, the Grenada operation reinforced the need to resolve this elemental command and control issue, one which the service Chiefs, because of the ties to their services, have found difficulty resolving.

In summary, it is clear that the demands of time and the demands of his service preclude the Chief of a service from being as unfettered as he must be in providing military advice on critical strategic and operation matters. These examples argue that there is a need for change to ensure that the system permits these highly qualified officers to focus their attention on the critical issues which face our Nation and our forces.

Now, to the second question, "How much change?"

In summary, since the end of World War II the correlation of forces has shifted dramatically. The shift demands that our national security policy be buttressed by better and faster planning mechanisms.

It also demands that the roles of the civilian and military leaders charged with this vital responsibility be clearly defined so that we provide our citizens the defense posture necessary to ensure their freedoms.

The prerequisites for organizational changes include:

First and foremost, to ensure for civilian leaders the best and most usable military advice possible. Above all, this advice must be relevant and timely. That must be a prerequisite.

Second, to ensure that the organization will work in wartime and, where possible, that it focuses in peacetime on the same issues with which it will be seized in wartime. If you do not do that, you will be through the process of ad hocing an organization as you transmission into war. It is important that that be a prerequisite.

Third, to ensure that the CINC's are given sufficient guidance and resources to do meaningful planning, are permitted to do such planning, and remain intimately involved in near-term issues relating to the capabilities and readiness of their forces.

If these three prerequisites are used as the basis for evaluating organizational changes, we should be able to come up with an organization which:

One, provides clear, concise, and timely military advice.

Two, permits the Chairman to shape internal discussions.

Three, gives CINC's the ability to influence in peacetime what they are expected to implement in wartime.

Four, focuses the service Secretaries and Chiefs on the current readiness and the future of their services.

Five, directs the OSD staff toward implementation of the Defense Department's critical functions in peace and war.

Six, provides to the President, the Congress, and the American people a clear indication of how much more secure they are as a result of the dollars spent on defense.

Attached to my statement is a copy of three of the alternative organizations of the JCS currently being considered. Today's system, the House proposal, and the recommendations contained in the Senate staff report. I have outlined in short statements the major change that would occur if the House proposal or the Senate staff report proposal were implemented.

I have done this so that in a short, quick way you might be able to look at the changes. I will not go through that in detail, but I would like to add my own perspective to the proposal made in the staff report.

The staff report goes farther than the House proposal in that the dual hatting of Chiefs would be undone so that the Chiefs would no longer be members of the JCS and there would be a Joint Military Advisory Council which, working with the Chairman, would provide senior military advice.

I would like to talk to that just a moment because I believe that it does provide an answer to some of the conflicting dual-hat problems with the service Chiefs.

The Council would remove the conflicting dual-hat roles of the service Chiefs. In peacetime the clear division between military authorities responsible for providing advice on service and joint matters should result in a major improvement in the timeliness and value of military advice.

In wartime the division of responsibilities between the Council and the Chiefs should permit both bodies to better engage the greatly increased decisionmaking demanded during a crisis. In World War II we had a group similar to this which provided advice to Admiral King and also to General Marshall.

Removal of direct service involvement in the relationship of the Chairman and the Council to the CINC's would free the latter to become more visible participants in the development of defense policy and joint programs.

The CINC's would give the Council their views on the development of feasible and affordable military courses of action for the near term, as well as the near-term fixes which would improve their force capabilities. Coupled with an improved Joint Staff, the CINC imput would influence the "front end" formulation of military strategy instead of the CINC's remaining in a reactive mode to established policy in the Defense guidance.

There are major objections voiced by many to the proposal made by the staff report. These include:

One, the planner (Chairman and Council) is separated from the implementor (service Chief); hence the service Chief will not be required to think jointly.

Two, the talents of the service Chiefs are wasted.

Three, a similar system to the Council was disbanded because it did not provide useful guidance.

Four, civilian control of the military could be usurped.

I will deal with each objection in turn. It is true that the service Chief would no longer be formally involved in joint issues. But he would be better able to influence decisions that he felt were wrong for his service and he would have imput in joint decisions because of his membership on the Resource Board and also because of his access to the Congress.

More to the point, his ability to focus more of his effort on internal service matters would improve significantly the quality of his service's forces. That, in turn, would enable the services to improve their joint operations for combined warfare.

The service Chief must remember that it is not he who will command the forces in war. The CINC's will do that. Removing the service Chiefs from the JCS would make that point crystal clear.

The second argument most often made against the staff proposal is that the talents of the service Chiefs, especially with regard to broad policy issues, are wasted if they are not members of the JCS. Because members of the Council could be ex-service Chiefs and ex-CINC's, the broad skills of the selected Chiefs would not be lost.

Also, their presence on the Defense Resources Board, together with their constitutional right of access to the President on issues they consider critical, should ensure that where they feel strongly about policy issues, their views will be heard.

Third, a setup similar to the Joint Military Advisory Council was abolished in the past because it was not considered useful. During World War II a Joint Strategic Survey Committee was established to draw up joint directives for prosecuting the war.

Both Admiral King and General Marshall have written of its vital role in winning the war. Clearly, in the last major war in which we could claim outright victory, a need existed for a committee to address strategic issues. But this Survey Committee was abolished in the early fifties after the institution of the joint staff system.

At that time, the Directors of the Joint Staff for Policy and Operations were in competition with the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. The three stars on the Joint Staff outranked the two stars on the committee, and the committee was dissolved. Since, the planning, policy and operational matters have been handled for the JCS solely by the Joint Staff Directors.

Those who believe that broad strategic options are essential for the future and who are dissatisfied with the way such planning is done today would do well to review history, particularly the pivotal role that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee played in World War II.

Such an element—in the form of the Joint Military Advisory Council—is arguably more necessary today than in the last major war we fought and won.

The final argument made by opponents of change has to do with fears of German general staffs, soldiers on horseback and usurpation of civilian control by the military. The history of our Nation has imbued in our military a deep sense of responsibility to obey civilian leadership.

Countless examples of this subordinate attitude are available throughout our history. It does a disservice to our military leaders to argue that their desire to provide better military advice would lead to a change in our historic civil-military relationship.

The only example we have in history is General Hooker in the Civil War. You will recall the letter that President Lincoln sent to him appointing him as Commander of the Army of the Potomac.

I realize that such an assertion bears scrutiny, but history, tradition, and officer's past loyalty to the Nation lead to the conclusion that this argument is nothing more than a canard.

In summary, reform of the mechanism which provides military advice and counsel to our civilian leadership is long overdue. Tinkering with the mechanisms will not suffice.

Only by addressing the issues which have been considered to be too tough to cope with in the past do we have a chance of instituting the reforms necessary to develop the smooth-running machinery required to see our Nation through to the 21st century with our freedoms and national values intact.

[The additional information submitted by General Meyer follows:]

INSTITUTIONAL ROLES UNDER THREE OPTIONS

	Today's System	House Proposal	Senate Staff Report
Congres	Focuses on Services for answers.	Will have a stronger Chairman but uncertain impact on Service Chiefs' roles and views.	Can investigate policies (through the Council) separately from programs (via the Services).
SecDef	Receives advice on military matteres from many sources including JCS. Relies on OSD staff for policy and program	Nochange.	No change. Relies on CJCS for policy and program initiatives.
OSD Staff	Recommends cross-Service tradeoffs. Drives policy formulation.	Will play less dominant role in forumlation due to strengthened Joint Staff.	Relinquishes the leading role in policy and program development, but adjusts to major role in policy and program implementation, which is more consistent with wartime role.
Services Secretaries	Influence policy/strategy.	No apparent change.	Loses some voice in policy formulation, but have a stronger position in developing current and future service capabilities.
Joint Military Advisory Council	--	—	Gives credible, uninhibited cross-Service advice to CJCS and civilian decision makers.
CJCS	Is the first among equals. Influence rests on role as JCS spokesman.	Principal Military Advisor. Staffed to more capably present independent views.	Principal Military Advisor is supported fully to fill role as trusted advisor to SecDef, President, and Congress.
Service Chiefs	Have major responsibilities in both Joint and Service arena	Members of JCS with less say.	Not members of JCS. Are able to focus more clearly on near- and long-term Service improvements.
CINCs	Possess little influence on programs	Gain a strengthened voice in matching resources to operational plans.	Present needs to the Council, which is more capable of initiating change. Exercise considerable influence on near-term programs.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you, General.

Admiral Train will be No. 2.

STATEMENT OF ADM. HARRY D. TRAIN II, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED)

Admiral TRAIN. Good morning. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee to share my views and to contribute to these important deliberations concerning our defense organization.

I apologize for the quality of typing, but it was my own which I undertook over the course of the weekend.

In 1982, while on active duty as Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, I was privileged to appear before the White Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. At that point I supported General Jones' proposals in their entirety. My views have not changed.

After retirement from active duty, I participated for 18 months in the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies Defense Organization project which resulted in the publication of the comprehensive report entitled, "Toward a More Effective Defense." I support the recommendations of the CSIS report in their entirety.

The perspective I brought to both my 1982 testimony and to my participation in the CSIS study was 4 years as a unified commander and 2 years as Director of the Joint Staff.

Of the various proposals for JCS organization currently being explored, I find the most merit in H.R. 3622, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985." The family of changes contained in H.R. 3622 reflect the recommendations of the CSIS report and include the view I, myself, helped to incorporate in that report.

I have studied the Senate Armed Services Committee staff report entitled, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change." While H.R. 3622 is evolutionary in nature, I believe a number of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff report's recommendations are revolutionary and present distinct possibilities of destroying some of the most valuable characteristics of the JCS organization as it exists today.

My own personal experience, both as USCINCLANT and as the Director of the Joint Staff prompt me to urge that this committee focus its efforts on bolstering the leadership provided to the Nation's war fighting commanders, (the unified commanders); on clarifying the relationships between the resource authorities, (the service Chiefs and service Secretaries), and the unified commanders; and on creating an organizational structure which will permit the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to function in fact as well as in theory as the leader, the voice and the advocate of the unified commanders.

Each of us who are privileged to share our experience with this committee may well have specific priorities which we would like to place on improving command of our Armed Forces. In my case it is on the recommendation which would create a Deputy Chairman. In my statement this morning I will concentrate on this point.

The remaining recommendations in H.R. 3622 are most important and I recommend they be accepted as a coherent family of evolutionary changes. But my personal logic trail begins with the current lack of a true alter ego for the Chairman.

The executive agent concept was discarded in theory and in law in 1958. With the demise of the executive agent concept, leadership of the unified commanders was vested in the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The operating budgets and resource support for these commanders, however, remained a function of the service Chief and the military departments.

The line between the service Chiefs and the component commanders who are the fighting and operational commanders on whom the unified commanders depend, is technically a support and a resource line. In practice it tends also to become an operational line which can and has blurred the command line between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commanders.

Predictable behavior and known personality are essential ingredients of leadership. The Nation has been blessed with a succession of effective leaders in the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

They have, without exception, been nonparochial leaders, admired and respected by the unified commanders. And they have served the unified commanders well—when physically present in Washington, DC. During my tenures as USCINCLANT and as Director, Joint Staff, there were cases of four changes in the personality of the Chairman during the course of a single crisis.

Today, because of the procedural change which establishes a single acting Chairman for 3-month blocks of time, the unified commanders and the Director, Joint Staff, experience these four personality changes over the course of 12 months instead of over the duration of a crisis. This is an improvement, but emphatically not enough.

The Deputy Chairman concept is clearly a solution to this dilemma and the only solution which will provide stability and bring to bear the necessary ingredients of predictable behavior and known personality to the most important command and organizational line in our entire governmental structure, the line between the President and his combatant commanders.

Whether the Deputy Chairman also functions as the Director, Joint Staff is not as important as the need to have a Deputy Chairman to provide a known alter ego for the Chairman himself.

There is a philosophical observation I would like to share with this committee. In shirt sleeve English, the professionalism of the Armed Forces is a product of the leadership of the service Chiefs through the support chain of command.

The application of that professionalism in combat or in defense of our vital interests in peacetime is a product of the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Chairman. Developing and sustaining the professionalism of the Armed Forces is a complex process involving day-to-day training, day-to-day development of tactics and doctrine, and the day-to-day sustaining of morale.

All of these functions are heavily dependent upon the ability of a service Chief to provide the highest quality weapons systems in adequate numbers to perform the missions expected of each service in peace and in war and to provide the highest quality training and doctrines in the use of these weapons systems.

These are crucially important functions. But they cannot and must not interfere with the operations of our combatant forces when they are applied to tasks by the National Command Authorities.

There must be a linkage between resources and support authority on the one hand and operational authority on the other. As one example, among a myriad, an operational commander must bear sufficient accountability for resources not to exhaust the entire fleet's limited fuel resources or an entire year's training munitions in the course of a single major exercise or operation.

On the other side of the accountability equation, the resource and support authority must bear sufficient accountability for support of a unified commander's response to a real world crisis so that he will not be prone to withhold AWACS aircraft, for example, in order to continue training NATO crews when the unified commander needs additional AWACS aircraft to fill a void in his own crisis response posture.

The linkage between resource accountability and operational accountability needs to be strengthened, certainly not eliminated.

The service Chiefs are, almost without exception, grown from the ranks of those who have shown the greatest skill in the programming and budget process. Seldom do service Chiefs come from the ranks of our most senior warfighting commanders, the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

Historically our Chairmen have been appointed from the ranks of these same service Chiefs who have not served as unified commanders. The notable exceptions are Admiral Radford, Admiral Moorer, and Admiral Crowe.

The experience and mindset, then, brought to the task of being the leader and spokesman for the unified commanders, is that of a resource and support authority as opposed to that of one accountable, at the highest level of command, for the employment of our Armed Forces in pursuit of our national security objectives.

Because of this anomaly, it was my personal desire to see the CSIS incorporate a recommendation in their report that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff be selected from among those who have served as a unified commander. I was unable to persuade my colleagues who worked on the CSIS project that this should be included.

I continue to believe, however, it would be beneficial for the Nation in that it would generate a normal progression of our senior officers from the position of service Chief to unified commander or from unified commander to service Chief with the resultant effect of creating a far better understanding of the accountability borne by both sides of the command lines.

In conclusion, I believe that the unified commanders have, in general:

Weak authority over Service Component Commands.

The exception was my own command, the Atlantic Command, because I served as my own Navy Component Commander. However, the Atlantic Command is now included in the ranks of those in which the unified commander has weak authority over the Service Component Commands as a result of the establishment of a separate Navy Component Commander in the Atlantic.

Limited influence over resources.

Little ability to provide greater unification.

I recommend that this committee join the House Armed Services Committee in the changes to the JCS organization contained in H.R. 3622.

In particular, I recommend you include in your bill a provision creating a Deputy Chairman as stated in H.R. 3622.

I further recommend you consider incorporating a provision encouraging the appointment of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from among those who have served as a unified or specified commander.

I specifically advise against the establishment of the Joint Military Advisory Council as recommended in the Senate Armed Services Committee staff report.

This concludes my formal statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer your questions.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Admiral.

We will next hear from General Dougherty.

STATEMENT OF GEN. RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED)

General DOUGHERTY. Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, for 26 years I have been closely associated with what I call an extremely clumsy command structure in the Pentagon. The fact that it has worked is a tribute to the skill and maturity of the individuals who have occupied some of our top military positions over the years.

The fact it has not worked very well under all circumstances is to me evidence of our failure to recognize and correct the organizational anomalies that tend to force a separation of military authority and military responsibilities.

So, I would like to associate myself with the initiative that you and Senator Nunn and members of your committee have taken to change some of these things by legislative action. I compliment you.

You want me to track my statement. I can pick it up here on page 3, sir, with a cautionary note that what I am going to say is in my own individual right, not reflecting the position of the Air Force association which I serve as executive director or Air Force magazine which I publish.

As I told the House Armed Services Committee 3 years ago, the matter of an optimum military and departmental organization for successful deterrence or effective containment of worldwide military aggression—with all the pertubations and complexities this implies—is absolutely vital to all of us. Nonetheless, it is esoteric and uninteresting to the general public.

Mr. Chairman, I compliment you on constantly bringing this to the attention of the public in the way that they will understand. Our Nation yearns for simple solutions to complex problems—insisting on a rapid "bottom line" even if we do not know how we got there, or whether it is right or wrong.

This is a tough subject to tackle, difficult for our people to understand, subject to sloganize attacks for example, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," "Prussian General Staff," "Man on a White Horse," "loss of civilian control," et cetera, extremely divisive, even among experienced contemporaries.

Notwithstanding the general apathy and these varying emotions and reactions among those directly affected, the "candle is worth the game," and I urge your committee, the House committee and the Congress to stay the course on this one, for change is needed.

Unfortunately, there is no general consensus to take the Congress directly to the needed changes. Opinions of the insiders on these issues vary widely. Some are held and advanced so vigorously that they approach the intensity of individual theological tenants.

While I do not consider myself strident on the issue of change, I am convinced, just as you and Senator Nunn seem to be, Mr. Chairman, that certain changes can and should be made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our defense establishment. I compliment you and your committee on your aggressive action to investigate and promote needed changes.

You asked me to focus my reviews on the recommendation of the study done by your committee staff and the House bill. I have digested here what I think your Senate staff study recommends. My only comment is that I do not agree with them. I disagree with the utility and advisability of this study's approach, as it affects the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To me the JMAC is not a substitute for the JCS as a body. I would not substitute an advisory committee. In my judgment, this is going exactly the wrong way. If these gentlemen, possibly ladies in the future, are not impotent when they are assigned, they will soon become so. That is not to say I do not think change is needed because I do.

You recommend removing the service component commanders within the unified commands from the operational chain of command. I would not recommend that. As I said here, I think that is a watershed action. There are thousands of things that flow from that that you have to think through.

If we take the thrust of your recommendation that you want component commanders to serve much better, then just reverse your recommendation. Put the component commander under the full command of the CINC and let him wear a separate hat as a support commander reporting to the service Secretary and his service Chief. Change that relationship with the CINC from operational command to full command.

Senator HART. Would you say that again?

General DOUGHERTY. Your study done for this committee, Senator Hart, recommends that the service component commanders be removed from the operational chain of command. I do not think you can remove them because I do not think there is anything you can put in their place.

You really are creating a monstrous problem. So, if you are concerned about the fact that the component commander is not sufficiently responsive to the CINC, the unified command—he now, by law, is under the operational command or the operational control of the CINC and those terms mean exactly the same thing and one is defined as the other in the military lexicon of terms. If you are not satisfied with the operational chain of command, put him under the full command of the CINC. Let the CINC be his lord and master and let him control all his actions and then give him a secondary, dual hat as supporting commander with supporting commander responsibility to the service Secretary and Chief of his service. That is my advice, if you want to retain that recommendation. I am talking about the recommendation now in the study.

The study also proposes establishing three mission-oriented under secretary positions for nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, regional defense and force projection and then create an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning to do interactive strategic planning. I have not taken a view on the three under secretaries recommendation.

That could possibly work out; if you do away with all the other under secretaries. Certainly I would not have the Assistant Secretary for Strategy Planning because, as I will outline, I think this is the wrong way to fix an organization.

And to pick up on that sloganistic theme, I do not really think the system is "broken," but I sure think it needs some "fixing."

Let me comment on the House Resolution 3622 which you asked me to focus on. They would retain the Chairman, but they would make him principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense; they would increase the term to 4 years.

I agree with those things. They would remove the 400-officer limitation. It is not a big thing, but I think 400 is enough; in fact, more than you need if you pick the right ones and not get what the services sluffed off. It is not the numbers, but the quality.

Give the Chairman control of the Joint Staff; I agree with that.

Require him to evaluate all nominees for three- or four-star positions with regard to performance in joint assignment. I would go further than that. Let him evaluate them in toto, for the Secretary and the President.

Give the Chairman supervisory responsibility over the unified and specified commanders. This is in line with my views as how best to organize the chain of responsibility without disestablishing the JCS.

Senator NUNN. Could you repeat that part about the Chairman's authority over the promotions, and so forth? I did not get that.

General DOUGHERTY. The House Resolution 3622 would give the Chairman an evaluation requirement for all nominees for three- or four-star positions with respect to their performance in joint assignments. I would not so limit his authority to evaluate. I would permit him to evaluate based on overall qualifications of three and four stars. I think he is in a good position to evaluate. The thrust of my recommendation is to strengthen his position, not denigrate it or remove it from the line.

I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a group, are very valuable. If I could make an aside to my statement, gentlemen, the JCS provides the best system for coordinating complex military matters that I have ever seen. I think everybody here who worked on the Joint Staff,—Harry, Shy, Vic,—would agree that, even though you are sometimes reluctant, it brings key elements together in coordination right down to the nub, and it quickly gets information dissipated throughout the system. It is the best coordinating procedure for complex military matters I have ever seen, and I have worked with it for 26 years.

This House resolution established the Chairman as the first among equals on the JCS. I am going to come to a different recommendation that I think is logical: To provide JCS advice when requested by the President and Secretary, to provide a direct channel to the President; where any members disagree, let the Chairman decide. I think that it is good to formalize that authority.

The thing I would take issue with there is to give the Chairman clearcut authority to resolve disputes among the Chiefs when a dispute occurs—and proceed with the planning.

I was given that authority as Director of Strategic Planning. It revolutionized integrated strategic target planning. If we had a disagreement during the planning, it was my obligation and responsibility to resolve that issue, and not let it be more than a hiccup. If the aggrieved party wants to take that up, that is what the House resolution provides, that is fine; but do not let disputes stop what you are doing. Give the Chairman resolution authority over JCS disputes.

The House resolution allows the Secretary of Defense to direct a chain of command to the combatant commands. I do not know why that is permissive in the language of the resolution—I would direct it.

Finally, the House resolution proposes the position of Deputy JCS Chairman, established by the House, also be Director of the Joint Staff. I agree completely. His most important thing is to be an alter ego to the Chairman. Additional Director of the Joint Staff dissipates that alter ego prerogative and authority. I think you ought to take another look at that. But a deputy is needed.

Finally, the House resolution would require a 6-month report as to how to enact things that are associated with the budgetary provision for CINC's, force posture recommendations, unified command plant changes, et cetera. All these things are fine except, if the legislation was to go that far, why don't you just tell the Secretary of Defense what to do and not require him to report back for implementation.

Now, my key recommendations for change, not in either House or Senate action—and that is on page 9.

I would make the Chairman a five-star officer. Now, that sounds trite, but let me tell you the "hidden agenda" I have on that recommendation.

Five-star officers established by Congress stay on active duty; they stay on the active military roles throughout their lifetime. You remove the Chairman from any revolving door allegation. You remove him from any taint of revolving door employment. You keep him on the active roll until he chooses to resign. He is always there and available to national authorities.

If you want an advisory group, after four iterations of this, you have a perfect advisory group of people who have done the job and who have had the responsibility. You have a built-in senior advisory group. You leave him senior to any officer within his own service and within the other services. For an advisory group you really have some steam and you get it all at approximately the same price as one four-star officer on active duty.

I would have the Chairman submit unrestrained evaluation on all three- and four-star nominees, as I mentioned; and, I would require that, during his tour as the Chairman, he be the nominating authority for officers to be considered by the Secretary of Defense and the President as Commanders-in-Chief of the unified and specified commands, as military directors of defense agencies, and as President of the National Defense University.

I would consider appointment of the Chairman and the CINC's for 4 years, vice two, in order to give stability to planning and control by the Chairman as well as the CINC's. A 2-year tour is inadequate for CINC's. It is true they often get reappointed for 1 or 2 years, but a 4-year tour is the kind of stability we can afford and ought to be given to the commands.

I would give the Chairman the authority to resolve differences among the JCS, as I mentioned. And, importantly, I would inject into the pertinent legislation an obligation of the services to respond to requests by the Chairman, the Joint Staff and CINC's for information, advice and assistance on any and all matters affecting this posture, equipping and support of the operational forces of the United States.

These things are vital and there should be an obligation to support them.

Then I would, by legislation or specific departmental directive, require that the Chairman and the CINC's be made an integral part of the force structure and budgetary decision process; particulary the establishment of priorities, because priorities change as budgetary revisions occur.

As those budgetary iterations come, do not let them be made in the middle of the night by a bookperson with a green visor. Get the CINC's in and say, "We have to change this. What are your priorities, given this restraint or given this budgetary act?"

Bring the CINC's into the prioritization of force structure. They are the ones responsible for the fighting force and they should have more cognizance of how it is structured, equipped and supported, and not get them by surprise after a midnight budgetary process in the Pentagon.

Those are my thoughts, Mr. Chairman, on how to make the CINC's a lot better with a little or no cost. We are talking about practically no cost.

Many of the organizational anomalies with which we have been living do not appear to demand action only because we have had some good people in these difficult positions and they made these procedures look good even when they weren't. The problems were there nonetheless.

We should not saddle good people with a difficult organization, or require that a substantial portion of their talent and skills go to making a bad organization work. After all, the Department's business is one of life and death for many, if not all, of the people. Its fundamental command organization should be as good as we can make it.

I will be pleased to respond to questions.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, General.

General Krulak.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. VICTOR H. KRULAK, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED)

General KRULAK. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am proud to be present today and to have an opportunity to share what is strictly a most critical examination of our chance of survival.

It had been my intention to give you my written statement and to submit myself to any questions you may have. However, this format has been altered. So, if it is your pleasure, I will do as the others here have done and go through my statement.

I read carefully the letter that Senators Goldwater and Nunn addressed to me about this hearing. It asked very clearly for my views on three aspects of the very substantial study prepared by your staff for your consideration. That is exactly what I did in my statement, I might say, with the bark on.

I did not presume to tell you what to do, but at the end of my written statement I will give you my views as to what you ought to do.

The Nation has seen, with almost metronomic regularity, claims that the security of the United States is in jeopardy because of organizational defects in our defense institutions. Tragedy, it is averred, will only be averted by reorganization—really enlargement—of the military hierarchy.

It has happened four times since 1947. I was directly involved in each of these events, and see the same formula at work today: "Just reorganize, add a little here and there, shift the authorities around, and the system will work smoothly." This, as I perceive it, is the thrust of the 645-page product of the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

In its extensive portrayal of the nature of the American military system and the process by which it has evolved, the study is a valuable document. However, in terms of coming to grips with our major defense institutional problems, the study does little more than nibble at the edges of stale concepts, offering more bureaucracy and more complexity as the way to move our Military Establishment toward the 21st century.

The staff study acknowledges that "in many respects, American forces are better manned, equipped and led than has been the case for a long time." However, it then cautions that "The full potential of this revitalization cannot be realized under current structural deficiencies" and proceeds to make 91 assorted recommendations aimed at putting matters straight.

Then, almost as an afterthought, the study notes that the great majority of the proposed changes can be made under the authority of the executive department—without legislation.

The basic criticisms in the study, as I perceive them, include the following:

That the Secretary of Defense does not possess adequate power to direct the affairs of his Department, being too dependent on the advice of the Chiefs of the military services who, it is implied, are likely to put service interests before national interests.

In truth the Secretary has total power over his Department. The law does not equivocate. In the 1958 changes Congress assigned him responsibility for "direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense" which was intended, once and for all, to make clear who was in charge of everything in the Department.

I remember listening to Senator Stennis' advice to the Secretary of Defense that he had been given all the authority that the Congress could give him. Paradoxically, and despite its conclusions, the staff study acknowledges this to be true.

Here, to my mind, is the heart of the issue. Complaints that the Secretaries of the military departments, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the service Chiefs will not carry out their orders are idle. It is true that some Secretaries, because of unfamiliarity, uncertainty or contrary conviction, have abrogated part of their authority—Neil McElroy is an example—but the system must proceed on the basis that his subordinates will do exactly what the Secretary of Defense tells them to do.

Since the Secretary is endowed with all the power he needs to operate his department, why all the dissatisfaction? There must be something wrong. While the Secretary of Defense says, "If the wagon isn't broke, don't fix it," the distinguished chairman of this committee takes the contrary view. He says, "The wagon is broke; let's fix it."

I do not disagree with Senator Goldwater very often, but in this case I must disagree with both positions. My own position is that the wagon is not broke, but that it is woefully overloaded. And, until we shovel off some of the load, no amount of tinkering with the organizational boxes is going to do any good, and it may do a lot of harm.

To exemplify what I mean, it may be useful to examine some of the other criticisms articulated in the committee staff study:

That the military services and the military departments dominate the affairs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, often to the national disadvantage.

If the Secretary of Defense perceives this to be the case, he has all the authority he requires to bring it to a halt. His instructions, of course, and this is a simple point, must be clear and admit of no misinterpretation.

That interservice logrolling is a form of conspiracy to avoid giving the Secretary of Defense information he requires, and to avoid surfacing basic philosophical, strategic or fiscal disagreements.

Here, again, to whatever degree the allegation is valid, the Secretary of Defense has the power and the tools to stop it. The services, and the unified commands, too, are, indeed, in dynamic and continuing conflict, for appropriations and missions in peacetime, for priorities and missions in wartime. And there could be no more useful function for the Joint Chiefs than to distill out the details of those conflicts and lay them before higher authority in terms that will facilitate a decision. Exactly what General Dougherty told you.

Nor is it acceptable to declare that they will not do it. They will do as they are told. In this regard, there is a thread woven throughout the report that service Chiefs "have normally been unable to subordinate the interests of their parent services to the larger interests of national defense." Undocumented, unsupported, alleging disloyalty of major dimensions, this assertion must be odious to the professional officer.

That the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to provide timely, unified military advice.

The JCS are quite capable of providing any form or level of military advice desired and directed, and within whatever time limits are prescribed. They have the experience, the talent and the resources and, to get to the bone, they took a solemn oath to do it.

The precise system they are using is not a good system. When I come to my comments, I will state what I think ought to be done to make the system work correctly.

Now, here is where we must introduce the matter of the wagon being overloaded. In many cases today the operative issue is not what the Joint Chiefs can do, but the quality and specificity of the guidance they receive from the complex, overweight, redundant Defense hierarchy.

That there is unnecessary layering and duplication of effort at the top, with unfavorable implications in planning, programming, and budgeting.

This is an altogether valid criticism, and the focus of duplication resides largely in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

That the people involved at the higher levels, both civilians and military are of inadequate quality.

Appointed civilian executives are, in the main, people of high quality and dedication. However, their tenure is usually so brief—averaging only 2.1 years—that most of them are gone before they learn their complex jobs.

Where the military are concerned, this is not true. An officer, already a professional, may legally occupy the same joint assignment for 4 years, and many do. And, if the quality of any officer serving in a joint position is not satisfactory to his superior, he need only request a replacement. I know. I did it and I got action.

This is an appropriate point to comment on the contention that the quality of performance by the Joint Staff would be greatly improved by creation of a special group of "joint specialists" who spend the majority of their time in joint assignments.

It would be very easy to create such a group of military mutations. To do so would guarantee that the officers involved would enjoy the consoling proximity of like-minded men but it would also guarantee that the work of the Joint Staff would be insulated from the practical military world—lacking in the best thought of those who are going to do the fighting.

That micromanagement, within the Department of Defense, and within the Congress affect military affairs adversely.

This is unquestionably true, as will be exemplified in more detail later.

I do not intend to talk about Congress. However, beyond stating the problem, the staff study offers little substantive relief. Indeed, it lays the foundation for even more detailed management than now prevails.

That the unified commanders do not have adequate influence over the allocation of resources in their commands, or in the preparation of plans for their employment.

There never being enough of anything to go around, unified commanders find themselves as perennial competitive claimants for resources. They have ample mechanisms to make those needs known, but they are not now made adequately known. The prudent CINC makes certain that his expressions of need are paralleled and reinforced by his component commanders.

Where planning, programming and budgeting are concerned, the study is correct. The unified commanders' views are probably not given sufficient exposure. However, the Secretary of Defense, supplemented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is capable of improving this condition. Indeed, the present OSD administration has recognized this fact and has begun to stimulate the CINCs' participation in those areas.

So much for the committee staff's conclusions. Now, of the study's 91 specific recommendations, the following are probably the most significant.

Establish three mission-oriented Under Secretary positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) NATO defense, and (3) regional defense and force projection.

The idea seems remote from the real world. The practical impossibility of separating every aspect of nuclear deterrence, say, from problems of NATO defense, or every aspect of NATO defense from regional defense, should be obvious. But even more obvious is the fact that the proposal adds three more Under Secretaries, plus their staffs, to the existing impressive array of 21 Deputy, Under and Assistant Secretaries who already serve the Secretary of Defense.

Create the position of Under Secretary of Defense—readiness, sustainability and support. Establish an office for low-intensity warfare and special operations. Create an OSD office, staffed by a combination of civilian officials and military officers, to review contingency plans.

The trend here must be clear to everyone. The study is proposing more offices, more bureaucracy, more overhead. With respect particularly to the third of these recommendations, there are already available to address elements of the strategic planning problem an Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Defense Resources Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commanders.

The following seven recommendations by the study operate together to change fundamentally the authorization arrangements in our military system.

Disestablish the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Establish a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a Chairman and a four-star military officer from each service on his last tour of duty.

Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to provide military advice in his own right.

Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty.

Make the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters—I would ask you to run this through your computer a couple times—and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JMAC system, while ensuring with absolute clarity that the JMAC Chairman is not a part of the chain of command.

Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to independently manage the Joint Staff.

Eliminate the statutory limitation on the size of the Joint Staff.

The substance of these seven convergent proposals is to make the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the recognized single authoritative military voice in the United States, with the Joint Staff, which he would both administer and manage, as his personal support. He would be authorized to provide military advice in his own right, and he would serve as the principal military adviser to the Defense Secretary on operational matters.

In short, so far as military counsel is concerned, he would be the whole package. Except for one thing. The novel, and unmilitary provision "sole command voice," but "not a part of the chain of command" is the seed of endless problems. I am a professional officer with 35 years of experience and have no idea what the study intends in this expression. Taken literally, the "voice" function could be discharged by the corporal of the guard.

Under the study's proposal there would certainly be no further problem about the President or Secretary of Defense ever receiving conflicting military advice. Thenceforward, under the proposed arrangement, they would have their military advice from one man.

The assurance that the Commander in Chief and the Congress would receive unfiltered and undistorted the advice of the most competent and responsible voices in the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines on warlike matters would be gone. Conflict would, indeed, be eliminated, but, as we all know, avoidance of conflict does not make the advice better, and may well make it worse.

As to the Joint Military Council, the "Council of greybeards," it would make no difference whether they were on their last tour of duty or their first, they would have little influence and less authority. With no staff to support them, they would be shooting blanks. The idea would soon atrophy and die.

I might add at this point, gentlemen, that if it is felt that because he is on his last tour of duty, the officer loses his service identification or his tattoo, forget it. A fair case can be made that they might be even more parochial.

Acknowledging the very great effort represented by the staff study, one may ask whether the study group was shooting at the most profitable target as it sought ways to make our defense system more effective. I believe they would have done far better to set about determining which of the legion of statutory Defense Department functions and activities, that have been spawned since World War II, could be eliminated, consolidated or diminished in scope.

The number of these and their assorted tasks are impressive. I go through the impressive list and I see statutory agencies which a generous and compliant Congress has given to four Secretaries of Defense who came up here and said "We want more," like Oliver Twist and his bowl.

And each time you gave the Secretary of Defense more in the way of authority until finally there was not more to give. This list of agencies exemplifies it.

I mention particularly the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency. They should have been particularly interesting to the staff. They aggregate about 50,000 people between them. They are responsible for, among other things, contract administration, achieving sound contract pricing, verifying the propriety and acceptability of costs charged.

One may ask where they were when the contracts were let for the $700 toilet seat and the $400 ashtray. Are they earning their keep?

And the staff study correctly dramatizes the inability of the Army and the Navy to communicate effectively with each other in the Grenada operation. It fails to mention, however, that the Secretary of Defense has, in his stable of supporters, the Defense Communication Agency which is "responsible for engineering and management of the Defense communication system" as well as an Assistant Secretary who is responsible for "management and coordination of service * * * programs for command, control and communications * * *" Are they earning their keep?

The simple truth is, our greatest military organizational problem is found in unnecessary complexity, undesirable duplication and institutional obesity. Like it or not, most of these defects reside in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its immense bureaucracy of offices and agencies which have expanded geometrically with each successive Defense reorganization since 1947, causing corresponding growth in the military departments, the General Accounting Office, the Bureau of the Budget and congressional committee staffs.

In 1958 Representative F. Edward Hebert described the procession of Defense Department reorganizations in simple but graphic words:

> The melody is different, but the lyrics are always the same—economy, efficiency, efficiency, economy. It is costing us more money each time we reorganize, and the efficiency never shows up. I have never seen a reorganization plan that did not cost more money and add more people to the payroll.

Mr. Hebert must be uncomfortable in his grave.

Those are my comments on the staff study. With respect to my views on what ought to be done, they are simple and brief.

First, take the staff study seriously in everything that it says about the Unified Commands. The unified commander is the warrior. He is the one who has to carry the combatant load. He does not now participate adequately in strategic planning, does not participate adequately in logistics and resource planning. He does not have the authority that he ought to have in selection of his subordinates. All of these things need correction.

I might add parenthetically that the Secretary of Defense could do all of these things now and he should. Whatever influence your distinguished committee has on seeing this done, you will be making a contribution to our defense.

Second, and this is an extreme recommendation, I know, in the eyes of many—the constipated nature of the JCS performance is brought about by the vibration back and forth between the Joint

Staff and the service staffs. The JCS are called upon to make about 2,000 decisions a year. I would say that 1,900 of them probably should be made by somebody else.

Be that as it may, the situation is generated by the vibration back and forth between the Joint Staff and the services' staff. I would sever the Joint Staff completely from any service relationship. The Joint Staff should serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff, period, rather than looking over its shoulder to the service planners for advice—and usually disagreement on every issue, however large or small.

Finally, I would put emphasis on the extreme importance of the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As General Dougherty commented, it is an almost mystical thing, bringing together a vast reservoir of experience in the total technology of our defense.

The emphasis upon the critical importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body cannot be overemphasized. Those things which tend to denigrate it should be rejected.

These are my recommendations. You can see, gentlemen, that the Secretary of Defense could do them all now. How he can be stimulated to do them is your business, not mine, but he should be stimulated to do them. It will endow our military force with the level of war-like capability which it does not now have.

Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, General.

It might interest you to know that we have one civilian for every two men in uniform trying to run that organization.

I will ask Senator Nunn if you have any questions?

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I think that all four witnesses have brought perspectives that are very valuable to us. Of course, there are obvious conflicts between the views, no doubt about that, but I think there is a central thread running through here, whether you call the system broke or whether the wagon is overloaded.

All the witnesses have said we do need to make changes, whether it is in Congress or whether it is in the Department of Defense.

It seems to me the other common thread here is that all witnesses believe the Commanders-in-Chief in the field need to be strengthened in their role in terms of resources, and in terms of overall authority and command.

As I view it, that was one of the most important parts of the whole study and it seems to me that we have moved toward a consensus in that respect, which is very, very important. Of course, the consensus in the other respects is not here yet, but at some point we will have to come to grips with it.

General Meyer, I was fascinated with your recitation of what happened back under General Marshal and Admiral King.

Could you go into more detail about the joint group of people they had advising them?

That is a part of military history that I do not know in any depth. I would like to get a little more understanding of how that worked.

General MEYER. They pulled together a group from Army, Navy, Army Air Corps and Marine Corps. We had a group of very talented strategic planners who came up through the planning routine in all the services. They became a part of the strategic survey group.

They would sit down and take a look at the war as it was progressing and determine priority such as should we have a Europe-first approach, how we would allocate resources among the commanders, and other issues involving the strategy of prosecution of the war. They were located in Washington.

Senator NUNN. Reporting to whom?

General MEYER. Reporting directly to Admiral King and to General Marshal. Their mission and their role or function was to perform missions similar to what is recommended in the staff report and that was to address issues of strategy, prioritization, operations and such and to provide recommendations to the two chiefs of services at that time.

Senator NUNN. Did they have a joint staff working for them?

General MEYER. Yes; they had a mixture of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and civilians on their staff.

Senator NUNN. They pulled those together?

General MEYER. They pulled those together and they served basically as a planning staff.

Senator NUNN. If this staff recommendation about Joint Chiefs and creating an advisory group in lieu of Joint Chiefs be adopted, how would you visualize it being staffed?

General MEYER. I did not read the staff report the way General Krulak used it as far as who would serve on this joint military advisory group.

I understood the staff study to indicate that the Joint Staff was a common staff which would be available for both the Chairman and also the Joint Military Advisory Council so that they would have access to the Joint Staff who would be able to provide the detailed political, military, and economic data the Council needed to develop alternatives and recommendations.

Today we are not well organized to develop strategic alternatives. In example I saw Senator Warner on television recently arguing that we are an island nation. We may not be a true island nation as you or I have perceived us to be in the past. Such issues need to be addressed.

The proposal to develop strategic defense capability is something which probably should have been developed over a longer period of time and with more experts involved. That proposal was prepared in about a month and a half by a very small group. Our defense establishment needs somebody focusing on such causes on a regular basis.

Senator NUNN. If any of the others have opinions on that point, I would be delighted to have them.

General KRULAK. The joint strategic survey, as General Meyer says, was an interesting and effective instrumentality. It was very small. The staff was very austere. They did whatever the then Joint Chiefs of Staff told them to do.

For instance, in 1944 when Representative Wadsworth introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to have a reorganization of the military structure in the middle of the war, the Joint Chiefs asked for a survey to examine this. The Joint Strategic Survey made a very provocative examination of it.

I make that point to indicate that they did what the Chiefs told them to do.

Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, I think my time is up.

Chairman Goldwater. John.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with the Chair. Each of these distinguished gentlemen has made a contribution to this complex problem. Indeed, you have focused on the unified commanders as probably the primary target that, in my judgment, we have to deal with. We shall have to decide if the Deputy Chairman of the JCS, indeed should serve as the acting chairman in a rotating manner.

I think we should look at the five-star concept of General Dougherty. That draws on the tradition of the military. It would be a single individual who could be looked upon for advice.

General Meyer, we expected no less than a frontal attack on the system which you gave us today. It is an indictment of the whole thing. Let us take a look at it together.

As I look through your statement, General, time and time again there is reference to "inadequate time for the Chief of a service to lead his service and to direct joint activities," insufficient time to examine "dense pack." On and on you deal with the question of the individual on the JCS stretched beyond human limits.

A simple reminder—we are about to celebrate the 200th anniversary of our Constitution. We still have one President and Vice President and, for what it is worth, two Senators from each State, my State having grown from several thousand to over 5 million.

Each of us experiences this stretch of one's ability over limited time. I cannot accept that as a reason for disestablishment of the JCS. The staff of the JCS, it seems to me, should be providing these individuals with the backup to perform the 1,900 decisions General Krulak stated should be made by others and to leave them opportunity and time to apply their extraordinary talents to the key major issues.

Indeed, they were picked for their position because of their extraordinary talent and experience and most of all for their ability to make judgments.

You refer to the continuing role of the service Chiefs as having "constitutional right and access to the President on issues they consider critical."

Could you elaborate on that constitutional right?

General Meyer. It may not be constitutional; I may have misstated that, Senator. It is at the present time that in any issues on which the Chiefs disagree with the Secretary of Defense, he has the right to go to the President.

Senator Warner. That is the custom.

General Meyer. Am I allowed time for response?

Senator Warner. Yes.

General Meyer. I would say every Senator sitting at this table has inadequate time to do all the things he wants to do and to be able to devote the amount of energy to those issues which he considers to be priority items.

When you were called upon to address SALT—you were here for SALT II, most of you were here for SALT II—that was a period of time when you had to spend a lot of time at night going over the details and still trying to do everything else that a Senator must do.

All I argue is that with the challenges that we face today, that there is a strong case to be made, as made in the staff study, that it requires the full-time efforts of people working on broad military and strategic issues so that there is a focus in that area; and, that someone else be working on the preparation of how to flush out those issues within the service. Almost every other country operates in this way.

I just highlighted a few items to show what happens today, and I believe you will get an Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force better able to conduct joint operations.

Senator **Warner**. You say that the individual who would be the Chief of service under your program would no longer be formally involved, but he would be better able to influence decisions he felt were wrong for his service and he would have input.

General **Meyer**. Yes.

Senator **Warner**. If left to him, he could spend all his time on the very same function performed by the council if he so elected?

General **Meyer**. He would not have any incentive to do that. He would not be forced to go to meetings like he is today. He would not have the same incentive. If he understood that someone else, other military people, as opposed to civilians that General Krulak talked about, were developing strategy, developing alternatives, developing prioritization, he would feel more comfortable with the decisions of those people with the military background.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Hart.

Senator **Hart**. Mr. Chairman, I join you and Senator Nunn in complimenting our witnesses. I think the statements here today were excellent, although varied, very high quality as we might have expected.

Gentlemen, I am most interested in the Joint Staff elements of the reform proposals. I really appreciate your comments. I will address the questions to the panel generally and any of you who want to take off, feel free to do so.

Under the present system, I am most interested in how you achieve from Joint Staff officers, members of the Joint Staff, nonparochial, unbiased opinions, recommendations to their principals, given the fact that promotions are under the control of their parent services.

Is that a problem?

I notice, for example, in the report when our staff recommends that the JCS Chairman have some influence over promotion of Joint Staff officers, our staff here says:

"Despite strong service objection, it will be impossible to obtain quality work from the OJCS unless those officers can be protected in service retribution for objectively performing their joint duty assignments."

Is that a real problem?

Admiral **Train**. As former Director of the Joint Staff, perhaps I can share my experience with you on that.

I do not think on the basis of my own observation that there have been many cases of "retribution." Basically what we had asked the individual officers on the Joint Staff to do was to present their service backgrounds, but not represent their service, to present their background.

In that sentence the important word is "background." Now, if a Joint Staff officer has the benefit, for example, of a command of a destroyer, command of an aviation squadron, or other experience in the field, he becomes a very valuable member of that Joint Staff and can indeed present his background and present his experience.

There is a problem, however, over and above the retribution type problem. That is, in order to do their job, the officers on the Joint Staff who are staffing something for the Chiefs have to gain access to information. By and large, they can get that information from two sources, either unified commanders or one of his components or the service staff.

Information has a form of tyranny of its own. He who owns that information has the power. The Joint Staff people do not have their own sources of information, so they have to go to the unified commander or they have to go to the service staff and sometimes if that approach is not made in an effective way, the information is withheld.

Now, whether that situation will be helped or alleviated by the changes that we have all been discussing, it is hard to say, but I sure would like to try. I do not want at the same time to lose the opportunity for officers who have a joint specialty to go to command of a ship or a squadron. That makes him a better staff officer.

Senator **Hart**. The fact that there has been little, to use the words of the staff study here, retribution, can be interpreted in two ways. It may mean we are getting the lowest common denominator; in order to avoid retribution or penalty, the service officers are not speaking out.

When you testified before the House committee in 1982 you said:

> Some services over the years have intimidated their officers serving on the Joint Staff. In retrospect, I unconsciously contributed to this when I served as Director of Strategic Plans and Policies. I suffered from it when I served as Director of the Joint Staff. So, I saw both sides.

Admiral **Train**. I still hold that viewpoint. I do not believe there is retribution per se. Intimidation certainly is there. It is probably still there and it may be there tomorrow.

Intimidation is indeed there. It takes a very powerful personality to perform well in spite of that intimidation. If there is a track record of poor promotion performance on the part of the Joint Staff officers, it is probably more the result of the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff than to the retribution feature.

Senator **Hart**. General Dougherty.

General **Dougherty**. The key to this is giving senior officers in joint assignment clout, not just from an operational sense, but in an administrative sense; making them responsible for some substantial portion of career progress. That is not done.

I have had a respected senior explain to me, he said, "Son, if you are ever given a choice of operational control or administrative control, you take administrative control, you take administrative control every time."

I think you have to look for ways to give the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Director of the Joint Staff and senior members of the

Joint Staff, administrative clout without letting them create a separate group of joint staffers. They need career leverage, not to create a bunch of "purple suiters."

We do not have a way to train our people for "purple suits." Joint duty must appeal to them in professional ways. It must appeal to them in career enhancement and appeal to them in all the things that make true professionals out of them. You just have to break them away from an undivided association only with their services.

Part of that is education. Part of our people are just inadequately educated, not only about the capability of their own service but they know practically nothing about the limitations of power in their own or other services; understanding the limitations of capability is so important.

That joint learning process is just invaluable. I think we ought to emphasize joint training right down to all levels. Our people should not be taught "simper fi" and nothing else. They must not think that anything not in the "wild blue yonder" is irrelevant. Blind dogma is ruinous to the joint process. We need to look at our military educational system and see where you draw the service line and how to best understand the capability of all of the forces of the United States.

Senator **Hart**. I think General Krulak would like to comment.

General **Krulak**. There is a flip side to what Admiral Train has said with respect to coercion. It is this. The officer who works in the Joint Staff works for an individual and that individual has the power to feed or starve where his subordinate is concerned.

A very fine efficiency report from him will go far toward advancing the individual's future. A bad efficiency report from him will have a corresponding effect. So, there is clout in the Joint Staff with respect to the future of an officer.

The matter which has been mentioned of low quality of officers who serve on the Joint Staff impeding things, put yourself in the shoes of a lieutenant colonel or lieutenant commander who hopes to advance his career. He is, I hope, a warrior. As such he would much rather be with the fighting forces than shuffling paper in the District of Columbia.

So, if he works his bolt, as he probably will, you will find that the cream will gravitate toward the fighting force. That is one reason why some people of inadequate quality find their way into the Joint Staff.

General Dougherty has said something very pertinent. They must be educated. They must be trained and the educational systems of the individual services as well as the joint schools must focus on that. There is no reason why it cannot be made a criterion for acceptance for duty on the Joint Staff that they be adequately trained.

General **Meyer**. I want to add one thing. First, the Army already has a specialty that relates to strategic planning, and so on, from which they draw the people for joint planning. Those people happen to be also warriors. They spend time as battalion commanders, brigade commanders, and time doing other things.

There is an area in which I disagree with General Krulak and my experience would tell me, having watched him, and that I would be very cautious about it, that is, in the area of reports that have been written by other service officers where the individual himself has gotten askew the service.

Those reports do not necessarily carry the weight that the service reports carry and people sitting on the board, rightfully or wrongfully.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me congratulate the witnesses on some of the more crisp and clear statements that we have ever heard. I think it is an extremely valuable session.

Let me focus on the priorities which Admiral Train assigned to the recommendation for creation of a Deputy Chairman alter ego to the Chairman. General Dougherty said he agreed with that thought and I would be interested in General Krulak's and General Meyer's responses to that.

General MEYER. I agree with that. I was also associated with the JCIS report and was responsible for the development and writing of it with Admiral Train, the proposal he made. We were not able to get agreement to make the Chairman a five-star general.

General KRULAK. I notice in the staff report, Senator, that it is proposed that the Deputy Chairman accompany the Chairman to his principal meetings. I can see the reason for that, but there is an obverse to that policy. If he is doing that, he is not doing something else.

It was my feeling that the idea of creating a Deputy would be to give the Chairman a chance to assign him something else to do. In the complex arrangements that we now have in the military the addition of one more Deputy cannot hurt. I doubt very much, though, if he tags around carrying the briefcase for the Chairman that it is going to help things.

Senator WILSON. General Krulak, let me ask you to elaborate on the second of your recommendations. You said that you recommend severing the Joint Staff from any connection with the service staff.

General KRULAK. Yes; I prefaced it by saying that it is a radical recommendation. I am mindful of my service in the Joint Staff and the annoying conflict between the demands of my superior, the Chairman, and the constant vibration of service flimsies, purples and buffs, all representing, as other officers here would agree, a level of parochialism—and not always focused toward war.

I would make the Joint Staff the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, period. Then they are looking in one direction and one direction only. A project which the services wished to have considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be entered through that member of the Chiefs themselves.

The question that Admiral Train raised of the withholding of information; you cannot play polo on the basis of expecting the other side to miss the ball. I would expect, as a representative of the Joint Staff, that if I went to one of the services and requested information, I would get it.

Senator WILSON. General Meyer.

General MEYER. That last point he made is the point I was going to add. That is that they must have access to the factual data that is available within the services. I do not believe they need to go through the purples, the greens, the buffs and all that, but they must have access to the data.

Senator WILSON. Do the rest of you have the same sense of frustration that General Krulak expressed this morning with regard to growth of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the deleterious impact it had on warfighting?

Admiral TRAIN. The executive structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and growth in that structure has had an impact on the way we work. There were persons who asked questions, there were persons from whom to get responses when we wanted something.

So, the operation of the Department is clearly more difficult to fathom today than it was back in the days when we had seven Assistant Secretaries and those Assistant Secretaries were long ball hitters and known personalities, and you were able to deal with those seven known personalities in a straightforward way.

Today with the 21 Assistant Secretaries at that level there is a very diverse profile, if not a diffused profile. They are more difficult to deal with on that basis.

I think that the creation of an additional Under Secretary would probably help rather than hinder because they will aggregate the activity and functions of those 21 Assistant Secretaries into a more identifiable and more easily worked with package.

General MEYER. I would agree. One of the reasons that most of us are proposing changes to strengthen the role of the Chairman, to strengthen the role of the Joint Staff in whatever proposal we make in the way military advice is provided is so that we can offset the growth in the Defense Department by improving the capability of the military to provide military advice.

My intent has been and always will be to raise the level of the military advice and to do away with what I consider to be the way in which the Defense Department is structured.

The JCIS report goes beyond just the change in the JCS. It also addresses OSD. It is not going to be satisfactory just to change the JCS if you do not change the interfaces with OSD and in interfaces with Congress.

Senator NUNN. If I can interject, what you are saying is that unless the military advice and the jointness of it and unity of it to some degree is strengthened, then the proliferation of civilians in the Department of Defense is going to in all likelihood continue.

General MEYER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. What General Krulak identified so thoroughly in his book is not coincidence, it reflects the Secretary of Defense lacking the confidence he needs in the military advice.

General MEYER. That is what past Secretaries have said.

Senator WILSON. My time is up. Could I have General Dougherty respond?

General DOUGHERTY. The phenomenal growth of things, and these are patent to all of us, the number of committees, the number of subcommittees and budget iteration just drives the size of the Department of Defense.

I know you know this, but everybody is answering the same questions and regurgitating the same information. All of us should look to eliminate those layers that do not have unique judgments to provide and do not have unique information to provide; get those who just keep handling the same information in different form, that is the fat of the Department. Most of it comes from budgetary issues.

Senator **Wilson**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that the size and complexity and duplication of effort, in my judgment, inevitably has to be sapping a great deal of the creative energy of everybody involved in the national security picture.

We have rightly focused on the fact that we are responsible for too much of that. I think we need to do something about it.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I want to add my thanks to that of the other members of the committee for the tremendously interesting and informative testimony you have all given.

I would just caution once again that the staff report is not anything that is written on a trestle board, that it is not going to be changed.

I have been impressed with many of the suggestions made here this morning. I first want to thank you because this is the type of information that we need from those of you who have been through the wringer on this.

Let me ask a question to follow up on the question just asked by Senator Wilson. General Meyer, you indicated that you took a great deal of your time appearing before congressional committees, subcommittees, and so forth and so on.

Could you give me an approximate estimate of how much time you and your staff put in appearing at and preparing for congressional testimony?

Was it 5 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent?

General **Meyer**. January, February and March of every year were set aside exclusively for the preparation and support of coming to testify before Congress. January, getting ready, all of February and March, appearing before the different committees. So, it represents about three-twelfths or one-fourth of your time.

We do other things in those months, but the principal focus in that period is on testifying. I mentioned to one of my predecessors that I never wanted Chief of Staff of the Army and I really did not because I saw him as the president of a university whose principal responsibility is to get money for the university.

The field commanders are the ones who have fun, they are out dealing with troops. If I do not focus my time on getting money for the service, I have failed in one of my principal responsibilities.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you for that. Of course, one of the reasons there is some feeling on this committee, as reflected in the staff report, is that we would like to relieve the head of the Army, for example, from some of that so that he could get on with the business of running the Army which is what we think you should do.

That does bring up, I think, what General Dougherty, among others, brought up very clearly, that his proliferation of staff is something that worries me a great deal. If we do away with the Joint Chiefs, aren't we putting another layer in there? I think that is a legitimate concern.

General Dougherty, I was impressed with your five-star proposition that you advanced this morning which was something new, I thought. I guess you were saying that if you had these five-star Generals who were former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, that would take the place of a super board to advise the President and he would draw on that rather than having the board as outlined in the committee report.

Is that your point?

General Dougherty. That is one of them, Senator Exon. You always have the problem of suspicion of the motives of people, either coming from the service orientation or they are parochial or biased by some futuristic personal planning. This five-star formula completely pulls that senior person out of that morass. It does make him available. It is not just a hortatory thing.

We have always dealt with the Chairman as the first among equals. What I am saying is make him senior—more than equal. It is very difficult in a uniquely democratic society like ours, which is fundamentally based on division of power, to go back and look to see how you coalesce power in a military situation. This is a fundamental dilemma of democracies with relation to military planning and operations.

In the Pentagon we have to have a Pentagon command structure that, in my judgment, is as good as we expect that of the CINC's to be. It has to be equally capable. It has to be responsible. This would be a very unique step. Other nations use this effectively.

Our command structure, which carries the burden of free world responsibility in large measure, it seems to me, ought to have that clearcut stance: a Pentagon command structure comparable to that of the Unified and Specified Commands.

Senator Nunn. Could we get the views of the others on that one, too?

Senator Exon. Yes. My time is up.

Chairman Goldwater. We will give you time.

General Meyer. I think it is a long time overdue. One of the great opportunities I had as Chief of Staff of the Army was to draw on General Bradley. You saw him being pushed around in a wheelchair, but his mind was still as sharp as it could have been. I was able to go back and review with him some of the training problems he had back training forces for World War II and also draw on the experience he had as the Chairman and as Chief of Staff of the Army.

Senator Nunn. What was his status? Was he paid fully?

General Meyer. He was on active duty until the day he died.

Senator Nunn. Did he report to the Pentagon?

General Meyer. He had an office in the Pentagon.

Senator Nunn. Is that what you had in mind?

General Dougherty. Yes; his tour as Chairman was complete, but he was on the active roll, always available to the President or Secretary.

Senator Exon. Was he the only officer ever in that situation?

General Dougherty. No.

General Meyer. He was the last. There was General Marshal, General "Hap" Arnold, General MacArthur, General Eisenhower, Admiral King, Admiral Nimitz.

Senator Exon. General Krulak or Admiral Train, do you wish to comment?

General Krulak. The experience of the post-World War II five-star officers was a unique thing. Looking back on the very considerable contribution that they made, each of them, before his death causes me to say that this may be one of the rampant inflation that I can tolerate. I believe it to be a wise thing.

Admiral Train. I also believe it is a useful improvement in the entire structure as we know it today, particularly if the five-star Chairman represents not only a superservice Chief, but also a super unified commander by having been one.

However, I do not think this concept is, and you are the best judge of this, sufficiently significant where I would like to see the whole package of recommendations run aground on this issue. If there is a danger that it runs aground on the issue of establishing a five-star Chairman, then I would recommend to you that you not let that stand in the way of the improvement in organizational changes that are required.

Senator Nunn. I have never seen adding stars to cause controversy. It is only when you subtract them.

Senator Exon. Or eliminate them altogether.

Thank you, gentleman. I do want to emphasize again that I greatly appreciate all your testimony. I will say to you, General Krulak, that had I not known better, I would have assumed from your testimony that you were a marine general.

General Krulak. Very perceptive.

Chairman Goldwater. Senator Denton.

Senator Denton. Mr. Chairman, I express my optimism about the thrust of the effort started by Senators Jackson and Tower, and now being carried forth ably by you and Seantor Nunn and the rest of this committee. I believe that we are going to be able to narrow down and weed out the proposals from the Senate staff and from the House of Representatives.

I congratulate you on your choice of witnesses for today. My 34 years background, of which I am proud, in the service leads me to state that I cannot think of four finer men in terms of their wisdom, integrity, experience, judgment, and creative thinking to present the perspectives of their own services.

We are going to have to narrow down gradually toward a consensus. I wonder if today we have not had a subconscious, if not conscious, agreement that it is probably true, as the four witnesses have said, that there is an overload right now at the JCS, there is a time shortage, and there may be a need for a bit more "purple suit" in this, either on Joint Staff or on a Joint Military Advisory Council or on whatever we go to.

There is a consensus, I think, on increasing the role of the Chairman, with the five-star recommendation and the recommendation to have a Deputy Chairman. The Deputy would tend to help with respect to the overload on time, and would make the JCS members able to spend more time on issues. I think we are narrowing it down somewhat, but we have a long way to go.

I want to ask our witnesses if they could comment specifically, each of them, very briefly, on the idea that disestablishment of the

JCS would allow the service Chiefs to return solely to service concerns.

My worry about that is that the imput of the service Chiefs, in parallel with the CINC's, would appear to be necessary. The service Chiefs, by mandate, each of them, has to know about logistics, about the training situation in his service. He, therefore, is the only one qualified in his service to react to the decisions about what can be done in a given area if some kind of operational requirement arises that requires a change in strategy, or even change in handling an immediate situation like the Beirut situation.

It seems to me that, if you disestablish the JCS, you will lose that immediate knowledge and that immediate input about logistics possibilities and readiness levels, which only the service Chiefs can know about.

I would like to know if the four witnesses share that concern.

Admiral TRAIN. In my statement I specifically advised against the creation of a Joint Military Advisory Council. I advised against it because I believe very strongly that there should be in the reorganization a strengthening of a link between the resource and support authorities and the operational authorities rather than a separation of those two command links.

In this regard I find consideration merit in General Dougherty's view, rather than take the component commanders out from the unified commander, that that relationship be strengthened, both in the operational sense and in the resource and support sense.

If we find ways to enhance that linkage, we are thereby making the system work for us and eliminating those areas where information denial, for example, can cripple an accountable Commander.

General KRULAK. Here were seem to find ourselves in agreement. I concur with you, Senator. The critical thing is, as Admiral Train said, to strengthen the unified commander logistically, operationally and administratively in every way, and to strengthen the linkage between him and the component commander. Do that and leave the JCS alone.

General DOUGHERTY. I was not for disestablishment of the Joint Staff. I think it has many advantages. I would strengthen then the role of the Chairman. I would give him the Joint Staff, as his staff, not to hide out from the other Chiefs, but to share with the other Chiefs, but be responsive to the Chairman's and the Director's dictates.

I would give the Chairman the power to resolve disputes and go right on, with obligation, or course, to be able to always explain the basis of this resolution, leaving the other Chiefs avenues, if aggrieved, to go up. But do not stop and split things and stymie the process while you split. Let the Chairman resolve the dispute and carry on and dispose of it.

Others can complain if they are aggrieved. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff has a very useful process. I used this analysis, Senator Denton, it is the best military governmental coordinative mechanism I have ever seen, because the word comes back from the Chief of service and it is rapidly disseminated throughout the service that "the Chief said it," that works.

General MEYER. I would say that the reason that I proposed, when I wrote several years ago in the Armed Forces Journal, an extreme case to address the separation of the role is because I believe that in wartime that it will require the full-time effort of the Chiefs in trying to do the allocation of resources among CINC and the broad strategic planning. The Vice Chiefs and the service staffs will have to take care of reporting to the Chiefs the readiness issues, and so on.

My argument for the JMAC is that if you will operate as I've indicated in wartime, then doesn't it make sense to operate that way now so that you do not have to transition in wartime? I believe it is possible to make such a change. I also agree in stengthening the role of the CINC's. I believe that with a stronger Joint Staff, an increased role for the Chairman, that the proposals that have been approved would all be executed through the service Chiefs, thus ensuring that the service dissemination mechanism is used.

Clearly the service Chiefs are the only ones who can tell the decision makers whether certain proposals can be executed. In example, it may not be possible for the Army to recruit the kind of people that would be necessary to carry out a specific proposal by the JMAC.

So, the service Chiefs clearly must be involved in the evaluation and execution of the proposals. How that would be done is not clearly spelled out in the staff report.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman GOLDWATER. When we bring a man into an operational job of any rank, major, lieutenant colonel, and so forth, the average man from operations does not like it. He was raised as an operating officer and that is where he prefers to stay.

I understand that they are discovering in the Pentagon in their search for people to bring in for management jobs, that they are finding volunteers in the operational field who are willing to move into the Pentagon and stay throughout their military career.

Would you gentlemen believe that establishing such a procedure would be wise provided that his promotion would keep up with his class? Do you see anything wrong with that?

Admiral TRAIN. I see merit in a specialty system that would permit staff specialists to go back into the field to hone their operational and combat skills and then bring them back again to the Joint Staff or back again to the staff that represents his service in Washington.

I would recommend against a specialty that denies continued development of combat and war-fighting experience so that we end up with a staff of people who are, in essence, separated from combat and war-fighting function that represents the ultimate desire in our professional life, namely, that of defending the vital interests of the United States in the field.

General KRULAK. I understand, Senator, that your scenario involves an individual who would prefer and volunteer to come to the Pentagon, and live out his military life in various jobs in the Pentagon.

My counsel would be to find that guy and fire him. Get rid of him as soon as you can because he does not belong in a warmaking system.

Admiral Train described it right. The correct way to do it is to expose them to gun smoke so that when they come to the Pentagon, they will be dealing with reality.

General MEYER. I would support that. I would remind you, however, that many of the Joint Staff officers you are going to need are supply officers, transportation officers, and people like that. They need also to go out to the field. They may not consider themselves warriors, but they need to go out and get their boots muddy one more time so that they can track mud through the halls of the joint decision process.

Senator NUNN. I agree with the philosophy that Admiral Train and General Krulak have expressed. When you get down to the management of the obstacle course and you look at the huge number of obstacles that we have compared to manned positions, all of us would like to smell the smoke, but the numbers in the field are not there.

The only way you can do that is to profoundly cut the number of officers we have in the military because the structure we have, the force structure, compared to the number of officers, does not give command an opportunity to put a huge number of officers out there.

We tried to do that back in the days of DARPA. It was opposed by some of the services. If you look at management capabilities compared to force structure, it is impossible to give people that kind of operational experience.

General DOUGHERTY. This may be anecdotal, but bear with me just a moment, Mr. Chairman.

I think that the service personnel experts ought to make decisions concerning the moving in and out of people and that it should not be done on a personal basis.

Chairman GOLDWATER. You said should not.

General DOUGHERTY. Should not be done on a personal basis. Let me use this anecdote, which is true. I had an application one time to be my aide. It was a curriculum vitae formal letter sent to me saying "I want to apply for the job as your aide."

I called personnel. I said. "Are you doing this now?"

"Yes, we have a central office down here you can call and you can apply for this kind of job or that kind of job."

I was astounded by this. So, at the next four-star meeting of the Air Force—General Brown was the Chief—I asked the question, "How many of you ever applied for a job in the military?"

Not one in that room of the four stars of the Air Force had ever sought or applied for or had written for a job.

Now, that comes as a surprise to people outside the profession, but it wasn't a surprise to me. It was surprise that we were job shopping and that people were actively conducting job shopping experience. I think that is wrong.

I agree with Vic, I would find that guy and fire him. I think we have some top-flight personnel who make the best out of the resources we have while they are building the basic professional spread of warrior skills and other things we need—and they do it very well. We screw it up when we try to let individuals tailor it because they like to be in Washington.

Chairman **Goldwater**. I am indebted to you all for that comment. I happen to agree with that, especially with General Krulak.

In the fall issue of "Strategic Review," there is an interesting article on the professional soldier, the heroic soldier, and what we are beginning to see in the Armed Forces—a division between the operational type and the managerial type. That will not be solved here, but I do think you have contributed greatly.

I have one question for General Meyer, and the rest of you may comment. The staff study recommends that the staffs of the service Secretaries and service Chiefs be combined.

What would be your idea of that recommendation?

General **Meyer**. Taken in isolation, it is difficult to assess it because whatever you do at the service Secretary level depends on what you do with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. You have to look at it as an entity.

From a service Chief's point of view I have felt for a long time there is great waste as a result of the duplication that exists between the Assistant Secretary for Personnel and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and that there would be merit in combining them and other such functions.

In doing so, there are major changes that must occur in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There are those who argue against a service Secretary. The great merit of the service Secretary is that he is the heat shield for the uniformed military appearing before you. He is a political appointee and as such provides a buffer. Without him the service Chiefs could become even more political and less military.

To me that is a very useful position.

Chairman **Goldwater**. I ask that question because our study shows that there are something around 87,000 civilians in this area connected with the military. Every time the Congress adds another Secretary, they ask for more civilians. The average number of people from whom the four Chiefs hear, hourly or daily or weekly, is 42 people. They do not wear a uniform. They are political appointees. Some of them do not know which end of the airplane goes on the runway first. Eliminating this situation would solve a lot of problems, but I will refrain from further comments here.

We will start the second round of questioning and this time you may have 10 minutes.

Senator Nunn.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If my memory is correct on the operational versus other experiences in the military in the Army, we have some 5,000 colonels and 550 command positions for those colonels. So, gentlemen, at any one time there is only 1 out of 10 colonels on the average who have any opportunity to be in command.

I think it is a profound problem. It is not going to be solved in this organizational situation.

I think we have a situation where the office corps itself cannot get command experience in sufficient quantity because of the necessity to rotate a very large number of people through a very small number of command slots. Therefore, the rotation is very, very rapid.

You mentioned the rotation in the Department of Defense, General Krulak, you are right. The average time is about 2 years. But the average time on the Joint Staff is short, too. The average time in anything in the Department of Defense, military or civilian, is very, very short. The average time in managing an Army major systems program is something like 2 years. The average time in industry is 2 to 6 years.

The Navy has moved upward on that scale, closer to 4 years. The Air Force is in between.

I know you have to have a transitional capability, I understand that.

Admiral TRAIN. I do not believe that it is necessarily crucial to have your staff officer going to the field and serving in command. The important thing is that they have experience in the field as well as in Washington.

I do strongly believe that a staff specialty that will result in a concentration on joint staff when he is out of the field and back in Washington would be extremely useful.

The thrust of my position is that we not deny to the Joint Staff officer the ability to go out in the field, whether it be in command or in another role, and then bring him back to the Joint Staff with that additional increment of experience that will enable him to do his job as a joint staff officer better.

Senator NUNN. I agree with that.

I also observe that the Pentagon is not the only place overflowing with bureaucracy. You can go out in the field and get into a bureaucratic tangle, too. We have headquarters in the field that are not exactly the epitome of smelling smoke.

General Krulak, in your book your recommend two or three things.

One is that you recommend the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs be abolished. You mentioned a moment ago leave the Joint Chiefs alone. Abolishing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is not leaving them alone.

Have you changed your view on that?

General KRULAK. I simply did not want to muddy the water in the discussion which Senator Denton brought up. I feel as I did when I wrote the book 2 years ago. The Chairman himself has not made his case. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, has indeed made its case in every war. It should be polished and honed, there is no reason why one of Chiefs cannot preside.

There is the matter of management of the Joint Staff. This is a very important thing. It was brought up earlier in the discussion of the Joint Military Advisory Council that the Joint Staff would serve them also.

Well, think it through. If the Chairman manages the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff is his staff. He writes their efficiency reports, he selects them, he approves their presence, he lays out the geometry by which they behave.

The Joint Military Advisory Council would have very little call on their time. They would be prioritized. I believe that it is the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that is the great virtue.

I have never been impressed by the presence or absence of a Chairman, and nothing that has been said today, nor anything that has been said in the lengthy staff study, has persuaded me that endowment of the Chairman with greater authority would do us much good.

It is the Unified Command, and the JCS in its corporate body that should be the hard rocks around which we work our uniform military.

Senator NUNN. Would you have the Chiefs report directly to the President, bypassing the Secretary of Defense, would they still report through the Secretary of Defense?

General KRULAK. You are speaking of the Chiefs of the military services?

Senator NUNN. Yes; the Joint Chiefs.

General KRULAK. No; indeed.

Senator NUNN. Should they go directly to the President or through the Secretary of Defense?

General KRULAK. The President, as the Constitutional Commander in Chief, is the proper agency for issuing the strategic orders. If he elects to do it through a staff officer, that is to say, a member of his Cabinet, the Secretary of Defense, well and good. That is the Commander in Chief's prerogative. Whether we want it or expect it or not, that is the way it will be. The Commander in Chief will do as he chooses. In the recent past he has chosen to use the Secretary of Defense as his mechanism for stating his strategic guidance. That, as far as I can see, is entirely right.

Senator NUNN. Can I get a response from the witnesses on the proposal to abolish the Chairman, simply having the Joint Chiefs?

General DOUGHERTY. Sir, in my opinion, I would be diametrically opposed to abolishing the Chairman. You go back to the rule by committee with no one equal or all equal. I think this is prostituting the desired command structure in Washington to support the field if you have a commander report to a committee or the Secretary of Defense.

There is an old saw that the "Lord so loved the world he did not send a committee . . ."

General MEYER. I cannot approve of that.

Admiral TRAIN. Nor can I.

General KRULAK. I did not expect anybody to agree with me, Senator. As a matter of fact, I would have been shocked if they had. We all see it differently.

I am a great believer in simplicity, and simplicity is only achieved by simplification.

Senator NUNN. Let me ask General Meyer one question here.

One of the conclusions of the staff report was what was called parochialism, log rolling, and so forth, interfering with the quality of joint command.

Dr. Brzezinski in testifying before this committee about the Iranian rescue mission, in answer to a question by Senator Tower, he answered:

> One basic lesson is that inter-service dictated very much the character force that was used. Every service wished to be represented in this enterprise and that did not enhance cohesion and integration.

This statement also seemed to be supported, perhaps not as directly, by the Holloway report criticizing the selection of helicopters used in the mission.

General Meyer, what is your view of that?

General MEYER. I never heard any service ask to have their service represented. In example, Marine helicopter pilots were chosen because they were better qualified to fly CH-53's over land than their Navy counterparts as a result of their greater experience in that area.

The choice of the CH-53 naval helicopters as opposed to Army helicopters was because they could be positioned in the area without anybody recognizing a change from normal operations. I never heard the issue raised that everybody wanted to be represented.

Senator NUNN. Would it have been raised in that kind of frontal kind of situation?

General MEYER. Yes; I would have known about it because the choice in every one of those instances was made by the commander. He, himself, made the choice. He went and looked at the naval pilots and decided they did not have enough experience flying over land. He wanted people with experience, so he wanted marine pilots. It was purely a choice.

I never heard that at all.

Admiral TRAIN. My helicopters were used. I assure you I did not propose helicopters be used for this operation. In fact, I did not know what they were going to be used for.

General MEYER. I was down to the Armed Forces Staff College in December 1979. I was on the Norfolk runway knowing what they were going for and I did not even discuss it with Admiral Train.

Senator NUNN. I want to thank all of you for being here today. It has been most helpful. Although disagreements remain, I believe we have made progress today in several key respects, especially the unified commanders.

General Dougherty, your recommandation on the five stars for the Chairman is very useful. Everyone agrees with that.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Someone made a recommendation that the Joint Chiefs wear purple suits.

General DOUGHERTY. We all came to our positions through different routes. None of us came up through the purple suit route. Let us leave it as a phrase to be used to describe joint duty rather than a practical way to pursue the military profession.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Train recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I do not know whether you meant by law or by suggestion——

Admiral TRAIN. By suggestion.

Senator NUNN [continuing]. Be picked from people who are out in the field in Unified Commands.

Would the others agree with that?

General MEYERS. I would agree with that.

General DOUGHERTY. I would pick the best man and use that wisely. We have picked great Chairmen. I have worked for all but two of them. I have known them at fairly close range. They have been great men. They have had great characteristics and attributes.

I think it is also splendid if you could have been Chief of service. Admiral Moorer had a very unique array of talents and Admiral Crowe has. If you can deliberately take the top people and put them in positions where the Secretary of Defense and President has great selectively, it is so much better than if you just sort of fall into the trap where you have only one person.

General KRULAK. General Dougherty is right.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am intrigued by the idea of simplification because it is so foreign to Government. Yet there is history in World War II when we had 12 million men under arms and eventually the same number of flag and general officers as we have now.

I am also intrigued that in that earlier time, as General Krulak noted in a footnote, Vice Admiral Leahy, the point he is making to President Roosevelt dealt with the service Chiefs directly.

I cannot help but think that the incremental growth in the Office of Secretary of Defense, to which we have certainly contributed, is enormous.

Having said that, let me focus on another point, the difference between the four of you. It seems to me there have been differences particularly with regard to the role of the Chairman. I am concerned, I think the footnote points up something, that nothing may be relevant today.

General Meyer, were you ever in the position where you felt that the Secretary or the President were not receiving the advice that you give as a member of this corporate body?

General MEYER. Yes.

Senator WILSON. What did you do about it?

General MEYER. I discussed it with the Chairman as to whether or not I could carry out my assignment. I had decided when I was appointed that there were two issues over which I would resign.

One was if I could not carry out my constitutional responsibility of being able to present advice, guidance, and counsel.

Two, was if there were some moral issue on which I disagreed with the administration.

I discussed the specific issue with the Chairman and we were able to resolve it.

Senator WILSON. Did you ever have a personal meeting with the Secretary of Defense as well as the President?

General MEYER. Independently?

Senator WILSON. Yes.

General MEYER. No; because my views were transmitted.

Senator WILSON. You were satisfied that they were?

General MEYER. Yes.

Senator WILSON. Apparently on at least one occassion?

General MEYER. More than one occasion.

Senator WILSON. You felt they were not and had to resolve that with the Chairman?

General MEYER. Yes.

Senator WILSON. You did have, though, the constitutional right to go directly to the President.

General MEYER. Yes, I did.

Senator **Wilson**. I wonder if the others have had similar experience.

Admiral **Train**. I never served as a service Chief, so I cannot provide any input.

Senator **Wilson**. In your service on the Joint Staff, were you ever aware of a situation in which one of the service Chiefs, one of the members of the Joint Chiefs was blocked from expressing his view or from getting his unfiltered views through to the Secretary or the President?

Admiral **Train**. I am not aware of any such incident. I can observe, however, that the enormity of this service Chief going by himself to the President is so awesome that it tends to discourage that practice.

I can recall incidents where perhaps had that not been so awesome and had each service Chief felt he could just walk in the door and present his view as the senior naval adviser or senior Army adviser to the President, that he might have done so. In fact, historically the act of a service Chief going to the President during the time I was there occurred only once.

General **Krulak**. I worked with Secretary McNamara. I can recall an instance, which will be remembered particularly by the Air Force, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning bombing targets of North Vietnam. The targets were proposed clearly to the Secretary of Defense, but never got beyond the Secretary.

General **Dougherty**. I share General Krulak's recollection from my vicarious position. It did not happen to me. I can think of no personal experience, Senator Wilson, though I did see it happen during the Vietnamese war.

In retrospect, though, I was not a Chief of service, I was only a three-star officer in the 1970–71 period, I have a great sense of guilt because I did not do more to stop what I think was a bad policy. I know we agonized over this. I heard my Chief agonize over this, what can we do, because we were not prosecuting this war in a way that was effective.

But by that time it became the enthusiasm of the military to do a job even though it was the wrong job. We switched to a Vietnamization process. I think we became intensely interested in Vietnamization and got deflected from the responsibiltiy to make sure that the Nation committed its full resources to combat.

I have a guilty feeling in retrospect I was never denied the opportunity to speak because my boss always gave me access.

I did see General LeMay denied an opportunity to present something to President Johnson that he wanted to. The President told him he would give him an audience. Then it became a "do not call me, I will call you" situation, and he never called General LeMay.

That is the only instance I remember.

Senator **Wilson**. Having cited those instances, the concern I would have is that if we concentrate too much power in a Chairman, that there may be more of these situations and it may get more difficult for one of the other members of the Joint Chiefs to feel strongly that his service advice has not been adequately portrayed and adequately represented, that there is a very serious concern that the Secretary, and in turn, the President, will not have an adequate view of what may be a very significant conflict that needs to be addressed directly and resolved.

General MEYER. I would argue where you separate them that they would feel far freer to go separately because they were not part of the original decision.

Senator WILSON. I did not follow that.

General MEYER. I am not arguing for the staff report here: but, where the Chiefs were not involved in developing the recommendation that went forward and a Chief disagreed with the recommendation he would feel more free to go directly to the President.

Senator WILSON. You are against that?

General MEYER. I am taking that case. In that instance they would feel freer to go to the Secretary of Defense and the President because they weren't involved in the original decision.

Senator WILSON. I do not know whether that is true or not. It seems to me they would be less likely to because they would have less feeling.

General MEYER. I do not think you will have Chiefs of service with less feeling. They will all have great feeling about the issues, particularly as they relate to their services.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I would like to ask for the record one question about the threshold level of questions determined by the Joint Chiefs.

General Krulak has said that they probably annually resolve 2,000 questions and should not be concerned about 1,900 of them. The Supreme Court in denying certiorari refused to take the case.

What kind of mechanism exists to determine how they should spend their time?

Chairman GOLDWATER. Are you asking unanimous consent to supply that information?

Senator WILSON. Yes.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Without objection. Who do you want to supply it?

Senator WILSON. I would be interested in whoever has relevant experience. I think that would include all.

Chairman GOLDWATER. They are all retired.

General MEYER. Why don't you ask the Chairman to provide it, to go back and get the information. They have the data.

Senator WILSON. The point about demand on their time.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Without objection, we did take care of that.

Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think no matter how much organization that we the Congress decide to impose upon the military, the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense will sometimes usurp the authority vested normally in the leadership of the services, and each of them has on a number of occasions.

In addition, the Congress has frustrated the initiatives of the President by denying appropriation of funds to do certain things and imposing limitations on him such as the War Powers Act, and so on. I find it unfortunate that we make references without qualification to the helplessness or the bad advice administered by the

Joint Chiefs, because I don't think that the situation is all that clear or all that simple.

There appear some quotations in here, in the staff report, attributed to Secretary Schlesinger. One of them is:

"The profferred advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded."

Now, with all respect to him and to General Meyers, who generally concurs with what was said, I think that such a statement would have to be greatly qualified because how can you know that it is bad or good advice if it is normally unread, and if it is unread how else could it be that it is almost always disregarded?

When we start thinking about Vietnam, we can get some pretty strong feelings about statements like that. I guess we would have to narrow it down to an agreement that the President can and has, the Secretary of Defense can and has, and the Congress can and has usurp the authority normally vested in the Chairman and the rest of the JCS.

I would ask if you four gentleman have read the description of the six major missions contained in the Senate Staff Report, nuclear deterrence, maritime superiority, power projection superiority, which are called worldwide missions, and then the so-called regional missions: defense of NATO Europe, defense of East Asia, and defense of Southwest Asia?

I cannot find those in any DOD documentation, and Secretary Weinberger has agreed with me that they are not necessarily a good statement of what the DOD missions are.

The reason the question is important is that the report goes on to develop from those six missions the importance of mission integration, and authors base a great deal of rationale on the definition of missions.

If any or all of you have read them, do you agree or disagree they constitute a proper and inclusive statement of the missions?

Admiral TRAIN. I have read that. I would personally prefer to described the missions of the Armed Forces of the United States described in the terms employed by the Secretary of Defense, for example, in his posture statement in which they are called national security objectives.

That to me describes in much broader terms what we expect the Armed Forces of the United States to do to support the duly elected or appointed political leadership.

The mission statement of the type contained in the staff report is a functional grouping of things that the Armed Forces do and that a unified command might do.

For example, as the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, I used to describe my mission as establishment of the sea lanes across the Atlantic over which the reinforcements and supplies to Europe were sent, to support adjacent commanders. That was my own simplified way of describing to my people and my subordinates what our mission was all about.

I doubt if I would use the same category contained in the staff study.

Senator DENTON. I agree. I thought the Secretary did categorize it better.

If you can make short answers, I would like to ask one or two more questions.

Go ahead, General.

General KRULAK. The important thing, it seems to me—I have read and understood this statement of missions. The important thing, it seems to me, is to realize that this is a dynamic affair and not a static one. Missions must be reviewed and changed from time to time based on all the circumstances which our Nation faces.

The altered attitude of our leadership about our position in the world at large means our missions have no specific durability. If we can be assured that the missions will be reviewed periodically and made consistent with our world position, that is the best way.

General MEYER. In the interest of time, I would align myself with Admiral Train's comments.

General DOUGHERTY. I think it is a way to describe missions. I do not think it is a good way to organize secretarial responsibility.

Senator DENTON. Here is the other question I would like to ask.

I know our Chairman, and I, too, talk about people actually wearing purple suits on the Joint Staff. I must say that I identify entirely with General Dougherty's representation of the need to have some increase among those on the Joint Staff, and the Chiefs themselves perhaps, not only because of the bias in the services but because of the tremendous ignorance of what the other services have done.

I can name naval officers who have come along through naval careers who do not know what surface ships do until they are given a deep draft command. And they may not learn that very well before they go to a further command.

I do not think Admiral Train would disagree with that. The officers have to learn it some other way. That does not mean they are not good men or are not well informed. I do believe there should be some means by which there will be an augmentation of purely uniservice knowledge.

I do not want to be self-serving. I did serve as the commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College. I knew that I needed more information about the other services while I was there.

Mr. Chairman, I think the Marines generally wrote the outstanding thesis at the Armed Forces Staff College because they were always borrowing or getting old equipment from the Army and because the Navy had to take them where they were going. The Marines were dependent on the Navy directly for augmentation of their own air support, and sometimes even on the Air Force and the Army before that.

So, the Marines were pretty well indoctrinated relative to the other three. The Army was a close second in that the Navy had to take them where they wanted to go and had to provide them with logistics.

The Air Force and the Navy were, and I include myself, definitely a rather distant third and fourth. We are talking about officers at the rank of major or lieutenant commander. I think there is a need for more interservice training. I do not know that the Armed Forces Staff College in 6 months can provide it.

I wonder if it should not be something that we should try, with an eye toward eventually service on the Joint Staff or possibly as a service Chief, that we somehow inject into the advanced education and training of officers who might be eligible for such assignments or billets the information which would permit them to know more about the other services.

Would any of you want to comment on that?

General **DOUGHERTY**. I recommend it and I still feel strongly about this. The school out here on the point, Fort McNair, now called the National War College, should be made a school for mandatory attendance of admirals, flag and general officers, for 9 months. They should intensely go into education for general and flag officers as to how to put things together and perform in a joint——

Senator **DENTON**. Respectfully, and I am sorry to interrupt, at the War College the curriculum has changed over the years. Generally speaking, even the Naval War College senior course, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, they seemed to be preparing us more for being Secretaries of State than for being an operational commander or a joint commander.

I say that in all sincerity because I wrote one of my thesis on that at the Naval War College.

General **DOUGHERTY**. I think they are getting better in that regard. They must have read your thesis.

Admiral **TRAIN**. The course General Dougherty is referring to, which we call the Capstone Course for newly selected flag and general officers, at the present time is 2 months' duration. I was privileged to help establish the course.

I think this valuable course, contrary to what you infer, is not only a course—we also take them out in the field and show them Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines in addition to exposing them to the policy development of the other services. I think it is valuable.

General **MEYER**. I think it should be extended in time.

Also, I believe the Service Staff Colleges need additional emphasis on joint operations.

General **KRULAK**. It is well and good to assume that an individual selected for flag or general rank needs more education. It probably is unhappily true. But, basically, one should say if he is good enough to be a general, it is time for him to start giving back.

The integration of the kind of education in the lower level schools that General Meyer proposes is really the genius of the education business. I would recommend emphasis on that.

Senator **DENTON**. I gather there is a consensus that a 2-month course over at the National Defense University is good, but not necessarily adequate, and that there should be interjection of more joint study at all the lower levels of the services.

General **DOUGHERTY**. In my days I once controlled the assignment of three officers with one follow-on assignment—my aides. I sent them all to the Armed Forces College.

Senator **DENTON**. Thank you.

Chairman **GOLDWATER**. I want to thank you gentlemen.

Senator **WILSON**. Mr. Chairman, May I ask one more question?

The staff study makes much of the concern about log rolling so that the decisions of the Joint Chiefs in terms of offering corporate advice is watered down.

I note that in 1982 testimony, General Meyer, you made the statement:

> The hard critical issues often tend to become watered down. Therefore, the hard issues are not necessarily presented to the degree I believe they should be.

Can you provide some examples of that?

General MEYER. One of the prime examples is the inability to come to grips with who commands Marine and Army troops ashore, on land. That was an issue that came up again in Grenada.

I can give you others that relate to the hard choices that have to be made in the strategic nuclear arena when you are dealing with whether or not to increase MX or whether or not to increase strategic bombers, or increase Polaris submarines, those kinds of tradeoffs instead of taking a new look you tend to continue along the route already programmed.

Senator WILSON. In the instance you have provided I am surprised that there was not a resolution after whatever differing views might have been presented to the Secretary through the chairman, I am surprised there was not a resolution, if not from the bottom up, at least from the top down.

General MEYER. There was resolution, but the resolution was reached by the Chiefs accommodating one another's views. I only saw two papers go forward to the Secretary and both of them had to do with helicopters. They had to do with General LeMay and General Wheeler with regard to who would control helicopters. That was the only time I have seen a split paper.

All of the rest of the papers went forward. The Chiefs were able to accommodate it.

General DOUGHERTY. There was a split that went forward that went to the President at the time the job of Directorate of Joint Strategic Target Planning was established. That was a tough one. It was split to the President.

General MEYER. Another was a split that came up with the issue of whether or not to have the current Central Command and none of the Chiefs proposed Central Command. It was recommended that it be a sub-Unified Command.

I'm sure that most of the time in the interest of trying to understand one another, you have to accommodate your views as a group here in the committee. Very often even you are going to have to decide that despite the fact that you may have very strong views on an issue, you have to accommodate them in coming up with a committee report.

Senator WILSON. I just wonder how often you felt that was watered down advice or necessarily the product of a wise accommodation?

General MEYER. Many times it was obviously wise accommodation. Other times I felt that we had to go too far in order to get accommodation.

Senator WILSON. How many Secretaries have encouraged less unanimity?

General MEYER. I do not believe any have encouraged unanimity. From my experience where there were differing views you would find a willingness to accept them. However, the problem of going forward with widely divergent views is that it relinquishes the authority to OSD civilians to propose specific recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

With that in the back of your mind, you would rather go along with a position on which the bulk of your peers agree from a military point of view as opposed to your own view as opposed to throwing the entire decision into the hands of the civilians.

General **KRULAK**. I can make a modest contribution to this dialogue. I do not know whether disagreement between two men is enough for a split paper to go forward. I do recall very keenly a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff telling me after returning from a session with the Secretary of Defense, "He does not want divisiveness. He wants one recommendation and no more."

That is unhealthy. It may have been the view of only one Secretary. He may have had a little abrasiveness with that Chairman, but the Chairman did say that. So, it has happened.

Senator **WILSON**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Again, gentlemen, thank you.

Chairman **GOLDWATER**. We want to thank you gentlemen. If the testimony of the witnesses that follow you measure up to what we have heard this morning, we will have taken a great step toward getting this military organization in the shape we need.

I thank you on behalf of the whole committee.

The meeting will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Denton, Nunn, Hart, Levin, Bingaman, Dixon, and Glenn.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, Russell C. Miller, Patricia L. Watson, research assistants; and Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; William S. Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. The committee will come to order.

The hearing today continues a series of hearings that the committee is holding on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense and the Congress. We are privileged to have here this morning two former Secretaries of Defense, Hon. Harold Brown and Hon. James Schlesinger.

Secretary Brown is familiar to all members of this committee. He has had extensive experience in national security affairs. He was Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, and Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He served as a delegate to arms limitation talks and served on numerous advisory bodies. His broad and varied background heightens the importance of his testimony.

We welcome you, Secretary Brown.

Secretary Schlesinger is also a familiar and distinguished witness. He served as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

No other individual has so comprehensive a set of responsibilities for national defense than does the Secretary of Defense.

As former Secretaries of Defense, your testimony will be most valuable in guiding the work of this committee in drafting legislation to strengthen the organization of the Department of Defense.

Senator Nunn will be right along. The prepared statement of Senator Alan Dixon will be placed in the hearing record at this point.

[The following was received for the record:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Alan Dixon

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here this morning as the committee continues its oversight hearings on issues related to the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense.

We have two very distinguished former Secretary's of Defense before the committee today. I appreciate their willingness to appear before the committee and give us the benefit of their insights and expertise.

Let me also take this opportunity to again congratulate the chairman and ranking member of this committee for their leadership in identifying the problems in the Defense Department organization and for undertaking to correct those problems.

I agree that the need for reform is beyond dispute. We have been engaged in a substantial defense build up over the last several years, but that money adds nothing to our national security because of flaws in defense organization and decision-making, it is not well spent, or the weapons purchased cannot be used in a coordinated and effective manner.

These hearings, therefore, are not about whether we need reform. Rather, I hope they will result in a consensus in the defense community on what those reforms will be. I look forward to working with Secretary Brown, Secretary Schlesinger, and all interested parties in an effort to achieve that consensus.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Jim, you may proceed.

Secretary **Brown**. I think actually his statement is more general and philosophical, as is his want.

I have specific things to say. I think it is appropriate for Secretary Schlesinger to speak first.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary **Schlesinger**. Thank you, Harold, for pushing me up front.

Mr. Chairman, I will start my remarks by reading the first paragraph of my statement to this committee 2 years ago:

> Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this invitation to appear today before the Armed Services Committee to examine the vexing problem of structural reform within the Department of Defense. I can only applaud the committee's courage in tackling this hoary issue. The task is indeed a formidable one.
>
> Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, I urge the committee not to be put off from structural reform because of the formidable institutional obstacles in the past.

Mr. Chairman, since I have no prepared remarks this morning, I would request that the balance of my statement of 2 years ago be included in the record.

Chairman **Goldwater**. It will be.

[The following was received for the record:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate this invitation to appear today before the Senate Armed Services Committee to examine the vexing problem of structural reform within the Department of Defense. I can only applaud the Committee's courage in tackling this hoary issue. The task is indeed a formidable one. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I urge that the Committee not be put off from structural reform because of the formidable institutional obstacles in the path.

All institutions become ingrained and have ascribed to them virtues that in retrospect may appear laughable or even pathetic. Perhaps this is particularly so in the case of military institutions—for which the stakes are so high and the institutions themselves not subjected to severe test during lengthy periods of peace. In this regard, I need only cite the attempts in Great Britain at the close of the 19th century to eliminate the system of commission by purchase. In defense of the purchase system all sorts of economic and political rationale were elaborated, including authoritative support for that hallowed practice by the Duke of Wellington. While the United States has suffered from no such glaring systemic defects as those revealed in the Crimean War, I believe that the experience in recent years does demonstrate that substantial improvements in the performance of the military establishment can be achieved for the Nation's benefit.

I have no wish to exaggerate nor to suggest that structural reform is a panacea that can solve our many military problems. Structural reform is no substitute for capable leadership or for suitable, well-trained and ready forces. Cynics will point out that only a limited amount can be achieved by what is described as "tinkering." Nonetheless, in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the Nation.

Since the creation of the modern American military establishement in the aftermath of World War II, we as a nation have been ambivalent regarding the goals that we set for that establishment. We have been and remain ambivalent regarding the purposes of defense unification. We have sought to preserve a degree of Service independence which has precluded effective integration of our military capabilities. I am sure that you are all familiar with the history of the National Security Act of 1947. At the close of World War II, we sought, above all, to avoid the creation of a dominating general staff—reflecting a fear of the German General Staff, that revealed both a misreading of history and a susceptibility to our own wartime progaganda. Whatever the paramount position of Ludendorff in Imperial Germany during World War I, the German General Staff in World War II had little power to control or influence Hitler's regime. Moreover, the issue quite separate from that of unification, for the German General Staff controlled only Germany's ground forces. In any event those concerns, whether real or invented, bear little relevance to the conditions of today and bear all the earmarks of another era.

The net effect of the structure that we created in the postwar period was that the balance was tipped toward a preservation of existing institutional interests and against the efficient design of forces or execution of war plans. In the period of America's military pre-eminence, which ended during the decade of the 70's, perhaps such arrangements remained satisfactory, if not wholly suitable. As the overall balance has changed, however, and as the political outcome in a confrontation has become increasingly dependent on the impressiveness of initial performance at the outset of a conflict looking toward rapid termination, we are, in my judgment, no longer able to bear the luxury of arrangements which, whatever their advantages in preserving traditional institutional roles, militate against the effective execution of military plans.

All of my own experiences within the Department argue in favor of further integration of the system that would result in a strengthening of both military decisionmaking in this country and the effectiveness of our forces.

The central weakness of the existing system lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You have already heard a great deal of testimony to this effect. Moreover, a series of studies going back for three decades has pointed to this problem. I have no desire to belabor the issue here. Even less do I have a desire to criticize the performance of able men who are performing as well as they can with the constraints of the established system. It is indeed somewhat unfair to criticize a structure which was established on the basis of one criterion—to preserve considerable latitude for the individual Services—on the basis of quite different criteria—to obtain excellent advice, efficient war plans and well designed force structures. The existing structure, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations and the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interests of each of the separate Services. The general rule is that no Service ox may be gored. If on rare occasions disputes do break out that adversely affect the interests of one or more of the Services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised.

The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like flourish. It is important not to rock the boat. This implies a built-in difficulty in formulating and executing military operations. All members of the Congress will recognize the earmarks of the system. It is the way that we formulate national policy. It is the way the Congress is run. The question is whether a system designed for long run political consensus is the appropriate one for making decisions regarding what may be time-urgent military operations. Our political system is designed to force compromise even at the expense of rapid achievement of certain national goals. In the nuclear age, one can only ponder whether a system for forcing compromise in such a manner is appropriate for our military establishment.

Perhaps—though only perhaps—of subsidiary significance is the impact on the formulation of budgets and the design of forces. The existing procedures, regrettably if inevitably, fail to engage with the national process of formulating the defense budget. What comes up from the Chiefs is a mutual endorsement of the individual desires of the several Services. There is no cross-cutting—nor, given the nature of the structure, can there by any cross-cutting. Since I myself have generally been a supporter of the top dollar for the military Services, I believe I can say that the dollar requests are invariably so high that they cannot conceivably be sustained by the national consensus.

The reality of the Nation's defense problem is that we seek to achieve security with an economy of force and in economy of national treasure. Little help can be provided through the existing structure. The proferred advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of forces are made by civilians outside of the military structure.

Is this an outcome that those who would like to enhance the prestige of the Military Services or the effectiveness of the nation's defenses really want? In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of "unity of command" is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed, if and only if, it applies at the Service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.

My greatest concern lies not in the area of budget formulation, however important that may be. It lies rather in the efficient design and execution of military operations. In this area I personally believe that we can no longer accept the burdens of the existing structure.

While I have some hankering after the more radical prescriptions of General Meyer, I would agree with Graham Claytor and others that we are wisest to follow an evolutionary approach. I would move first to fix those things that now need fixing—and avoid the quest for an ideal military command system. In general, therefore, I would support the more modest reforms that have been suggested by General Jones for the strengthening of the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Those reforms are quite similar to ones recently instituted in the United Kingdom.) I believe that the Chairman should be the link to the unified and specified commands, that he should provide independent and cross-cutting advice to the Secretary of Defense, that the Joint Staff should become responsive to his (unilateral) requests, that greater flexibility and continuity should be provided in the Joint Staff, and that there should be a four-star Deputy Chairman.

These are very modest reforms. I think I can assure you that even with such reforms there will remain ample power to preserve the perspectives of the individual Services and protection for their interests. (Indeed, this last point may be the very issue about which General Meyer is concerned.)

Why do I suggest that such reforms are desirable, Mr. Chairman? Because I believe that these reforms would provide for greater coherence and continuity in the planning process and greater effectiveness in execution. Execution in my judgment should be the responsibility of the Chairman—not of the Joint Chiefs in its present form. The existing structure does impede planning, for each of the Services quite naturally wishes a piece of the action in any crisis—and the existing structure assures that all will somehow be fitted in, even if a Service provides less than optimal forces for dealing with with that particular crisis. Coherence would also be enhanced by making the Joint Staff responsive to the Chairman rather than to a five-sided executive.

Continuity is also essential, and would be enhanced by the responsivenes of the Staff to the Chairman and by the provision of a Deputy Chairman. If the Chairman happens to be out of town during a crisis, as was the case in the Mayaguez incident, the acting Chairman, quite naturally, tends to lean on his own service staff. That causes a fair amount of turmoil in the system. The provision of a Deputy Chairman would eliminate that risk. Let me observe in passing, however, that to deal with possible protocol problems that the Deputy Chairman should be ranked sixth in order of procedence—although he would be empowered to act in the Chairman's name in his absence.

Above all, we must seek greater continuity. A less-than-ideal plan, vigorously executed, is better than endless debate.

Mr. Chairman, in so brief a compass I must pass on to other matters and cannot go into further detail. You have raised questions regarding the structuring of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At this juncture I should make one preliminary point. The OSD should not be a problem in crisis management—and, in this regard, may represent something of a red herring. A wise Secretary of Defense will turn for crisis management involving military forces primarily to the uniformed military. That is their professional responsibility. All those civilian engineers, scientists, systems analysts, logisticians and the like, who aspire to be field marshalls, should be gently cut out of the process during the handling of the immediate crisis. The principal exception of course will be International Security Affairs which may play an indispensable role in establishing the political dimensions for the engagement. This last, I might say in passing, is the principal responsibility of the Secretary of Defense—acting in behalf of the President—within the Department. The establishment of political guidelines is of major, potentially crucial, importance. It is not a subject to which the professional military are generally sensitive.

The Office of the Secretary has grown substantially and has sometimes strayed beyond the appropriate boundaries of its authority. By and large, however, the growth of that Office is a reflection of the weaknesses of the military command system. The Office of the Secretary has provided the analyses cutting across service lines, which the Joint Chiefs cannot now provide. It has provided the principal means for reducing military "requirements" to the levels of expenditures supported by the national consensus. Somebody must perform this task. If the Chairman's responsibility for cross-cutting advice is expanded, the analytical arms of the OSD should be made available to him. Yet, until such time that the uniformed military establishment is better structured to perform these tasks, criticisms of the OSD staff should be tempered.

The activities of the OSD have expanded quite naturally. Much of the formulative thinking regarding nuclear strategy and arms control have come up from outside of the uniformed military establishment. It was natural that these matters increasingly were absorbed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. But activities continue to expand. Some were justified—for example, the planning-programming-budgeting system introduced by Secretary McNamara, which remains his greatest achievement. But, without question, the OSD staff has occasionally, though too frequently, become involved with micro-management within the individual Services. That seems to me to exceed the appropriate responsibilities of that staff.

It must firmly be borne in mind, however, that many of the problems of the OSD come from outside. The growth of the staff reflects the enormous increase in the interest and power of outside entities. There must be continued responses to members of Congress, to congressional staffs, to the General Accounting Office—all of which have expanded exponentially—as well as to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to such older institutions with expanded powers like the Department of State and the Office of Management and Budget. If one is concerned about the size of the OSD staff, the initial place to start is probably outside.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I have provided sufficient substance for the committee to chew on. I have not gone into the awesome question of roles and missions, a subject fraught with even greater difficulty—and one which is perhaps best left alone at this time.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with one final observation: at the outset, I suggested that structural reform was no panacea, although it could provide for an unleashing of imagination and energy within the military establishment now unduly constrained. An improved process for decisionmaking is not a substitute for trained and ready forces, for high morale, for appropriate logistical support and the like. Nonetheless, an improved structure for decisionmaking will permit, though it cannot guarantee the enhancement of the effectiveness of this Nation's military forces. In a political democracy, Mr. Chairman, unlike some totalitarian states, we must always be seeking ways of balancing the requirements for our military forces against the requirements of a flourishing civilian sector. I trust, Mr. Chairman, that this committee's deliberations will contribute to the achievement of that goal of a better balance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should be delighted to answer any questions that you or other members of the committee may have.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, structural reform is no panacea. One should not exaggerate what structural reform can do for the Department of Defense. It is not a substitute for political leadership. The political leadership has created many of the problems that appear to exist within the Department of Defense.

So, I start off with this in the way of admonitions. We deal with a system that is political and democratic. It is not a business organization. Because it is a political system and a democratic system, it will be subject to certain inefficiencies that can be criticized, but these are generally inefficiencies that we want to retain.

We would not want the Department of Defense to operate in the same efficient ways as a business organization. We want it to be responsive to the Congress. We want many people and many groups to have access to the Secretary of Defense.

Americans are great believers, as you know, Mr. Chairman, in organizational charts. But this is a society that is not particularly well suited to be governed by an organization chart because it is cumbersome. In particular, as we design organizational charts, we should avoid creating structures which diverge from the real power within the Department of Defense, a subject that I shall come back to.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, despite these admonitions, I would urge on the committee a view that we could do far better within the Department than we are at the present time through structural reform. What is wrong with the Department at the present time?

The fundamental difficulty, Mr. Chairman, is that the marriage that was intended in 1947 and particularly by the reforms of 1958 remains unconsummated. There is a lacking of the spirit of unification within the Department and this is reflected, I think, in some of the institutional problems.

The JCS represents that most serious of these problems. The time honored doctrine of unity of command is ignored within the JCS system. What we have in the JCS, Mr. Chairman, is a multiple executive. A multiple executive lacks certain advantages in clarity and quickness of decision.

Congress is familiar with the notion of a multiple executive. It leads, as we know, to log rolling, back scratching, to all of those things that contribute to the formulation of national policy.

Nonetheless, it is a poor way to formulate military decisions and particularly military decisions under conditions of emergency. What we have created in the JCS is not an institution in which one group, one service, has a veto. That service can be overridden.

But we have created a kind of House of Lords in which the House of Lords has the power to delay decisions, and delay frequently is adverse to the interests of the Nation.

The other major problem that I wanted to specify is that of the Unified Commands. Here, once again, the spirit of unification has not been fully achieved and the unified commander does not have the authority either in relation to the Component Commands or to his responsibilities in case of emergency that we wish and, consequently, I think that we should change the authorities within the Unified and Specified Commands.

There are three areas which you and Senator Nunn, Mr. Chairman, have asked both of us to concentrate on. Let me say with regard to changes that we are engaged in a delicate process of adjusting the balance of power within the Department of Defense.

Therefore, it is my judgment that the changes should be evolutionary. Even modest adjustments, given the logjam that has existed within the JCS system in the past, can bring substantial improvements.

With respect to the JCS, I would strengthen the Chairman's position. I would have certain nominal legal changes making the Chairman the principal military adviser to the President and to the Secretary of Defense.

I would have the Joint Staff report to the Chairman and I, myself, would favor the creation of a new post of Deputy Chairman for purposes of continuity.

Second, with regard to the Unified Commands, some of the problems will fall away if we strengthen the role of the JCS Chairman. He would act for, and in behalf of, as the voice of the unified commanders and in that way some of the problems that we now see between the unified commander and the commanders of the Component Commands would fall away.

But we must recognize that we are attempting with the Unified Commands to do something that perhaps is of less relevance than when the system was set up in the 1940's. What we expect, in fact, is that the component commanders will retain authority up until the time the Nation goes to war; that when the balloon goes up, the authority shall at that moment be transferred to the Unified Command.

But the Nation has not been engaged in a formal war since the time of this legislation. The emergencies that come up come up quickly and we do not have time enough to shift authority within the Unified Commands. Even if we went to war in the way that was anticipated, it would be a war of lightning decisions and we would not have the long period for the establishment of relationships between the unified and component commanders. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I strongly think that the balance should be shifted so that the unified commander can indeed direct the forces under his command to a greater extent.

Third, with regard to the Secretary of Defense's Office, as I have indicated earlier, they are sometimes used in an analogy to business firms. I think this is a poor analogy.

The span of control of the Secretary of Defense inevitably will be far wider than that of a senior business executive. We want more people to have access to him. Indeed probably 535 Members of Congress believe that they should, if they so desire, be able to call up the Secretary of Defense. I use that for purpose of illustration.

I think it is desirable for the Congress to cease organizing the work of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. When I was Secretary of Defense I had two new Assistant Secretaries dumped upon me to respond to constituency groups. I saw them relatively little, but I think that the office would have been better off if they had not been imposed upon the Secretary.

I believe it is important for the Secretary's Office to be organized more in terms of missions than is the case today. At this time we have an organization which is directed primarily toward function. That will require the cooperation of the Congress.

It will require the cooperation of the Congress more than simply encouraging the Secretary of Defense to move in that direction. It will require the Congress to focus on mission. If the Congress focuses on detail, line-item detail, for example, the nature of the Department of Defense in the Pentagon will be to respond in terms of detail.

Trees are beautiful, individual trees are beautiful. A forest is very hard to conceive. Although I sympathize with the notion of moving toward greater mission orientation, I want to stress how difficult it is in an organization to do that. That does not mean that we should not try.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the Congress, I do not expect perfection from the Congress of the United States. In the days of the Continental Congress, General Washington was instructed in fine detail as to how he should manage the Continental Army.

I expect to have a great deal of detailed interest, but I would hope that the Congress would recognize the need to provide a standard for the Military Establishment, with an emphasis on mission and restraint with regard to detail.

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to talk about the suggested reforms. I turn first to the staff report. I congratulate the staff. I think that the staff has put together an excellent report and we are all in its debt. It highlights issues, it gives the history.

I, myself, fall off on some of the recommendations of the staff. I urged upon you earlier that the problem of reform within the Department is a delicate rebalancing of powers within the Department.

I would not, Mr. Chairman, disestablish the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would, as I indicated earlier, strengthen somewhat the role of the Chairman. I would not create an advisory committee of senior military officers. I think that that would be confusing and it would not reflect the true sources of power within the Department of Defense.

One must have the services engaged in the military missions of the United States. To create a separate body of military advisers, I think, would detract from the most effective functioning of the Department.

Mr. Chairman, on the other side of the Congress the bill by Mr. Aspin and others has been proposed. I have endorsed that bill. There are a number of aspects that I worry about, but in general I think that that bill goes in the right direction.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, you are engaged, as I indicated in my initial comments, on a very delicate task. It is one that is historically overdue. I trust you will not be put off by the rhetoric you will hear. You will hear historical analogies about the German general staff.

If the burning of Washington were more recent in our memories than it is, you would hear threats that if you change the balance of power within the Pentagon, some foreign naval power will sail up the Potomac and burn Washington again or move into New Orleans.

These historical metaphors, I think, are quite irrelevant to our present circumstances.

You will hear economic metaphors about the need for competition amongst the services. I stress that that is what economists would call competition amongst the few with a very, very high degree of recognition of mutual dependence amongst the services. That is the problem that we must seek to rectify.

Reform can improve things enormously, Mr. Chairman. It does not have to be radical reform, but simple reform is needed and needed now.

Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome the witnesses. They have already played a very significant role in the defense of this Nation and our national security as Secretaries of Defense in different administrations. They have testified on reorganization before.

I believe the first time we had hearings a couple years ago under Senator Tower both witnesses testified. Both of them participated in our weekend seminar down at Fort A.P. Hill.

So, we are delighted to have them. I am pleased to join you in welcoming them.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Secretary Brown.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for inviting me to appear before you today.

I have a short prepared statement that I will run through quickly.

My detailed reasoning and views on the subject of the Defense Department reorganization and various components are generally well known. In fact, I have devoted a couple of chapters in my book "Thinking About National Security," to them. In fact, at the earlier hearings of this committee I submitted them and would indeed like to see them reproduced at this point in the record. [See appendix, p. 249.] I will accordingly confine my brief prepared statement to my current conclusions on these matters and a couple of specific points.

Most of those points have emerged from consideration of the very useful, though not infallible, staff report to this committee on the subject and consideration of H.R. 3622, the bill to which Secretary Schlesinger referred, and also from recent discussions among and statements by Senators, former senior civilian and military officials and scholars on the subject.

My own view is that the organization of the Defense Department does need major revision. When President Eisenhower along with the congressional leadership at that time, particularly that of this committee and the corresponding committee of the other body, reorganized the Defense Department in 1958, he had some goals in mind.

Those goals are far from having been fully achieved. They include unified planning and execution of military oprations, a smooth, efficient and effective process of strategy, planning, programming, and budgeting or as smooth and efficient as is achievable and reasonable in a democratic society, and centralized decisions on force structure to support that strategy and on development and procurement priorities, but decentralized authority and responsibility for execution of such decisions.

The structure and function of the JCS and of the CINCs, unified and specified commanders and the relationship between them need revision.

The relationship between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the military departments, their structure and to some degree that of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, also need revision, although I think not so drastically.

So does the congressional funding and oversight process and its relationship with the executive branch. Since presumably Congress will want to devote separate attention to putting its own Houses in order I will concentrate on the first two pairs of relationships.

Turning first to the JCS functions: in my judgment, the best solution if we were starting the world over again would be the creation of a combined military staff directed by a Chief of Military Staff with a Deputy from the other pair of the services—if Army or Air Force, the Deputy should be Navy or Marine Corps, and vice versa.

The service Chiefs would retain their service functions, but would not have responsibility for such combined activity. The Chief of Military Staff would be the principal military adviser to the National Command Authority and the National Security Council.

That would include political-military advice, for example, on military deployments, on arms control, and so forth. He would use a combined military staff to develop those positions.

He and his staff would also be responsible for creating operational plans. For that purpose they would use inputs from the unified and specified commanders and they would combine and prioritize those claims on limited overall military resources, because there will be contingencies more often than not involving simultaneous operations by the forces of two or more CINCs.

The Chief of Military Staff would also present advice on force structures and programs corresponding to several alternative budgetary and programmatic levels so that there would be a place short of the civilians in the Defense Department where priorities could be weighed in the light of realistic financial constraints.

Service Chiefs would continue to exist. They would give advice when requested by the President or the Defense Secretary. Indeed, they could volunteer such advice, although that process ought to be self-limiting since an intention to deliver advice on all subjects of whatever degree of importance would generate a corresponding reduced level of attention to that advice.

The service Chiefs would, as now, submit proposed programs and budgets through the military department Secretaries.

One argument comes to my attention in this connection that needs to be addressed. That is, it is important to keep the Chiefs of service active and influential in the joint arena because if the reasons we give for jointness in planning and operation are very important, the service Chiefs need to be reminded of that importance by being involved in the process. In their consideration of training, equipment, procurement, and so forth, which would remain their responsibility, they then would be more inclined to include jointness as a criterion. The same argument is made about their Deputy Chiefs for Operation in the services. It is noted that jointness is important at the lower organizational level in the services, squadron and brigade level.

I think there is some validity to that argument and I certainly respect the former Chief of Staff who urged it upon me, but I also note it is not how the present arrangement works in practice. Various attempts to fix it within the present system have not made it work much better. Indeed, to some extent, the argument is like saying the foxes should be given a say in the chicken coop so that they will learn to respect the chickens' point of view.

I do accept that with the organizational arrangements I propose there arises a need to find a substitute for the Chiefs of service present participation in the joint arena for all the purposes described in that argument. That is so even if it is a substitute for something that does not exist now, but ought to exist.

My view is that such a function should be carried out by a combination of the unified and specified commanders and the Chief of the Military Staff and that should include planning, direction, and execution of joint training and exercises. Those are now skimped in part because a service Chief, given the choice between whether to spend money on joint training or service training, will pick the latter. It should include determination of the needs for equipment compatability, and directing actions to ensure that compatability. It should include recommendations to the Secretary of Defense about force structure and it should include the planning of military operations and contingencies.

For that purpose the unified and specified commanders should provide the first cut. It should then be reviewed by the Combined Military Staff and the Chief of Military Staff to ensure compatability of such plans with each other, with national policy and with resource constraints. Of course, the Chief of the Military Staff and the Combined Military Staff should be responsible for seeing that such plans to be carried out by the unified and specified commanders on the direction of the National Command Authority as the President and Secretary of Defense transmit it through the Chief of Military Staff.

I want to endorse what the staff committee report says and what Secretary Schlesinger says about the need to strengthen the position of the unified and specified commanders within their own commands. This should ensure that they do not, for example, have to convey orders only through their component commanders. It should ensure that they can organize a task force at whatever level of advice is appropriate, using whatever units are assigned to their command.

Let me point out that even if the Chiefs of service are not members of a joint body, the Chief of Military Staff could call on them for advice on any of these matters.

I have thought about the suggestion in the staff report to the committee, for a Statutory Advisory Board of four-star officers from each service on their last tour of duty, but without service duties. General Meyer also recommended that. The idea has appeal, but on balance, I now conclude it should not be implemented. The potential of its forming another layer, of becoming a service lobby, is increased if it is statutory. The Chairman now or the Chief of Military Staff in my proposal can call on recently retired officers for that purpose, for example, and can also call on the Chiefs of service. If legislation were such as to allow two more four-star officers on the Combined Military Staff in addition to the Chief and his Deputy, they would serve the same purpose.

The Secretary of Defense's Office ought to be organized by the Secretary of Defense. I think the way the Congress ought to act on this is to allot 3 or 4 Under Secretaries and 8 or 10 Assistant Secretaries and let the Secretary of Defense decide the organization.

I do agree with the staff study that the process should be more oriented toward program or mission objectives, that is, strategic forces, NATO, East Asia, Southwest Asia, force projection, maritime superiority—not only toward the traditional staff functions. You cannot abolish those latter functions, however. Somebody has to do them.

But I do not think the orientation toward mission objectives is best achieved by replacing the Director of Program Assessment and Evaluation with three Under Secretaries of Defense or even with three Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

The unified and specified commanders already play a role in organizing the Defense Department for program objectives and the CINCs' activities and perspectives fall better into the program objective compartments than do those of a headquarters staff. It might under some circumstances make sense to have representatives of the CINC's in Washington attached to the Joint Staff or the combined military staff. And in the Secretary of Defense's Office I think there is also a role for a NATO adviser or strategic forces adviser, and so forth. When I was Secretary, I, in effect, had a person in each of those roles, although not with the formal authority of an Under Secretary. But, in any event, I think each Secretary of Defense will want to organize in a different way. It depends on the individual style as well as the current needs and, unfortunately, also the current fashions. I have one or two favorites among the the alternatives that the staff study sets forth, but I am not the Secretary of Defense. I do think that the Congress could usefully press the Secretary of Defense to organize his office with greater attention to mission objectives. The four services surely and the three military departments probably serve a useful function. For all sorts of reasons the services should remain and unifying them in a single service would be a mistake.

Among his mistakes, President Truman, a great President, suggested that the U.S. Marine Corps be abolished. That is moreover, not a good idea. The military department Secretary is useful, in insulating the uniform military to a degree from outside political influences.

He can also be a useful intermediary justifying the ways of the National Command Authority to the Chiefs of Service. But if the military department Secretary becomes a mere mouthpiece distorting or even amplifying the views of the professional military, the role can become a disruptive one. I think that the military staffs and civilian staffs in the military departments should be combined quite substantially, if not entirely, just as I believe the Combined Military Staff (or in the present situation the Joint Staff) should be recognized as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

That would reinforce the creations of a combined military staff in encouraging the Secretary of Defense to make more use of the inputs of senior professional offices on the military components of decisions on force structure and resource and of political-military decisions.

Those are now respectively largely the province of program analysis and evaluation and of the policy complex in OSD. In other words, you have civilians giving to a substantial degree the military component of advice in these matters. It really should not be that way. But it will be that way so long as the professional military are not organized so that they can give clear, timely responsive advice.

In connection with the organization of the military departments, I think it would be useful to clean out the underbrush of legislative provisions that could be construed to imply an independent authority, independent of the Secretary of Defense, for military department Secretaries or service Chiefs, though such a legitimization of insubordination may be painful for the Congress to contemplate.

What I have in mind is that if this is not done, some military department Secretary someday may find a lawyer or even an ex-Federal judge to opine that the National Security Act, as amended, despite what its framers, proponents, and practitioners have thought for 37, 32, or 36 or 38 years, does not really put the Secretary of Defense in charge of the Department of Defense.

I would caution the Congress not to expect any of the changes I have outlined to solve most of the problems of inefficient procurement, $600 toilet seats, and so forth. That will take some separate actions painful to contractors, to defense officials, and to the Members of Congress.

The procurement process still belongs principally with the military departments. To improve it will require changes in the processes of program management, of establishing military requirements for systems, and for contracting. But the organizational changes I have outlined would significantly reduce duplication, ineffective performance, and noncompatability of forces and equipment. Those changes could substantially reduce overspecification of performance in the requirements process. In other words, we now overspecify performance. That causes much of the overrun problem. That overspecification of performance is at least in part the result of the way the Department is organized.

I should add that there is a lot more waste in the practice I have described, noncompatability of forces and equipment, duplication, ineffective performance, than there is in the items that grab the headlines. Not that the items that grab the headlines are less than unconscionable and do not need to be fixed; they are and do. But they are a smaller amount of waste than what I described.

With respect to the Congress, I favor a biennial authorization and appropriation process. Apparently the Congress does, too, for the Department of Defense, but not for itself.

The Congress does require 2-year commitments from the Department, but does not bind or even constrain itself as to how it will act the following year.

It would, I think, also be wise to reduce the present hundreds of line items for authorization and appropriation to a couple of dozen.

When I first came to Washington 25 years ago, there were only a couple of dozen line items. The system worked better then. But I am not naive enough to expect such a change very soon. Indeed, the political will to go anywhere near as far as I suggest in the Defense Department reorganization may well not exist. It is a delicate mechanism. Secretary Schlesinger is right, it should not be carelessly tinkered with.

I think that the situation I have described is the right thing to move toward. But if such sweeping revisions are not feasible—and of that you are a much better judge than I could possibly be—a step corresponding to the suggestions of Gen. David Jones or to the thrust embodied in H.R. 3622 reported out by the House Armed Services Committee on the 29th of October, with which I have differences in detail, but whose thrust I support, a step of that sort would be a modest but useful contribution to national security.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We are going to try something a little different today. We are going to start the questioning in reverse order.

Senator Cohen, you will be the first man.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

Secretary Schlesinger, I thought it was interesting you submitted your testimony of 2 years ago and it has stood the test of time. It is almost a violation of the rule of perpetuity that you are allowed to do that.

I would like to raise a couple issues with you. Secretary Brown has said it is important that the JCS provide advice in a clear, timely, and responsive way.

Was it your experience when you were Secretary of Defense that the JCS provided you with advice that was clear, timely, and responsive?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. There are two kinds of advice coming up from the JCS.

One is formal documents. I think that those formal documents directly are unread, largely concerned with budget, strategic, or total force objectives and the like. That is a case of back scratching, by and large.

The Secretary of Defense is sometimes rebuked for not reading those documents. In my brief inquiry of members of the JCS, the members of the JCS do not read those documents either.

On the other hand, if one gets into an emergency, one must turn to the military and, indeed, as I said in my original statement, keep all of the self-proclaimed field marshals out of the activity, the JCS can put together and plan very quickly. In most cases it is an effective plan.

Therefore, I think in regard to military operations the advice is quick and timely. I think it can still be improved by restructuring.

With regard to budget issues, those are longer term issues in which the interests of the services are deeply involved. They understand the implicit competition and they understand even more clearly the benefits of recognition of mutual dependence.

Senator COHEN. Last week Secretary Weinberger testified that the only reformers are those who are no longer in the service. In other words, the implication is "Where were they when the country needed them?"

I was wondering if you would comment on the dynamics of this situation? Why does talk of reform have to wait until people leave the uniformed services?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. In the first place, I do not think that is the case. I think if one talks quietly to senior military figures in the Pentagon, that they normally are in favor of some reform while they are there.

Whether or not the investment of political capital for that individual or for a group within the Pentagon is likely to bear fruit and, therefore, invest that capital is another question.

But David Jones, for example, who kicked off this current interest in military reform, did so while he was still Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He did it at the end of his career because he knew, as everyone else has known, that one must strengthen the Chairman and he did not want to seem to be operating to strengthen his own office while he was there. That is a different and I think commendable motivation.

I have noted during Secretary Weinberger's tenure that there is less expression of interest in reform of the Military Establishment. But I think that that may reflect the pressures coming from the Secretary's Office at the present time.

Senator COHEN. Secretary Brown, would you address yourself to the question of turbulence within the Joint Staff?

What we have read in the staff report is that there is a rapid turnover with very little incentive for qualified officers to either join or remain on the Joint Staff.

We found, for example, that even though it was testified to last week that we cured that problem, that 9 out of the 12 top positions in the Joint Staff are new as of this year and that no senior officer who was present during the Grenada operation is currently on the Joint Staff.

That was dismissed as being not a terribly significant factor, but it seemed to me to indicate that turbulence remains.

Secretary **Brown**. Those facts do speak for themselves. The reason for turbulence is partly Department of Defense-wide. There are pressures to move people, especially reasonably senior people, general and flag officers and also colonels and captains, around rather rapidly to fill slots. Changes cascade; when one slot changes, another has to change to fill it, and so forth.

But I think there is an extra dimension in the question of service on the Joint Staff. It is not a terribly popular assignment. Promotions, after all, are made in the service and not jointly. Joint service is not viewed very highly. Consider the very best officers I have seen—for example, officers in the National War College who are, by and large, the best there are. When time comes for their assignments, those who are assigned to the Joint Staff are not happy about it because it is not a way to get ahead in the service.

Similarly, when something turns up outside the Joint Staff, and they are on it, they are quite happy to leave. That encourages turnover. Turnover in what should be the principal planning and operations center of the military establishments is not conducive to good performance.

That is true at the 05 and 06 level. It is equally true at the three-star level where the most senior people on the Joint Staff are. They are almost never there as long as 2 years, which is rather ridiculous. The services clearly do not believe that should be the situation in their most important jobs because they have prevailed upon the Congress to establish a 4-year term for the Chief of service.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you.

Chairman **Goldwater**. You made a very brief reference to the Marine Corps. It reminded me of one morning I was having breakfast with the Joint Chiefs and before I went to the meeting, I received a letter from a cousin of mine who for many, many years was president of the West Point Association. He advocated doing away with the Marine Corps.

I took the letter over and read it at breakfast. I was lucky to get out of the Pentagon alive.

We still have a Marine Corps, though. John?

Senator **Glenn**. That just proves that not all the Goldwaters are as brilliant as our chairman.

I have a couple of questions here. One of the major problems identified by the committee report was that the Secretary of Defense has, and I quote, "insufficient power and influence." The study further states that:

> The major reason for this is that the Secretary is confronted with powerful institutional forces including service Chiefs who vote against prenegotiated big key issues.

Do you agree with this finding, either or both of you, and do you think the Secretary's Office itself needs to be strengthened in its own control over the Department?

Do you feel that is true, that the Office of the Secretary, itself, needs to be strengthened and would changing the JCS organization enhance that or make it work?

Secretary **Brown**. I think, Senator Glenn, that the Secretary of Defense probably has more control over his Department than any other Cabinet officer. That is partly because despite these institutional pressures—which I agree exist and are not hopeful—there remains a degree of military discipline in the U.S. Armed Forces.

So that I would not, for example, try to excuse any of my failures, of which I remember many and of which undoubtedly you can provide me with many additional examples, as a consequence of my lack of authority.

I do believe that the structure has too much friction in it. This results from legislation, but even more from the current practice that has been built up. It requires the Secretary of Defense, he wants to get something done, to use up too much of his time, too much of his authority, too much of his political capital. That should be changed.

As you see, there is a subtle difference between not having enough power and being inhibited in the use of it because you have to pay too high a price in time or in political capital.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that Dr. Brown has covered the main point which is that there is all the formal authority in the office that one could wish.

As Secretary McNamara once observed, one can only slay so many dragons each day. He was perhaps more ambitious than other Secretaries of Defense who were satisfied to get one a month or perhaps one during the entire tenure. But it is as Dr. Brown indicates, the investment of political capital. There are too many fights that are not worth taking on.

This is driven in part by the dead weight of the past. One has to keep a harmonious department. One does not want to have an outbreak of the kinds of frictions that existed between the Navy and the Air Force in the late forties. Maintaining harmony in the Department is one of the jobs of directing the Department.

So, I do not think that strengthening of the office is necessary. Both Harold and I have urged that the JCS Chairman be strengthened and that the strengthening of the role of the JCS by improving military advice might in some way dilute the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

That is a possibility, but I think that it is a risk that we would wisely take because strengthening the performance of the JCS will strengthen the Department overall and make the Secretary's task easier even though to some extent there is a different source of power within the Department than the Secretary himself.

So that I think on balance, despite the risks you point to, that strengthening of the JCS is desirable even for the Secretary of Defense.

Senator GLENN. I have been concerned that we tend to concentrate all the time on what is at the top. Yet what we are all about is what happens in combat, out there in the field.

I sometimes think we should do our staff studies by starting at that end in the field and working up with what the organization should be to support the people out there shooting and getting shot at instead of starting the other way around with some grandiose scheme at the top and not paying much attention to what happens at the bottom.

I was interested in both of your comments on strategic matters. Secretary Brown, you made a point of that on page 5 of your testimony, that strategic matters should be brought into this issue.

I have been concerned for a long time that we tend too often in defense to go off and buy what weapons systems looks good at the moment and not consider what is really needed in NATO, the Far East, or whatever, and setting up our weapons systems to support what our strategic goals really are in the foreseeable future for the next 20 or 25 years as best we can outline them.

That will be a moving target as you go along. It may need some changing as we proceed. We have some seven treaties that align us with 42 nations, including Cuba and Nicaragua, I might add. We have to come to their defense if they are attacked. I do not know that we are giving enough consideration to the strategic matters.

How do you incorporate that into the whole process?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, I think the Secretary of Defense issues planning guidance and I think the Secretary of Defense in dealing with the service Chiefs, with the JCS and the service Secretaries, should see to it that the choices of the military department reflect the planning guidance which presumably is an embodiment of national strategy.

Secretary BROWN. There are really two pieces to this problem. The long-term planning, planning for 5 years from now, 10 years from now, I think really has to begin at the center. It should be done by the Joint Staff or a successor organization together with the rest of the Office of the Secretary of Defense which really has to feed in the national strategy not merely the military strategy. It has to feed in the economic, diplomatic, and political factors.

The unified and specified commanders, on the other hand, are the people who have to make up the actual combat plans and whose perspective will generally be shorter. They are looking at how ready we are now, how would I fight this year, next year, and so forth.

I think it is probably too much to ask of them, even though there are some very unusually capable individuals among them, to provide the 10-year perspective or the national political perspective.

So, I think it is in terms of plans both a top-down and bottom-up process.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, your comments on going up from the field I think is a comment wisely taken on the part of all of us. It is necessary to look at the delicate balancing of powers within the Pentagon to see to it that the field is not shut out.

I do not believe that we have the luxury of a radical remaking of the Department of Defense. If one looks at the Department of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force has no role to play when a decision is made to execute an operation such as the airlift to the Middle East.

But everybody who knows how the Department of Defense operates knows that the head of the Specified Command, which is part of the Air Force, will turn to the Air Force Chief when a command comes from him and to ignore the fact that the elements of the service look to the Chief is something that we ought not to do in any reform program, that we must look at the way the powers are balanced within the Department and not attempt radically to change.

Senator GLENN. My time is up, Mr. Chairman, but just one other thing here.

One of the proposals has been to make an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning. Maybe we can get a yes or no.

Do you favor that or not?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We both indicated, I think, that we would favor letting the Secretary of Defense decide.

Secretary BROWN. Some Secretaries of Defense may want one and some not. I think that is something that ought to be left for them.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Those are excellent questions.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to shift the subject to procurement. Procurement is probably the political problem that is driving a lot of legislation and a lot of the interest up here.

As a matter of fact, we passed quite a bit of legislation, small business, spare parts, CICA, two major reforms on the Defense authorization bill.

In oversight hearings we have had people say generally the thrust of competition and dual sourcing and things of that sort are right, but what has happened is that we have gotten into a situation where the Congress has created legislation in response to problems, perceived problems or real problems, and I think many times real problems as well as perceived problems.

DOD now has taken a situation where all these so-called horror stories are never going to happen again, no more ashtrays, no more toilet seats, no more nothing. They have an environment where there is going to be a risk free, there is not going to be any risk, a zero-risk mentality.

What we have now is a situation where we have an unbelievable amount of regulations and interpretations of all this legislation that is getting down to the program manager and contracting officer simply taken by these types of things.

Now, the political fact of life is that there is still going to be an interest in doing something about procurement reform. That is the politics of it. You all know that. We deal with it day in and day out.

Since we have had this issue out there and the Packard Commission is working on procurement first and military reorganization next, what I am trying to do is to get the debate sort of out of the area of minor—I do not like to use the word micromanagement because this legislation was not micromanagement, it was a general thrust—but get it out of that area into some macro-type of approach in the area of procurement so that we could refocus the debate and say, OK, we have a problem and we have a situation, so let us take this political situation out and use it to our best advantage and come up with something that will be meaningful and lasting in the area of procurement reform.

Now help us get out of this hungered-down mentality, seige-type mentality, where nobody is going to get blamed, everybody is going to cover you know what.

Are there some big things that we could focus on in the area of procurement?

It has been suggested as an alternative personnel service, particularly civil service may be, particularly with the new technology that is coming on and requirement for engineers and things like that, we ought to take a major look at that.

There is always the argument, and I would like a comment on the idea, it ought to be more centralized in DOD or more decentralized.

Do we want line authority for that program manager in OSD or should we leave it with the service Secretaries?

Could you help us along on this thing and look at the big picture?

As you look at the big picture, where should we go?

Secretary BROWN. I think you have encapsulated the problem very well, Senator Quayle. Of course, the solution is not easy or else we would have found it and executed it a long time ago. I think you have to begin with the requirements process and the budgeting process because that is where I think many of the problems begin.

If you look at the way things are done now and have been done increasingly as a result of Defense Department actions and congressional attention over the past 20 years, what happens when a new weapon system is begun is as follows. In order to get it approved, in order to get it approved by the Secretary of Defense, but first within the service or military department, system's abilities are oversold, its performance is overadvertised.

It needs to be a revolutionary breakthrough. That means that very big steps get taken, which I think sometimes make sense, but they are certainly overpromised.

Moreover, they are promised at much lower cost than is realistic. Why? Because in order to get into the budget, even in the recently past 7 fat years and more so as we come into the 7 lean years, you have to persuade the decisionmakers that it is not really going to cost very much.

OK, you start with that. It gets approved and it goes into the POM and it goes into the budget and Congress approves the program. Then it goes forward. You establish a program manager who immediately finds out that the program is undercosted and overpromised, but he is not going to bring the bad news because if he does, the program will be canceled before it gets off the ground and he'll be out of a job.

It goes out for contract. They are under exactly the same pressures. They buy in, they lie in, and this now gets incorporated into a requirements document. You have an interaction between the contractor and the operators, one of whom wants to promise the world and the other one wants the world.

The program manager gets caught in between. He has often less influence than either the operator, the potential user, who sometimes knows enough to know that the promises are not sensible, but more often does not, or the contractor who wants to have a good solid—and big—program. The way to have a solid program is make it such that the promise is unbearably attractive to the potential user.

So, you have a reinforcement of the first process. The process that was gone through in getting the program approved is reinforced during the initial contracting procedure.

Moreover, you establish, aside from the program manager, who unfortunately does not have full control of his budget, a separate process. His budget gets massaged on the way up and then gets massacred in the Congress, so he does not know how much money he is going to have. But he has been locked into a promise of how much the program is going to cost and he has been locked into a schedule and locked into a performance.

Now, under congressional pressure the Secretary of Defense establishes a separate office of reliability or maintainability, or whatever, all of which are very important things. The people who are put in charge of those offices do not have to come up with the money, they are there to see that some particular piece of the set of requirements is met, no matter what the cost to other parts of the set up requirements, or to the taxpayer. If it looks as though their price is not going to be met, they scream and there is a scandal. So that these numbers, whether performance or cost or reliability or maintenance cost, and so forth, that were established independent of each other at the beginning, but which are mutually incompatible, are locked in with a separate constituency now and the program manager is really up a tree.

Then, of course, the scandal starts because there is a reporting requirement now. The Congress, I guess 8 or 10 years ago, insisted on institutionalizing a semiannual reports of costs and overruns—without substracting inflation—so that the scandal would be elevated into public view. Of course, overruns start, programs get cut back, there is still less money and the vicious circle continues.

This is a great deal worse than an expensive ashtray or a coffeemaker. We are talking about billions of dollars here.

I have described an impossible situation. What do you do about it?

Senator NUNN. The end of it is when Dixon goes out and tries to shoot it. [Laughter.]

Secretary BROWN. What do you do to try to fix this?

I think you have really to start early in the process and you have to go against all the natural tendencies. You have to reduce the number of levels of review in order to make people behave in a more responsible fashion. You have to relieve them from the anxiety of having 10 layers looking over their shoulders all the time. Then you hold them responsible at the end.

How do you do that?

Well, there is a model. It is by no means a perfect model and I am sure the Congress will find scandals in it, too. But the highly classified programs are not run as the bad examples I have described. Now there have gotten to be so many highly classified programs, that there are probably not enough good people to run them.

So, you will have trouble there, too. But in general those programs have demonstrated that if at the beginning you set a dollar limit constraint and say this is how much money there is going to be, now you tell me what you can do in the way of performance and reliability, and so forth, and I am going to hold you to it, and you then do not have a large number of levels of review within the service, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, the Congress, and the press, you will do better, by and large.

You will not do perfectly, but you will do better. That also accords with the memory of those of us who have been around a long time, that 25 and 30 years ago that is how all the programs were run and they did run better.

Senator QUAYLE. My time is up. Do you have a brief comment?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think Harold has described the detailed process very well. The process today is pernicious. We are not going to cure the ailment of this dog by playing around with the tail of the dog.

You have to go in with radical reform if you are going to cure the problem and at the same time retain public support for defense procurement expenditures. It has to be radical reform as opposed, in my judgment at least, to the changing of the MCS system, for example, or reform of the structures within the Pentagon. There are three very simple things:

One, accountability, hold program managers accountable, give them serious power.

At the moment the program manager to whom Harold referred has only one deliverance, if he is permitted to leave before the scandals get too large. [Laughter.]

Then his successor can say, "Then it was all here when I started."

Second, you have to get rid of the paperwork.

Industry will sell the Government paper if the Government wants to buy paper. The industry is now engaged in selling the Government carloads of paper. That is a reflection of the requirements process. It goes on year after year before you start to bend any metal.

Third, you have to reduce these redundant staffs.

That would require radical reform. But it is the way, I think, to cure the problem. In the 1950's we did not take 7 years and have a program specifications before we knew what we were doing. We sent a letter to North American, no longer in existence, saying, "We need a new fighter, please start work, paperwork will follow."

They got to work and within 6 months they had a prototype. Now it is 6 years before you think of building your first aircraft and it is not a prototype. You have already bought all the production machinery which you throw away.

Senator HART. Dr. Schlesinger, I think all those conditions prevailed in World War II, a little more before my time. A Senator named Harry Truman made a political career out of scandals that went on in procurement in World War II.

Maybe you did not have accountability. Certainly you did not have the paperwork. You had direct contracting, all the things you are talking about. Apparently there was fraud all over the place.

Secretary BROWN. What I suggested does not take care of fraud. It does take care of inefficiencies generated by the system. Everything you say is true about the Truman committee, but in World War II we got things done quickly and at a much lower cost than we get it done now.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. This was in the 1950's, Senator. This was after Mr. Truman had left the Senate and after, indeed, he had left the Presidency that we produced the Century series of fighters and we did so by these rough hewn methods.

The important thing is to get to a prototype quickly. If you will go back to the history of the F-5, Northrop Corp. did a study of how much it would have cost them to build an F-5 under Air Force procurement regulations. It was $5 million a copy. They were selling it overseas for $2.5 million a copy because they did not have to go through this paperwork.

But your point on fraud, there is no guarantee against fraud. But even all the systems of control that we have since elaborated to check on the previous ways that people have committed fraud, although not on the imaginative new way of committing fraud, all of those add immensely to the expenditures, but do not eliminate fraud, although they may curtail it.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Next is Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me change the subject a little bit.

Secretary Schlesinger, I recall some testimony you gave to the committee a year or so ago. One question was asked, I am not sure by whom, myself or someone, on what you could tell us about the Secretary of Defense's ability and experience in managing the Department of Defense agencies.

I think your response was you would have to ask someone who had had experience with that. I take it you think there is a serious problem of inability to manage, inability of the Secretary of Defense to manage those agencies or have some effective oversight of what is happening in those agencies.

I would be interested in any thoughts you have on it.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The management of those agencies properly should not come for the most part of the attention of the Secretary of Defense. They should be managed at a lower level within the Department.

The defense agencies would clutter up, it seems to me, the time of the Secretary of Defense who, if the views of the staff are seriously pursued, should be spending a good deal more of his time worrying about mission, as I think is correct, and less about the Defense Logistics Agency and the price of oil and a few things of that sort.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask about one issue that General Meyer discussed yesterday in this testimony. He was pointing out that the service Secretaries have inadequate time to deal with all the jobs loaded on them. Let me just cite you one example that he pointed out.

He said that the Chiefs and their operations Deputies have been totally immersed in recent weeks, and months, in preparing and commenting on options that might be raised at the summit in regard to strategic arms negotiations. This has been a near all-consuming matter, in General Meyer's view.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Service Chiefs, I think, not service Secretaries.

Senator BINGAMAN. Service Chiefs. He pointed out, in his view, this has taken their attention away from the preparation of the 1987 budget and perhaps he does not state, but he implies that perhaps that was not a useful or not the appropriate use of their time.

I would be interested in any comments either of you have as to whether that is a serious problem that we are loading the service Chiefs.

Secretary BROWN. Strategic arms control is a typical political-military function or issue. Properly, I think, it belongs in a centralized, combined military staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or Chief of the military service staff, if you had such a person, would be the obvious person to deal with that question. He would have a combined staff to do it.

My experience of these matters is that when I was Secretary of Defense I thought that the then Joint Chiefs of Staff, were very thoughtful and very helpful and very instructive on matters of arms control. It took an awful lot of their time and my time to achieve that outcome. It seems to me that in my day that is the way it worked, but it took a lot of time and it must take even more time now when, as it seems to me, the Chiefs have been assiduously working on how to avoid taking a position on these matters. That takes even more work. [Laughter.]

But the situation, I think, should be that that is done centrally. If it is done in the services, there will be an overriding consideration—overriding national interest, overriding the virtues or defects, and there are both, in arms control.

It will be what will these various proposals do to the force structure of our service now and in the future? That will take precedence, it will consume an enormous amount of time and although relevant to the national interests, it is not a preeminent input into the national interests.

I think this is a perfect example of a situation in which although the present organization can make things come out right, it is a miracle of creativity if you can get it to do that.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, General Meyer was bored with the amount of time devoted to this issue. It should have been devoted to the budget. It is not really an Army problem, but one Chief's priority is another Chief's bore or waste of time.

Senator Warner will recall that a CNO that operated during his jurisdiction spent much of this time worrying about the SALT problem and worrying about what the President was doing, the Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.

So, General Meyer's priorities will be different from others. It points to the institutional problem, that the Chiefs are forced to sit there hour after hour working over problems that could be more expeditiously dealt with if there was control over the agenda.

At this time if one Chief is interested in START and keeping it on the agenda, that will be it and hours will be devoted to it. I think you need to get away from joint executive as we have it at the present time.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Thurmond has indicated that he has to leave. I will recognize him at this time.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to compliment you gentleman on excellent testimony. I think what you have said this morning has been right in line with what the distinguished chairman and distinguished ranking member are thinking about.

I was talking to a very able military commander, a very high-ranking officer who is retired now several days ago. He has been thinking along the same line here of his project that is being worked upon. It was his idea that the Army and Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps should recruit, train, equip, and have ready the men and women of their services, they would have nothing else to do but that.

Then the unified commander who is responsible for fighting the war, training, and overseeing operation would be a so-called fifth group.

I am wondering if you have thought much about that because right now one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is Chief of Staff of the Army, the same thing for the others. While they are planning this they have to be thinking about the Army and building up the Army and seeing that the budget of the Army is in line with where it ought to be as well as arms control and other things.

Whereas, if we segregate it, give him the one duty that I have said with that service and make him responsible for that and nothing else, and then have a Unified Command to take over. He even went so far to say that when an officier may have reached one-star rank, maybe he ought to go under the supervision of the Unified Command so that he would know from then on if he is going to be a commander, he has got to take an overall view regardless of service with a view to operations in case of war.

I am just wondering if that makes sense to you or what variation you would have from that?

His idea is to relieve the Army Chief of Staff from anything except the duties I specified. The same thing with the other services.

Secretary **Brown**. It seems to me, Senator Thurmond, that is an idealized and extreme form of what President Eisenhower had in mind in 1958. The service should train and equip and procure. All operations should be in the Unified or Specified Commands. The natural consequence of that would be the establishment of a rank, be it one star, or whatever, at or above which everything ought to be thought of in terms of Unified and Specified Commands.

The real world is not that simple. I think you probably cannot arrange that idealized situation in practice. There are situations where a single service does the whole thing. The Navy, if it is sufficiently far at sea and stays away from land and land-based air, and never lands anybody, does have those aspects. I think the Navy does have more independent aspects than the other services.

It is also true there is always going to be a gray area of training. When does training stop being training that is unique to one service and becomes joint?

So, there will be gray areas. I would certainly like to see things move in the direction you described as having been described to you by a senior Army officer, but I doubt that one can go all that way. I would like to see it move in that direction.

My proposal is actually more radical than most in that way, but not quite as radical as the one you described.

Senator **Thurmond**. I might say that his idea is no Chief of the service will be in this Unified Command. In other words, this is all combined command. They would be the ones that determined operations and they would be the ones who make decisions along that line, that the services are there to be for the purposes I specified.

Secretary BROWN. That is how I see the unified and specified commanders and combined military staff. The question is how deep down can you get that together.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, would you care to comment on that?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think I agree to a large extent with Secretary Brown. The proposal makes some sense, but it should be approached, in my judgment, cautiously. We have a tradition, we do not have a luxury of suddenly and radically altering the military establishment of the United States.

I indicated earlier that while I complimented the staff for its excellent work, that I did not go along with some of the recommendations. This is akin to the recommendation to disestablish the JCS as we probably know it. I think that we must recognize that a large part of the capacity or organizations to fight reflects their history, their esprit, their morale.

We do not want to move very far and suddenly in the direction that Canada went a few years ago and the staff was in effect a common service. Esprit must be maintained. The role of a service Chief, which I want to see weakened to some extent—I want to see the Chairman's strengthened, but the role of service Chiefs is a critical role.

He understands he is not only in charge of the training of those forces, but he knows how they will become engaged. He knows if we face the choice of a particular operation, a *Mayaguez,* for example, he knows which of the forces are in a position to move. I do not think that one can wipe that out.

I said earlier that Americans like organizational charts, they like them clear and crisp, but the Military Establishment is very complicated and one should have the organizational chart going along with the realities of power within the Pentagon rather than try to dam them up and contradict them.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my thanks to the former Secretaries for being with us this morning; for their loyalty to the issue here and to their concern for making the Defense Establishment even better.

I would like to talk to you about the question of chain of command, civilian control. You both commented on this on earlier occasions, but I think it is important for the record that we have your comments this morning.

The suggestion, as I understand it, is that we strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we strengthen the Chiefs themselves, give the Chairman more staff, give him a Deputy. At least one of you believes, perhaps both, that we ought to permit the President to authorize the Chairman or the Chiefs to be in the chain of command. We would give the discretion to the command authority to do that, I believe one of you said.

Perhaps I am wrong.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is in the Aspin bill.

Secretary BROWN. I guess my judgment would be that the President really has the authority right now. I think it would be a mistake for him to exercise it.

I think the Chairman or the Chief of military staff should not be in the chain of command. That is, I believe, constitutionally a matter within the President's prerogative.

Senator LEVIN. Should we authorize the President by statute to place the Chairman in the chain of command?

Secretary BROWN. That is not a provision of the House bill that I think has great merit. I think it probably should be out.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I would not. I agree with Secretary Brown.

Senator LEVIN. In terms of civilian control, and I think one of you already this morning has indicated we would give better advice to the Secretary of Defense by having a stronger Chairman—I understand that—is there any possibility at some point that we might also have a too strong Chairman?

Secretary BROWN. It is conceivable. I particulary have worried in the past, although maybe Jim can speak more specifically about it, about the possible problem of too close an association between the Chairman and the Assistant for National Security Affairs in the White House.

That is a way of dividing the Secretary of Defense's authority which I think could be dangerous. However, it is going to exist no matter what the law says.

I would only urge that the law not give it sanction or give it an excuse. I do not think any of the changes that I would favor or Dr. Schlesinger would favor would do that. I think it will always remain a problem of personalities and potential personalities.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, I think it is conceptually possible that one could have too strong a military man, but I do not think it is a practical likelihood. We are pleased in this country with a military that respects, deeply respects, civilian authority.

I think any military man that deviates from that will lose the support and respect of his own colleagues. Amongst the many risks we have, I do not think this is one we need worry about.

Senator LEVIN. I tend to agree with that. I wanted to make sure we had on the record your assessment that strengthening the Chairman, whatever we call him or her, does not make the risk greater or make the risk unacceptable.

Secretary BROWN. I would distinguish between bureaucratic circumvention of the Secretary of Defense, which I think is a risk, and undue military influence or takeover which I think is an imaginary risk. There is no risk of this in the United States.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I must say this about my own observation during one administration, that while there were many who thought they might be circumventing the Secretary of Defense, one has to get up damn early in the morning to circumvent Mel Laird.

Senator LEVIN. He was slaying dragons early in the morning.

One question about the powers of the unified commanders.

Right now, as I understand it, they do not have court-martial authority, personnel authority, much administrative authority.

Would you give them court-martial authority?

Secretary BROWN. That is a detail I have not looked at carefully enough to have an informed opinion. It does seem to me the unified and specified commanders should be able to exercise many of the administrative functions that are now in practice only done through the component commanders; court-martial or even more simply not only court-martial authority, but the authority to replace subordinates which I think he is also missing.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I agree with that. The senior levels of the component command should be made more responsive to the unified commander. The question of court-martial I think could be left for the time being, at least for the time being.

Probably that is a detail that one could certainly leave to the services. I think that is one of the authorities of the services I would be very reluctant to take away.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming these gentleman. It is nice to see both of you this morning with such a mellowed, moderated approach to this tough subject, having been on the short end, both of you, in other circumstances.

Look at the Chairman in his role as adviser to the President and the National Security Council. Should he be a member? Should he be a member with a vote?

Secretary BROWN. There is no such thing as a vote in the NSC. Or rather, there is one vote, the President's vote. The National Security Council is advisory to the President. The President will operate as he sees fit.

I think that it is a mistake to make the Chairman a member of the National Security Council because it implicitly divides the Secretary of Defense's authority. Members of the National Security Council are not subordinate to any other member except the President.

There are, in fact, only four members, President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense. The Chairman is a statutory adviser as is the Director of Central Intelligence. That makes sense to me.

I do not see a good reason to change it. If you do add the Chairman, why do you not also add the Director of Central Intelligence? Why do you not add the Secretary of the Treasury? That has been proposed often as well.

I think there is a distinct difference in the functions of those who now are on the National Security Council and the functions of all those who have been suggested for those positions. I would not change it.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I fully concur. I think that the Chairman represents the professional military as the Director of Central Intelligence presumably reflects the professional intelligence view, that they are advisory and that they should be kept in a special status.

The National Security Council as originaly constructed was constructed the right way. We should be very cautious about further tinkering.

Senator WARNER. A previous panel member specifically recommended that the Chairman of the JCS or in the case of Secretary Brown's recommendation, I think, Chief of the Military, be elevated to a five-star rank.

Senator BROWN. It is a symbol, but it is an interesting symbol. I think since five-star officers serve for life, it means when he left that post, he would still be available and might under those circumstances be usable in the kind of advisory body that General Meyer or others have suggested. I think it is an interesting suggestion.

Senator WARNER. One worth further consideration?

Secretary BROWN. Yes; I do not think it is going to solve a lot of problems. I would have to think about whether it would create some, but I see some adantages.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Schlesinger.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that is right. I would be cautious in moving in that direction, but it deserves further thought.

Senator WARNER. Now, considering the role of Congress, and recognizing the separation of powers with the executive branch, I commend both of you, Secretary Brown and Secretary Schlesinger, for stating that the maximum amount of flexibility should be left to the Secretary of Defense to implement the parameters established by the Congress in accordance with his goals and his methods of operation.

Then turning to the JCS, much of that will require statutory change.

What sort of balance would you suggest that the Congress take, again as the distinguished chairman and ranking minority member of this committee begin to formulate the bill?

How far should we push the Department of Defense in this reorganization, drawing on your comments, Dr. Schlesinger, of investing military capital?

Is it wise that we, the Congress, push and invest that capital rather than have a Secretary of Defense do it?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that a statement by the Congress in this area, Senator Warner, would be invaluable. It would provide a direction for the Secretary of Defense. It would ease the task of the Secretary of Defense in bring changes in this institution.

The Chairman's role can be significantly strengthened by the Secretary acting without new legislation. An individual Chairman can vigorously employ his persuasive powers, as we know, and can achieve much of what should be accomplished.

What we want to do is to change the balance between the Chairman and the service Chiefs in such a way that he does not have to devote all of his time to these endless debates, log rolling, what have you.

If I may add, if the Congress decides to provide a Deputy Chairman, which is a more arguable proposition, that Deputy Chairman can devote a great deal of his time to dealing with the problems of the unified commanders and in that way help strengthen the role of the unified commanders.

At this time the Chairman is so busy with his other responsibilities he can never fully attend to the issues of the unified commanders.

Senator WARNER. In short, the Congress should lay down more definitive rules and guidelines in statutes for the JCS than they should for the Secretary of Defense?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, indeed.

Let me add once again that the Joint Staff should report to the Chairman. One of the reasons that the graduates of the National War College are reluctant to go to the War Staff is not only that they get more brownie points for advancement elsewhere, but because it is a frustrating job.

You spend all your time there arguing with the representatives of other services about service interests that are not going to change very much. If it were a more interesting job, I think we would solve half the problem of recruitment and retention in the Joint Staff.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Brown, do you have any views?

Secretary BROWN. I agree with Secretary Schlesinger.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. I will yield to Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Gentlemen, Senator Glenn made a very important distinction between, as I would phrase it, efficiency in the Defense Department and effectiveness on the battlefield. Obviously, our mandate and your presence has to do with more the former than the latter.

I hope the committee in undertaking these reforms looks at efficiency in the Defense Department as it translates into effectiveness on the battlefield.

How do you make the Joint Staff job more interesting, more important, and translate it more into effectiveness on the battlefield and not less in efficiency, but less in the bureaucracy?

How do we make this system work so that we win battles, particularly with reference to the Joint Staff?

Secretary BROWN. The Joint Staff is going to be involved much more with strategy than with tactics or with leadership on the battlefield, obviously.

The planning function and the concept of operations are the appropriate activities of the Joint Staff. Having them work on that and not working, as Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, only on arguing with representatives of the Chiefs of services in order to get anything done will make the job more interesting to them and attract better people.

If the promotion system is modified so that they get credit for that, that will certainly help as well. The battlefield problems, I think, are in fact largely service problems. Some of them are joint problems, I mean joint doctrine and joint operations those clearly are a matter for the Joint Staff or combined military staff.

But inculcating leadership at the field grade officer level is clearly an appropriate task for the services. I do not think it has to do all that much with the kind of organization in headquarters that we are talking about.

Senator HART. Secretary Weinberger persists in perpetuating a myth that Grenada was a monstrous military victory. There is a thought that says it appeared to be a military catastrophe, primarily caused by, among other things, lack of cooperation among the services, lack of real joint operation.

Does the staff have anything to do with it and should it?

Secretary BROWN. Plans should have been made by the Joint Staff. Now, in that particular case they were given a weekend to do it and that really was not enough time and it was not given to the Joint Staff. If the task is small enough, you do not need the Joint Staff perhaps. But jointness of that sort in a bigger operation where the United States resources might be strained more than they were in Grenada has to be done at headquarters and would be done by the Joint Staff.

Senator HART. Shouldn't those officers be trained in the operational art, not just bureaucrats?

Secretary BROWN. Staff officers who never leave headquarters have, obviously, limitations. I believe that it would be possible to establish a career pattern which would include service in Unified and Specified Commands at a staff level or at a command level, too, and then rotation to the Joint Staff.

That is as feasible in joint operations or joint activities as it now is in unit service activities. A service officer who serves in service headquarters and never in the field has a pretty poor future, too.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, so much of the activities of the Joint Staff are now devoted to formalized paperwork, like the JSOP, arguing about details of the JSOP and, on the other hand, sort of endless trench warfare with regard to the prerogatives of the individual services.

There is too little time to deal with the very significant issues that you point to. I take, for example, the question of contingency plans, contingency plans of the U.S. Government, of the Department of Defense, are notoriously lousy, to coin a phrase. They are notoriously bad.

Why is that? I think in part that in the process of drawing up a contingency plan, if one gets too detailed, one begins to specify the functions of the individual services and, consequently, one gets into very treacherous ground.

Now, what we should do, and I think what your question is pointing toward, is the need for precise and detailed work. We should have had a contingency plan for Grenada that was really quite good by the time we moved into Grenada because from 1981 onward the President of the United States was saying that Grenada was a problem.

When we moved in soldiers later, the intelligence was not notoriously good, nor the contingency plan.

Senator HART. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, gentlemen, welcome.

I do understand that neither of you supports the dissolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? I think that was asked of Secretary Schlesinger.

Secretary BROWN. In writing I have said that my preferred solution would be to replace the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a Chief of military staff and of a combined military staff.

As a practical matter, I think that may not be feasible, at least in the near term. Lacking that, I would support some of these more modest options which I think would be helpful, but I do not think go far enough.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, may I answer?

If we were to start anew without the responsibilities around the world that we have today, we might move in an entirely different direction. But we do not have the luxury of going back to 1947. We must continue to grapple with our worldwide responsibilities and, consequently, I think cautious reform, but serious reform is desired.

Senator DENTON. I must acknowledge my connection with an admiration for Dr. Schlesinger. I just happened to have had occasion to brush past him, but he was the first man I called, when I learned I was elected to the Senate, to ask advice about how to form my staff. I took all the advice he gave. I do want to acknowledge that.

I know I am talking to two men with great experience, and particularly one from whom I have received great advice in many fields.

We seem to have a consensus on the committee generally, and among the witnesses, that we need a stronger Chairman, less influence of the service Chiefs, and more authority in the CINC's.

But there are some complexities General Meyer does recommend doing away with the JCS. I questioned him as I questioned other witnesses, including the current Secretary of Defense, about what is going to happen when you remove the Chiefs of the services from the processes of decision. Because of their responsibilities for training and logistics, they are the only ones who uniquely have intimate knowledge of the readiness and thus of the feasibility of any proposed major operational forces change, of a movement of forces, of a change in strategy.

General Meyer says he does not know exactly what will happen, and that is what worries me.

Would you comment on that?

Secretary BROWN. Let me try to comment on that, Senator Denton, since it is a question that can be addressed to my proposal.

My response is that that is a problem, but the Chiefs of service are not going to be abolished, they are still going to be there.

It seems to me natural that the combined military staff and the Chairman—or the Chief of military staff if you abolish the JCS as such—would still, it seems to me, go to the services—to the Chief of service—and ask about readiness, ask about units, ask about logistics.

But they would not be going hat in hand as they now do. It would alter the balance of authority and responsibility. The information could still flow. The Chairman or the Chief of military staff could still direct, would direct something on the authority of the Secretary of Defense and he would not have to get a vote, which is the way it is now too often done.

He would not require hours and hours of discussion so as to have either a unified position or split position on some of these matters. So, I think it is a legitimate question and the answer would have to be worked out in detail. But it would not be the case that the resources or the knowledge would be abolished. It would still be available, but it would operate in a different way.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, if it ain't broke, don't fix it. In my judgment, the JCS system is not working well today and can be improved. But the role of the service Chiefs in participating in deliberations of the JCS is not broke, as it were, and, therefore, does not need to be corrected.

My initial comments this morning suggested that I am very apprehensive about separating real power that your own question went to and formal authority. The Chiefs even under these reforms, more radical reforms, would have real power, and I want them to be part of the decision process.

I do not think at the present time that the decision process is appropriately balanced because one has a multiple executive and there is too much differentiation of authority. That does not mean that I would like to see other Chiefs eliminated from the process.

I mentioned earlier, in response to a question by Senator Glenn, the 1973 airlift, that anyone who looked at the table of organization of the Department of Defense and thought that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force was not really part of our military operations was in error. He had real power and the military commander of the Military Airlift Command went right to the Chief.

Admiral Moorer, of course, delivered the instructions, but the Chief of the Military Airlift Command asked Joe Brown and Joe Brown has to be part of the process to get the thing working well and getting the enthusiasm of the service behind it.

So, I would be careful about moving in that direction or less inclined to be bold than Secretary Brown.

Secretary BROWN. I think we do have some difference there.

Senator DENTON. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentleman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, this has been useful testimony today. I think it is somewhat historic in that Secretary Brown has coined a new phrase, at least to me, on page 7, "the delegitimization of insubordination." That is new even in Washington. I do not know whether I will remember that one, but I will endeavor to.

I have two or three lines of questions.

Last Thursday Secretary Weinberger testified that the changes that have been made during his tenure have corrected the problems that may have existed in the past, especially in the areas of Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary Brown, do you agree with that assessment?

Secretary BROWN. I would have to say that personalities and personal relations do matter. If you have a Secretary of Defense who is fully seized of all of the details and who is on excellent terms with the Chiefs and if you have a group of Chiefs who are not particularly influenced by service parochialism and if there is enough money to go around, things may work fairly smoothly.

You know better than I whether those conditions now prevail. They may very well. I do know that when I was Secretary of Defense, you did not have a Secretary of Defense who was able to handle these matters perfectly and the Chiefs also had their own flaws.

I found, and I think most of them found—you heard from some of them—that the organizational arrangements did not help matters. We were able to struggle through, perhaps not as easily and as completely as is now done, but we were able to struggle through.

But whatever you think the situation is now, in the future there will be less than perfect occupants of all of those offices and I think one ought, therefore, to attend to the organization.

Senator NUNN. And you do not think that has been done?

Secretary BROWN. No.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Schlesinger.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think General Vessey, who is a man of considerable diplomatic skill and charm and wisdom, was able to eliminate some of the paperwork that goes on, get rid of the buff and the blue and all of these blasted flimsies, and so on. That is an improvement, but it still does not go to the heart of the matter.

Secretary BROWN. Buff and blue is in another war.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. What we are talking about, Senator Nunn, is not a question of personalities. It goes to the heart of power relationships and the relationship of power within the JCS was established to prevent a high degree of frustration of the overall system by an individual service.

I would be astonished if what Secretary Weinberger said was correct, but I concede that the age of miracles may not be dead.

Senator NUNN. On another point, the whole question of who assigns forces out to the field, who makes that decision?

Under the law the President makes it on the advice of the Secretary of Defense. As a matter of practice, we all know there is a difference between law and organizational charts and what really happens.

In your experience what really happens in terms of review of the force structure, where those forces are allocated and how they are allocated?

During your tenure in office, did you make a thorough review of force allocation and did you take the advice of the Chiefs in that regard?

Who really made that decision and where did the impetus for such a decision come from if it was made?

Secretary BROWN. I think you have to separate peacetime and crisis deployments.

Peacetime deployments, decisions on that, are part of the ongoing study of programs. In the Carter administration we did a study early on, PRM-10, of force deployments and balance of forces, to which the Chiefs very strongly contributed. Pieces of it they did not like very much. That study led to some decisions on deployments.

The White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services and the Joint Staff all got involved in that process.

If one is talking about deployments of units in a crisis, almost always there will be an interagency group that examines those questions. The decision is made by the Secretary of Defense, usually checking with the White House, depending on the degree of political or international sensitivity, and transmitted to unified and specified commanders by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Senator NUNN. I am really speaking of peacetime deployments, non-crisis deployments, and whether there was, let us say, a thorough review.

Did anyone make a thorough review of that, whether it was deployed correctly or whether changes needed to be made?

Secretary BROWN. We did in the beginning of 1977. There were some deployment changes as a consequence and some changes in commitments as a consequence over the following years.

Senator NUNN. Were you really in charge of that as a practical matter or was JCS in charge of it?

Secretary BROWN. It was done as a combined OSD-JCS study.

Senator NUNN. You were very involved?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Schlesinger.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator Nunn, the President and the Secretary of Defense on his own behalf are responsible for the formulation of the political objectives of the United States and the political guidance from the military. The deployment issue fits right into that and, therefore, on the decisions with regard to deployments, particularly overseas, that is very much of a foreign policy decision as it affects our Military Establishment.

Therefore, I believe that the lead normally should come from the Secretary of Defense rather than from the JCS. The JCS is engaged in how do we do this?

My own period in the Pentagon, as you will recall, a period of some turbulence and the budget were coming down very rapidly, we had to decide how to allocate forces. We were phasing out. We completed the phase out from Vietnam. It was my decision, partly reflecting my own background, substantially to increase our forces in Europe.

At the time that was not the preference of a large number of Members of Congress. It was a time, as you will recall, as all of you will recall, I believe, that the Mansfield amendment was on the Hill. So, the decisions about deployment came, I think quite properly, from the political authorities.

Now, with regard to the creating of forces, once again that reflects the arrangements of a specific Secretary of Defense and I think one can generalize along that line. Secretary McNamara, for example, believed that the Secretary of Defense should specify the force structure.

My own view was that the Secretary of Defense should provide incentives to the services to expand the number of units that they could field. It was for that reason that I approached General Abrams and we entered into our golden handshake, as it was sometimes called, in which I said that I would protect his manpower level if he would convert other nonessential activities into additional divisions. We would move from 13 to 16 divisions. But that is not a preordained in the arrangement. I think that reflected the personalities, the inclinations, and the philosophical approach to defense management. As I indicated, Secretary McNamara took quite a different view of such matters.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Chairman **Goldwater**. A question for both of you—a frequent criticism of service Secretaries is that they have not balanced their responsibilities and have placed too much emphasis on being service advocates, more often than not that the Secretaries of Defense have viewed service Secretaries as obstacles to progress rather than key assistants.

What was your experience with the service Secretaries?

Secretary **Brown**. I have had experience at both ends. As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, I had the experience of being the man in the middle. My own judgment, both as an Air Force Secretary and Secretary of Defense, was that the proper role of the military department Secretary is to be an intermediary.

He will gain the confidence of the military staff, of his Chief of service, and of the service staff, if he shows that he is able to formulate things for them so that they get more of what they want, whatever that may be, than they would in his absence. To that extent he has to be something of an advocate.

On the other hand, if the Secretary of Defense is doing his job, then the military department Secretary has to serve a role as his interpreter, his interlocutor to the service, and help to translate the guidance that is provided by the Secretary of Defense into a service program that makes more sense than it would if it were just generated in a vacuum.

So, if he does his job right, he is an intermediary. As I say in my prepared statement, neither solely an amplifier nor still less a distorter of views.

Secretary **Schlesinger**. My view will be more biased or more unbiased by the fact I have not been a service Secretary as Dr. Brown has been.

If we were to go back and recreate the Department of Defense, it is not clear to me that the job of service Secretary would survive. However, we are not going to go back and recreate it and the job does have a responsibility. It is in part vestigial reflecting the old departments, it is part symbolic.

I have had experience with quite a variety of service Secretaries. Some are more effective than others in pushing national policy. Some have pushed service interests to an extraordinary degree. I would find that intolerable and have found it intolerable. Therefore, one would eliminate it.

The service Secretariat, I think, should be substantially reduced. The job of the service Secretary should be altered into being primarily the embodiment on the civilian side of the special history and position of the services. If the service Secretary is to be useful, he is to be useful in implementing the national strategy as laid down by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Thank you very much.

Secretary Schlesinger, as you know, the staff study recommended full or partial integration of the service Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the military department. In his prepared statement Secretary Brown endorses this recommendation of the staff study.

How do you feel about this?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. I would go a long way in that direction if I could, Senator. I think right now we have duplications of staff and duplications of staff. We should start reversing the process. This is one of the places to start.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Dr. Brown, you have recommended a Chief of military staff with a Deputy and a combined military staff to perform the functions now assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's assistants.

How do your proposals differ from H.R. 3622 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee?

Secretary BROWN. H.R. 3622 does not abolish the JCS. It does make the Joint Staff report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It, I think, is a step in the direction I advocate, but it is quite a long ways from where I would go if I were inventing the universe.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Secretary Schlesinger.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I have generally supported the bill that has been submitted by Mr. Nichols, Mr. Aspin, and a half dozen others. I think it goes in the right direction. There are a number of changes that I would make.

I would not allow the President or Secretary of Defense to direct that the national military chain of command runs to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands through the Chairman for reasons that we indicated earlier.

I would not require that the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman of the JCS shall attend all meetings of the National Security Council.

I would simply say that they may regularly attend and leave that decision to the President. I would not extend the term of the Chairman to 4 years.

Those, I think, were principal concerns that I had about the bill. By and large, I am in favor of the bill. It is a bill that incorporates moderate change that can have substantial benefit.

Secretary Brown would feel, I think, that the bill should go further. I am much more on the side of revolutionary change than Dr. Brown is.

Secretary BROWN. I do not think we need to emphasize differences with each other or with the bill. I regard it as a first step in the right direction.

Secretary Schlesinger and I disagree somewhat on the ultimate goal, but I think we agree on the first step. I would agree also with most of his observations about the specific provisions of H.R. 3622 that I have questions about, but that is something that I think can be ironed out.

The main point is that it makes good changes.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much. My time is up, but I would like to make an observation relative to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The press picked up that recommendation by our study group. It constantly appears in the press media, with the inference that it has been adopted. I want to remind my colleagues that we have not adopted one single word of that report.

I am prompted to speak to that very briefly because in the morning Washington Times there was a column written by one of our colleagues in the Senate in which he assumed that we have already decided to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff and replace it with a German or Prussian concept.

I just do not want to have that kind of rumor spread. We must meet and decide what we are going to do. We have not reached that point yet.

Senator **Nunn**. I completely agree with that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Cohen.

Senator **Cohen**. Secretary Schlesinger, in your response to Senator Warner's question on whether or not Congress had a role in its recommendation, I think you said congressional action would be invaluable in helping the Secretary of Defense to strengthen the Chairman and make other changes.

I would suggest to you it may be indispensable, particularly if the Secretary of Defense does not feel there is any need for a change in the status quo.

If our report or recommendations were advisory only and not statutory, then I would surmise it simply would not get done.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. I fully agree. There is a long history in this connection. If one goes back to the attempts of Mr. Truman and subsequent attempts of Mr. Eisenhower to bring service unification, they were resisted by individual services and they were resisted by going through the Congress and that the ultimate compromise reflected the congressional judgment as to degree of unification that was permissible.

I think that the Congress on this issue must speak very clearly if the services are to get a clear indication of what is wanted.

Senator **Cohen**. Secretary Brown.

Secretary **Brown**. I agree with that.

Senator **Cohen**. The Chairman just mentioned the possibility of the spector being raised of a German or Prussian general staff. Some believe that if any of these recommendations are implemented, we will be off crossing the border in Berlin on our way to Poland and perhaps on to Moscow.

Is there any real concern in your minds that if we implemented the recommendations proposed by the House Armed Services Committee, or those of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown, or, indeed, the staff recommendation, that there is a real threat that we would constitute a German general staff and all that conjures up?

Secretary **Brown**. The staff study and some of the papers that accompanied it deal, it seems to me, thoroughly and effectively with this issue. It is a nonissue in the United States for a variety of reasons.

In the first place, the historical context and temper of the United States is completely different from that of Wilhelmian Germany. The tradition of the military subordination to civilian authority began with George Washington and with his departure from command of the Continental Forces and has continued essentially unbroken.

The few half-hearted attempts that have been made by individual military people to subvert that have gotten nowhere. Not only would the civilian population not support it, but the military would not support it either.

Moreover, the Prussian general staff which was only an Army staff or the imperial German military staff was again an Army staff, and even the Hitlerian general staff—they did very well. Actually one of the reasons they did not do even better, they were not a combined staff. They did not know how to handle combined operations well enough.

So, I think that they could not be more misdrawn.

Senator COHEN. Secretary Schlesinger.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. One must call a red herring a red herring. It is as simple as that. The analogy of the German general staff came after World War II. It was related to Hitlerian Germany and the fact that the German generals were not all powerful and Hitler took them out one by one and shot them.

It is not reflective, I think, of the excessive power of the generals. Any kind of rhetoric will be used, I think, that is a motive that will block progress.

I mentioned earlier you might hear under other circumstances of a foreign fleet sailing up the Potomac. You will hear, at least in Senator Nunn's part of the country, if you change the JCS system, that Sherman will march to the sea again.

All of these historical metaphors strike me as a source of confusion, most charitably put.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Schlesinger, I think you indicated in your testimony that JCS has been plagued, not so much by inter-service rivalry, but by a quite sort of unarticulated mutual understanding that guarantees consensus at the expense of military preparedness.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Not always unarticulated, Senator.

Senator COHEN. Can you give us any specific examples during your tenure when that occurred?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think this also has to be viewed in a historical context. With the declining budgets after World War II it was plain that the mission of strategic attack would receive maximum national emphasis and that budgets would reflect that service that was chosen for strategic attack.

It was then that we had B-36 versus super carrier controversy. From that controversy which rocked the Pentagon, rocked the military establishment, and did vast internal damage—that kind of competition is not helpful—the services learned a lesson, that it is better to get along and accommodate, not rock the boat, than to have these explosions.

There have been all sorts of things of that sort. The study, I think refers to the Senate arrangements that were adopted at Key West with regard to the Unified Commands despite the fact you have the 1958 law which was designed to strengthen the unified commanders.

The UNAF was not significantly changed and the roles of the individual services continued. That is the kind of arrangement, accommodation, that is almost unavoidable.

I do not want to criticize it in general because such accommodations are necessary to permit one to have the time to get on with doing the real job. Some accommodations become pernicious and they must be changed.

Senator COHEN. How often did either one of you receive reports of buff and blue, whatever you were referring to, reports that recommended an increase in the role or mission of one service at the expense of another?

Secretary **Brown**. Those were always rather carefully worked out beforehand and nothing was changed. The most interesting case of an attempt to change the CINC structure during my tenure came with the establishment of the rapid deployment force headquarters.

Roles and missions had to be worked out and there was quite a lot of pulling and hauling the way it was left. I do not think in this regard it has been changed by the establishment of the Central Command. The way it was left is that there is the usual arrangement, and it does not work terribly well, that the Command is split depending on whether the naval forces are in the Indian Ocean or in the Persian Gulf.

The naval forces remain in support except in the highly unlikely situation in which they would be moved into the Gulf.

Secretary **Schlesinger**. I think such proposals coming from below were largely in the nature of housekeeping arrangements designed to maintain the peace rather than really to redivide the sets of responsibilities. There were cases in which service Chiefs felt the need for closer collaboration.

I think that is true of General Wickham and General Gabriel on close air support at the present time. They have entered into a set of arrangements that strikes mutually the two services.

Earlier the use of Air Force planes to support the Navy in the sea control operation was met by the Navy with ambivalence and ambivalence here is a good word. It meant that the Navy saw the advantages, the potential advantages of having Air Force support and had the traditional attitude we would like to do the job ourselves, but there was not the kind of massive resistance, as it were, to the idea.

That did get implemented. But it took a period of 10 to 15 years to have successful implementation.

Senator **Cohen**. The report indicates that the interests of the special operations forces are not represented by the services, they tend to be held down to a lower level. In fact, it indicates that the interests of the special operations forces and those of the parent services often diverge.

Do you think there are any changes warranted in terms of organizational direction for special operations forces?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. I think there will be an improvement in that respect under these kinds of changes that would stengthen the role of the Chairman whether or not there is a Deputy added.

The reasons for this is that in the service hierarchy these special operations forces tend to be way down at the bottom and that when one charges the Chairman with the responsibility as being chief military adviser and hold him accountable, he is going to be looking around for that instrument that can most efficiently perform a particular military function irrespective of where that instrument may stand in the traditional priorities of the service. I think you will have an improvement.

Secretary **Brown**. There is no logical place for that activity now in a combined way. Given the present arrangement, you are not going to create a Unified Command. The result is that that is run essentially out of the JCS organization.

It will not be well run so long as you have a divided military, well, a committee military authority in which each committee member has a special interest in a place of the combined operation.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We heard from General Krulak yesterday. He has written a book detailing the huge growth of the Department of Defense. A lot of times there is confusion between the Secretary's Office and the agencies which are under the overall Department of Defense. I think the Secretary's Office, itself, is about 2,000 people now. Let me first ask about that.

Do either of you believe that the—approximately—2,000 people in the Secretary's Office can be significantly reduced if we create a more effective Joint Chiefs mechanism and strengthen the military advice the Secretary has available?

Secretary BROWN. I think that will allow some reduction in the Office of the Secretary of Defense because there are now many cases where people in the Office of the Secretary of Defense are doing what should be done by the Joint Staff or the combined military staff.

There are more important factors than this, however, in determining the size of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They include the size of congressional staffs, the existence of the military departments and the growth in other parts of the executive branch—as a matter of fact, even the Office of Management and Budget.

Senator NUNN. We are not going to reform Congress, we have already said that. Secretary Weinberger has endorsed that. That is on course.

Secretary BROWN. But to a significant degree the ability to reduce staff sizes depends on reducing all of them. You cannot reduce one preferentially except in a minor degree. I think that minor degree would take place if you made changes in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Schlesinger.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Much of the growth of the OSD staff was a reflection of the 1958 changes. Secretary McNamara came along shortly after that legislation. General Krulak, I believe, is not a keen admirer of the changes that Secretary McNamara introduced. This is a part of an extended war, if I can put it that way.

I think if one wants a degree of coordination, it is going to come out of the Secretary of Defense and out of his office. We can reduce that office if we can cut back elsewhere in the Government so that half the staff is not replying to mail and we can reduce it, indeed, if we strengthen the Joint Staff system and the Chairman so that the Secretary of Defense does not have to have so many civilian wisemen second-guessing the military. But that is what we have today.

Senator NUNN. We have the article Senator Goldwater referred to a while ago that was in the paper this morning by Senator Trible and there are two or three points I want to ask you about that.

Speaking of reform said:

> It is ironic that these new proposals come at a time when the existing system has achieved stunning success, capturing the highjackers of the *Achille Lauro*, the required assessment of the problem, formation of a plan and coordinated execution. In this instance the President got from the Joint Chiefs what he needed which was textbook precision.

Would both of you comment not on the details, but whether that success negates the need for reform of the Department of Defense?

Secretary **Brown**. Forcing a civilian airliner to land is not really the same thing on the Soviet military machine.

Senator **Nunn**. A slight distinction, I would say.

Secretary **Brown**. We should not judge one by the other.

Senator **Nunn**. Mr. Schlesinger.

Secretary **Schlesinger**. I seems to me to be a polemical, argument. It does not bear deep scrutiny.

Senator **Nunn**. You have already commented on another argument made here, the Prussian-style general staff, reducing the role, and so forth. You've already given your view on that. Let me ask you this question.

Another argument made is:

> Redtape service, filibustering, and plain recalcitrance can be dispatched easily by the Chairman. The argument that his powers are too few, does not hold water. Any JCS Chairman who fails to be effective in his job is beyond the help of the reorganizers.

Would you comment on that?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. Well, it is a half truth. If a Chairman fails to be effective in his job, he is indeed, beyond the help of the reorganizers or anybody else; he should be replaced. Most Chairmen have to choose where to be effective and where to invest their political capital.

It is true that a Chairman can overrun resistance, particularly if he has great prestige in the Congress and great backing from the White House and the Secretary. But in the absence of that, one has to strengthen the position of the Chairman, otherwise the Chairman must see a large part of his time devoted, time of the JCS devoted to what anyone would describe as highly parochial matters.

Senator **Nunn**. The other point, again quoting the article:

> Creating a Deputy Chairman which would end the other Chiefs' individual working relationship with the President so that in a crisis the President and the service Chiefs would be meeting to work together for the first time.

Secretary **Brown**. The President can call on service Chiefs for advice when he wishes and I am sure he will do so. I think that the differences between the way Presidents feel with service Chiefs—from President to President—far exceed the effect this would have, in my judgment.

Secretary **Schlesinger**. I think that is very clear as one takes the relationship of General Eisenhower with Adm. Arleigh Burke, to take a special case. Those relationships are quite diverse.

The Deputy Chairman's role, indeed, would affect the Chiefs because it would be designed in part to strengthen the position of the unified commanders. I think that strengthening the position of the unified commanders, the people who are actually going to fight if we are called upon to fight, is advisable, but it need not be to the exclusion of the Chiefs. I think that is at best a half truth.

Secretary **Brown**. It was my experience that it was just as important for the President to get to know the unified and specified commanders as the service Chiefs.

Senator **Nunn**. The ones who are actually going to be doing the fighting?

Secretary **Brown**. They are the ones who will be doing the fighting.

Senator **Nunn**. Back to the Defense Department. There is a list of defense agencies here: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Communications Agency, Office of the Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Investigative Service, Defense Legal Service Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, Defense Audio-Visual Agency, Defense Mutual Assistance Agency, Defense Security Agency, Uniform Services, University of the Health Service, National Security Agency, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency.

Are any of these expendable or can we cut them down some or do you believe they are really doing the job they were created to do?

Secretary **Brown**. They varied, Senator Nunn. At least one I did my best to expend without success. That was the medical school, of which it did not seem to me that the Defense Department needed its own. Some of these, I think, do do very good work. Some of them are imposed by Congress incorrectly. Others I think are imposed by Congress correctly.

You do need some of these things. In no case do I think any of those situations would be improved by dividing them into three or four parts and assigning them to the services. Indeed, the cases that have worked least well are the ones where these were added to the existing structure and not substituted for it.

It is a problem for the Secretary of Defense to try to direct all of those different things. As Secretary Schlesinger said, no Secretary of Defense now is going, himself, to pay a lot of attention to most of them.

I tried to handle it by assigning responsibility for them to the various staff elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, thus violating the separation of line and staff responsibility so dear to generations of military planners. It worked fairly well, but it is not an ideal solution.

Secretary **Schlesinger**. These are a hodgepodge of different activities. Some are quite substantive. Some are housekeeping activities.

Creation of the Defense Mapping Agency was, I thought, a considerable step forward because of the economies and efficiencies and additional effectiveness that came from that.

I spent a fair amount of time with the Advanced Research Project Agency, myself, and I am sure Harold spent more. It was in that way that we threw the weight of the office behind the creation of the Stealth aircraft. That I gather is important and substantive for the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense should spend a fair amount of time with the NSAS and DIA. The housekeeping agencies should not intrude too much on his time as opposed to the substantive agencies.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I might point out that the creation of the medical school was purely political. The military did not have much to do about it. They could not have stopped it if they had wanted to.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if you might give us your viewpoint of the lessons learned particularly in relation to organizational problems in the Iranian rescue mission and also the *Mayuguez* affair.

Looking back on it, if we had a better organization, might we have been able to do a better job?

I guess what I am trying to extract from you are some of the problems that we had in those two instances which have been identified by our staff study and how some of those problems might relate to our thinking as we look to this reorganization.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I do not know whether you want me to comment on the Iranian episode and Harold to comment on the *Mayuguez* affair.

Senator QUAYLE. That would be helpful. Perhaps you are telling us something right now.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. But with regard to the *Mayuguez* episode, I have strongly felt the need for the Deputy Chairman in large degree reflecting the circumstances of that affair.

As you may remember, Senator Goldwater will certainly remember, at that time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was out of the country. He was unavailable. Therefore, the responsibility of full planning passed to the senior JCS member who was the Air Force General, David Jones.

General Jones understandably worked with the people that he was familiar with, which was the air staff. This led to some questioning—I will put it delicately—on the part of the Navy, on the part of the Army, et cetera.

I think that all of that could have been avoided if you had had a Deputy Chairman who worked steadily with the Joint Staff and provided continuity even when the Chairman was absent.

Yes, indeed, it goes right to the heart of that issue. I think that the operations that we put together very quickly and proved to be effective were quite commendable, but there were some oddities and anomalies.

The Navy, for example, dispatched a refrigerator ship to the Cambodian coast. There was some question whether they were going to hurl frozen steaks at Cambodians. [Laughter.]

But those were basically anomalies and amusing anomalies that came out of it. By and large, it was put together as an effective operation, it was put together very quickly.

There was understanding, particularly in the wake of the fall of Saigon and the fall of Phnom Phen, the United States could not let a third-rate power like Cambodia interfere with the freedom of the seas.

We put together an operation that was quite effective. I think it could have been more effective if we had had the continuity of planning that these new arrangements will permit.

Senator **Quayle**. There was some discussion earlier on the lack of contingency plans for the Grenada operation. Was there also perhaps lack of contingency planning?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. There is a difference between Grenada and *Mayuguez*. First of all, nobody expected the nutty Cambodians to seize a United States ship on the high seas. If you do not anticipate something, you cannot have a contingency plan for it. You should not waste your time providing contingency plans for millions of hypothetical contingencies.

The thing about Grenada that was quite different is that the President of the United States, Mr. Reagan, came into office pointing to Grenada as a source of infection in the Caribbean and under those circumstances you have signalled a high degree of political interest and both the intelligence and military establishments are there to respond to the concerns of their political electives and the President of the United States.

Secretary **Brown**. In the case of the Iranian hostage attempt, I think it would be a mistake to assign all or even most of the responsibility for failure to the organization. There were lots of reasons for things going wrong. But I would draw one lesson that is relevant to the organization.

The JCS did supervise closely what went on, they kept it very closely held, and they spent a great deal of time working out the details of the mission. But they did not have units, combined units, to draw upon. That meant that they had to put the thing together using disparate units and that had a negative effect.

To some extent, there was also, I think, a degree of service interest in seeing that things were done in a way that reflected the capability of all the services, but separately rather than together. I think that had a negative effect.

I do not say that those were the make-or-break causes, but I do draw those lessons.

Secretary **Quayle**. Would this suggest that we need special force for special operations, or are you talking perhaps of a joint force?

Secretary **Brown**. I am talking about a special operations force that would have dedicated to it all the units that it really needed to get where it was going as well as to do what it needed to do when it got there.

Now, you cannot take care of all contingencies. There will always be some things that you are going to have to add for the particular event. But I think we had not then, and I hope we have now, I do not know, gone near far enough to make sure to have all the capabilities that could reasonably be expected to be assembled in advance.

Secretary **Schlesinger**. Could I pick that up again for a moment?

We want the services to have high morale. We want them to feel this is the best bloody service that was ever created and we can take anything on. Therefore, it is no surprise that when a crisis occurs that the services, all of them, will want a piece of the action. That is what we want.

But we also want to not have them voting on how the assignments should be made. These reforms would strengthen the hand of the JSC Chairman to say you have great capability, but in this case we are calling on the Marines or Army, or the other way around.

That decision is awfully hard to take when jointly the Chiefs are recommending something to the Secretary.

Senator **Quayle**. May I ask a general philosophical question to the two of you?

There seems to be, just putting it in general terms, two schools of thought on how we best can improve our organization of the military.

One is a more centralized approach and the other is a decentralized approach, if I can be that simplistic.

In which direction do you think we should be going and where do you put yourself in one of those traditional argumentative schools of thought?

Secretary **Brown**. I am a compromiser. If I were forced to choose, I would say we should move toward centralization of planning and operations from where we are now.

Senator **Quayle**. Where should you decentralize?

Secretary **Brown**. The execution of procurement. I think you can centralize policy, but if you try to centralize execution of procurement, you are in big trouble.

Secretary **Schlesinger**. There is question of whether we are talking about geographical decentralization or geographical centralization. I am not particularly fond of those words because I think they can be too easily exploited polemically.

The fact of the matter is that every effective organization requires a blend of centralization and decentralization. We certainly do not want any greater geographical centralization of program mangement in Washington, DC.

So, I would certainly be a decentralizer in that respect. But we require a high degree of coordination. The Nation, I believe has made a decision for unification. You gentlemen are faced with a very simple decision at this point. You do have the possibility of moving back from unification, but unification working as the Congress intended in 1958 or as you think it should work in 1985.

And if not, you have to do some adjustments to make it work more effectively to bring those services closer together for joint military operations. They do not always have to be joint.

Senator **Quayle**. I gather from listening to the questions and listening to your responses and testimony that you feel probably that the Congress' key focus in the area of reorganization should be on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that there are other things that everyone mentions, but that on these things you would probably leave that flexible and a lot of discretion to the Secretary of Defense and that if we really want to get this ball rolling, that what we ought to do is look at JSC.

Am I wrong in concluding that is what you are basically telling us what to do?

Secretary **Brown**. The JCS organization, I think, is most in need of action and after that I would say some of the arrangement for the CINC's.

Senator **Quayle**. Legislatively?

Secretary **Brown**. I am not sure about legislation. The JCS definitely needs legislation.

Senator QUAYLE. From that, possibly some of these other things could come, but you are not necessarily saying we should legislate?

Secretary BROWN. Many of the things need not be legislated. I do not think the JCS can be made much more efficient and effective, and that is planning and operations, without some legislation. That is essential.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. What the Pentagon lacks is sufficient spirit of unification. You have written or your predecessor Congresses have written splendid legislation with regard to unification in the field of Unified Commands.

The problem is that that is not being carried out. That is, I think, essentially a Washington issue. The modification of the JCS will particularly solve the problems of the unified commanders. That is of equal, perhaps even greater importance, but the key, I think, lies in the Pentagon itself rather than in the field.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to congratulate the two witnesses for outstanding presentations. It is very helpful to me.

Chairman GOLDWATER. That is a good question you asked because it is my feeling that there is a lot of this that can be done by a Commander-in-Chief, the President, or by the Secretary of Defense.

I would personally like to see the action come from those sources rather than come from legislation. After all, the President is the head man.

Senator Denton.

Senator NUNN. Would the Senator yield for a brief followup on Senator Quayle's question?

Talking about what has been done in terms of unification, I agree with your assessment of the intention. Let me read, and if you can explain it to me, first, I will be amazed, and, second, I will be grateful.

This is the actual directive that the Unified Commands operate under. It is under the unified action, Armed Forces. It is on page 308 of this study. I will read it very briefly here. Sentence No. 1.

> Operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the service component commanders or through the Commanders of subordinate commands established in accordance with the procedures and criteria set forth herein. Unless authorized by the establishing authority, the unified commander will not also act as commander of any of the service components or other subordinate commands.

Whatever has been given, it seems to me, in sentence number one has been taken away in sentence No. 2.

Authority, protraction, sentence No. 3:

> In exercising his operational command, the unified commander shall take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibilities of the service component commanders.

Sentence number three says exercise it, but watch out, do not step on anybody's toes.

No. 4:

> Commanders of service components will communicate directly with their respective Chiefs of service on matters which are the responsibility of the military department and service.

That is a series of contradictory statements, it seems to me, to say the least, to tell the unified commander what his responsibility is.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think, Senator, you will not be amazed at my explication of this.

There is a reflection of the post-1947 act. It was never adequately modified after 1958. It is a reflection of the abiding strength of the services to preclude the degree of unification that was intended by the legislation.

It is a reflection of the desire to keep the unified commander in a position in which he is dependent upon his subordinates.

Senator NUNN. I do not know how you look at that in terms of centralization or decentralization, but whatever it is, wherever it fits, it has completely obliterated at least in spirit the whole act, that of trying to get the services to work together and have a Commander-in-Chief in the field.

I would submit either way you are in limbo right now. If you want more strength in the field, which I think is decentralization in operation, the man in the field has to have a degree of centralized authority or unity of command out there.

So, you are really working both sides. If you want it to all be flowing back through Washington, then that is what this does. This is the ultimate of centralization because the effect of it is to basically tell that unified commander out there to not step on anybody's toes, tells him, No. 2, do not interfere with the service prerogatives and tells him, No. 3, go back to the services for things that the services are in charge of.

Of course, that again is a very broad situation. I would submit that this directive from the Joint Chiefs to the CINC's in the field is the ultimate in centralized authority, that is, if you define it as flowing back to Washington and taking the authority away from the commander in the field.

That would be my view.

Senator QUAYLE. I would say that these are some of the key concerns and we have to figure this thing out. The Secretary has tried to move toward decentralization. You can argue whether his directives are following that philosophical approach. By and large, he is in that camp.

I agree it is a bit simplistic to talk in these terms, but the Secretary has been a decentralizer. We want to make sure if we are going to centralize or coordinate more that we do not get more of what you have just read.

I think I would like to see this coordination and unification, but the actual implementation ought to be on a decentralized basis.

We talk about quality control in business. We ought to talk about quality control in the services as well. The best way to get it is if those local people have the authority and responsibility to go out and do the job.

Senator NUNN. If you want to decentralize operational capability in the field, you have to give the man out there unity of command.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. There is a traditional attitude toward this on the part of most people in authority which is decentralize down to my level, centralize below my level.

If one is talking of decentralization, one must ascertain to whom one is decentralizing. Secretary Weinberger has decentralized from the OSD to the services. The effect of that is, as Senator Nunn suggests, may be to bring about centralization within the services or greater centralization.

Now, the problem of the unified commander is that in frequent cases he does not get the copies of the correspondence between his nominal subordinate and the service headquarters in Washington. In the case of that subordinate commander he said, "My unified commander"—read irony there—"My unified commander has just suggested that I do the following." What is the Army's or Navy's position on this?

Then there is a flow of correspondence and after a while when it has been ironed out within the service, the subordinate commander reports back to his nominal commander saying, "No, we cannot do that."

He does not say it is against the service policy, or what have you. That is a case in which you have a much greater degree of centralization. It is why I said one must approach these things as finding the appropriate blend of centralization and decentralization and this blend weakens the capacity of our unified commanders to conduct military operations under conditions of adversity and, therefore, I think it is a pernicious plan.

Chairman **Goldwater**. Senator Denton.

Senator **Denton**. I would like to turn to something that I hope we do more about, that is the effect of service bias, lack of understanding of what the other services can do as a factor in an organization.

Then we have to deal with personalities, and, in spite of the organization, the personalities will prevail favorably or unfavorably. We really have not addressed some of the things, in my view, that we can do to change that situation by inculcating more knowledge, therefore eliminating the tendency toward bias on the part of those who reach the level of the JCS or high joint command, or perhaps even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

What we need is really expertise, willingness to risk one's life to the point of committing suicide for your service.

Chairman **Goldwater**. I am going to ask for your indulgence. I am trying to address something we do not know enough about. We all laugh when we say purple suits. I am going to talk about purple minds a bit.

I am afraid that we do not understand here in Congress that not only do the services vie for money on a biased basis, and you know they vie for roles and missions, but, as some of these gentleman who have been Secretaries of Defense know, most especially Secretary McNamara, they are often victimized by the force of personality of an officer or officers who either do not have enough understanding of the other services or do not have enough integrity to yield in their deference.

We can do something about that. Right now the bias and ignorance are imposing bottlenecks in terms of speed of processing planned proposals. Feasibility is often lost because of this in terms of any action, including battle action.

We can lose battles and have because of that. We have lost wars, I can maintain, because of that. We have certainly had unnecessary fatalities, and we have lost some U.S. interests, and we could be losing security at too rapid a rate because of that if we do not do anything about it.

It has come up in a previous hearing. Adm. Harry Train said we have a 2-month capstone course over in the National Defense University. That is good, but that is not enough.

You know, Mr. Secretary, because you were kind enough to come to us at the Armed Forces Staff College; the motto of that school is that all may labor as one.

As I mentioned the other day, the Marines always get the best grade because they know about the other services. They do. The Army is next. The Navy and Air Force do not give a hoot about the others, generally speaking. Something needs to be done, because they do not understand what the other guy can do. They are pushing themselves for things sometimes that they should not.

We have the Armed Forces Staff College 6-month course. In the Navy it is considered a lousy place to send anybody. Similarly, the Army and Marine Corps regard it differently. We need to go beyond the capstone course, beyond the War Colleges, into some kind of expansion of the War Colleges at levels, say, at 04 or above.

Do you agree that maybe we should have a certain portion of the curriculum, even at command and staff levels, perhaps even at squadron level, in which they are forced to address what the other services can do, because a good planner cannot become a good operating planner unless he knows what he is dealing with in the other services and he can mislead you guys.

I am sure that Secretary McNamara was mislead on this. That was attendant upon and I think was a predisposition for, the scenarios in Vietnam by which we did not break their will, we twisted their arms. We had too many guys who did not have knowledge of what other services could do and pushed their own thing and overestimated what the effect would be.

I do not mean to condemn Mr. McNamara. I believe that he was oversold on some things. By the time he realized it, he was up to his hips in alligators and could not do much about it.

Do you agree we should do something about that in the general way I am talking about?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, Senator I do. If I may make a general observation before responding directly to your comments.

Much of the problem in Vietnam came from the political authorities. The services, despite their historical differences, were more inclined to jointness than were the political authorities.

It was the President, Mr. Johnson, who resisted the establishment of the unified commander in Southeast Asia.

Senator DENTON. Whatever organization you have, the media, the Congress, the President can blow it away, and that happened in Vietnam.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. President Johnson wanted a war, but he did not want the United States to be too engaged in the war, and so forth. We understand that.

Service training is not going to override the prejudices or feelings of political judgments of the Presidents of the United States. I think you can do two things.

One is that at a much earlier level instead of only teaching at West Point, sink Navy, destroy them, 65 to nothing, 100 to nothing, or the reverse of it at Annapolis, sometimes in the senior year all of those people, and they are going to provide the bulk of the general officers, should have some instruction in jointness rather than the individual service.

Second, when one scamps along to the colonel and perhaps the general or flag officer level, that there should be an annual renewal and reemphasis on the common interests amongst the services as opposed to the special interests of the individual services, not to replace it because once again we want these people to be imbued with service spirit.

Senator **Denton**. Thank you, sir.

Going back, then, to something you brought up, to what degree do you think some of our failures have been caused by fallacies or flaws in the organization as it exists, the one which we are addressing? I do not mean *Mayuguez*, or even the Iranian rescue effort or the airliner, but I am talking about things like Angola, when Secretary Brown and President Carter tried to say, look, Mr. President, if you continue to send Cuban troops on Russian ships to Angola, we will make it unpleasant for you.

The media that night tore him to pieces. The Congress responded, "Jimmy, get back in your hole."

"People, please do not have your President speak with an empty voice."

To what degree do you believe that our failure in security policy, which I think I can prove, cost the United States infinitely more economically than the businessmen of this country understand?

To what degree do you think that the media, Congress, and Presidential intervention have been a factor in failure as opposed to the organizational structure per se?

Secretary **Schlesinger**. I think that the bulk of our difficulty is a reflection of the overall structure of the society rather than any deficiencies in the military organization per se. It is easier to deal with the deficiencies which are smaller of the military organizations than of the larger society.

We have entered into the pursuit of a free society in this country and that imposes certain risks and the risks are embodied that one must have some degree of that consensus in order effectively to carry out our policy.

When a democracy has a national consensus, it is a far more effective instrument than an authoritarian statement. But establishing a consensus is not that easy. We run the risk that the Congress will fail or the President, despite good intentions, will fail or because ambivalence on his own part will fail to achieve that degree of consensus in society.

The public is prepared to follow its leaders for a while. After a while if the policy seems to be endless or hopeless, the public is not going to follow any more. They can opt out in a democracy in a way that they cannot in an authoritarian state.

These are risks that we willingly, happily, eagerly enter into.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Senator, that is a very good point. I think when you were in Annapolis they had exchange students with West Point.

Senator DENTON. The first visit made to West Point by the midshipmen was the year I graduated.

Chairman GOLDWATER. A very small number. We do that now between all three academies. All three academies' Board of Visitors are looking into the possibility of expanding that. You make a good point.

It is something that we can either discuss in the Armed Services Committee or discuss with the Department of Education—providing education on worldwide political affairs for graduates of our academies and for the War Colleges of the Army, Navy and the Air Force.

It is an excellent idea.

Senator DENTON. You have been very considerate, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Could I add one word to that?

When this is done, it must be done in the right spirit; otherwise, it ends up with cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union which does not achieve the ends that we want. Those people who go from West Point to Annapolis or Annapolis to the Air Force Academy must try to enter into the minds, at least temporarily, of those who will be instructed at Colorado Springs or at Annapolis.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I want to thank Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Brown for being with us today. It is always a pleasure to visit with you and listen to you.

I hope you will never hestitate to come to us with any ideas you have. We will listen.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Secretary BROWN. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you both very much.

The meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

12

Organizing and Reorganizing for National Security

U.S. national security rests on, among other elements, military strength, economic programs, and diplomatic efforts. The political, managerial, and financial resources available for these efforts will always be limited. In principle, one way to improve U.S. national security for any given level of resources is to reorganize the way the government formulates and carries out national security policy. Many such efforts have been made, through legislation and through executive branch reorganization. Moreover, Congress has altered its own procedures. Some of these changes have been improvements but some have not.

In defining and executing national security policy the government acts within three major sets of organizational relationships: the executive branch with the legislative branch; the President and White House staff with the executive departments and agencies; and the offices within each of the various executive departments.

CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Congressional procedures in the past fifteen years have changed most notably in staffing patterns and in committee functions. Congressional staff personnel are about four times as numerous as they were in the mid-1960s. The expansion was in part an understandable reaction to the previous situation, in which executive branch officials had maintained a monopoly on detailed information and expertise. The legislators in Congress found it difficult to compete with the executive, and the subdivision of their attention among a growing variety of issues lost them the advantages of their lengthier tenure. Congressional committees accordingly now examine individual national security programs in much greater detail, whether they deal with weapons or foreign policy. The result has been an increase in Congressional oversight and thus in the degree of executive branch accountability. It is doubtful that this has improved the efficiency or effectiveness of either branch of the government.

Senior policymakers in the executive branch—in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other agencies—now spend much more time testifying before Congressional committees and answering detailed questions prepared by Congressional staffers but asked by individual legislators. Members of the Senate and the House have no more time to attend to the details of these matters than they had before. They are elected to office to serve a variety of political interests, not to act as executives; so it is no surprise that their staffs are not organized to produce a smooth evolution of consistent foreign or defense policy positions, even for the individual legislator. The legislators themselves are responsible to their constituencies for their actions, but one legislator is almost never the final individual decider of an issue. As one vote among 535, he or she is unlikely to be held accountable for the consequences of the legislation itself. Moreover, the authority of party leaders and committee chairmen within Congress has weakened greatly over the last two decades, so each Senator and Representative must be negotiated with separately. The Congressional staffer is much less accountable than the executive branch policymaker or even a low-level bureaucrat and need not know much about some military subject or program to be *the* expert among Congressional staffs.

Congress not only examines but also legislates foreign and defense policy and programs at a much more detailed level. For example, Congress now reserves the right to veto military sales to foreign countries. Reasonably enough, the responsibility for initiating that veto process has been assigned to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In fact, no major military assistance sale has been rejected, but negotiations between the United States and foreign governments on these matters now have an invisible third party (or rather, 535 of them) present. Again accountability is improved, and unjustified and careless executive branch actions are inhibited; unfortunately, necessary foreign assistance and military equipment transfers have also been made more difficult.

Congress passed the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of

1974 to force President Nixon to make expenditures for domestic programs that had been voted by Congress. The act also forced Congress itself to make an overall decision, in a "budget resolution," on tax revenues, entitlement programs contained in authorizing legislation, the appropriations of individual departments, and the resulting effects on the economy. Supervision of just these concerns is what the Office of Management and Budget is supposed to do in the executive branch. As usual, things did not work out as simply as Congress intended. The budget resolution process gradually gained strength through the late 1970s as the congressional budget committees and the resolutions they pushed through Congress came to have more and more effect on individual authorizations and appropriations. The budget reconciliation process also began to affect revenue and entitlement legislation. Often the government was forced to operate for long periods of time on continuing resolutions. In its consideration of those resolutions Congress as a whole assumed the functions that it had previously delegated to the authorizing and appropriating committees. Those committees, bested in the struggle to control overall budget totals for domestic programs and defense, turned to closer micromanagement of individual departmental budgets, in part in an attempt to compensate for authority lost to other Congressional power centers.

In 1981 President Reagan successfully used the budget reconciliation process to force a single up or down vote on his proposed budget and tax legislation, threatening to veto any substantially different programs, an action that would have brought the government's functioning to a standstill. This showed that the process can be used to give a powerful and popular President the last word. This procedure is unlikely to work more than once for a given administration or session of Congress, but it does highlight the need for the legislative branch to find some way to make modifications in executive programs—domestic and economic as well as national security programs—without falling into one of two traps. The first trap is getting into so much detail that a coherent program is impossible. The second is making policy changes the individual parts of which (defense, taxes, entitlements) Congress approves but the consequences of which (deficits) it is unwilling to take responsibility for. Of course, Presidents must avoid the same traps, but their responsibility is clearly fixed.

Two additional examples of Congressional limitations on executive authority in foreign policy and national security matters are the laws covering covert action and the War Powers Act. Both have restricted or inhibited executive branch actions on occasion, but in fact they represent the limits that U.S. public opinion now sets on the nature and length of any U.S. combat involvement or covert activities in foreign countries. A determined President, confident of public support for his foreign and military policies, will not be unduly hampered by the present laws and practices.

A reorganization of Congress delineating committee responsibilities more clearly, reducing overlaps, increasing the authority and responsibility of the leadership, and reducing the size of staffs would produce more coherent national policies and legislation. But that seems even less likely than the comparable changes that Congress frequently urges on the executive branch.

WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

National security policy has diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, and domestic political components. It must therefore be formulated by several executive agencies, individually and through interagency coordinating procedures. When there are differing views among the agency heads, and for sufficiently important matters even when they agree, the President must make the decision. With the agency heads, the President's national security staff develops criteria for what issues must be taken to the President and frames those issues for decision. Both in the interagency consultations and in the interactions of agency heads with the President and the White House staff, personalities will inevitably play an important role. This factor makes it difficult to lay down hard and fast procedures.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (also known as the National Security Adviser) heads the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) and must do more than just ensure that differing agency views are debated and where necessary brought to the President for decision. He should also offer his own advice, given from the standpoint of one who represents the President's (and, one hopes, the nation's) interest and who has an overarching viewpoint rather than the particular functional perspective created by the departmental bureaucratic pressures that inevitably influence the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other agency heads.

But the effectiveness of the National Security Adviser in offering advice, as well as in coordinating interagency activities and in ensuring that Presidential decisions are in fact implemented, is determined by whether he acts to facilitate decision making or is seen as an independent player. In this regard appearances, press conferences, and "backgrounders" are usually unnecessary and can even be counterproductive. They should occur rarely and then only with explicit and specific Presidential approval, usually when the President wants something said but for some reason cannot or should not say it himself and does not want the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense to issue the statement.

The President must also make decisions that weigh the foreign aspects of national security (military and diplomatic) in the balance with economic and domestic political considerations (including those that also affect national security) and adjudicate between the differing views and perspectives of his domestic political advisers and his advisers on foreign and defense policy.

It may be possible to make organizational improvements to aid the President in this task. Making economic advice a recognized component in national security policymaking would be an important step. But that will not be easy. The governmental structure does not provide a single preeminent economic adviser for the President, as it does a foreign policy, a defense, and an intelligence adviser. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) all have a clear claim, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has a major effect. Moreover all of the domestic agencies—the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and so on—not only represent domestic constituencies but are likely to have views on the economy as a whole. Each President should select a single agency head to be the principal adviser on economic affairs as they relate to foreign policy and national security policy. Presumably the principal adviser will usually be the Secretary of the Treasury, although it might be the Director of OMB or the Chairman of the CEA. The economic expertise of the NSC staff should also be strengthened.

The White House staff will have to deal with the effects of national security on domestic politics and of domestic politics on national security. It would help if the President were to designate a single person to be the preeminent adviser on the interaction of domestic policy and national security policy. Assuming that the National Security Adviser reports directly to the President, that top adviser on domestic interactions ought to be the President's chief of staff—the senior adviser for everything else.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary of Defense

A Secretary of Defense has a variety of responsibilities. Some of these are mutually reinforcing and some are conflicting. His first task is to advise the President on and to manage for him the military aspects of national security policy. The Secretary of Defense must inevitably be part of a national security team. He plays the leading role in defining military policy, as the Secretary of State does in defining foreign policy. But foreign and military policy are closely connected, so the Secretary of Defense and, under his direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) influence foreign policy, and the Secretary of State influences military strategy and programs.

The Secretary of Defense, for example, appropriately advises the President about the probable effects on the U.S.-Soviet military balance if the United States and its allies tighten or loosen restrictions on transfers of technology to the Soviets. The Secretary of State would, however, usually take the lead in formulating and negotiating such a policy. The Secretary of Defense can comment on a recommendation that the United States distance itself from, say, some East Asian nation whose internal policies are distasteful, in light of the effect such a policy would have on U.S. security in the Far East. Correspondingly, the Secretary of State can make recommendations on the deployment of weapons systems, e.g., enhanced radiation weapons, to allied countries in the light of the effects of the proposed deployments on U.S. relations with those allies. He can also assess the effect than changes in U.S. fleet-deployment levels in the Far East will have on Japanese attitudes or on how proposed deployment modes for U.S. land-based ICBMs are likely to affect European attitudes toward accepting U.S. land-based nuclear weapons. But in such cases, the primary responsibility for formulating and implementing these defense policies rests with the Secretary of Defense. Depending on the President's interests and on the state of world and domestic affairs, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, other White House staff members and advisers, and the Director of Central Intelligence will also play major roles in both kinds of national security decisions.

A second responsibility of the Secretary of Defense is to act as the President's deputy in the military chain of command. For example, the Secretary of Defense approves, or returns for modification, requests from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for authority to move military units—even a single aircraft or ship. He also approves plans drawn up by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha for the use of U.S. strategic forces in case of a nuclear war.

A third major function of the Secretary of Defense is to manage the Department of Defense—an enterprise that spends more than $200 billion a year—with all the major domestic political effects and pressures that engenders. The Secretary determines, subject to Presidential approval and to very considerable congressional review (1) policies for procuring and awarding contracts for military systems; (2) the number and location of military bases; and (3) regulations for the recruitment, training, and compensation of personnel. Industry, families of service personnel, and Congress all have special interests at stake in these decisions.

Thus, in connection with his duties, the Secretary of Defense often finds himself communicating with the public, the press, Congress, and also foreign governments and publics—sometimes persuading, sometimes bargaining.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense must be familiar with the ideas and views of numerous interested parties and constituencies—domestic and foreign, political and bureaucratic. He must build a consensus about defense policy across the widest possible range of those perspectives. A corresponding task exists for most senior government officials, but the Secretary of Defense has one of the most difficult, given the differences in perspective of the various Military Services, the differences between military and civilian officials, and the variety of interests—domestic, foreign, economic, and budgetary—involved in defense issues. The difficulties of building such a consensus are greatly compounded by the bureaucratic process and by individual personalities. Nevertheless, a substantial degree of consensus on policy can be established within the Department of Defense, given reasonably effective leadership.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

Every Secretary of Defense must make a choice—or rather, his personality makes it for him—about the degree to which he and his immediate assistants will run the day-to-day operations of the Department. Both a hands-on and a hands-off management style are workable, and the practice tends to shift from one to the other every five years or so.

Probably the greatest single innovation in managerial style and organization since the Military Departments were subordinated in 1949 to the Secretary of Defense took place in the early 1960s when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) Charles Hitch instituted a formal planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS).

PPBS is a system that, in a highly idealized description, operates as follows. First, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS decide on a military strategy. Then PPBS determines the optimum force structure to carry out the chosen military strategy or plan. It devises a five-year program to produce and maintain those forces in the most cost-effective way, revising the program annually and rolling it forward one more year. Then it budgets annual increments of the program. PPBS compares alternative forces by objective rather than by military service and uses overall program costs, including maintenance and personnel, rather than initial acquisition costs alone. An office of systems analysis (now called Program Analysis and Evaluation) carries out the corresponding studies.

This was the first example of such a system in the U.S. government, although it had been prefigured to some degree in the Department of Defense (DOD) itself during the tenure of Secretary Thomas Gates (1959–1961). PPBS remains in use. It has spread throughout the government, even while its prophets, the Systems Analysis Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, have sometimes seemed to be without honor in their own country and have seen their own numbers and influence wax and wane.

Since 1959, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (now the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) has exercised strong staff supervision over the development and acquisition of major systems. But much more attention needs to be paid to the mechanics of acquiring weapons systems and materiel, both in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the Military Services. The problems of high costs, delays, and unsuitable products are largely traceable to the lack of personal responsibility and accountability on the part of anyone for any particular weapons program as a whole. Instead, overly detailed military specifications are drawn up for standard items, piles of documentation accumulate that no one looks at but that protect procurement officers when Congress starts investigating, and lengthy and repeated reviews settle nothing. All of these contribute to the problem rather than to the solution. The best evidence for this thesis is the relative success of programs carried out at a high level of secrecy, e.g., the U-2, the SR-71, various satellite programs, and the "stealth" aircraft programs. In these cases, very few individuals in the Military Services, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in the Office of Management and Budget, or in Congress—and none in the public or in the press—knew about the programs until they were well along, sometimes even until after they were deployed. Documentation in such cases is minimal, decisions are made and approved by a small number of people, program managers have long tenure, and personnel and overhead are minimized—in part for security reasons.

Such expedited procedures are almost by definition not possible for the entire defense development and production program. For one thing, such an approach demands outstandingly capable, and correspondingly rare, people. But the much better record of highly classified programs suggests that modifying the overall development and procurement system along those lines would be a great improvement. Whether such a modification is feasible is uncertain, for the American public, press, and Congress have come to demand accountability in great detail and extremely quickly.

The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, created in 1977, has staff responsibility for the interaction of foreign policy and defense policy, for planning, and for helping the Secretary of Defense evaluate the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military strategy and operations. The Secretary of Defense also needs a small operational staff to review the adequacy of military contingency plans. The best way would be to share such a staff with the Chairman of the JCS.

The Military Services

Any organization as large as the Department of Defense must be divided into major operating units, with appropriate authority delegated to them. Historically, having an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines has made considerable sense. Each service has definable functions, and the land, sea, and air environments differ sufficiently to call for differing skills, experience, and sometimes even equipment. The morale and esprit in the military have largely come from service identifications. Recruiting, training, and personnel functions up to a certain level are clearly best carried out in such a structure. Attempts to substitute for service identification some general professional military identification, or a functional identification that would go with the activities of particular unified or specified commands, are unlikely to work as well.

Nevertheless, the division into four military services has led to some large and wasteful overlaps. The most obvious is the maintenance of four separate tactical air forces. Others include separate medical services, separate development and procurement of communications equipment, competing public relations organizations, and duplication of expensive military bases and facilities.

Service divisions have increasingly contributed to operational difficulties. In Vietnam, for example, the air war was directed in part by the theater commander in Vietnam, in part by the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces in Hawaii. U.S. Army and Air Force units in Europe have difficulty communicating because their systems were developed separately and are not interoperable. Because the Navy and the Air Force use different refueling equipment, tanker aircraft of one cannot refuel fighters of the other without an equipment change. Until recently, even that option was not available. Each service has its own model of transport helicopters, and crews are generally not cross-trained.

Conflicts also exist over service roles and missions. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force all see a role for themselves in space systems and operations; these ambitions compete. Both the Navy and the Air Force operate parts of the strategic deterrent forces. The Army and the Marines have differing views on which service should take the lead in providing the ground forces for the Rapid Deployment Force. The services themselves cannot eliminate the waste, correct the operational difficulties, or resolve the conflicts over roles and missions. Efforts by civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to resolve them, through procurement decisions or new ideas about strategy and tactics, are better than nothing. But they are not nearly so appropriate as military efforts to that end, in the JCS, for example, and their Joint Staff. Unfortunately, those bodies as now constituted are unable to resolve such issues.

Two major organizational issues in the Department of Defense require attention. These are the role of the Military Departments and the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Military Department (or Service) Secretariats are intended to ensure civilian supremacy and to insulate the Service Chiefs from political pressures from Congress and the public. Sometimes the Secretariats are able to carry out these tasks; the key is the relationship the Service Secretary (the man in the middle) has with the Service Chief and with the Secretary of Defense. In some cases the Service Secretary has actually increased the service pressures on the Secretary of Defense and his immediate staff in the OSD. In recent years Assistant Secretaries of the Military departments have often been appointed from the ranks of Congressional staffers in an attempt to cement departmental relations with Congress. Unfortunately, this practice has increased the likelihood of Service Secretariats' trying to bypass the Secretary of Defense in dealing with Congress. The insulation fails, and short circuits result, as the former Congressional staffers revert to their earlier loyalties.

To reduce the number of levels in an overly layered managerial structure, it would be desirable to eliminate the Service Assistant Secretaries and to combine the staffs of the Service Secretary and the Service Chief into a single staff serving both. The Service Secretariat would then include only the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and a total staff of four or five professionals. A more streamlined option would eliminate the Service Secretaries altogether, vesting most of their functions in the Service Chiefs and the rest in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This could make sense if the Service Chiefs were severed completely from their JCS responsibilities. Then the chain-of-command and combat functions (planning, and operations) could be separated from the support functions of personnel, training, development, and procurement. If a less sweeping revision of the present JCS structure is adopted, the retention of a modest Service Secretariat is appropriate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Service Chiefs who now, together with the Chairman, constitute the JCS, have a built-in and insuperable conflict of interest. They have individual responsibility for running their services and confront strong internal pressures to fight for their service interests. They are also expected to provide joint military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense on political-military issues and operational military planning. But the Chairman of the JCS has no power of decision and commands no forces. In fact, he does not even command the Joint Staff.

Service Chiefs must spend so much time running their services that on interservice issues, and especially political-military issues, their reliance on subordinates is great. Those subordinates, who depend for their promotions on the approval of their immediate service superiors, are unlikely to advise the Army Chief of Staff to assign a high priority to defending air bases with Army surface-to-air missiles or to go along with a plan to have British units serve that function for U.S. Air Force bases in Britain. Nor is the Air Force Chief of Staff likely to support Navy suggestions for sealift increases unless the Chief of Naval Operations supports the Air Force's airlift program.

Preparations for military operations, including command arrangements, logistics, and plans, must go through an elaborate interservice procedure. This sytem has its advantages: The interrelationships in a combined operation are examined beforehand, and different perspectives are advanced. But the result is often the lowest-common-denominator resolution of differences in service positions, adding together requests rather than making hard choices either between services or between operational theaters. It is easier, for example, to assume that enough airlift and sealift will somehow be available for multiple contingencies than to face up in advance to the difficult choice as to which front will get priority. And when the Joint Chiefs do face the fact that the requirements will exceed the available lift capacity, their peacetime compromises are likely to be the wrong ones for wartime exigencies.

A variety of views, backgrounds, and experiences must be brought to bear on military advice. Experience across the boundaries of land, naval, and air forces is rare. The President and the Secretary of Defense therefore need a senior interservice advisory body. The JCS, if it is to give coherent advice and to take an effective position reflecting professional military views, should not be a collective body. By far the best solution would be to have a Chief of Military Staff (with a deputy from the naval forces if he is an Army or Air Force officer, or vice versa) and a Joint General Staff drawn from all the services but responsible *to him alone*. He should have the principal authority for promotions on that staff. Some movement back and forth between the general staff and the service staffs would be possible, but obviously there would be a difference in career paths—some officers choosing or being chosen to remain largely within their services, others following a career path of joint service except for occupying, on occasion, some very senior positions in the service in which they were commissioned.

Such an approach would be an attempt to introduce a clearer and less parochial military view on issues of military strategy and capabilities, and the relationship between the two. It would provide a means to clarify roles and missions and to improve the procedure for establishing the requirements for operational capabilities. A General Staff would be able to review, compare, and suggest changes in the plans of commanders with different geographical or functional responsibilities and to decide among their competing demands for limited combat resources. Decisions would be less likely to be influenced by (or go unmade because of) questions of whether individual unified and specified commanders are from one service or another, whether the functions are oriented toward one service or another, or how the decisions would affect service roles, missions, opportunities, futures, and personalities. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress would be able to get much clearer and more accountable military advice than they get now—if they want it. U.S. military planning and strategy would become more responsive to the changed needs of military operations and to complex political-military situations.

The Service Chiefs would continue to have responsibility for structuring, equipping, and training their services. They would make budget recommendations on behalf of their services through their Service Secretaries. But they would no longer make recommendations in a separate chain under JCS auspices. The Chief of Military Staff would make an overall budget recommendation, including a ranking of priorities from among the programs of the different services. He would also review budget decisions and their implications for joint operations.

What is proposed here is to separate those charged with training and procurement (the Service Chiefs) from those charged with strategy and operations. The Chief of Military Staff and the Joint General Staff would provide not a second channel for service inputs but a separate perspective on these matters. It is notable that such a structure and military posts (whatever their names) already exist in so disparate a collection of nations as Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, France, and the Soviet Union.

Are there drawbacks to this Chief of Military Staff–Joint General Staff approach? Surely. It does tend to create an elite group, and strains between that group and the operational forces would be inevitable. Operational commanders at the high level, however, already have multiservice responsibilities and should prefer getting their guidance from a General Staff alone to receiving additional informal but influential pressures from service headquarters. This proposal will not necessarily resolve the problems of, or bring a clear and unique military insight to, choices among weapons systems or procurement levels. And there is a risk in not having at the top levels of the General Staff some of the immediate service experience involved in training, weapons development and procurement, and service doctrine that the Service Chiefs now provide in the JCS.

General David Jones, the recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has proposed a more modest modification of the present JCS system. This would give the Chairman—who would be provided with a deputy—more authority. The Chairman would replace the JCS as a group in their role as principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. The Service Chiefs would continue as members of the JCS. In that role they would advise the Chairman, and each would be given a small interservice staff for that purpose. The present participation of the service staffs in JCS matters, where they effectively have a veto at each of four steps, would disappear. The Joint Staff would be responsible to the Chairman alone. He would have influence in the promotions of officers assigned to the Joint Staff, and they in turn would be allowed to serve longer in those assignments. This proposal is a reasonable way to begin. But it would not fundamentally alter the dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs.

One concern about any JCS reform is frequently expressed, but in my judgment it has no substance. This is that it will produce something analogous to the German General Staff and threaten democratic principles. The problem with the German General Staff in World War I—which was an army staff rather than a joint staff—was not that one service dominated the others; it was, at least in that war, that it dominated the civilian authority. In World War II the German General Staff probably had too little capability to plan or direct combined operations—for example, the Luftwaffe, through Göring, remained a political force on its own. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or a Chief of Military Staff, is no more likely to dominate civilians than is a committee.

A more legitimate question is whether divergent views would be suppressed. Though that possibility will always exist—as it does now—a Secretary of Defense or a President can see to it that alternative choices are presented and can reach down into the services, or to the Unified and Specified Commands, to get dissenting views. Enforced conformity of view is much less likely in a Joint General Staff than within a specific military service. Strong traditions and a sense of cohesion and community make the headquarters staff of a military service more monolithic than any other organizational unit of the U.S. military. Plenty of argument goes on, but it is kept inside.

A reform of the JCS would have several additional benefits. First, it would almost certainly greatly improve the quality of the Joint Staff. That is not to say that the present Joint Staff is of poor quality. It is composed of fine officers. The real stars among the lieutenant colonels, colonels, commanders, and Navy captains, however, are guarded jealously by the individual services. Thus, though the Joint Staff gets its full share of good officers, it probably gets less than its share of the very best. This, almost as much as the existence of service vetoes during the formulation of JCS positions on policy or operations, affects the quality of all Joint Staff work, most importantly their operational planning and their review of the plans of the unified and specified commanders.

Second, military officers in such a Joint General Staff could take over many of the current roles of the OSD staff. Civilian analysts in the Department of Defense have been making military recommendations for more than twenty-five years, and they will undoubtedly continue to do so, no matter what organizational changes are made. But the degree to which their recommendations are accepted over those of military staffs will depend on how well-conceived and responsive the recommendations of the military staffs are, both to the situation and to the needs of civilian decision makers. In principle, the best recommendations would come from a joint military staff or from teams of military officers and civilians, with the military officers usually in charge of those teams. Under present arrangements the JCS organization and the Joint Staff cannot meet the above tests for quality of recommendations. Secretaries of Defense have, therefore, turned to civilian staffs in the Office of International Security Affairs and in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation to get policy and planning advice whose content comprises at least as much of military as of political or technical matters or of international relations.

Usually, but not always, Secretaries of Defense have also turned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a personal adviser. This has inevitably caused the Chairman problems with his colleagues on the JCS and forced him to rely on a staff of four or five—a special assistant and a Chairman's special staff group. He uses the Joint Staff as well, to whatever degree is feasible with a Joint Staff that reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group. All joint staff actions are also monitored and influenced at every step by the staffs of the Military Services.

A third reason for such a change would be to improve the interactions of the Joint Chiefs or of any successor organization with the unified and specified commanders. Almost all modern military operations are joint operations and have been since World War II. Today reconnaissance and target acquisition and designation are largely done from the air or even from space. The ranges of manned and unmanned attack vehicles—ballistic or aerodynamic, launched from land or from the sea—are much larger than they were before. Land and sea battles are now strongly influenced, if not dominated, by control of the air; and air and sea forces require land bases. For all these reasons, the operational commands charged with planning and executing combat operations require a much closer integration of the different services than was necessary in the past, even in World War II. Some of these Unified and Specified Commands are functional and involve only a single service (the specified commands—the Strategic Air Command and the Military Airlift Command); others are geographically defined and tend to be dominated either by naval forces (the Atlantic and Pacific commands) or by ground and ground-based air forces (the European command).

In every case, the unified commanders in the field should have greater control over their component service commands, which now respond more to service headquarters staffs in the Pentagon. The unified and specified commanders (CINCs) should also play more of a role in defining military requirements and budgets and in the initial planning for military contingencies. The Chief of Military Staff, using the Joint General Staff, should then review and balance the plans of the CINCs, reconciling them within limited resources, ensuring their compatibility with overall operational plans for various single-theater or multitheater contingencies, and evaluating them in light of international political considerations. Then, ideally, the CINCs' plans would be redrawn to be compatible with all those constraints, or the constraints would be adjusted where possible.

If these radical JCS and military service reorganizations make sense, why have not previous DOD administrations (specifically my own) put them forward? The answer is simple: Ripeness is all. Such changes are best proposed by either a departing or a recently departed administration, which cannot be accused of self-aggrandizement. They also require the informed support of the incumbent administration. All the organizational changes I have discussed are feasible, given an administration that is strong enough and a modicum of acceptance in the Congress. But until now they have not had a high enough political priority when that political strength was present. The 1980s are a good time to move at least some distance in these directions.

13

Managing the Department of Defense

The Congress established the Department of Defense in 1947, incorporating and reorganizing the elements of the old War Department and Navy Department. The experience of World War II and the immediate postwar years provided much of the impetus. One goal of the reorganization was to integrate the military policy of the United States more closely with its foreign policy, a task that could be more effectively addressed by a single, central, civilian management of the various armed forces and their activities. A second goal was certainly to address the perceived need for efficiency of operation. This was to be done by avoiding waste and duplication and applying sensible business practices in procurement and in other areas where they could reasonably be expected to save the taxpayer money. The original Congressional hearings on the legislation establishing the Department of Defense (DOD), the legislation itself, and the testimony on and text of the amendments that have since gradually restructured the department all make frequent reference to such principles.

In the years since 1947, there have been many calls for better, more efficient, and more effective management of the Department of Defense. Some come from the General Accounting Office (GAO), which offers many suggestions every year—some practical and some not, some useful and some not, some adopted and some not. In 1981 the retiring Comptroller General, Elmer Staats, indicated that he had delivered to the new Secretary of Defense a list of fifteen suggestions. The savings from their adoption would, he said, reach an "absolute minimum" of $4 billion a year by 1985. A further list, which would take longer to implement, could be expected to increase the annual savings to $10 billion. Some of the proposals were new, most were not, but none of the good ones was at all easy to implement or they would have been adopted before.

Suggestions also come from political candidates. As a Presidential candidate in 1976, for example, Governor Carter advocated a $5 billion to $7 billion reduction in the defense budget through the elimination of waste. In office, President Carter explained that such savings, if achieved, would mean a budget lower than it would otherwise have been, rather than a budget lower than the previous year's budget. Innumerable Congressmen, retired military officers, academics, and journalists call for savings, for rationalization, and for reorganization.

It should be no surprise that every Secretary of Defense also takes office declaring that he will cut back, eliminate waste, reorganize, and manage better. And each succeeds—to a certain extent. Some are more successful at that particular duty of the office than others. But each—and I include myself—has left office at least as frustrated by what he had failed to get done as he was pleased by what he had accomplished along these lines. There are still four tactical air forces, and there are still too many military bases and installations for the present or any reasonably anticipated size of U.S. armed forces. There is still a mismatch between the procurement of initial systems and equipment, and the procurement of spare parts. There are still fifty-cent fasteners that cost fifty dollars. Why?

Many (though by no means all) of the disappointed hopes and expectations of Secretaries of Defense can be traced to some common confusions and misconceptions. In many cases, Secretaries of Defense have in mind—and express in word and deed—different and even conflicting objectives. Pursuing some can make others difficult or impossible, or can undo them once they have been done. Furthermore, the comparison to business, useful in some contexts and in some areas of defense management, breaks down in others.

The management procedures followed in spending the $110 billion for research and development (R&D) and for procurement included in the fiscal 1982 defense budget certainly bear many resemblances to those in the private sector. But the overall size and expenditures of the Department of Defense continue to dwarf most individual business enterprises. Even Exxon, number one in the *Fortune* 500, has annual sales that are only about half the annual expenditures of the DOD. In personnel, the differences with the private sector are more obvious: The DOD has more than 2 million uniformed personnel and about 1 million civilian employees and in fiscal 1982 supported about 3 million workers in defense industries. By contrast, Exxon has about 139,000 employees, and AT&T, the single largest private employer, has just over 1 million.

The Department of Defense also has an enormously diverse set of products, but only one line of business. Consider the following list of objectives and activities of the DOD:

- The Armed Forces must deter armed conflict and, if necessary, fight. They must be organized. This organization includes the formulation of doctrine, the creation of strategy and supporting war plans, the recruitment and training of personnel, and the deployment and maintenance of forces. Each of these activities requires a very different kind of management, although they certainly influence one another.
- The DOD must procure, repair, maintain, and often develop materiel ranging from aircraft carriers to light bulbs.
- DOD policies, programs, and operations must support the foreign policy of the United States—a truism, but not one that applies to business activities in the private sector.
- The DOD must deal with a vast and diverse set of constituencies—including the public, Congress, the media, organizations of retired military people, and the various nongovernmental associations interested in national security. The acceptability of defense budgets, programs, and activities all depend on the attitudes of some or all of these constituencies. Their views must therefore be taken into account. A great deal of consultation, explanation, and persuasion is required.

Most important, the Department of Defense differs from business because it is part of the government. There is no single number that provides a bottom-line measure of how well the DOD or any other government agency is being managed. And there is a whole set of conflicting and often legitimate forces whose pull is neither toward improved efficiency nor toward increased combat capability.

Beyond this difference, there is also a balance to be struck between cost and combat effectiveness. For any particular level of combat effectiveness, there should be a way to do the job at the lowest cost possible. Doing so makes resources available, either for additional military capability that can be translated into greater confidence of being able to support or extend U.S. foreign policy goals, for nonmilitary foreign aid that can serve the same purpose, or for support of domestic goals, including a balanced budget. But there are differences in judgment, even among well-informed, experienced, and dedicated people, about the relative effectiveness of different military forces.

The criteria that define effectiveness vary with external circumstances and with the internal assumptions on which the comparison is based. Some of this variation is susceptible to economic analysis or systems analysis, but some is not. There are also differences between what is efficient in peacetime and what is effective in wartime. In principle, the United States wants to structure its military forces for optimum wartime use, but it is less likely to pay the high premium for such a configuration if the likelihood of war appears remote. Readiness for combat is expensive. So long as crises that require such readiness do not arise, it may come to be thought of as unnecessary insurance.

It is therefore not possible to manage the Department of Defense exactly like a business and to try to get to a bottom line that indicates profit or any other single measurable criterion. Even the management criteria used in private nonprofit organizations or in other parts of the government cannot be applied to all the various operations of the DOD.

Each of these differences from private business management is worth more detailed consideration. The problems of a government agency are familiar. Clearly there is and always will be great political pressure from local officials, members of Congress, and the White House staff on decisions, for example, to realign military bases in a way that would reduce the number of jobs at any location. There can be equal or even greater pressure on awards of defense contracts. Such pressure undermines efficient management by any economic standard.

It was easy to show in 1979 that it made sense to reduce from nine to five the number of defense contract and supply centers in the Defense Logistics Agency. And it was not too hard to determine, by economic analysis, which four should go. But only one was eliminated. The political forces in the regions concerned did not agree with the analysis and came up with alternative calculations. These were not correct, but they were difficult to prove incorrect to their authors.

In the business sector, the arguments would be heard and a decision would be made and implemented. Moreover, the final decision could be made privately, with the appropriate executive considering and judging the various arguments and calculations submitted by the parties within the organization, interested and disinterested. But in the Department of Defense there is no privacy in decision making except in the Secretary's own office, and by no means always there. Given an arena to perform in and a captive audience, officials of the military services, Congressmen, and countless other parties engage in a debilitating amount of posturing.

The story on military bases is much the same, but it has several dimensions. There is little doubt that by the time a choice must be made between eliminating a military base in the Northeast or Midwest and one in the South or the West, analysis will show that it is cheaper to keep the one in the Sunbelt. There is some merit to the opposing contention that a more uniform distribution of bases is needed both to retain a geographically diversified infrastructure and to ensure broad political support, but I have never found that argument decisive.

My own examination, though, has indicated that there is a story behind the story. A major reason the Sunbelt bases look more cost effective by the time the choice is presented to the Secretary of Defense is the way in which many smaller decisions, sometimes biased in nature and always biasing in effect, were made well down in the organization for decades beforehand. Generally these decisions were made by senior military officers, who were thinking not only of the most cost-effective way to manage the base structure and operate the forces. They were also weighing which organization of facilities would provide a larger number of senior managerial spots. They were thinking as well about where they and their friends would prefer to serve—in the snow or in the sun. When it came time to retire, they wanted to retire near a military hospital and a commissary—and those will be where the bases are. Under such circumstances, there is little inclination to improve or expand a base in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan when you can expand one in Florida or Texas or California instead. Another well-known cause of the existing geographical base structure is the functioning of the Congressional seniority system, which put southern Democrats from safe districts in committee chairs in the days when chairmen ruled and bases were built. Those states and districts benefited accordingly.

These earlier decisions were not improper, nor have they necessarily led to the wrong result. Sunbelt bases have better flying and training weather, and in the past facilities were less expensive to build there. To some degree these remain factors in today's decisions. The personal factors do demonstrate, however, that when the time comes for a critical decision, what may seem to be a decision based entirely on cost effectiveness will often depend on other elements, influential or even decisive, that developed for quite different reasons.

It is instructive to examine some other examples of the forces that affect management in its drive for efficiency. Shouldn't procurement be centralized? Yes, it should. But the real question is, for which items? It seems appropriate to centralize procurement of standard items, and the Defense Logistics Agency was set up to do just that. Light bulbs and raincoats can be most efficiently procured that way. But what about aircraft engine parts? They have a critical effect on combat readiness, and a good argument can be made that they should be procured by the particular command that will be carrying out the maintenance and repair.

What about centralized training? The example of undergraduate helicopter-pilot training is a good one. There is no fundamental reason that initial training in helicopters cannot be the same for the Navy as for the Army. Indeed, the Army has done the first-level training of many Marine helicopter pilots. But even during the brief period when the Navy agreed to such a change, members of Congress from Florida, where separate Navy undergraduate helicopter training is carried out, reached a different military conclusion and were able to sustain that position in Congress.

The arguments about cost and efficiency will be further complicated by different judgments as to the relative combat effectiveness of the less expensive way of doing things. Some of these differences can be analyzed and quantified, but others cannot. The same is true, of course, of many aspects of business. Not even the best opinion poll will predict consumer preferences with high accuracy. And a revolution in Iran affects the price of gasoline and sales of automobiles as much as it affects the feasibility of a given U.S. military strategy in Southwest Asia. But combat capabilities and military posture bring a sense of urgency and importance to the debate that can easily outweigh the analytical arguments for efficiency, or even for effectiveness measured by some particular criterion. If this urgency does not overwhelm the decision making of the executive branch, it can still do so in Congress, especially when it is reinforced by the political interests of members whose states or districts will be affected.

Moreover, though the separate services develop and procure equipment and recruit and train personnel, they do not make decisions about force deployment or about the use of forces in combat. Those decisions are made in the field by the unified and specified commanders, based on instructions transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This means that when the services give advice on alternative ways of accomplishing a given combat mission, they do so primarily as suppliers rather than as users. That is, they are interested in selling more, not spending less.

Examples abound. The question of the effectiveness of land-based or sea-based tactical air power in conventional warfare goes beyond the issue of which deployment mode is able to deliver a certain amount of ordnance on target for a given cost. The answer to that is rather clear: Over a campaign of several months or more, land-based airpower will be more cost effective, *if* both are equally available. But will land bases or bases to support naval forces be available? How soon after a crisis arises will they be available? How much materiel can be prepositioned at land bases for land-based air forces? What about the relative vulnerability to attack of land bases and the ships of a carrier task force? Answers to all of these questions depend on the particular contingency envisioned. All such answers are also subject to geopolitical judgments about the way they interact with U.S. foreign policy. And all are quite removed from the simpler issue of whether land-based or sea-based air forces, when in place, will be more accurate, more responsive, more efficient, and more economical. Many of those simpler questions can be answered by quantitative analysis—though different analysts are likely to come to different conclusions. The diplomatic and geopolitical questions are much more difficult to analyze and cannot easily be stated numerically.

Another illustration: The so-called "light" ground forces require much less airlift capability for their deployment than do armored forces. But once they get to a combat zone they will have less mobility and less punch, because they will lack the armored vehicles and helicopters needed for local mobility. Thus decisions on the mix of armored forces, helicopter-borne air-mobile forces, and infantry will depend largely on such issues as the nature of the forces they are expected to fight and whether they will be defending a limited though valuable area or moving forward from wherever they disembark into surrounding areas against enemy resistance. These issues, as much as the questions of accuracy of ordnance delivery, target detection and identification, and sortie rates that are the usual stuff of systems analysis, are likely to be the critical ones.

The list of examples could be extended almost indefinitely. The management of the Department of Defense must also choose between a B-1 and a bomber based on new technology, and between a land-based MX missile and a sea-based alternative. It must select the right mix of aircraft carriers, attack submarines, and surface ships equipped with cruise missiles. These choices depend on much analysis and even more on judgment. When a choice is made with which a particular commentator disagrees, that commentator will often characterize it as "waste." And so it can be, in one sense. Suppose a decision turns out to produce less combat capability for a given expenditure than some bypassed alternative. Or suppose a particular weapons system's deployability or usability is incorrectly evaluated because of misjudgments of international factors. In either case, the decision produces less capability than the same funding could have done if invested elsewhere. And judgments about the best choice will vary widely, not only before the system is procured but even after it is procured and deployed or even after it is used. It is not improper to call such mistakes "waste." But that is not the same kind of waste as the unnecessary extra military bases in the United States, which add nothing to U.S. capability.

This is the nature of some of the problems. What are the solutions? The first step is to acknowledge that the conflicts and contradictions of managing defense cannot be fully resolved. They can only be traded off against each other, well or not so well. It will be argued that such insoluble conflicts obviously exist in any large organization: External political forces act on every government agency; every corporation faces difficult choices, with many of the factors largely matters of judgment and only partly quantifiable. All this is true. But the intensity of the pressures and the importance of the stakes are so much larger in the Department of Defense as to produce a qualitative difference. Individual corporate mistakes can have catastrophic financial effects for many people; wasteful or misguided domestic policies can damage the country; but mistakes in defense and foreign policy can kill us all. That alters the nature of management in these areas. In that sense, the DOD cannot be fully managed—or at least, much of it cannot be managed like a business.

Organizing parts of it in a businesslike way is desirable; it improves efficiency and saves money. The defense establishment is more efficient now than it was in, say, the 1950s. But the management of the Department of Defense still needs major improvement.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense must exercise close policy control over military strategy, force structure, arms control, research and development of weapons, force deployments, and interactions with the military establishments of other countries. Only in that way can there be reasonable assurance of a coherent defense policy and assurance that defense policy supports foreign policy. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense must have the responsibility for dealing with the various defense constituencies. These practices have generally been followed for the past twenty years, and they are being followed now. But there are some signs that they may be weakening, as they have from time to time in the past. Then the individual services follow separate global strategies, procure hardware and forces that fail to match, and conduct public relations and Congressional lobbying activities that compete even more than usual. The need for the Secretary of Defense to exercise these particular powers, though, is so clear that in the long run they will always come back to him and his staff.

The Military Departments should probably have more authority than they have had recently in contracting and procurement and in training and experimenting with different kinds of combat organization. Then the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs must be held accountable for the results. This is one area in which I am not particularly satisfied with my own performance. The problem is that it is difficult to hold subordinates (especially middle-rank civilians) accountable for their performance in government. It is then often fairer—and easier in the short run—to pull the authority back to the top level.

It is neither feasible nor desirable to abolish the Military Services, which create and foster the kind of morale and loyalty on which military organizations so much depend. Moreover, the Military Departments offer one of the few forms in which necessary decentralization of business-type responsibilities can be effected in the Department of Defense.

The need for improvement and some ways to achieve it have been described; fairness demands an overall assessment. Mine is that despite its difficulties, the Department of Defense is nevertheless the most efficient and the best managed—even in business terms—of all the major departments and agencies of the U.S. government. (Unfortunately, that is damning it with faint praise.) It operates more effectively than the others and is (along with the Department of State, perhaps) the most ably staffed—by military and senior civilian officials alike. Presidents, White House staffs, governors, and mayors turn to DOD when they need something done even outside the military sphere. This is not only because the Department has such substantial financial and hardware resources; it is also because DOD is organized to get things done.

But the major lesson to be drawn from any study of management in the Department of Defense is the basic limitation that any attempt to manage DOD in an ideal fashion will confront. The need to be able to fight a war will always limit the peacetime efficiency of the defense establishment. So will domestic political factors. The problem remains—and will always remain—one of balancing the need for combat readiness and capability with the need for efficiency by exerting strong leadership within the democratic political process. The pull of highly demanding requirements for flexible combat capability—employable in a variety of unpredictable circumstances against opposing forces whose capabilities cannot be confidently foreseen—is a crucial element of our national security. Neither the democratic political process nor the requirements of combat capability can or should be totally overridden in the name of cost-effectiveness. To manage the nation's defense efficiently at the lowest possible cost, along the lines of private-sector business management and organization, is a useful standard. But meeting it exactly entails prices the United States cannot afford to pay. One is the abandonment of democratic control. Another is the loss of a war. Defense cannot be managed like a business, but it can be *led* in a way that preserves U.S. national security interests while operating effectively in a world of limits and amid the pull of conflicting interests.

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, Quayle, Denton, Nunn, Stennis, Hart, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, and Dixon.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, Carl M. Smith, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, Russell C. Miller, Patricia L. Watson, research assistants; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; William S. Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. The committee will come to order.

Before we start, I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that the House of Representatives passed the JCS reorganization bill, H.R. 3622, by an overwhelming vote of 383 to 27. The House JCS vote is a very powerful one. I believe the House action will build a momentum for substantial JCS reorganization.

This morning we will continue the committee's hearings on the subject of the Defense organization. Today we are privileged to have as witnesses the two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the current Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Command of which the U.S. Armed Forces were last employed in a major operation, that is, Grenada.

Our first two witnesses are former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs. Both are uniquely qualified to address the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense.

Adm. Thomas Moorer served as Unified Commander, U.S. Atlantic Command, as Chief of the Naval Operations from 1967 to 1978 and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from 1970 to 1974.

Gen. David Jones served as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force in Europe from 1974 to 1978, as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, and 1978 to 1982 as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

As many of you know, General Jones has taken the lead in calling for organizational changes in the JCS, although this issue has been periodically debated for almost 40 years. The proposals he made while serving as Chairman of the JCS kicked off the current round of intense interest.

Admiral Moorer has also been an active participant in the debate. We will let Admiral Moorer speak for himself, but it is fair to say that Admiral Moorer disagrees with General Jones on one or two points.

Both Admiral Moorer and General Jones joined us at the meeting at A.P. Hill last month and all of us present at that meeting benefited greatly from their counsel and comments.

At 11 a.m. this morning we will hear from Adm. Wesley McDonald, currently Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command.

Senator Nunn, do you have an opening statement?

Senator NUNN. I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses this morning. They both have had extensive experience, both have been Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs. There is a slight chance they may not agree on every item. I am sure they both have the same motive which is to strengthen our national security.

So, we welcome both of them.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to be here.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Only to say that as we proceed with these hearings, which I think were laid down very carefully, there is a pattern that is beginning to evolve and a pattern which I think will be extremely helpful to the members of the committee as we approach this decision.

I wish to commend the chairman and the distinguished ranking minority member in the selection of the witnesses and the scheduling of these hearings. I am confident that the full committee will eventually come out with a unanimous decision on this difficult subject.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALAN DIXON

I am pleased to be here this morning, Mr. Chairman, as the committee conducts its fourth hearing on issues related to the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense.

We have three very distinguished and well-qualified witnesses before the committee today. I appreciate their willingness to appear before the committee and give us the benefit of their insights and expertise.

The witnesses before us today are particularly well-qualified to discuss questions involving the roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the roles of the unified commanders. I look forward to their contributions and to the benefits of their insights and expertise.

My own review of the study prepared by the staff of this committee leads me to believe that both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a little authority but not enough. The same thing may be said of the unified commanders. Their ability to coordinate and control the resources nominally under their commands clearly must be improved.

I therefore welcome the recommendations and analysis of Admiral Moorer, General Jones, and Admiral McDonald on these issues and other issues related to the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Defense Department.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Admiral Moorer, we will welcome your testimony first.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before this committee. As you know, I have been here many, many times before and certainly to see Senator Stennis again and Senator Nunn, and Senator Warner, and Senator Dixon with whom I have worked with so long is an experience I did not think I was going to have again. I am very pleased to have this opportunity.

You are correct. I do not agree with many of the things in this staff study and I will tell you why.

In the first place, I was a little disappointed in appendix B to this study which was designed to tell what happened at A.P. Hill and the phrase "The experts generally agreed" appeared over and over.

I think there were several Senators that did not agree. Mr. Murray did not agree and I made a point of notifying everyone that I did not agree. As a matter of fact, Senator Nunn made a joke about that.

Aside from that, I would like, just for the benefit, particularly of Senator Dixon and others, to outline my career.

I was at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked. I saw 2,000 American boys dead, laid out on the grass, ships burning and exploding. I was shot down during the war in flames. I was aboard a ship that was sunk by aircraft, and I jumped overboard.

Subsequently as I went on through the Navy, I was appointed Commander of the 7th Fleet by President Kennedy and subsequently commanded the Pacific Fleet. I commanded the Atlantic Fleet. I commanded the Unified Command in the Atlantic.

I was Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and later Chief of Naval Operations, and then Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff.

During that time when I was a unified commander we landed the 82d Airborne in the Dominican Republic. That was a very smooth operation and I think the subsequent activities in the Dominican Republic proved it was a good move on the part of the United States.

I did not notice any of the allegations that are made in this report in the sense that the services tried to get a piece of the pie. As a matter of fact, the Chief of Staff of the Army made a special trip to my headquarters to thank me for providing ship transportation for Army helicopters to the Dominican Republic. So far as I was concerned, that was a smooth operation.

In addition to that, when I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff we had the war in Jordan, the India-Pakistan war, the war between Israel and the Arabs in 1973 and, of course, overlaying all that was the Vietnam war.

I was in a command position from the time that we put advisers in South Vietnam until the time an agreement was made which ultimately released the POW's in 1973. That was a span of 9 years that I was heavily involved in the Vietnam war.

During that time I supervised and worked on the plans for the Cambodian cross border operation, for the Sontay prison raid, for mining Haiphong Harbor, for the Christmas bombing in 1972 which was so severely criticized, and I am sure if Senator Denton were here, he would express the fact that he thought it was a pretty good operation.

I just want to make the point that I probably have a different sense of values than many people who are involved in this problem because I have been associated with three Presidents, five Secretaries of Defense and many Secretaries of the services, and, in addition to that, I have testified before the Congress many times on many subjects.

When I was Chairman, the country was in a state of near anarchy. We had people pouring blood on the Pentagon steps, throwing rocks through the Justice Department Building, lying down on Constitution Avenue, and, finally, we had a situation where a President was forced to resign.

But all through that I have made my mind up that since we have the greatest country in the world and we have a democracy which is designed on the basis of checks and balances, that nothing is ever going to be perfect because it is men who make decisions, men who fight battles and men who die and not structures that make decisions and structures that fight battles. Structures apparently sometimes die and sometimes they do not.

In any event, I would like to point out one more thing. Besides several combat medals, I have nine medals of distinguished service, five from the Navy, one from the Army, one from the Air Force, and two from the Secretary of Defense. The citation from the Secretary of Defense says that Admiral Moorer always put his country first despite any interest he might have of a personal nature or interest in his service.

I was very proud of that until I read this staff report and I found out that Mr. Locher and Mr. Odeen now say that the Secretary of Defense did not know what he was talking about, that when I was Chief of Naval Operations my interest was just in the Navy and not in the security of the country.

I do not think you should make these kinds of statements about people. You can say that we are not talking about the people, we are talking about the structure, and so on, but you are talking about the people when you talk about what things have happened in the past.

I will get quickly to some of the things you asked me to comment on. For instance, let us talk about the JCS and the organization of the JCS itself.

I must say that after reading this report, I have to conclude that General Jones and I—General Jones is quoted many times—did not have the same job. He said he did not have enough power. He says that the JCS did not submit clear, concise, and timely advice.

I say that if that was the case, it was his responsibility to prepare a Chairman's memorandum and provide the Secretary of Defense with clear, timely advice.

I look back on situations such as the mining of Haiphong. The Joint Chief of Staff recommended that strongly in 1965, I wrote the plan. We recommended over and over again and it was not until 1972 that President Nixon authorized it. We were, at that time, flying 1,000 sorties a day. We used only 26 aircraft, not a person was hurt and not one ship left that harbor until we went down ourselves and removed the mines.

On occasions such as that it was not the JCS that permitted North Vietnam to have a sanctuary in Cambodia. It was not the JCS that refused to attack tanks in Lake Bhatt north of the DMZ. Three times we submitted in writing a recommendation to attack these tanks, telling the National Command Authority that some foggy morning they were going to come across the DMZ. They did just that on April 3, 1971, and proceeded all the way to the Cua Viet River.

I can site you over and over again where we did give very timely advice and it never was accepted. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the White House judged the timeliness of advice on the basis of whether or not we recommended what they wanted to do.

You can also say the JCS does not give timely advice by saying they do not agree with the advice because they want to do something else. I know that you mentioned in one of your speeches the *Pueblo*. I was closely associated with that.

What happened was that the Commander of the 7th Fleet intercepted the *Pueblo*'s transmission, ordered the *Enterprise* to proceed into the Japanese Sea at full speed, but Washington then put out an order and told the *Enterprise* to reverse course and not to enter the Tsusima Strait.

So, I think somehow everything that happens focuses on the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than recognizing that there are many people involved in what we do.

During the Vietnam War, Mr. Chairman, as you well know, the rules of engagement were very odd, to say the least. You have done more to try to find out what they were and who published them and who thought of them than any man in this Senate, but we had to abide by them.

People say to me, "You could resign." I thought about it, but the one thing that was driving me during that time was the POW's and I was determined I was going to stay there until I got them free, and we did that with the Christmas bombing of 1972.

There are suggestions that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff just select his own officers. I defied any service Chief to send an officer to the Joint Staff when I was Chairman that I would not have. The Chairman has all the power he needs to veto any assignment if he does not like it.

There is a suggestion—I think this is also by the House—that the Chairman should control the promotions, some elite group that has worked in the Joint Staff on the basis of this joint performance.

Generally speaking, when an officer comes up with three or four stars, the Chairman may not even know him. If that was put into effect, what he would have to do is have a staff officer go over to the records of this individual and summarize what other people had said about him and the Chairman really would not know anything about him personally. He would just know what the staff officer wrote down. So, it goes on and on and on in terms of trying to make some kind of organizational change which would change people. I do not think, Mr. Chairman, that that is possible. I could point out several other things.

Now, when I was Chairman the problems we faced were of two kinds. There were time-sensitive problems and there were planning problems which take time, giving an opportunity to talk to the service Secretary, unified commanders, Secretary of Defense, and so on. However, frequently there were problems that came up which had to have an immediate answer.

Alongside my bed I had a classified teletype, I had a classified telephone, and the minute that message hit the Pentagon, it also hit my bedroom. I would call the Secretary of Defense and clear with him the action we would take and then I would notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Somehow the picture has been painted that the Joint Chiefs have to have a debate and bicker before we take any kind of action. That is not the case. I repeat that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has all the power he needs if he just wants to take it.

I would like to now shift to the Unified Commands. I think you have to recognize when the Congress established the Unified Command plan, it was right after World War II. It was designed for a large-scale war.

Well, today the press has hyped up every little instance so much that the truth is that you have a situation where five airplanes intercept one transport flying from Cairo to Tunis, and it turns out to receive the attention of a major battle.

In a real full-scale war the things that rush into the White House from outside would never be mentioned back here. There is no communication system that could absorb the kinds of things that happen in a big war.

So, I appeal to you to bear in mind that an organization that does not work in full-scale war is one that we should not have.

Now, there have been several allegations, for instance, that the unified commanders do not have enough power either, according to this report, and that they have component commanders that only deal with the services and undercut the unified commander. I say that is the unified commander's fault.

The statement is made that the unified commander cannot select his staff. There has never been a Chief of Staff or a service who would send a unified commander an officer for his staff that a unified commander did not want. Before the officer is ordered, there are frequent telephone calls back and forth.

The unified commander cannot have everyone he wants because he might be on another unified commander's staff over in Europe or somewhere else. But a strong effort is made to satisfy any unified commander.

Much has been made about inter-service rivalry. I can tell you there is also what I call inter-regional rivalry, because the unified commanders, because of the responsibilities they have, certainly want to have the strongest force they can get their hands on. But where does that force come from?

It comes from another unified commander. In that sense, he is a rival of the other unified commander. So, there are several things of this kind.

Now, I want to point out to you that the unified commanders do not have any responsibility for research and development or for recruiting or for training, and so on, which is a composite part of the budget. They are properly interested in the readiness of forces and their combat capability today.

Many of the budget items are designed to provide the forces for the future. Every President that comes into office is dependent upon the decisions made by his predecessors for the forces he uses in the military sense to promote and support his foreign policy. So, I think there is a limit to what the unified commanders can do.

I did not find when I was a unified commander that I did not have enough power. You know, we kind of divide power around this town. General Jones said he did not have enough power. Mr. Locher says the Chiefs of service have too much power. He also said that unified commanders do not have enough power and the Congress says the President has too much power, so they pass the War Powers Act. So, we are always redistributing power around this town.

I think for the people who really want to do the job, the statutes today provide adequate power. That has been my experience during very tumultuous times in the history of our country.

I would like to mention briefly procurement. We are talking all the time about procurement. We have the Packard Commission. I have talked to them several times. But let me just point out a couple of things and I will wind up.

In the first place, the TFX airplane. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Naval Operations did everything they could to prevent the building of that airplane which is now called the F-111. General LeMay took a very strong position and we had a Chief of Naval Operations who got fired. This happened while I was Chief of the Navy.

The Navy spent $600 million and we did not get one solitary airplane. It had nothing to do with structure, it had nothing to do with the organization. The Secretary of Defense just made up his mind he was going to do it that way and that was the way it was going to be, period.

You read about those aircraft that intercepted that Egyptian airplane the other day. I can tell you right now if it had not been for Senator Stennis, that airplane would never have existed because he was the one that redirected the Navy effort toward an airplane that is now the best fighter in the world.

So, I am saying that I think you might be a little optimistic about what will happen if you change the structure.

Now, if you were to introduce all the recommendations that Mr. Locher and Mr. Odeen have put in that staff report, there would be utter and total and complete chaos. I do not know how long it would take us to recover from that multitude of recommendations.

Now, we have had many studies and in this particular study there are quotes dating all the way back to George Washington. It goes on and on. There are no negatives. No one is quoted on the other side of the issue.

The Blue Ribbon Panel is brought up several times. Mr. Fitzhugh was head of that. I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Fitzhugh panel talked to me about 5 minutes.

Mr. Locher did not mention the fact that there were several very distinguished members of that committee who put in a very strong dissent and one of them was Mr. Powell who is a member of the Supreme Court, Mr. Clements who was Deputy Secretary of Defense and later Governor of Texas, Hobart Lewis who is head of the Reader's Digest, and two or three others.

Mr. Locher keeps quoting just as if everybody accepted the Blue Ribbon Panel report. Of course, Mr. Nixon, did not like it at all. Very few of the recommendations in that report were put into effect because he took a personal interest in it. That is where we began to create all these layers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The first approach was another Deputy. Now, they dropped that down to an Under Secretary of Defense.

The Senate staff report recommends in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that we go the mission control route. Well, the missions that are listed in this report I do not think are practical in a real sense. I think it is noteworthy that this report was written by a system analyst.

The only division in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that is mission-oriented is the System Analyst Division. So, maybe there is a little parochialism setting in here.

At the Georgetown Center, Mr. Odeen worked on a report they published which is a dead ringer for this one. Mr. Odeen quotes Mr. Locher and Mr. Locher turns around and quotes Mr. Odeen in his report. So, I think people get a mind set in one direction and it just snowballs in this town and the media pick it up because the media like controversy and the media want to criticize the Congress, the President and the Pentagon, and so on.

I just want to comment on one more thing. That is that very much depends in this organization on the relationship between the President and the Secretary of Defense and between the Secretary of Defense and the service people. Today you have, I think, the best situation that has ever existed.

Now, I note Secretary Weinberger gets chopped on by the media and he gets called to task by the Congress, and so on, but, in my opinion, he is the best Secretary of Defense we have ever had. All you have to do is ask the current Chiefs of Staff and the military people today and they will give you that same answer, because he delegates authority and he listens to what you have to say.

He understands that the civilian people in control should tell the military what to do and not how to do it. We spent years and years being told how to do it. We had a 10-mile circle around Hanoi or a

5-mile circle around Haiphong, a 30-mile buffer on China and we were not allowed to cross the DMZ.

Troops were not allowed to fly past latitude 20 degrees. We were not allowed to send over 50 sorties. It went on and on. This did not have anything to do with the JCS or the structure. You cannot control by drawing a diagram and putting people in boxes, how people are going to perform.

It is recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attend the National Security Council meetings. When I was appointed, I asked President Nixon if I could always do that and he said, yes, because Mr. Johnson did not let that happen. The President can operate the way he wants to, regardless of what kind of structure you put together.

If the President does not want the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the National Security Council meeting, he does not have to have a Security Council meeting. What he does is have a lunch and advise the people he does want to come.

My recommendation is that we do not make any major statutory changes. I do not think we will accomplish anything. As a matter of fact, many of the recommendations have already taken place. What we are doing is putting recommendations in that should have been put in maybe 10 years ago, but in the meantime, these things have worked out.

Recently under General Vessey, who has done a fantastic job over there in this area, we have memoranda of understanding between the Air Force and the Navy, between the Army and the Air Force, and the contingency plans are briefed every year.

The CINCs are called in and conduct war games. This is an evolutionary process. I just think it would be a mistake to whipsaw the whole system and try to start all over because some person said something that happened sometime ago.

For instance, one of the things I keep hearing is that in the Pacific Command the Army put some ammunition where the CINC did not want it to go. I talked to the CINC just last Friday. He did not know what they were talking about.

So, I can point out in this study many things where they say things happened and you go run it down. For instance, they quoted General Goodpaster saying he could not control component commanders and they were always end running him. I can tell you this: I talked to General Goodpaster three or four times, more than that, a week. He never said anything like that to me.

If he had just said one time he did not like this component commander or that component commander, it would have been changed like that. So, I think the system is set up to work during the environment which you find at the moment.

I will just wind up by saying that it is people who make things happen, who make decisions and fight wars. It is not organizations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Moorer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY (RET.)

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate, As background for my remarks today, I would like to quickly review my involvement in the Unified Command plan. I have commanded the aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean as well as the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific; I have served as a component commander in the role of Commander in Chief of both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets; I have served as a unified commander in the Atlantic as well as the Supreme Allied Command in the Atlantic, and subsequently was Chief of Naval Operations and, finally Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During these assignments, I was involved at the highest level in the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964; the landing of the 82nd Airborne Division in the Dominican Republic in 1965; in wars in Jordan, India and Pakistan, as well as the Yom Kippur war between Israel and the Arabs in 1973, and during this time the war in Vietnam was in full cry.

During this time, I personally supervised the planning, involving such things as the Cambodia across-the-border operations in 1970; the Sontay prison raid; the mining of Haiphong harbor, and the Christmas bombing of 1972. So, I have dealt personally with two Presidents, five Secretaries of Defense, and a large number of service chiefs and unified commanders. Consequently, the opinions I express today are dictated by my experience and not through hearsay or intellectual imagination.

I would like to inject here a brief reference to Annex B contained in the Staff Report on Defense Organization. I was very concerned at the time, and so stated to the entire group at Fort A.P. Hill, that I did not agree with the thrust of the Locher report and did not want to have my name listed in the group of supporters. Nevertheless, Appendix B, at the beginning of paragraph 4 on page 642, first sentence, states that ". . . The group agreed that the fundamental analyses in this study were sound and accurately reflected the substantive problem areas in the Department of Defense." I said at the time I did not agree with the analyses and I would like to repeat before the full Committee again that I do not agree.

I will now explain why I take issue with this report, which is full of quotes, allegations, and opinions drawn from a multitude of people, some of whom should know better.

Let me be more specific. In any overlook of the United Command System, one should bear in mind that in the debate over the National Defense Act of 1947, the main focus was directed toward development of a system that would work in a large-scale war. Today we have minor confrontations which generate extreme attention on the part of the executive and legislative branches of our government as well as the media and, hence, the public. For instance, in a recent event where only seven fighters intercepted one airplane, the President of the United States was queried over and over about this matter even though he was doing his best to discuss the proposed tax reform. My point is that in a full-scale war, those things that receive headline attention today in many cases would never reach Washington.

Much of the criticism levied in the Staff Report focuses on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of each service. First, let me say that the JCS system in conformity with our general approach of government involving the three equal branches, is based on checks and balances. In my opinion, the worst thing that could happen would be to have some Wizard of Oz in the Pentagon designated as the only one who could advise the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States. Suppose he were to be wrong and that there were senior, experienced officers in the Pentagon who were prepared to render sound advice but were prevented from doing so? The JCS represents in excess of 150 years of military experience. It is only natural that they do not always have the same opinion about every problem. This is the 23rd study made of the JCS and I have often wondered why so much focus is directed toward the JCS when in effect it is far more efficient than many agencies in the government, including the Congress. I can only conclude that the problems faced in the national security area, which cut across so many domestic as well as international issues, are so complex that people become frustrated because they cannot readily acquire a simple answer to a very complex problem.

The JCS, at least during my experience, deal with two sets of issues. The first issue is one that is very time-sensitive and frequently this does not allow time for long deliberation. When I was Chairman during the Vietnam war and faced with such an issue, I did not take a poll at two o'clock in the morning, but rather checked with the Secretary of Defense and proceeded to take action informing the other members of the JCS immediately thereafter. I was confident that they would fully approve since professional people who have worked closely together for many, many years understand each other.

The second type of issue involves planning and programming which require extended consultation with the unified commanders, the office of the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries and service commanders as a process which takes several months. To get down to more specifics, it is claimed that the JCS do not give timely advice. This is patently unfair. The Secretaries of Defense who have agreed with this charge define timely advice as advice with which they agree. Let me give some examples. In 1964, the Navy was conducting reconnaissance over Laos. We were told what altitude to fly and what camera to use. Due to the terrain in Laos, I advised the Secretary of Defense that we would lose an aircraft and that I was changing the altitude. I was ordered to resume the low altitude and an aircraft was promptly shot down. This was reported to Washington and I received an order which said that under no circumstances was I to overfly North Vietnam in my rescue attempts, which meant, of course, we had to fly far south and round the DMZ. By the time the helicopter arrived, the young pilot had been captured. The next morning, which was late afternoon in Washington, I received another message and it said to "use all the forces at your disposal to rescue your pilot," who by that time, as it turned out later, was locked up in a cage. So far as timely advice is concerned, the JCS recommended over and over again, beginning in 1965, that we mine Haiphong harbor. Seven years later—in 1972—we finally received authority to conduct this operation. At the time, May 8, 1972, we were flying 1,000 sorties a day in Southeast Asia. With less than 30 aircraft that were airborne for only about one and a half hours, we mined Haiphong harbor and not one ship entered or left until we returned and removed the mines ourselves. Seven years lead time is timely advice. Next, when the PUEBLO was seized by the North Koreans, the JCS submitted three options to retaliate immediately to force the North Koreans to release the ship. All of these options were turned down on the grounds that we had a war in Vietnam and we did not need a second war. The North Koreans reacted as one might expect: they shot down an electronic reconnaissance plane 75 miles from their coastline and killed 26 young Americans. Later on they cut two lieutenants to pieces at the DMZ with axes and soon thereafter shot down a helicopter. We did nothing and the North Koreans still have our ship. I suppose at the time Secretary McNamara would have considered advice to do nothing to be very timely.

In order to generate this timely advice, the Staff Study suggests a council of wise men who know they are going to retire and consequently will render very objective advice—not parochial advice—to the Chairman who will then construct it as he sees fit and present it to the Secretary of Defense and the President without reference to the Service Chiefs. I submit, from experience that a member of such a council would be behind the times in just a few days in our fast moving life today and would have no alternative but to go back to the Service Chief to get his information. So what we are doing is inserting one more layer. I have sat in this same chair many times and had members of this committee interrogate me, sometimes in pretty hostile tones, as to why we had so many senior officers. Now this study recommends the addition of five more four-star officers, counting the recommended deputy, all of whom must have staffs and office space of no small size. To speak of the deputy, I am opposed to creating this new assignment. By designation, a deputy must promote the views of the principal and consequently to alternate the service affiliation between the Chairman and the Deputy would not in any way add to the desirability of this arrangement. Worse than that, however, the establishment of a deputy to the Chairman deprives the Service Chiefs of dealing directly with the Secretary of Defense and the President even though there is a considerable possibility that they will in the future become Chairman.

In this report much has been said about interservice rivalry and the implication is that the Service Chiefs are stumblebums more interested in the welfare of their services than the security of their country. I consider this implication nothing more than an insult to the fine officers who have held that job. Of course, there is always going to be competition since the Service Chief is responsible for seeing that his service is equipped, trained, and combat ready. A chief who does otherwise is derelict in his duty. To support this allegation, it has been suggested that operations are designed so that each service can participate. If such a thing happens, I consider it to be the fault of the chairman of the JCS. I can cite many operations which I planned and executed where such was not the case. For instance, the Sontay prison raid, mining Haiphong harbor, the Christmas bombing, the landing of the 82nd Airborne division in the Dominican Republic, providing logistic support to Israel in 1973, etc. In most operations it does require the capability to a greater or lesser degree from every service, but I cannot conceive of anyone deliberately weakening the possibility of success in order to simply inject another service. Of course, there is interservice competition and there always will be and I don't think we want it any other way if we expect the young officers to have pride in and dedication to their service. And while I am on the subject of rivalry, let me point out to you that we have interregional rivalry because there is no unified commander who does not try to get sufficient forces allocated to his command to ensure that he can discharge his responsibilities. Where would these additional forces come from? They would only come from another unified commander so what we are doing is allocating shortages and there will always be competition by those in responsible positions. If a commander does not compete, or, to put it another way, puts in a maximum effort to increase the combat readiness of his command, he is derelict in his duty.

Next, I would like to discuss the subject of power which is mentioned frequently in the Staff Report. This report suggests that the unified commanders do not have enough power, that the Service Chiefs have too much power, and General Jones has frequently stated that he did not have enough power and, for that matter, members of the Congress have said with the War Powers Act that the President has too much power. So far as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is concerned, I found that I had all the power I wanted to take. So far as the men in uniform are concerned, I have never in my experience given an order to a military man and had it disobeyed. So far as the unified commanders are concerned, the report claims that they do not have enough power, that the component commanders and the Service Chiefs do not carry out their orders and the report gives an example: that the Army located ammunition in a Pacific command in a place where the unified commander did not want it. My answer to that, if that happened, is that it is the unified commander's fault. According to the law, the unified commander is directly under the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command. Consequently, if a component commander or a service fails to take action in the area of a unified commander, he already has all the power necessary to reverse their action. In other words, again, it is his fault.

There have been proposals that the unified commander has his own budget, that he select his own officers, that he run his own command without reference at all to other requirements which the services face. I would point out to you that the unified commanders are concerned with contingency plans and war plans for using the combat capabilities of the forces already assigned by the President to that area. They are not involved in training, recruiting, legal policies, research and development, education and training of officers and enlisted men, and many other things that the services are responsible for and which will have an impact on the capabilities of the unified command long after the incumbent commander has been retired. So, to set the unified commander up in effect as a separate little military hierarchy is wrong. The unified commanders have ample time and opportunities to present their views. General Vessey recently has done much in this regard since he called in the commanders to brief their Chiefs of all of their contingency plans to participate in a joint wargame at the U.S. Naval War College while, in the meantime, the Service Chiefs have developed memoranda of understanding covering close air support procedures for the Army, mining by the Air Force, use of the airwings in naval operations as well as Air Force tactical fighters for support of ships at sea. So, it should be clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming more joint in an evolutionary way and, in my opinion, dictating by statute the exact organization of the office of the Secretary of Defense or the JCS and subordinate commands is wrong since, no matter what kinds of wiring diagram one may draw, the only way a system such as ours will operate is by the assignment of good and competent people. This does not always happen. During the Vietnam war we were told how many bombs to put on each wing, what kind of weapon should be used against a tank, in one case napalm against a steel bridge, what camera to use during reconnaissance, etc. Mr. Chairman, there is no one who understands the rules of engagement imposed in Vietnam better than you. But then it was not "untimely advice" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that invoked these rules of engagement; it was not the JCS who refused to mine Haiphong Harbor; it was not the JCS who had our troops sit a few miles from an enemy compound, thus permitting them to saunter forth, inflict casualties on our troops and then retire to their sanctuary. It was not the JCS that tried to fine-tune the bombers of North Vietnam in terms of latitude, numbers of aircraft and intermittent cessations; it was not the JCS with their "untimely advice" to take retaliatory action against North Korea when they seized the PUEBLO. I can go on and on, but, Mr. Chairman, how are you going to make certain that the political bosses of the military do not impose such restrictions and restraints during combat? These short-sighted controls, that placed a 10-mile circle around Hanoi, a 5-mile circle around Haiphong, and a 15-mile zone on the Chinese border. I might add that three times the JCS recommended that we bomb a large number of tanks that the North Vietnamese collected around Bhatt Lake just north of the DMZ. This was ignored so the North Vietnamese penetrated to the Cua Viet River and finally into Saigon itself.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention one other thing that occurs in our system and will always occur in a democracy. It was not touched on in this voluminous study, but is of equal importance. The Constitution says that the President is the Commander in Chief. How are you to organize in such a way as to avoid a situation where the President and the Secretary of Defense don't agree and therefore the

President goes directly to the Chairman of the JCS and orders specific actions? This is a very difficult situation for the Chairman of the JCS, but in our political system I defy anyone to correct this by reorganization short of elimination of the office of the Secretary of Defense, which is certainly not desirable from my point of view. In short, it is not so much the structure in our government as it is the people in the structure that cause it to function or not function, as the case may be.

I am sure from my lengthy statement one is apt to draw the conclusion that I am for the status quo and resist all change. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I am in complete accord first with the statement made by Senator Nunn concerning the profusion of Congressional committees and staffs. I am in complete agreement with biannual budgeting of the Defense Department. I am in complete agreement that those appointments to the Office of the Secretary of Defense must be carefully selected and, hopefully, have some knowledge of the assignment they undertake. I strongly support the reduction of the number of personnel in the office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the staffs of the Service Secretaries, and in the services, but that must begin in the Congress and passed down the line—not up the line.

In short, one must dispose of the question askers before he eliminates the question answerers.

In summary, I consider that the Staff Report is filled with overstatements based on opinions and hearsay rather than fact and, consequently, the majority of the corrective actions are excessive and often are aimed at solving problems that have been or are being progressively solved.

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am prepared to answer your questions.

Chairman. GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Admiral.

That is a fine presentation, probably the most complete from a man of experience that we have had.

I would like to put your mind at ease on one thing. I can understand how this happened. If I happened to work for the press and I wanted to find something in this report, which contains 91 different suggestions, I think as a pressman, I would have picked out the abolition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I can assure you that that is not the feeling of this committee. In fact, this committee has not adopted any one of the points made in that study. That is the job for the full committee.

The House-passed bill on the Joint Chiefs probably will come as close to what we might do as anything which has come up yet. I just want to put your mind at ease, we do not want to destroy the Joint Chiefs. We want to find out if there is something wrong in the structure, and if there is we want to do what we can to correct it.

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Chairman, I certainly do not question the objective. I do think that the Defense structure should be carefully examined periodically. After all, it was the National Security Act that was passed in 1947.

Since that time we have had satellites and we have had all kinds of supersonic aircraft. Technology drives a lot of things we do.

Now, this study recommends, I think it was General Meyer who wants to have a commission or high level committee that does not do anything but sit there and advise the chairman. That is nonsense. These people would have to go back to the service Chiefs.

I can tell you, just leave that Pentagon for 2 months and you do not have the slightest idea what is going on.

Senator Nunn, the other day you spoke about proliferation of senior officers. This study wants to create five more officers. They want to have another committee to advise the Chiefs and they want to have a Deputy Chairman. I did not speak on the Deputy

Chairman, but if I am questioned about that, I will be very glad to because I do not think it is necessary.

Let us get fewer officers, fewer people in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, fewer people in the Joint Staff, fewer in the service. There are too many people over there. There is no accountability because they will not delegate authority down.

What we ought to do is delegate authority and hold the people accountable. That is what ought to happen.

Chairman GOLDWATER. We want to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff so good that you will volunteer to come back and be head of it.

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am available. I am unemployed.

Senator NUNN. I just want to mention one thing. I was interested in your reference about Odeen quoting Locher and Locher quoting Odeen.

I do not know how Odeen could have quoted Locher because this report came out months and months after the Georgetown meeting.

Admiral MOORER. He had been talking to Locher. He was not quoting this report. He was quoting Locher. He was talking to Locher. This thing has been going on a long time.

Senator NUNN. The preparation of the Georgetown report?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. The other thing I want to mention is that General Goodpaster was an enthusiastic supporter of the Georgetown report.

Admiral MOORER. I do not think he was enthusiastic.

Senator NUNN. He was one of the people who was in support of it.

Admiral MOORER. Maybe so. Then he was wrong in not telling me. That is my point. If he had all his difficulties and problems, he should have mentioned them because he had many, many opportunities. That is what I am saying.

Senator NUNN. I think he mentioned them in the Georgetown report. That is the best evidence I know.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, but he was not on duty. It has been 10 years since he was on duty. I am talking about when he had the job. That is what counts. It does not make any difference what he says now.

Senator NUNN. If you are so forceful, there are a lot of officers who were sent to you that did not mention things to you from time to time.

Admiral MOORER. I am sure of that. That just proves my point that people are people and they are never going to change.

Senator NUNN. We can always stipulate that for the record.

Chairman GOLDWATER. General, you are the next in line. You are the fellow who sort of dreamed this all up, so take it away.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General JONES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great pleasure to be with you.

I agree with your statement, Mr. Chairman, of a few days ago, that this is the most important issue facing us from the national security viewpoint.

I applaud the actions of the committee and the staff for an outstanding report. It contains not just the thoughts of a few people, but reviews many reports that have been made over the years. I think it was useful in going back because there is a common thread of deficiencies in those reports. Certainly your report is a basis for action by the Congress and by the administration in the days ahead.

I was pleased that you also criticized the Congress and how the Congress acts. Too often people point fingers at others rather than realizing that they are all part of the problem, all of the institutions, and things need to be changed in all areas.

We have serious problems. There have been improvements. I am sure that each former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs could document the improvements made during his tenure. General Vessey was an outstanding Chairman and I am sure that in December when he appears he will give some examples of the improvements that were made while he was Chairman and I applaud those and those by General Gabriel and General Wickham in their 30-plus items of the interface of the two services and the actions by the other Chiefs and services.

I think there is one fundamental point. All of these improvements have been based on agreements, agreements within the Chiefs or agreements between two service Chiefs.

I would like to point out that there are problems facing us, serious problems, probably the most serious problems that you are not going to solve by agreement. They are going to have to be highlighted and somebody make the decision, probably the Secretary of Defense or the President.

There are some who said that the basic assumption for the need for change is because the Chiefs are parochial and cannot rise above their service interests. That is certainly not my view. I do not read that as the view of the reports. I did not see the Chiefs when I was Chairman or Air Force Chief as being parochial or as bickering.

In some areas I agree with Admiral Moorer, but I think the report documents the problems that are institutional. We are overly centralized. We have gone to dehumanizing centralization. We have too many layers.

There is too much fixation on the budget process. Frankly, the rewards go primarily to people who can sell the budget as opposed to those responsible for oversight and readiness. Authority and responsibility are badly diffused, particularly in the joint system. We ought to judge performance.

If we look back, our performance has not been all that great through Pearl Harbor, Korea, Vietnam. I was in Vietnam. We had serious problems. I agree with Admiral Moorer that we had serious political problems. But we also had serious military problems.

We fought five separate air wars in Vietnam. Since then in the Iranian hostage crisis and even in Grenada we have had problems. We work best when we work single service. We do not do well when we go multi-service. Maybe we can do small operations with a single service or maybe two services, but when it gets big, then it requires all four services.

There has been a lot of controversy about advice; is the advice good, bad? Is it timely, innovative? I can understand the reasons for that disagreement because I believe there are three types of advice.

The first is the face-to-face advice of the Chiefs meeting with the Secretary of Defense and the President, or the Chairman meeting with the Secretary of Defense and the President. For many years, the Secretaries of Defense have spent one afternoon a week with the Chiefs and often more than that. Those are very good face-to-face meetings. I spent 8 years under four different Secretaries of Defense and the meetings sometimes get heated but the face-to-face advice is given high marks.

The second is what I called the bureaucratic advice. One study reported that the Joint Staff handled 2,000 to 3,000 issues a year. They do not all end up in a red striped paper, only a small number of them in a final paper. But 2,000 to 3,000 issues a year.

When Secretary Weinberger was here last week, he was asked how many disagreements had taken place among the Chiefs had been reported to him since he had been in office. He answered 8 to 10. That would come out to two per year. The hundreds and hundreds of issues are mulled over by five very large staffs, then they work their way up the system. There is either a consensus gained or there is a disagreement, but a disagreement only in a couple of cases.

It does not change much from Chairman to Chairman or one group of Chiefs to the next group of Chiefs. Their bureaucratic input is the second type of advice.

The third, and in many ways maybe the most important advice is the advice not given. What I called the too hard drawer. General Meyer came up with that first, too hard drawer. One subject in this drawer is roles and missions. They were etched in marble in 1947 and there have been only a few changes since then, and those were usually prompted by changes in technology such as our use space.

Another too hard subject is budget priorities under a constrained budget.

Another very important one is the basic Unified Command plan that distributes the forces.

I would like to go into more detail just to illustrate the difficulty of this one area that has been too hard to address. We have a thin overlay of jointness. First let us look at the Unified and Specified Commands. With activation of the Space Command, we now have 10. Three of them are pure Air Force: MAC, SAC, and the Air Defense Command.

Of the other seven, there are three that essentially do not have forces, or very small forces: Space Command, Southern Command, and the Central Command. They do not have central operation and control of forces of any significance.

Then we have the Readiness Command which is pure Army and Air Force. We have the Atlantic Command which is Navy and Marines. They have a dotted line to a couple of Army and Air Force headquarters, but they do not have control of those forces.

Then we have the European Command and the Pacific Command, the final two commands that are really the only commands that have any substantial forces of the four services.

Even in Europe most of the Army and Air Force is understandably in the central region and Navy obviously is in the southern region. So, if we look at the assignment of the preponderance of forces, they are under Unified, but not under a true joint four service commands.

If we look below the level of the senior headquarters, the European Command or Pacific Command or any Unified Command, we immediately go to service components. As an ex-component commander in Europe, and Air Commander working for the European Commander, I worked for two bosses, CINCGUR and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force gave me all my equipment, all my people, promoted my people, transferred my people. No matter how strong the individual as the European Commander could be, General Goodpaster was a very strong, forceful commander, he did not have the tools of power. We did not end run him, but the influence stayed with the component commanders and the service Chief.

A majority of our forces are based in the United States, the overwhelming preponderance of the force. If we just look at the United States, where our strategy is developed, where our requirements and doctrine are developed, we see little jointness. Except for the Air Force units that are in the Specified Commands which are single service, Air Force and Army units are assigned to the Readiness Command.

Navy and Marine units are assigned to Atlantic and Pacific Commands.

So, here in the United States where we really ought to be doing the true jointness of doctrine and concept and strategy and the rest, we do not have much jointness. It is no surprise that when a Grenada comes up, the first thing we do is have the commanders meet and get acquainted. Then they pull out an empty yellow tablet.

I believe there is a better way of doing business. I think that is to strengthen the joint system. Every time we bring up strengthening the joint system there is a lot of cry about we are going to weaken civilian control. If we give the Chairman a greater influence within the joint system, that somehow we are stifling advice from everyone else, that we are creating layering, we are creating another bureaucracy. These are the arguments.

There are ways that changes can be made that will strengthen civilian control, that can reduce layering, can reduce this our centralization, this bureaucracy.

I would not treat recommendations of your report lightly because when people like Secretary Brown and General "Shy" Meyer, who have the tremendous experience, recommend going further than I do, I would not dismiss that.

I would go for lesser changes, but I think significant ones. I would retain the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a somewhat different role. I would retain the face-to-face meetings with the President and the Secretary of Defense where the advice is good, it is crisp.

I would try in the bureaucratic area, with the 2,000 or 3,000 issues, addressed each year, to separate the wheat from the chaff. Under my proposal, when the President or Secretary of Defense wants corporate advice, wanted a piece of paper from the Chiefs that clearly represents the corporate view, they would ask for it.

In the other hundreds, even thousands of issues the Joint Staff would get inputs from the services, inputs from the field commands, combatant commands, and then put together a paper which the Chairman would forward with his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman would not have the power to decide on key issues but would pass his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. If any Chief feels strongly and disagrees with the Chairman, he can, obviously in their weekly meeting with the Secretary of Defense bring it up. I have not found one Chief who was inhibited in bringing things up. Or the Chief can send a separate memorandum to the Secretary of Defense saying, "I disagree with the Chairman for the following reasons."

I submit you will get greater diversity of advice under that system than the current system.

Third, I would charge the Chairman with opening the too hard drawer, but I would not only charge him, but give him the capability to do so. I would give him a Deputy Chairman and I would give him supervision of the Joint Staff.

Today the Joint Staff is under the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has to be somewhat separated from the services if we are really going to address the very tough problems. It is too intertwined with the services today.

It was noted in a Joint Staff study a number of years ago that only 2 percent of the people on the Joint Staff were repeats, had service on the Joint Staff before. With senior officers it is a 2-year tour. Take, for example, three-star positions, 2 years.

When people come to a joint job, most have not had joint experience. They may have had something on their books that gave credit for it, but not truly joint experience. They do not know much about other services and they are in a position only a short period of time.

This year, of the seven three-star positions on the Joint Staff five of them turned over this last summer, or up through this fall. The average time of the three-stars now on the Joint Staff is 7 months. Two holdovers from last year.

Two years has been the normal assignment. So, there has to be improvement and much better opportunity for promotions. We do not recommend going as far as Admiral Moorer implied we would go. The House bill does not go that far. But people who have been on the Joint Staff have not had good opportunity in promotions as well as those who have been in the service planning staffs who have interfaced with them.

With the CINC's, I would increase their influence, increase their authority, give them much more authority over the components. They could use task forces further so we can get greater integration of effort.

I would have the CINC's work with the Chairman in the revision of the Unified Command Plan, so we would have organizationally more jointness, particularly in the United States we should force jointness from the bottom rather than today where we only have jointness at the senior levels.

Clearly these proposals will not solve all the problems, but I think it will give greater diversity of advice to the Secretary of Defense which should strengthen civilian control. If the Joint Staff can open up some of these more difficult problems on a cross service basis, I think you can reduce some of the 500 officers on the staff of the Secretary of Defense.

It will give the services an opportunity to spend more time on oversight. We can decentralize much of the operation if we have jointness all the way down in the system rather than only at the top.

So, I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee and providing any inputs I can on this very serious problem that faces our Nation.

Thank you for your time.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, General.

Because I am going to have to be absent for a short time, I will start off with a question. I do not know what to ask you.

This matter of promotion keeps coming up. I do not think it is all that important. Somebody will probably get to it. I will get to it when I get back.

I am of the opinion that the services should make their own promotions, not the suggestion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff make promotions of flag rank and star rank.

Critics say it appears the JCS require a unanimous view prior to sending a recommendation to the Secretary. We have had testimony that of the approximately 2,000 issues per year which the Joint Chiefs are asked to review, only a handful go forward to the Secretary in a split decision.

The first question is why do Chiefs have to review 2,000 issues a year, if that is correct.

General JONES. The Chiefs do not address 2,000 issues a year, Mr. Chairman. That is in the joint system. Anything that has to do with interface must have some joint overview. So, it is a Joint Staff. Most of them do not get to the Chief level, most of those 2,000.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Admiral Moorer.

Admiral MOORER. I was listening to General Jones. It was my experience over and over again when I did not agree with the Joint Staff, I wrote what was called a Chairman's memorandum and sent it up to the Secretary of Defense that same evening.

I had many situations where the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force would write their position and, furthermore, it was my experience when I went to the National Security Council meetings, and we had plenty of them in those days because of the Vietnam War, the President went through a set routine.

He asked the Secretary of State what he thought, he asked the Secretary of Defense what he thought, and he asked me what I recommended.

I told him this way. I said the Joint Chiefs of Staff take this position, but it is my duty to inform you that the Chief of Staff of this service or that service does not agree and gave the reason.

As soon as I got back to the office I called all the Chiefs and told them exactly what went on. I called the dissenter and told him I had informed the President that he did not agree with the other members of the Chiefs.

Every member of the Joint Chiefs had ample opportunity to advise the Secretary of Defense and the President himself. The Chairman is the spokesman because the Chairman is right underneath the Secretary of Defense. He sees the Secretary of Defense more often than the service Chiefs and he attends the National Security Council and sees the President all the time.

The President would call me on the telephone many times a week. I was cognizant of what the others thought. I was very careful to so advise the National Security Council as to what they really thought.

So, this idea of unanimity, I did not have that problem. We were not unanimous on a lot of things. I think it is a mistake to give the President just one option or one set of advice.

I think what has happened today is when you have 4 million civilians and military people in an organization and a $300 billion budget and technology is racing along like it is and we are dealing with the Soviets, life is so complex and the problems are so big that you always are going to have some difficulties in trying to control the resources and handle the problem.

General Jones says that problem is competition over budget. He is right in peacetime. I can tell you when we did the Christmas bombing and put 100 B-52's and 300 tactical aircraft over Hanoi in 30 minutes, there was no inter-service rivalry. There was total cooperation.

What I am saying in the closer we get to war these problems begin to fade away because the budget problem fades away. It would be certainly unreasonable to expect the service Chief or unified commander to not do everything he possibly can to get the maximum amount of resources in his command. If he does not do that, he should not have the job.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment on that.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Yes.

General JONES. First, I did it the same way Admiral Moorer did in NSC meetings, meetings with the Secretary of Defense. However, the record shows the number of disagreements in the formal papers were very few. Competition, I think, is great. I think we ought to have further competition. But, we ought to expect the Chiefs to rise above it and come up with a constrained budget.

I would not have, as Admiral Moorer says, one set of advice to the President. I am trying to get more diversity of advice to the President. During the Vietnam war we had serious problems.

General Bruce Palmer points out during the Vietnam War the Chiefs had very fundamental differences of opinion on many issues, but came up with agreed-to recommendations.

I am trying to encourage greater diversity of advice. I am trying to promote good competition. But, I would like to see someone not in that competitive environment, someone on the Joint Staff being somewhat separated from the service, coming in with what I call horizontal advice. Today we have strong vertical advice from the services, each one fighting for their own programs, and we have within the CINC's each fighting for their own resources in a different way. The Chairman would come in horizontal cross service advice the Secretary of Defense would get better advice because he would now have stronger horizontal cross service advice, to go with the strong vertical advice from the services and that strengthens his position.

Senator **Warner** [presiding]. Senator Nunn.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you.

I have enjoyed the testimony of both of you. I appreciate it very much.

I want to explore one thing that is a little bit different from what we have been talking about. It has been a question I have had in my mind a long time.

I have heard over and over again, I think it is credible, that basically Joint Chiefs recommended in the sixties and early seventies over and over again various things in Vietnam and the civilians refused to do it, the civilians changed things around, and et cetera, et cetera.

The thing that is puzzling to me, though, looking at other systems is no one resigned that I know of. Not a single military official resigned during that whole period of time that he was on the Chiefs.

It seems to me at some point, even respecting completeness of civilian control, that there would be some top military resignation if the war being prosecuted was being prosecuted diametrically opposed to the advice of people responsible in a military uniform.

Why did we not ever get resignations from the top ranks in the military when they are that frustrated?

Admiral **Moorer**. I mentioned that, Senator Nunn. I did give that serious consideration. As you recall, at least when I came in as chairman, we had something like 549,500 troops in Vietnam. Most of the options had already been used up, so to speak.

So, the idea of what they call a Vietnamization program was put into effect where we were withdrawing our troops right in the middle of the war, the idea being we were going to turn the fighting over to the South Vietnamese.

In the meantime, we had all these boys that were being tortured, and locked up, and the American people did not seem to care very much about that. As a matter of fact, I have had several people say, well, they volunteered, didn't they? It serves them right. American citizens said that.

I was determined I was not going to get out of there until we got the POW's back. We got to the point where I think the reason President Nixon finally approved the Christmas bombing was that the withdrawal plan out of Vietnam was going to wind up and all Americans would be gone except the POW's. If that had ever happened, they would still be there.

So, I brought the point up. I said, you know, we have one more group to take out of there. When they leave, you will leave the POW's there alone and you will never see them again. That is what made President Nixon decide to do the Christmas bombing.

All you have to do—I am sorry Senator Stennis is not here—he will tell you the North Vietnamese damn well got the news when we did that. We should have done it 8 years before because those people did not understand anything but brute strength.

I thought about resigning, but I was also dedicated to getting the POW's free.

General JONES. I understand General LeMay seriously considered resigning because he thought that the introduction of ground forces into the Pacific Basin or in Asia was not wise, being in agreement with General MacArthur.

He was asked about this at the War College one time and he said it would not have had much of an impact. It would be in the papers for about 2 days, and then the subject would disappear. I do not know if Admiral Moorer was on the Chiefs at the same time as General LeMay or not, but he has been observed to say that.

There would be conditions under which a Chief would resign. There have been a few cases where other officers have resigned, but usually it was shortly before their retirement anyway.

Admiral MOORER. I will add to what General Jones said. If a senior military man were to resign, you can be certain that his replacement would be someone that the President would be certain would do what he said.

We had an example of that, as you recall, when the war clouds over Japan began to come up and Mr. Roosevelt ordered the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii. Admiral Richardson refused to go. He said it would jeopardize the fleet. So, he fired him. Then Admiral Kimmel was appointed in his place on the condition he would go to Hawaii.

It is a pretty hard life to lead when you get into that kind of political vise.

Senator NUNN. We had recommendations from Gen. Russ Dougherty that was agreed to by General Krulak, agreed to by General Meyer, agreed to by Admiral Train, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs be given another star, a fifth star, and that they be kept basically in the military capacity after they get off the Chiefs, as I believe General Bradley was for a number of years.

They felt that these people that had been retired were valuable, they would not need to go out and find another job. They would be available for whatever use the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States might want to make of them.

Would either of you comment on that proposal?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; the British essentially do that and the retiring Chairman is provided with an office, and so on. We provide an office for 1 year in order to clear out your files.

I think that would be a good idea. That would be a way to enhance the position of the Chairman. It is done in many, many nations.

Since I retired, I have a hard time finding a parking place. [Laughter.]

So, we just kind of throw people out like that in our country, in a democracy.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, do you have any comment on that?

General JONES. Senator Nunn, I could support it with two reservations.

One is that people already think our proposals are making an all-powerful Chairman. That could contribute to that if it were made a big issue, somehow we are putting a man on horseback with great power.

My recommendation is not to increase the power of the Chairman, but to increase the influence of the joint system.

Admiral MOORER. I thought you did not have enough power.

General JONES. I did not say that.

Second, there might be conclusions that a five-star authorization solves the problems. If you did not do other things, it would only have an incidental impact on what went on.

Yes; I think it would be a good idea. Be careful because of the two down sides of it.

Senator NUNN. It would not solve the problems that you feel need solving?

General JONES. No; I think the Chairman needs a Deputy, he needs control of the Joint Staff and he needs a mechanism to get the wheat and chaff separated. Making a fifth star would contribute to that. If it degraded the chances of getting fundamental changes, I would have concern. Overall, I think it is a good idea.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Gentlemen, we welcome you this morning.

The extent of divergence in your views add strength to the combined testimony and I am sure it will be a very helpful contribution in resolving this problem.

I want to follow up on Senator Nunn's question on the Deputy. I think you specifically, General Jones, mentioned that you were in favor of having a designated individual in the Office of Deputy Chairman.

Admiral Moorer, do you have a view on that?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; as I said, I disagree with that. I do not think it is necessary. I think the system being used today wherein a service Chief is designated for a 3-month period to be the Acting Chairman when the Chairman himself has to absent himself from Washington is a good one.

Today we have supercommunications, so the Chairman knows what is going on no matter where he is, anyway. I think it is valuable for the service Chiefs, one of whom will be the next Chairman probably or highly likely will be, to have an opportunity to attend the National Security Council meetings, and so on.

I am just opposed to keep aiding more people. For instance, this study wants to have three more Under Secretaries. It seems in this town every time you want to solve a problem, you form another group, another group here, another group there.

Senator NUNN. I have heard that two or three times. In fairness, the study also recommends dropping a number of Under Secretaries and Assistants, so the net effect would be less, not more.

Admiral MOORER. But they are dropping Assistants and putting in Under Secretaries.

General JONES. The Deputy would not be an additional position.

Senator WARNER. Turning to the question of the National Security Council and participation by the Chairman, what, if any, changes do either of you have?

Would you lead on that, Admiral Moorer?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; when I became Chairman my predecessor, General Wheeler, did not attend many National Security Council meetings. As a matter of fact, the President at that time did not have any National Security Council meetings.

As I said earlier, the President can always avoid discussion of a key issue with the Chairman present simply by not having a meeting. I think it is highly important for him to attend. You can get arguments that if you have made him a member, you have elevated him up on a level with the Secretary of Defense, his boss, and that is not good.

I think certainly he should attend every National Security Council meeting because I have observed a situation wherein the problem was almost 100 percent military and the Chairman was not even there.

Senator WARNER. Let me be explicit. In other words, you are not satisfied with the way it presently operates in the NSC?

Admiral MOORER. Yes.

Senator WARNER. You do not advocate his becoming a member?

Admiral MOORER. Not becoming a statutory member. I certainly recommend his attending.

Senator WARNER. So the present system with respect to the NSC meets your criteria.

General Jones.

General JONES. I think there could be marginal advantage of presence being required. I agree with Admiral Moorer, though, that it has been the normal practice and it is important that the Chairman attend, it is not a critical issue.

Senator WARNER. You are satisfied with the present statutory custom?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Turning to the question of being in the chain of command, would you lead off on that one, General Jones. Do you have any views on that?

General JONES. We should recognize the difference between the national command authority and chain of command. The national command authority is the President and Secretary of Defense. Everybody below that is very constrained in what they can do, unified commanders, specified commanders, and so forth.

To direct major deployments of forces or do something, similar, we must have the decision of one of those two people. Under any system that should be the basic way. I am sure that is the way Admiral Moorer operated. The Secretary of Defense initialed any message which went out. Under administrative procedures today it says through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

What I would like to see is an administrative change through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than the Joint Chief of Staff, but I do not think legislation is necessary.

Senator QUAYLE. The present system with that one modification?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Admiral MOORER. Could I comment?

Senator WARNER. Yes; I want to make certain that the recorder reflects General Jones' assent to the question, the present system with the one change?

General **Jones**. I operated the same way Admiral Moorer did in a crisis. The Chairman took action and then brought the Chiefs in and that would continue. The administrative change to what really is the practice today.

Senator **Warner**. Admiral Moorer.

Admiral **Moorer**. I do not think it means anything, whether it says Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Chiefs of Staff. The facts are that the decision is made in the National Security Council.

For instance, the President may make a decision to send the 82d Airborne to such and such a place. That is all he decides. It takes 15 or 20 messages to move the 82d Airborne. You have to get the airlift, you have to instruct people to stand by to receive, and so on.

So, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will always have to prepare the directive so that there is nothing that falls through the cracks. It was my policy, from which I never deviated, at any time that any combat was involved where there was going to be gunfire, to always get the initials of the Secretary of Defense on the message before it was allowed to go out because I was not going to get accused of violating the civilian control. So, I ran a message up to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator **Warner**. For the record, you are satisfied?

Admiral **Moorer**. I am satisfied the way it goes. Again, you can have a situation where the Secretary of Defense would deal directly with the field sometimes and not tell the Chairman what he is doing. That has happened.

I keep saying, I do not care how many boxes you draw, that you are going to get people who are going to operate a little differently.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you very much.

Senator Stennis.

Senator **Stennis**. Mr. Chairman and gentleman, I am going to be very brief.

I think it is very timely that this whole question be discussed. I am encouraged that we are working on it. I want to emphasize that, because I do not want to be misunderstood in what I am going to say.

Those of us who have had an actual contact with this problem while a shooting war was going on, as civilians and Senators, as members of this committee, have seen this problem in the raw and we are not quick to rush in with an answer now.

I feel that this is one of the things where we do not have a complete answer. I think we are fortunate, based on my observations, to have the men of the caliber and capacity in the military that we have had during the Korean War and the War in Vietnam.

We are living in another day now with a budget of over $300 billion. That is a different world than what I lived in and serving on this committee. It accentuates your problems, it accentuates the problems of the men in the White House who have to make those final civilian decisions. I have been there and seen them struggle. I was not sent there because of my knowledge, but because of my position. I had direct contact with the problem, as it was.

If you leave it to me to write it up, I would not know how, but I would depend on the quality, character, courage and experience of these military men, and civilian control has to prevail.

I am sitting by, gentlemen, to make a contribution here at the end if a new plan is going to be adopted, but I am not going to be quick to abolish the old and vote for the new. This problem has to be carried on and has to be met the best we can.

I know no one intends to discourage the people, but let me say to the people of America, as a whole it is my own opinion that as far as men in these places, capable men, they have been loyal to their purpose and as a whole they have done a good job. It is one of the benefits in our entire system of Government. It requires more of the best.

Maybe later I can make a more definite comment.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator Stennis. Your wisdom and experience is essential as we approach a resolution of this.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Admiral, to pick up on a point perhaps made indirectly by Senator Stennis, if we had a similar situation in the U.S. Congress where we had a complete turnover every 2 years in both the House and the Senate, I think both of you would probably agree that that kind of turnover and "turbulence," although desirable on the part of many perhaps, would not necessarily be in the overall good of the country.

You need some corporate memory, some sense of history, and some institutional direction, as embodied by our own Senator Stennis.

What is striking in what General Jones was saying and what former Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger and Brown said yesterday is that you have a tremendous turnover on the Joint Staff.

General Jones, you indicated 5 out of the 7 positions turned over this year. As a matter of fact, it is 9 out of 12, 9 out of the top 12 turned over this year.

General JONES. Three stars.

Senator COHEN. Nine out of twelve have been turned over this year. We know we have no senior officers on the Joint Staff today who were there during the Grenada operation. Secretary Weinberger did not seem to be troubled by that, saying that was not a critical factor. It may not be.

Does that kind of turnover really inhibit a sounder planning process for joint operation?

Admiral MOORER. Do you want me to answer that first?

Senator COHEN. Yes.

Admiral MOORER. I do not think so. There is a big difference between rotating the Congressmen every 2 years and rotating the military people. When you rotate the military people, they are professionals and the Joint Staff is no mystery to them. They have been receiving messages from them, they have been to the War College, and so on.

It is like a baseball player moving from one team to another. He plays shortstop on this team and second base on the next one, but he is a baseball player. Whereas the people coming into the civilian positions, an Assistant Secretary, for instance, comes in and keeps the job 2 years and leaves.

That is the only time they have that job. They do not know anything about it when they get there and I do not know how much they know when they leave. It is not the same problem.

Senator COHEN. General Jones.

General JONES. I take a different view. I think there are two problems. One is a short tenure and the second is lack of experience in the joint system when they come in. Most have had little, if any, true joint experience before they came in.

You can have an Admiral who spent most of his life in submarines or an Air Force General who spent most of his time in the Strategic Air Command and so forth, come in and all of a sudden be in charge of all military operations for the whole country, in charge of planning for the whole country, and be there for 2 years.

What I would like to see is not only a slowdown in turnover, but a few more repeats on the Joint Staff because being on the Joint Staff is different from being on the service staff or other places, but not create a general staff, not an elitist group. A few more repeats, a little more stability.

Senator COHEN. The committee study says that for the most part military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty. With the pressures for loyalty by their service while on joint assignment, they are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties and are serving only for a relatively short period of time when they learn their job.

One Chief said, "It was the kiss of death." That is how joint duty is regarded at least in one service. Again, yesterday both Secretary Brown and Secretary Schlesinger indicated it was not a desirable tour of duty as such.

Has that been your experience?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. In the first place, I think that when you have the technology we have today and the complex military weapons, a young pilot or a nuclear submarine officer, of course, does everything he can to stay in an operating squadron.

It is not that he does not want to come to the Joint Staff. He does not want to come to Washington. I understand that. I think you have to have motivation. After all, everything we are talking about is designed to fight. If the young people do not learn how to fight, they do not know how to plan.

So, as you get more and more senior, then you spend more time on planning.

Now, I have been a member of many study groups, it does not make any difference whether you talk about project officers or the intelligence. One of the recommendations that always comes is that you have to assign better people to intelligence, better people to be project officers, better people to the Joint Staff. There are not that many better people.

You are always trying to allocate shortages. If you want to take some kind of lead group and let them sit in the Pentagon while everybody else does the fighting, you will not have a very good organization.

General JONES. It is true that most of us would rather be in the field than in Washington, in the Pentagon. If you are assigned to Washington, almost without exception the greatest opportunity is in your service Staff and particularly in the service Staff that works on force structure matters.

If you look through the promotion lists, the people in the joint system, particularly the Joint Staff, have not done well. They are some misleading statistics. Compared with all others they might do fairly well. But if compared with the special people that are on the service Staff working the joint issues, the Joint Staff people do not do anywhere near as well.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Hart.

Senator **Hart**. Gentlemen, if I could pursue the line of questioning of Senator Cohen, is it impossible to combine the operational arts with the role of the theoretician?

In other words, it seems to me our military system does not reward the theoretician. Many of the great military leaders of history have been military theoreticians and yet under our system if a person is steeped in the art of combat, history of warfare, a sense of tactics, strategy, and doctrine, they are set aside. Those are not considered to be promotional attributes.

Somehow being a commander and leader has nothing to do with the sense of history. It seems to me this is the crux of the problem, the weakness of the Joint Staff and the Joint Operational Command.

How do we change the attitude of the military that says if you come in and you have a longing and hunger to understand the history of warfare and you feel that makes you a better battlefield commander, how do we promote that?

Admiral **Moorer**. I do not agree with you. I think you have to have a balance. You cannot have a theoretician, or whatever you are talking about, understand the problem unless he has actually done it. So, you have to have people that have been in combat or have commanded forces that come to Washington and finally wind up as members of the Joint Chiefs or the Chairman.

So, you cannot lead a group of young people and tell them what to do in combat if you have not done it yourself.

Senator **Hart**. I understand that.

Admiral **Moorer**. How do you know what to do in combat? You are not born with that. You are born with certain leadership attributes, but how do you know how to win in combat?

You learn it by being in an operational unit and training over and over again. That is what training is all about in peacetime. Your world is compressed as your rank goes down. When you are in a squadron, in a fighter squadron or interceptor squadron or bomber squadron, you are not worried about what is going on in the Pacific, you have to learn to do that well. You have to learn how to do it well and what tactics and how the control works and how the direction works.

As you go up and get more senior, your area of expertise, geographically speaking, expands. So, you cannot just be a sort of history professor.

Senator **Hart**. I understand that. That is not what I am talking about.

What I want to know is when an officer like Bruce Palmer or Colonel Summers writes a critique on strategy in Vietnam and how it was carried out, what use is made of that in our military academies, in our war colleges?

When the Secretary of Defense says Grenada was an unmitigated military victory, nothing went wrong, what signal does that send out when everybody knows that was not the case.

If everybody says we did not make any mistakes, what kind of learning experience is that?

Admiral MOORER. I can tell you this. There is never going to be a battle you do not make mistakes. It is not like in a corporation where no matter how many mistakes you make, did you make a profit?

In the case of the Grenada situation, the answer to the question is did you succeed in carrying out your mission?

The answer to that is yes and the Secretary of Defense is right.

General JONES. I think it is a problem, Senator, with regard to strategists. I once made a remark that if Clauswitz was in our military, he would retire as a colonel and go to work for a think tank.

There has been disparagement of strategists. I remember one Chief said we need fighters, not writers. That is true in a simple sense. We do have very few real strategists in the system and the rewards for them are not very great.

What I would like to see is a young officer who comes to the Joint Staff and really shows the capability, broad thinking, on the bigger problems including strategy, have the opportunity to come back two or three times to the Joint Staff as he matures and gets the experience so that he can use that basic conceptual thinking. And give him more rewards for good joint service. But not keep him as a captive of the joint system.

I would like to see us develop a better group of strategists who have operational experience, not an elite group set aside.

Senator HART. General Jones knows, we have talked about this, I had an opportunity and real privilege to serve on the Board of Visitors of the Air Force Academy for 9 years along with Senator Goldwater.

One of the things I found out is that you could get your wings, your diploma, your degree, and your commission and have one semester of militry history. Now that has been changed. I recall General Patton said in a letter to General MacArthur none of the engineering courses he took at West Point prepared him for command in the field.

What we are turning out of our four military academies is engineers and business managers. We are not training warriors. When you talk about a history professor, that is not what I am talking about. I am talking about the theory of combat.

You do not walk out there and take a man in a tank battalion or a fighter wing without understanding the theory of combat and history of warfare. We are not teaching our young leaders that. That is my point. It is not either/or.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. I am trying to get a bead on where you think we ought to be going legislatively.

Yesterday I asked Secretary Brown and Secretary Schlesinger if in fact from the legislative point of view we should do something similar to the House biil that has been passed on the JCS reorganization. Perhaps the Senate would have a little different viewpoint, and there might also be some changes the Department of Defense might recommend.

But basically both Schlesinger & Brown agreed at least for the time being the House bill would be probably sufficient, although Secretary Brown indicated we should perhaps think about doing something else, but he was not in a position, at least yesterday, to recommend specifically that we go beyond that.

What is your opinion?

Admiral MOORER. A summary here, Senator Quayle, of the contents of H.R. 3622 which you are talking about. As I go down the list, it starts out by saying replace the JCS with the Chairman as principal military adviser to the President and National Security Council and Secretary of Defense.

He is already principal military adviser. He is the one that goes to the National Security Council, he is the one they call on the telephone. As you go down on and on——

Senator QUAYLE. You do not think the House legislation makes much of an exchange then?

Admiral MOORER. No. It does not change what is happening already.

Then I get all the way down to this business of having the Chairman submit to the President his evaluation of an officer who has been recommended for three- or four-star grade, the Chairman often does not know this officer. He never has seen him. He sends a staff officer down to get a summary of the guy's record. There you are. I do not think that accomplished anything.

H.R. 3622 specifies that the Chairman shall attend all NSC meetings. You have discussed that and I agree with that.

It directs the Secretary of Defense to assure the Joint Staff is independently organized.

It talks about supervising—the Chairman would supervise the unified commanders. I think he already does. Every time the unified commander has a problem, he calls the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the telephone and asks him what to do.

I think most of these things are kind of cosmetic because they already happen.

Senator NUNN. Would the Senator yield on that?

Senator QUAYLE. If I do not lose my time, if the Chairman will give me my time.

Senator NUNN. Would that mean you find the House bill, except for that provision, to be harmless?

Admiral MOORER. I would like to give you in writing sentence by sentence what I think of it. In general, it simply authorizes or makes mention of things already happening.

Senator NUNN. It is harmless then, is it not?

Admiral MOORER. In general. I am using Mr. Locher's statement. In general, it does.

But there are some things in there I do not like. I do not like the idea of the Deputy Chairman.

Senator QUAYLE. Is the deputy in the House bill? You do not like that.

Admiral MOORER. I do not like that.

Senator QUAYLE. Maybe you would like to give us a statement for the record on this particular provision?

Admiral MOORER. If you would like, I will be glad to do that.

Senator **Warner**. Both witnesses are invited to give a commentary on the House bill.

[The information follows:]

Response by Admiral Moorer

In response to a request by Senator Warner, Acting Chairman during my appearance as a witness last Thursday, November 21st, I hereby submit my comments on H.R. 3622, the House bill on reorganization.

I will list the provisions of the House Bill and then my comments.

A. Provision: Replaces the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Chairman as the principal military adviser to the President, etc.

Comment: As a matter of practice, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has always been the principal military adviser. His office is very near that of the Secretary of Defense, he talks on the phone and/or intercom to the President as well as the Secretary of Defense several times a week and he attends the National Security Council meetings. It was my experience that the President always asked the Chairman for his advice on the issue under discussion at an NSC meeting.

B. Provision: Assigns the duties currently performed by the JCS to Chairman who is to consult, as appropriate, with the other JCS members and the unified commanders. In addition authorizes a JCS member to give the Secretary of Defense any opinion and disagreement with the advice of the Chairman of the JCS as well as authorizes a JCS member to submit to the President, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, any opinion in disagreement with the advice of the Chairman and JCS.

Comment: This is exactly what happened during my tenure as Chairman of the JCS and to my knowledge has always been the procedure used. This is simply a manifestation of good management procedures in an executive pyramid.

C. Provision: Replaces the Joint Chief of Staff with the Chairman as the source of advice for the President in establishing Unified Commands.

Comment: The establishment of Unified Commands is a very involved process. In the real world the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not establish Unified Commands. The recommendations to the President go through the Secretary of Defense when a change in the Unified Command setup is deemed desirable. Before such a recommendation takes place, extensive discussions are held by the JCS, the CINCS of the Unified Commands, and the Secretary of Defense. No Chairman would ever attempt to establish a Unified Command in secret, without discussing fully with all involved. I am opposed to the provision.

D. Provision: Assign responsibility to the Chairman for supervising the Unified Command.

Comment: Here again the Chairman has always "supervised" the Unified Commanders. The minute the Unified Commanders have a question involving the Component Commanders, the JCS, or the Secretary of Defense, it has been my experience that they always call the Chairman first and seek advice, as well as all the background information they can obtain. While I do not think this provision is necessary, it does not harm and simply codifies normal procedure.

E. Provision: Directs the Chairman to integrate the budgetary needs of Unified Commands into an annual budget recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

Comment: It must be remembered that the Unified Commanders are not involved in all of the antics of the Defense budget experienced by those in Washington. The Unified Commanders are not responsible for Research and Development, for recruiting and basic training, for policy matters involving pay scales and retirement laws affecting military personnel or discipline and changes to the uniform code of Military Justice etc. In short the Unified Commander should be provided with budgetary support for joint exercises which are scheduled well in advance. However, it would be a mistake to involve the Unified Commanders in full-scale budgeting since during war he would not have time to concern himself with the budget—his job is to fight the forces he has been assigned. It is poor practice to establish an organization in peacetime that will not function well in a major war. I am opposed to this provision.

F. Provision: Places the Joint Staff under the authority of the Chairman and deletes the limit of 400 on the number of officers who may serve on the Joint Staff.

Comment: The Chairman as a matter of practice does have authority over the Joint Staff. No officer can be assigned to the Joint Staff if the Chairman does not approve. He simply vetoes the assignment and asks for a substitute. With respect to the level of 400, I see no objections deleting this limit. But I do think that the number of officers in the JCS as well as in several agencies is excessive. However, I do not think that a significant reduction can be made until reductions are made up the line in the staffs on Congressional Committees, as well as the Secretary of Defense.

G. Provision: Authorizes the President or the Secretary of Defense to direct that the chain of command runs through the Chairman to the Unified Commanders.

Comment: The National Command Authority is composed of the President and the Secretary of Defense. However, here again the normal chain through which orders flow from the NCA to the field commands, to my knowledge, has always run through the Chairman to the Unified Commanders. This is because a one sentence decision on the part of the President can generate a multitude of messages involving active as well as supportive commands required to execute the President's directive. This procedure becomes simpler and simpler as scope of combat increases. For instance, during World War II the orders to commanders in the field stated simply "Seize the Philippines." If procedures by non-professional management people forced on the military during the McNamara regime in the conduct of the Vietnam War had been used during World War II, I doubt if General MacArthur could have seized the Philippines or General Eisenhower conducted the Channel crossing. However, I don't see how by statute one can control the imposition of ridiculous rules of engagement on those fighting a war if the civilians in control choose to force the use of such rules.

H. Provision: Directs the Chairman to submit to the President his evaluation of the Joint Service of an officer who has been recommended to the President for a three- to four-star grade.

Comment: This provision is not practical. Very few Chairmen have had an opportunity to personally observe every officer recommended for three- or four-star grade. The Joint Service of such an officer could well have occurred long before the incumbent Chairman was given his present assignment. In such cases the Chairman would have no alternative but to detail his staff to summarize the Joint Service of the three- or four-star nominees. The way to handle this problem is to have the JCS submit nominations to the Secretary of Defense who would forward them to the President. If the Chairman does not agree, it can be handled in the normal way, he can so advise the President, through the Secretary of defense in writing.

I. Provision: Changes the Chairman's initial term in office from two to four years.

Comment: While I do not have a particular objection, since the Chairman normally serves four years, I would advise against the provision, since the situation could arise where an officer was appointed Chairman a few months before the inauguration of the President, who would then be stuck with this officer for the majority of the President's first term in office. I believe the President should retain the flexibility provided in the two-year term.

J. Provision: Directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support the Chairman, etc.

Comment: I object to this provision. I firmly believe that in an executive pyramid the Chief, in this case the Secretary of Defense, should have the option of setting up his own staff the way he feels he will get the best support. I have had many staffs and would take very strong objection if I were told how I was supposed to be organized and how it was to function.

K. Provision: Establish a Deputy Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman.

Comment: In my opinion, this simply creates a four-star billet with staff, office and other support, and does not contribute to the operation of the Chairman/JCS's office. The present procedure, which ensures continuity for a three-month period, seems to me to be adequate. Furthermore, the procedure now in use ensures that each member of the JCS, other than the Chairman, will have an opportunity to observe the details of the duties of the Chairman. Since one of the officers will more than likely be Chairman later, this provides excellent training. Consequently, in my opinion a deputy JCS Chairman is unnecessary and simply contributes to bloating the bureaucracy.

L. Provision: Deletes the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations to be the principle naval adviser to the President.

Comment: I am opposed to this provision since it has been my experience that all Presidents involved in a major naval issue invariably call the CNO for his advice. He also does the same thing with respect to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If the JCS Chairman and Deputy Chairman (for instance if this is approved) are from services other than the one involved in an issue in which the President is interested, no President would make a final decision without speaking to the Chief of the service concerned.

M. Provision: Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on how a series of matters could be implemented.

Comment: I do not think this provision serves any useful purpose, since it requires the Secretary of Defense to plow through the same ground over and over and adds to the burden of a plethora of studies thriving throughout the system.

In summary, since the reorganization of the Department of Defense and JCS reform has gained considerable momentum due to various studies and media overkill, I recognize that some bill will be forthcoming from the Congress. As indicated in my comments, H.R. 3622 serves to codify several procedures that have been in effect for some time and consequently this may serve to educate many who seem to misunderstand how the JCS system operates. However, there are some provisions of H.R. 3622 with which I do not agree and my opinions in this regard are clearly stated above.

RESPONSE BY GENERAL JONES

I believe the House bill is a good approach to solving many of the serious problems within the joint system. However, I would make two changes.

First, I would not require that the dissenting opinion of a Service Chief be attached to the memorandum forwarding the Chairman's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. A Service could have almost a de facto veto over the forwarding of the memorandum by not providing the Service Chief's dissenting opinion in a timely manner. It would be far better for the Chairman to provide the Service Chiefs with a copy of his memorandum and let the Service Chief forward any comments directly to the Secretary of Defense.

Second, I would not designate the Deputy Chairman as the Director of the Joint Staff. With such an assignment, the Deputy would inevitably become tied up in the administrative process. In order not to increase the total number of senior officers, one of the other three star positions could be deleted when the four star Deputy is authorized.

Senator QUAYLE. General Jones do you agree with what Secretaries Brown and Schlesinger said yesterday?

General JONES. I agree. I think the House bill moves in that direction. It does not mean drastic change. Let us codify much of what Admiral Moorer says we are already doing.

If the chairman is principal adviser today, as he says, then there should not be any problem in making that legislation. Legislation now is confusing as to what it says.

Senator QUAYLE. You would not suggest that we go legislatively much beyond that?

General JONES. Legislatively there are a few points of secondary interest and issue that I might do slightly different. The overall approach with regard to the Chiefs and Deputy and Joint Staff, I think are moves in the right direction, although very modest moves.

Senator QUAYLE. Then we could see what would happen as far as any kind of unification with the CINC's and the commanders and commands and things of that sort, if there are any internal changes, the Secretary of Defense might want to take?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator QUAYLE. General Jones, I will direct this question to you on the lessons learned. I would like to go back to the Iranian hostages rescue operation.

What did we learn from that episode on the problems that we have with the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General JONES. First, I think there is both legitimate and unfair criticism, but overall there was a——

Senator QUAYLE. What unfair criticism was there?

General JONES. Unfair in that somehow the Chiefs were acting in a parochial way with each service demanding a role in the mission.

Senator **Quayle**. You do not think there was any problem in the organization?

General **Jones**. There may have been down in what they call the iron major level. Overall in the Chiefs it was not a burning desire that each service get into the act. I am convinced the decision of all service involvement was one made without a parochial approach.

The problem we really did not recognize is the fact that the people had not worked together before. The system had not worked in a well-integrated effort. In the very limited exercising that could be done without exposing our hand. Hundreds of airplanes were involved in a very complex operation and to have run a full dress rehearsal would have tipped our hand.

So, there was great difficulty working out the integration of effort because there was so little integration of effort ahead of time in the exercising and the operations and this type of thing.

Senator **Quayle**. If you had to pinpoint—you know, I am just trying to think out loud, I guess we are trying to get the lessons learned—if you could say what was the major problem.

I think Senator Nunn asked the question of Admiral Moorer why nobody resigned if they did not like what went on in the Vietnam war.

Maybe we did not learn something about the JCS operation in Grenada, but there was something wrong. I am trying to figure out if this was as organizational problem.

Secretary Brown said we did not have a joint mission, we did not have a joint operations force. That is what I am trying to get out of you. I do not want to tell you what Secretary Brown said.

I was trying to get a different answer here, what really went wrong with this thing?

Admiral **Moorer**. I might comment on that because I planned and conducted the Sontay prison raid which was similar to that.

Again, as General Jones said, there was no clamor on the part of the Navy to get into the act. As I understand it, the Navy was in Desert One just because, as he said, the helicopters were on the scene more or less, out at sea. To go over there with a great number of helicopters would have tipped their hand. This is true of most any operation which is a surprise in nature.

I think there were two or three simple things wrong. The sandstorms they went through have been there ever since Peter the Great, or even before that. Anybody who knows a thing about helicopters knows if you want to have eight helicopters at a certain point, you had better send 20 for them to get there, particularly if they are going to fly through a sandstorm for a long distance.

Senator **Warner**. I think the inquiry is important, but I think we have to adhere to a schedule. If the gentlemen would like they may supply for the record their commentary on this chapter.

Senator **Quayle**. Why not let him finish.

Admiral **Moorer**. Third, I do not think you should have a plan with milestones on it.

In other words, tell the people, when you get here if everything is not just right, turn around and come home. That plan, as I understand it, had milestones that they had to meet a certain set of conditions before they could go to the next one.

General JONES. Just one word. I think basically a lack of jointness of the four services. Sontay was a well-run raid where much rescue experience had been gained. But lack of basic jointness was a serious problem in Iran.

And one last point. People talk about 20 helicopters and that is not the first time it has been brought up, we realize we were trying to hide helicopters in the middle of Iran for 2 nights. They needed a lot of refueling by C-130's.

It turned out that we should have additional helicopters, but it was not lightly taken by the Chiefs to go with fewer helicopters.

There was great worry in having a massive Armada hiding 2 nights and 1 day in the middle of Iran. It would have been ridiculous to have 20 helicopters with the crews involved and all the extra refueling they would have needed, would have exposed a very large number of Americans and greatly increased the likelihood of detection.

Senator WARNER. My recollection also is there were very few of the helicopters in the inventory anyway. I do not know if we had 20.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The two questions I wanted to get into have already been asked and I think were satisfactorily answered.

One issue I think we are going to explore a bit further is the idea of making the chairman a five-star officer.

On another issue, I was quite surprised the other day when the Secretary of Defense said we should have had more helicopters available for the Iranian rescue operation. I suspect that the reason we did not have more helicopters there was the reason that General Jones just correctly said. That is, if we had 60 helicopters in there, we may have had a better assurance of the people getting there, but by the time they got there 90 percent of them would have been dead.

It is easy to sit back and blame somebody for why something did not happen. The question is what part did poor joint coordination among the services have to do with the failure of the Iranian operation.

Admiral Moorer, I take it you do not think much of our reorganization attempt.

Admiral MOORER. I am not surprised you take that position.

Senator EXON. Admiral, keeping the Iranian operation in mind, are there any changes that should be made in the present command and control structure, both from the standpoint of carrying out the duties that the individual Chiefs have to their services as well as the upward information that should go to the Commander in Chief and the President of the United States?

Admiral MOORER. I am not opposed to change. I think it has to be evolutionary, not revolutionary.

I think many of the changes have been made recently in terms of pulling in the CINC's to conduct war games together and reviewing the contingency plans and utilization of one service and the augmentation of another service's mission as mining by the Air Force, AWAC's support, and so on. A lot of progress has been made.

When you hear General Vessey, he will tell you about this. It has been progressive. The JCS, and I think General Jones will agree with me, in one sense is coming of age. It was started from zero in 1947. It moved ahead.

I think that some changes should be made in the Congress. I think we should have a 2-year budget. I think the Congress imposes too much in terms of occupying the time of the people in the Pentagon.

I had occasion one time when Congressman Vinson was chairman and Mr. McElroy was Secretary of Defense and they got into an argument whether to have torpedoes in the Polaris submarines. Mr. McElroy would write to Congressman Vinson. Vinson would send a letter to Admiral Burke who would give it to me. Vinson wrote back. McElroy would give the letter to Admiral Burke who gave it to me.

So, I spent 6 months writing to myself. I had to be very careful that I did not make a statement I could not answer. [Laughter.]

That is a true story.

To be more specific and so far as the office of the Secretary of Defense is concerned, I think it is too big, it has too many people in it. As I said earlier, I do not think they delegate authority down to people where you can really put your finger on who is responsible. If you dispose of the question asked, you can dispose of the question answers.

Senator Exon. During the time you had this highly responsible position, did you have any qualms or were you disappointed with the responsiveness of the bureaucracy of the Joint Chief personnel, military and civilian, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

You are obviously opposed to any kind of Deputy Chief that would be over the staff.

Did you have cordial, good relationships during your term?

Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir. Of course, we have a Director of the Joint Staff who served the function now proposed for the Deputy.

Let me just say that I have never in my 41 years in the Navy given a military man an order he did not carry out. My problem was not with the man in uniform. My problem was with the people under McNamara.

For instance, on the shipbuilding program I was told if you do not put this ship in the Pacific, we are not going to approve it.

Of course, I said OK, we will put it in the Pacific, knowing full well the guy would be a thousand miles away by the time the ship was finished.

Those were the kinds of things that heckled me. And telling me how many bombs to put on each wing of the airplane and what kind of camera to put on the plane when I was doing reconnaissance.

Those are the kinds of things that worried me. The people should tell the military what to do and not how to do it.

Senator Exon. My time is up. I would like to ask you, General Jones, did you have those kinds of problems that Admiral Moorer just cited when you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

General Jones. First, I agree with Admiral Moorer that things should be changed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The record shows that in your study and a dozen other studies, there is a common thread of difficulty of addressing what I call the too hard problems. We had them in spades in Vietnam and we have had them ever since.

In my term of Chairman for 4 years and Chief of Staff for the Air Force for 4 years, I was involved one way or the other for a long time. There is a continuing thread of problems rather than one that occurs during one group of Chiefs or another.

Senator EXON. Did you feel you received instructions from above which were too detailed?

General JONES. There were instances where the Chiefs thought there were actions by the political authorities that got into too much detail, but not to the grossness that Admiral Moorer was talking about. On the other hand, the bureaucratic advice from the joint systems weakens the role of the Chiefs. If it were crisper, I think it could have more influence on actions.

Senator EXON. I will simply say, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time. I think that we would concur that those things you cite are mistakes. I am not sure that is a legitimate criticism of the staff report.

Thank you very much.

Senator WARNER. Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to pay brief tribute to the two gentlemen this morning. General Jones and I knew each other when he was an operator and I was a minor administrative person. I respect him and anyone else who becomes Chief of Staff of a service. I think they have to be outstanding people to be there.

Admiral Moorer, I am not only respectful toward for having served without precedent as CINCLANT commander of the Pacific Fleet, then the remarkable accumulation of important duty stations during critical times in recent U.S. history. Those were times when we were not involved in discussion, or taking part in bringing an airliner down, or incidents like the *Mayaguez*, but major incidents like the Tonkin Gulf, the 82d Airborne landing in the Dominican Republic, the Yom Kippur war, and the latter days of Vietnam during the strategic bombing around Hanoi and Haiphong. There were many, many remarkable occasions in which he played a role with which I have become somewhat familiar and I admit to a subjective attitude of approval toward him because I know his family, his brother, and so on.

Gentlemen, with the minor military experience that I have compared to you, I am trying to avoid a revolutionary wrong change rather than an evolutionary correct change.

Therefore, I find it useful to remain more fundamental early in my questioning because the points of departure are going to determine, in the end, the way that we develop our proposals for change.

One fundamental point of departure is that we seem to be comparing the efficiencies or flaws in organization with successes or failures in major or minor events around the world involving the execution of military activities.

That might not be entirely correct, because there are political components in those failures, such as the failure in Vietnam, such as the failure after Vietnam.

For example, the way we got started in Vietnam. The way we gave our victory away after the fact. The fact that we did not even give the Shah of Iran medical treatment or a place to die. Those things have effects on what you can do in Nicaragua or El Salvador.

In other words, is JC organization a more important factor determining success or failure, or is it the President, his personality, his intervention? Is it Congress, in the way it can sometimes do mischief as well as good in foreign relations as well as military affairs? Is it the media? Are those more important than the manner in which you organize because the personalities and the institutions I mentioned have had more effect on the organization?

I would ask your reaction to that.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Denton, I think you have certainly summarized the overall problem. I have been trying to make the same point: That you cannot solve the problem by putting people in boxes because it starts out with the President. Every President operates differently.

There was a time in this country when we had a bipartisan foreign policy. We do not have that any more. So, when you feed on down, you get people like McNamara who centralized everything and would insist on making every decision and instructing you right down to the finest detail.

I do not know how you are going to legislate against that because people are people and unless everybody works together, no organization is going to work.

I think you really summarized the overall problem very well.

General JONES. Senator Denton, I think we have from time to time problems in all areas, within administrations, within the civilian side, within the Congress, but also within the military. Therefore, I would not want to try to say which was most important.

Take the Iranian rescue mission——

Senator DENTON. I do not mean to interrupt, but I am only asking whether it is fair to assess the efficacy of the manner in which the DOD and the JCS are organized in terms of the Nation's successes or failures, considering the preponderant effect of those other things I talked about.

General JONES. I think it would be wrong to assume that a failure was caused by just one agency being involved. Clearly, as we pointed out, we have too much layering. We have too big a span of control. We have lots of problems across the board, micromanagement by the Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I think we can look at successes and failures and draw conclusions with regard to the joint system.

In the Iranian rescue mission I do not fault the civilian leadership.

Senator DENTON. You fault the organization?

General JONES. I fault both myself and the system for not being joint enough, for making some assumptions that in retrospect should have been different. All the Chiefs duly endorsed the plan.

But we had a lack of jointness fundamental to the system that was never fully resolved by the time we started the operation. Many of the problems we did not realize at the time, we really did not realize until afterward.

There were problems in all areas. There are things we can do to fix the joint system, but to really get the most effective military, we have to look at all aspects of defense organization.

Senator DENTON. My time is up. I do agree with you we can make improvements. I believe they should be evolutionary and not revolutionary.

Dr. Schlesinger, who was here yesterday, is quoted as saying that the proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread and almost always disregarded. If it is unread, I do not know how it can be anything but disregarded.

That kind of subjective emotional extreme statement about the situation is one that I would like to avoid. Dr. Schlesinger is a very reasonable man, and I think he was quoted out of context here.

I am trying to get us away from 80 percent of the questions being aimed at something screwed up about the organization because of what happened to helicopters with sandstorms. Sandstorms and helicopters do not mix.

The President's timing on it had something to do with that That was not a JCS decision. That was a Presidential decision. That is one of the reasons I chose to run for the Senate.

General JONES. I must say that I made my initial approach to the subject of reorganization 5 years ago. It was based on a lot of study, not just one operation. I think there are many things that have to be done to make us as effective as we should be.

When I talked about the advice not being timely, I was talking about the bureaucratic corporate advice that comes up through the five staffs.

The day-to-day personal advice I give high marks to that.

Admiral MOORER. If I had known that the advice given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was seldom read and always disregarded, I would have played more golf and you would still be in Hanoi.

Senator WARNER. Gentlemen, we thank you. We must go on to Senator Levin here.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I know we all appreciate the candor of the testimony of both of our witnesses. It is direct, blunt, helpful.

I am intrigued by the unwillingness of the Secretary of Defense to learn the problems. That we had in Grenada because we won. We won World War II, but we were smart enough to learn some lessons from World War II.

There was a commission that reported shortly after the war that there was a complete failure in Hawaii of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period, November 27 to December 7.

If we do not learn from our successes and our failures, we are going to lose American lives in the next effort we make. I think it is appropriate that there be a hearing, a review of the communications problems in Grenada because the Army could not talk to the Navy. That is not healthy.

The Army had some problems apparently communicating with the Marines. Admiral McDonald will be here to testify and I am sure he will cover some of this.

Again, I would like to, if I could, perhaps just ask the Chair for his attention for the moment, I want to reiterate a request that I have made that we have witnesses come before us to talk about the communications problems in Grenada so that we can learn lessons from them in terms of the organization of the command.

You know our next witness will be able to testify. I believe it is worth more time and more focus than one witness. I would urge again that this committee have a hearing on that issue. Because if we are not willing to delve in detail into what happened there, at least what we were told happened there, then I do not think we are willing to tackle this problem in the way it should be tackled.

We keep reading reports about Grenada. We won in Grenada, so who cares about the problems. That is what the Secretary of Defense says. I repeat that the answer is because you may save American lives the next time. That is why.

I think it is our obligation to do so. I am not asking the witnesses these questions. I am asking our chairman whether or not the Chair will consider having a more focused hearing into the communications problem in particular that apparently existed in Grenada.

I am not asking for an answer now. I just want to reiterate that request. I think it is important that we be willing to do that.

When the Secretary of Defense was here the other day and refused to say that there were any problems because we won, I think that we are endangering American lives by that attitude. It is that simple.

We obviously won. We ought to be grateful. The mission was accomplished. We all ought to be grateful for that. At the same time, we ought to insist that we learn lessons from the problems we had in Grenada.

I have used part of my time on that request. It was not a question. I address that to the Chair and I will leave it there.

Senator WARNER. I think there is adequate time if the witnesses wish to respond.

Admiral MOORER. I will say that I agree with your general statement that you must learn from these things. I think you will find that as you get into it, there has been exhaustive study of the communication problem in Grenada.

I talked to Admiral Metcalf who was in command of the operation. He recognized this might happen and before he left he placed some of the Army equipment on his flagship. Perhaps down between and among the lower units they had problems. Certainly they should be corrected and they will be.

Senator LEVIN. A couple questions. The staff report indicates that there are some ambiguities in the chain of command. My question to the witnesses is as follows on the chain of command issue.

The House bill authorizes the President and the Secretary of Defense to direct that the chain of command run through the chairman to the unified commander.

Is that exactly the current practice? If not, should we do that by law?

Either one of you can answer.

Admiral MOORER. I think it always does that. What has happened today, though, Senator Levin, is that you can have a situation like five fighters intercepting one transport, that is so hyped up by the media that the President cannot even make a speech about the tax bill without being asked about that.

So, we are going to have terrorism, and so on, in the future, these outbreaks, I call them, of very limited nature, and, consequently, I think that sometimes you are going to have to bypass, in a sense, the regular chain of command down through the unified commanders and deal directly with what you might call a crisis task force.

So far as any kind of combat, and, of course, we always think of confrontation with the Soviets, I think the chain of command is adequate and it will always go through the Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. General Jones, my precise question is: Should we by law authorize the President or Secretary of Defense to direct that the chain of command run through the Chairman and the unified commanders?

That is my point.

General JONES. I think I indicated earlier it could be marginally helpful, but it is not a fundamental problem.

Senator LEVIN. It is your understanding that that is the current practice?

General JONES. The current practice is administrative. The Chairman of the Chiefs is not in the chain of command today. Administratively, by executive directive, it goes to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would change it administratively.

I think the proposal would be helpful, but not a major issue and it would not solve the fundamental problem.

Senator LEVIN. To put it in colloquial terms, would you put the Chairman in the chain of command?

General JONES. If I had total independent authority, I would put him in the chain of command, but I would not be so naive to think that it would make a difference one way or the other. It is not a fundamental issue, but I think it is helpful.

Senator LEVIN. Would you change the Chairman's term to a 4-year term as the House law does?

General JONES. No.

Admiral MOORER. I do not think that is necessary, but I would not object to it.

General JONES. I agree.

Senator WARNER. A quick followup on Senator Levin's question on chain of command which parallels the inquiry raised earlier. I want the record to be clear on this point because we will have to consider it.

As you approach your responses, I am sure you are keeping in mind the fundamental proposition that there should be civilian control which flows from our Constitution throughout the history of our country.

If the Chairman were to be injected by law or statute, it seems to me you would have a confrontation with that principal and, therefore, it is best that we leave the present system in place. The present system as you describe it, functions by virtue of custom, administratively or, frankly, by the force of personality between the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense.

Would you agree with that overview?

Admiral Moorer. Yes.

Senator Warner. General Jones?

General Jones. In general I do not think it would be a big issue in civilian control, but I have no problem with leaving it as it is today.

Senator Warner. Theoretically, if the Chairman were in the chain of command, he might have some discretion to modify the order or reverse the order.

General Jones. Only if national commanders gave him that authority and they could give it to him today. It would depend on what the Secretary of Defense and the President wanted in civilian control.

If they want little civilian control, they can work it to give little civilian control. If they want a lot of it, they can give a lot of it. Legislative change would not have major impact on the way it operates.

Admiral Moorer. All the military people I have ever known are strict constitutionalists. They accept the fact that we have civilian control and the President is Commander in Chief. I have never heard any person say otherwise. I do not think civilian control is a problem. I just think it is all right as it is.

Senator Warner. My observation and question was not intended to suggest anything other than what you have said. It has been my experience that without exception the military throughout our history have acknowledged that value of having civilian control and never once have I heard any suggested encroachment on that.

Gentlemen, we are extremely indebted to you for your candid and forthright testimony. Both of you have returned to your private lives, but have unselfishly contributed in many ways to the betterment of our country. I am grateful.

Senator Nunn. I share that. I thank both our witnesses very much for being here. You have been very helpful.

General Jones. Thank you.

Admiral Moorer. Thank you.

Senator Warner. The committee will now welcome Adm. Wesley McDonald.

Admiral, we welcome your participation in this important series of hearings.

The committee acknowledges with regret that you have announced your retirement. You have testified before the committee on several occasions on the subject of reorganization, and on your role as commander in chief of the Atlantic Command during the Grenada operation.

You have been a very thoughtful and articulate witness. The committee looks forward to receiving your testimony today.

Senator Nunn.

~~Senator~~ Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming Admiral McDonald. He has been a very valuable asset for this committee in trying to analyze Grenada. We have talked to him on several occasions. He has testified. He has been frank and candid about the pluses and minuses.

I think the after-action reports that Admiral McDonald and his group put together is exactly what Senator Levin was talking about a minute ago in terms of taking a look at what the problems are, even though we had success, in trying to make sure those problems are ironed out in the future.

So, I congratulate Admiral McDonald in the approach he used in that regard. I look forward to his views on the reorganization issues.

I will state without any doubt that his services will be missed very much in our U.S. Navy when he retires, but we will continue to call on him, with his permission, and I hope he is located within at least a plane ride to Washington because he has been very helpful.

Senator WARNER. I was going to suggest that the admiral has the option of proceeding to go through his entire statement or he may desire to summarize.

Senator NUNN. I see the statement. I have read it very briefly. It is not that long. I think it would be helpful to have the entire statement.

Senator WARNER. That has been the practice of the committee thus far that most witnesses have given their statement in their entirety.

So, we will proceed if that is agreeable.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WESLEY L. McDONALD, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Admiral McDONALD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is an extreme privilege for me to be here this morning to be able to express my views on the organization of the Department of Defense.

I am delighted that my distinguished classmate, Senator Denton, is present today because when I leave, there will only be one left—Admiral Crowe, who is now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will be the last of the long breed.

Senator DENTON. I only wish you would change your mind about retiring.

Senator WARNER. Chairman Goldwater convened the hearing this morning, but by necessity had to be absent himself. He wishes to extend to you his appreciation for your participation here this morning.

Admiral McDONALD. Thank you, sir.

The staff report, "Defense Organization. The Need for Change," will most certainly generate considerable debate, both in the halls of Congress and elsewhere. However, it is, in my perception, exceptionally thorough in its content.

I wholeheartedly agree with Senators Goldwater and Nunn that the authors of the study have done a superb job and should be commended for their efforts on behalf of the Congress, the Department of Defense and the American people.

Earlier this month I attended a meeting at which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that the Joint Chiefs and the unified and specified commanders study the report. For my part, it has been, or is being, read by all of the flag officers assigned to my staff, all 645 pages!

As you might imagine, I do agree with many of the observations and recommendations contained in the report. However, you would be disappointed if I did not tell you that I also disagree with some sections. This morning I will address both.

In the time allotted to me this morning, it is not possible to address in detail each of the subjects contained in the report. In my remarks I will address some aspects of the following subjects.

The planning, programming and budgeting system.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Unified Commands and their relationships with the services and OSD.

Procurement.

The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System—Planning. I believe that the staff report is generally accurate in its assessment of the state of long-range planning within the Department of Defense. There are many factors which have led to a short planning horizon, most notably among them the Government-wide focus on the annual budget process.

As all of you are aware, there are offices within each service and in JCS dedicated to long-range planning. However, from the observations of members of my staff in their participation at a recent long-range planners conference, only the Navy is supporting a properly organized and staffed long-range planning group.

It is, therefore, no accident that only the Navy, through the efforts of their long-range and strategic planning groups, has developed, in the context of a national strategy, a strategic framework which defines the role of the Department and gives direction for the development of programs in support of the national military strategy.

Many of you have heard the Navy's presentation on maritime strategy and I believe that you would agree that it effectively articulates the role which the Navy plays in support of national objectives, and I would add parenthetically, it also complements and interfaces closely with the alliance strategy for the Atlantic, for which I am responsible as the SACLANT.

Programming—The staff report describes in detail the myriad of problems which the services face in the programming phase of PPBS. One of the most significant problems has been the practice of "getting well in the out-years."

As the report notes, we have based our 5-year funding estimates on very favorable real growth projections. Of course, these projections are rarely accurate, and we must constantly redefine our programs.

As an example, the estimates of funding available for the fiscal years 1987–91 period have been adjusted downward three times since they were first published in January 1985. A fourth revision is currently being made as DOD conducts its review of the services' budget estimates.

Through the first three revisions, the Navy's funding estimates for the 5-year period have been reduced by over $90 billion.

How do we solve this problem? Probably with great difficulty and, although I am not a cynic, I do not believe that it can be totally eliminated. However, I do believe the magnitude of the refinements can be reduced by the use of realistic estimates of future funding.

The Senate and executive branch efforts to define growth for the fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987 defense budgets has substantial potential to improve the overall PPBS process. I will address this subject further in my remarks on procurement.

Budgeting—In this area, I believe that you must change radically the manner in which you conduct the business of reviewing and approving the various budgets submitted for your approval. The report and the statements of Senators Goldwater and Nunn reflect a full appreciation of the problems and offer viable solutions.

The biennial budget for the Defense Department will be a giant step forward, but only if the procedure does not result in simply providing even more time for acrimonious debate, further politicalization of the Defense budget, more amendments, and more requests for studies.

Senator Nunn's characterization of the Defense budget review process as Washington's version of "trivial pursuit" is, regrettably, right on target.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff—While there may be problems with the JCS, I do not believe that creation of a "council of elders" will solve the problem. In fact, it could make matters worse. There is no certainty that these officers would bring to the advisory council a broader perspective than that possessed by the incumbents.

We should keep in mind that all of us are influenced to a large degree by our experiences, our perspectives guided in this case by 30 to 40 years in primarily a single service setting.

The study's authors erroneously believe that officers in their final tour will "change their stripes;" that being freed from concerns over their next assignment, they will see the world in a different light.

Rather than instituting a change of the magnitude proposed in the study, I recommend that the Congress consider adoption of the following provisions contained in H.R. 3622:

Place the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command.

Create a Deputy Chairman.

Make the Chairman a fully participating member of the National Security Council.

Adoption of these provisions would, I believe, satisfy the intent of the recommendations on JCS organization contained in the study.

Despite the assertions in the study, I do not believe that we require a cadre of officers whose specialty is Joint Staff duty. Nor do I support efforts to have the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs directly influence the selection of officers for promotion.

Unified commanders—I would like to focus on the issue of the role of the unified commanders in the resource allocation process. There have been a number of concerns expressed in the study, none of which are new, but all of which are important to those of us charged with the responsibility for conducting operations.

In an unconstrained world, we would be able to procure all of the equipments we require for modernization and force structure improvements, while also satisfying all readiness and sustainability needs. That world has never existed and, therefore, the services, DOD, and the Congress must make judgments about balancing present versus future needs. Obviously, not everyone is satisfied with the results.

On readiness and sustainability issues, the CINC's, whose views are centered on current capabilities, argue forcefully. In the past, I felt that many of my most pressing issues did not always receive priority consideration.

In an effort to provide the CINC's with a more visible forum, Secretary Taft has directed a number of actions to enhance the role of the CINC's in the PPBS process. We have just completed our first cycle under these procedures, and I am satisfied with the responsiveness of the services and the results in this early effort. While we have not solved every problem, we have made substantial progress.

Some problems will not be solved easily. The forces in the field are equipped to counter our most capable adversary, the Warsaw Pact. Our procurement emphasis is there, and, in my view, rightfully so.

But where does that leave a CINC whose principle concerns lie in the Third World, in those regions where conflict involving U.S. forces is a substantially higher probability?

The study staff has already heard from Gen. Paul Gorman, and I am certain that the new USCINCSO, General Galvin, as well as the commander of the Central Command, would echo his sentiments that resource allocation to their commands remains inadequate.

Tradeoffs must be made, and in those situations, no command achieves all of its goals. We must have a balance between present and future needs, and the services and DOD are doing a credible job in this area.

CINC views are being heard and, within fiscal and balance limitations, their needs are being addressed. The situation is continuing to improve as the CINC's role in PPBS evolves. The bottom line: DOD is on the right track and no sweeping changes are needed.

Procurement—At our recent meeting with the Defense Resources Board, I discussed the problems we are experiencing in maintaining procurement programs in the face of ever-changing fiscal guidance, and the impact these changes have upon my ability to plan effectively for the long-range employment of forces assigned to the Atlantic Command.

While I specifically cited tactical aircraft and munitions procurements, my recommendations truly have broader application. I asked that, rather than subjecting programs to major year-to-year perturbations, we settle upon an affordable and achievable procurement profile and stick with it to completion.

While this could result in delays in achieving planned procurement objectives, in reality these objectives are ever elusive anyway. We need program stability for both operational and financial reasons. The Congress could be a big help in this regard by providing early decisions on expected budget levels.

Conclusion—I believe that you are now at the point where there is really no further need for study. Everyone who wanted to participate in the discussion has had, or will have, the opportunity to speak. Further study will serve no useful purpose; it will only delay needed decisions.

If change is to be implemented, conditions appear optimum during this Congress. However, time is short if legislation is to be proposed, debated, passed and signed into law prior to Senator Goldwater's retirement. It would be a fitting tribute to him if your work could be completed during 1986.

As for me, change will not come before my active service ends. Next Wenesday, I will be relieved by Adm. Lee Baggett and, after over 42 years of service, I will retire. I am most grateful to have had the opportunity to serve our country as a member of the Armed Forces for so many years.

Over the past several years, I have had the opportunity to meet and get to know many members of this committee. I am grateful, too, for your dedication to the ideals of this great Nation and for your unfailing support of our men and women in uniform.

Thank you, gentlemen. I now stand ready to respond to your questions.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Admiral.

I am sure Senator Nunn and members of the committee join me in expressing our profound respect for you as an individual and the fact that you have given 42 years of your life to the service.

I think out of respect to you, we will allow your classmate to lead off with questions.

Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Wes, congratulations on 42 years of marvelous, exemplary service to your country. All your classmates love you. Everybody that I know who knows you loves you. Thank you.

I have read your statement and heard it. I agree with everything you have said. I have some questions about a couple of things, because I do not know why you want them and I have not fully made up my mind on a couple of them.

One of them is the Deputy Chairman, which you acquiesce in. I think that Admiral Moorer believes that the present system of rotation of the duty, as it were, among the service Chiefs is preferable. This might be the only thing on which I disagree with him and agree with you.

My reason would be that there is a work overload, there is a time constraint.

In other words, the Chairman might have been having to look at such a thing as putting that airliner down in Sicily when the rest of the world is still going on in terms of your requirements, what is going on in Southeast Asia, or whatever.

What is your own reason, why do you think that Deputy Chairman should be created?

Admiral McDONALD. It is hard for me to counter some of the testimony you have had from former Chairman who might say that they do not believe that that is a requirement. But from my observation as a unified commander in the last 3 years, it just appears that watching General Vessey work as the Chairman and now his successor, Admiral Crowe, that there is an awful lot on the plate.

It would appear to me that the Chairman can be served very well by someone else who is, I guess, to use Admiral Train's phrase, the alter ego, although I am not sure I want to use that phrase, but someone who is there, has the continuity day to day and can fill in for him in many of the areas that the Chairman just should not be tasked.

Senator DENTON. In other words, it would improve the quality of advice, the ability to supervise?

Admiral McDONALD. The only reason for a deputy.

Senator DENTON. You say, "I do not believe we require a cadre of officers whose specialty is joint staff study." To flip the coin, I am going to side with the staff study to this degree.

If we do not need this new kind of staff to replace the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and if we do not need a specialization as Joint Staff officers, would not you agree that it would be helpful were we to have a bit more knowledge of the other services by the time we are eligible for service on the Joint Staff or an important Joint Staff command assignment?

I think there is an element of ignorance and bias. Were we exposed more to what the other guys can do and do do, we would not have such an unbalanced appraisal, or tendency toward unbalance, as we approach not only budgetary items but questions like who should do what in a given operation?

Would you agree to having more joint training incorporated in the curricula?

I do not mean overdo it, but a lot more than we have now in our respective command and staff schools and our war colleges, as well as in the 2-month Capstone course that they have at the national War College?

Admiral McDONALD. I certainly agree with the need for all of the services becoming more involved in those things which are joint. As I think the study points out rightfully, any time you are talking of a conflict in the future, we are talking joint operations.

I think that we are beyond where any individual service is going to run an operation of any significance, of any national consequence, in the defense of this country. Obviously, those things that can help us understand and work together better should be championed.

I misunderstood, then, what I am commenting on here or maybe you have misread what I intended. I do not think you need a cadre of officers who only serve on the Joint Staff.

Senator DENTON. I agree with that.

Admiral McDONALD. I think that would be self-defeating by eliminating the advantages that exist in the current JCS where we do have a mix of people.

It is also, I think, a little bit constraining and inhibiting if you have a Joint Staff specialist who repeats into the joint arena all the time at the expense of understanding what the services may require of him in his own Army uniform or his Air Force uniform or his Navy uniform.

I think the quality of officers who participate has to continue to be examined carefully by the services as to who they are assigning to the Joint Staff, to ensure that the quality remains very high. I think you then get an end product based on the quality that goes in.

Senator **Denton**. Most of the rest of your recommendations refer to matters on which I defer to my colleagues here, such as congressional DOD relations, but I do have one question on that.

How are the CINC's views being heard more within the PPBS circuit?

Admiral **McDonald**. I am just about to come in with my prioritization of things I need to carry out my war-fighting capability. That listing goes through the service components. They then put their resource inputs in to the service Chiefs. It gets in to the services for resource allocation and consideration in that way.

The services are required now to respond to the CINC's inputs. If they do not fill them, then an explanation of why that requirement was not filled or was unable to be filled is provided to the CINC.

Senator **Denton**. You say the situation continues to be improved as the CINC's role in PPBS evolves. Maybe you can tell me precisely how the evolution is taking place. I know it has to. I am just not aware of how it has been.

Admiral **McDonald**. I will.

Senator **Denton**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Warner**. Senator Nunn.

Senator **Nunn**. I will follow your example and yield to Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you.

Admiral, my congratulations and commendations for your devotion to duty and country over all these decades.

Admiral **McDonald**. Thank you, sir.

Senator **Levin**. The staff report outlines some of the problems in the Grenada operation. I preface my question by saying that we are grateful that it was a success. There is no doubt we achieved our mission there. Let me spend just a few seconds on that, although I could spend only my 5 minutes on that.

I would rather spend 5 minutes learning some lessons so that we can be sure that the next mission is a success.

Senator **Warner**. The Senator recognizes this is an important issue. You may take longer than 5 minutes.

Senator **Levin**. I have indicated to the chairman on a number of occasions I think it is worthwhile to have a hearing into the problems that were illustrated in Grenada to see if we cannot find the cause, whether it is structural or whatever they are, so that we will not face those problems next time.

There will be other times when we will be using military force, it is not the last time. We might as well learn from our successes as well as from our failures.

Now, the staff report indicates some problems. Have you had a chance to read that staff report?

Admiral **McDonald**. Yes, sir, I have.

Senator **Levin**. Will you comment on it. Rather than my trying to summarize it for you, could you tell us whether it is essentially accurate relative to the problems that were illustrated in the operation or are there a lot of inaccuracies?

Admiral **McDonald**. I would say the report is essentially accurate. I think there are some things stated that I would have stated in another way. I have no basic disagreement with the thrust of the report in its conveyance of the fact that everything we did in

Grenada did not work out exactly as we would have liked to have it happen, that there were some deficiencies that were in fact documented.

They are in fact, as Senator Nunn said earlier, documented in a report which is classified and was promulgated from my command to do exactly what you have just articulated, to learn from those things that we did not do right, although they were not catastrophic, so that we would not commit those same errors if we get into another situation, whether it be similar to Grenada or something else, God forbid.

Unless we learn from what we do and particularly if we do not do it right, then we are going to commit those same errors again.

Senator LEVIN. I would like to go through some of these with you and see if you would rate it the same. I would like to solicit for the record from you an unclassified statement as to where we had problems.

I am wondering, Mr. Chairman, if it would be all right to solicit that kind of report for the record?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Would that be all right, Admiral, to get that report?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. The staff report says the largest single problem was the inability of some units to communicate. Army and Navy units could not communicate with one another.

There were also problems between the Army and Marine units on the ground.

Is that accurate?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir. That is not to say that those deficiencies were not overcome by making do and, as you pointed out, the operation was successful in its overall achievements.

You are right, there were some difficulties in establishing communications with some of the units that were there.

Senator LEVIN. Are you reluctant to say that there were some problems?

Admiral McDONALD. No, sir.

Senator LEVIN. It is not a word that you would avoid?

Admiral McDONALD. If there is a problem, there is a problem. No, sir, I do not have any problem with that.

Senator LEVIN. I am happy to hear that. The report says on March 22 Senator Nunn asked General Nutting about the communications problem, about the interoperability problems. This was General Nutting's answer to Senator Nunn:

> It is the function of the way we prepare for war. That is the fact that the law charges each military department to organize, train and equip forces to operate in a particular environment for which it is responsible.
>
> That is too simple an answer, but that is where it begins with the way we prepare for war.

Would you agree with General Nutting's assessment of the cause of that problem?

Admiral McDONALD. I think that is right. If you go back and review, the services are in fact tasked to provide the resources and the training and doctrine for their services in preparation for war. It is the CINC's responsibility to wage that war.

Senator **Levin**. Another point made by the staff report is that:

> The officers from the 82d Airborne Division flew by helicopter several times to Guam to coordinate naval gunfire. Unfortunately, these efforts were still unsuccessful.

Is that an accurate statement?

Admiral **McDonald**. I do not think that is in totality an accurate statement. I think they were successful. There were, obviously, times when there was personal liaison. In fact, we did have special communications liaison teams on the scene with equipment provided by the special forces that did address some of the problems. That is one of the aberrations to make the system work.

Senator **Levin**. It is an aberration to make the system work?

Admiral **McDonald**. That did not come out very well. To make sure the communications were in fact carried out.

Senator **Levin**. In a further example the staff report says certain messages failed to reach the Army on the ground in Grenada.

Admiral **McDonald**. That is true. There was a deficiency of record traffic. We went back and uncovered it and some messages were not received.

Senator **Levin**. The report says this problem nearly proved disastrous as one of those messages contained information concerning existence of a second campus where American students were located.

Admiral **McDonald**. We have discussed this with Senator Nunn at some length. I am still not quite convinced just what happened on that message. My intelligence officer spent some time with Senator Nunn on the message which discusssed the second campus.

I was not even aware of the second campus until late in the timeframe. So, the message you are referring to was available from the intelligence sources. It was transmitted, but, obviously, everyone did not get it.

Whether it could have been disastrous, yes, I guess if you look at all the aspects of possibly the Cubans recognizing that we did not know, and wanting to take more aggressive action on the students who were in Grand Anse Campus, then it could have been disastrous.

It did not work that way, obviously.

Senator **Levin**. It is your testimony here that some of the Army units did not receive the message?

Admiral **McDonald**. I am sure that is true, sir.

Senator **Levin**. And some did?

Admiral **McDonald**. I would have to defer to my communicator. Some did.

Senator **Levin**. Do you know which did and which did not?

Admiral **McDonald**. I do not personally, but I can provide it if you want to get into that detail, Senator.

Senator **Levin**. I think it would be useful to know which did and which did not and explain the difference, if you could, for the record. It is a critical issue.

We can all count our blessings that we got to that second campus before the Cubans.

Admiral McDonald. I think you will find that it is going to come around to what units had the equipment with them to in fact copy record traffic. All of them did not.

Senator Levin. If you could tell us for the record how many did. It will take some digging, I know. If you could tell us that, I would appreciate it.

Admiral McDonald. Yes, sir.

[Information not received at time of going to press.]

Senator Levin. We have these annual training exercises, I believe, do we not?

Admiral McDonald. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. Coordinated training exercises?

Admiral McDonald. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. Does it usually take months of advance work for those exercises to coordinate the communications for them?

Admiral McDonald. Senator, we start planning for our next major joint exercise, an annual exercise called Solid Shield, almost the day it is completed.

Yes, you are exactly right. Communications, being one of the major considerations in an exercise like that starts being planned shortly after the other one is over. Again, we use the lessons learned from a "quick look," if you will, of the exercise which has just been completed.

May I add, and I do not mean to take your time, but may I add that we have taken some relatively stringent efforts to make those exercises work in a more realistic mode than we had before Grenada. If I may for just a moment explain.

There is only a certain block of time that is available to run a joint exercise. There are a certain number of units that are involved and there is a lot of money that goes into trying to run a joint exercise.

So, in trying to ensure that everybody gets the maximum amount of training during that very precise timeframe, we found that it was hard to endure communications breakdowns. So, we would even test communications systems before the exercise took place.

It may even have gone to the point of pre-positioning, in some cases, of some equipments that you did not have the money to airlift in or to accommodate other types of constraints that might be imposed on you during a short period of time.

So, some of the ease with which we were handling communications may have been a false generation of our capabilities because of the desire to maximize training.

We have changed that now. Come as you would come to practice the exercise, and we are finding that it is more realistic, it is more truthful and it also uncovers the weaknesses a lot more clearly for us to work on.

Senator Levin. That is extremely helpful. Any report on the lessons from those exercises, I think, also should be transmitted here because they will help us in looking at these reorganization issues, perhaps.

Let me ask for one further comment on Grenada and then I want to ask one question not related to Grenada.

When you give us your unclassified report about the problems at Grenada, what we learned there, would you also comment on any inaccuracies in the staff report so that we can make sure there are some corrections someplace?

Senator NUNN. You mean on Grenada, do you not?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Senator NUNN. I am worrying about the fleet if he had to do the whole report.

Senator LEVIN. No; just on the Grenada portion. If you could correct any inaccuracies you perceive.

Admiral, you told us on a different occasion that you felt that the court-martial authority of the CINC's should be increased, either that or you indicated at some different point, you commented on the court-martial jurisdiction.

I am confused.

Admiral McDONALD. I hope you are because I do not recall, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Should the CINC's have greater court-martial jurisdiction than they now have?

Admiral McDONALD. I have not thought about it ahead of time, but I do not have any great problems with the situation as it exists today.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator. You have made a very valuable contribution.

Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, just one question.

Senator Levin asked a number of questions that I was going to ask. I think that information is very useful.

Senator LEVIN. Will you yield, Senator Nunn?

I should have said that Senator Nunn in yielding to me was obviously yielding for some questions in an area where he has done all the yeoman work. I appreciate your yielding to me.

Senator Nunn, particularly in this area, has done an awful lot of digging which I hope all the members of this committee, indeed, the military, will look at because it is important work that he and his staff have done, not just in the Grenada area which I happened to pick up on, but a number of other areas in this report.

I also want to thank the chairman for letting me run over my time. As usual, he is overly gracious.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Senator for his comment.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, who should be responsible for interoperability of communications?

If you are out there, the average person on the street pays taxes and looks at the military and thinks that things should run smoothly, and so forth.

When you hear the two services cannot communicate, whose responsibility should that be?

Admiral McDONALD. Senator Nunn, it has to be an area where someone is exercising overall coordination as you are suggesting. That has to be at the JCS level where all the CINC's will report and where the services are also participating.

The service Chiefs are, of course, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We as CINC's participate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would appear that no CINC can do this. He can certainly influence those decisions greatly from his perception of, again, training exercises or in this case a real operation.

I would like to believe that we are doing that. There is an oversight group right now at Fort Monmouth, NJ, that is looking into those areas of, again, interoperability among all the services.

We hope that we are doing better in that area. I like to believe that we are. As an example, the crypto voice communications systems that we were not fully equipped with at Grenada created some of the problems.

The Vinson systems that some services had, and others did not have, are now being fully addressed through, again a careful review and each service paying attention to procurement which we, the CINC's, have to insist on through the procurement system.

We have to sort of tell the services where we want them distributed within the Atlantic Command area, the Pacific Command area, the European area.

We have a responsibility, too, in that business of, one, resources and, two, allocations of those resources once procured, how best to use them within the area of responsibility of each of the Commands.

Senator NUNN. In other words, the CINC's cannot solve the problem, but they can raise so much cain about the problem through their own attention to it and their own training, inter-service training, that they can at least highlight the problem? The stage at which it has to be solved comes together at the JCS level?

Admiral McDONALD. That is how it is happening.

One of the things Senator Levin was talking about is basically the communications difficulties and problems in Grenada. It broke down into about four different areas, UHF satellite operation, ground mobile force equipment, incompatibilities, exercising joint communications, something the CINC's are almost totally responsible for, and communications security.

As an example, when you start talking communications security, this is where a lot of our problems arose because we were trying to talk through secure voice with the individual services that were participating, 82d Airborne, Navy units off the beach, the Marines who were in one section, aircraft that were flying.

Vinson is the new system. I do not want to get into much detail because I will get over my pay grade and I will probably confuse you if you are not alert to those specific things.

Vinson is an example where 50 percent of all the Army Atlantic units today are Vinson equipped. At the time of Grenada that was not true at all. With the selected units, those that we are going to call on first, they are 100 percent equipped.

All U.S. Marine Corps ground units are now Vinson equipped.

The Navy has continued to the point where all of its flagships and carriers are Vinson equipped now.

So, those kinds of problems we saw, again not integrated in a prioritization as to who gets it, who needs it, are being addressed.

Senator NUNN. I think your attitude has had a lot to do with solving some of these problems. If you had been of the type to go into the shell and say nothing went wrong, no problems, I think in the future some brave young people would pay with their lives.

You have been candid and frank about it, you said the overall operation was successful, which we're all grateful for, we know there was tremendous bravery there, but you have been willing to face the problems.

That is the way the game ought to be played. I congratulate you for it because that means the next time around these same problems will have a lot less chance to be repeated. I congratulate you on that.

I have one other question, Mr. Chairman. I see we have a vote.

Admiral, I have been concerned with the language of the so-called unified action, Armed Forces setting forth what the CINC's are supposed to do, the overall CINC rule.

Have you read that paragraph that sets forth what the CINC's are charged with doing?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir; I read it this morning, but I cannot recall all the specificities that are in it.

Senator NUNN. I will ask you if you will furnish this for the record. Let me read it. It boggles my mind.

> Operational command by the Unified Command will be exercised through the service component commanders or through the commanders of the subordinate command established in accordance with the procedure and criteria set forth here.
>
> Unless authorized by the established authority, the unified commander will not also act as commander of the service components or those of a subordinate command. In exercising operational command, the unified commander shall take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibility of his service component commander.
>
> Commanders of service components will communicate directly with their respective Chiefs of service on matters which are the responsibility of the military department or service.

That paragraph is supposed to govern our CINC's. To me it defies every principle of unity of command. Whatever it gives the CINC, it takes away from him two or three times over. Maybe it is not working that way in practice.

Admiral McDONALD. In practice it does not, but I would like to see it turned around. It ought to be service component working though the CINC's to the Chiefs of service which will give us greater continuity.

How we accomplish that needs to be looked at fairly carefully. There may be direct liaision from the component commander to the service Chief to carry on this type of interface that is needed for, one, the resources in his service, the training and the doctrine that he has to provide those forces.

The service component commander provides them to the CINC's for warfighting.

Senator NUNN. You are saying the liaison ought to be from the service component through the CINC's to his services rather than completely by passing the CINC?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir.

The reason I have come to that conclusion, after examining this book in great detail, is that it makes better sense for us, the CINC's, to articulate our concerns in the resources that the services will be in fact trying to draw attention to, service component to their service Chiefs.

Now, this can probably be done another way. You can probably have the service component as it is right now and as the Army has just directed its service components to submit their resource requests with information to the CINC's that they serve.

You have to realize that some service components serve two or three CINC's, as an example. That is workable, but I recommend more direct control. If you are looking for efficiency in a military organization, it is better to have service component through the CINC to the service.

I had not said that earlier to Mr. Punaro, but I have examined it at great length. I honestly want to tell you I think it will work better that way. I am not sure that the services will feel comfortable with it, but in candor, I think it gives a better military organization.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

Admiral McDonald, there are several questions here which Chairman Goldwater desired to have answered. I am going to ask staff to give you copies to take with you today for the record and request that you respond at your earliest convenience.

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. I have a question of my own. On page 8 you state:

> Rather than instituting a change of the magnitude proposed in the study, I recommend Congress consider adoption of the following provisions contained in H.R. 3622: Place the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command.

Would you care to amplify your feelings on that important point?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir.

I think we ought to go ahead and codify what in effect takes place today as far as the CINC's participation is concerned. I report directly to the Secretary of Defense.

That really does not work out that way in practicality when you have a Chairman who is a military man and you have the Chiefs of Staff of the services as the Joint Chiefs. You basically go through the chain, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman to discuss military matters, and then if it needs to move up, to the Secretary of Defense.

That is not to say that being able to discuss matters with the Secretary of Defense is not a zealously guarded privilege that we have. I do in fact submit a quarterly issues report to the Secretary of Defense on matters that are affecting my command. I really think the Chairman ought to be there if I do that, anyway.

Senator WARNER. If we were to adopt that, how would it work? Would you then report to the Chairman as opposed to the Secretary of Defense?

Admiral McDONALD. Yes, sir. I think it takes away that confusion which has existed and which I think is brought out in the study as to who the CINC's are reporting to.

Senator WARNER. I am advised by counsel that is one of the problems we are having in analyzing the House bill. You are very clear on it, you would then as a CINC report to the Chairman as opposed to SecDef?

Admiral McDONALD. That is the way I read the bill, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Admiral McDonald, in your prepared statement, you recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be placed in the chain of command. This idea, which is included in H.R. 3622 and has been endorsed by the administration, is a source of confusion as to what "in the chain of command" means. JCS Publication 1, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," defines the term "chain of command" as follows:

"The succession of commanding officers are from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised."

When you recommend that the JCS Chairman be placed in the chain of command, do you want him to have command authority?

Or are you talking about making him a channel through which orders are translated?

Admiral MCDONALD. I think he has command authority. That is the way I read it. That is the way I was brought up. I would report to him and he would report to the Secretary of Defense.

I heard your question earlier to General Jones or Admiral Moorer, or both of them, as to whether it could possibly dilute command authority. I would offer absolutely not.

The chain of command responds, often responds down. I have no problem with that at all. I think the Chairman would then report to the Secretary of Defense in the chain.

Senator WARNER. Let me run a test case. You recommend to the Chairman that an operation be initiated against a Caribbean Island under your command because of threatened takeover by Communists.

The Chairman then in the chain of commands says, no, I reverse the decision and the answer is no.

Does it go any further than that?

Admiral MCDONALD. Would you please repeat your question?

Senator WARNER. You as commander of your particular command say, "I recommend that we invade this small Caribbean Island because it may be taken over by the Communists." You see the Chief on that.

He says, "No, I reverse it."

Does it stop there or do your thoughts and recommendations go on up?

Admiral MCDONALD. I would presume it would stop there as far as where I am. I would find myself hard pressed to be in a position like that on a matter of national consequence. I would think in the chain of command if the man on the top says, "I listened to what you have to say. It does not wash. You are not going to go."

Senator WARNER. If the President decides he wants to go in on that island, tells the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense tells the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman says no and does not pass the order?

Admiral MCDONALD. It does not work that way.

Senator WARNER. What kind of chain of command is this where it works one way and not another way?

Admiral MCDONALD. The normal chain of command.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. We have to run and make a vote now.

In conclusion, I want to say that those of us on the committee express our appreciation to you and your wife and family in making very important contributions to our Nation.

Thank you.,

Admiral McDONALD. Thank you very much, Senator.

[Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER

JOINT STAFF

Chairman GOLDWATER. Admiral McDonald, one of the serious deficiencies that has been identified in the JCS system is the inadequate quality and performance of the Joint Staff. It would seem that efforts to improve joint military advice must seek to provide a better educated, more experienced, and a more independent Joint Staff.

In your prepared statement you do not recommend actions in this area and you indicate that you do not see the need for a joint duty specialty.

Could you explain your views on the Joint Staff?

Admiral McDONALD. I do not accept the proposition that there is inadequate quality and performance on the Joint Staff. However, if such a problem existed, it would be easily solved by the Joint Chiefs. They can refuse to accept personnel for duty on the Joint Staff if these personnel do not possess the requisite background and a performance record which indicates the potential for satisfactory service; I believe that this type of screening is already accomplished.

I do not support the concept of a joint duty specialist because I believe that we are better served in the Joint Staff by having officers of broadly-based operational and staff backgrounds. This diversity and depth of experience serves the unique requirements of joint duty far better than that which would be provided by officers whose staff experiences are limited solely to joint duty.

Chairman GOLDWATER. In your testimony you say that only the Navy is properly conducting advance planning and cite the new maritime strategy.

Earlier this year, General Vessey, who was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that he had not been asked to coordinate with the Navy on the naval maritime strategy.

Under the law, as I understand it, the services are charged with recruiting, training and equipping the services and the Joint Chiefs are charged with developing strategy.

Why then is the Navy involved in developing national maritime strategy?

What role does the civilian Secretary of the Navy have to play in the development of national military strategy?

Does the fact that the Navy is doing this say something about the JCS?

Admiral McDONALD. The maritime strategy is derived from and contributes to our national policy and strategy. Embedded within the maritime strategy are the plans and concepts of the unified commanders and their naval component commanders. I wish to emphasize that it is *not* an independently developed strategy, but rather one which attempts to place into a maritime focus the requirements of higher authority.

Its purposes are to:

Provide a global view of fleet operations for deterrence and crisis control.

Provide a baseline integrated naval strategy for a global conventional war.

Provide the foundation for the Navy's day-to-day fleet operations.

Provide the basis for the development of the annual Department of the Navy program and budget submission.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.

Present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Quayle, Denton, Gramm, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Bingaman, and Dixon.

Also present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Richard D. Finn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., and James R. Locher, III, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, research assistant; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Fred Curtis Erixon, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND, PRESIDING

Senator THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

Senator Nunn had to go over and introduce a judge this morning. He will be over in a little bit.

Today's hearing is the fifth in our series of hearings on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense and the Congress. Testifying today are four distinguished retired military officers who have a broad and varied range of experience and expertise. On behalf of the committee, I extend a warm welcome to today's panel of witnesses. We are looking forward to hearing your testimony, and appreciate the time you have taken from your busy schedules to appear before this committee.

The first member of the panel is Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., who retired on October 1, 1985, after serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more than 3 years. Much of General Vessey's 46-

year military career was with infantry and armored divisions, including combat duty during World War II and the Vietnam war. During his career, General Vessey occupied key joint assignments, including Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea and U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans.

Before assuming the duties as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey served as Army Vice Chief of Staff.

The second panel member is Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. General Goodpaster's distinguished career includes service as Defense Liaison Officer and Staff Secretary to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Joint Staff, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, and President of the Institute for Defense Analyses.

The third member of our panel of witnesses is Adm. Robert L. J. Long. Admiral Long retired as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command in July 1983, after 40 years of service, which included combat duty in World War II and Vietnam. Admiral Long also commanded Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Submarine Force, Allied Command, Atlantic.

In addition, he served as Deputy Chief of Staff of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare, and Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

The fourth witness for today's hearing is Gen. William V. McBride. During World War II, General McBride saw combat duty in the European theater as a navigator in the 387th Bombardment Group. While much of his career was in the Military Airlift Command, General McBride also commanded the Air Training Command and the Air Force Logistics Command. He also served as Military Assistant to Secretaries of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert and Harold Brown, and as Vice Commander in Chief of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe.

General McBride's final assignment was Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.

In hearings that the committee has held so far, a consensus on the need for organizational changes appears to be emerging in three areas.

The first area, and the one in which the consensus is most obvious, is the need to strengthen the authority and influence of the unified commanders so that they can more adequately prepare for and conduct their war-fighting missions.

The second area of consensus is the need for changes to improve the quality of joint military advice. There is less certainty over how this should be accomplished, with the two basic alternatives being a strengthening of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman or forming a separate joint military advisory council.

The third area of concensus focuses on the need to better prepare military officers for joint duty assignments.

Today's witnesses have substantial experience and expertise in each of these three areas. Therefore I would suggest that the hearing be focused on identifying a course of action that the committee should set to correct deficiencies in these three areas.

Before the witnesses present their statements, I would like to read a statement by Senator Goldwater, who cannot be here. I am sure you gentlemen know that his wife is very ill, and we are very regretful of his inability to be present on that account. I will then defer to Senator Nunn for any comments he may have.

Senator Goldwater's statement reads this way:

> I am sorry I will not be able to chair the committee's hearings this week on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense and the Congress. In my absence, I have asked Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn to maintain the hearing schedule that has been set and to continue to give this effort the critical attention that it deserves.
>
> I have been delighted with the interest that committee members have shown in this work, as the outstanding attendance at the hearings has indicated. I urge my committee colleagues to take full advantage of the three hearings this week. The witnesses for each hearing have substantial expertise on these important issues.
>
> On Monday, December the 2nd, Senator Nunn and I received a letter from Secretary Weinberger presenting the positions of the Department of Defense on a number of recommendations contained in the committee staff study, Defense Organization: The Need for Change.
>
> Secretary Weinberger's letter addressed three subjects: provision of military advice to the President, command and control of the combatant commanders, and management of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
>
> With respect to military advice, Secretary Weinberger's letter states, "We believe that the basic concept of the JCS system should be maintained." He adds, however, an important qualification. "This is not to say that the advice-giving mechanism of the JCS cannot be improved."
>
> In this regard, Secretary Weinberger states the department's support for certain proposals to strengthen the role of the JCS Chairman. These include provisions that the Chairman would hear the JCS, attend National Security Council meetings subject to the jurisdiciton of the President, provide alternative views of the JCS, and be designated as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.
>
> With respect to command and control of combatant commanders, Secretary Weinberger also supports a strengthened role for the JCS Chairman. He states, "We would support proposals such as authorizing the Secretary to place the Chairman in the chain of command and to use the Chairman as the Secretary's agent in supervising the CINC's."
>
> Secretary Weinberger also indicates that the JCS have initiated a review of JCS Publication Two, Unified Action Armed Forces. As you know, the committee staff study concludes that this publication is inconsistent with the concept of Unified Command. While I am pleased that this review has been initiated, I am disappointed that it will not be completed until June 30, 1986.
>
> The last area, management of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Weinberger states support for strengthening the management authority of the JCS Chairman over the joint staffs. In this regard, the department favors changes in the law to provide that the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform such duties as the Chairman prescribes and to establish a four-star Vice Chairman.
>
> Secretary Weinberger's letter starts a comprehensive dialogue that is needed between the committee and the Department of Defense, but it is only a start. It is obvious that wide differences remain on the degree of change that should be made to correct current deficiencies.
>
> The letter does help, however, to narrow the differences that previously existed. The most positive aspect of the letter may possibly be the department's concurrence that improvements can and should be made in these important areas.
>
> I would ask that a copy of Secretary Weinberger's letter be made a part of the record of this hearing, and I urge committee members to study this letter carefully and build upon its positive aspects in the next several hearings.
>
> I would like to take this opportunity to praise General Vessey for the series of improvements made in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system during his tenure. The changes made over the last 3 years have begun to move the Department of Defense in the right direction. General Vessey's efforts were important, and they should not go overlooked.
>
> At the same time, it is absolutely clear that much more needs to be done to solve the serious organizational problems of the Department of Defense. As we start this morning's hearing, I would like to direct just a few remarks to every person in uniform, not just the ones who might be here, but wherever they are.
>
> No matter what color uniform you wear, no matter what rank or insignia you carry, no matter what command you now have or might ever have, you are going to

remember those hearings all of your days, and my guess is that you are going to thank God they came about.

I know how hard it is to find problems within your own organization. I was a corporate president myself once, and I was also the commander of different units during World War II. Since and before that time, if you ever wanted me to get mad, start making wisecracks about my outfit. But after leaving them and thinking back, I could think of times when criticism was deserved. Had I not been so wedded to my job and so parochial in my thinking, I could have understood it at the time.

What these hearings are directed at will never have any effect on those of you wearing a uniform. What these hearings will do is to look at the fact that you have come close to giving your life for your country or at least demonstrated your willingness to do so, and that is directly related to the absolute security of our Nation.

Only by long, honest discussion between all of us will the matters that need correcting be brought to the surface. The best way in the world to have that done and the timeliest way in the world to have that done is right now. Now, with the Congress charged with every nickel we spend, and with large segments of the population unconvinced that defense is necessary. Defense is necessary, and it is critical that we put in the field and operate without any encumbrances as we have operated under in the past.

Please keep this one thought in mind. None of us live forever, but with proper care, allegiance, and adherence to basic principles, we have a country that will endure, so let us put our minds to that task.

I think Chairman Goldwater has made a fine contribution with the statement he has issued here this morning.

[The letter from Secretary Weinberger to Senator Goldwater follows:]

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, DC, December 2, 1985.

HON. BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During my testimony before the Committee on November 14 regarding organization of the Department of Defense, I indicated that we were in the process of evaluating the staff report on this subject and would respond in more detail to the substance of the report as our evaluation progressed. As you may recall, I told the Committee we could support many of the recommendations of your staff.

During the three weeks since my testimony, we have reached conclusions on some of the issues raised by the report and believe it is appropriate, in view of the pending hearings, to report these conclusions to you on a timely basis. As we reach additional conclusions on other issues in the future, we intend to report them to you—likewise in a timely fashion.

Our conclusions reported below relate to three major areas of concern: provision of military advice to the President, command and control of the combatant commanders (CINCs), and management of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS).

MILITARY ADVICE

The military advice received by the President must be based upon the best available knowledge, experience and expertise in military matters and must present all feasible options from every viable military perspective. It should contain objective and thorough evaluation of the pros and cons of all options. The mechanism for developing and providing the advice should be structured in a manner which guarantees that decision making and policy formulation are actually (not just nominally) reserved to, and exercised by, the President.

We believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the best entity for providing such military advice to the President. As heads of their respective services, the JCS are most knowledgeable of the special and particular capabilities and capacities, as well as the state of training and readiness, of the forces under their responsibility. Furthermore, the JCS system ensures the continuity between policy making and subsequent implementation that is essential to success, and it provides a sound balance between responsibility and accountability that would be absent in a group of advisors who possess merely advisory duties and function entirely outside the operational or resource structure.

Therefore, we believe that the basic concept of the JCS system should be maintained. Replacing the JCS with a Joint Military Advisory Council as proposed in the staff report would dramatically compromise the quality of military advice and would have a net harmful impact on our national security. As I testified, the President and I have found the advice provided by the JCS to be consistently timely, accurate, competent and innovative.

This is not to say that the advice-giving mechanism of the JCS cannot be improved. For example, we would support certain proposals to strengthen the role of the Chairman of the JCS in this process, such as codifying the following functions now being performed by the Chairman: heading the JCS; attending the NSC meetings subject to the direction of the President; and providing alternative views of the JCS. We could also support designation of the Chairman as the principal military advisor provided that his duty to present the alternative views of the JCS is clearly established in law.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. His command and control of the combatant commanders (CINCs) should be as direct as practical. The chain of command should not be encumbered with intermediate links between the President and the CINCs. The President issues orders to the CINCs and supervises the CINCs' performance through me, as his deputy. The JCS assist me in formulating and communicating the orders and in supervising their execution.

We also believe that the role of the Chairman of the JCS in this regard should be strengthened, provided it is clear that he acts on behalf of the JCS. For example, under this condition, we would support proposals such as authorizing the Secretary to place the Chairman in the chain of command and to use the Chairman as the Secretary's agent in supervising the CINCs.

We have not yet completed our consideration of the recommendations directed at improving the manner in which the CINCs prepare for performing their warfighting missions. Although the concerns raised in this area by the staff report deserve genuine, aggressive consideration, the issues are complex and changes must be carefully fashioned to avoid reducing the current effectiveness of our warfighting capabilities. The JCS have initiated a review of JCS Pub 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces," which I have directed to be completed by June 30, 1986. I will be pleased to report to you on the nature of improvements in the CINC command relationships which we intend to make after the study is completed.

MANAGEMENT OF OJCS

The OJCS supports the JCS in providing military advice to the President, developing contingency plans, formulating and communicating orders from the President to the CINCs, and supervising the CINCs' performance.,

The OJCS should be truly joint in composition and motivation. It should avoid parochialism but should fully consider competing service perspectives. It should consist of highly competent officers and should have strong, effective leadership. Although the JCS need access to the OJCS for support, the effectiveness of the OJCS would be improved by focusing its direction in the Chairman of the JCS. Accordingly, we favor changing the law to provide that the OJCS shall perform such duties as the Chairman prescribes, provided that it remains clear that the Chairman manages the OJCS on behalf of the JCS.

As a part of strengthening the management authority of the Chairman of the JCS over the joint staffs, we agree that a four star Vice Chairman should be established. However, the Vice Chairman should not out-rank the JCS and he should not act as Chairman in the absence of the Chairman. The current system of rotating the acting Chairmanship on a quarterly basis among the JCS broadens their joint perspectives and enhances their effectiveness in both their joint and service roles. It gives each Chief the opportunity and experience of serving as Chairman, and it settles, a year in advance, who is to be acting Chairman. Both the Vice Chairman position and the acting Chairmanship system should be established in statute.

The foregoing conclusions represent the Department's position. The witnesses who are scheduled to appear before you, of course, are aware of this letter, but I have told them, as I always have told other witnesses, to feel free to provide you with their personal views on these matters.

We look forward to working with you to determine the most suitable method for effecting the changes contemplated by the foregoing comments. In the meantime, we will continue our evaluation of other issues raised by the staff report.

Sincerely,

CASPAR WEINBERGER.

Senator THURMOND. Senator Nunn, I would be very pleased to hear from you.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Goldwater's letter, read with a southern accent, is indeed gratifying to me this morning. I think it had the right tone. I think it was exactly on the mark in terms of a positive response to Secretary Weinberger's letter.

I, too, agree with the categorization of Senator Goldwater that that letter is a step in the right direction. We still have wide differences between the staff report and Secretary Weinberger's response, but I do believe that this letter reflects that the Secretary and the Department of Defense are doing serious thinking. I think it indicates that they are striving to approach this with an open mind. I think it indicates they are receptive to some change, and I think it indicates, as Senator Goldwater said, that they believe certain changes can be made.

I also want to strongly echo Senator Goldwater's statement about General Vessey and his tenure. I think he did move the system in the right direction. I think it is indicative of his long, outstanding career that he did it in a quiet and an effective way. I do not believe that all problems have been solved, and I think we have a long way to go, but General Vessey and his tenure certainly contributed to that.

Our other distinguished witnesses this morning, General Goodpaster, General McBride, and Admiral Long, have long and distinguished careers. I have followed their careers with a great deal of pride since I have been in the Senate, and of course their tenure in office goes back far before I got here, so we are delighted to have them, and I know that all of them will have their own perspectives, but they will make a great contribution to these hearings.

Paraphrasing President Reagan's words to the United Nations, the best thing I can say about Secretary Weinberger's letter is that I think he has given us seeds that should be nurtured, and I think that that is a good way to start the hearing this morning.

I do not have a prepared statement. But I do welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to our hearing this morning.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn.

Senator Warner, did you care to make an opening statement?

Senator WARNER. No.

Senator THURMOND. Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. I have to preside in the Senate at 10 a.m., and I had another committee meeting prior to this. I will be back at 11.

I want to express along with the rest of the committee my respect and admiration for the people whom Senators Goldwater and Nunn have arranged to testify on this rather solemn commission we have undertaken to make important changes.

I have had the privilege not only of admiring these men from the perspective that my colleagues have, but as a junior to these gentlemen, I have admired and known them personally, and I just wanted to pay my respects to each of the four of them this morning.

General Goodpaster was my kind host when he was SACEUR. Admiral Long has been a friend and neighbor and man I have been close to for many years. I have known and admired General Vessey for years. I only regret I was unable to attend his change of command and his retirement ceremony. I think the whole Nation owes him a great debt for his farewell speech, which I wish had been given a bit more publicity.

General McBride was known to me and very admired in his own service when he was vice chief, and I just wanted to express before departing that I have sensed, gentlemen, a consensus growing here on the need to strengthen the role of the CINC's, perhaps the wisdom of upgrading the position of the Chairman that might involve giving the officer a five-star.

There is less consensus on putting him in the chain of command directly or making him the sole military adviser to the national command authority which Admiral Long was addressing. We do agree that there should be some kind of incremental addition to interservice understanding.

Each of the services has a special mission to apply themselves to, and Admiral Long, as a submariner, knows how essential it is that he and his branch of the Navy understand that mission or the whole chain which is dependent on each of its links fails.

However, I do believe that there might be a strong advantage in incorporating in all of the service schools at every level starting with staff and command education of what the other services can do so that we do not have ignorance contributing to bias which exists when we get to the joint arena.

I saw this as a naval officer. I do not think it was a major damaging influence, but I do think it was a detriment in some cases. But I cannot think of any four I would rather consult regarding that particular issue, and I hope that they make comments on that.

We have not reached a consensus on JCS reorganization, and I hope that you gentlemen will speak from your hearts on that. This is an extremely important revolutionary task and this opportunity for you, those who know, to testify to us, who do not, could preclude revolutionary changes with very sad results, as you well know.

I am delighted that we are having such men as you in such a series. I feel that most of my colleagues on the committee know this is necessary. And I congratulate again Senator Nunn for the long term in which he has been involved here and the wisdom with which he and Senator Goldwater undertake this problem.

Thank you very much.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to depart to introduce a Federal judge from my own district in the State of Georgia. I will come back as soon as I possibly can.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALAN DIXON

Mr. Chairman, this hearing is our fifth on the many issues related to the organizaton and decisionmaking processes of the Department of Defense.

Today we will be hearing four distinguished and extremely well qualified witnesses.

I am concerned that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commanders do not have enough authority. Testimony of witnesses offered thus far before this committee has not dissuaded me from my perception that we must give the Unified Commanders more authority to control the resources and personnel assigned to them. I also think it is long past time to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority to make sure that the four services work together.

I therefore look forward to hearing from Generals Vessey, Goodpaster and McBride.

Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Our first witness this morning is Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Vessey, we are honored to have you here, and you may now proceed.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., USA (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General VESSEY. Mr. Chairman, thanks very much. I am pleased to be here.

Senator THURMOND. I want to say this in the beginning. If any of you gentlemen have long prepared statements, your entire statements will go in the record. What we would really like to get from you is right from your heart, what should be done here, if anything, to correct the situation that we are now discussing, and if you can just put it in words as simple as you can, and as brief as you can, it will be helpful.

You may proceed.

General VESSEY. I am pleased to be here with these distinguished former colleagues of mine. I do not have a prepared statement because your letter or Senator Goldwater's letter that asked for my prepared statement to be submitted yesterday or day before yesterday arrived at my house the day before yesterday. And I had 30 inches of snow on the ground and 20 below zero temperatures, and no typewriter, so I do not have a prepared statement.

I do have, though, copies of my answers to questions that were sent to me by the Chairman early this year. There are two sets of questions, one that I answered on the 1st of March, and the other set of questions, the shorter series of questions on unity of command that I answered on the 4th of June.

Those answers reflect my well thought out views on the issues you are addressing here, and they were used, I believe, by the committee in preparing the staff report, but the answers to the questions are not in the staff report, and I believe that I would like to have those questions and answers in the record as my prepared statement here this morning, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Without objection, that will be done.

[The information follows:]

Office of the Chairman,
Washington, DC, March 1, 1985.

Hon. Barry Goldwater,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: In accordance with the request of the Conferees of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, the attached answers to questions on the organization of the Department of Defense are forwarded.

Sincerely,

John W. Vessey, Jr.,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1. You are the senior uniformed official of the United States and the only uniformed official in the Washington headquarters of DOD who views the problems and challenges facing the Armed Services from a perspective independent of Service functions and responsibilities. If you were given greater authority over the Joint Staff so that you could task it and have it report directly to you, how would this improve your capability to integrate the efforts of the four Services?

General Vessey. First, I must tell you that I am not the only uniformed officer in Washington who views issues from a persepctive independent of a single Service. The duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as laid out in Section 141, Title 10, US Code, certainly imply that all members of the JCS are to view national security issues from a perspective that is beyond that of a single Service. Each member of the JCS brings with him unique knowledge about his Service, and considering the context of his other duties as uniformed chief of that Service, he is never totally divorced from that Service. Nevertheless, when those Service Chiefs sit as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it seems to me implicit in Section 141 that they are to treat their duties independent from a perspective of Service functions and responsibilities. Another body of uniformed officials who must view defense issues from a perspective independent of single Service perspective is the Joint Staff. Its duties are laid out in Section 143 of Title 10 and those duties involve supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their duties.

Now to the question about my authority over the Joint Staff. Both before and after the changes passed by the Congress and approved by the President last year in the DOD Authorization Act, Section 143 in subparagraph (c) says the Joint Staff shall perform such duties as the JCS and the Chairman prescribe. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages the Joint Staff and its Director on behalf of the JCS. The law as written clearly gives the Chairman the authority to task the Joint Staff either independently or on behalf of the JCS. Last year, the changes in the law explicitly gave the Chairman the authority to select the officers to serve on the Joint Staff. As the law reads, it seems implicit that the Chairman owes an accounting to the JCS for his management of the Joint Staff on their behalf. As can be seen from the words in the law and from actual practice during my tenure as Chairman and in my observations of past Chairman, the Chairman has extraordinary authority over the Joint Staff in directing its use to service the JCS.

Your question goes on further to ask how would this improve the Chairman's capability to integrate the efforts of the four Services. This particular part of Question 1 deserves careful analysis by anyone asking the question as well as anyone answering the question. It seems to me that the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947 as amended envisions the Secretary of Defense to be the "integrator" of the efforts of the four Services. He has extraordinary authority in these matters and he has a lot of help. Title 50, Section 401, lays out the Congressional Declaration of Purpose in the Act. It calls for

". . . the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security: to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have duties laid out in the law and additional duties assigned by the Secretary to help him integrate the efforts of the Services. Those duties generally fall in the integration of operational efforts in war plans and in the joint support of operations (such as joint logistics plans and joint training of the armed forces). The Chairman's principal duties are those of helping the JCS perform their duties. The change to the law last year specifically added to the Chairman's duties the duty of acting as a spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirements—a duty which calls for him to be able to make informed judgments on the effective integration of the efforts of all Services. The Chairman is a member of the Defense Resources Board, a body which helps the Secretary integrate the efforts of the Services. The Chairman has been assigned other duties by the Secretary, such as operating the National Military Command System for the Secretary of Defense, and establishing policies and procedures for all components of the NMCS—a duty which also requires integrating efforts of the Services. Therefore, I conclude that there are no changes required in the authority the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff now has over the Joint Staff to improve his capability to carry out the duties he has for integrating the efforts of the four Services. Again, I stress that the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for integrating the efforts of the Services; the JCS and the Chairman are among his helpers.

2. How can the JCS be organized so as to give the Secretary of Defense joint military advice that will reflect the full range of reasonable options available to the country?

General VESSEY. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now organized to give the Secretary of Defense joint military advice which reflects the full range of reasonable options available on issues that are within the range of the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nearly three years ago, the Secretary of Defense asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine this very issue themselves and advise him on changes required, if any. At that time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the duties in the law were the correct duties for the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the larger context of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947 as amended. The Secretary of Defense is the person to whom the law accords broad, sweeping authorities and responsibilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are a part of his body of advisors and helpers. At that time the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended two changes to the law. One called for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be placed in the chain of command to the unified and specified commands and the other removed from the law some of the limitations on numbers and assignment policies for officers assigned to the Joint Staff. The proposed changes were submitted to the Congress in draft legislation. The only part of the recommendations which were included in the latest changes to the law were those removing some of the limitations on tour lengths for officers assigned to the Joint Staff.

3. If you were given a Deputy of four-star rank, second in the line of protocol, how would you make use of him to assist you in your responsibilities?

General VESSEY. First, I want to reiterate a point I have made to the Congress on a number of occasions and that is that, with the duties and authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as now in the law, a four-star deputy chairman is not required and one would, in fact, not improve the operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As to the question of how would I make use of him to assist me if one were assigned, he would be used generally to carry out the duties now assigned to the three-star Assistant to the Chairman. The Assistant to the Chairman extends the eyes and ears of the Chairman in the various fora addressing national security issues here in the Nation's Capital. He helps the Chairman attend meetings and helps the Chairman integrate the efforts to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the other bodies who serve the Secretary of Defense and the President on national security issues.

If he were to rank ahead of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the question implies, he would also be charged with chairing the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the absence of the Chairman. Giving him such duties takes away an important integrating tool that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been using for the past three years; that is, we have rotated the duties of Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman for periods of three months. We have found that this procedure makes all of us better members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from time to time brings each of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into direct contact with the Secretary of Defense and the President. Modern day communications permit the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff and, through the National Military Command System, all of the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands no matter where he is in the world. We have found over the past few years that the combination of modern communications and using Service Chiefs for long and planned tours as Acting Chairman in Washington has worked well for consistency of advice and in unifying the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Is the JCS system capable of making meaningful inputs on programmatic issues? If not, why not?

General VESSEY. The evaluation of "meaningful inputs on programmatic issues" from the "JCS system" deserves a thorough understanding of the Defense Department programming and budgeting system.

Programs and budgets are constructed by the Services based on guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is assisted in the formulation of his guidance by advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff duty which has primary programmatic implications is 141(c)(4), "review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans." Through the years the Joint Chiefs of Staff have interpreted this duty as one that requires them to tell the Secretary of Defense the general size and composition of the forces required to carry out the Nation's plans under various degrees of risk. That knowledge is used by the Secretary in helping form guidance for the military departments as they build programs and budgets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body also examine the programs of the Services and provide the Secretary an assessment of those programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body recognize that the organizing, training, equipping, and supporting of forces is a Service responsibility and the details of how each Service carries out that responsibility are of specific interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in terms of the ability of the Services to provide the required forces and to operate together in the unfied and specified commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must look at the technical and procedural aspects of joint doctrine, the assignment of responsibilities which provide for necessary support of all the Services, and the integration of those defense responsibilities which enable us to carry out national war plans. Command, control and communications, intelligence and mobility cut across all Services and are essential for each of the unified and specified commands. Other areas that have particular attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the strategic nuclear deterrent force and the parts of the battle area where the efforts of two or more Services come together, such as in integration of ground- and sea-based air defense with air defense aircraft and the use of land-based air in support of naval operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff can and do provide useful advice, "meaningful inputs," to the Secretary of Defense on these issues.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently organized a Joint Requirements Management Board to help them advise the Secretary of Defense on programmatic issues affecting joint programs and joint requirements. The Secretary of Defense has tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to sit as a member of the Defense Resources Board. The Secretary of Defense has also taken steps to ensure that the commanders of the unified and specified commands are heard by the Defense Resources Board through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on day-to-day issues and by having them address the Defense Resources Board in person at least twice a year.

5. Is the closed staff character of the JCS system justified? Why?

General VESSEY. I am unfamiliar with the term "closed staff." In fact, the nature of our business is such that the Joint Staff must and does deal openly with the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense, with the Service staffs, with the CINC's staffs and with the military staffs serving our alliances in order to serve the JCS properly.

On the other hand, it is the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are charged with being advisors to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council. Because of the importance of the issues with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff deal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff guard that duty very carefully. The Joint Chiefs of Staff want JCS advice to be just exactly that and not to be Joint Staff advice. The Joint Staff duty is to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assist them in carrying out their duties.

1. How can you as a Service Chief function effectively in your role as a member of the JCS, responsible for viewing all issues in the light of the national interest, while still being an effective leader of your Service and loyal to its particular interests?

General VESSEY. The simple answer to the question is that for the Service Chief to function effectively as a member of the JCS, he must recognize that he has two different jobs. The duties are connected but different. The knowledge which each Chief brings to the JCS about his particular Service is an important contribution to his ability to function as a member of the JCS. I would also add that the knowledge he takes from his duties as a member of the JCS to his job as Service Chief is very useful to him in performing his job as Chief of his Service. To perform their duties, the JCS must have a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each of the Services. I know of no one who should be able to provide that knowledge better than the respective Service Chiefs. At the same time, the JCS, as the developers of strategic plans and strategic direction for the Armed Forces and as the body which examines the overall missions and requirements for the Armed Forces of the United States, have a direct and absolutely invaluable channel through the Service Chiefs to the Services which have the responsibility for organizing, recruiting, training, equipping, and supporting forces to be used in carrying out those strategic plans. To carry out their corporate JCS duties, those members of the JCS who are Service Chiefs must be able to hang Service loyalties and prejudices on the hat rack outside the JCS meeting room. In my observations, except in very rare instances, that is done. It is a matter that must be considered by the Secretary of Defense and the President in selecting the Service Chiefs.

2. Do the current procedures of the Joint Staff, which often result in pre-negotiated JCS positions being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, adequately inform him of the full range of options he should consider? Do those procedures serve the best interests of the Secretary of Defense? In what manner could the Joint Staff's operating procedures be streamlined and made less cumbersome?

General VESSEY. Your question is a good question except for the pejorative clause, ". . . which often result in prenegotiated JCS positions being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense." They send the best corporate advice they can devise for the issue at hand. "Procedures" don't produce the advice; people produce the advice. The JCS are the five senior members of the United States military establishment. They work hard to try to produce the best advice they can. They are also fallible human beings and as such may not always produce the "best" advice nor the "full range of options" he should consider; but when they don't, it is not a question of procedures, it is a question of their wisdom. The question about whether or not "JCS procedures" serve the best interests of the Secretary of Defense ought to be, "Does the advice of the JCS serve the best interests of the Secretary of Defense?" In fact, a better question would be, "Does the advice given the Secretary of Defense best serve the interests of the Nation?" Only history and the later evaluations of individual Secretaries will tell. As in the case of all advisors who perform their duties well, the JCS from time to time have to give Secretaries of Defense advice they may not like to hear. But to be honest to the oath they have sworn to serve the country they must do so. The Joint Staff's operating procedures are under generally continual review by the Chairman, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the Director.

3. How can the Joint Staff be made more effective? How can it be organized so as to function independently of the Services, yet still profit from the expertise and knowledge that only they can provide?

General VESSEY. The way to make any staff more effective is to improve the quality of the people, improve the training of the people, improve the staff's tools, improve its procedures, and improve the direction it gets. All of these are underway for the Joint Staff. The JCS as a body have paid particular attention to improving the quality of the people assigned to the Joint Staff, and the Congress has assisted by giving the Chairman authority to select people to be assigned. The JCS have taken two steps to improve the training of the people assigned joint duties and Joint Staff duties. First is a CAPSTONE course at the National Defense University for selected flag officers, a course designed to give newly selected flag officers a fresh look at national security issues from the joint operational perspective. Over the last several years, the JCS have planned a computer-assisted training course for officers newly assigned to the Joint Staff. The JCS have set in motion a program called "Modern Aids to Planning" to help harness automation, wargaming, and simulation in the development of war plans. An extension of Modern Aids to Planning in the form of advanced automation support for Joint Staff officers will be in place soon. Under the direction of the JCS, the Chairman has revised the responsibilities of the agency formerly called "Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency," now Joint Analysis Directorate, in order to provide responsive analytical support to the Joint Staff. In the Conference Report for the 1984 DOD Appropriations Bill, the conferees asked to the Secretary of Defense to provide the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 20 additional civilian positions and 20 military positions to assist the Chairman in making independent judgments "on the readiness, logistics, and doctrinal impact of budgetary and programmatic proposals." Those 40 spaces have been used to form the Strategic Plans and Resources Analysis Agency in order to help the Chairman and the JCS review the issues outlined by the conferees, particularly as those budgetary proposals impact on the warfighting capability of the Unified and Specified commands. Concerning procedures, the JCS have under review now the internal operating procedures of the Joint Staff. At least over the last few years, the JCS have paid particular attention to providing "top down" guidance to the Joint Staff as they deal with complicated national security issues. The guidance helps ensure that the wisdom and direction of the senior military leadership are injected into the staff process at the beginning.

Concerning the second part of the question, "How can the staff be organized to function independently of the Services, yet still profit from the expertise and knowledge that only they can provide?", the Joint Staff has to be the staff that does the staff work for the JCS in performing their JCS duties. At the same time, it must be recognized that the Services staffs have knowledge and information that the Joint Staff needs to do its work for the JCS. The Joint Staff must be able to go to the Service staffs for information and assistance. Thus, it can never truly "function independently" of the Services. On the other hand, the Joint Staff must be composed of officers with intellectual honesty and the ability to think independently in the context of the broad national security issues that the JCS must address. It is not a question of organization, it is a question of selecting, training, and guiding the right people.

4. How can service on the Joint Staff be made more rewarding in order to attract the highest quality officers in the Services?

General VESSEY. Continue on with all the improvements underway outlined in the first part of the answer to Question 3 and particularly pay attention to selecting good people who are likely to be promoted.

5. Is there unnecessary duplication of effort and layering of supervision within the headquarters of the Military Departments?

General VESSEY. Every large bureaucracy must keep the issue of excessive duplication and layering of supervision under review. Good procedures worked out by one set of leaders and managers can often be misunderstood and misused by another set. It is an issue that requires regular attention and review and, if past practices are any criteria, I am sure that both the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs have it under review.

I answered these questions putting myself into the position of the commanders of the unified and specified commands, but bringing to the questions the perspective of my experience as a former commander-in-chief and my experience as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1. Is there an imbalance between your responsibilities and accountability as an operational commander and your influence over resource decisions? If such an imbalance exists, how can the Unified and Specified Commanders have greater input in the DOD policy, programming, and budgetary process?

General VESSEY. I believe that, considering the changes that have been made in recent years, the balance is close to being correct and the movement is in the right direction. A CINC's main business is operational business, not budgeting and programming; nevertheless, the programming and budgetary process is important to the CINCs. The process produces the CINCs' forces and supports their ability to fight. The Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary and the JCS have worked to have the views of the CINCs clearly heard on both Defense Guidance (policy issues) and on the program and budget. In recent years the JCS have paid more and more attention to cross-Service issues which bear most directly on the CINCs' warfighting and deterrent postures. The JCS continue to work with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and the Services to find ways to improve CINC participation in programming and budgeting matters. The CINCs appear before the Defense Resources Board at least twice a year. Two and a half years ago, the Secretary of Defense designated the Chairman as spokesman for the CINCs on operational requirements. That duty is now included in Title 10 as one of the responsibilities of the Chairman. The Secretary of Defense has taken steps to strengthen the CINCs' linkage to the Services through the component commands. We need to continue to strengthen that process by ensuring that the CINCs communicate directly to the Service Chiefs on component issues and to the JCS on joint and cross-Service issues and programs. The CINCs do help the JCS on the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, the JCS assessment of the composite of the Service programs.

2. Do you have sufficient authority during peacetime over your Service component commands to ensure that you can adequately fulfill your wartime operational re-

sponsibilities? Given that you are not in the logistical chain of command, how do you ensure that forces under your command are equipped, supplied, and trained to be capable of executing likely missions, especially those requiring joint operations?

General VESSEY. There is no question about the authority of the unified command commanders over the Service component commands for operational matters. The question says "sufficient authority. . . to ensure that you can adequately fulfill your wartime operational responsibilities?" All the authority in the world over Service component commands cannot ensure the CINC's adequacy to fullfill wartime operational responsibilities. The question revolves around resource allocations. The CINCs do have adequate authority to lay out their requirements to the Service component commanders and through them to the Services as well as authority to lay out those requirements directly to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. Programs and budgets and resource allocation at the national level produce the forces and support given to the CINCs through the component commands. Consequently, the question of adequacy for fulfilling wartime operational responsibility is more a question of the resources that have been allocated to the CINC rather than a question of his authority over his Service component commands. In the Unified Command Plan, there are some CINC's with unusual Service component structures, commands in which the component structure is varied from a JCS Publication 2 structure, usually for reasons of economy. In those cases, the JCS have to pay particular attention to ensuring that the CINC's connection with the Service Chief and the JCS themselves is clear and unobstructed. The second part of the question concerns how the CINC ensures that the forces under his command are equipped, supplied, and trained for the likely missions. Here again the CINC has the same channels open to him that he has on budget matters; that is, to the Services through his component commanders; as well as directly to the Service Chiefs on Service-unique matters and to the JCS on joint operations matters. The CINC himself has a great deal to do with the training of his forces, particularly the joint training. He works with the JCS to establish the Joint Exercise Program for his command. The JCS have also involved the CINCs deeply in the development of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. It is an effort to ensure that the voices of the CINCs are heard in force developments.

3. Given the range of missions to which your command may be required to respond, is there sufficient unification of your command at subordinate levels?

General VESSEY. Yes, there is generally sufficient unification of the commands at subordinate levels to accomplish the range of missions required. There are cases in some unified commands where insufficient forces are allocated to the command in peacetime to perform the wartime missions. There are other cases where certain missions will become more important as future threats develop. Some of these missions will require extraordinary unification within the unified commands and with other unified commands. The JCS are conducting tests and studies now to make certain that joint operations of the future will be able to meet developing threats. The previously cited involvement of the CINCs in the development of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures is designed to help keep the command plan ahead of developing threats.

4. Are provisions of JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), inconsistent with the concept of unified command? Does UNAAF overly restrict your authority over your Service component commanders? Does UNAAF create obstacles to greater and necessary unification of your command?

General VESSEY. No. The provisions of JCS Publication 2 are consistent with the concept of unified command. In peacetime the logistic and administrative control of unified commanders over the activities of component commands is, of course, constrained by the budgetary and legislative restrictions imposed on the Services and by the allocation of resources of the Services to the component commands. The general priorities for the allocation of those resources are set by the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The allocation of forces and resources is a major wartime problem as well, and the solution of those problems is one of the major wartime missions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Both in peacetime and wartime, close collaboration among the JCS, the CINCs and the Services is required.

Office of the Chairman,
Washington, DC, June 4, 1985.

Hon. Barry Goldwater,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your letter of April 19, 1985, the attached answer to questions on the organization of the Department of Defense are forwarded.

Sincerely,

John W. Vessey, Jr.,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1. Is the concept of unity of command a fundamental and inviolate principle for the joint employment of US military forces?

General Vessey. The concept of unity of command is a fundamental principle in the Armed Forces and it is central to the structure of our operational forces. Unity of command is a principle which is a guideline for effective action and it was an important motivation behind President Eisenhower's proposing legislation on 3 April 1958 which led to the last major reorganization of the Department of Defense. In forwarding this legislation, he made it clear there are two distinct lines of authority in DoD, that of building forces and that of providing operational direction, both of which emanate from the Secretary of Defense. These provisions are upheld in Section 124, Title 10, that "with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified commands or specified commands to perform military missions; and prescribe the force structure of those commands." The authority of the Secretary of Defense in operational matters is second only to that of the President. With the approval of the President, he has the authority to assign forces to the operational commands and forces so assigned remain under the full operational command of the commander to which those forces are assigned. No Service or other authority can assign or remove those forces from that command without the consent of the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the Secretary's military staff and they work hard to advise both him and the President on command structure and arrangements which provide most effectively for the defense of the Nation. The Unified Command Plan, which is the basis for command arrangements and which establishes our system of unified and specified commands, is founded on the principle of unity of command as can be seen in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces:

"The concept of the US Military Establishment as an efficient team is based on the principle that effective utilization of the military power of the Nation requires that the efforts of the separate Military Services be closely integrated. Unity of effort among the Services at the national level is obtained by the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense exercised through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the strategic planning and direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by common, joint, and cross-servicing by the Military Departments. Unity of effort among Service forces assigned to unified or specified commands is achieved by exercise of operational command, by adherence to common strategic plans and directives, and by sound operational and administrative command organization. This concept is the basis for a sound working relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands in the overall strategic direction of the Armed Forces on the one hand and, on the other, the Military Departments and Services charged with preparing and providing forces for the unified and specified commands and administering and supporting the forces so provided."

2. If so, how do you explain the findings and conclusions of the report, *Unity of Command—Does it Exist in the Field?*

General Vessey. The Joint Chiefs encourage diverse and wide-ranging studies from students of the Defense schools and welcome their research products for the insight they provide. In this particular case, it is incorrect that this office asked for or directed this research paper. The research paper in question is a mandatory written requirement as a part of the core curriculum at National Defense University. However, the subject is certainly worthy of examination by any serious student of military affairs and I encourage such endeavors.

The conclusions of the research paper stem from two criticisms of the structure as it existed circa late 1982: "(1) Lack of institutional CINC authority to develop and prepare forces in peacetime and (2) complex command relationships." On the first point, the research paper could not take into account the numerous changes made which now give the CINCs more authority in the development of forces, in the assignment of forces and in joint doctrine. I note here that the research paper explicitly does not advocate a "significant power shift" . . . but that "the operator should have more authority in shaping forces that will eventually come under his command." Under this Secretary, the Department of Defense assisted by the Joint Chiefs, has undertaken to improve the role of the CINCs in developing forces. Many of these improvements are detailed in my responses to the Congress of 1 March 1985, which I respectfully include here:

Question: "Is there an imbalance between your responsibilities and accountability as an operational commander and your influence over resource decisions? If such an imbalance exists, how can the Unified and Specified Commanders have greater input in the DOD policy, programming, and budgetary process?

General VESSEY. I believe that, considering the changes that have been made in recent years, the balance is close to being correct and the movement is in the right direction. A CINC's main business is operational business, not budgeting and programming; nevertheless, the programming and budgetary process is important to the CINCs. The process produces the CINCs' forces and supports their ability to fight. The Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and the JCS have worked to have the views of the CINCs clearly heard on both Defense Guidance (policy issues) and on the program and budget. In recent years, the JCS have paid more and more attention to cross-Service issues which bear most directly on the CINCs' warfighting and deterrent postures. The JCS continue to work with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and the Services to find ways to improve CINC participation in programming and budgeting matters. The CINCs appear before the Defense Resources Board at least twice a year. Two and a half years ago, the Secretary of Defense designated the Chairman as spokesman for the CINCs on operational requirements. That duty is now included in Title 10 as one of the responsibilities of the Chairman. The Secretary of Defense has taken steps to strengthen the CINCs' linkage to the Services through the component commands. We need to continue to strengthen that process by ensuring that the CINCs communicate directly to the Service Chiefs on component issues and to the JCS on joint and cross-Service issues and programs. The CINCs do help the JCS on the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, the JCS assessment of the composite of the Service programs."

On the second point, "complex command relationships": This allegation is not discussed in any detail in the research project and has little substantiating documentation or analysis. However, the existing command relationships are those necessary to support the two distinct lines of authority that our system requires.

I believe that the present system is a good one and the Joint Chiefs and the CINCs, in their responses to Congress on 1 March 1985, indicated their general satisfaction with the arrangements as they now exist.

3. If so, how is the concept of "in-Support-of" forces, which permits divided command, consistent with unity of command?

General VESSEY. There is no divided command. The CINCs have all the operational authority over their component commands that they need and they are in turn responsive to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Tasking forces as "in support of" is a concept that exists in one form or another at every level in a military operation, irrespective of Service, whether that be an artillery commander firing in support of a ground maneuver commander or a fleet commander supporting a land operation or one Unified or Specified CINC supporting another under the central direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense—such as was done in the Grenada operation.

Tasking forces as "in support of" is an efficient way of augmenting the forces of a commander charged with accomplishing a task. It provides a means to be both flexible and successful with limited forces. It is consisent with unity of command and is particularly appropriate in those commands in which the assigned Service component, usually for reasons of economy, varies from a JCS Publication 2 structure. Where CINCs are established with unusual Service component structures, these arrangements are set forth in the Unified Command Plan with the consent of the Secretary and the President. In those cases, the JCS pay particular attention to ensuring CINCs' operational requirements are met and that the lines of authority are clear and unobstructed. In every instance, assigned forces operate under the direction of a single commander responsible for a given area, mission, or task. In summary, "in support of" tasking represents the reality of current total force structures, particularly maritime, balanced against the projected mission requirements of the supported CINC and the mission requirements of adjacent theaters of operation.

4. Why don't the doctrinal writings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps refer to unity of command?

General VESSEY. As I mentioned previously, unity of command is both fundamental and pervasive in our doctrine and in our organizations. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications do refer to unity of command as unity of effort. JCS Publication 2 specifically sets forth principles, doctrines, and functions governing the activities in performance of U.S. forces in joint operations and these include unity of command. It provides military guidance governing both exercise of command by unified, joint task force and other joint force commanders, as well as doctrine for unified operations and training. It also provides guidance for use by the Services to aid in the preparation of their detailed plans in support of joint operations. With repect to the individual Service doctrines, all are in consonance with JCS Publication 2. Whereas unity of command is not explicitly treated in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, it is an underlying foundation.

The current CINC and Service involvement in joint doctrine development programs will provide insight into how best to adapt our forces to conduct successful joint operations in the future.

REMARKS BY GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE OJS ACTION OFFICER ORIENTATION PROGRAM

Let me just spend a few minutes with you and give you the view from my foxhole. Part of our duty as members of the Defense establishment of the United States is to provide security for the United States today and tomorrow, and by "tomorrow" I mean a long way from now—when I'm in my rocking chair and when you are in your rocking chairs. The decisions we make today will have a lot to do about what kind of security the Nation has in those days.

The principal guy under the President in developing the security of the United States is the Secretary of Defense. The more you look at it, the more sweeping those duties of the Secretary seem. He provides the civilian control of the Armed Forces of the United States. He's the President's agent for doing that. He has two staffs. He has a civilian staff that serves him in matters of overall policy on how to deal with the rest of the Federal Government, how to deal with the Legislative Branch of the Government, and how to get help from the industrial and scientific community.

Then he has a military staff. And his military staff is a staff of five. It's composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, commonly called the "Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Secretary is forbidden by law from having any other military staff. The law also says that the duties of those five are to be the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.

Now, that group of five has a staff of its own. It's called the "Joint Staff." And its duties are laid out for them in the law. The Joint Staff is to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff and through them the Secretary of Defense in developing strategic plans and providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States, logistic plans to support those strategic plans and the assignment of logistic responsibilities to the Services. With the help of the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs review the personnel and material requirements for the Armed Forces, they establish joint training and education systems for the Armed Forces, and they provide representation at the UN Military Committee.

They also provide the strategic commands and strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States through another group of guys, and those are the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands. That's the system that provides the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Now, what about the Services? There are duties for the Services, too—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Those outfits organize, train, equip and support the Armed Forces that are to be fought by the Unified and Specified Commanders.

The Services respond to the Secretary of Defense, too; and they build forces in response to the requirements laid out in the strategic direction that is set out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and endorsed by the Secretary of Defense. Sometimes that relationship gets cluttered or is not understood. Part of the reason is that there is an understandable, direct and good connection between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services: The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also happen to be the uniformed heads of their respective Services, with the exception of the Chairman.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have two different sets of duties, one as heads of their Services to organize, train, equip and support forces to be fought by the Unified and Specified Commands and the other to come back in from the other side of the house, hang their hats on the peg, put on a different hat, and go in there and put on their strategic hats to do those other things.

You see that there has been a great debate in the newspapers in the last few years about whether or not this body which heads the Services, coupled together with the Chairman, can also do these other tasks. Some would suggest that because they are so wed to building an Army or a Navy or an Air Force or a Marine Corps that they can't be objective enough to do the other tasks. On the other hand, I would suggest to you it's a very good arrangement. With the Chiefs being in those other chairs, who knows more about the Army, the Navy, the Air Force or the Marine Corps than the uniformed heads of the Services? So, it is my firm belief that they are the right people to be the strategic advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Now, the Chairman's role in this is a unique role. He has some duties specified in the law. They are fairly simple duties like the duties of the JCS. But by and large, I can summarize all that by saying the Chairman is a servant. He serves three bodies. He serves the President and the Secretary of Defense, that sort of mythical body called the "National Command Authority"—and sometimes the Secretary of Defense delegates duties to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. But his duties as part of the National Command Authority are only delegated when the Secretary is not present.

Then, the Chairman serves another body. He is a servant of another body and that's the body of which he is a member, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His service to those two bodies is as a channel of communication principally because the Chairman is the guy who sits in with the President and the Secretary of Defense at National Security Council meetings and National Security Planning Group meetings or small security meetings with the President and the Secretary of Defense. He's also the guy who sits in the meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So, I'm a "messenger boy." I carry messages back and forth and it's important that I carry those messages clearly. It's important that I serve both of those bodies in my relationship with the other body.

The Chairman is also the servant of the third group and that's the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands. He brings their views to the JCS. He also takes those views to the Secretary of Defense and the President and into the other fora throught which the Secretary of Defense does his job. An important forum where decisions are made on allocating resources to build the forces—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. The Chairman's duty is to help make sure that the forces that those CINCs want built get built by the force builders in the Services.

Those are the duties that I have. You are members of the Joint Staff or those agencies which serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff—your job is to help me and the other four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do their jobs. You who are members of Service staffs are to help the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do their other job—that is, build, organize, train, equip and support the forces that are fought by the Unified and Specified Commands. Sometimes you may help make the strategy for the forces but that's not your primary task. That's the job of the Joint Staff. Are there any questions on that?

Two years ago when I took over this job I made out a "menu" for the JCS and for the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands and they endorsed that menu. We've pursued those items with some vigor. I've got a fancy chart of that menu here. And I'll go through it with you because it's important that you understand what the JCS are trying to do.

The thing we said that was the number one item on the menu are war plans because they drive force requirements. They are the one area that we as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs are solely responsible for. Nobody else makes the war plans. We can bitch about the suppliers of weaponry because weapons are not built to standards. We can squawk about the recruits because the secondary education system doesn't work as well as it ought to. We can squawk about the Congress because Congress doesn't provide enough money. But, if the war plans are wrong, we can point only to ourselves. So, war plans call for particular attention.

What we have done is start out with a unique exercise. We brought the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands in here and I told them they could bring one staff officer. If they had to have slides, they could bring one staff officer to flip the slides for them. But their duty was to explain to the JCS the concept of the operation for their most demanding war plan and we didn't want any staff officer explanations. We wanted the explanations of the commanders. Then we started from there with the idea of doing some things like giving top-down guidance on the way the war plans should work. It's my theory that they should not grow like moss in the basement but should start with guidance from the top.

The second thing we put on the menu is to provide planning support for the CINCs. The idea behind this is to give "modern aids to planning" to those CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands. Every Service has an analytical agency; every war college has a war gaming facility; but, there are a lot of CINCs with only yellow foolscap and number two pencils, hand-held calculators and slide rules. Our objective is to harness all this horsepower and give it to the warfighters out there making the plans.

Some of these other menu items are sort of old hat—such as tying military strategy to the national strategy. That's the duty of the Chiefs. Another is reviewing the NATO strategy and addressing the changes that take place. Some changes are taking place right this afternoon with the Congress voting on whether or not to mandate a withdrawal of US forces from NATO because the NATO nations have very little percent growth in defense budgets.

Another is increasing the influence of the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands in the POMs and the budgets. We've come a long way with that. In two weeks the CINCs will be in again to meet with the Secretary of Defense and with all of his advisers on the Defense Resources Board. The Chiefs and the CINCs have made considerable progress in making our views known there. We've examined the cross-Service issues, the things that make the Unified and Specified Commands work. Those issues are primarily command and control and communications, intelligence and mobility plus logistics support. And then there were some of the other things that we agreed should be on the menu: Arms control, JCS organization (which is still an issue which gets some attention), the Unified Command Plan "seams," joint doctrine and how to handle joint manpower.

We will update that menu here in a few days and have it ready for the CINCs the next time they come in here (in two weeks). We will reaffirm the general direction for the next two years.

Now, what is your job? How do I view your job? Well, you're like me. You're a servant of the two groups, with a similar relationship to the third group. The first group is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and you help them do those jobs that they're to do. Their principal job, again, is providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

When this group of stalwarts of mine assembled two years ago, we talked about military advice. When was military advice good and timely? Through the years this JCS has oscillated between giving advice that was unsolicited or waiting until the Secretary of Defense and the President asked for it. So, we came to the conclusion that if we were to do our job correctly, then we had to give them timely advice. We set a rule for ourselves for timely advice: that was "Give them advice before they know they need it." And if they get advice before they know they need it, they've gotten timely advice. If they have to ask us for advice on what to do, it's probably already too late and we haven't done our job. So that's our goal. As staff members of the Joint Staff, your objective is to help us do that. Help us see the world and anticipate what's to happen and give that advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President before they know they need it.

The spread of duties you may have is as wide as the spread of duties on the Staff itself. But what I want to tell you is that whatever you are doing, it is important. Some of you may be down there counting money for the exercise budget. You may have done that out in a subordinate command at a far lower level and what you're doing doesn't seem to be much different except that you're aggregating bigger numbers. What I want to tell you is that there are no unimportant duties here.

You are dealing with issues that have risen to the highest level of military authority in the country. Now, some of the issues perhaps could have been solved below, somewhere else. But, the fact of the matter is they're here now and the fact that they are here makes them important. Somebody thought they were important enough to get here. They're here. They're ours to solve and none of them are unimportant. None of you will perform duties that are any more or less important than the others. The sum total of our effectiveness is what we do as a whole. The more I travel around in a uniform the more I recognize that there is nothing that requires teamwork more than military operations. No other place in which you are requires teamwork more than here.

So, it means understanding the programming and budgeting system. It means understanding the joint planning system. It means understanding who knows what around the Staff and how to get that information and use it for yourself for the problem that you've got to solve; and it means how to get along with the others members of the Staff.

There are some qualities that I believe are important, particularly while you're here. You will be dealing with issues that affect the security of the country now and which will affect the security of the country in the future. They are issues that should be dealt with within the fora that are assigned for solving those problems. We don't need to write out our problems on the front page of the Washington Post or the New York Times. In other words, keep your mouth shut, and if you can't keep your mouth shut, you're in the wrong job. So, if that's one of your problems, if you have by proclivity a tendency to chatter to newspaper reporters or in cocktail bars or wherever it happens to be, please see me or the Personnel Officer after this formation and we can part friends now. But I'll tell you that if that's your proclivity and you do it later, we will part but we will not part friends.

The second part of it is that you come here wearing Army green, Navy white or blue, Air Force blue, Marine OD or civilian clothes and you bring here the expertise that's needed because you're an expert in your own particular Service. Oftentimes we hear the issue of, "Well, we need the guys that aren't experts in their services but experts in joint planning," or something like that. Well, joint planning requires experts from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Those are the only people who can do the jobs here correctly. And it requires them to work together toward the common goal. This means that you come here as an Army officer, as a Naval Officer, or whatever it is; but, you're not working for the Army or the Navy. You're working for the JCS to produce plans that provide for the security of the United States.

Now, you've got to put a little purple in your green or your white or your OD or whatever it happens to be in your addressal of problems that you address. When you operate, you are expected to be an expert in all and you must learn that while you're here.

Not only is there no unimportant work, there is also more than enough work for everybody to do and we're not inhibited by a lack of room for improvement. We've got plenty of room for improvement in whatever we do so there is a great opportunity for you to make a great contribution to the country today and in the future. I kiddingly tell the guys up in my office, "We'll work half days on Sunday—about 6 to 6. The rest of the time you'll put in a full day." But I say that to you for a purpose because you will have those kinds of days as well. We had a session over the weekend when I know one fellow had to miss the surprise birthday party he had planned for his wife. He had no choice because he was the expert in this particular field. The President needed an answer.

On the other hand, there are times when there may be some slack time in your particular field and I don't want you sitting around here or standing around waiting for somebody to issue orders because somebody three levels up is still sitting there playing golf on the carpet in his office. Go home because tomorrow you may not have the opportunity.

O.K. I've chattered on long enough. What questions do you have for me?

General VESSEY. Thank you very much.

Now, as to the issue at hand——

Senator THURMOND. General Vessey, let me explain that as President pro tempore of the Senate I have got to open the Senate at 9:30, and I have to leave in a few minutes, but I will be back just as soon as I can do that. You may proceed. I will ask Senator Warner, the next ranking member, to take over in my absence.

General VESSEY. I think it is important to do what Chairman Goldwater said, to examine our organization and see what needs to be done. You need to know that where I am coming from, I believe that President Eisenhower was absolutely right, and that his letter to the Congress in April of 1958 ought to be required reading for anyone that has anything to do with defense, and particularly for people in the executive branch or in the Congress.

And I want to tell you that I sat as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with four other Chiefs who also believe that President Eisenhower was right, and we worked very hard to try to move the organization in the direction that President Eisenhower wanted to set it in in 1958.

There are some improvements that can be made, and we ought to go ahead and make those. On the other hand, we ought to recognize that we have very good Armed Forces, and one of the dangers of this constant repetition of the fact that everything is all screwed up is it will lead the people of the United States to believe that we do not have good Armed Forces.

We have very good Armed Forces. We have good defense for this country, and they did not get there by accident. Now, we have a system that is a democratic system that involves an executive branch where the President is Commander in Chief in civilian control of the military, a system of professional military forces who do military planning, and then a complicated interaction between the executive branch and the Congress, and it has produced what we have.

That system has a lot of faults, and many of those are pointed out in the committee staff report. Perhaps we can do something to improve the organization, but the other thing that we need to recognize is that the system has evolved steadily through the years since the beginning of World War II and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947, and the 1958 Reorganization Act.

The committee staff report seems to impute sort of a constancy of fault through that period, and does not recognize that the system itself has evolved, and that not only I but my predecessors, these commanders and former Commanders in Chief and their predecessors all understood those things that went wrong in the past, and set about to try and make corrections.

So, as we change things, we want to make sure that we do not throw out the baby with the bath water. Let us make sure that we change what needs to be changed, but do not change the things that are strengths.

I would like to address in my oral remarks here just simply one of those things, because I cannot tell you in 10 minutes all I know about the JCS, but let us talk about the issue of whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be the body of military advisers and should be constituted of the service Chiefs. Because our system is a two-track system. You have the military services, who build forces, and then the chain of command through the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Unified Commanders, who fight the wars with the forces that are built.

That is not a bad way to do it. There is perhaps some tuning that needs to be made in that system, and we can do that. But now the real issue comes: Can those service Chiefs, who have two different sets of jobs adequately perform those two different sets of jobs?

You have heard people say yes, you have heard people say no. The principal criticism about including the service Chiefs as the body of advisers comes around one of their functions, and that is to advise the Secretary of Defense on how to divide up the peacetime defense budget.

Yes, there is some conflict of interest there for the service Chiefs. Now, what I would like to point out to you is that first dividing up the defense budget in peacetime is a very, very difficult job. Other than the decision to recommend to go to war to the President, that is the Secretary of Defense's most difficult job, how to divide up the peacetime defense budget.

But he gets a lot of help from people other than just the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are not the only ones who advise him on how to do that, and ultimately the Congress divides up the peacetime defense budget. So that is only one facet of the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would call to your attention again in title 10, section 141, those duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other duties have to do with taking that defense budget at whatever level it is set and however it is divided and producing the best possible Armed Forces for the country, and then allocating those forces to the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands to carry out their plans.

That is an even more important duty for the military side of the House than is the recommendation on how to divide up the defense budget, because eventually the level at which the defense budget is going to be set is a political decision. There is going to be a lot of politics in how it is divided up. It would be nice to have a closed loop system that uses only logic and analysis, but it will not come out that way.

So the other JCS duties are really far more encompassing than how do you divide up the defense budget. I would submit to you that figuring out how to build the Armed Force, how to build forces that can work together, how to allocate those forces to the unified and specified commands, can best be done by that body constituted of the people who have been chosen to build the forces.

They know the forces that can be built with the level of defense budget that has been set. They can hear the needs of the unified and specified commanders. They can strike some balance between deterrence today and deterrence tomorrow. That is a very important balance to strike. And they can build the forces that can work together.

They must do it. Only they can do it. If you disband the Joint Chiefs of Staff and say let us have a body of separate military advisers, you will have to reconstitute the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go out and do those other duties anyway. If the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force do not get together to figure out how to fight the air-land battle, who is going to do it? If the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force do not get together to figure out how to provide land-based air support to Naval operations, who is going to do it?

So, I would submit to you that it would be throwing out the baby with the bath water to disband the Joint Chiefs of Staff and set up a body of four separate advisers. It will not work. It is a bad idea. And it will harm the defenses of this country. So, I would just chuck that one out right now, and then go on from there to figure out what we do.

The other thing I would say about the report is that it generally recognizes an important point, and the key point is not how to strengthen the Chairman of the JCS, not how to improve the interface between the JCS and the unified commands. The key point is how to make the Secretary of Defense the best Secretary of Defense we could make, because in our law he is absolutely the key guy. He is a three-headed man. He is a cabinet officer and an adviser to the President. He is the head of the biggest outfit in this country, that is, in terms of amount of money spent. We are talking about close to a $300 billion budget that he manages. But more importantly, he is the President's agent as the commander of the Armed Forces. And it is how to make him effective in that channel and mesh, as the committee report calls it, mission integration, the building of the budget with carrying out the strategy. How you use the JCS or whatever body of advisers you have to make the Secretary effective is the key question.

Obviously, I have a lot of ideas on how to do that, and I tried to work very hard to do that while I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and certainly the committee can help, but you need to recognize that the key is how to make the Secretary of Defense effective.

I think I will just reserve the rest of my time for questions.

Senator **Warner** [presiding]. Thank you, General Vessey. That is indeed a valuable contribution coming from one who served with great distinction and is fresh out of the job.

Members of the committee, my suggestion is that we proceed and receive the testimony of each of the witnesses, and then turn to questioning. Should a member have a schedule conflict, the Chair will try and accommodate one or two questions.

General Vessey, just for clarification, when you said let us chuck out an idea, you made reference to the idea of a council of military advisors.

General **Vessey**. Chuck out the idea of a council of military advisors other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator **Warner**. I just wanted to clarify for the record that the phrase "chuck out" was to apply the concept of the council of military advisors.

We will now hear from General Goodpaster.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, USA (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General **Goodpaster**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee as it considers this issue of a strengthened and improved defense organization.

I have a prepared statement. My travels were such that I was unable to submit it prior to this session, but with your permission I would like to submit the prepared statement and pick a few of the highlights I would like to emphasize.

Senator **Warner**. Without objection, it will be admitted into the record, as will be the prepared documents of all witnesses and such supplementary material as the witnesses may desire to submit hereafter.

General **Goodpaster**. I participated in a recent study which produced the report called "Toward a More Effective Defense." It was conducted by the Defense Organization. Project of CSIS—the Center for Strategic and International Studies—at Georgetown University. Phil Odeen was the chairman, and Melvin Laird and I were vice chairmen.

I have also had opportunity to read the staff report of this committee of 16 October entitled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," as well as the House of Representatives report on H.R.

3622, and I concur with the central premise of all three of these reports that there are problems, that these are serious problems, that substantial improvements in organization and function are needed, and that they are possible.

I would like to center my remarks on top level military organization and responsibility both in Washington and in the field, because that is where my experience primarily occurred.

First and foremost, I would say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization as it exists is in serious need of improvement. The military advice and planning, I think, are quite often deficient in quality, timeliness, and effectiveness. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff bear only part of the responsibility, they bear a very important part of the responsibility.

The difficulties and shortcomings of the present system, some of them cited by recent JCS members themselves, are reflected as well in deficiencies in our ability to plan and conduct military operations in the field with full effectiveness. The product of the joint system, military advice and plans, as I indicated, often lacks the timeliness and responsiveness that it should have.

I think that it reflects too much of a weapons push and service proponency rather than an operational requirements pull based in overall strategy. Although recent steps toward improvement have been made, and here I would like to support the comment of Senator Goldwater concerning the improvements brought into effect during the regime of General Vessey, because they surely have moved the system in the right direction, even so, the joint advice on budget formation and resource allocation, though it is a heavy burden to the whole joint organization, still lacks the necessary realism and financial constraint, and does not influence these decisions in a sufficiently major and useful way.

And here I would like to say that there is an indispensable role, in my opinion, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for professional military advice in that process, and that requirement cannot be filled by the civilian echelon of the Defense Department. I think that this is one of the weak areas in the present structure and system. It is an area to which General Vessey gave particular attention, and to which he brought some improvement, but further improvement, I think, is very much needed.

Now, if these improvements are to be made, then I think there are two key principles that define the central issue. The first was well stated by President Eisenhower in his 1958 message to the Congress, and I had the privilege of working with him during that time, and on this particular issue, that contained his proposals for defense reorganization at that time.

The results of that reorganization have not measured up to his hopes, but I think the principle is still valid, and I will read it, because it is indeed central:

> Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements with all services as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and technical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly lead and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.

Now, the second principle that I would cite is the need for assuring a close linkage between U.S. security objectives and the military capabilities for achieving them. That is, a linkage of what is desirable with what is feasible and realistic—for the security of the people of the United States and the safeguarding of their free institutions.

The military capabilities I refer to include two things, first, the military forces and resources, and second, the ability to employ these forces and resources effectively. For the first, that is, the military forces and resources, I would like to emphasize that joint planning must be closely tied to service capabilities. For the second, that is, for the ability to employ these forces and resources effectively, joint planning must be closely tied to the plans and the operational capabilities of the unified and specified commands.

In this regard, I would like to emphasize the point that joint military advice and planning on operational matters should not be dominated by service staffs or subjected to service veto or to indirect service control via the service components that are assigned to the unified and specified combatant commands.

This in my mind is a major source of the difficulty, and an unnecessary one in present JCS operations. To me, it is unmistakably clear that a strengthened role for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the key essential to achieving the systemic improvement that is needed, and let me say here, if I may, that I think it is systemic and fundamental improvement, and I am not in any sense criticizing the members or the performance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I think it is remarkable that they have been able to do as well and make the contribution that they have made with a system which still has inherent and fundamental weaknesses.

Now, in more specific and detailed terms, let me just list the changes that in my opinion are needed to achieve a more effective defense. First, to strengthen the role of the Chairman by making him by statute the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

Second, providing a Vice Chairman of a different service subordinate to the Chairman but with functions coextensive with his own.

Next, give the Chairman full authority over the joint staff. Remove the statutory limit on its size, and control its size and composition through the normal program and budget processes of the executive and the legislative branches.

Fourth, continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a Joint Chiefs of Staff committee to advise the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, if he so elects, on matters particularly pertaining to the capabilities and the readiness of forces of their respective services to perform their operational roles.

Next, sharply reduce service staff involvement in the joint process, limiting it to coordination relating to such service capabilities and readiness.

Next, authorize the Chairman with approval of the Secretary of Defense to prescribe staff level coordination procedures between joint and service staffs, and that to me is a very important matter that must continue to be provided for together with arrangements for the provision of service information to the joint staff.

Next, broaden the training, experience, and rewards for joint duty. Authorize the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense to establish qualifications for service on the joint staff and establish measures to increase joint service experience and provide suitable rewards for joint staff service.

Facilitate interservice transfers and details by officers desiring such transfers and details, and permit a reasonable number of graduates of each service academy to be commissioned in other services as the present law authorizes but does not require.

Authorize the Chairman to review and advise the Secretary of Defense regarding all recommendations for three- and four-star officer staff and command assignments to operational forces, service and joint, and also to the joint staff.

Give the commanders of the unified and specified commands a stronger voice in setting defense requirements and supervising the training and readiness, including the peacetime operation and maintenance of the forces under their command.

Now, these recommendations respond, I believe, to the principal issues raised both in the Senate study, the Senate staff report, and the House report on H.R. 3622.

There is a final question, and that is, what is the likelihood that such changes would themselves introduce significant disabilities or even dangers on their own? I have to say that my own analysis and experience suggest that the probabilities lie very strongly the other way. It will be the responsibility of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and other elements of government to see that proper supervision and control are maintained.

The true problem, I think, is not lack of control but the need for more effective realization of the broad perspectives and purposes of higher civilian authority than is now being achieved.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. It is my considered judgment that this committee could make a major move in the direction of stengthening our overall military planning, our development of more coherent defense strategy, and the provision of more effective military advice to our governmental leadership by taking steps along the lines recommended.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Goodpaster follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, U.S. ARMY (RET.)

Mr. Chairman: I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Committee as it considers the issue of strengthened and improved Defense organization. I was directly involved in the recent study which produced the report "Toward a More Effective Defense", conducted by the CSIS Defense Organization Project, of which Phil Odeen was Chairman, and Mel Laird and I were Vice-Chairmen. I have also had opportunity to read the Staff Report of this Committee of 16 October 1985 entitled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change", as well as the House of Representatives Report on H.R. 3622—and concur with the central premise of all three of these reports that serious problems exist, and that substantial improvements in organization and function are needed—and are possible.

My remarks will be centered on top-level military organization and responsibility, both in Washington and in the field.

First and foremost, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization as it now exists is in serious need of improvement. Military advice and planning are deficient in quality, timeliness and effectiveness. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff bear only part of the responsibility, they bear an important part. To much too great a degree, we see the results of piecemeal approaches lacking an effective integrating strategy, and concentrating on programs relating to particular weapons and services rather than operational plans and requirements. The contributions to increased military efficiency and effectiveness that could be made through improved top-level military planning and advice are not being realized. In particular, the mechanisms for providing coherent overall strategic plans, and responding to overall national security interests and needs, are far weaker than those for developing and advancing individual Service interests, and promoting individual weapons systems.

The difficulties and shortcomings of the present system, some of them cited by recent JCS members themselves, extend from the adequacy and objectivity of the information fed into the planning process to the effectiveness of the process itself and to the timeliness, usefulness and validity of the advice and the plans that are the final product of the JCS effort. These weaknesses are reflected as well in deficiencies in our ability to plan and conduct military operations in the field with full effectiveness.

The information provided by service staffs is mixed with service interest and service positions. The information and recommendations from the unified and specified commands need to be greatly strengthened, and reflected more strongly in overall military planning and resource allocation.

The "corporate duties" of the JCS, repeatedly emphasized by President Eisenhower, have not in fact been given the kind of priority he recommended and the contribution of the JCS has declined, leaving a gap in overall military advice as an input to Defense decisions, which OSD civilians are not and will not be able to fill. The service Chiefs of Staff are heavily burdened with service responsibilities, and their attention is strongly focused on Service activities and interests. The staff process for joint matters is cumbersome, laborious and characterized by watering-down and logrolling through repeated layers of review and revision.

The product—military advice and plans—lacks the timeliness and responsiveness it should have, reflects too much of "weapons push" and service proponency rather than an "operational requirements pull" based in overall strategy. Although recent steps toward improvement have been made, joint advice on budget formation and resource allocation, though a heavy burden to the whole joint organization, lacks the necessary realism and financial constraint and does not influence these decisions in a sufficiently major and useful way.

In considering what should be done concerning these gaps and shortcomings, first let me say that I am not criticizing the individuals involved. I know from my own observation and experience the talent and devotion which the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff and the Service staffs bring to their jobs. It is to their great credit that the system has been made to work as well as it has. The truth is that the weaknesses are systemic and fundamental, and that it is systemic improvement that is needed.

Whether the inevitable institutional opposition to systemic reform can be overcome, whether the trauma within the Pentagon over reduction of individual Service prerogatives can be dealt with, whether the necessary public understanding and support for such improvements can be achieved with acceptable expenditures of political effort and leadership, I will not attempt to estimate. That is a task for this committee, for the Congress, and for the Executive Branch. I do know that it took the unique experience of an Eisenhower, and the unique confidence of the American people in his military judgment, to accomplish the reform measures of 1958.

If improvements are to be made, then there are two key principles, I believe, that define the central issue. The first was well stated by President Eisenhower in his 1958 message to the Congress containing his proposals for Defense reorganization at that time. Though the results of that reorganization have not measured up to his hopes, the principle is still valid:

". . . [S]eparate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service."

The second principle is the need for assuring a close linkage between U.S. security objectives and the military capabilities for achieving them, i.e., linkage of what is desirable with what is feasible and realistic for the security of the people of the U.S. and the safeguarding of their free institutions. The military capabilities I refer to include 1) military forces and resources, and 2) the ability to employ these forces and resources effectively. For the first, I would like to emphasize that joint planning must be closely tied to service capabilities; for the second, joint planning must be closely tied to the plans and the operational capabilities of the unified and specified commands.

In this regard, I would like to emphasize that joint military advice and planning on operational matters should not be dominated by Service staffs, or subjected to Service veto, or to indirect Service control via the Service components assigned to the combatant commands. This is a major source of difficulty—and an unnecessary one—in present JCS operations.

The aim of the "linkage" I refer to should be to carry out top-level joint planning within the framework of a "top-down" overall or integrated strategy that rests solidly on realistic capabilities both of the services and the U&S operational commands. These capabilities, both current and future, should be developed and maintained in accordance with approved SecDef guidance, established after careful consideration of joint military advice and recommendations prepared in the manner just described.

To me, it is unmistakably clear that a strengthened role for the Chairman of the JCS is the key essential to achieving the systemic improvement that is needed. He should have full authority over the Joint Staff (which he now manages on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The Joint Staff itself should be strengthened and placed under his full and direct control. The participation of Service staffs in the joint process should be discontinued in its present form, and a greatly reduced and re-aligned mode of participation should be established. The authority of the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands should be strengthened and existing service-imposed restrictions removed or reduced.

In more specific terms, the following are the changes that in my opinion are needed to achieve a more effective Defense:

(1) Strengthen the role of the Chairman by making him by statute the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Provide a Vice Chairman of a different service subordinate to the Chairman, but with functions co-extensive with his own.

(3) Give the Chairman full authority over the Joint Staff. Remove the statutory limit on its size, and control its size and composition through the normal program and budget process of the Executive and Legislative Branches.

(4) Continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to advise the Chairman (and the Secretary of Defense if he so elects) on matters pertaining to the capabilities and readiness of forces of their respective services to perform their operational roles.

(5) Sharply reduce Service staff involvement in the joint process—limiting it to coordination relating to service capabilities.

(6) Authorize the Chairman, with SecDef approval, to prescribe staff level coordination procedures between joint and service staffs, together with arrangements for the provision of service information to the joint staff.

(7) Broaden the training, experience and rewards for joint duty. Authorize the Chairman, with SecDef approval, to establish qualifications for service on the joint staff, and establish measures to increase joint service experience and provide suitable rewards for joint staff service. Facilitate inter-service transfers and details by officers desiring such transfers and details, and permit a reasonable number of graduates of each Service academy to be commissioned in other services (as the present law authorizes).

(8) Authorize the Chairman to review, and advise the SecDef regarding, all recommendations for 3- and 4-star officer staff and command assignments to operational forces—service and joint—and also to the joint staff.

(9) Give the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands a stronger voice in setting Defense requirements and supervising the training and readiness, including the peacetime operation and maintenance of the forces under their command.

These recommendations respond, I believe, to the principal issues raised in the three reports to which I referred at the outset of my remarks.

A final question remains: what is the likelihood that such changes would introduce significant disabilities, or even dangers, on their own? This will obviously be a matter for earnest examination by this committee—and for public debate. Such concerns might relate to proper civilian control of the military, proper support for the separation of powers (and specifically, responsiveness to the Congress), assurance that the Chairman is not overloaded, assurance against rashness or bias on the part of the Chairman, and the like. My own analysis and experience suggest that the probabilities lie decidedly the other way. In none of these or similar areas, does it seem to me likely that controls and constraints would be inadequate. The Chairman will have command authority over forces, as do the President and the Secretary of Defense. It will be the responsibility of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the

Congress, and other elements of government to see that proper supervision and control are maintained. The true problem is not lack of control, but the need for more effective realization of the broad perspectives and purposes of higher civilian authority than is now being achieved.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. It is my considered judgment that this committee could make a major move in the direction of strengthening our overall military planning, our development of more coherent defense strategy, and the provision of more effective military advice to our governmental leadership, by taking steps along the lines recommended.

Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, General.

We will now hear from Admiral Long.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ROBERT L.J. LONG, USN (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me say, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee on this very important subject. I think that out of this debate I hope that our national security apparatus will be strengthened, and I also must comment that I am very honored to be here with these three other distinguished gentlemen.

I do have a short statement that I have submitted for the record, and if I might just comment briefly on that, and then I would like to, as Senator Thurmond says, speak from the heart.

Senator WARNER. Please proceed just as you desire.

Admiral LONG. Some weeks ago Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn invited me to comment on the recent staff report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and I did submit some short comments.

Last year at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations I chaired a review of this subject that included many of the issues that are before the committee today, and briefly, those recommendations that we presented to the Chief of Naval Operations included support for strengthening the role of the unified and specified commanders, particularly in resource allocation and the programming and budgeting process; second, support for unfettered access by the unified commanders to the Secretary of Defense; three, support for closer involvement of the unified and specified commands and decisionmaking on the readiness and sustainability goals of their assigned forces.

Next, support for the revision of joint staff procedures, which I think still need significant action; and I guess last, opposition to abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, which provides civilian authorities with advice based on an unmatched breadth of experience and thorough knowledge of the current capabilities and limitations of U.S. Armed Forces.

And I have submitted that report to Senator Nunn and Senator Goldwater, and hopefully it might be of some help to your deliberations.

Senator NUNN. I might say I have read that report, Admiral Long, and it has been helpful. Thank you very much.

Admiral LONG. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

Let me now turn to things that come from my perspective as a former Vice Chief of a service and as a former unified commander of a combatant command, the Pacific Command. I have maybe oversimplified the issues, but to me I have broken down the issues into what I would call major issues of great importance to the United States and, I would say, issues of lesser importance.

The issues of major importance to the United States that I believe that are before us are, first of all, the military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. How do we best do that? Second, what is the capability, what is the status of our ability to develop national military strategy and translate that national military strategy into war plans in a timely fashion?

And third, what is the role of the unified commanders in shaping the requirements and the allocation of resources in order to carry out those plans? I would say that items of less importance, and I do not mean they are not important, but they are less important, and that is, how do we get the joint staff, which includes the involvement of the services, how do we get that to operate in a more effective way with less red tape, less delay?

How do we get the appropriate number of high quality officers assigned to joint staffs, and how do we ensure that we get them appropriately rewarded and promoted? How do we strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff without emasculating the role of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in giving advice to the President and the National Security Council. That involves such issues as should he be by statute a member of the National Security Council, should he be a spokesman of the unified and specified commands, should he in fact control the joint staff as his own?

There is also the question of how do we address the split between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff insofar as their functions are concerned? Do we need a Vice Chairman? And should we go ahead and put the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Chairman in the chain of command?

Now, those are all significant issues, but they certainly do not hold the same importance to me as the first three that I gave you.

First of all, the President is by law, the Constitution, the Commander in Chief. He may not be the most efficient or effective military commander, but he is by law the Commander in Chief. He has a deputy, the Secretary of Defense.

As a theater commander in those military operations that we did conduct or we were planning to conduct, the thing that I did not need from Washington was military advice to tell me how to do it.

What I needed was a combination of military and political advice, the political judgment. That has to come from the civilian control of the Government. That has to come from the President through his own national security apparatus, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and it has to be—it has to have contained in it the best military advice that we can give the President and the Secretary of Defense.

I submit, even though I have the highest regard for my good friend, Jack Vessey, that there is no military officer that has at his command the detailed knowledge of naval warfare, air warfare, ground warfare such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have, and I therefore would strongly urge that this committee not abolish the Joint

Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

It would be more efficient, more effective if we had a single spokesman, but I do not think that would serve our national security needs well.

The second major comment has to do with the development of national military strategy. National military strategy obviously is something that needs to be developed as a result of the political strategic guidance that flows from the President and from the Secretary of Defense. That national military strategy needs to cover not only the possibility of a nuclear holocaust or a general war involving the Soviets, but it really needs to address the entire spectrum of warfare.

I have urged in the past that we pay more attention to the development of national military strategy covering the entire spectrum of warfare, and from that, we insist that the CINC's develop the necessary contingency plans or war plans to cover those various vital needs of the United States.

Senator Denton, I was addressing the question of what I consider to be a major issue, one of the three, and that was that we can improve our ability to develop more comprehensive, realistic national military strategy and translate that strategy in a more timely way to contingency plans and war plans.

I must note at this point that General Vessey has given this issue some significant attention while he was the Chairman.

The last issue that I feel very strongly about is the role of the CINC's, the combatant CINC's. I believe that their role needs to be strengthened certainly in the formulation of requirements and requirements more specifically in the area of readiness, sustainability, command and control.

Obviously, I do not believe the CINC's should properly get involved in the design of a new aircraft or a new ship or a new tank but they are very much involved in determining and setting forth, I think, as clearly as possible to the Secretary of Defense the requirements for war fighting, and that involves how many spare parts you have, how much fuel you have, how much ammunition you have, and your ability to conduct training. Those are all directly related to the responsibility of the CINC to be able to conduct operations today, not 5 years from now.

The other issues that I see that I ticked off, I think, are important issues, and I will be very happy to address those during the question period.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Long follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. ROBERT L.J. LONG, USN (RETIRED)

Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn invited me to comment on the recent staff report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change." Last year, at the request of Admiral James Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, I chaired a group that considered many of these issues. Recommendations included:

Support for strengthening the role of the unified and specified commanders, particularly in resource allocation and the programming and budgeting process;

Support for unfettered access by Unified Commanders to the Secretary of Defense;

Support for closer involvement of the unified and specified commands in decision-making on the readiness and sustainability goals of their assigned forces;

Support for the revision of Joint Staff procedures;

Opposition to abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, which provides civilian authorities with advice based on an unmatched breadth of experience and thorough knowledge of the current capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Armed Forces.

I would like to make the following observations about the SASC staff report.

In its letter of submittal, the report rightfully acknowledges the efficiency, improvements, and positive direction of defense management. This offhand remark cannot, however, mask what appears to be the report's larger purpose, a harsh and unwarranted attack on U.S. military performance to justify imposing a radical, untested new theory of defense organization at the seat of government. That theory would eliminate the diversity of knowledgeable advice and options now presented to civilian authorities by the Joint Chiefs and would centralize the authority for such advice in one officer and his Pentagon staff—thereby severing the relationship between responsibility and planning at the seat of government. As a former Commander of a Unified Command, with many years of operational experience, and as a former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, with responsibilities for the preparedness of naval forces, I believe that such results would severely and adversely affect informed decisionmaking at the highest civilian levels and efficient, effective military operations.

I was also struck by the report's concentration on defense structure while dismissing the importance of the many intangibles of military success, such as leadership, flexibility, and initiative. Good military organization is most helpful when it minimizes the tiers of bureaucracy, military and civilian, that perpetuate staff-level second guessing of the on-scene judgment and leadership of responsible military commanders. Good organization at the seat of government functions best when it ensures that the national command authorities have close working relationships with the top military officers who must advise them of options to carry out their orders.

In short, the very best solution to operational or managerial questions is to select excellent, top-level officers in whom you have confidence; give them strong direction and the flexibility and authority to get the job done; and hold them accountable.

The report is full of recommendations that reflect the authors' unproven opinion that structure is both the origin of and the solution to all real and perceived problems in defense. The recommendations do not, in my view, reflect the realities of military operations or management. As a former Commander of a Unified Command, I never found the chain of command from the President to myself to be "confused," as the SASC staff alleges. I do find confusing the staff's recommendation that the JCS Chairman become "the sole command voice of higher authority within the JCS system, while ensuring absolute clarity that the JCS Chairman is not part of the chain of command" (p. 351). Regarding putting forward recommendations for operational requirements, I believe that Unified Commanders' direct access to the Secretary of Defense, and their additional input to the Defense Resources Board, is far more realistic and effective than the creation of yet more "OJCS offices to represent the unified commanders on a day-to-day basis on policy and resource allocations" (p. 346).

With respect to the question of civilian control, I am not only concerned with the impact of this report upon the Pentagon and the White House but also upon Congress' traditional role in defense. I have frequently observed the important influence of Congress on military affairs—not only through the appropriations and authorizations processes, but through the experience and knowledge of Members, like yourself, who understand the complexities of the global Soviet threat and the defense requirements necessary to meet it. While criticism of Congressional micro-management is justified, I believe that the leading defense committees of Congress must continue to benefit from the diverse and even sometimes conflicting views of the Services if they are to play an effective, real role in policymaking. One uniformed Defense Chief, with the authority over the senior ranks that military hierarchy accords him, will necessarily diminish that debate and discussion—or force military leadership into self-destructive insubordination and discord. This is not in the nation's interest.

The one chief benefit of the staff report is the degree to which it forces the nation to re-examine the defense establishment with a view to strengthening national security. With respect to its actual recommendations, I believe that we must exercise the greatest prudence and care in radically altering a system that has, in fact, worked well to preserve our strength and the world's peace; and has been unique among the nations of the world in filling the requirements of a democratic people.

Thank you for the privilege of addressing these issues.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Admiral.

We will now hear from General McBride.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM V. McBRIDE, USAF (RETIRED), FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General McBRIDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is indeed a pleasure for me, having been out of Government service for a few years, to appear once again before your distinguished committee.

I have been retired from the Air Force for a number of years—since 1978. My last assignment was Vice Chief of Staff. I held that position for almost 3 years. Since that time, among many other things, I have been a member of a small group of military and civilian officers that have been called upon from time to time by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to analyze a number of management policy issues.

The people in our group are very distinguished military people, and they are listed in my prepared statement, sir.

In 1981, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dave Jones, called on us as a group to evaluate the overall JCS organization and procedures, and our group prepared a report, an unclassified report, which was published in April 1982. Our group became commonly known as the Chairman's Special Study Group, and excerpts from our report were frequently used in the comprehensive staff report prepared for you on "Defense Organization: The Need for Change."

I respectfully recommend, sir, that our report be entered into the record of these hearings.

[See report "The Organization and Functions of the JCS," p. 407.]

General McBRIDE. My brief comments this morning will be based upon the substance of our report. I am going to do that because they are directly related to many of the issues contained in your staff report and also in H.R. 3622.

The JCS organization as you well know has been studied many times in the last 40 years and the fact that little has been done to correct the deficiencies does not mean the deficiencies are inconsequential or that one should not continue to strive for change. Rather, in my opinion, it reflects the fact that change comes slowly in a large, diverse military organization such as ours—one very rich with strong service traditions and service constituencies.

Our report addresses perhaps the most fundamental but least recognized deficiencies in the JCS organization, and that is the manner in which officers are trained, educated and assigned to joint positions, and also the procedures that govern joint staff activities.

Our group believes that it is easy to overlook personnel management and staff procedures as possible issues, because they are low profile topics, and they appear to be routine institutional practices to many. In fact, they are profoundly important in determining the effectiveness of the JCS organization and the ability to provide useful advice.

For this reason I want to emphasize today two major points that I hope are useful. The first point has to do with officer preparation and assignment for joint duty. Most officers in joint assignments have very complex and major responsibilities. Frequently those responsibilities are quite different from the task that they have been trained for in their past service. There is now no systematic effective plan for assuring an officer assigned to joint duty has the requisite staff experience, the technical knowledge of the joint system to really know what is happening on a joint basis. It would be unthinkable to man service positions demanding a practical knowlege of being a skipper of a submarine, a commander of a large aircraft or commander of an infantry batallion the way we staff joint headquarters. This combination of lack of Washington staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of joint activities, lack of formal preparation through the joint school system, coupled with very short tours without repetition, makes it very difficult for joint staff officers, no matter how capable, and let me stipulate, they are very capable, it makes it very difficult for them to effectively deal with their responsibilities. Thus in my opinion the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as corporate body tend to be handicapped.

Actually, joint assignments are seldom sought by officers. There are few rewards and there are significant hazards. A joint position removes them from the environment for which they have been trained, an environment in which they have established relations and reputations, and one in which they seek advancement. Joint duty places them in wholly new environments involving unfamiliar procedures for which most have little or no formal training. Now, adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work done in joint duty is unprodutive.

Thus the general perception among officers is that a joint assignment tends to be one to be avoided. By contrast, most service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishment and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers want service assignments rather than risk joint duty.

The second point I want to stress this morning has to do with the JCS procedures. Joint staff procedures, often cumbersome and dominated by the services, also inhibit utility of the joint staff activities in the eyes of the Secretary of Defense. Many people have stated the JCS papers for the Secretary rarely cover the full range of possible alternatives, and they certainly often seem laden with compromises. Any Secretary will be quite aware there are other alternatives that exist, and when he does not find them in JCS papers, he turns to his civilian staff to find them and to determine whether they are preferable to the one recommended by the JCS.

In summary, on those two points, on these vital personnel and staff procedures, our group concluded that planning and managing the use of Defense Department resources wisely and well requires a strong, responsive joint process and well prepared officers in all joint duty positions.

Our group submitted a number of recommendations. I am going to only highlight those recommendations. We submitted one set of recommendations on internal changes, changes that can be done internally within the Defense Department, changes that do not require legislative action.

The first internal change was to improve the preparation and experience level of service officers assigned to the joint staff in joint activities. We recommended, for example, among other things, the establishment in each service of a joint duty career specialty open to selected officers in the grade of O–4 and above.

A second recommendation would strengthen the joint staff by improving JCS procedures. We believe we should change the practices and policies that result in overemphasis on the consensus-seeking committee approach to the development and approval of joint papers. Joint papers should be organized to present alternatives. Service staff involvement should be limited to providing information and advice on issues at the request of the joint staff.

The joint staff should be asked to brief, to interact with, and to prepare the service Chiefs for JCS meetings. This normally does not happen. They should also be asked to support the Chiefs generally in their resolution of the joint issues they address.

A third recommendation on internal changes had to do with strengthening the joint staff through an organizational realignment.

Senator NUNN. General, when you said this normally does not happen, would you go back and read the sentence that preceded that? I am not sure what you are saying normally does not happen. I just missed it.

General MCBRIDE. I said the joint staff should be asked to brief the Chiefs, to interact with them, and to prepare them for JCS meetings. This normally does not happen, Senator, in that the service staffs normally prepare the Chiefs to attend the JCS meetings.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

General MCBRIDE. And there is very little previous interaction between the joint staff and each individual Chief.

Senator NUNN. So basically what you are saying, if I could, Mr. Chairman——

Senator WARNER. Yes, of course.

Senator NUNN [continuing]. You are saying in spite of the fact that the Chiefs are charged with jointly looking at the broad picture, and General Vessey's testimony says that is what they do, but you are saying when they are briefed, they are not briefed by the joint staff, they are briefed by their own staffs to prepare for their joint responsibilities. Is that correct?

General MCBRIDE. Yes, sir. Now, you should know what the service staff will brief them on, sir, is the JCS paper itself, the issue, the position of the joint staff, the position of each of the services——

Senator NUNN. But he is being briefed from the service perspective, not from the joint perspective.

General MCBRIDE. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. You are saying your group thinks this is a critical deficiency.

Senator WARNER. I think General Vessey would like to comment, but I think, Senator Nunn, that what you meant, was that they are being briefed by persons on the service staff, and there may be the inference it is from the service perspective. But give them credit. They may have the objectivity to look at it from a joint perspective even though they are part of the respective——

Senator NUNN. I am really not trying to testify. I am trying to get what General McBride's group found, and I understand he found there was a deficiency, and there must be a reason for it. Perhaps we could come back to it.

Senator **Warner**. Having been there as Secretary of the Navy myself, I frequently observed my chief going down the hall, usually at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, with a string of advisers following him giving him last-minute advice. They did not do it from an objective standpoint. They happened to be members of his staff, but that does not rule out objectivity.

General **McBride**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Nunn**. It does not rule it in, either.

General **Vessey**. If it is possible to interrupt this thing, I find myself agreeing with most of what Bill McBride says here, but I must tell you, you need to go back to what he said in the beginning, that this is fixable.

I would like to tell you that he left in 1978, and we worked very hard to try to fix that over the last few years, and the interaction as he implies, the interaction between the joint staff and the Chiefs in their duties as members of the JCS is very important, and that is fixable.

And I can tell you that the joint staff interacted with the JCS as a body and briefed them on the issues routinely. It is very important that that be done, as he implies, and so you ought not to go off thinking you need to change the law. That is fixable by the people that are there, and I want to tell you that I worked very hard to fix that, and it can be done, and has to be done, and should be done. That just makes good common sense. And I hope that Bill Crowe is still doing that.

Senator **Warner**. We will now proceed, gentlemen, with the questions.

Senator **Nunn**. I think General McBride is not done.

Senator **Warner**. I am sorry. I thought you had concluded. Please continue, General.

General **McBride**. If I may, sir, I was in the process of giving you a number of recommendations that we recommended to the Chairman and the service Chiefs where we thought internal changes in the Defense Department, changes not requiring legislation, could be made.

The last recommendation we presented involved the CINC's and the staffs of the joint staff. We thought that there should be regular working meetings between CINC's and the JCS to review the DOD guidance concerning the programming and budgeting process. I think that improvement has been shown in that area.

We did have two recommendations in the legislative area, Mr. Chairman. Our first recommendation was to establish the position of a Vice Chairman in the grade of general or admiral. Most members of our group believe that on balance it is not possible for the service Chiefs to substitute effectively for the Chairman in his absence, no matter how hard they try. The Chairman should have a full-time alter ego to whom the President and the Secretary of Defense have complete confidence in all matters. This includes both policy matters and emergency actions. And the position of our group is very similar to that contained in H.R. 3622.

Regarding our second recommendation, and this has been made since by many other people, and this is our last one, and it is also in the legislative area, we believe that the provision in the United States Code that now restricts the length of and the interval of officer assignment to joint staff as well as the size of the joint staff should be rescinded.

To conclude, sir, let me say that we believe that strengthening the joint system can be accomplished without threatening either the traditions of the military services or the principle of military control.

I would like to emphasize that no initiative to improve the JCS structure will have meaningful impact without a formal program designed to qualify officers for joint duty, to reward them for effective performance, and to dignify their work by giving them a reasonable degree of independence, and soliciting and using their product.

I cannot close without acknowledging, Mr. Chairman, that a number of useful actions have been taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff since we submitted our report, some of them directly responsive to our recommendations. Much of the credit for this improvement must go to the Chairman for the last 4 years, Gen. Jack Vessey.

However, in my personal opinion, they are insufficient by themselves to provide the desired preparation of officers assigned joint duty. For that reason, I believe that the thrust of the recommendations of our group remains valid.

I will be pleased to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General McBride follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM V. MCBRIDE, USAF (RET.)

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure for me having been out of active government service for a few years to appear once again before this distinguished committee.

I have been retired from the United States Air Force since 1978. My last assignment was Vice Chief of Staff—a position in which I served nearly three years. Since that time, among other things, I have been a member of a small group of senior military and civilian officers that have been called upon from time to time to assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in analyzing a number of management and policy issues.

The members of our group were:

General Walter T. Kerwin, USA (Ret.) General Kerwin retired in 1978 after serving four years as Army Chief of Staff. Prior to that, he was Commanding General of the Army Forces Command.

Admiral Frederick H. Michaelis, USN (Ret.) Admiral Michaelis retired in 1978 after serving for 3½ years as Chief of Naval Material. Prior to that, he was Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet.

General William V. McBride, USAF (Ret.) General McBride retired in 1978 after serving for nearly three years as Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. Prior to that he was Commander of Air Force Logistics Command.

General Samuel Jaskilka, USMC (Ret.) General Jaskilka retired in 1978 after having served for three years as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Prior to that he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Headquarters Marine Corps.

Lt. General Charles A. Corcoran, USA (Ret.) General Corcoran retired in 1973, after serving as Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command; Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Command—Vietnam and Commanding General, I Field Force also in Vietnam.

Mr. William K. Brehm, Chairman of the Board, Systems Research and Applications Corporation. Between 1964 and 1977, Mr. Brehm served over ten years in the Defense Department in various positions, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of the Army, and Assistant Secretary of Defense. He served under five secretaries of defense and three presidents in both Democratic and Republican administrations.

In 1981 the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General David C. Jones, asked us as a group to evaluate the overall JCS organization and procedures. He asked us to confer with the service chiefs and other senior military officers to obtain their interpretations and their solutions. He also asked us to review previous studies of the JCS and to develop appropriate recommendations. Our work culminated in an unclassified report on JCS organization and procedures dated April 1982. Our group became commonly known as the Chairman's Special Study Group—and excerpts from our report were frequently used in the comprehensive staff report prepared for you on Defense Organization: The Need For Change. I respectfully recommend that this report be entered into the record of these hearings.

My statement is based on the substance of this report. The individual members of our group were in general agreement with the detailed findings in our report and we urged the chairman and the chiefs at that time to consider the recommended initiatives. Individually we differed somewhat as to how certain objectives might be achieved. These differences did not alter the solid agreement on the need for change in the basic directions of the improvements required.

The JCS organization has been studied many times in the last 40 years. The fact little has been done to correct basic deficiencies does not mean that the deficiencies are inconsequential or that one should not continue to strive for change. Rather, it reflects the fact that change comes slowly in a large diverse military organization such as ours, one very rich with strong service traditions and constituencies.

As we studied the issues, our group solicited the views and advice of the chairman, the individual chiefs, the commanders-in-chief of the major unified commands, and the senior members of the Joint Staff. The views expressed by these distinguished men, and contained in our report, are not the cautious comments of executives complaining about life in the bureaucracy. They reflect hones, deep-seated concerns about the viability of the most important joint military organization in the free world.

Our report addresses perhaps the most fundamental but least recognized deficiencies in the JCS organization and that is the manner in which officers are trained, educated, and assigned to joint positions and the procedures that govern Joint Staff activities. Our group believes it is easy to overlook personnel management and staff procedures as possible issues because they are low profile topics and appear to be routine institutional practices to many. In fact, they are profoundly important in determining the effectiveness of the JCS organization and its ability to provide useful advice. For this reason, I want to empahsize today two major points made in our report on this subject.

The first point—officer preparation and assignment for joint duty. At the time of our report there were about 4,600 officer positions in U.S. joint headquaters. While that only accounts for 3 percent of our officers, it accounts for 13 percent of our generals and admirals, 6 percent of our colonels and Navy captains, and 6 percent of our lieutenant colonels and commanders. The officers in those positions have major and complex responsibilities, frequently quite different from the task they have been trained for in their past service. There is now no systemic, effective plan for assuring that officers assigned to joint duty have the requisite staff experience, the technical knowledge of joint system. It would be unthinkable to man service positions demanding the practical knowledge of commanding a submarine or an aircraft or an infantry battalion the way we staff joint headquarters. This combination of lack of Washington staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of joint activities, and lack of formal preparation through the joint school system, coupled with very short tours without repetition, makes it very difficult for Joint Staff officers no matter how capable—and they are very capable—to deal effectively with their responsibilities. Thus, the chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body are handicapped.

Actually, joint assignments are seldom sought by officers. There are few rewards and there are significant hazards. A joint position removes them from the environment for which they have been trained, and environment in which they have established relations and reputations and one in which they seek advancement. Joint duty places them in wholly new environments involving unfamiliar procedures for which most have little or no formal training.

Now, adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work done in joint duty is unproductive. Too much effort is wasted on tedious interservice negotiation of issues until they have been debased and reduced to what Mr. Steadman in his 1978 report said was, "The lowest common level of assent."

Thus, the general perception among officers is that a joint assignment is one to be avoided. In contrast, most service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishment and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers want service assignments rather than risk joint duty.

A second point has to do with JCS procedures. The Joint Staff procedures, often cumbersome and dominated by the services, also inhibit the utility of Joint Staff activities in the eyes of the Secretary of Defense. Formal JCS papers for the Secretary rarely cover the full range of possible alternatives and they often seem laden with compromises. Rarely do the JCS submit split recommendations, yet there are very few issues with only one possible resolution. Any Secretary will be quite aware there are other alternatives that exist and when he does not find them in JCS papers, he turns to his civilian staff to find them and to determine whether they are preferable to the one recommended by the JCS.

In summary, on those two points, on these vital personnel and staff procedures, our group concluded that planning and managing the use of the Defense Department resources wisely and well requires a strong, responsive joint process and well prepared officers in all joint duty positions. Today there is neither. Now, for our recommendations.

Our group submitted the following recommendations to the chairman and to the service chiefs. We submitted one set of recommendations on internal changes. The first internal change was to improve the preparation and experience level of service officers assigned to the Joint Staff and joint activities. We recommended establishment in each service a joint duty career specialty open to selected officers in the grade of 0-4 and above. Such officers should be nominated by the service chief and approved by the chairman, both for selection in the specialty and assignment to joint duty positions. The officers should be educated at joint schools and should serve primarily in joint duty positions, but should also return periodically to their parent service to maintain currency. Service promotion boards selecting officers for level 0-5 and above should have proper representation from the Joint Staff or the major joint headquarters.

A second recommendation would strengthen the Joint Staff by improving JCS procedures. We believe we should change the practices and policies that now result in overemphasis on the consensus seeking committee approach to development and approval of joint papers. Joint papers should be organized to present alternatives and service staff involvement should be limited to providing information and advice on issues at the request of the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff should be asked to brief, to interact with and prepare the service chiefs for JCS meetings. This normally does not happen. They should also be asked to support the chiefs generally in their resolution of the joint issues they address.

Our third recommendation on internal changes had to do with strengthening the Joint Staff through an organizational realinement. Realinement should improve the workload distribution among the principal directorates and assures that all major functional areas receive proper coverage and integration.

Our fourth recommendation was to selectively reduce the burden of the service chiefs involvement in joint activity by eliminating service chief corporate consideration of issues they need not address because of their routine nature or relatively unimportant features and issues they cannot address effectively because they involve intense conflict of interest. The chairman should be given the authority to resolve routine issues and be empowered to resolve issues on which there is majority agreement within the JCS.

Our fifth and last recommendation on internal matters had to do with involving the CINCs and their staff in Joint Staff activity. We believe there should be regular working meetings between the CINCs and the JCS to review the DOD guidance regarding the programming and budgeting process and review direction of the CINCs by the OSD.

We had two recommendations in the legislative area. Our first recommendation was to establish the position of a vice chairman in the grade of general or admiral. Most members of our group believed that on balance it is not possible for the service Chiefs to substitute effectively for the chairman in his absence no matter how hard they try. The chairman should have a full-time alter ego in whom the President and the Secretary of Defense have complete confidence on all matters. This includes both policy matters and emergency actions.

Regarding the second recommendation, and this is our last one and it is also in the legislative area, we believe the provision of the United States Code that now restricts the length of and interval of officer assignment to the Joint Staff, as well as the size of the Joint Staff, should be rescinded.

To conclude, we believe that strengthening the joint system to enable it to make the contributions it has the potential to make can be accomplished without threatening either the traditions of military services or the principle of civilian control.

We would also like to emphasize that no initiative to improve the JCS structure, will have meaningful impact without a formal program designed to qualify officers for joint duty, to reward them for effective performance, and to dignify their work by giving them a reasonable degree of independence and soliciting and using their product.

I cannot close without acknowledging that a number of useful actions have been taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff since we submitted our report three years ago to improve potentially the preparation and experience levels of officers assigned to joint duty. However, in my personal opinion, they are insufficient by themselves to provide the desired quality of officers assigned to joint duty. For that reason, I believe the thrust of the recommendations of our group remains valid.

This statement represents the composite views of our study group—but my response to your questions will be my own personal opinion. None of my comments should be taken as the position of the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, which I serve as President.

I will be pleased to respond to your questions.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, General McBride.

Gentleman, we will now proceed with questions. The first question I have is directed to General Vessey and Admiral Long, since both of you were on active duty at the time of three of our military operations in various capacities.

We are now addressing the whole subject of reorganization. You have come forward with your suggestions as to the changes that should be made, and implicity therein, in your testimony and the testimony of other witnesses, is the fact that these changes are required because the present system is deficient.

Our distinguished chairman several times has used the term, it is broken, and so forth. We will not go into that. The implication is that the present system and the system that has been in effect for a number of years has been deficient. My question to you, as we look at three military operations in the past, is did these deficiences contribute to the problems that we encountered. The three military operations being: First, the raid into Teheran to rescue the hostages; second the sending of our Marines into Lebanon, and particularly the losses at Beirut; and third, Grenada, which although viewed as a success, and I agree with that in many ways, had its problems, particularly in the area of communications.

The question is, in retrospect, had we brought about certain changes that we are now considering, would the problems that we incurred in those military operations have been in some part alleviated?

General Vessey, would you like to lead off?

General VESSEY. Well, it is a little hard to translate somewhat if's into a given situation, because we cannot duplicate any particular situation or set of advice. Concerning the raid into Teheran, that was a very high risk operation, and there was no way to figure out how to conduct a raid into Teheran without going to war with the Iranians, without running a high risk operation. When you run a high risk operation, you have to recognize that it is the risk of failure that is high, so when it fails, the odds did not work out in your favor.

The report that was done on that is very clear on what could have been done to make things work better, and I think we have corrected most of those.

Beirut, I guess the basic question is, should you have been there, and that was a political decision made with all the advice and judgment. I understand why the decision was made. Now, Admiral Long did a report for the Secretary which shows what might have been fixed if—what might have reduced the probability of something like that happening given the decision to go in there.

I do not see that any of these changes would make any differnce there.

Grenada, I get a little sort of bubble down in my solar plexus when people talk about how screwed up and what a great failure that was.

I say on the Grenada thing when people talk about that being a failure or being an example of why we need to reorganize——

Senator WARNER. I did not say that. The question——

General VESSEY. I know, but some have said it, Senator, and what I want to say here is, what you really need to understand is, it is probably an exhibition of the strengths in our system. That is, what you need to recognize as we go through this is, we are never going to build in peacetime the Armed Forces that are going to make the people who study assiduously the threats that face us, we are never going to make them comfortable. We are going to try to stuff 10 rounds of defense into a 5-pound or a 3-pound budget bag, no matter what we do. What makes us strong is flexibility and the ability to put our forces together and do things quickly when we meet that tomorrow that comes over the horizon that does not look like the tomorrow for which we planned.

Grenada was one of those. I would submit to you that the Grenada operation demonstrates the strength of the present system, that is, the ability of the JCS to put forces together and go off and do something unusual. Now, some of the radios did not communicate with each other. Now, that is always going to be the case unless you go out and buy a new set of radios.

Most of those radios were bought 25 years before the Grenada operation, and certainly we understand that interoperability is important, and each time you conduct a new type of operation, you learn some lessons, and we learned a few lessons in Grenada, but the JCS had foreseen the need to have tactical communications that worked together and set up an outfit called the Joint Tactical C Cube Agency, to make sure that in the years ahead when we buy radios that we go ahead and have the necessary parameters given to the services who develop those radios.

But I do not think what you are proposing here, any of the solutions will make Grenada any better. It went off well.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Admiral Long, do you have any comments on that question?

Admiral LONG. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, on Iran, I agree with General Vessey; it was a high risk, but from my perspective, looking over the wall there between the Pacific Command and the other command next to it, it seemed to me that this was an example of an operation being very closely controlled and planned by a small group, and where there was inadequate expertise being brought to bear.

As you know, Admiral Holloway did a rather extensive report on that. The issues that I see before the committee insofar as the role of the CINC's, I would have been much more comfortable if there had been significant planning done at the theater operational commander level.

General VESSEY. I want to say that I agree with that, too. I agree with that.

Senator WARNER. Excuse me?

General VESSEY. I want to say that I agree with that issue, the point that he raised. It is tightly controlled, and the CINC's were not involved in it.

Senator WARNER. They should have been involved to a greater degree in the planning and the execution of the rescue mission into Teheran?

General VESSEY. It was tightly controlled for security reasons, and it raises the risk on security if you involve more people, but also you are likely to get better support, so it is touch and go.

Admiral LONG. In my opinion, your comment is correct. It should have been—the theater commander should have been much more involved.

The conditions under which the Marine forces went into Lebanon changed dramatically over the course of the year, and my observation was that very little was done in order to change the military disposition. There were also some errors of omission and commission that I believe were committed by the chain of command.

And I think insofar as that particular point, I would hope that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense should be taking steps to ensure that the chain of command is tailored for future contingency operations. In peacetime, having many layers in the chain of command many times does not serve the military mission well.

As far as Grenada, I am not intimately aware of that, only what I read in the press, but I would say overall it was a success for the United States. There clearly were demonstrated problems in interoperability, and unfortunately, some of those problems in interoperability of forces exist today. And that is something that in my opinion should be corrected.

I agree that future operations, probably relatively small operations, the chances are very good, to echo President Eisenhower's comments, that is, it will be a combination of services and not normally just one service.

Senator WARNER. As we look at the need to strengthen the role to the CINC's, if in fact that is the judgment of this committee, should we give them the authority to select their component commanders, and indeed the members of their staff? Why don't you not lead off, General Vessey, and we will proceed in the order that the witnesses provided testimony?

General VESSEY. First, I would say that the role of the CINC's should be strengthened, and we worked very hard to do that. As I just reminded Admiral Long, in my first meeting with the CINC's in June 1982, that was one of the major topics, how to strengthen the role of the CINC's. That should be done, and I think every witness has said that here, and there are some good ways to do that.

Should he select his component commanders? I do not think he necessarily ought to select them, but he ought to have a veto on them. That for all practical purposes exists today, and I do not think you need to make that into law. The CINC's by and large have a say in who their commanders are.

Senator **Warner**. What about their staffs?

General **Vessey**. The CINC, sure, he ought to have a veto on the staff people as well.

Senator **Warner**. General Goodpaster.

General **Goodpaster**. I agree with that. And I think that the normal process of consultation that has existed and exists today between your combatant commander and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the service in the case of the assignment of senior officers is the way to proceed.

I think that process will be strengthened if some of the proposals regarding the authorities for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are pursued. Where that consultation occurs on a kind of voluntary basis or with some variation today, I think that consultation will have a stronger basis and will be strengthened.

And the same applies to staffs. I think that in effect a veto for the assignment of staff officers, particularly those in key positions of the staff, is the right road to pursue.

Admiral **Long**. Mr. Chairman, I agree with General Vessey. Certainly the theater CINC should have a veto vote over his components, and we need to recognize that most of those component commanders are in fact operational commanders as well as, as they say in the Navy, administrative commanders.

He should have a very large say on the staff. I do want to caution the committee that in our zeal and eagerness to increase the input or the strength of the theater commanders, that we not go so far as to make them another programming and budgeting staff.

Their primary function is still as an operational commander and the ability to wage war, and so therefore we must be careful we do not get that theater commander so intimately involved in the budget process that he spends all of his time, as many staffs do in the Pentagon, worrying about the budget.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you.

General McBride.

General **McBride**. Sir, I believe that for the selection of the component commanders, the service Chiefs are certainly the ones that should be recommending who should be in that position. The selection should be coordinated, I believe, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and also the CINC, and they should have veto on any particular nomination. The CINC certainly should be comfortable with the selection, but I believe the recommendation should come from the service commander and it should be who is the best qualified person for that job.

On the CINC staff, on the staffs of the unified commanders, I believe that the senior officer, the Commander in Chief certainly should have veto authority over them, and he may want to get involved in the selection process, determining on the importance of the position.

For the junior members of the staff, I think it could be handled by establishing very precise criteria on training, education, and prior service required before coming into that task. I do not believe the CINC needs to be directly involved.

Senator THURMOND [presiding]. I just have a couple of questions here. I am handling on the floor the nomination to be Assistant Secretary of the Army, and I need to get back there, but I am reading this testimony of you gentlemen, and we do appreciate you being here. Now, I just had two questions.

Some people feel that Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have increasingly relied on their civilian staffs for advice that possibly they should be getting from professional military sources. Is there merit in this, and if so, is this a trend, and would the House bill on the JCS reform and the staff study's recommendations enhance or lessen the influence of professional military advice?

Let us start with General Vessey.

General VESSEY. Did you want me to go first, Mr. Chairman?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

General VESSEY. The question of whether or not Secretaries use somebody other than the military staff for military advice. Your report, the staff report, points out that Secretaries may have done this, and that maybe the advice was not good, the military advice was not good. Maybe they did not like it, so they went elsewhere for their advice.

Certainly the President and the Secretary of Defense could get military advice any place they want to get it, and there is nothing that you can do to preclude that, I guess, but if they are to get military advice from the people that the law say are the principal military advisers, there has to be a good relationship between them and those military advisers. That has to be worked on both by the Secretary and by the Joint Chiefs or whoever you designate as the principal military advisers.

So, the House bill, it will not change it, I do not believe. I think what is key to this is setting up that right relationship, and that is the duty of the President, the Secretary, and his senior military advisors. The law as it now says it that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the military staff for the Secretary, and he is to have no other military staff.

Now, the thing that has always annoyed me through the years is that there are more military officers on the Secretary's civilian staff than there are on his military staff, and I think that that is a role clarification that needs to be addressed, but that is the Secretary's job to address that.

Senator THURMOND. If you other gentlemen agree with General Vessey, it will not be necessary to answer. If you do not agree, I would be very pleased to have your comments.

Admiral LONG. Mr. Chairman, I agree with General Vessey.

General GOODPASTER. I would like to add just one comment, that this has varied over time. A few years back there did seem to be a tendency to push the higher echelon, the civilian echelon into operational matters, for example. I think there had been a certain number——

Senator THURMOND. Such as during the Vietnam war?

General GOODPASTER. That comes to my mind. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There have been a certain number of burned fingers as a result of that, and burns elsewhere, I might say, and there is not so much of that tendency now, it does seem to me. But there is a second area, and that is in resource allocation, and there I think that at one time we saw something of the same thing—a desire to dominate that process. But gradually I think there has arisen a recognition that more and stronger military advice is needed in that area.

Now, this is an area where Jack Vessey has taken some initiative. It is very useful initiative, but I think there is a great deal more that is needed in strengthening the joint role in giving that kind of military advice on resource allocation.

General McBRIDE. Mr. Chairman, I agree with what General Vessey said, and I would like to add just a couple of comments concerning the advice of the Joint Chiefs. In my experience, and this has been a few years ago, the best advice that the Secretary of Defense ever had was when he was eyeballing directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one on one, or one on the group, straight, good, useful, timely, and I thought it was always outstanding.

What happens, though, on most issues, issues that must be staffed become embroiled in the procedures we have, the results tend to be watered down, and the alternatives get to be very few, and the resulting advice is frequently unuseful and untimely.

In addition one of my greatest concerns is that area of advice that does not come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issues where the advice of the JCS is not requested where the Chiefs possibly should be speaking, and these are on the tough issue, and these are almost too tough at times for the Chiefs, and I am talking about advice on resource allocation, unified command plan, and roles and missions. These are very difficult issues and the JCS tend to be silent rather than taking the initiative in these areas.

I want to assure you, sir, that I think the Secretary of Defense when he is dealing one on one with the Chiefs, each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff give outstanding advice.

Senator NUNN. General McBride—would the Senator yield? Are you saying this is what General Jones has termed a too hard box, and that too hard boxes are just not dealt with?

General McBRIDE. I do not know of what General Jones spoke, but I did hear the testimony Secretary Schlesinger gave you, and I was impressed by what he said, which is very similar to my own experience, where I think he valued very highly the advice that he got directly, one on one, from the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator NUNN. But you named four or five issues you said are not addressed by the Joint Chiefs, roles and missions, resource allocation——

General McBRIDE. It is very difficult for the Chiefs to take the initiative to give advice on those subjects, sir.

Senator NUNN. Do you think that is still the case?

General McBRIDE. I believe it is. I think General Vessey might give you more timely advice on that than I can, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I just have one other short question. Then I will have to leave. Secretary Weinberger indicated in his testimony that possibly he has made the changes necessary to correct the problems that may have existed in the past in the area of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am wondering if you have an opinion or do you have knowledge of whether changes have been made that you feel are sufficient to correct the problems in the department's organization.

In particular, have the organizations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commanders been strengthened to the point no further change is necessary?

General VESSEY. No, there is still plenty of room for improvement in this, as I have said, and we said to you in testimony a year ago that we marched down that road trying to move in the direction that President Eisenhower laid out. Bob Long and I were just going over what we laid out as a menu for the Chiefs and the CINC's in June 1982. It is germane to Senator Nunn's last question on the too hard box.

The issues were war plans, military strategy, and making the military strategy follow the political guidance, how to work with our alliances, how to improve the influence of the CINC's, particularly in the budget preparation process, how to get the best advice to the President on arms control, how to go into and examine the JCS organization and improve it, how to strengthen the Unified Command plan, how to improve joint doctrine, how to allocate joint manpower, and how to give the Secretary of Defense the best advice on budgetary matters.

So are those too hard? Those are the right questions to address. And certainly if the principal military advisers are not addressing those questions, they are not addressing the right questions. Whether you like the answers they came up with, of course, you may not like them, but as a matter of fact, those are the sorts of things we addressed, and those are the sorts of things the JCS have to address.

Senator THURMOND. Is there any disagreement with what General Vessey said? If so, express yourselves.

General McBRIDE. In my opinion, Mr. Chairman, I think significant improvement has occurred over the last 3 to 4 years, and again I will give the credit to the past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many of those changes were based on his initiative, but in my personal opinion there are many, many changes that yet can be made to strengthen the procedures of the JCS. I believe he has moved it in the right direction, but I think we have a long way to go.

General GOODPASTER. I would like to endorse the statement that General McBride has just made. I think there are two sides to this. Some improvements have been made. The other side is that there is still quite a long way that we can go in strengthening the joint side of the system both in Washington and at the combatant command level.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Long, do you have a comment?

Admiral LONG. No, Mr. Chairman. I have expressed earlier that I think there are still significant improvements that can be made in the joint staff operation.

General VESSEY. I want to just say again I agree with that.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

I am going to have to go to the floor now to handle this nomination. I am going to ask Senator Quayle if he will take the chair, and Senator Nunn, I believe you are next.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Vessey, just a couple of comments, then I will be glad for you to respond. The question of the Army and Navy not being able to communicate properly in an operation the size of Grenada is not something to be addressed over an evolutionary procurement cycle. It should not be the case that it has been happening for 25 years, and it will be worked out over a long period of time.

We are spending $300 billion a year; I would think the American people and the taxpayers would expect our Army and Navy to be able to communicate today, tomorrow, and yesterday.

General VESSEY. They can. You need to understand that. The fact that certain radios did not communicate with each other is one point. Whether or not the Army and Navy can communicate with each other is another point, and they can. There are all sorts of operational workarounds to the fact that one piece of equipment cannot do this or that, and that in fact existed during the Grenada operations. So the Army and the Navy can communicate. Sure, if you buy new radios, and you have it so that you can tune these particular radios to communicate, that will make it better. But the Army and Navy can communicate. You need to understand that.

Senator NUNN. I would think that this Congress would approve the funds in spite of the pressure on the defense budget now, if the Department of Defense says that there are radios that need to be bought that are not now in existence so that our Army and Navy can communicate. It was not just a radio or two in Grenada, it was not just one thing, it was the communication and command control crucial to the operation.

No one has said it was a failure. We have all said it was a success. But I hope we do not reach a point that we have to have failures to learn. I hope we can succeed and still improve.

General VESSEY. I hope you recognize that it was a success, and they did communicate and that they did get the job done.

Senator NUNN. Everything I said about the communications came from the Department of Defense's and the military's own internal analysis, which at this point is still classified, unfortunately; but it was not a group of people in Congress saying there were communications problems. This was based on your own internal analysis.

General VESSEY. That is right. You need to understand that every time we conduct an operation, we have an after-operation "lessons learned" exercise, and that starts down at the bottom level, and everybody tells exactly what they would like to have to make it better. Many times it becomes a shopping list sort of thing, and it has to be balanced between what you can do and what each particular echelon would like. That was an amalgamation of every single thing that everybody said they would like to have to make it better.

Now, even the $300 billion, even a $600 billion defense budget will not provide enough money to provide every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine what he would like to have to do his job, and we need to understand that. There have to be some balances struck. So you do that with a combination of equipment and operational concepts and training, Senator. And that is our business, to work that out.

Senator NUNN. That is exactly right.

General VESSEY. And when we find that we did not do it quite right for this particular operation because it was an operation we did not anticipate, then we have to get into it and fix it.

Senator NUNN. The man who headed the operation was here last week—a week and a half ago—and he acknowledged that there were very serious communications problems. So it is not a question of people sitting up here and dreaming this up under a tree, a congressional palm tree out in the yard.

General VESSEY. I acknowledge that, but the fact of the matter is, the operational workarounds and the communications worked. They got it done.

Senator NUNN. Let me ask you this. You mentioned that the Grenada operation was not planned for.

Now, it seems to me one of our big challenges in terms of getting more joint thinking is to have contingency plans for likely contingencies, and when you say that Grenada was not planned for, it seems to me that in itself is an indictment of our current system when the President of the United States has appeared on national television and defined an airfield being built on this small island as a threat to our national security and a threat to the sealanes in the Caribbean.

This was many months before anything happened, and it seems to me if that is not an adequate signal for a contingency plan to be drawn up, and to have the best intelligence, and to have some joint thinking on it, then something indeed is wrong with our system.

General VESSEY. Senator, I will tell you that the threat to our national security from somebody else using that airfield, that sort of thing is planned for, but the idea of having to go in there on short notice without inflicting casualties, keeping the casualties down low, and bringing out those students was a completely different problem.

You know, we could have wasted away Grenada without losing an American life, but that would not have served American policy. What we wanted to do is go in there and get our people out with the least number of casualties to the Cubans, to the Grenadans, and to our own people, but particularly to those other people. A different type of operation.

Senator NUNN. Well, it seems to me that contingency could have possibly been visualized, too, with adequate contingent planning. I do not want to get into——

General VESSEY. Well, it might have been, but there are a lot of things that are a lot higher priority for contingency planning, and you cannot, as these people will tell you, you cannot make a contingency plan for every possible thing that might happen in the world. You have to be able to adapt to what does come over the horizon, and that flexibility is the great strength that is needed in our Armed Forces. As you deal with the issues here, you need to maintain that flexibility to be able to deal with a tomorrow that you had not planned for.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Long, in the reports you prepared for the Chief of Naval Operations, and I did read the report, and I did find it very helpful, you state here that "The acting Chairman concept has been severely abused in the past." But you go on to say, you think the Chiefs have now disciplined themselves and solved this problem.

Could you give us an example of the acting Chairman concept being severely abused?

Admiral **Long**. Senator Nunn, let me give you an example. When I was the Vice Chief of the Navy back in 1977 or so, the procedure to rotate the acting Chairmanship was such that on a couple of occasions I, as the Vice Chief of the service, became acting Chairman.

To me that was rotating it much too quickly, and clearly we did not have the benefit at that time of some continuity as to the things that the Chairman should undertake. There have been some specific recommendations to establish a Vice Chairman. My problem with establishing a Vice Chairman who is senior to all of the other Chiefs is that he does not speak with the same authority.

I do not know really what this person would do. And so until I would know better what a Vice Chairman would do, I would tend not to support that. I do support the direction that the Chiefs have gone in the past several years, and that is to ensure that someone is designated as the acting Chairman when the Chairman leaves town, and to ensure that he is maintained current in what is going on.

General **Vessey**. Could I add a little bit to that, Senator Nunn?

Senator **Nunn**. I do not think I have had 10 minutes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Quayle**. I think we are probably operating on a 5-minute rule, because we are going to have to vote at 11 a.m.

Senator **Nunn**. Well, we were operating on a 10-minute rule until it got to me, because I suggested it to Senator Warner.

Senator **Quayle**. I got in here when they were operating under a 5-minute rule.

Senator **Nunn**. No, that is not what we have been doing. We have all had 10 minutes. But I will just ask one more question, if I could, if that is permissible.

Senator **Quayle**. The only thing is, we have three other people who have not asked questions, and we have only 10 minutes before the committee is going to be adjourned.

Senator **Nunn**. Are we not coming back?

Senator **Quayle**. I do not think we are, are we?

Senator **Gramm**. We have a meeting over there, and that is 205. We have three other people here that have not asked any questions yet.

Senator **Nunn**. Well, that is fine. I will waive. But I do not think we have even scratched the surface with these witnesses. I thought we were going to come back. We have four of the most knowledgeable people we are likely to have before us.

Admiral **Long**. I would like you to know, Senator Nunn, I am prepared to stay all day.

Senator **Quayle**. Maybe we can invite them back, but I am told by staff that Senator Thurmond was planning on having a meeting over there and not coming back. So we have a vote scheduled at 11 a.m.

Senator **Gramm**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Nunn**. I will waive. I suggest we come back, and maybe we can check with Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Quayle**. You might want to check that out and see if we can in fact come back, but let us try to get this in before 11 a.m. Senator Gramm.

Senator **Gramm**. Mr. Chairman, I will try to be brief. I had four questions I wanted to ask that related to the JCS and the CINC's. I think we have answered the first one. I think everybody is basically in agreement that we need to strengthen the CINC's. In looking at the JCS and the CINC's, the members of the JCS obviously as service Chiefs are representing their service.

I do not see anything wrong with that. I see great strength in that, which is why I have never bought the idea that we ought to separate the people advising the President and the people who are doing the job. The problem is that you get coordinated advice, but they do not know what the hell they are talking about.

Now you put people in a situation where they have a big job to do, but at least they have got the information to do it. But in looking at that process, it seemed to me that there might be some advantage in having the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chain of command as it related to the CINC's with the idea that the members of the JCS that were service Chiefs would at least have the knowledge and the inclination to be especially aware of the concerns of their services, and that it might be helpful to have the Chairman in the chain of command with the CINC's so that the Chairman would be representing the Unified Commands on the Joint Chiefs.

I would like to get each one of you to say very briefly whether you think that idea has any merit.

General **Vessey**. Yes, it does have some merit. As you know, the administration submitted a bill suggesting that in 1983, I guess it was. But that bill carefully defined the way the Chairman would be—the proposed bill carefully defined the way the Chairman would be in the chain of command, because as Admiral Long pointed out, we need to understand very clearly that it is the President and the Secretary of Defense, his agent, who are the commanders in chief.

You do not want a military commander in chief. You want a civilian commander in chief because, as Admiral Long pointed out, it is the integration of the political direction and our diplomatic policies and so forth, all those have to come into play when the CINC performs his duties out there. The way we envisioned the Chairman being in the chain of command was as the agent of the Secretary of Defense in carrying those out.

The JCS as a body give advice to the Secretary of Defense. Then once the decision is made you do not need the body of the JCS to carry that out. It ought to be clear. So there is some usefulness in having the Chairman in the chain of command, but there are some cautions that need to be understood. You do not want a minicommander in chief in uniform who looks like the President except he wears a uniform. You want it very clear that there is civilian control.

Admiral **Long**. I basically agree with General Vessey. The thing I think I would urge the committee to protect, that is the unfettered access of the Secretary of Defense to his combatant commanders and vice versa. I have supported strengthening the Chairman in that role, but I would urge that we do not put the Chairman or even the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command.

Presently the chain of command goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the channel of the JCS to the CINC's. I would urge that we leave it alone because, as I have said earlier, Senator, I as a CINC did not need pure military advice from Washington. I needed a combination of military advice and political advice, because every significant action in peacetime and wartime really involves that political decision.

So, for me to have another layer in the chain of command is just an unnecessary burden. Keep the best military advice going to the Secretary of Defense and the President, but I would urge that you not go ahead and actually insert formally in that chain of command either the Chiefs or the Chairman.

General **Goodpaster**. I would support giving the Chairman the authority to supervise the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. I do not think that giving him command authority is required. I think that introduces some factors that are probably better avoided. But establishing him as the central point of supervision in his role as military staff to the Secretary of Defense—the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the President exercising the role of Commander in Chief—I think would be a sound and constructive move.

Senator **Gramm**. General McBride.

General **McBride**. I believe the chairman should be in the chain of command, I believe, in the same way that General Vessey recommended, acting as the agent for the Secretary of Defense where civilian control remains very clear. I believe among other things that need to be done to strengthen the Chairman, one of them is that he needs to be in the chain of command.

Senator **Gramm**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Quayle**. I am going to take my 2 minutes, and then I will yield to Senator Exon.

I would like for each one of you to comment specifically on the House passed bill. I apologize. Maybe you have already done that. If you have, then I will not ask the question, but if you have not, I would like the specific changes you think we ought to make.

Second, do you think that the Senate should go beyond the basic scope of what the House has passed in legislation. In other words, as we look to legislative reform or legislative proposals in this area, should we be thinking about going on beyond the basic scope of what the House has done?

So, my question is two-pronged. One, specific suggestions, recommendations, concurrences with the House. And second, should the Senate in its legislative responsibilities go beyond that? Who wants to go first? General Vessey.

Admiral Long looks like he is ready, but go ahead, General Vessey.

General **Vessey**. As far as the House bill is concerned, my own view is that a Deputy Chairman is not needed. I could see making the director of the joint staff a four-star officer with some deputy authority, but I would not put a deputy between the Chairman and the Chiefs. Modern day communications permit the Chairman to be the Chairman wherever he is.

I was never out of secure communications with the JCS and the Secretary or the President. They expected me to be in communication wherever I was. You need somebody to chair the meetings while you are gone or run over to the White House or something like that. You do not need a Vice Chairman.

Now, it is hard, but the problem is, roles are ill-defined. The rest of the bill—my view is that some of these things are not necessary. I do not want to take up all your time with this, but I submitted a letter to Mr. Nichols telling him that these are not necessarily harmful, and in some cases may actually strengthen the organization, but I did not think they were necessary.

Strengthening the Chairman, strengthening the CINC's is a good idea.

Senator QUAYLE. What about the Senate on its legislation addressing this issue and possibly other issues? Are there other areas that we ought to get into from a legislative point of view that will be helpful?

General VESSEY. I think the most helpful thing that legislation could do is get the Department of Defense and the Congress on the same floor in examining the defense budget. That is, let us move toward a biennial budget, and let us cut out this nonsense of the services and the OSD preparing a program that is mission-oriented and then translating it into a line-item budget that comes up here to the Congress.

I think that is one of the greatest wastes of time and effort and confuses the operation almost more than anything else as far as the JCS themselves are concerned. You have got some options here for strengthening the Chairman. I think Andy Goodpaster came up with perhaps one of the best things, and clearly it does not need to be done in law, but to give the Chairman the authority to set the procedures for the joint staff.

The Secretary can do that, and fix many of the things we talked about here this morning that do not work as well as they ought to.

Senator QUAYLE. Admiral Long?

Admiral LONG. Mr. Chairman, I went over the Nichols bill, and I listed some 14 proposals that they had in the Nichols bill. Let me just address those very quickly, the ones that I would not support. They want to make the chairman the military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense. I have commented as to why I think that is wrong for the United States to do that.

They want to assign to the Chairman statutory responsibility now assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I think that that is wrong, to emasculate the role of the Chiefs as advisors. I do not believe there is a need to create a Deputy Chairman, and I have addressed that before.

I would certainly support the Chairman acting as a supporter and coordinator of the CINCs, but I say again it must be made very clear that there is an unfettered line between the Secretary and his combatant commanders. The CINCs must have direct access to the Secretary, I believe.

I think also the question of the Joint Staff being responsible to the Chairman. A strong Chairman such as General Vessey, I think, is fine, but I think we should not formally tranfer that responsibility.

There were many things that were done under the 1985 defense authorization bill that address some of these. Specifically what I would urge that the Senate do is, there are very few things that require legislative change in my opinion, but there are problems that we all recognize that exist. Some of those problems I have already gone over; increasing the role of the CINCs, improving our handling of national military strategy and contingency plans; improving the operation of the Joint Staff, improving the quality of the officers assigned to joint staffs, not just the joint staff in Washington, but the joint staffs out here at the theater level, making sure that we are doing something about the split in responsibilities between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And, of course, one of the things that I would agree fully with General Vessey, and that is one of the most important things that the Congress can do, and that is to go to a biennial budget so that we are not continually, you know, wrapped up in a budget process.

Senator **Quayle**. General McBride, then General Goodpaster.

General **McBride**. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the substance of H.R. 3622. I agree with these things, the Chairman being the principal military advisor, increasing the Chairman's term from 2 to 4 years, creation of a Deputy or Vice Chairman, military chain of command through the Chairman of the JCS with the qualifications that the Chairman be the agent of the Secretary of Defense, joint staff reporting to the Chairman, to remove the 400-man limitation on the Joint Staff, giving the Secretary of Defense authority to extend the tenure of officers serving on the joint staff, and for the Chairman to evaluate all nominations for three and four-star positions related to joint duty.

One area that I may disagree with has to do with the Chairman attending NSC meetings, and I believe that possibly should be on a permissive basis. I think there may be times when—certainly he should be there for most of the meetings, but I think that—I am not sure that is an appropriate recommendation for the Chairman to be present at all meetings.

I would add one recommendation to that, sir. And I personally favor making the Chairman a five-star position. Not only do we want to give him additional authority, but I think it would be of great symbolic value to favorably consider the Chairman as a five-star position, sir.

Senator **Quayle**. General Goodpaster.

General **Goodpaster**. I also support the substance of H.R. 3622, and I identified several principal changes. I would support establishing the Chairman as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense and the NSC.

I would support the creation of a Deputy Chairman or a Vice Chairman. I would support the provision that the military chain of command will go through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that he supervise the combatant commanders. I would put a qualification on that, he perform that function as military staff to the Secretary of Defense.

I think the joint staff should be made responsible to the Chairman, and I support the proposal that the Chairman submit program and budget proposals, and that the commanders of Unified and Specified Commands submit such proposals to the Chairman.

I, too, have a question about authorizing the Chairman or Deputy Chairman to attend and participate in NSC meetings. It seems to me that the real substance of that question is met by establishing him as the principal adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

The provision is somewhat intrusive, it seems to me, in terms of how the President conducts his decision process. I, too, would very much support the idea of an improvement in the budgeting procedure. A biennial budget, I think, would be a tremendous valuable step, and I support what General Vessey said about finding some way to improve on the relationship between the program budgeting in terms of mission areas and the line item budgeting, which is a confusion at the present time.

I think that moving in these directions will clarify responsibilities. It will end the diffusion and sometimes confusion of responsibilities that exist at the present time.

Senator QUAYLE. I certainly concur. I think that is something we should work on.

Senator Exon.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, may I just have one second here? I agree with the expression about the biennial budget, and that is now law as far as the authorizations are concerned. What we are going to do on appropriations is another thing, but the biennial authorization is law.

We will have a plan submitted in the spring, as General Vessey knows, by the Secretary, and then the next year we will start the biennial as far as authorizations, but I think the point is very well made about missions having to be transposed into line items. It is an exercise that not only is useless, it is worse than useless because it makes us focus on the wrong things over here, and the wrong testimony. So, I agree with that.

Senator QUAYLE. Senator Exon.

General VESSEY. If I could just add one other point, which brings back something that is in the committee report, that that will give both the Secretary of Defense and the Congress more time to look at what has been produced rather than waste all the time in looking at the future, what we are trying to get, and we can have a thorough examination of what we have produced with the defense budget, which will be most useful in moving on in the years ahead.

Senator QUAYLE. Senator Exon, would you like to ask a question?

Senator EXON. I would, and I will try to be very brief to give my friend, Senator Levin, a chance.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming here. This has been an extremely interesting set of hearings we have held. We have had all the active and living past top military people here. We are going to have some more. I wish we had more time with you.

Let me see if I can summarize what I believe to be your view. It has been my interpretation that by and large when the military people come before this group, they have said there are some changes necessary, that some changes are being made, but that we should not rock the boat too serverely despite some needed changes.

I take it that most of you are following that basic line. I just want to say that those of us not in the military have been concerned that the authority of the Chairman is not as strong as it should be. Maybe his position can be strengthened internally by DOD policy. I do not know.

From the first day that a recruit comes into the service, he is taught to click his heels and follow orders. It seems to be, though, that the further we get up into the upper echelon of the military, that does not necessarily follow. Maybe that is a layman's misinterpretation of what is going on. But there is some concern on this committee and the House committee likewise that we want to strengthen the Chairman's authority and make him more effective.

Let me ask you this question. And if you can answer yes or no, each quickly, that would be all right. Given the situation as you view it today, if you had the option on one hand of doing nothing and allowing the DOD initiated reforms to take their normal course, as opposed to our proposed legislation, which would you favor?

General VESSEY. I think you ought to produce some legislation in this area. I agree with Admiral Long that there is more room inside the law as it now exists for improvement than we will make by changing the law, but this is an important juncture. A lot of things have happened. We have interested people in the Congress, in the administration. It is a time to examine it. It is like 1947, 1958, now we have 1985.

When you finish the examination, go ahead and confirm the observations in legislation. Then we can get on and look at the really important things, and that is building the forces that this country needs. If we continue to examine the organization each year, we divert ourselves from the major issues.

We can improve the organization a little bit, and we should go ahead and do that, although there is plenty of room for improvement inside the law, we ought to go ahead and change the law. We should do it this year.

Senator EXON. I guess what you are saying is, you ought to change the law, but not with regard to organization. Let me rephrase my question.

General VESSEY. No, I did not say that. There are some clear things that should be done, and we ought to go ahead.

Senator EXON. Do you want the laws changed, Admiral?

Admiral LONG. I think there clearly is a role for the Congress to play here in improving the way we are doing business in the national security. As I made, I hope, clear in my testimony, I would urge that you do not change by law the principal military adviser to the President. I hope you do not change by law the role that the Chiefs play by setting up another group of people who are not aware of what is going on.

But there are sufficient problems that we all recognize, and one of the things, as I say, that you can do, and that is that you can cause these items to be highlighted and require a report to come back from the Pentagon and from the President as to how they are going to correct them.

Senator EXON. General McBride.

General McBRIDE. Sir, I believe some legislation is required, and I would recommend it very closely to that outlined in H.R. 3622. I believe in the substances of that particular bill.

General GOODPASTER. I feel exactly the same. I think legislation is required, and that what is set out in H.R. 3622 is very close to the mark of what is needed and what will do the job.

I would just endorse the comments made that we should not stop with the legislation, however. I think that there are further changes and improvements—there will be further strengthening—that can be accomplished within the scope of existing law and the new provisions of law which the administration, the Defense Department should proceed to carry into effect.

I would like also very much endorse the efforts that I know are being considered here in the Congress to try to improve the ability of the Congress to work with the Defense Department in this area.

Senator EXON. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral LONG. Could I add one point? If you look over the Nichols bill, some of the most serious problems that I have seen as an operational commander are really not addressed in that bill. And I think that there is a tendency here to focus on the organizational aspects of the problem, and although I have some strong objection to some of the things in that bill, I want to point out such things as strengthening the role of the CINCs, trying to improve our war-planning capabilities, those are substantive issues that are not addressed by that bill.

Senator QUAYLE. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Relative to the power of the CINCs, would you give the CINCs the court-martial authority that they now do not have?

General VESSEY. You might do it. I think it is a very small point.

Senator LEVIN. It is.

General VESSEY. What you want to do is keep the CINCs focused on the war fighting, strategic planning, that sort of thing. Once you get them down into administration, then you get them focused away from the things——

Senator LEVIN. Was your answer no?

General VESSEY. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Would any of you give the CINCs court-martial authority?

General GOODPASTER. I very definitely would not. I do not think they need it, and I know from my own experience when I have had that authority that it demands a good deal of your time and attention.

I would, as other people have said, concentrate the CINCs on the war planning, the preparing for the war fighting, but also the formulation of requirements and the ability to control and direct training, including joint training, joint exercises, preparation for joint operations.

Out of that you have a basis then for formulating what the requirements are that will improve the effectiveness, the readiness, the sustainability—in other words, enable them to do the job that has been charged to them much better.

Senator **Levin**. General Goodpaster, could you assess for us the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs during the Vietnam war in giving strategic guidance to the U.S. commander in Vietnam concerning the conduct of military operations?

General **Goodpaster**. Yes. I participated in several ways during that period. I was assistant to the Chairman for a number of years, 3½ years. I was director of the joint staff for somewhat less than 1 year, and then I was the deputy commander in Vietnam.

I know that there is a tendency to say that there was no guiding military strategy. I think that is not correct—viewing it both from the standpoint of the Washington responsibilities and the reponsibilities in the field. As to the latter, General Abrams was the commander and I was the deputy commander, and we, I think, had a very clear conception and formulation of what our combined military and pacification strategy was there.

At the earlier period, I would say that there was a lack of clarity and a lack of cohesion in the formulation of our strategy at the national level. Much of it was done piecemeal. It was done in programmatic terms rather than as a true strategy—which, in my view, lays out in very clear form what you are trying to do, how you are trying to do it, and what you are going to do it with. If the question is, was our strategy at the national level as coherent and as well thought out as it should have been? I think the answer clearly would have to be no. But did we have a strategy that enabled the commander in the field to know what his job was? Yes, I think we did have such a strategy.

Senator **Levin**. If I may have just 1 more minute—I think there is a vote on—I think you have commented, at least a number of you, this morning on the question of the Chiefs being in the chain of command. I would like to ask a slightly different question. Are the Chiefs perceived in the field as being in the chain of command now?

Admiral **Long**. Certainly speaking as a unified commander for 4 years, there never was any question in my mind as to what the chain of command was, from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the theater CINC. Now the chain of command runs through the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a channel, and that is whether the Chairman normally acts as someone who takes the Secretary of Defense, the President's decision and sends that on out, but there never was any question in my mind as to, you know, who had the control, who had command.

Senator **Levin**. So that they were not in the chain in the strict sense. Or perceived that way.

Admiral **Long**. Not by me.

Senator **Levin**. By other CINCs?

General **Goodpaster**. Not by me.

Admiral **Long**. I cannot speak to that, Senator.

General **Goodpaster**. I can speak to that, having served in that capacity. I did not consider that they were in the chain of command. The chain of command was as Admiral Long described it, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff somewhat nominally, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs very much in actual fact, serving as military point of contact and as military staff to the Secretary of Defense at that time.

General VESSEY. JSC for the military staff, for the Secretary, who converted his orders and decisions into military language for the CINCs.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the record be kept open?

Senator QUAYLE. Yes, the record will be kept open for a while, and it is our intention as of now, if it is OK with you, gentlemen, to reconvene this hearing at noon. Is that going to cause any inconveniences? I do not think it will last more than 20 minutes maximum.

Admiral LONG. You are serving lunch, Mr. Chairman?

Senator LEVIN. The same lunch we get, we will share with you.

Senator QUAYLE. You will get the free lunch that we are all entitled to around here.

General GOODPASTER. Mr. Chairman, if I might be excused, I would appreciate that. I have a commitment for noon today, and it is with a very senior gentleman from another country.

Senator QUAYLE. All right. It you have to be there, we certainly understand.

General MCBRIDE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be excused at 12:30 if I may.

General VESSEY. I shoveled a couple of tons of snow to get here, so I would just as soon finish it up and say what I have to say.

Senator QUAYLE. You have a few moments then. OK, we will see you.

[Recess.]

Senator NUNN. I was going to say the Navy is the only one that has staying power. But I see General Vessey.

Admiral LONG. I must confess, Senator, that I found a coffee pot.

Senator NUNN. Good. We apologize.

Senator DENTON. We are reopening the hearing, and I will defer to the distinguished Senator from Georgia, the ranking minority member, Senator Nunn, for questions.

Senator NUNN. I see General McBride had to leave, and General Goodpaster had to leave.

Admiral Long, in the report that you have submitted, I believe—what was the date of it, 1982?

Admiral LONG. The report I did for the CNO?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Admiral LONG. It was March of 1985, Senator.

Senator NUNN. You did it during 1984 and 1985. What was the time period?

Admiral LONG. The fall of 1984 through the winter.

Senator NUNN. So it is pretty current then?

Admiral LONG. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. In that report you state, and I quote, "Nor is the contention that the service staffs exercise excessive influence over the Joint Chiefs without merit." Could you tell us what you mean by that?

Admiral LONG. I think that goes back, Senator, to the belief that I have that there needs to be an improvement in the operation of the joint staff procedures, the way that issues are addressed within the joint arena, the involvement of the service staffs in that.

My own perception is that in the past there clearly has been too lengthy a discussion and staffing of major joint issues. There has been excessive amount of service involvement in those issues that has resulted in unnecessary delays in getting these issues up before the Chiefs themselves.

Senator NUNN. How do you deal with that? You are not saying a law needs to be passed, are you?

Admiral LONG. No, I am not. I do not think that a law is the proper solution. I think that congressional interest certainly would help, but I think that this is a matter that can and has in part been addressed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chiefs, including the Chairman. They do have the authority to address that problem themselves.

Senator NUNN. Do you think it still has a way to go in terms of being solved?

Admiral LONG. I do not keep current on just how those things are working, Senator, but my belief and guess is that there still needs to be a considerable amount of work done in that area.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. You also recommend, and again, this is quoting from your report, that the Joint Chiefs "dispel the notion that it is the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that unanimity be achieved on all joint actions."

Would you first explain that, and then tell us how you would recommend that be dealt with? In other words, you are saying that the joint staff perception is that they are seeking unanimity.

Admiral LONG. That is correct, Senator Nunn. Certainly in the past there has been the perception and I believe in fact true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have tried to achieve a unanimity of view when their positions went forward.

I know that in my discussions with the past Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Chiefs themselves, and I will certainly ask General Vessey to address this authoritatively, but my impression is that the Chiefs themselves do not hold to the view that they need to have a unanimous view on an important issue, but unfortunately in the study that I chaired for the CNO there still is a very strong view down within the staff that there needs to be a unanimity of view.

And the solution to that, I think, is for the Chairman, acting on the joint staff, and also the service Chiefs acting on their own staffs, to dispel that notion very, very strongly, because I think that is one of the great strengths that come out of the Chiefs' deliberation, and that is the divergence of views that you present to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Senator NUNN. I would agree with that.

General Vessey, would you comment on the Long report that says the joint staff believes there has to be unanimity of views between the Chiefs?

General VESSEY. Well, I must confess that with all great respect that I have for Bob Long, he did not put me on his distribution for his report, so I have not read the report, but let me talk about the issue of unanimity and how the joint staff works and how you get at it.

First, concerning the procedures, as you may know, the procedures for the JCS functioning are set by the JCS, and if they are not any good, it is the fault of the JCS, and I want to tell you that I did not believe that the procedures were as good as they should be, and we set about to change those procedures.

This last year a major change in the joint staff staffing procedures was made. I don't know whether or not we went far enough. We did not go as far as I would like to have gone, but the changes went a considerable length in giving control to the joint staff of the staff work for the Chiefs. That is the real key in reducing the service influence and in making the JCS function effectively; that is, have the joint staff be the Chiefs staff for the JCS duties and the service staff be their staff for their service duties.

The question of unanimity, yes, there is, I think, a certain inbred sort of drive toward unanimity, but you ought to understand that if the Secretary of Defense can get unanimous advice from the Chiefs and it is good advice, it is very strong advice, and very useful to the Secretary.

Where there are clear differences of opinion and clear different alternatives, those ought to be laid out for the Secretary, but what you do not want to do is give the Secretary inconsequential differences. It is very important that the Chairman work with the JCS to point out where the Chiefs may differ on something, but it is not of great enough consequences to go to the Secretary and waste his time in choosing between alternatives that really do not make any difference to the defense of the United States. But where it does make a difference, the difference needs to go to the Secretary. The Chairman has to work very hard on seeing that alternatives are laid out, and where there are real differences, they need to go to the Secretary.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I have just one other question that I put on my essential list, and I have another couple I would like to ask, but at this stage if you would like me to defer, I would be glad to do that.

Senator DENTON. It depends on your time. If you have a crunch, please proceed, because I intend to ask mine.

Senator NUNN. I believe Admiral Long has to leave at 12:30.

Admiral LONG. I am not pressed by time. I have a meeting that I can get there any time.

Senator NUNN. General Vessey has a lot of snow waiting for him.

Senator DENTON. Can you wait 10, then, and let me get through 10 minutes?

Senator NUNN. I have one other question, and then I can stop there.

Admiral LONG. Mr. Chairman, before Senator Nunn goes, I wonder if I might try to clarify something that I think is not clearly understood by everyone here. And that has to do with the chain of command.

Senator NUNN. I would be glad to defer for that. I think that is very important.

Admiral LONG. We have heard testimony here this morning where they have used the term "chain of command" rather loosely. If I might, I would like to refer to the report that I did for the Navy, and see if we could make some clarification of that.

Let me read from the report:

> The statutory basis for the command of the Unified and Specified Commands is Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 124, which provides in pertinent part that combatant commands established under this section are responsible to the President and the Secretary for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary with the approval of the President.

The actual chain of command is set forth in the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, which goes on to say:

> Its commanders of Unified and Specified Commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. Orders to such commanders should be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. These commanders shall have full operational command over the forces assigned to them, and shall perform such functions as are prescribed by the Unified Command plan and other directives issued by competent authority.

In analyzing these provisions, it is important to distinguish between the chain of command and the channel of command. The chain of command is the hierarchy of reporting seniors, those who have operational command of the operating forces, who may direct the movement of those forces on their own authority, or who may approve or disapprove requests and recommendations from subordinates in the chain.

Within the chain of command, seniors exercise command authority over their subordinates and direct them operationally either in their own name or that of a senior higher in the chain.

The channel of command, on the other hand, is a mechanism by which the orders of the superior are transported to a subordinate. A military or civilian official in the channel of command may or may not be a superior in the chain of command.

With regard to command of the Unified and Specified Commands, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the Unified Command. Stated another way, the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The channel of command, however, is from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands.

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in the channel of command, but not the chain of command of the combatant forces. I think that is a very important point, and I think that many times we in the military confuse those two terms. And I think that there was some confusion as to the role that the Chairman would take in some of the recommendations, so I would just like to clarify that point.

Senator NUNN. And you are saying that that feature should remain as it is, the Chiefs or Chairman or both should be in the channel but not in the chain of command?

Admiral LONG. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator NUNN. Does that mean you believe they should not be able to initiate on their own orders the movement of troops?

Admiral LONG. I feel very strongly that the Chairman or even the Chiefs should not be in the chain of command and initiate on their own directives to the combatant forces. To me, that would be the wrong way to go. That would not be in the best interest of the United States.

Senator **Warner**. General Vessey, do you agree with that?

General **Vessey**. I am in general agreement with what Admiral Long has said there. In fact, the wording of the bill, the way the administration set it up, had it about that way. The Chairman was really a channel of command to pass on the orders of the Secretary of Defense and the President, and then to exercise whatever authority the Secretary of Defense and the President gave him.

Senator **Nunn**. Mr. Chairman, I have one other question. The five-star general idea that I first heard proposed by General Dougherty in a hearing a couple of weeks ago, giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs a fifth star, making him clearly the supreme ranking officer of the Chiefs. Would both of you comment on that idea?

General **Vessey**. I think everybody knows now that the Chairman is the senior military officer, and I really do not see much usefulness in it. There are a lot more important things to be done than that.

Senator **Nunn**. Admiral Long.

Admiral **Long**. Senator, I think that is one of those issues that I would consider as quite marginal in value. Clearly, if the Congress wanted the Chairman to be five stars, I think that would be nice for that person, but I do not think that would address the substantive issues that really are on the table.

Senator **Nunn**. I thank both of you very much. I think one purpose of that five-star proposal was related not so much to the symbolism of the rank while he was serving, but rather what would happen after he completed his tour, his active tour. He would still be there as a senior advisor, and would not have any, let us say, company affiliation or other possible conflict. He would still be a military officer, and be available to the President and the Secretary of Defense. So gradually you would begin to get these people of great experience, including you, General Vessey, and others to be in that position. That was, I think the spirit of the suggestion.

Thank you both very much for being here. I know you have come, General Vessey, a long way. And Admiral Long, you have done a yeoman's job in helping this committee both with your report and your appearance, so we thank both of you.

General **Vessey**. Senator, I would like to give you one other thing as it deals with one of the other things we have not talked much about. That is how to make the joint staff a better staff, and how those officers operate.

When I was Chairman, I talked to every single officer that came into the joint staff or the Office of the JCS, and I gave them a little extemporaneous talk. It differed only slightly from time to time. But somebody ran the recorder on the one I gave on the 20th of June, 1984, and transcribed it. It contains a lot of my philosophy about how one has to operate to be an effective joint staff officer.

I would like to give it to you, and if you think it is worthwhile, you could put it in the record, because I think it would be useful for the people who are going to look at how to improve the joint staff.

[Document referred to by General Vessey follows:]

REMARKS BY GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AT THE OJCS ACTION OFFICER ORIENTATION PROGRAM

Let me just spend a few minutes with you and give you the view from my foxhole. Part of our duty as members of the Defense establishment of the United States is to provide security for the United States today and tomorrow, and by "tomorrow" I mean a long way from now—when I'm in my rocking chair and when you are in your rocking chairs. The decisions we make today will have a lot to do about what kind of security the Nation has in those days.

The principal guy under the President in developing the security of the United States is the Secretary of Defense. The more you look at it, the more sweeping those duties of the Secretary seem. He provides the civilian control of the Armed Forces of the United States. He's the President's agent for doing that. He has two staffs. He has a civilian staff that serves him in matters of overall policy on how to deal with the rest of the Federal Government, how to deal with the Legislative Branch of the Government, and how to get help from the industrial and scientific community.

Then he has a military staff. And his military staff is a staff of five. It's composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, commonly called the "Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Secretary is forbidden by law from having any other military staff. The law also says that the duties of those five are to be the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.

Now, that group of five has a staff of its own. It's called the "Joint Staff." And its duties are laid out to them in the law. The Joint Staff is to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff and through them the Secretary of Defense in developing strategic plans and providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States, logistic plans to support those strategic plans and the assignment of logistic responsibilities to the services. With the help of the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs review the personnel and materiel requirements for the Armed Forces, they establish joint training and education systems for the Armed Forces, and they provide representation at the UN Military Committee.

They also provide the strategic commands and strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States through another group of guys, and those are the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands. That's the system that provides the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Now, what about the services? There are duties for the services, too—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Those outfits organize, train, equip and support the Armed Forces that are to be fought by the unified and specified commanders.

The services respond to the Secretary of Defense, too; and they build forces in response to the requirements laid out in the strategic direction that is set out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and endorsed by the Secretary of Defense. Sometimes that relationship gets cluttered or is not understood. Part of the reason is that there is an understandable, direct and good connection between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also happen to be the uniformed heads of their respective services, with the exception of the Chairman.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have two different sets of duties, one as heads of their services to organize, train, equip and support forces to be fought by the Unified and Specified Commands and the other to come back in from the other side of the house, hang their hats on the peg, put on a different hat, and go in there and put on their strategic hats to do those other things.

You see that there has been a great debate in the newspapers in the last few years about whether or not this body which heads the services, coupled together with the Chairman, can also do these other tasks. Some would suggest that because they are so wed to building an Army or a Navy or an Air Force or a Marine Corps that they can't be objective enough to do the other tasks. On the other hand, I would suggest to you it's a very good arrangement. With the Chiefs being in those other chairs, who knows more about the Army, the Navy, the Air Force or the Marine Corps than the uniformed heads of the services? So, it is my firm belief that they are the right people to be the strategic advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Now, the Chairman's role in this is a unique role. He has some duties specified in the law. They are fairly simple duties like the duties of the JCS. But by and large, I can summarize all that by saying the Chairman is a *servant.* He serves three bodies. He serves the President and the Secretary of Defense, that sort of mythical body called the "National Command Authority"—and sometimes the Secretary of Defense delegates duties to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. But his duties as part of the National Command Authority are only delegated when the Secretary is not present.

Then, the Chairman serves another body. He is a servant of another body and that's the body of which he is a member, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His service to those two bodies is as a channel of communication principally because the Chairman is the guy who sits in with the President and the Secretary of Defense at National Security Council meetings and National Security Planning Group meetings or small security meetings with the President and the Secretary of Defense. He's also the guy who sits in the meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So, I'm a "messenger boy." I carry messages back and forth and it's important that I carry those messages clearly. It's important that I serve both of those bodies in my relationship with the other body.

The Chairman is also the servant of the third group and that's the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands. He brings their views to the JCS. He also takes those views to the Secretary of Defense and the President and into the other fora through which the Secretary of Defense does his job. An important forum where decisions are made on allocating resources to build the forces—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. The Chairman's duty is to help make sure that the forces that those CINCs *want built get built* by the force builders in the services.

Those are the duties that I have. You who are members of the Joint Staff or those agencies which serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff—your job is to help me and the other four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do their jobs. You who are members of service staffs are to help the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do their other job—that is, build, organize, train, equip and support the forces that are fought by the Unified and Specified Commands. Sometimes you may help make the strategy for the forces but that's not your primary task. That's the job of the Joint Staff. Are there any questions on that?

Two years ago when I took over this job I made out a "menu" for the JCS and for the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands and they endorsed that menu. We've pursued those items with some vigor. I've got a fancy chart of that menu here. And I'll go through it with you because it's important that you understand what the JCS are trying to do.

The thing we said that was the number one item on the menu are *war plans* because they drive force requirements. They are the one area that we as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs are solely responsible for. Nobody else makes the war plans. We can bitch about the suppliers of weaponry because weapons are not built to standards. We can squawk about the recruits because the secondary education system doesn't work as well as it ought to. We can squawk about the Congress because Congress doesn't provide enough money. But, if the war plans are wrong, we can point only to ourselves. So, war plans call for particular attention.

What we have done is start out with a unique exercise. We brought the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands in here and I told them they could bring one staff officer. If they had to have slides, they could bring one staff officer to flip the slides for them. But their duty was to explain to the JCS the concept of the operation for their most demanding war plan and we didn't want any staff officer explanations. We wanted the explanations of *the commanders*. Then we started from there with the idea of doing some things like giving top-down guidance on the way the war plans should work. It's my theory that they should not grow like moss in the basement but should start with guidance from the top.

The second thing we put on the menu is to provide planning support for the CINCs. The idea behind this is to give "modern aids to planning" to those CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commanders. Every service has an analytical agency; every war college has a war gaming facility; but, there are a lot of CINCs with only yellow foolscap and number two pencils, hand-held calculators and slide rules. Our objective is to harness all this horsepower and give it to the warfighters out there making the plans.

Some of these other menu items are sort of old hat—such as tying military strategy to the national strategy. That's the duty of the Chiefs. Another is reviewing the NATO strategy and addressing the changes that take place. Some changes are taking place right this afternoon with the Congress voting on whether or not to mandate a withdrawal of US forces from NATO because the NATO nations have very little percent growth in defense budgets.

Another is increasing the influence of the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands in the POMs and the budgets. We've come a long way with that. In two weeks the CINCs will be in again to meet with the Secretary of Defense and with all of his advisers on the Defense Resources Board. The Chiefs and the CINCs have made considerable progress in making our views known there. We've examined the cross-service issues, the things that make the Unified and Specified Commands work. Those issues are primarily command and control and communications, intelligence and mobility plus logistics support. And then there were some of the other things that we agreed should be on the menu: Arms control, JCS organization (which is still an issue which gets some attention), the Unified Command Plan "seams," joint doctrine and how to handle joint manpower.

We will update that menu here in a few days and have it ready for the CINCs the next time they come in here (in two weeks). We will reaffirm the general direction for the next two years.

Now, what is your job? How do I view your job? Well, you're like me. You're a servant of the two groups, with a similar relationship to the third group. The first group is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and you help them do those jobs that they're to do. Their principal job, again, is providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

When this group of stalwarts of mine assembled two years ago, we talked about military advice. When was military advice good and timely? Through the years this JCS has oscillated between giving advice that was unsolicited or waiting until the Secretary of Defense and the President asked for it. So, we came to the conclusion that if we were to do our job correctly, then we had to give them timely advice. We set a rule for ourselves for timely advice: that was "Give them advice before they know they need it." And if they get advice before they know they need it, they've gotten timely advice. If they have to ask us for advice on what to do, it's probably already too late and we haven't done our job. So that's our goal. As staff members of the Joint Staff, your objective is to help us do that. Help us see the world and anticipate what's to happen and give that advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President before they know they need it.

The spread of duties you may have is as wide as the spread of duties on the Staff itself. But what I want to tell you is that whatever you are doing, it is important. Some of you may be down there counting money for the exercise budget. You may have done that out in a subordinate command at a far lower level and what you're doing doesn't seem to be much different except that you're aggregating bigger numbers. What I want to tell *you is that there are no unimportant duties here.*

You are dealing with issues that have risen to the *highest level of military authority in the country.* Now, some of the issues perhaps could have been solved below, somewhere else. But, the fact of the matter is they're here now and *the fact that they are here makes them important.* Somebody thought they were important enough to get here. They're here. They're ours to solve and *none of them are unimportant.* None of you will perform duties that are any more or less important than the others. The sum total of our effectiveness is what we do as a whole. The more I travel around in a uniform the more I recognize that there is nothing that requires teamwork more than military operations. No other place in which you are requires teamwork more than here.

So, it means understanding the programming and budgeting system. It means understanding the joint planning system. It means understanding who knows what around the Staff and how to get that information and use it for yourself for the problem that you've got to solve; and it means how to get along with the other members of the Staff.

There are some qualities that I believe are important, particularly while you're here. You will be dealing with issues that affect the security of the country now and which will affect the security of the country in the future. They are issues that should be dealt with within the fora that are assigned for solving those problems. We don't need to write out our problems on the front page of the *Washington Post* or the *New York Times.* In other words, keep your mouth shut, and if you can't keep your mouth shut, you're in the wrong job. So, if that's one of your problems, if you have by proclivity a tendency to chatter to newspaper reporters or in cocktail bars or wherever it happens to be, please see me or the Personnel Officer after this formation and we can part friends now. But I'll tell you that if that's your proclivity and you do it *later,* we will part but we will not part friends.

The second part of it is you come here wearing Army green, Navy white or blue, Air Force blue, Marine OD of civilian clothes and you bring here the expertise that's needed because *you're an expert in your own particular service.* Oftentimes we hear the issue of, "Well, we need the guys that aren't experts in their services but experts in joint planning," or something like that. Well, joint planning requires experts from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Those are the only people who can do the jobs here correctly. And it requires them to work together toward the common goal. This means that you come here as an Army officer, as a Naval officer, or whatever it is; but, you're not working for the Army or the Navy. You're working for the JCS to produce plans that provide for the security of the United States.

Now, you've got to put a little purple in your green or your white or your OD or whatever it happens to be in your addressal of problems that you address. When you operate, you are expected to be an expert in all and you must learn that while you're here.

Not only is there no unimportant work, there is also more than enough work for everybody to do and we're not inhibited by a lack of room for improvement. We've got plenty of room for improvement in whatever we do so there is a great opportunity for you to make a great contribution to the country today and in the future. I kiddingly tell the guys up in my office, "We'll work half day on Sunday—about 6 to 6. The rest of the time you'll put in a full day." But I say that to you for a purpose because *you* will have those kinds of days as well. We had a session over the weekend when I know one fellow had to miss the surprise birthday party he had planned for his wife. He had no choice because he was the expert in this particular field. The President needed an answer.

On the other hand, there are times when there may be some slack time in your particular field and I don't want you sitting around here or standing around waiting for somebody to issue orders because somebody three levels up is still sitting there playing golf on the carpet in his office. Go home because tomorrow you may not have the opportunity.

O.K. I've chattered on long enough. What questions do you have for me?

Senator NUNN. We will be delighted. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

I will ask a few, gentlemen, and I will try to make them rather general so that you can, if you would, supplement oral answers in writing. As you know, what we do will have great impact on the security of our country.

You seem to agree that even the Chairman should be outside the chain of command, when we get to the channels of command and consider disestablishment of the JCS with the alleged efficacy of permitting the service Chiefs to return solely to service concerns.

Would there not be a difficulty irrespective of the CINCs' authority to move this or that and try this or that in a nonwar or war situation? Would there not be substantial disadvantage to removing the JCS in that each of these service Chiefs with its logistics and training responsibilities is in a good position to advise upon the logistical feasibility in terms of readiness of given forces about which the CINCs might not know?

Would that in combination with other factors rule out the advisability of disestablishing the JCS and allowing the service Chiefs to return solely to service concerns? General Vessey.

General VESSEY. As I said in my opening statement, I think it is a very bad idea, because the reasons you cite are good reasons. There is a more important reason, I believe, and that is, the actual force-building job, the integration of that with the national strategy and with the requirements of the Unified and Specified Commands is key. So you can have advisors who go ahead and tell the President to do something, but the Chiefs are also force builders.

They go out and do things, and they make those forces fit together, and if they do not make them fit together as well as they ought to, then knock their heads together or can them or do something else, but that is a very important mission, and in it they draw strength from their knowledge as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in doing their job as service Chiefs, and they also draw strength from their job as service Chiefs in doing their job as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

So, I think you would have to recreate them in some other form if you did away with them as the body of senior advisors.

Senator DENTON. Indeed, you raise another thought in my mind which I would check with your superior wisdom. That is, part of the force building is the interface with the Congress, and were you to leave the CINCs with that job, I am not sure they would be able to perform their duties as CINCs

How about you, Admiral Long?

Admiral LONG. Senator Denton, I think maybe in an oversimplified way I have always considered that a Chief has two primary responsibilities. One is certainly force building and the readiness of his service, and the other is involved in the military strategy development and providing military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

I think very strongly that those two responsibilities are closely related. I can think of no time as an operational commander, whether operational command of submarine force or the service force in the Seventh Fleet or the Pacific Command that when an operational decision was made, that I was not very, very conscious and needed to know the status of the readiness of the force, materiel conditions, the state of training, all of those things.

And I would agree with General Vessey that to have advisors to the President and not have that detail available as to the readiness of the forces available, you would have to create some organization to do that, so I think that having the Chiefs as military advisors to the President makes inordinate sense.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

I do not want the direction of these questions to appear to be refutations of some of the staff recommendations. Some of those recommendations have advantages, others, I think, have disadvantages that rule them out, and others I am not sure about. But I do want to get the opinions of those who know more than anyone here, including the staff, on these, and some of you will differ.

Nonetheless, this record will be very important. We have had a tendency to dwell upon the deficiencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some of the expressions regarding those deficiencies are unfair. I will not go into them, but they have to do with such things as statements that "the corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential." That may be true in any given period of time, but "The proffered advice"— this is another quote—"is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded."

Well, per se it is difficult to see how one could avoid being disregarded if one is normally unread, the paper. So that kind of subjective approach I deplore, and I hope we can continue to develop more objectivity, as I think we have as we move along.

Focusing on possible reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff often from the point of view of relating possible needs for changes to organizational and possibly organizationally caused mistakes and failures in operations that occurred in minor crisis as well as in wartime.

In my opinion, and I would ask your own view, in Vietnam such mistakes as were made early on in sort of forgetting that the object of war is to break the enemy's will and embarking on twisting the arm rather than beating on the head with a sledge hammer approach, that was less a product of any deficiencies in the Joint Chiefs or organizational matters.

It was more a testimony to the reality that the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States can usurp the authority, or rather can abide by the President's authority as Commander in Chief and the Secretary as the civilian in charge of our military, as it were. They can change entirely that which the military have recommended with rather drastically disastrous consequences.

Are you with me so far on that? Thank you. You are both nodding.

Then, or course, there are the media and Congress, and we are not without our propensity for mischief, and in my belief after the war was finally won militarily and the enemy's will broken, I do think that the media and Congress as a whole contributed to a forfeiture of an issue which had been won militarily, but was then later lost politically, and that is the biggest military disaster as well as psychological warfare disaster, I believe, in probably American military history, but I do not see laying it at the feet of the Joint Chiefs or of the military in general.

Is there general agreement on that, or do you want to make some more wise remarks or qualifications?

Admiral **Long**. I agree, Senator Denton, in general with the thrust of what you are saying, and that is, if I understand you correctly, and that is that wars are fought, contingencies are carried out because of political decisions. Part of those political decisions are determined by military advice and military capabilities and readiness.

My own view of that unfortunate period that we had at the end of the Vietnam war and subsequent to that, and that is that it has only been in the last several years that I have observed that the U.S. military forces have regained a level of readines and capability that we seriously lost immediately after the war.

When I first went to the Pacific Command, there was a significant reduction in the readiness of those forces, and that was naval forces, Army forces, as well as air forces. During that time, I would like to say that through outstanding leadership on my part, but it was unfortunately a series of other things; namely, the increase in the political support, the attitude of the American public, the economy of the United States, the actions of the Congress to increase the sustainability, the amount of money that went into spare parts, the whole attitude of the military changed, but that took a long time coming about.

General **Vessey**. If I could just add a little bit to that, Senator, it gets back to the basic point you raised earlier and some of the things that were said here in the report which you quoted from about the JCS system not being "capable of adequately fulfilling its responsibilities to provide useful and timely unified military advice, corporate advice as that provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential. Proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded."

I want to tell you that if I thought any of those things were the case while I was the Chairman, I would have been Chairman for only enough time to submit my resignation. It is very important on the timeliness and usefulness of the advice that if the JCS are to be the military advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President, they have got to be timely.

We set a rule for ourselves that said what is timely, and the rule we set is that the advice is timely if the Secretary of Defense and the President get military advice before they know they need it. Then it is timely. If they have to ask for it, then it is probably too late.

The JCS will not always be timely, but they certainly ought to use that as their fundamental rule. That is, get military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President before the President and Secretary know they need the advice, and if they do that, it is timely.

Now, sometimes former Secretaries of Defense have been quoted as saying that the advice was irrelevant, unread, and disregarded. I want to tell you, if I had been Secretary of Defense or if I ever am Secretary of Defense, and God willing and the laws prevailing, I will not be, thank the Lord, but if I ever think I am getting bad advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or irrelevant advice, I am either going to get a new set of advice or I am going to get a new set of Joint Chiefs, and for Secretaries to sit there and accept what they think is bad advice from their military advisers and then go on and not do anything about it, I think is malfeasance in office.

Senator DENTON. That brings up a question. The President is the Commander in Chief. The Secretary has authority in the chain of command from the CINCs. To what degree should this Nation give thought of more indoctrination in the matters of war and peace, crisis management, a little bit different from business management, but from which many of them come more from politics.

It seems to me that, and I have not thought about this, just a little, that that is something that is really necessary. There has to be a major incremental addition to the President's and the Secretary of Defense's preparation for and indoctrination while within the jobs from the security point of view there are so many issues across the board from the President. When we think of the one horrible and unspeakable moment when he might have to contemplate pushing the button and what evidence he is going to require, what thoughts are going to go through his mind before he goes through that, and then take that all down the spectrum of whether or not we should provide this or that aid to such and such freedom fighter groups, and what we should do in a given terrorist crisis.

It seems to me that we have had enough trouble from those gentleman not understanding enough about the principal mandate of government, which is to survive its people, that we ought to have a recommendation from the military that we need that, because I do not know where else it is going to come from, because nobody else understands.

General VESSEY. Well, the report deals with the issue reasonably well, the committee reports, and of course the President and the

Secretary have to understand the responsibilities, and I just want to tell you that this Secretary and the President we now have does that.

This President has met about every 2 months with the JCS as a body. Then he sees the JCS representative and the Chairman probably two or three times a week.

Senator **Denton**. I do not mean to interrupt, sir, but I totally concur with that. I consider both of them relatively well qualified. I do not want to impugn President Johnson, but I think it might have been injudicious for him to be selecting these specific bombs to be dropped on specific targets, and things to be launched at specific times.

That is what I am talking about. I think Mr. McNamara was a good man, but I think his imposition of management techniques irrespective of some of the differences between that and military science were unfortunate for the country, and I do not mean that critically of either gentleman, because they could have been relieved to some degree had this kind of thing taken place.

General **Vessey**. The other thing the committee report points out is the importance of choosing well qualified people for their staffs, and that is the kind of thing Secretaries have to pay attention to.

Senator **Denton**. General Vessey, in your retirement speech you made some off the cuff remarks which I found relevant, and touching. Considering the importance of some of the remarks made about the imposition of congressional demands upon the military which cause you to divert more time and effort to that than is warranted or in the mircomanagement aspect of it, the way Congress intervened—you did not say that, but I shall—when President Carter suggested to Brehznev that if he did not desist in transporting Cuban troops and Russian troops to Angola, that he, Mr. Carter, would do something unpleasant, something deterring in that direction.

The media jumped on that that night. Congress slapped the President down the next day. The President is often, in his Commander in Chief role, I think, not overly constrained by Congress, and the Secretary of State also, as a result of some of the executive department errors, and perhaps overreaching during the early phases of the Vietnam war, when congressional approval and consultation was not that well sought out.

If either of you with the wisdom you have would contribute anything in that direction, it would help, because we now have 536 Secretaries of State over here. We are now in the Senate devising and dissenting rather than advising and consenting, and that hurts me as a human being. I do not like to be associated with a balance in that direction. I would rather be somewhere else if that does not discontinue, or at least decelerate.

So, anything you could say in that direction, and I know, General Vessey, some of your remarks were generally directed that way, if you could put in writing for this hearing, it will be part of the record. It will be that which these good men and women on the staff go over. And some of the Senators will even read the whole report. I think it would be most beneficial.

General **Vessey**. Well, from time to time, Senator, I have had Senators and Members of Congress tell me how to be a general or a military officer, and sometimes it rubbed me the wrong way even though sometimes the advice was good. I would not want to tell Senators and Congressmen how to be Senators and Congressmen, because they know more about that than I do, but the staff report, and the issues of how to deal with defense, the staff report on the role of the Congress and some of the problems that are involved there is well worth everyone's reading and well worth tackling. The Congress and the Defense Department getting as close as they possibly can in how to lay out the issues so that they could be examined in the most expeditious fashion to produce the best defense instead of, as I said in my retirement remarks, dabbling far too deep in the details.

The Congress should give broader direction to the executive department, set limits on what should be done, and then ask for reports of results on what was done. Then I think we can get on with——

Senator DENTON. I think that is an extremely important point, which is interferred with by the immediate reaction on the part of the media, which is reflected in an immediate reaction on the part of Congress, and a rather shallow understanding of some of the security-related issues, because they have so many other issues to address. That to me is a problem.

Admiral Long, do you have any remarks?

Admiral LONG. Well, I was just sitting here listening to this dialog that you and General Vessey are having, and one point that I believe that we need to remind ourselves from time to time, and that is that national strength really stems not just from military strength but from economic strength and very much political strength, and without getting into specific administrations, I have seen the United States go from a position of relative weak strength nationally in the eyes of the rest of the world to one where I think that there has been a major increase in national strength.

I think clearly in the past we have needed a clearer enunciation of national political objectives, which in turn drive the vital interests of the United States, which in turn drive the defense guidance, which in turn drives the national strategic military guidance. And it is in this area that I think we all share, we all have shared in the past.

Obviously, the establishment of political objectives of the United States, and I use that term in the broadest sense, the Congress must play a part in that. I think all too often we focus on the tail end of the product rather than clearly understanding why the military exists, for what missions, what are the things that we are really worried about.

As an example, I do not worry as much about Soviet military power as I do about their pursuing their political objectives, which—they use the military power for that. So this is an extremely important subject, and I think that we all need to understand just what the real problems are.

Senator DENTON. If I could add to that, in the pursuit of their political objectives by military, paramilitary, terrorist, or whatever other means, the Soviets have made considerable progress, and we have a tendency, in my belief, too much in these two bodies to regard those strictly in military terms, and not to see the political and economic reflections of that.

I am embarked on an effort to show the economic effect in order to let the businessmen of the country be free of the thinking that, yes, we have got to balance the budget, but if we undertake some of the pending proposals which enjoy remarkable popularity here, we are going to find ourselves cutting defenses beyond, in my view, what is affordable without ever having assessed the economic effects of security failures since Vietnam in particular, in my view, and that is something I would solicit any help that you could offer me, because it is something that is translatable. Yes, sir?

General VESSEY. I think that is important, and as Admiral Long pointed out, in the role of the Congress here, I have often thought that the best position we could give to the Soviets, the best view the Soviets could get of the United States is to have the President of the United States submit a defense budget, and the Congress add 5 or 2 percent or whatever it is, and say, Mr. President, you need 2 percent more than what you have submitted. Look at the present—the President has just gone to a summit. We are talking about another summit next year. And it looks like the Defense bill will come out approving 12 MX in contrast to the 44 or whatever it was the administration submitted. I can just see the President talking to Mr. Gorbachev and Gorbachev saying, you want to trade your 12 MX for my 308 SS-18's? What kind of a poker player are you?

So, what the Congress does is very important.

Senator DENTON. I certainly concur, and that loses me some sleep. My last question. They have listed in the staff report, which I agree is worthy of considerable scrutiny and is a good point of departure for a discussion of this type, six major missions, as they call them, and I do not know whether you two gentleman are familiar with them—nuclear deterrence, maritime superiority, power projection superiority, which they define as deploying military forces in times of crisis to distant world areas which are primarily outside the traditional system of Western alliances. Then they have three others: Defense of NATO Europe, defense of East Asia, defense of Southwest Asia.

I messed around in this field some myself, and I do not consider those a very good statement of our missions, and the reason they are important is that the departure point is those missions, and then we start talking about the integration of those missions in terms of the focus on them, the strategic planning derived from them, and the organizational setup which is responsive thereto.

So, I have a problem. I have never seen those in a Department of Defense issuance, and I do not think they are mutually exclusive. I think they are too limited in what they express as the missions, six major missions of DOD.

And if you ever care to comment on that——

General VESSEY. Well, the idea of mission integration that is in the report is good—a good idea. Now, choosing the right missions when you get to the guidance we get for the President and Secretary of Defense first says defense of the homeland, that is priority No. 1. Then we go on into the other mission areas, and that sort of thing can be worked out. I agree with you. I would not take these, but I complimented the staff on the idea of looking at missions as a way to get at this.

Senator **Denton**. I wish we would get back now—we have this terrorism thing, and I do not think we have a setup yet to deal with that properly. I hope the Vice Presidential Task Force deals with it. But I certainly concur strongly with Admiral Long's admonition that we must look at our interests, our principal one being survival.

The way I look at it, that has two aspects—well-being, which is survival against the elements, against social dysfunction, against starvation, disease, that sort of thing, all of the social field, if you will, and some of the political field—then survival against our enemies, who would rob us of our liberties, rob us of our land, our freedoms. But then you look at what your national objectives are, and they might be, you know, we are dependent upon such and such a percentage of vital metals and minerals in Africa. We are dependent upon—with our allies—for our survival upon access to the oil in the Middle East.

Those are political, economic goals requiring a military application in terms of what our military contingency plans are. We seem to forget that in a mishmash of human rights or whatever else we get into, and too often topple governments which are not good in deference to what develops later, unspeakably worse. And, again, I say that more, I guess, from frustration than anything else, but we are into that still. Yes, sir?

Admiral **Long**. Senator, I would like to just comment on the business of missions. I share General Vessey's support for looking at military forces from a mission area, recognizing that it is quite complex and recognizing that the services—and let me speak just to the Navy here.

The Navy has for several years been trying to look at its own requirements from a mission point of view, and those missions within the Navy include such things as strike warfare, antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, amphibious warfare, mine warfare. Those would be some of the major mission areas.

And that is very important—that these services start doing that, because there are duplications of programs that impact on the ability to carry out that mission. Now, within the Defense Department there clearly are other missions such as General Vessey pointed out. One mission is clearly to defend the United States.

But I think that the Congress working with the Defense Department could well work toward some meaningful mission areas that would be reviewed by the Pentagon as well as by the Congress, not just programmatically, but also from a mission area, and one area that cries for something like this is in the whole area of low order of warfare forces, antiterrorism forces, special forces that need to be looked at from the standpoint of an aggregate look rather than by individual service program.

Senator **Denton**. That is what I have recommended to the Vice President and Admiral Holloway, and I think that is the way they are going. They were going to conclude their task force work in December. Now they are granting themselves a rather open-ended longevity, which I think is helpful, considering the need.

Admiral LONG. I might add, Senator Denton, that I think that the increased involvement of the theater CINCs looking at resources from the standpoint of carrying out their assigned missions is a step in the right direction, and we need to pursue that and to build on that.

Senator DENTON. Well, thank you very much, General Vessey, Admiral Long. I thank you for your perseverence. Thank you for your service, and for whatever you might offer later to become a part of this record. I strongly recommend that you search your souls and see if you might not be able to vent some of the things that you think might be impossible. The study group on the staff may come up with something good that you would not expect them to.

Again, thank you.

This hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

[The report, "The Organization and Function of the JCS", follows:]

REPORT FOR THE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
BY THE CHAIRMAN'S SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE JCS

APRIL 1982

The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of Defense position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

REPORT FOR THE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
BY THE CHAIRMAN'S SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

- THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE JCS -

APRIL 1982

CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF THE JCS ORGANIZATION . 5

III. THE VIEWS OF THE PROFESSIONALS 15

1. Historical Perspectives 15
2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 17
3. The Service Chiefs 23
4. The Commanders In Chief 31
5. The Joint Staff 35
6. Summary 39

IV. JOINT DUTY -- PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND PROCEDURES. 41

1. Preparation and Tenure of Officers 41
2. The Desirability of Joint Duty 44
3. Joint Staff Procedures 46

V. RECENT IMPROVEMENTS 49

VI. NEW OBJECTIVES 53

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 63

APPENDICES

A - STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JCS

B - THE CHAIRMAN'S SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

C - BIBLIOGRAPHY

D - QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO THE SERVICE CHIEFS

E - JOINT PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

"A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom."

Thomas Paine
Introduction to Common Sense

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were first formed by President Roosevelt during World War II as an informal advisory group. In 1947, when the Military Services were brought under a single organization, the JCS became an official body -- a permanent source of Joint military advice and assistance to the President and the new Secretary of Defense. In 1949, the additional position of Chairman of the JCS was created, and a Joint Staff authorized at a level not to exceed 100 officers. In 1952, the Commandant of the Marine Corps was added to the JCS, but only to participate in matters of concern to the Corps; however, in 1978 that restriction on the Commandant's participation was removed. Thus, the JCS today comprise five co-equal members: the Chairman, and the military chiefs of the four Services. Over the years a structure of Joint activities has evolved that now includes the JCS organization, military representation on the "civilian" staff of the Secretary of Defense, and U.S. military representation in the combined headquarters of NATO. This structure now employs about 5,000 Joint-duty officers, including about 150 of flag rank.[1/]

The basic tasks of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are these: (1) to develop and present Joint military advice to the Secretary and the President on a wide variety of issues involving military strategy, objectives, plans, and programs; (2) to guide the development, by the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands (the CINCs), of military operation plans for U.S. forces operating jointly and in combination with allied forces; and (3) to support and oversee the execution of those plans by the CINCs, as the agent of the Commander in Chief.[2/] To accomplish these tasks requires that the JCS and the CINCs be supported by officers of the highest quality -- officers skilled, experienced, and interested in Joint command and staff matters. Also required is a highly responsive Joint military organization.

[1/] The JCS organization includes the JCS, their Operations Deputies (who serve also as military executives in the Service Staffs and thus, like the Chiefs, play a dual role), the Joint Staff (with its current statutory limit of 400 officers), the other staff activities within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Joint Deployment Agency, and the Unified Command headquarters. As treated in this report, it does not include the headquarters of the Specified Commands (which are primarily uni-Service) or the Defense agencies. The total number of active-duty officers assigned to all "non-Service" activities including the JCS organization, the OSD, the NATO headquarters, and the Defense Agencies approaches 9,000. This accounts for 5% of all officers, 19% of all generals and admirals, and 11% of all colonels and Navy captains.

[2/] The official functions of the JCS as contained in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, are listed in Appendix A.

Today the JCS organization must contend with national security requirements very different from those of 1947, and different as well from those of 1958 when the JCS organization was last formally revised. Four phenomena are responsible: First, the United States, no longer enjoying a clearly dominant position in military strength and facing a potential adversary with the capability to strike quickly with modern large-scale forces, now has less margin for error in managing and planning for the use of its own military forces. Second, the time and space factors that govern military readiness requirements have been compressed through improved weapons, logistics, and communications systems. Third, the system of world alliances -- formal and otherwise -- has become complicated by new economic interdependencies and power structures, making military planning more difficult. Fourth, there is an increasing interdependence among the Services, an irreversible trend set in motion many years ago by the increasing scale and complexity of modern warfare. These simultaneous developments dictate a level and quality of Joint-Service planning and preparedness transcending anything that the military leadership has had to provide in the past. It is the view of many that the JCS organization must be changed if it is to meet these requirements.

With these thoughts in mind, General David C. Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked a Special Study Group to review previous studies of the JCS, to analyze the effectiveness of its organization, procedures, planning, and staffing in the light of today's needs, to confer with the

Service Chiefs, the CINCs, and other senior military members of the defense community, to document clearly any need for change, and to develop appropriate recommendations.3/ 4/

No constraints were placed upon the Study Group other than the general guidance noted above. The results of its analysis are contained in this Report. The Report is essentially an "in-house" study, and it seeks ways to improve the JCS organization primarily from within. The views of the Service Chiefs were solicited, and the study results discussed with them.5/ The individual members of the Special Study Group are in general agreement with the detailed findings.

The Study Group urges the consideration of their recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some of the recommended changes will require legislative action or approval by the President or Secretary of Defense. Most, however, lie within the authority of the JCS themselves to implement.

3/ Study Group Members are listed at Appendix B.

4/ A bibliography of previous studies is given at Appendix C.

5/ A questionnaire submitted to the Service Chiefs is given at Appendix D.

II. THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF THE JCS ORGANIZATION

The JCS organization has the least visibility of any group of major DoD headquarters activities. Few outsiders understand the constraints -- some legal, some traditional -- under which the Chairman, the Service Chiefs, the Joint Staff, and the CINCs operate. Few appreciate the delicate balance that exists between Service imperatives on the one hand and Joint imperatives on the other, and how the struggle to maintain that balance influences the effectiveness of the JCS organization. This chapter has been written not only to reveal the characteristics of this balance, but also to show how those characteristics limit the JCS in important ways, why the JCS as a corporate group are often criticized, and why (to their own sense of frustration) they frequently have little or no impact on the resolution of important joint-Service issues.

Some outsiders expect the JCS to operate much like a corporate board of directors, with similar executive powers and procedures. In fact, the corporate board is a poor analogy. Unlike a corporate board, for example, the JCS have no executive authority; there are special legal restrictions on the JCS that stem from the principle of civilian control.

At the same time, however, there are self-imposed policies and procedures under which the JCS and the Joint Staff operate that no corporation would ever impose on its own corporate headquarters. These policies and procedures, largely traditional in nature, more than anything else determine the character and effectiveness of the JCS as a corporate body. They affect not only the way Joint business is conducted, but also the selection and training of the people who conduct the business.

One of the other major differences between the JCS concept and a corporate board is that all but one of the five members of the JCS (the Chiefs) are also "division presidents." Their divisions -- the Services -- compete constantly and intensely for corporate resources. Thus the four Chiefs have a built-in conflict of interest when, as a corporate advisory group, they are asked to advise on such matters as the allocation of DoD resources and mission responsibilities. Still another distinction is that the Chiefs, by law, have no responsibility for operations. They only marshall and manage the resources. It is yet another group of senior executives -- the CINCs -- who are responsible for planning and conducting operations. But the CINCs are far removed from the central decision-making process. The result is a polarization of interests and emphasis: On the one hand, the Service Chiefs and their Service staffs devote most of their time to Service programs and budgets -- the input side of defense management. They do not involve themselves thoroughly in Joint operation planning. Even though the law says that the Chiefs' Joint responsibility should take precedence over their Service responsibility, the simple fact is that managing their Services is essentially a full-time job for the Chiefs. The Chief also "carries the flag" for his Service as none other can, and that is not likely to change.

The CINCs on the other hand are concerned with the output side -- the current readiness of Joint forces, and the development of plans for their possible use at any time. The CINCs are thus interested in Joint doctrine -- in figuring out how the Services would fight together and support each other. They are also in an advantageous position to determine where existing or new DoD resources can be used most effectively to improve current operational capability in their respective theaters. However, because they are remote, they have no systematic way to influence the resource allocation process. They have little impact on the development of national military objectives.

The fifth member of the JCS, though having the title of Chairman, is by law one of five equals; he is not empowered as a chief executive officer to render decisions for the JCS when its members do not agree. Yet he is the link between the input- and the output-oriented constituencies -- between the Chiefs and the CINCs -- the only senior military executive so situated.

There are no "corporate" officers in the Joint Staff that supports the JCS -- no career executives specially trained and responsible for particular functional areas and for maintaining continuity and corporate memory. The flag rank executives of the Joint Staff are temporary -- serving only two years or less on the staff. Their subordinates serve only slightly longer -- about 30 months on the average. Both are drawn exclusively from the Services, who of course not only pay them but manage their promotions and careers. Few have had formal training for Joint Staff work and even fewer previous Joint Staff experience. Only about one-third have even had Service staff experience. Most have come directly to Washington from specialized field operations where they have had little contact with the complex issues with which the Joint Staff must deal. Few, if any, will ever come back to the Joint Staff. The average Joint Staff officer, while knowledgeable in his Service specialty, has limited breadth of knowledge of his own Service, much less a broad understanding of his sister Services. And he has little incentive to gain such an understanding, since his tenure on the Joint Staff is so brief, and because his future is not there but rather back in his own Service.

The JCS procedures for developing "corporate" (Joint) positions and resolving issues, deeply and formally involve the "division" staffs. Indeed, Service staff executives actually have effective veto power on most Joint Staff actions. The procedures work this way: A corporate issue requiring resolution is assigned to a Joint Staff action officer who, on the average, will have been on the Joint Staff for about 15 months. This action officer prepares a draft paper that develops the issue and proposes a solution. Then he must seek concurrence (not simply coordination or comment) from a counterpart officer in each of the four Services. He may have to rewrite the paper and then recycle it several times with this "committee" of representatives in his effort to reach agreement, because each Service representative is primarily concerned with protecting Service interests, making it difficult for the committee to reach substantive agreement on any issue in which Service interests are in conflict. One can hardly criticize the Service representatives for protecting the interests of their Services. It would be against human nature for them to do otherwise. One can, however, question a JCS procedure that encourages the committee to reach unanimity, as opposed to one that simply requires information and advice from the Services, that the action officer then has the obligation to reflect in his paper.

If agreement cannot be reached by the action officer committee, the issue is passed formally to the next higher echelon. This new echelon constitutes another committee, and the cycling process is then repeated at that level. If agreement is not reached there, then it goes to the next higher echelon, etc. This cycling process is thorough, and it does keep the Service staffs sensitive to Joint issues. It also assures that their expertise is brought to bear on them. But the price for this thoroughness is often slow response and diminished content. Seeking the mandatory consensus objective takes time. It also tends to water down or "waffle" both the exposition of the issue and the recommended position as the constraints imposed by the protection of Service interests are applied at each echelon. The process is viewed as unproductive by most action officers, one of the reasons many fine officers do not seek Joint Staff assignments. It is also perceived as unproductive by its civilian consumers, one of the reasons that JCS formal advice is frequently not requested or heeded. (See Ref. 4, Appendix C -- the 1978 Steadman Report.) This is, ironically, a source of great frustration to the very men -- the Chiefs -- who over the years have perpetuated the procedures. It is reassuring that the five current members of the JCS are studying these matters.

Thus, the JCS and the Joint Staff do not reach decisions by executive staff process; they seek unanimous consensus among the Services, which is difficult to achieve except through compromise and escalation. A dissenting Service thus can force any issue to the agenda of the JCS -- still another committee. Though the issue may be of interest only to one or two of the four Chiefs, and in the opinion of the others not require their joint consideration, it still comes before the five-member tribunal, and they must deal with it. The Chairman may not resolve such issues himself since, by law, he does not have executive decision authority. If the JCS fail to reach unanimous agreement -- neither he (nor the JCS) can decide what the JCS position is to be. When this happens, the impasse not only delays action but can be broken only through compromise. That frequently diminishes the value of JCS corporate advice. "Split" recommendations are of course one way out (and indeed would be regarded generally as useful by the civilian leadership), but the JCS historically have not favored such a solution.

The Joint Staff -- by law -- is managed by the Chairman but is supposed to work for the JCS as a body. However, by tradition, the Chiefs prefer to depend on their Service staffs rather than on the Joint Staff to analyze Joint issues and to assist them in preparing for JCS meetings. For this reason, there are collectively about as many officers in the Service staffs generally dedicated to Joint activities as there are on the Joint Staff. More important, the Service Chief is not given the benefit of regular Joint Staff advice to balance against the Service views he receives from his own Service staff. The Chief obviously has access to Joint Staff papers, but he does not normally interact with the Joint Staff on a regular basis, nor is he routinely briefed by the Joint Staff.

In addition to their responsibilities to provide corporate advice and to help resolve Joint issues, the JCS have Joint planning and project management responsibilities. Both require extensive technical capability and practical experience in Joint activities. Both require a working knowledge of Joint objectives and Joint management needs. However, officers assigned to the Joint Staff, while capable in their Service career specialties, rarely offer such credentials. There is simply no systematic plan to help officers acquire these credentials or even to emphasize such background when it does exist in the selection of officers for the Joint Staff.

The self-imposed procedures and personnel management policies described above limit the inherent effectiveness of the JCS organization. Naturally, those who depend on the JCS organization for Joint advice, are likely to be critical when the "quality", style, or timing of that advice falls short of their expectations. Moreover, those who work within the JCS organization are understandably frustrated when their efforts seem to have little impact. But -- as noted above -- those most frustrated by their lack of impact as a corporate group seem to be the Chiefs themselves. Reacting to this sense of frustration, the current members of the JCS are examining the efficacy of these staff procedures and policies, and considering ways to improve them.

The major consequences of these constraints are the following, described in relation to JCS tasks:

1. Joint Military Advice. JCS corporate advice is too seldom sought and too seldom heeded. The JCS meet as a group with their Commander in Chief to discuss issues only a few brief times in each administration. That fact in itself limits their credibility as an advisory group. They meet with the Secretary of Defense more regularly (depending on the style of the Secretary) but the meetings have often been pro forma. The JCS generally have been seen by civilian leaders as unable to provide useful Joint advice on many issues. Joint Staff work often comes across as superficial and predictable, and of little help in resolving issues. The Chairman, being the senior officer, has more regular personal contact with the civilian leadership than do the Chiefs. However, as far as the JCS are concerned, he cannot speak for or

decide for the JCS on contentious issues even when there is a majority view. As far as personal advice is concerned, he does not have the kind of trained and experienced staff he needs to be a fully-effective participant in the DoD decision process, representing the Joint military interests. And even if he did have such a staff, current JCS procedures would limit its responsiveness.

2. Military Objectives. Over the years, national security objectives concerning strategy, policy, and programs have been developed without the full benefit of JCS corporate advice. Often the objectives are vague, and lack continuity and consistency, occasionally changing even within a single budget cycle. Such objectives are difficult for the JCS, the CINCs, and the Services to translate into stable, meaningful military missions, economically efficient programs, and feasible plans. The quality of the defense program accordingly suffers, as does its public credibility. If properly organized and staffed, and with the support and encouragement of the civilian leadership in the executive and legislative branches, the JCS could be a stabilizing influence in the development of objectives. They could also help to definitize objectives to make them more useful in military planning, both in programs and in operations. In short, the JCS and the Joint Staff could be much more the "military staff" of the Secretary than they now are.

3. Military Plans and Resource Allocation. Military operation (contingency) plans are an important test of the DoD resource allocation process, since they must be based on resources actually available. Opportunities for improving force capabilities revealed by this planning process should be important inputs to the programming and budgeting process. However, the

JCS and the Joint Staff do not have a significant role in setting objectives or in resource allocation. And even further removed are the CINCs, who actually prepare the operation plans under JCS guidance and would have to implement them. The Joint Staff has only five officers assigned to the programming and budgeting process, hardly enough to track the events of the process, much less represent the CINCs and support the Chairman in his key role in resource allocation as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB). The CINCs are in a particularly good position to advise on operational problems such as shortages of spare parts, munitions, and manpower, but they have been remote from, and poorly represented in, the programming and budgeting process. If the Chairman's staff support were strengthened so that he could better represent the views of the CINCs, a better balance in the allocation of Defense resources between long-term needs for modernization and short-term needs for readiness could be achieved.

4. Plan Development and Execution. The military planning apparatus itself lacks sufficient flexibility and responsiveness in the development and execution of military plans. The apparatus and its technical requirements demand officers skilled in technical planning and joint force structure analysis and management, but officers with such background are seldom available. The planning system also depends on the support of carefully designed information systems to ensure that, in an emergency, the JCS and the National Command Authority (NCA) will have adequate information on the changing status and movement of conventional forces, and on problems as they develop. However, the JCS organization is not

manned or structured to manage such complex Joint projects as the development and supervision of worldwide command and control and other management information systems vital to crisis management and plan execution.

Since implementation of the JCS concept in 1947, the limitations of the JCS organization periodically have been recognized, both by practitioners and by knowledgeable observers. The military leadership has had the opportunity to make significant, orderly improvements. Yet the system has consistently resisted basic change.[6] But now the limitations are more serious than before because of the great need for careful and flexible planning, maximum efficiency in the use of defense resources, faster response capability, and greater emphasis on Joint operations.

It is evident that the JCS organization must be improved. The real questions are: How will it be changed? And by whom?

---

[6] Some important management improvements in the Joint area have been instituted by the JCS in recent years, as noted in Chapter V. But while these show a clear willingness and, indeed, an ability of the JCS to effect change, the changes have not treated the fundamental difficulties at issue here.

III. THE VIEWS OF THE PROFESSIONALS

1. Historical Perspectives. The difficulties encountered in forging several military services into a coherent joint force without threatening their traditions and independence were recognized by professionals long ago, and rather succinctly. In a 1942 letter to Winston Churchill, Sir Frederick Maurice, who had been Director of Military Operations in Britain in 1918, said the following:

> ...The one defect in the present [British] system, as I view it from outside, is the Joint Planning Committee. My experience is that the members of this committee are, ex officio, too much occupied with the affairs of their own Services to give their minds to joint planning, and that when they meet they are disposed rather to find difficulties in, and objections to, proposals for action than to initiate such proposals... 7/

And from Vannevar Bush in 1949:

> "...We are confronted immediately by an apparent paradox. In recent times, we have done military planning of actual campaigns in time of war exceedingly well, and we have done military planning of broad nature in time of peace exceedingly badly. Yet both have been done largely by the same individuals, and so it will pay to look for reasons...
>
> "...How have we determined such vital questions as the fraction of our effort to be placed in strategic air facilities, or whether an outsize aircraft carrier is now worth its great cost? By careful judgement in which expert opinions are balanced, supplemented, and vitalized by coolheaded public discussion? No. Rather, by arguments

---

[7] The Hinge of Fate, Winston S. Churchill (1950).

> of these highly technical matters in public, in the press, in magazine articles, some of them vitriolic and most of them superficial. By statements of high-ranking generals and admirals attacking one another's reasoning, and at times almost one another's veracity. By presidential and Congressional commissions paralleling almost entirely the organization for planning purposes established by law. By the action of committees of Congress, based on superficial examination of the facts and analyses, attempting to pick out from the chaos something that corresponds to reason. By the personality and appeal of enthusiasts for this or that, wherever placed. This is not planning; it is a grab bag. It will lead us to waste our substance. It will lead to strife between services of a nature that can destroy public confidence. It will render us vulnerable in a hostile world. It has already done so to an intolerable degree..." 8/

And finally from William Frye writing about George Marshall in 1947:

> "...Conceived as an advisory group to the constitutional Commander in Chief, the gravest defect of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was...that it was unable to reach a decision except by unanimous consent...
>
> "Now the instruments of warfare had so altered the factors of time and space that the barriers of land and sea had lost meaning...Land, sea, or air, each required the services of the two others. Combined operations were the inescapable need. In this war now reaching a triumphant conclusion, the failures had been scored by separate services, the victories by a team.
>
> "Single command in a theater of operations had been accepted by all services as a minimum necessity. Yet how could theater command be truly effective unless it had at its disposal forces

---

8/ Modern Arms and Free Men, Vannevar Bush (1949).

> educated and trained in combined operations? Joint planning, not debate, would produce a team. Single authority over single purpose, not compromise of separate interest and jealously guarded prerogative, was the only hope of achieving the soundest possible military establishment at a minimum cost...
>
> "Marshall looked at the organization of which he was a member: the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Marshall, Leahy, King, Arnold. Their achievements had been great; but there had been failures, too, and the weakness of the group was that, despite himself, each member had been caught by the fears and ambitions of service prestige and made an advocate of special, instead of national, interest. When that happened, there was no one short of the President to render a decision on what was, after all, a purely military problem....
>
> "The national security is a single problem, and it cannot be provided for on a piecemeal basis, was his rational summation,..." 9/

These men, in the 1940s, saw a different world -- surely one less dangerous than we see today. Yet, even then, they feared that ways might not be found to enhance the Joint perspective of the Services for the common good. They were people experienced in managing war, from the top down. They were also remarkable prophets, as is demonstrated further in the paragraphs below relating the views of senior military personnel now holding Joint positions.

2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By law, the Chairman is one among equals within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet, he differs from his colleagues in important ways.

9/ Marshall Citizen Soldier, William Frye (1947).

On the one hand -- as the senior military officer -- he is the regular military link to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council. He is the only military witness who testifies frequently before the Congress on a Defense-wide basis. As the one member of the JCS with no Service responsibilities, the Chairman is in the best position to treat inter-Service issues strictly on their merits and thus to advise on the resolution of inter-Service differences, a principal reason for having the JCS in the first place.

On the other hand, his potential effectiveness is, by law and by practice, curtailed. As one of five equals, he cannot speak authoritatively for the other members of the JCS as a corporate body unless they all agree or he states the positions of the individual Service Chiefs; he is not the "chairman of the board." Unlike the Service Chiefs, he manages few resources, and resources are an important source of influence. With regard to personnel, he controls no promotions and few assignments, so has little sway over the officers assigned to the Joint Staff and other Joint organizations, including the Unified Commands.

The Chairman is the only senior executive in the Defense organization who does not have a "deputy". This imposes a heavy burden on the Chairman. It also threatens continuity and often breaks it when he must be absent. Thus he tends to be inhibited from planning field trips that would be beneficial in forging stronger links between the JCS and the CINCs, and in giving greater emphasis to Joint operational preparedness.

The unique activities in which the Chairman is involved place unique requirements on the staff that supports him. One requirement is for timeliness. As things are now, he often cannot afford to wait for the whole mechanism of the Joint Staff system to function. Its procedures, though thorough, are not sufficiently responsive. A second requirement is for security. The Chairman deals routinely with very sensitive issues. Many of these not only involve complex military factors, but become inextricably interwoven with political factors. They often touch on matters so sensitive that the Chairman will not risk revealing them to a group as large as the Joint Staff, particularly with its routine involvement of the Service staffs in its preparation of Joint positions. Thus, on sensitive, urgent issues the Chairman is often forced to set up ad hoc arrangements to obtain the kind of staff support he needs.

The Views of the Incumbent Chairman.

The current Chairman has been a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for over seven and one-half years, four as Air Force Chief of Staff. He notes that his view of the role and importance of Joint activities has changed significantly since he became Chairman. The following are his observations about the characteristics and shortcomings of the current JCS organization:

(1) In the twenty years since the Chairman attended the National War College, little has changed regarding Joint activities. The Chairman has served with about a dozen different Service Chiefs. All have experienced dissatisfaction with the Joint system. Most would like to see it changed.

(2) Few Service Chiefs (the present Chairman included) had much Joint experience prior to being promoted to Chief (other than perhaps National War College attendance). Few have brought a full appreciation for Joint activities to their roles as members of the JCS.

(3) The emphasis on Service competition and independence, intended originally to restrict the power of the military within the government, has had the unintended effect of reducing the ability of the government to forge the Services into effective Joint forces.

(4) The Services have few Joint operations in which all four Services are significantly involved on a day-to-day basis in peacetime. The major command headquarters are mainly uni-Service, or involve at most two Services. And the combinations, when they exist, usually pair either the Army and Air Force together, or the Navy and Marine Corps. Of all the commands, the new Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) has the most direct involvement with the forces of all four Services in peacetime and would thus be best prepared to achieve Joint effectiveness in wartime.

(5) The statutory provisions that limit the tours and hence the experience of officers assigned to the Joint Staff are anachronistic. Staff officers assigned to Joint positions generally are not prepared for Joint duty, either through education or experience. Moreover, the allegiance of an officer assigned to a Joint position is generally to his parent Service;

the Service provides his basic environment, compensation, career development, and promotion opportunities. New personnel management procedures are needed that broaden the preparation of officers for Joint duty, and reward them for effective work.

(6) The elaborate staff procedures used by the JCS organization cause Joint Staff officers to act primarily as referees, working within committees of Service staff representatives, rather than as independent staff officers developing Joint positions. Thus, for most officers, Joint duty is seen as undesirable, both because it has a reputation for being non-productive and because it is not perceived as career-enhancing. A way must be found to reduce Service staff control over Joint papers, while still allowing for Service staff input to the preparation of Joint papers.

(7) The Service Chief, by tradition, depends on his own staff to prepare him for JCS meetings rather than the Joint Staff. Naturally, his staff tends to take a Service view of the issues, and a Service Chief must back his Service staff most of the time or he will risk losing their support. Thus, when a Chief comes to a JCS meeting he may be "locked in" to a position before the meeting starts.

(8) The Service Chief has a major job just managing his own Service, and the job is growing in complexity. He has little time to address Joint activities even though he is supposed to give them priority. Sometimes the issues are complex and subject to almost daily development. Thus, the Service Chief often has little incentive and even some difficulty in being prepared to discuss such topics.

(9) The Service Chief has the additional burden of being called on to perform as Acting Chairman, a custom that is growing increasingly impractical and that works against continuity in the Chairman's position. This is important in many areas, but surely the most critical involves the role of the Chairman as an advisor to the Secretary and the President in the emergency use of strategic nuclear forces, now a highly technical subject.

(10) There is not enough emphasis in the government on the "output" side of the Defense program (e.g., readiness). In particular, there is too little emphasis on Joint activities, which are primarily output-oriented. The Department of Defense traditionally organizes around inputs, not outputs; its priorities are driven by such issues as procurement decisions, manpower levels and policies, budget deadlines, Congressional hearings, and other program-oriented activities. Thus, the DoD has tended not to deal effectively with "output" issues such as readiness, integrated force capabilities, and crisis management preparations. The latter are all primary JCS issues -- difficult under the best of circumstances, and certainly not resolved effectively when not given equal time in the defense management process.

(11) The current Chairman, with the perspective of having been a Component Commander under a Unified Command, a Service Chief, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes that the position of Chairman must be strengthened to allow the Chairman to resolve more of the issues and to represent the Joint military interest more effectively. Also, the Service Chiefs

should be released from having to deal with Joint issues of lesser significance, to give them more time to manage their Services. Moreover, the CINCs should be brought into the deliberative process at the Pentagon to represent the Joint point of view. These steps need not reduce the prestige or influence of the Services, but must be taken to increase the sense of "jointness" within the Defense establishment. The Chairman believes these things to be essential now, and certainly in the years ahead. Requirements today are very different compared with those of twenty or thirty years ago. Change should not be forced upon the JCS organization in time of crisis, but should be introduced deliberately, as much as possible by the JCS themselves.

3. The Service Chiefs. The dual burden that a Service Chief bears -- one as the military head of his own Service, and the other as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- is a heavy one. President Eisenhower's views on the subject were clear in his message to the Congress of April 3, 1958:

> "I have long been aware that the Joint Chiefs' [dual] burdens are so heavy that they find it very difficult to spend adequate time on their duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff...The problem is not new but has not yielded to past efforts to solve it. We need to solve it now, especially in view of the new strategic planning and operational burdens I have previously mentioned.
>
> "I therefore propose that present law be changed to make it clear that each chief of a military service may delegate major portions of his service responsibilities to his vice chief. Once this change is made, the Secretary of Defense

> will require the chiefs to use their power of delegation to enable them to make their Joint Chiefs of Staff duties their principal duties."

That proposal was included in the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. However, 24 years later, the problem that President Eisenhower tried to rectify persists. While the Service Chiefs clearly have the power to delegate the running of their Services to their Vice Chiefs, they have been reluctant to do so, and have not been required to do so. The current ASD(MRA&L), Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, suggests why in his book, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff":

> "The problem of the service chief is that he cannot divest himself of his service duties. The real problem is he does not want to. The man who spends nearly forty years as a follower in his service sees his appointment to the JCS as the opportunity to remake his service in his own image. He does not view it as an opportunity to serve as a principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense."

It should be expected that the Service Chiefs would have mixed feelings about the time they spend on Joint matters. Their Joint advice is not in demand. Their main interest and their constituencies lie with their Services. They cannot deal with many major Joint issues to their satisfaction because they cannot reach agreement without compromising their Service positions or waffling their advice. Many of the Joint issues they deal with they consider unnecessarily time-consuming. And being a Service Chief is in itself a full-time job.

For example, the Chiefs must travel extensively to meet their own Service leadership obligations (and they rarely have time to visit the installations and activities of another Service). Their travel schedules make it hard for the JCS to maintain continuity as a working group:

JCS Meeting Attendance
(PRINCIPALS)

Five Years, 1976-81
467 meetings
(about 2 per week)

Number Absent	Percent of the Time
None	24%
One or more	76%
Two or more	40%
Three or more	14%

Thus, only one-quarter of the time were all five principals present and 40% of the time two or more were gone.

Each Chief does try to attend all of the more important JCS meetings, and will adjust his travel schedule accordingly. But nonetheless, the requirements of the two jobs inevitably compete for the time and attention of each man who bears the dual responsibility. The result is a lack of continuity in the JCS meetings.

The Vice Chiefs attend JCS meetings in the Chiefs' absences, but they have even greater difficulty being current on the issues than the Chiefs themselves, since internal Service management is their primary focus and they are present at JCS meetings less frequently than the Chiefs.

What the current system demands of the Chiefs is often unrealistic. They have one job that requires them to be effective advocates for their own Service; they have another that requires them to subordinate Service interests to broader considerations; and they are faced with issues where the two positions may well be antithetical. It is very difficult for a Chief to argue in favor of something while wearing one of his "hats," and against it while wearing the other. Yet that is what the current system often asks of the Service Chiefs.

The Views of the Incumbent Service Chiefs.

Persuasive reasons for change are supported by the views of the four incumbent Service Chiefs. Though they sometimes see the problems in different ways, their consensus is that the JCS organization fails in several of its basic institutional tasks. The Chiefs agree that, though Joint advice is vital, their Joint deliberations are often inconsequential in affecting defense policy and programs. Indeed, what influence they have depends more on individual personal relationships than on Joint institutional relationships.

The current Chiefs also note that their responsibilities as the military heads of their Services are extremely demanding and destined to be more so. Thus they see their Joint activities as an unwelcome intrusion when the results are not productive.

Most disturbing to them of all is that Joint advice has been too seldom sought and too seldom heeded in timely fashion by Defense Secretaries and Presidents, the very executives the JCS organization was devised to support. They note that this is not a recent phenomenon, and indeed that individual management styles and personalities alter the situation only marginally. One must infer that the fault lies not with any particular group of military and civilian executives, but rather with the implementation of the JCS concept itself. Indeed, others who have evaluated the JCS organization over the years reached the same basic conclusion.[10] The fact that the JCS organization has suffered constant criticism by both practitioners and observers supports that conclusion.[11]

Among the specific comments of the Service Chiefs are the following, paraphrased and without attribution:

---

[10] See Appendix C.

[11] Some might argue that there really is no need for Joint military advice from the JCS. At the very least, that argument fails because the President and the Secretary must avail themselves of a wide variety of diverse counsel as they lead the national security program and command its forces. Joint military advice is unique and absolutely critical to assure balance in the spectrum of views they obtain.

(1) "The JCS cannot carry out their statutory responsibilities. It is wrong to say that there is nothing wrong with the JCS organization. The basic organizational concept is flawed."

(2) "Even when the JCS agree on an issue, their Joint advice frequently has no impact."

(3) "Of the major responsibilities of a Service Chief, the Joint responsibility is by far the most frustrating. It seems to have little payoff. Uneven attendance by the principals at JCS meetings is clear evidence of the difficulty of having a Service Chief wear two hats."

(4) "The DoD focus is on programs, almost to the exclusion of systematic examinations of how resources should or would be used, an obvious concern of the JCS and the CINCs. The result is a lack of effective planning, or more precisely a major mismatch between plans and resources. The JCS and the CINCs have very little corporate impact on shaping the Defense program."

(5) "The Service Chief has much more to do than he used to, and the future will place even greater demands on his time. Training and quality assurance in the Services are getting more and more difficult. (Some countries use their Service Chiefs mainly as inspectors general.) It may be that it no longer makes sense for the Service Chiefs to split their responsibilities. Perhaps their Joint roles should be reduced to being members of the 'Board', available to comment on DoD tentative plans."

(6) "The JCS staffing process is flawed. It seeks the lowest common denominator. To avoid 'split' papers for the Secretary, the process constantly seeks agreement in resolving issues, even though that may be accomplished only by watering down the issues and by blunting the sharp edges of the Chiefs' views."

(7) "Such critical Joint responsibilities as the overall direction of command, control, and communications are poorly handled and poorly supported by the Services. Other programs that are obviously Joint or national programs (e.g. rapid deployment and prepositioning) are not managed as such."

(8) "The Joint Staff is not an initiator. It only reacts."

(9) "Organizational changes within the Joint Staff to improve responsiveness and effectiveness are needed, with particular emphasis on improved war planning."

(10) "Procedural changes within the Joint process are needed to encourage prompt, objective, and Joint consideration and resolution of issues; single Service views are emphasized too long in the present process."

(11) "The J-3 should be more involved in the plan review process to ensure a more balanced approach between operations, plans, and policy, and to ensure that the operations people have a more intimate knowledge of the plans that must be implemented in times of crisis or war."

(12) "The quality of the personnel in the Joint Staff and in Joint assignments in general should be better assured. Joint education and Joint assignments following school should be emphasized; personnel policy should be established and enforced. The Chairman should have greater control over Joint assignments, tour length, qualifications and career incentives for Joint duty."

(13) "The current policy on Joint or international experience as a prerequisite for selection for promotion to general officer is appropriate. However, the Secretary of Defense should strengthen the emphasis, among all of the Services, on the importance of officer development through assignment to Joint or international duty at the major through colonel level. We must develop leaders well-schooled in Joint matters who possess a broad multi-Service and international perspective."

(14) "The Chairman should have greater authority within the JCS. It may be appropriate to provide the Chairman more decision authority to rule in favor of a position that has support of a majority of the Chiefs. An increase in authority for the Chairman should increase the efficiency of the process. Adequate channels for appeal would remain for the Service Chiefs."

(15) "The Chairman requires a small but effective staff to deal in resource matters and specifically in the PPBS process. The Chairman should present his own views derived from the Joint process in which the Service Chiefs participate. The Chairman's views should emphasize Joint war-fighting capabilities and cross-Service issues with significant operational impact."

(16) "When considering improvements to the JCS it is important to consider the role of the Service Chiefs and their staffs. It is clear that the process is highly interactive and must be so. Service responsibilities for organizing, training and equipping forces, and related resource allocations are best executed in the context of planned Joint operations and needed Joint capabilities. This context is brought to the Service staff most effectively through the effort of the Service Chief who is clearly dedicated and responsible for actions in both the Joint and Service arenas. The role of the Service Chief in the JCS needs greater emphasis, both to assure better performance as a member of the JCS and to assure better performance as a Service Chief with clear perspective of Joint warfare."

These remarks do not in every instance represent a unanimity of views of the Service Chiefs. But the Service Chiefs are together on these points: they are frustrated by the lack of JCS impact on national policy, regret non-productive time spent in the Joint arena, and see the need for significant improvements in the interest of national security.

4. The Commanders in Chief. A major deficiency in the existing Joint process is the lack of an effective mechanism through which the CINCs of the Unified Commands can participate in the DoD programming and resource allocation processes, contribute to the development of Joint military advice concerning military strategy and other operational matters, and interact more thoroughly with the Joint Staff.

Today, the CINCs are at best only superficially involved in many things critical to their commands. They play almost no role in the programming and budgeting process (though they recently were invited by the Secretary to participate occasionally in meetings of the Defense Resources Board) and have little influence in the JCS force allocation process. In addition, they are not strongly supported by either the Services or the Joint Staff. They have practically nothing to say about the officers assigned to them; just as the Joint Staff has difficulty getting officers qualified in Joint duty, so too do the CINCs. And while there are strong linkages between the Service component commands and their parent Service headquarters, similar bonds do not exist between the Unified Command headquarters and the Joint Staff.

The Views of the Incumbent CINCs.

As a result, the CINCs, too, have expressed concern about the effectiveness of the JCS organization. Their perspective is somewhat different from that of the Chairman and the Service Chiefs, but many points are the same. The following is a composite (though not necessarily a consensus) of the views of four of the incumbent CINCs (two of whom are former Directors of the Joint Staff):

(1) "The Unified Command headquarters need better qualified and better-trained people. Some of this should come in the form of better-focused education at the senior Service colleges (not just the National Defense University) and at the

Command and General Staff schools. The promotion system within the Services should be disciplined to give positive value to Joint duty."

(2) "Return assignments to the Joint Staff are essential. The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) is the best Joint educational experience because it catches officers at the right point in their careers (Grade 0-3/0-4). Service in a Unified Command Headquarters is not necessarily good preparation for service on the Joint Staff, though it is better than no previous headquarters staff experience at all."

(3) "Attitudes regarding the desirability of Joint duty are very different among the several Services."

(4) "The Joint decision-making process takes far too long, primarily because its complex apparatus keeps seeking consensus."

(5) "The Joint Staff spends too much time on day-to-day 'crises'; it should also work harder on long-range planning, and should have greater interaction with the CINCs in this critical area."

(6) "There needs to be more emphasis on war planning in the Joint Staff. Moreover, the process used to develop military operation plans takes too long."

(7) "The CINCs have difficulty getting strategic guidance covering specific politico-military issues."

(8) "The CINCs sometimes get fuzzy guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINCs recognize that JCS guidance must be based on OSD guidance that may itself tend to lack certain specifics; but it is virtually impossible for a military commander to deal with a military mission that depends on guidance objectives such as 'deter', or 'dissuade'."

(9) "Crisis management capabilities within the Pentagon have traditionally been poor. One reason is that faith and trust are not mutual among the principals involved, and have seldom been in the past. The political leadership hasn't always taken the implementers into their confidence at the time they are considering options and making plans."

(10) "The Service Chiefs should be relieved of the need to try to deal jointly with resource allocation under constrained resource circumstances."

(11) "The influence of the Joint community on the resource allocation process should be greater, and particularly of the CINCs, who are in a unique position to establish theater priorities. They should have a major input, particularly on such things as the sustainability of forces."

(12) "There should be major functional contact between the Joint Staff and the CINCs on promising technical innovations such as cruise missile technology and all of its possible applications."

As noted, not all of the CINCs necessarily would agree with all of these statements. One, with experience on the Joint Staff, believes that the procedure used to develop Joint Staff papers for the JCS is sound, primarily because it is thorough, and because it works. But that same individual is deeply concerned about the ability of the Joint Staff to support crisis management.

5. The Joint Staff. The principals within the Joint Staff are charged with making the basic staff mechanisms function. They perhaps are in the best position to see weaknesses attributable to organizational and procedural arrangements. These are the paraphrased views of several of them:

(1) "The Joint Staff is a 'derivative' staff. It is not original and it does not innovate. It answers questions, but doesn't ask them. It needs a better opportunity to be innovative and to interact with the JCS."

(2) "The Joint Staff does not prepare the Chairman well, nor does it prepare the Chiefs. The Chiefs get most of their preparation on Joint issues from their own Service staffs, which hardly grants them a Joint orientation."

(3) "The Chairman often gets the 'file-drawer' treatment, in which a Joint Staff action officer, when given the task of preparing a briefing paper, simply compiles and tabs previous papers in a notebook and adds a bland summary sheet listing the tabs. The typical action officer, with limited staff experience in general and very limited Joint experience in particular, is not equipped to do much else."

(4) "There is little integration of briefing material for the Chairman. This problem is exacerbated when issues arise that involve more than one functional directorate, and these cases are more the rule than the exception. Thus, the pressure is on the Chairman's Special Staff Group, or the Chairman himself, to perform the integration and digestion of the material."

(5) "It is difficult for the Joint Staff to examine options, a problem further complicated by any special sensitivity associated with the issue, since the staffing apparatus ties in the Service staffs as well. It may be that a partial answer would be to provide a small special staff group to the Director of the Joint Staff that could help integrate and digest material, and analyze options on issues of high sensitivity."

(6) "Under current circumstances, it is frequently necessary for the Chairman to insist on ad hoc arrangements, in an attempt to 'tailor' the Joint Staff to the problem and to limit access. If used too frequently, however, that option undermines the Staff and its organization. Thus, the Staff organization, procedures, and personnel preparation should be changed to permit it to be more responsive to the Chairman's needs for high-quality support by the Joint Staff itself, with the ability to limit the numbers of officers involved when necessary."

(7) "It takes far too long to get projects moving, such as the formation of the Steering Group to study the military operation planning system."

(8) "More horsepower within the Joint Staff is needed in the PPBS and POM (Program Objectives Memoranda) review area to help the Chairman carry out his responsibilities in the Defense Resources Board decision process."

(9) "On the policy side, what is needed most is more time -- not calendar time, but fewer diversions. The people on the Joint Staff are good in the policy area."

(10) "As it is now, each Service Chief 'owns' the Joint Staff simply because his Operations Deputy has veto power on Staff actions. Joint papers are derivatives of Service papers, not independent efforts."

(11) "The quality of Joint Staff officers is not really a problem. A way must be found to capitalize on their strengths, and on the inherent importance of Joint activity."

(12) "The policy specialists on the Joint Staff constitute a substantial amount of capability, but as of now they are commenters, not generators."

(13) "A Service Chief can seldom reverse himself on a position he has taken as Chief of his Service. However, he should have an interest, as a military man, in laying out the alternatives, rather than defaulting on that task to the OSD staff."

(14) "The Chairman is expected by Congress to lay out his views. He should have the best staff support possible."

(15) "The mission of the U.S. Armed Forces is changing. We must have the capability to meet the Soviets anywhere (including in space). The Joint system must be changed to give us the capability to do the necessary innovative studies and planning."

(16) "The Joint Staff needs a stronger focal point for pulling together (and anticipating) crisis actions."

(17) "Lack of Washington experience and the short terms of assignment for officers on the Joint Staff are really a problem. A three-year term is needed for flag-level officers."

(18) "Officers tend to risk their careers on the Joint Staff if they move out too smartly. Yet, new and innovative moves are needed, in military planning and in command and control, to name two examples."

(19) "Improvements to the planning system and the creation of the Joint Deployment Agency are not fundamental changes in themselves. We must look beyond such steps."

(20) "The Service staffs have different perceptions of Joint problems, which makes progress difficult given their strength in controlling Joint actions."

(21) "A better procedure is needed to provide continuity in the position of Acting Chairman. During one recent three-day period when the Chairman was out of town the responsibility for Acting Chairman changed hands seven times."

6. Summary. The views presented above are not the casual comments of executives complaining about life in the bureaucracy. They reflect the honest, deep-seated concerns of the military leadership itself about the viability of the most important joint military organization in the Free World. Their overwhelming consensus is that changes are needed, and needed now.

IV. JOINT DUTY -- PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND PROCEDURES

1. Preparation and Tenure of Officers. All professional military assignments have special requirements for prior training and experience. Submarine skippers, F-15 pilots, and infantry battalion commanders all require -- and are given -- careful preparation.

The same should be true for officers serving in Joint assignments, such as the Joint Staff or the Unified Command headquarters. Aside from understanding how such staffs function, they face the immense problem of learning how the DoD and their sister Services function. Few officers are expert in the several branches of their own Service, let alone the other Services. But officers serving on Joint staffs should at least have a broad working knowledge of all the Armed Forces. Few do. Most assigned to Joint duties have little formal preparation, and few stay long enough to acquire expertise on the job:

(1) Of those officers now serving in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) 12/, only 2% had any previous Joint Staff experience and only 36% had prior Service staff experience. Many have been assigned directly from the field.

(2) Only 13% have attended the five-month resident course at the Armed Forces Staff College, the school specifically designed to train young officers for Joint duty.

12/ The OJCS comprises the statutory Joint Staff that is specifically limited by law to 400 officers, and a group of other staff elements established over the years to meet additional staff requirements. Both are under the direction of the Director of the Joint Staff.

(3) Of the colonels and Navy captains now assigned to the Joint Staff, about two-thirds have been to one of the five senior colleges -- the three Service War Colleges and the NWC and ICAF in the NDU; but less than one-quarter have been to one of the two Joint schools -- NWC and ICAF -- that are specifically provided for Joint education.

(4) The average tour length of officers in the OJCS -- the most complex and important military staff in the defense establishment -- is less than 30 months. This means that at any given time the average experience level on the Staff is no more than 15 months, and there is virtually no corporate memory.

(5) The leadership positions in the Joint Staff are filled by general and flag officers. Their normal tour is 24 months, less than that of their staff officers. Thus, the average level of experience on the Joint Staff for generals and admirals is about one year. For those who served during the past 5 years, less than 60% had served previously in a Joint assignment, even though DoD policy states that a Joint-duty assignment is a prerequisite to promotion to flag rank. Moreover, many of the positions counted as "Joint" are really not, and are simply not comparable in scope (as regards Joint matters) to positions in the Joint Staff and Unified Command headquarters. 13/

The Armed Forces Staff College prepares officers at the O-3 and O-4 levels for Joint duty. However, there is no assurance that most AFSC graduates will ever be assigned to Joint duties. The same is true of the more senior National War College

---

13/ The senior civilian positions in DOD fare little better in regard to tenure. Among approximately 30 presidential appointee positions in OSD and the Military Departments requiring Senate confirmation (assistant secretaries and above), the average term of service for the 205 executives who have held those positions since 1960 has been only 32 months (a figure that allows for promotions and other reassignments that did not break continuity). Moreover, extended vacancies have occured in these positions 146 times with an average duration of 5 months.

and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which are aimed at preparing officers at the 0-5 and junior 0-6 levels. NWC and ICAF are now revising their programs and curricula to prepare graduates better for Joint duty. However, unless Service officer assignment policies are changed, their revised curricula will be of little help in improving the background of the officers actually assigned to Joint duty. The investment in NDU is substantial. The total annual cost of operating the three schools under NDU, including the compensation of the military faculty and students, is estimated to exceed $30 million.

In summary, Joint officers are asked to analyze major national issues such as arms control, develop national security objectives, oversee the development of Joint military plans, and complete other major tasks that require a depth of knowledge of the other Services, of defense strategy, and of the overall defense program that they simply have not had the opportunity to acquire. The combination of lack of staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of Joint activities, and lack of formal preparation through the Joint school system, all coupled with short tours, makes it very difficult for Joint Staff officers, no matter how capable (and many are very capable), to deal effectively with these major staff responsibilities. The result is that the Chairman lacks the support he needs to carry out his responsibilities, and the Secretary of Defense is not provided the kind of military staff support he needs, has a right to expect, and could be provided if the Services gave greater weight to Joint-duty positions in their management of officer personnel.

2. The Desirability of Joint Duty. Joint assignments are seldom sought by officers. A Joint position removes them from the environment for which they have been trained, in which they have established relationships and reputations, and in which they seek advancement. It places them instead in a wholly new environment involving unfamiliar procedures and issues for which most of them have little or no formal training. Their fitness reports (which affect their careers and prospects for advancement) are often entrusted to officers of other Services with little in common by way of professional background.

Adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work on the Joint Staff is unproductive, and that too much effort is wasted on tedious negotiation of issues until they have been debased and reduced to the "lowest common level of assent."[14/]

The general perception among officers is that a Joint assignment is one to be avoided. In fact, within one Service it is flatly believed to be the "kiss of death" as far as a continued military career is concerned. In contrast, Service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishments and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers opt for Service assignments rather than risk a Joint-duty assignment. Yet Joint positions have the potential for making major contributions to the defense effort, and to offer challenging work to the finest officers. Indeed, the number of Joint positions available and the relatively rich

---

[14/] Richard C. Steadman, "Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure", Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1978.

grade structure are impressive. With only 3% of the total number of officers in the four Services, Joint positions account for 13% of the general and flag officers and 6% of the grades of 0-5 (lieutenant colonel and commander) and 0-6 (colonel and Navy captain):

Officer Positions In Joint-Duty and Other "Non-Service" Activities [15]

	Grade					
Activity	0-3	0-4	0-5	0-6	Gen/Flag	Total
OSD	19	68	176	156	19	438
OJCS	2	70	368	211	31	682
JDA	5	26	30	9	4	74
Unified Commands	236	730	850	291	47	2,154
NATO Commands	162	405	478	209	45	1,299
Subtotal "Joint"	424	1,299	1,902	876	146	4,647
% of Total Grade	<1%	3%	6%	6%	13%	3%
Defense Agencies	545	986	882	380	35	2,828
Other Activities[16]	159	440	501	347	29	1,476
Total	1,128	2,725	3,285	1,603	210	8,951
% of Total Grade	1%	5%	10%	11%	19%	5%
Army						(3,317)
Navy/USMC						(2,400)
Air Force						(3,234)

---

[15] As of 28 September 1981. Excludes officers assigned to the Service staffs whose principal or part-time responsibilities are in support of their Service Chiefs in Joint activities. It is estimated by the Services that at least 675 officers are so involved, including several of flag rank.

[16] Aerospace Defense Command; National Defense University; Armed Forces Staff College; Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff; Joint Electronic Warfare Center; Joint Strategic Connectivity Staff; Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center; Inter-American Defense Board; Defense Attache System; Security Assistance Activities (MAAGS, MILGPs, etc).

At a minimum, the Joint positions above the subtotal line -- some 4600 positions including 146 general/flag officer billets -- could be specially managed as a group, to see that officers are assigned who have the proper experience, education, and motivation (i.e., rewards) to bring Joint duty to the stature and effectiveness it deserves.

It is interesting that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) itself has two-thirds as many officers (including generals and admirals) as the OJCS, so that the number of officers on the Secretary's combined staff is 1,120, or nearly _three times_ the official officer strength ceiling authorized for the Joint Staff. One can only speculate, but the fact that over the years the various Secretaries have seen fit to create over 400 officer positions (including 19 of flag rank) within the "civilian" staff, suggests that somehow the Joint Staff is missing out on the opportunity to play a far more meaningful role in advising the Secretary than it now does.

3. _Joint Staff Procedures_. There are three characteristics of current Joint Staff procedures that tend to inhibit the utility of Joint Staff activities in the eyes of the Secretary and his civilian assistants. First, JCS papers for the Secretary of Defense rarely cover the full range of possible alternative resolutions to the issue in question. The JCS traditionally have tried instead to resolve such issues through their internal deliberative process, and to avoid split recommendations even if that results in a bland and sterile presentation of their views. A Service Chief may hesitate to lend his name to a document that includes an alternative with which he takes issue, even if it is not recommended. Some of the Chiefs also believe that split

positions diminish the strength of their Joint recommendations. (Some of the Chiefs also believe that the opposite is true.) However, there are few defense issues with only one possible resolution, and any Secretary of Defense will be quite aware that alternatives do exist. If he does not find them in JCS papers, he will turn to his civilian staff to find them and to determine whether they are preferable to the one recommended by the JCS. But, no matter how useful this civilian advice, it cannot substitute for a competent military evaluation of the alternatives.

A second characteristic is that Joint Staff action officers, rather than drafting JCS papers themselves, often accept drafts authored by the Services. This practice tends to subvert the Joint process. If a Service can frame the issues and the arguments in the initial draft, the terms of the subsequent deliberations may well be cast in a context most favorable to that Service's position, and the other Services may find themselves at a disadvantage. Joint Staff action officers then tend to be "brokers" rather than initiators, and the process is aimed more at "damage-limiting" for the Services than at developing a paper reflecting true Joint interests. Another result is that, for those papers involving issues of concern to the CINCs, the CINCs do not have adequate representation.

A third characteristic -- one much debated -- is the highly-stylized, multiple-level "flimsy/buff/green/red-stripe" staffing process. As noted earlier, it is possible, and indeed likely, for a JCS paper to go through four levels of staffing, each with multiple iterations of drafting, commenting, and revising. This admittedly thorough but prolonged process of trying to reach some mutually satisfactory compromise among the Services tends not to sharpen and hone the issues, but rather to bury them. The more iterations this process involves, the longer the process takes, and the less substantive the paper becomes. The objective becomes one of agreement, at the expense of content.

Thus, rather than producing a paper with Joint orientation that sets forth clearly defined alternatives and analyzes them for their pros and cons, Joint Staff procedures tend to filter out jointness and to "protect" Service positions. Many issues are analyzed not by one staff but five -- the Joint Staff and the four Service staffs. Not only is there redundancy in the process, but it tends to be sterile, a fact known widely throughout the Services and the Joint Staff -- one of the major reasons that many competent officers are not attracted to Joint duty. The approach is thorough, but often at the expense of content -- and time.

The tight interlocking of the Joint Staff and the Service staffs is traditional. Without doubt, when established decades ago, the procedure was intended to "protect" the Services by assuring their individual control over Joint Staff activities. It serves the purpose well of keeping at least a certain group of officers on each Service staff sensitive to Joint issues. But whether the national interest is served by perpetuating these checks and balances designed in a different era is questionable. It is easier to conclude that by restricting the independence of the Joint Staff as is now done, a principal source of military advice is lost, or at least attenuated. The vacuum is either filled by civilians -- or not filled at all.

V. RECENT IMPROVEMENTS

Several important initiatives have been undertaken recently to repair weaknesses in the Joint system. Some were started as a result of the lessons learned during mobilization exercises NIFTY NUGGET and PROUD SPIRIT, which were designed by the JCS to detect and evaluate problems. The major initiatives are described below.

1. Creation of the Joint Deployment Agency. In NIFTY NUGGET it became clear that the Joint Staff was not equipped to work with the Transportation Operating Agencies (MTMC, MSC, and MAC) in the development of detailed movement plans for military operation plans. The Joint Staff also needed help in tracking the execution of plans from the standpoint of mobilization and deployment. The JCS therefore recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the Joint Deployment Agency be established to perform these functions as an adjunct to the Joint Staff, but working under the aegis of the Commander in Chief, Readiness Command. The JDA has been established and is now being strengthened through additional actions.

2. Merger of MSC and MTMC. As a further step in improving transportation planning in connection with mobilization and the transition from peace to war, a special project was established by the Chairman to find ways to improve surface transportation planning, and in particular to deal with the interface between land and sea in both peacetime and wartime. The result of that effort will be the creation of a new command, formed by merging the Military Sealift Command and the Military Traffic Management Command.

3. Staff review of the Joint Planning System. The lack of flexibility and responsiveness in Joint planning was identified in NIFTY NUGGET and examined in detail in PROUD SPIRIT. A Steering Group was then formed, chaired by the J-3, to study ways to improve the planning system or to develop a new one. The Steering Group is now working with the Services on several promising initiatives.

4. Improvement of Joint education programs. In an effort to improve the effectiveness of Joint education, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman have directed the President of the National Defense University (NDU) to revise the curricula at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to provide a better focus on preparing officers at the 0-5 and 0-6 levels for Joint duty, particularly in mobilization and deployment planning (ICAF) and in joint and combined operations (NWC). The Armed Forces Staff College has also been assigned to NDU. In addition, three centers are being established at NDU, separate from the colleges, to help improve DoD planning and exercises. These are the War Gaming and Simulation Center, the Strategic Concepts Development Center, and the Mobilization Concepts Development Center. These Centers will conduct in-house studies and also respond to requests for support from the Secretary of Defense and the JCS.

5. Creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The creation of the RDJTF was an innovative step toward improving joint-Service operations capability. Being the operational headquarters having the most direct involvement with the forces

of all four Services in peacetime, it could prove to be an important new focus of Joint activity, including the development of joint-Service doctrine, tactics, and logistics.

6. Improved Joint exercise program. The JCS exercise program has been expanded and intensified to reveal problems in the major areas of mobilization preparedness, crisis management, and the deployment of large-scale forces. An important innovation was the broad involvement of civilian executives, both in DoD and in supporting federal civil departments and agencies.

These steps, which encountered a modest amount of institutional resistance in some cases, are important efforts. They also demonstrate the willingness of the JCS to make changes that increase the effectiveness of Joint activities. They do not, however, strike at the fundamental problems of the JCS organization.

VI. NEW OBJECTIVES

The nation expects the Defense Department to plan and manage the use of its resources wisely and well, and to be able to respond, quickly and competently, to a wide variety of potential emergencies. Among other things, that requires a strong, well-conceived Joint organization and process, and well-prepared officers in Joint duty positions. Today there is neither.

It is time to redress the balance between Joint interests and Service interests. Defense preparedness demands some constructive initiatives, and they need threaten neither the independence of the Services nor the principle of civilian control. Such initiatives must meet the following general objectives:

1. Provide greater emphasis on the management of Joint activities. Since the original passage of the National Security Act, Joint military activities have dealt more with matters of form than of substance. In part, that is because the Military Departments and the four Armed Services have strong constituencies, rich traditions, and understandable competitive desires for independence. But it is also because of a concern that can be traced back to the founding of the republic -- that its armed forces be kept firmly in check and not allowed to become too influential. One of the most enduring manifestations of that tradition is the distrust of anything resembling a separate, central military staff. Thus, when the National Security Act was drafted, special care was taken to tightly circumscribe the power and authority of the JCS.

The original objective of constraining the JCS has been achieved so completely that the threat today is not that the JCS could become a powerful political influence that might lead us into military adventures. Rather, the threat today is that the Joint system may not be able to forge our independent Services into an effective fighting force if war should come.

It is now clear that there are changes that would make it possible to plan and carry out Joint operations properly without threatening either the independent status of our Services or our nation's political traditions. The problem is one of balance. A certain amount of Service independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the Services too much, and the larger needs of the nation's defenses too little. The military organizations given the responsibility for the planning and execution of Joint activities -- notably the JCS, the Joint Staff and its subordinate agencies such as the Joint Deployment Agency, and the various Unified Command headquarters -- simply do not have the authority, stature, trained personnel, or support needed to carry out their jobs effectively. The result is that there are major deficiencies in the management of Joint activities, a matter of particular concern in those areas unique to the JCS, notably military operation planning and execution. It is the nature of such shortcomings to have little visibility except in times of real emergency. That is one reason that changes have not been made.

2. Strengthen the military voice in the resolution of Joint issues involving the allocation of resources. It is unrealistic to expect the Service Chiefs as a corporate body to help resolve Joint issues involving the allocation of limited resources among

the four Services. Thus, those allocations have been resolved primarily by civilians. But professional military advice to civilian leadership on such matters would be immensely valuable. Therefore the ability of the Chairman -- who does not share the Service Chiefs' inherent conflicts of interest -- to provide that kind of advice must be strengthened. Furthermore, the CINCs of the Unified Commands must play a more influential role in the resource allocation process than they now do, and this must be accomplished through the JCS organization.

3. Reduce the Joint workload of the Service Chiefs. President Eisenhower declared in 1958 that the Joint Chiefs' burdens were too heavy, even then. Legislation was passed to permit the Service Chief to delegate his Service responsibilities to his Vice Chief, and thus free himself for Joint matters. But, in practice, no Service Chief can or will do that. The Chief is still the Chief, by tradition, inclination, and expectation. Furthermore, just managing their Service can keep both the Chief and his Vice Chief fully occupied. For, since Eisenhower's time, the Services have grown in complexity, and the management challenge has grown in proportion. The Chief's internal span of control is broader, and he is required to deal with more outside organizations as well, including -- in the budgetary process -- layers of management that hardly existed 24 years ago: there are now an expanded OSD, full-blown Service secretariats, an OMB, and Congressional interest that is far broader and deeper than before, with at least six committees requiring formal testimony. As a Service Chief looks ahead to accelerated change in the world power structure, in technology, and in the competition for human and material resources, he sees a growing challenge to himself

and his successors merely to carry out Service responsibilities. Indeed, to accomplish the latter is in itself a full-time job, a conclusion with which most Chiefs -- current and past -- will agree.

In sum, there has been a tendency to involve the Chiefs in everything, at least in form if not in substance. That is unfair to the Chiefs, and clearly not realistic. The Service Chiefs should be relieved of tasks in the Joint arena that they cannot do or do not need to do, to permit them to spend as much time as possible managing their Services. On the other hand, they should be strengthened in their ability to contribute to Joint military advice on the major national security issues that they can effectively address as a corporate body -- issues in which they are not constrained by conflict of interest. Changes along these lines would not weaken the influence and prestige of the Chiefs, but on the contrary would enhance their standing.

4. Strengthen the Position of the Chairman. The Chairman also plays two major roles, one as the senior military officer advising the Secretary and the President, and one as a member of the JCS. The distinction between these roles perhaps has not been fully appreciated. The complexity of both is growing, as are their demands on the Chairman's time. But he is handicapped in both roles in two ways.

First, he is highly dependent on the Joint Staff to prepare him for DoD and interagency policy meetings. Yet the elaborate staff procedures used by the Joint Staff, involving extensive Service staff participation, make it difficult for the Chairman to obtain responsive and independent staff support, particularly on controversial subjects. The Joint Staff is also handicapped by high turnover and by having officers assigned who in most cases lack education and experience in Joint matters and, frequently, senior military staff activity of any kind. And, finally, the fact that the Chairman has no executive powers to settle disagreements among the JCS means that he spends a great deal of time adjudicating debates and trying to foster compromises that all can accept.

Second, the Chairman is the only senior official in the defense establishment without a deputy. Except for his Assistant (who cannot act for him), he has no one to substitute for him on a regular basis, either in JCS meetings or in DoD and interagency meetings.[17/] Under present arrangements, the most senior Service Chief (or, if need be, Vice Chief) available becomes Acting Chairman when the Chairman is absent. That may be a different individual each day, since the Chiefs and Vice Chiefs travel as well. This obviously makes it difficult to provide continuity, and inhibits the Chairman from visiting the field. This difficulty should be particularly noticeable to the Secretary of Defense, who looks to the Chairman for day-to-day continuity on a wide variety of issues including military emergencies. The Secretary also depends on the Chairman's support on those issues at meetings of the National Security Council (NSC), the Defense Resources Board (DRB), and other major policy groups, as well as in appearances before the Congress. It is certainly noticeable to the Joint Staff, who of course, look to the Chairman for

---

[17/] Since 1963, the position of Assistant to the Chairman has been authorized in the grade of O-9 (lieutenant general/vice admiral).

leadership, and in his absence must quickly bring an Acting Chairman "up to speed." The Service Chiefs, in turn, are not totally comfortable with playing the role of Acting Chairman. It is a diversion from their primary interest and they have difficulty keeping themselves current on the issues, not having participated on a day-to-day basis in meetings of the NSC and the other interagency groups.

The Chairman needs to be strengthened, not so much in the sense of giving him greater powers, but rather in the sense of giving him the resources he needs to carry out the responsibilities he already has in fulfilling the two roles described above. A Deputy or Vice Chairman, and a fully-qualified Joint Staff with sensible procedures, appear to be key ingredients.

5. Increase OJCS staff support of the Service Chiefs to increase emphasis on "jointness" in Joint Staff activity. Joint Staff procedures, though exemplary in their thoroughness, are complex and ponderous. Counting the Service staffs, there are really five staffs engaged in Joint activities in support of the Chiefs, not one. Much of the work they do is redundant, with the several staffs analyzing the same issues in parallel. President Eisenhower noted 24 years ago that "these laborious processes exist because each military department feels obliged to judge independently each work product of the Joint Staff." The situation has not changed. The Service Chiefs depend on their own Service staffs to prepare them for JCS meetings. They are seldom briefed by officers on the Joint Staff, and have relatively little interaction with them. The net effect of the staff process often tends to be a projection (and protection) of Service positions rather than an emphasis on the Joint interest.

6. Provide better education, more Joint experience, and improved incentives for officers assigned to Joint duty. Because of the low priority (and even low esteem) attached to Joint assignments, the Services today have little incentive, and thus make no systematic attempt, to develop, educate, and select properly prepared officers for Joint duty, in spite of its demanding requirements and its importance to national security. Tours of duty in Joint assignments are relatively short -- averaging less than 30 months -- and repeat tours rarely occur, neither of which is surprising given the lack of incentives for Joint duty and the statutory limitations imposed on the Joint Staff.[18] The statutory limitations are anachronistic; the most important U.S. military staff should not be singled out for special restrictions that inhibit continuity.

There are three impressive Joint colleges[19] available to educate officers in Joint command and staff matters, but the Services appear to have little success in correlating the selection of officers to attend them and the assignment of graduates to Joint duty (though some of the Services work harder at this than others). Similarly, previous senior headquarters staff experience (Joint or otherwise) is not used uniformly as a primary criterion in selecting officers for Joint duty.

---

[18] The law now limits tours on the Joint Staff to three years. Back-to-back tours normally are not permitted except in time of war. Officers completing a tour of duty on the Joint Staff may not be reassigned to the Joint Staff within the following three years, except that selected officers may be recalled to Joint Staff duty in less than three years with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in each case. The number of such officers recalled to duty in less than three years may not exceed 30 serving on the Joint Staff at any one time. (Officers serving in the OJCS but outside the Joint Staff are not affected by these limitations.)

[19] All three are part of the National Defense University: The National War College (NWC); the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF); and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).

The quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff is hard to measure (though often criticized -- unfairly, we suspect -- because lack of experience and poor procedures are equated by some to lack of officer quality), but there is no question that much could be done to improve their preparation for Joint duty as well as their sense of its importance and of their ability to contribute. But even that would be of little help as long as a Joint duty assignment is seen to be at best a ticket-punching career stop for officers, and at worst a real detriment to career progression. Thus, meaningful incentives for Joint-duty assignments also must be developed.

7. Improve the organization of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff as now organized does not fit the scope and diversity of today's workload. The ability of the Joint Staff to support the Chairman in his role as a member of the Defense Resources Board is limited; the Joint operation planning and execution capability needs to be improved; there is no single focal point for logistics and manpower mobilization planning; there is no staff executive responsible for the management of Joint duty positions, or for the preparation and assignment of the officers who man them; and the JCS have no meaningful project management capability even though responsible for several key information and communication systems, the most important of which is the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). A staff realignment is needed to accommodate these requirements.

8. Improve Joint planning. The JCS are concerned with two basic planning tasks: (1) the development of strategic concepts, national security objectives, and military force goals, both to help shape the Defense program and to establish a basis for military planning; and (2) guiding the preparation of Joint military operation (contingency) plans, constrained by actual force readiness and other real-world conditions, and designed to meet the most important near-term contingencies. There traditionally has not been a fully effective dialog between the JCS and the civilian leadership regarding the first task, and there are serious management problems in the mechanisms used to accomplish the second.[20/] The important iterative process by which the civilian and military leadership settle on military objectives and on the political assumptions important to contingency planning should be enhanced. The JCS must be furnished clearly defined objectives by the civilian leadership. And the JCS must develop a more flexible and responsive military operation planning system.

9. Provide for greater involvement of the CINCs in Joint activities. A principal responsibility of the JCS is to ensure that the CINCs can accomplish their wartime missions, should that become necessary. To fulfill that responsibility requires regular interaction in peacetime between the JCS and the CINCs, with a strong emphasis on preparation for Joint operations. However, the CINCs (of the Unified Commands) are not the primary focus of activity in the field. Rather, their Component (Service) Commanders are, because they command the resources. But the Component Commander's allegiance tends to be to his parent

---

[20/] See JCS and OSD NIFTY NUGGET and PROUD SPIRIT exercise evaluations (Bibliography, Appendix C).

Service, not to the Unified Command headquarters. As a result, the CINCs are relatively isolated as far as the DoD budgetary process and defense priorities determinations are concerned. They also have little to say about the forces assigned to them; there is very little direct discussion between the CINCs and the JCS about the assumptions and content of military plans. A mechanism must be established to bring the CINCs more routinely into the key processes at DoD headquarters.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The JCS concept is 35 years old, but it has not yet fully matured. Change has always come slowly within the 200-year history and traditions of the U.S. military Services. The Army General Staff was created in 1903 to coordinate the relatively autonomous Army field and support organizations, but it was not until the 1930s that it began to function smoothly, bringing a sense of continuity, balance, and internal consistency to the Army management process. The transition, when it finally happened, was the result of enlightened leadership encouraged, no doubt, by a growing awareness of the Army's need at that time for better military preparedness and more effective planning. Looked at in that light, the need is even greater now to modernize the JCS organization and its policies and procedures.

Thus it is reassuring that, under the leadership of the Chairman, the JCS personally are actively looking for ways to improve Joint activities. Significant initiatives already underway are noted in Chapter V. More changes are contemplated by the JCS in the organization of Joint Staff activities -- especially military planning. While not dealing with the primary JCS structure itself, these changes nevertheless represent a willingness to make change, to improve the effectiveness of Joint activities, and above all to respond to the changing national security environment. Regarding the JCS structure, the fact that this Report was commissioned -- and that the Chairman, the Chiefs, the CINCs, and senior members of the Joint Staff have been forthcoming and candid in their personal assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the JCS structure and that all are seeking improvements -- are solid testimony to the concern of the current military leadership. They do not necessarily agree on how to characterize every problem or its causes, nor are they likely to agree on solutions in every case. That is to be expected. Indeed, even within the Special Study Group there was a diversity of opinion, a fact that proved to be extremely helpful in establishing priorities and developing and testing recommendations.

The Study Group proposes several initiatives to improve Joint activities. Each is important in its own right, but the proposed steps interact and are mutually supporting. They must be viewed collectively to appreciate their real and essential impact.

None of the proposals if implemented would restrict the statutory position of the Service Chiefs as military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President in the areas of their special expertise, nor would the proposals lead to the creation of a centralized "general staff". Except for two specific items requiring legislation (noted below), the proposed actions can be accomplished by the JCS either within their own authority or with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. However, we stress here that initiatives taken by the JCS to increase "jointness" and improve Joint activities will have maximum impact only if the civilian leaders -- the President, the Secretary of Defense, and other Defense executives, both now and in the future -- actively support the improved JCS organization, and solicit and use its products. Such support goes beyond pro forma meetings; it requires a basic change in approach on the part of the civilian leadership from the general pattern of the last 20 years or more. The Chairman must have a strong voice in defense councils, both formally and informally, representing the Joint community, including the CINCs. The advice of the Service Chiefs, as a corporate group along with the Chairman, must be actively solicited on the wide variety of national issues to which they can contribute in unique ways.

The mission of the military establishment is to deter war, and to respond quickly and effectively if deterrence fails. As noted earlier, that mission requires three things of the JCS:

- To provide Joint military advice to the National Command Authority in peacetime and under emergency conditions;
- To be prepared for mobilization and war;
- To support the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands in the event of war.

One cannot overdramatize the fact that while the peacetime management of military activities is an important matter, preparedness for war management is the overriding imperative. That type of preparedness is the best possible deterrent to actual conflict, and provides the best assurance of success if deterrence fails.

RECOMMENDATIONS

With these requirements in mind, the Study Group recommends the following actions:

1. Establish the position of Vice Chairman in the grade of general/admiral (0-10), with the authority to act for the Chairman in his absence -- to chair JCS meetings, attend Defense Resources Board and other policy meetings, and in all other ways act for the Chairman. The Vice Chairman would not be a regular

member of the JCS. He would function much as a Service Vice Chief of Staff does in relation to his Chief of Staff. Either the Chairman or his Vice Chairman would be in Washington at all times. This step would assure maximum continuity in the Chairman's position (both in routine activities and in time of crisis), free the Chairman to participate more actively in field activities including exercises to improve Joint readiness and develop joint-Service doctrine, and relieve the Service Chiefs of the need to play the role of Acting Chairman.[21/] Except

---

[21/] The Study Group considered two alternatives to the creation of the Vice Chairman position as means to solve the continuity problem. One would be to select a single Service Chief (presumably the senior one) to be the acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence. The other would be to rotate the responsibility among the four Service Chiefs, with each Chief serving three or four months at a time. The Study Group rejected both of these alternatives in favor of the Vice Chairman concept for the following reasons: First, the JCS have had 24 years (since the 1958 reorganization led to the appointment of Vice Chiefs) to solve the continuity problem and have never managed to do it. In the meantime the demands on the Chairman and thus the continuity problem have increased. The sustained commitment of time and the restrictions on travel that a Service Chief would have to accept in either approach now appear to be unrealistic; the record supports that view, and the demands of his Service on the Service Chief have also been increasing. The appointment of a Vice Chairman is a modest and logical step that does not threaten the Chiefs' responsibilities as members of the JCS and advisors to the Secretary and the President, including their rights to direct access. It would ease the workload problem of the Service Chief and not divert him from his key responsibility as military head of his Service, a job with increasing demands in its own right. One member of the Senior Group, Admiral Michaelis, generally agrees with this view, but also believes that the Chiefs themselves should assess the demands that would be placed on them if either of the two alternatives mentioned above were selected. They should then make a definitive judgment as to whether those demands -- over the long run -- could realistically be accommodated by the Service Chiefs.

for brief appointment transition periods, the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and the Director of the Joint Staff should be from three different Services. The Vice Chairman should take on specific areas of management responsibility, such as the military operation planning process, by direction from the Chairman. Legislation would be required to authorize the new O-10 position.

2. Refine the process for focusing the attention of the JCS on issues of major national significance (e.g., arms limitations) and strengthen the Chairman's authority to resolve other issues. Selectively reduce the burden of the Service Chiefs' involvement in Joint activities by eliminating Service Chief corporate consideration of issues they need not address because they are routine, of issues that involve intense conflict of interest problems for the Service Chiefs (e.g., definitive resource allocation questions), and of issues involving only one or two Services (e.g., nominations for Joint positions). The Chairman should resolve the routine issues and also be empowered by the JCS to resolve issues on which there is majority agreement within the JCS. He should work directly with the Service Chiefs specifically concerned on narrow issues involving only one or two Services. The Chairman should report independently to the Secretary of Defense on issues not addressed by the JCS because of the conflict of interest problem, including particularly matters involving the allocation of resources. On all such matters the Chairman should keep the members of the JCS fully informed. The process for identifying issues requiring corporate attention should be established by the JCS, with the approval of the Secretary. The Chairman should then restrict JCS agendas to the priority topics for the JCS. Also, he should frequently limit the attendance for JCS meetings to principals to encourage

frank discussion of major national issues in a less formal, less structured atmosphere than usually provided. This will free the Service Chiefs to devote more time to essential Service matters. Equally important, their work on Joint issues to which they can make a significant contribution will not be diluted, but rather enhanced. Then, with the other changes recommended here, the quality and timeliness of that work can be improved and recognized as such by the civilian leadership, thus building the credibility of the JCS as an effective advisory group. This will pave the way for an enhanced, more active working relationship between the President and Secretary of Defense and the JCS, a relationship that also can be fostered by the Chairman as the primary link between the JCS and the civilian leaders.

3. Require the Joint Staff to brief, interact with, and prepare the Service Chiefs for JCS meetings, and to support the Chiefs generally in the resolution of the Joint issues they address. Foster greater reliance on the Joint Staff by requiring that Joint papers be authored by Joint Staff action officers, responding to written guidance from the Director. Joint papers should be organized to present alternatives, and as a general rule, Service staff involvement should be to provide information and advice on issues, at the request of the Joint Staff. If needed as a transitional step to encourage greater reliance by the Service Chiefs on the Joint Staff, establish four OJCS Service Chief Support Groups -- one assigned to each Chief and physically located within the Joint Staff area. Each Group should be headed by a flag-rank officer (of the corresponding Chief's Service, if so desired), and staffed by officers from the four Services. These Groups should brief the Chiefs in their preparation for JCS meetings. While this would not preclude

briefings by the Service staffs, the Groups eventually should be able to relieve the Service staffs of some of their Joint activity burden, and even permit Service staff officer requirements to be reduced. (Nearly 700 officers on the Service staffs now spend much or all of their time in support of the Service Chiefs in regard to Joint issues.)

4. Change the practices and policies that now result in overemphasis on the consensus-seeking "committee" approach to the development and approval of Joint papers. While concurrence may be a desirable goal in some instances, since "compromise" need not in every case lead to diminished content and a unanimous opinion can be helpful to the Secretary and the President, concurrence as an overriding goal, particularly when applied to the multiple levels of staff in a large bureaucracy, more often than not will stifle good ideas. Thus the concurrence objective should be sought only on an exception basis.

5. Improve the preparation and experience levels of Service officers assigned to the Joint Staff and other Joint activities such as the Unified Command headquarters. Establish in each Service a Joint-duty career specialty open to selected officers in the grade of 0-4 and above. Such officers would be nominated by the Service Chiefs and approved by the Chairman, both for selection in the specialty and for later assignments to Joint-duty positions. The officers would be educated at Joint schools (AFSC, NWC, ICAF). They would serve primarily in Joint-duty positions, but would return periodically to their parent Services for field assignments to maintain currency.22/ Perhaps

---

22/ See Appendix E for an elaboration of the concept.

half of the positions on the Joint Staff and in other Joint headquarters would be filled by such officers, thus retaining an essential mix of officers with varied backgrounds (including command experience) on the staffs, and assuring that the Joint Staff particularly would not become isolated or in any sense a "general staff." The provisions of the U.S. Code that now restrict the length of and interval between officer assignments to the Joint Staff, as well as the size of the Joint Staff, should be eliminated through legislative action. To assure that officers in the Joint-duty career specialty have adequate promotion opportunities, Service promotion boards selecting officers for promotion to 0-5 and above should have appropriate representation from the Joint Staff or other major Joint headquarters. Written guidance should be furnished to each promotion board that states explicitly that the selection process should (1) emphasize the advancement of the best officers in all specialties, including those in the Joint specialty, and (2) recognize the importance and value of Joint-duty experience and accomplishments. In another step designed to reflect greater awareness of Joint needs, a program should be established for increasing the frequency of cross-Service assignments aimed at improving the awareness within each Service of the characteristics, traditions, capabilities, and problems of the other Services. Finally, the appointment of a limited number of civilian specialists to Joint positions should be considered as a way to strengthen continuity and to provide expertise that may not be readily available within the career officer corps.

6. Involve the CINCs and their staffs in Joint Staff activities. Establish regular working meetings between the CINCs and the JCS to review draft DoD guidance regarding the programming and budgeting process, to review draft OSD and JCS policy guidance concerning military operation plans, and to review and assess the military operation plans (and their underlying military assumptions) developed by the CINCs. The purposes of this greater interaction would be to foster increased support of the CINCs by the Joint Staff, to clarify guidance for the CINCs, to assure the thorough personal involvement of the CINCs and the JCS in the development of military operation (capability) plans, and to forge a stronger link between the military planning process that identifies weaknesses in force capabilities and the DoD resource allocation process that should be aimed at correcting them. (An important advantage of adding the position of the Vice Chairman is that there would be an opportunity for the Chairman [and the Vice Chairman] to visit the field regularly and to participate extensively with the CINCs in operation planning and exercise activities.)

7. Strengthen the Joint Staff through an organizational realignment that improves the workload distribution among the principal directorates and assures that all major functional areas receive proper coverage and integration, including: military operation planning; PPBS/DRB support; mobilization planning; the project management of Joint information systems projects in the area of command, control, and communications; and the Joint personnel management responsibilities associated with approximately 4,600 Joint-duty positions and -- in due course -- as many as 5,000 officers in Joint-duty specialty programs established by the Services.

In addition, as a part of the increased emphasis on the preparation of officers for Joint duty, the Study Group strongly endorses in principle the recommendation of the National Defense University Board of Visitors that a special NDU resident course be set up for all newly-selected general and flag officers of the line. This would increase their sensitivity to and knowledge of Joint matters, an important objective regardless of their future assignments. Equally important, such a course would help to build lasting personal relationships among the officers as they prepare to move into positions of higher responsibility.

FURTHER STUDY

The Study Group also recommends that two studies be undertaken:

(1) The basic curriculum objectives of the three colleges within the National Defense University should be reviewed to determine if they are consistent with the needs of the Joint community, particularly if the new senior course noted above is established and a Joint-duty career specialty is created within the Services. The objectives of each school should be examined in relation to those of the other two, and in relation to those of the Service schools at the command and staff college and senior service college levels.

(2) The Unified Command concept should be analyzed to determine how improvements can be made to strengthen the role of the CINC, both in planning and operations. Of particular

interest are the relationships between the Unified Command headquarters and the Component Command headquarters, and between the Unified Command headquarters and the JCS, including particularly the Joint Staff.

Finally, the Study Group, in noting that its recommendations entail the establishment of new staff entities (e.g., Service Chief Support Groups within the OJCS), also notes that there are 1,800 officers in the OJCS, the OSD, and the Service Staffs engaged in Joint activities. The Group believes that the total need not be increased; indeed, as the OJCS gains in effectiveness, the Service Staffs and OSD can and should be reduced.

APPENDIX A

STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JCS[1/]

1. Prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces;

2. Prepare joint logistic plans and assign logistic responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those plans;

3. Establish unified commands in strategic areas;

4. Review the major materiel and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans;

5. Formulate policies for the joint training of the armed forces;

6. Formulate policies for coordinating the military education of members of the armed forces;

7. Provide for the representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and

8. Perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

[1/] 10 USC 141.

APPENDIX B

THE CHAIRMAN'S SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

General Walter T. Kerwin (USA, Ret.)
Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

General William V. McBride (USAF, Ret.)
Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

General Samuel Jaskilka (USMC, Ret.)
Former Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

Admiral Frederick H. Michaelis (USN, Ret.)
Former Chief of Naval Material

Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran (USA, Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command

William K. Brehm
Chairman of the Board, Systems Research and Applications Corporation; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

In addition to the above principal members of the Special Study Group, Brigadier General Paul D. Phillips (USA, Ret.), who was a key Joint Staff action officer for the implementation of the 1958 DoD Reorganization Act, provided a critical review of the report and contributed significantly to the Group's insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the JCS organizational concept.

APPENDIX C

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July, 1970.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study. The Evolving Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Security Structure. Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.: July, 1977.

3. Ignatius, Paul R. Departmental Headquarters Study: A report to the Secretary of Defense." Washington, D.C.: June, 1978.

4. Steadman, Richard C. Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure. Washington, D.C.: July, 1978.

5. SRA Corporation. Evaluation Report of Mobilization and Deployment Capability in Connection with Exercise NIFTY NUGGET-78 (U). Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C.: 15 March 1979. (SECRET)

6. Franklin, Joseph P. Study of Selected Responsibilities Within the Joint Staff. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense. Washington, D.C.: May, 1979.

7. Department of Defense. *Documents on Establishment and Organization 1944-1978*. ed. Rudolph A. Winnacker, et.al., Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979.

8. Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study. *Chronology, Functions, and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.: January, 1979.

9. Dupuy, Col (Ret) Trevor N. *Civilian Control and Military Professionalism: A Systemic Problem*. Washington, D.C.: Winter, 1980.

10. Kester, John G. *The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review. Washington, D.C.: Spring, 1980.

11. Holloway, Admiral James L. III. *The Quality of Military Advice*. AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review. Washington, D.C.: Spring, 1980.

12. Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study. *Chronology of JCS Organization Since World War II*. Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.: June, 1980.

13. Brehm, William K. *Review of OSD Organization and Related Topics* (pp. 26-29). Prepared for the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Arlington, Virginia: 4 November 1980.

14. SRA Corporation. Evaluation Report of Mobilization and Deployment Capability in Connection with Exercise PROUD SPIRIT-80. Prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.: 4 March 1981. (CONFIDENTIAL)

15. Kester, John G. Designing a Defense General Staff. Strategic Review. United States Strategic Institute. Washington, D.C.: Summer 1981.

APPENDIX D

QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO THE SERVICE CHIEFS AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION

A team of senior-level consultants has been asked by the Chairman to review the process by which the JCS develop and provide military advice, and to recommend measures to improve the quality and responsiveness of such advice. There are no constraints on alternatives to be considered, though the preference is for measures that do not require legislative action. The team is reviewing the Chiefs' dual role as the heads of their Services and members of the JCS, the unique role of the Chairman, Joint Staff effectiveness, procedures for processing Joint Actions, and the military school system with regard to the preparation of officers for Joint duty. "Military advice" in this context is assumed to cover such major activities as military operation planning and evaluation, strategic direction of the forces (crisis management and plan execution), national military issues (e.g., SALT, MBFR, arms sales), and the PPBS.

The Team would like to meet informally, on at least two occasions, with each of the Service Chiefs and with selected individuals who hold or have held key Joint positions. The first meeting would be to solicit their personal views on these topics. The second meeting would be to discuss the Team's tentative recommendations. The purpose of this approach is to afford the JCS the opportunity to be part of the review process and to influence the development and evaluation of possible improvements.

At the initial meeting, the Team would appreciate informal, "top of the head" views on the following issues and any others believed pertinent:

- What is your perception of the utility and responsiveness of the Joint process and the quality of Joint advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense?
- How effective is the OJCS in supporting the day-to-day roles of the Chairman and the JCS? If there are shortcomings, how might they be alleviated? Is Joint Staff work perceived to be satisfying to capable officers so assigned?
- How do you view the compatibility of the dual roles of the Service Chief?
- Is there an organizational or procedural alternative that you would favor that would both enhance the capability of a Service Chief to manage his Service, and improve the responsiveness and quality of Joint military advice?
- Do you believe that the school system (notably NDU and AFSC) could be used more effectively to prepare officers for joint assignments, in both the OJCS and the field?

APPENDIX E

JOINT PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

In the 1960s, to emphasize the importance of and raise the quality of officers assigned to Joint duties, Joint-duty experience was made a prerequisite for promotion to flag or general officer. Though that action had some effect, it was gradually vitiated by waivers and by increasingly liberal interpretations of "Joint" duty. To increase interest in Joint duty, one could return to a strict interpretation of that prerequisite or, indeed, institute other forms of pressure on officers to seek Joint assignments. However, such coercive policies are not the best approach, nor are they likely to be effective in the long run.

The best approach is to change the character of Joint duty so that officers will be attracted into it -- because it is interesting, challenging, and important, and because it offers recognition for good work. If service on the Joint Staff instills a sense of pride and elan, problems of staffing will be greatly reduced. Thus, the thrust of the initiative described below is to do precisely that.

An option to realize the benefits of better continuity, more objectivity, and longer experience in the handling of Joint matters, is to establish a Joint-duty career specialty within each Service for interested officers.

Service officers at the 0-4, 0-5, or even higher level, evidencing a talent and desire for Joint Staff work, would apply for assignment to the Joint-duty specialty. Upon acceptance, their assignments, education, and career patterns would be steered by their Service personnel management systems toward Joint duty, though from time to time they would be assigned to field positions in their parent Services to maintain currency.

Not all Joint positions would be filled by such officers. Officers not in the career specialty would continue to serve on the Joint Staff and in the Unified Command headquarters as they do now. The mix would be decided by the Chairman and the Chiefs. If 50% of the officer positions in Joint headquarters eventually were filled by officers in the new specialty, about 2,300 positions would be involved at any given time. If, in turn, officers in the specialty spent about half of their time in Joint assignments, a group of about 5,000 officers in the specialty would be needed in a steady-state situation.

The potential advantages of this alternative stem from the fact that a core of officers would be available who would be more skilled, experienced, and presumably interested in handling Joint matters. They would be "professionals" in such matters -- assigned to Joint duties because they volunteered and then were selected and specially prepared. Under this approach they would not become isolated from their Services nor would they take on the appearance of an "elite" group. No increase in total officer strength would be required.

The gain in the general level of competence in Joint activities that would result from specialization, training, continuity, and experience could be significant, particularly in contrast to the situation today in which two out of three officers on the Joint Staff have had no prior senior staff assignments, and less than 2% have had any prior Joint Staff experience.

While this initiative can properly be viewed by the Services as incremental in an organization sense since it would be phased over a period of years, it would be a fundamental change for officers actually selected. The personnel management implications would be far-reaching. Grade structure, career patterns, promotion opportunities, and a host of other issues would have to be planned with care. A personnel management office in the Joint Staff (a true "J-1") would be needed to work with the Services in handling position management and personnel support. The Chairman would need to have a role in selecting the officers and in helping to assure that officers in the Joint-duty specialty (including those of flag rank) received their fair share of promotions and key assignments. An important step in this regard would be to appoint a senior officer from a Joint headquarters to sit on each Service promotion board involving the selection of officers to the rank of O-5 or above, and to furnish each such promotion board with clear guidance concerning the need for fair treatment of officers in the Joint-duty specialty. Officers would have to have evidence that if they excelled in the Joint-duty specialty they would have at least as good an opportunity to be promoted as their contemporaries, and indeed could aspire to four-star rank.

Training for the Joint-duty specialty would begin at the Armed Forces Staff College. Its curriculum is designed to provide such training for officers at the 0-3 and 0-4 levels. There is now no systematic means for assuring that AFSC graduates ever get to Joint duty assignments. That would be changed to be consistent with the development of the career field.[1/]

Formal training would continue for selected officers at the 0-5 and Junior 0-6 level at either the National War College or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. As with the AFSC, priority would be placed on making sure that NWC and ICAF graduates actually serve in Joint duty, and that officers destined for Joint duty, if selected for senior service college, are sent to NWC or ICAF.

The schools themselves would give greater emphasis to preparing officers for Joint duty. The NWC would emphasize preparation for Joint and combined planning and operations. Likewise, the ICAF would emphasize Joint planning and management of mobilization and deployment. Both schools would limit their emphasis on generalized studies of the politico-military environment and instead concentrate on preparing officers for near-term Joint assignments. Because so few officers have professional familiarity with their sister Services, assuring that officers on the

---

[1/] Consideration might be given to revision of the AFSC curriculum to aim it at slightly more senior officers in order to make it possible for an officer in the Joint-duty specialty to attend both the command and general staff college (or equivalent) of his parent Service and the AFSC.

Joint Staff and in other Joint headquarters have a broader comprehension of the nation's Armed Services would be an important objective for NDU.

A high percentage of the graduates of the Joint schools would be assigned to Joint duties, either immediately upon graduation or in an early subsequent tour. While the Services would find personnel management difficulties in meeting such goals, there are two important facts to bear in mind: First, effective Joint duty is vital to the nation's security interests, and so the preparation of officers so assigned should be taken as seriously as, say, pilot training; second, because it costs from $25,000 to $75,000 or more to send an officer through AFSC (5-month course) or NDU (10-month course), these schools should not be treated simply as alternatives to their Service "equivalent" schools. These are Joint schools; they are costly, and they have little justification if not so used. This is not to say that some graduates should not be assigned to Service staff positions, only that a plan should be developed that explicitly responds to the needs of the Joint community.

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 11:08 a.m., in room SDG-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner presiding.

Present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Denton, Gramm, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, and Dixon.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Richard D. Finn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., and James R. Locher III, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, research assistant; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, and Thomas Longstreth, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER, PRESIDING

Senator **WARNER** [presiding]. As you know, gentlemen, the chairman, Mr. Goldwater, is staying at his home today for personal reasons.

Today the committee meets to hear testimony from the four Chiefs of Staff on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense. This is the sixth in our series of hearings on this very important subject.

Today our four distinguished witnesses need no introduction. Appearing before the committee, we have had the valuable opportunity to hear their wise counsel on many occasions. On behalf of the committee, I am delighted to welcome Gen. John A. Wickham, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; Adm. James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. P.X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps; and Gen. Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

Given the dual responsibilities of our witnesses, today's hearing will be the most useful if it is focused on both the Joint Chiefs of

Staff system and the military departments. There are a number of areas of concern to the committee in both of these organizational elements. When it is time to hear from our witnesses, we will follow the traditional order of service—that is, precedence of service—with General Wickham first, followed by Admiral Watkins and then General Gabriel and General Kelley.

I would like to remind our witnesses of a portion of the letter that Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn sent to each regarding this hearing. The letter stated: "You should anticipate being asked for your personal views on many of these issues." Throughout this hearing, each witness should take every opportunity to present his personal views on every issue. That is the type of testimony that would be of greatest value to this committee.

Before our witnesses proceed, I would like to read a brief statement from Chairman Goldwater sent in this morning specifically for this hearing. I am now reading from Chairman Goldwater's communication.

> As we start this morning's hearing, I would like to direct just a few remarks to every person in uniform, not just the ones who might be here, but wherever they are throughout the world. No matter what color uniform you wear, no matter what rank or insignia you carry, no matter what command you now have or might ever have, you are going to remember these hearings all of your days. My guess is you are going to thank God they came about.
>
> I know how hard it is to find problems within your own organization. I was a corporate president myself once, and I was also commander of different units during World War II. Since and before that time, if you ever wanted me to get mad, start making wisecracks about my outfits. But, after leaving them and thinking back, I could think of times when criticism was deserved. Had I not been so wedded to my job and so parochial in my thinking, I could have understood it better at that time.
>
> What these hearings are directed at will never have any affect on those of you wearing the uniform. What these hearings will do is to look at the fact that you have come close to giving your life for your country, or at least demonstrated your willingness to do so, and that directly related to the absolute security of our Nation. Only by long, honest discussion between all of us will the matters that need correcting be brought to the surface and corrected.
>
> The best way in the world to have that done and the timeliest way in the world to have that done is right now. With the Congress charging at every nickel we spend and with large segments of the population somewhat unconvinced that defense is necessary—and, believe you me, in my opinion, defense is necessary—it is critical that what we put in the field is operating without any encumberances that we have operated under in the past.
>
> Please keep this one thought in mind. None of us live forever, but, with proper care, allegiance, and adherence to basic principles, we have a country that will endure. So let us put our minds to that task.

I will now defer to my distinguished colleague, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I will defer on an opening statement because I do not think any could be devised that would improve on the words Senator Goldwater has forwarded to us. We regret he cannot be here. I know he wanted to be here. He thinks a great deal of each one of our witnesses. He has told me personally how much he thinks of them as individuals, and he thinks that they are doing a remarkable job in heading up their services.

Repeating what he has said many times, we are not here talking about whether we have all stars heading up the military services of our country; we are here talking about whether we have a team approach and whether we can get the all stars together for joint planning, joint training, so that in peacetime we have prepared ourselves for the kind of joint activities that are necessary, as General and President Eisenhower said in the 1950's, that are necessary and inevitable in the conflicting age that we live in today.

So I have no prepared opening statement, but I do echo Senator Goldwater's words, and I welcome each of the service chiefs here today, knowing that we are going to benefit from their testimony, knowing that they are not going to agree with a good many of the things that are being talked about here, but recognizing their viewpoints are unique and very valuable from our perspective in assuring them that their viewpoints, even where we begin with disagreements, will be carefully listened to and greatly respected, and will greatly assist our committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **WARNER**. Gentlemen, as we say in the Senate, a point of order raised here. I read what has been prepared by the staff, and I find there is an error. If we are to proceed in order of service seniority, as a former marine, the Marines will precede the Air Force.

Senator **NUNN**. Is that based on age or based on length of service? [Laughter.]

Senator **WARNER**. Both.

General Wickham.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR., CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General **WICKHAM**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I would like to express a view on the part of all of the Chiefs. The chairman and his wife are in our prayers and in our thoughts today. We appreciate the statement that he has given to us and the time he has given to us with that statement, even though he cannot be here.

Mr. Chairman, the testimony I am about to give here I view as probably the most important in my tenure as Army Chief, and I have approached it in that regard. These are my personal views, rest assured, and they are based on 14 years of joint duty. Out of the past 18 years, I have spent 14 of them in joint assignments, including Director of the Joint Staff, Senior Military Executive to two Secretaries of Defense, and Commander-in-Chief of the combined as well as unified forces in the Republic of Korea.

I have carefully studied the staff report of the committee, with its far-reaching proposals, as well as the House bill, and both of them merit very serious consideration. Overall, the report of your committee presents constructive criticism on the entire defense organization. There are a number of positive recommendations that I can support. Also, the report is forthright in recognizing that the methods and nature of congressional oversight have a major hearing on the way we do our business.

The report, unfortunately, contains some nearsightedness. Based on my experience, I can find little basis for the report's sweeping generalizations about service parochialism or log rolling, which allegedly undercuts the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, in my opinion the report fails to give adequate credit to how the current JCS system has been changing to respond to today's conditions and to correct identified problems.

These hearings, in my humble opinion, must take cognizance of these ongoing internal reforms if we are to adopt further changes that make sense. For example, DOD has modified significantly the Defense Resources Board to consider the Commander in Chief (CINC) requirements and priorities in strategic planning. Moreover, each service has established formal procedures for reviewing CINC priorities during the programming process and for keeping the CINCs informed.

The Joint Requirements and Management Board requires service vice chiefs to examine joint requirements and to coordinate system development to avoid duplication. Also, we have initiated a Joint Force Development Program anchored on 35 joint Air Force-Army points of agreement, and now including four-service participation. The report, incidentally, correctly calls the 35 initiatives revolutionary. As General Gabriel indicated, a key element of this participation is cross-service involvement in programming developments. Another one is the Joint Doctrine Pilot Program, with four major projects involving the CINCs to improve interoperability.

Now, in addition to these initiatives, let me outline those areas where I believe further improvements could be considered, some of them drawing from the House bill and your report. I agree generally with strengthening the role of the Chairman, and so I could support legislation which, while retaining the corporate JCS as military advisors, would nevertheless make the Chairman the principal military advisor.

I also believe the law could assign to the Chairman certain title 10 responsibilities, such as joint training and professional education of the armed forces. Also, the Chairman could assume new responsibilities for the development of joint doctrine and formulation of recommendations on strategic priorities, defense programs and military budgets.

Moreover, I believe that the Chairman should continue to consult, time and circumstances permitting, with the JCS in fulfilling these responsibilities. The Chiefs, in turn, would be able to forward dissenting views to the Secretary of Defense or even the President, should they think their concerns were inadequately addressed. Thus, the system would contain checks and balances needed to maintain a healthy joint perspective in national security decisionmaking, just as we have embedded in our whole governmental structure.

Current law and ongoing JCS initiatives provide for substantial improvements in the Joint Staff. I think the Chairman should be able to specify staff procedures and tasks. It makes sense to remove the limits on the size and tenure of the Joint Staff, as it does to do away with the distinction between the Joint Staff per se and various other organizations within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I should note that the quality of the Joint Staff has been improving. The Army has always tried to provide officers of recognized competence to the Joint Staff. For example, this year 100 percent of the Army majors, eligible for promotion, on the Joint Staff were selected for lieutenant colonel.

Toward the goal of upgrading Joint Staff quality, I could support granting of authority to the Chairman to specify the qualifications needed by officers on the Joint Staff. The net result of such foregoing proposals would be to increase the authority of the Chairman and, I would expect, that of the entire JCS as well.

You need to be mindful of a potential danger—that over time and with different personalities such as increase in authority could lead to less consultation and might result in less Service Chief involvement in, and sense of responsibility for, joint affairs. I believe that carefully crafted legislation which retains language expressing corporate responsibilities, consultation among the Chiefs, and the Chairman's actions on behalf of the JCS will assure solid involvement of the Chiefs in joint affairs.

There is another measure that I strongly recommend to you. We should retain the current practice of quarterly rotation among the Chiefs in the role of Acting Chairman. The Acting Chairman's role requires that the service Chiefs become more deeply involved in joint affairs and the national security decisionmaking process. Fulfilling this important responsibility has made me a better service Chief and a better member of the JCS, leading, I believe, to sounder military advice for our superiors and better support for the CINCs.

If we are serious about making the JCS more joint—and, of course, I know that we all are—then the Acting Chairman's role is clearly a key element in the maturation process. Do not do away with it.

Increasing duties of the Chairman may make it advisable to assign him a Vice Chairman. I do not advocate that the Vice Chairman replace the Chairman during his absence, for the reasons cited above. But the Vice Chairman could enhance the Joint Staff's capabilities to review contingency planning, to perform resource analysis, help formulate planning, programming and budgeting recommendations, and to work with the CINCs staffs on their resource priorities. He also could head the Joint Requirements and Management Board and oversee major mobilization exercises.

Now you can see from these comments that I strongly support retention of the basic Joint Chiefs of Staff concept rather than replacing it with a body of military advisors. Some have called the idea a "body of joint eunuchs".

I recognize that the dual hat responsibilities of JCS members are comprehensive. My experience leads me to believe that they are not a serious impediment to providing joint, sound advice on operational as well as policy matters. As a matter of fact, I think the dual hat role is a valuable source of strength for three reasons.

The first is that the quality of advice to the National Command Authority in peace, crisis or war is enhanced by Chiefs who can meld their advice from service and joint perspectives. Who else but the Chiefs are the most knowledgeable of and accountable for their statutory obligation of preparing forces for prompt and sustained combat operations?

Second, and the other side of the coin, is that service programs are more solidly focused to support operational forces by Chiefs whose perspectives have been shaped by participating in the joint decision process and by interacting routinely with the CINCs.

Third, and related to the first two, is that no single military officer, no matter how competent, dedicated or experienced, can know enough about all aspects of our Armed Forces to render complete military advice or counsel. The Chairman needs all the help he can get to function as the principal military advisor. This advice will be authoritative and sound when it is derived from knowledge and judgment, garnered from personal relationships and consultations with the service Chiefs.

Now let me turn to the Unified and Specified Commands, as the Chairman's letter asked me to do. As you know, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs. By DOD directive, the chain runs through the JCS. The Chairman in practice exercises this function on behalf of the JCS and I could support codification of that practice.

The Chairman also could be authorized to supervise CINC implementation of National Command Authority directives. These measures should not and would not make the Chairman a commander in his own right. I do not believe any of us support that.

The staff report makes recommendations regarding unification of the command structure at the CINC level and below. These require more detailed study and the JCS are already examining these issues.

Regarding the military departments, the third area that we were asked to address, let me make several brief comments. Secretary Jack Marsh tomorrow will provide a statement on this subject. I fully share his views. Jack Marsh and I share a very close working relationship. We consult daily on key departmental matters. I also keep him informed on JCS actions which impact on the Army. I see no confusion in his role or in my responsibilities to him under statute and DOD directives.

Secretary Weinberger has strengthened the role of the service Secretary, particularly in the resource and policy areas, by increasing his participation in the deliberations of the Defense Resources Board. I have observed the resource issue now for 14 years, from a variety of circumstances, and the current DRB process, in my humble opinion, is the most comprehensive review of programmatic and policy issues that I have witnessed.

The roles of the Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the CINCs has been strengthened significantly in recent years. So I believe the statutory authorities are adequate and structural changes basically are not necessary with regard to the Army Secretariat.

Mr. Chairman, 3 years ago, in undertaking our own study of the military command structure, the Joint Chiefs, working with the Secretary of Defense, established five criteria for evaluating proposals for change. First, would the change improve our ability to wage war? Second, would it provide the President and the Secretary of Defense better and more timely advice? Third, would it better ensure that the needs of the unified and specified commanders are met? Fourth, would it improve the ability to allocate national security resources more wisely and efficiently? And, last, would it maintain our national legacy of civilian control of the military?

In my view, these criteria remain valid today and they should be used to measure the merits of proposed changes. We also should keep in mind one last thought—the importance of the human dimension. I believe that the effectiveness of reform is less a function of organizational structure and change than a function of the quality of people in the organization, their personal relationships and their commitment to, as well as understanding of, the purpose at hand.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me express my full willingness to work closely with the Congress in this important review of our defense organization. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Wickham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAN, JR., CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify during your review of our Nation's defense organization. This testimony may be the most important of my tenure as Army Chief of Staff.

My personal views are based on broad joint experience. For 14 of the past 18 years I have served in joint assignments including duty as Director of the Joint Staff; Senior Military Executive to the Secretary of Defense; and CINC of the Combined as well as Unified Command in the Republic of Korea. Also I attended the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College. Thus, I understand from a variety of perspectives many of the problems which are reviewed in your committee's staff report, and which also have led to changes proposed in the House bill on Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reorganization.

Based on my experience I have been a strong supporter of reform, but reform that is evolutionary rather than drastic in nature. One of the lessons I draw from duty in complex joint and combined organizations is that effectiveness is less a function of organizational structure and change, than a function of the quality of people in the organization, their relationships, and their commitment to as well as clear understanding of the purpose at hand. While I do recognize the need for some organizational change, it is important to emphasize the essential role of selecting leaders with joint vision.

Your staff has prepared a comprehensive and valuable report on defense organization. I have carefully studied the report as well as the House bill. Naturally in a brief statement, I cannot comment in detail on the report and the House bill although there are many aspects of both which merit serious consideration. Consequently, my remarks will focus on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Service Secretariat as your letter requested.

Last year, the Congress mandated several positive changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) which we are now implementing along with a number of significant changes taken at our initiative. Part of the success of this endeavor was that the Congress and the Defense Department worked together on the legislation.

The broader issues we are looking at now will require even closer cooperation over the next few months. I view this testimony as a first step in what I hope will be a joint collaborative effort with you and among our staffs over the coming months.

Overall, the report presents constructive criticism on the entire Defense organization. The staff was forthright in recognizing that the methods and nature of congressional oversight have a major bearing on the way we conduct our business. For the most part, too, the report helps to focus our efforts on the key areas of concern for our defense organization and offers a number of positive recommendations.

At the same time, there are several areas where the report is less than objective in my opinion. The report alleges that the Service Chiefs are motivated in the joint arena more by self-serving service parochialism than by concern for what is best for the Nation; that we conspire, or "log-roll," on issues to prevent the Secretary of Defense from being able to exercise his proper statutory authority over the military services; and that we circumvent the Service Secretaries thereby undermining their authority and weakening civilian control of the military. From my experience, I can find little basis for such sweeping generalizations which diminish the objectivity of what otherwise is a serious and constructive analysis.

Moreover, the report does not give adequate attention to analysis of how the current JCS system has been changing to respond to today's conditions and to correct identified problems.

Rather, the report draws largely on historical studies to make the case for major change. Perhaps, that is why the report makes the following unfortunate statement which my experience does not bear out: "More than 40 years of experience with the JCS system has shown the theoretical model to be invalid. The JCS has consistently failed to provide the quality of joint military advice the Secretary of Defense and other senior decision makers vitally need." (p 169)

Consequantly, I believe the Committee hearings should take full note of the ongoing internal reforms in our Defense organization and how they are responding to a number of the problem areas cited in the report. For example:

DOD has modified significantly the Defense Resources Board (DRB) procedures to improve the visibility of Commanders in Chief (CINC) requirements and priorities in strategic planning in service programs. Moreover, each service has established formal procedures for reviewing CINC priorities during the Program Objective Memoranda (POM) process and for keeping the CINCS informed.

The Joint Requirements and Management Board brings together Service Vice Chiefs to examine joint requirements and coordinate system development to avoid duplication.

We have initiated a Joint Force Development program anchored on 35 joint Army-Air Force points of agreement and now including four-service participation. A key element of this participation is cross-service involvement in POM development.

The Joint Doctrine Pilot Program, with four major projects involving the CINCS to improve interoperability, further reflects our sustained effort to improve joint thinking and operations.

In addition to such ongoing initiatives as these, let me outline those areas where I believe improvements could be considered.

I could support measures which enhance the freedom of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to act independently on behalf of the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thus, I could support legislation which, while retaining the corporate JCS as military advisers, would make the Chairman the principal military adviser. I also believe the law could assign to the Chairman certain of the Title 10 JCS responsibilities, specifically those pertaining to the joint training and military education of the Armed Forces. Additionally, the Chairman would assume two new responsibilities: the development of joint doctrine and formulation of recommendations on strategic priorities, Defense programs and military budgets.

I believe that the Chairman should continue to consult, time and circumstances permitting, with the JCS in fulfilling these responsibilities. The Chiefs, in turn, would be able to forward dissenting views to the Secretary of Defense or even the President should they think their concerns were inadequately addressed within the JCS councils.

Current law and ongoing JCS initiatives provide for substantial improvements in the operation and quality of the joint staff. The Chairman should be able to specify the procedures of and to determine the tasks to be performed by the joint staff. It makes sense to remove the limits on the size and tenure of the joint staff, as it does to do away with the distinction between the joint staff and other OJCS officers.

The quality of the joint staff has been improving. The Army has always tried to provide officers of recognized competence to the joint staff, frequently exceeding the norms found inside our own service. For example, this year 100 percent of the eligible Army majors on the joint staff were selected for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. Toward the goal of upgrading joint staff quality, I support the granting of authority to the Chairman to specify the qualifications needed by the officers on the joint staff.

He could usefully have a reduced scale personnel management system, but a duplication of the personnel systems of the services would not seem warranted. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense is now commissioning a study of the proposal for a joint duty speciality, my initial view is that a joint skill identifier would be preferable. Joint billets generally require functional specialists with solid, current service backgrounds, not simply those who have had joint duty or joint education.

The net result of the foregoing proposals would be to increase the authority of the Chairman and, I would expect, that of the entire JCS as well. However, there is a potential danger that, over time and with different personalities, such an increase in authority could lead to less consultation and might result in less service Chief involvement in, and sense of responsibility for, joint affairs. I believe carefully crafted legislation which retains language expressing corporate responsibilities, consultation among the Chiefs and the Chairman's actions "on behalf of" the JCS will assure solid involvement of the Chiefs in joint affairs.

There is one other measure which I would strongly commend to your consideration. We should retain the current practice of quarterly rotation among the Chiefs of the role of Acting Chairman. I have worked with other practices when I was Director of the Joint Staff and Senior Military Executive to the Secretary of Defense. The Acting Chairman's role requires that the service Chiefs become more deeply involved in joint affairs and the national security decisionmaking process. Fulfilling this important responsibility has made me a better service Chief and a better member of the JCS, leading I believe to providing better military advice for our superiors and to support better the CINCS. If we are serious about making the JCS more joint, and I know we are, then the Acting Chairman's role is a key element in the maturation process.

Increased duties of the Chairman may make it advisable to assign him a Vice Chairman. I supported this concept six years ago during my tenure as Director of the Joint Staff, but I did not then, nor do I now, advocate that the Vice Chairman replace the CJCS during his absence. A Vice Chairman, for the reasons cited above, should not become Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence, but he could aid very considerably the Chairman in such areas as enhancing the joint staff's capabilities to review contingency planning; to perform resource analysis; to formulate planning, programming, and budgeting recommenations; and to work with the CINCS staffs on their resource priorities. Additionally, he could head the Joint Requirements and Management Board and oversee major mobilization exercises such as "Nifty Nugget" conducted in 1979 and periodically since then.

As you can see from my foregoing comments, I strongly support retention of the basic Joint Chiefs of Staff concept rather than replacing it with a body of military advisers. While I recognize that the "dual hat" nature of JCS members is difficult, my experience leads me to believe it is not a serious impediment to providing sound, joint advice on operational as well as policy matters. As a matter of fact, I believe the "dual hat" nature is a valuable source of strength for several reasons:

First is that the quality of advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA) in peace, crisis, or war is enhanced by Chiefs who can meld their advice from service and joint perspectives. It is the Chiefs who are the most knowledgeable of, and accountable for, their statutory obligation of preparing forces for prompt and sustained combat operations.

Second, and the other side of the coin, is that service programs are more soldily focused to support operational forces by Chiefs whose perspectives are shaped by participating in the joint decision process, and by interacting routinely with the CINCS.

Third, and related to the first two, is that no single military officer, no matter how competent, dedicated, or experienced can know enough about all aspects of our Armed Forces to render complete military advice or counsel. The CJCS needs all the help he can get to function as the principal military adviser. This advice will be authoritative and sound when it is derived from knowledge and judgment garnered from personal relationships and consultations with Service Chiefs.

The Staff report's chapter on the Unified and Specified Commands addresses three key areas: the chain of command above the CINCS, unification of the command structure at CINC level and below, and the CINCS role in resource allocation.

As you know, the chain of command to the CINCS runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCS. By DOD Directice the chain runs through the JCS. The Chairman in practice exercises this function on behalf of the JCS, and I could support codification of that practice. The Chairman also could be authorized to supervise CINC implementation of NCA Directives. These measures should not and would not make the Chairman a commander in his own right.

The Staff report makes recommendations regarding unification of the command structure at CINC level and below. These require more detailed study, and the JCS have already undertaken to examine these issues as part of the review of JCS Publication 2—Unified Action Armed Forces—that we initiated in early October.

I already have noted some of the many actions we have taken to improve CINC involvement in the resource allocation process. In this regard, I could support the report's recommendations to establish the CINC readiness fund and to strengthen the capability of the OJCS to analyze resources and to assess new requirements.

Regarding the report's conclusions and recommendations concerning the military departments, let me make several comments. Secretary Marsh tomorrow will provide this committee a detailed statement on this subject. I fully support his views.

The Secretary of the Army and I share a very close working relationship. Virtually every day the Secretary and I consult on departmental matters. I seek his views and decisions on key matters. I also keep him informed on actions of the JCS which impact on the Army. I do not see confusion in the role of the Secretary or in my responsibilities to him under statute and DOD Directives.

Secretary Weinberger has strengthened the role of the Service Secretary, particularly in the resource and policy areas by increasing his participation in the deliberations of the Defense Resources Board. Based on my 14 years of joint duty, the current DRB process involves the most comprehensive review of programmatic and policy issues I have witnessed. The roles of the Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the JCS, and of the CINCS have been strengthened significantly in recent years.

As to the issue of cross-service responsibilities, I do not believe it would be practical or necessary to assign formally such responsibilities to the Under Secretary of the Army. All of the principals on the Army Staff and Secretariat regularly have contact with the other services. Some of this is formalized in periodic meetings between me and the other Service Chiefs, between the Vice Chiefs, and between the Service Secretaries. Moreover, we annually exchange staff officers between the Air Staff and the Army Staff, and the Navy will soon participate in these exchanges as well. Our POM development process also involves close coordination with other services as well as the CINC.

In short, much progress has been made in strengthening the role of the Service Secretary, in keeping him fully informed, and in assuring solid cross-service contacts. Thus, I believe the statutory authorities are adequate and structural changes basically are not necessary with regard to the Army Secretariat.

Mr. Chairman, three years ago, in undertaking our own study of the military command structure, the Joint Chiefs, working with the Secretary of Defense, established five criteria for evaluating proposals for change:

Would the change improve our ability to wage war?

Would it provide the President and Secretary of Defense better and more timely advice?

Would it better insure that the needs of the Unified and Specified Commanders are met?

Would it improve the ability to allocate national security resources more wisely and efficiently?

Would it maintain our national legacy of civilian control of the military?

In my view, those criteria remain valid today. I believe that our joint efforts to initiate specific reforms should use these criteria to measure the merits of proposed changes. As we evaluate change, we must also insure that the practical consequences or specific recommendations are carefully considered.

In conclusion let me again express my full willingness to work closely with the Congress in this important review of our Defense organization.

Senator WARNER. Senator Nunn and I feel that we will receive the direct testimony of all the witnesses and then turn to members for questioning. If any member has a special problem, the Chair will be glad to take it under consideration. Absent that, we will now hear from Admiral Watkins.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral WATKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee.

In my formal statement I tried to address in detail all major points covered in the staff report to this committee as well as key provisions of the recent house bill, and the statement's purposes are straightforward, in my opinion. To be constructive while remaining candid, I have tried to be fully responsive to Chairman Goldwater's hearing instructions in his letter to me of November 22. I will not take your valuable time in this brief oral summary of my statement by going over every point; rather, I think it will be of more use to the committee to take these few minutes to discuss certain critical issues I see embedded in the debate on this important matter.

Let me get to the bottom line first. The questions I have asked and tried to answer for myself are: Can the functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its contributions to making and carrying out national defense be improved? The answer. Yes, without a doubt.

Can new legislation to codify those improvements make a positive contribution to our security? My answer again is yes. But—and this is important—are those few radical changes recommended in the staff report either in the best national interest or essential to assure the best military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense? And I say absolutely not.

Let me summarize those issues I see as important to you and to me and the other Chiefs. First, do we continue the concept of providing military advice from a corporate body called the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or do we fashion some substitute? Next, if we do retain our tested and proved Joint Chiefs of Staff system, then what is the proper role for the Chairman and how should the Chiefs interact with him to ensure our military advice is wise and timely and useful?

Third, if the Chairman's role could be strengthened—and I believe it should—how can he be supported in a way that best serves the national interest? And, finally, does dual-hatting of service Chiefs as JCS members make any sense and why? I will work down this list of critical issues with you very quickly.

As I do so, I would like you to keep in mind two essential attributes of our national security structure that I feel should remain sacrosanct and unaffected by whatever changes emerge from these debates. These attributes are: diversity of opionion from qualified participants and civilian control of the military.

If one agrees with the value of constructive, albeit sometimes divergent, points of views from the most qualified advisors available, especially when dealing with complex national security issues, one quickly comes to the conclusion that you must have something like the Joint Chiefs of Staff or invent something that looks very much like it. A Chairman, no matter how wise or well intentioned, can only bring one viewpoint, his, to problem-solving, and often with a single solution. That viewpoint and solution are based on perspective and understanding gained at least during a major portion of a career in a single service experience.

Conversely, the Joint Chiefs bring diverse experience as well as differing opinions to the table. Disagreements, discussions, indeed, occasional conflicting military advice, in my opinion are not a weakness of the system; they are a major strength. For a number of reasons, but especially because of the importance of knowledgable diversity, I conclude that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should remain as the root organizational concept for our national security policy and structure.

Further, a guarantee of providing the Secretary of Defense and President with details of member disagreements, such as that contained in the amendment to the House bill, should be preserved in any legislation. To do otherwise is to ensure that our political leadership does not receive balanced counsel. No matter how smart or well-intentioned one might be, there can be no substitute for the combined and current knowledge of the four others. Incidentally, from my experience such a process need not and does not delay urgent decisions, as the current body of Chiefs have so often proven in recent fast-moving operational events.

Now how should the Chairman interact with the Chiefs and with the Joint Staff? This is the key issue, but it is not a new one. We have addressed it frequently in theory as well as in practice. In fact, the Chairman in practice is the principal military advisor to the National Command Authority. It is inherent in his job. His proximity to the Secretary, his attendance at National Security Council and other high-level meetings, his day-to-day participation in senior intergovernmental agency discussions, make him the principal military advisor regardless of what is written. That is his proper role, and, in fact, I believe it should be codified in law.

By the same token, as I said a moment ago, any legislation which so decrees must also contain the priviso that the Chairman in this capacity must make the National Command Authority aware of dissenting viewpoints and counterproposals of the Chiefs on important issues.

Additionally, I believe we can improve and streamline our procedures for executing military actions in support of national policy. The Chairman's authority in execution can and should be enhanced. While the latitude given unified commanders is appropriate in times of general conflict, a more flexible command arrangement with a greater role for the Chairman will enhance our ability to respond in times of lower levels of crisis.

In support of this increased role for the Chairman, I support the concept of having the Joint Staff report to him. If the role of the Chairman is strengthened in the manner I have described, it is also important to consider other concepts for enhancing his new role. I have spent nearly 150 days as Acting Chairman over the past 3½ years, so I can tell you from personal experience the Chairman needs all the help he can get, as General Wickham just said. For that reason, I support a legislative approach that would provide additional assistance to him.

It is important, however, to keep such a system in proper perspective. Instead of a Deputy Chairman, as envisioned in the House bill, a Vice Chairman who is neither a replacement nor a substitute Chairman, but a broad-gauged assistant seems very appropriate. I support a Vice-Chairman concept, precisely because the Chairman is overloaded. The Chairman, along with his three-star Special Assistant and his Director of the Joint Staff, currently carries too heavy a burden of responsibility, which could be ameliorated and discharged by an additional senior officer, one who has the full confidence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This Vice Chairman would represent the Chairman in both the Government's interagency process and in the internal management of the Joint Staff, just as our service Vice Chiefs assist in the internal management of their service staffs.

Finally, the Vice Chairman could provide continuity in dealing with the unified and specified commanders on many issues on behalf of the Chairman by strengethening staff management, improving the level of military representation in interagency matters, and removing some of the existing burdens on the Chairman. The Vice Chairman would contribute to improving the quality of military advice while preserving the best features of the current system. We do not need a Deputy Chairman.

Legislation establishing this position of Vice Chairman should explicitly specify that the incumbent will neither supervise the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor act as Chairman in the Chairman's absence. Beyond that prohibition, any legislation should allow the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, flexibility to make the most appropriate use of the Vice Chairman.

Next I want to talk about the Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence. The Acting Chairman approach implemented by General Vessey is a success. Each quarter a Chief is designated as Acting Chairman. He stays on top of all issues, receives frequent briefings, and acts for the Chairman when he is out of town or otherwise unable to perform official functions.

The Acting Chairman approach has many benefits, not the least of which is making each Chief a much better, more informed member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Another benefit is continuity throughout each quarter. The approach works and works well. The Secretary believes it. The Chairman believes it. And so do I.

Finally, I would now like to answer the question: can I manage the dual role of Service Chief and JCS member objectively? I say yes, I can. I have been doing it for 3½ years, as far as I know effectively. I do not see these roles conflicting. To the contrary, I see them as mutually supportive.

As a service Chief I am familiar with my service's capabilities and limitations in a way that could not be matched by someone not intimately involved with the Navy's day-to-day training, support and management. In plain language, I know what we can and cannot do today and what we must do and plan for tomorrow. As a JCS member, I can apply that specific detailed knowledge to recommend policies and actions that make sense.

When necessary, I can assess accurately and with no notice the risks associated with options being considered for my forces and in a way someone else without currency in my two hats could not. That is precisely why I disagree vehemently with the Joint Military Advisory Council concept described in the staff report.

No matter how wise and ecumenical, it could not have the current information and depth of understanding of today's forces which is available to the service Chief and considered essential if advice is to be not only timely and appropriate but also executable. You should not legislate away that unique duality. Being a service chief is essential to being the best JCS member and military advisor I can be. Similarly, and more importantly, being a JCS member makes me a significantly better and broader gauged service chief.

To sum up, let us take a close look at the current record. President Reagan said we are serving him well. So does Secretary Weinberger. We have given frequent advice to this President. He seems to value it and he seeks it and he acts upon it. Perhaps some of the criticisms you have heard have more to do with the willingness of earlier Secretaries and Presidents, or the lack of willingness of earlier Secretaries and Presidents, to seek, or even listen to, the military views which might conflict more with predisposed and politically-desired objectives than with the quality of advice they were receiving.

The President and the Secretary of Defense both seek, listen and act on our advice. By the way, we have met with the President 12 times, and I personally have attended over a dozen National Security Council meetings of great importance. In fact, the number of times we have met with the President exceeds the total number of visits to the President by Joint Chiefs of Staff in the prior 12 years.

Our new Chairman, as did his predecessor, welcomes dissent and reports it when it is appropriate to do so. Honest, constructive dissent is sought, valued and reported on. I would like to give you a little vignette. On one important occasion in a meeting with the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense made his report to the President and told the President that the Joint Chiefs had another point of view that was in disagreement with his, and he wanted the President to hear it. I consider that to be the finest in democratic approach.

On a second occasion, on sudden notice, all Chiefs were called to the President and we were each asked our individual point of view and recommendation as service leader, as member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an American citizen. I consider that to be one of the proudest days of my life.

Perhaps we are guilty of not blowing our own horn about improvement we have already made because we have made so many that progress is a continuing process, not just in those areas I have talked about today but in others as well—important areas such as Unified Command participation in resource allocation, elimination of redundant service programs, better cooperation among services, correction of problems found during operations such as those in Grenada.

Maybe we should have been more vocal in highlighting these improvements, but political posturing is not our preferred approach. Although these improvements already answer several legitimate staff report and House bill criticisms, their codification into law may be desirable nevertheless.

During this oral statement I have deliberately tried to not address those issues treated completely in my formal statement. I agree with many of the recommendations found in the House bill, for example, and I could accept others therein with modifications. I welcome these hearings and I believe legislation can be helpful, provided that legislation cures today's problems, not the problems of those who previously served in a different environment or the problems of those who derive vicariously their limited view as to what the national security organization is really all about.

I urge this distinguished committee to continue to work with Secretary Weinberger and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the House committee to provide a bill that builds on the substantial improvement of the last several years and continues the aggressive but evolutionary approach to change. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Watkins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear today to share my views on the important issue of the nation's organization for national defense.

In my thirty-six years of commissioned service in the defense of our country, I have witnessed the ebb and flow of our U.S. military capability. Recently, I have also witnessed the resurgence of pride in our military, largely due to the widsom of congressional decisions in the recent past and the strong leadership of this decade's Commander-in-Chief. I also wholeheartedly agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that your examination is likely to be one of the most important undertakings by Congress in our lifetimes. Therefore, I applaud the openness, as well as the caution and care, you are maintaining in your deliberations.

I am here today in my dual role as Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Chief of Naval Operations, I have served two Chairmen and have been Acting Chairman myself on many occasions. I also served as a member of the JCS in Admiral Hayward's temporary absence during my two year tenure as his Vice Chief of Naval Operations from 1979-1981. Further, I speak from my years of operational and staff experience and as one, in the past decade, who was a critic of the system as it operated in those years.

I have read the Staff Report prepared for this Committee. Like many members of the Committee and most of your previous witnesses, I can agree with a large number of the report's observations, but I do not agree with most of the study's radical recommendations. The recommended cure is far more dangerous than the diagnosed symptoms warrant. Can the functioning of the JCS and its contributions to the making and carrying out of national defense policy be improved? Yes—without doubt. Can legislation to codify those improvements be a positive, even necessary, factor? Again—yes. But, are major changes in the JCS system required? Absolutely not.

I submit that Admiral Crowe, previously General Vessey, and we four Service Chiefs have been working effectively to make many needed reforms from within the national defense system in order to make it better serve our nation. In fact, it is those of us who serve today in the national security organization who should be and are the real reformers. In this regard, however, perhaps we can be criticized for failure to give our reforms over the past several years an appropriate level of public breast-beating.

Before making specific comments, I will share my general thoughts on what I consider essential requirements for any national security structure for the United States.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

There are two essential attributes in our national security structure. The first, and most important, is that it, like the democracy it serves, must not be monolithic. Our process provides for a clash of competing views as we search for the best approach to solving complex challenges we face. The American system of checks and balances, and protection of dissenting views, is essential and is our national strength whether in Congress, the judiciary, business or national security.

DIVERSITY OF OPINION

The JCS provide military advice to the civilian leadership and develop the military strategy in concert with presidential directives on national policy. While many of your witnesses have focused on the fact that we don't always agree among ourselves, I contend that this is a fundamental strength of the JCS, not a structural weakness. Our American system provides for the diversity of opinion and we must ensure that all voices continue to be heard. The current law, for example, states that the Chairman shall . . . "inform the Secretary of Defense, and when the President or the Secretary of Defense considers it appropriate, the President, of those issues upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not agreed." The framers were wise in so ordering, as was the House of Representatives by recently retaining this strength in amendment to their recently passed bill on this matter.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their dual capacity as uniformed heads of their Services and principal military advisors to the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense, are the essential link between the formulation of strategy and the procurement and readying of combat forces to meet demands of that strategy. Finally, the Unified and Specified Commanders must operate and employ forces, state essential requirements for warfighting in their areas of responsibility, and develop regional plans. Each of these players has a separate role to play; and our system, strengthened over the past three years, allows for their voices to be heard. Many of the Staff Report recommendations would silence dissenting views if safeguards were not provided.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

The second fundamental attribute of our national security structure is that it must remain under civilian control. I agree with the Senate staff report about the importance of this issue and the need to preserve it. Unitary advice offered by a single military individual, no matter how competent, with a single Service background and a single point of view, will not ensure the quality and objectivity of civilian control that a democracy demands and that our history demonstrates is both necessary and feasible. In fact, the potential is there for undesirable politicization of any sole military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, an advisor who has been both selected and appointed by these same individuals. The other Joint Chiefs and their legal right to dissent and be heard help to balance out such potential.

These two points—diversity of opinion and civilian control—are, of course, directly related. Strong Congressional support for the first has, throughout our history, helped ensure the second. There are no side benefits in any reorganization act that would compensate for the tragedy resulting from tampering with these two fundamental elements. Our unique American system has these important strengths and safeguards in many areas of Government. They have served us well in the past and should remain sacrosanct in any Defense reorganization.

JCS AS ADVISORS

I should now like to focus briefly on the role of the JCS. The JCS and their supporting organization have been criticized over the years for their committee approach to defense problems, for perceived Service biases, for the quality of advice provided to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress, and for the slowness of the joint process in decisionmaking. Critics propose a stronger role for the Chairman and enhancement of the Unified Commanders' participation in strategic planning and resource allocation. I have read the proposals and listened to the critics.

I believe much of the criticism is born out of the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam period of overall public distaste for national and military leadership. It was also born out of a time when we had negative real growth in defense and rationalized that negative growth by a flawed national military strategy which rejected the concept of peace through strength and replaced it with such concepts, for example, as the fuzzy, non-global, one and one-half war; or the 14-day duration conflict with a Central Europe-only focus. Either of these budget-driven strategic concepts failed to address their relationship to the real world of global U.S. commitments to over 40 friendly foreign nations as well as to our own national defense in an increasingly unstable world. It was born out of a time when Presidents seldom sought direct participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in militarily-related decisionmaking. Unfortunately, many of the critics you have heard in recent testimony have blurred the past with the present. So, I say we should put criticism of last decade's approach to national security in proper perspective and ask, "Is criticism born of the last decade relevant now?" "Do the proposed solutions address real issues extant today?" "Most importantly, do they improve our warfighting capability in either times of violent peace or global war?"

There are those who have stated that under the present system "advice is not good," "advice is not useful," or "advice is often ignored." Perhaps this was true at the time a number of the critics served within the DOD. But, I say this is just not so today. As Secretary Weinberger has testified, he found JCS advice "to be consistently timely and accurate . . . competent and innovative . . . my own experience with these gentlemen . . . has been extraordinarily good." During the 1970s, the civilian leadership wanted to cut back the military, and did—the JCS opposed those cutbacks. In the past, perhaps the Joint Chiefs weren't listened to because they could not support a flawed national military strategy which justified inadequate support for a modernized and strong military posture. Therefore, that JCS advice was seen as neither "good" nor "useful" by those serving at that time . . . perhaps a thorn in the political side. Advice of the JCS is military, and is, therefore, sometimes politically unpopular. Congress must ensure that any reform finally legislated allows unfettered military advice to continue to flow from the JCS to the National Command Authority.

Let's take a close look at the current record. President Reagan says we are serving him well, and so does Secretary Weinberger. We have given frequent advice to this President—advice he has both sought and acted upon. This situation has not necessarily occurred because the advice was better—but because the President, himself, was receptive. We have discussed such matters as strategy, military readiness, arms control, and even JCS organization with him, at his request, on about a dozen occasions. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative was prompted in part by one of these sessions. This interaction, the President's forceful leadership on defense matters and the support of the Congress has propelled this nation back into its rightful place of international prominence. Our strategy as a world power has come into focus once again and the JCS now provides advice to a President who values our opinions. The lesson I draw from all this is that the quality of JCS advice is—in large degree—related to the attentiveness of and participation with the Secretary of Defense and the President.

DUAL-HATTED SERVICE CHIEFS

Some critics have also said that "Service parochialism" dominates the system and to avoid conflicts of interest, JCS members should not be Service Chiefs. They remind me of those who claim that all members of Congress are incapable of voting wisely on important national issues because they cannot look beyond the interests of their districts, states, or special interest groups. Just as this broad-brush criticism is a disservice to members of this committee, so it is a disservice to members of the JCS.

As the Chief of Naval Operations, I have the responsibility to equip, organize, and train our Navy to be ready to support national military policy and strategy. This responsibility forces me to become the expert on all facets of maritime strategy and operations. I must know what the fleet can and cannot do. I must have a feel for developments on the waterfront. I must remain on top of changing technological, political, and operational developments.

It is our dual role as Service Chiefs that makes us uniquely qualified to provide advice on matters of warfighting and strategy. As Service Chiefs, we frame our annual budget proposals based on our experience in strategy development as members of the JCS and with the full knowledge of the regional requirements of the Unified Commanders. There is a tremendous two-way benefit in our dual role as Service Chiefs and JCS members. This arrangement has made me a better Service Chief—I can say unequivocally that I have become more "joint"—particularly during my role as Acting Chairman for four three-month periods during the Chairman's absence over the past 3½ years. In this role, I have spent over one hundred actual days as Acting Chairman, during which attendance at congressional hearings and numerous National Security Council meetings has been required.

No other body could provide the depth of military experience or the thorough understanding of the current capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Armed Forces than the body represented by the five JCS members. I firmly believe that the present dual-hatting arrangement is a tremendous strength of the system that offers little of the disadvantage alleged in the staff report.

FOCUS ON STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

As the JCS, we continue to focus on strategy. As individual Chiefs we submit memoranda which force innovative strategic ideas into the joint process. For over three years, for example, I have proposed initiatives on such diverse topics as counter-terrorism, nuclear force modernization, drug interdiction, Latin American policies and other matters that affect military force application. Similar proposals come from the other Service Chiefs. Such initiatives are neither parochial nor petty; rather, they force decision makers to address issues which each of us thinks important to the nation, issues which in most cases could be otherwise smothered by the bureaucracy or lack the sense of urgency we may feel they warrant.

Some complain that, under the present system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot develop a proper total force structure themselves. While, in a sense, the critics are correct, they err in thinking this is a major flaw or that some alternate organization will perform better. What we can do—and have done—is develop the military strategy which drives resource choices in framing the total force. Our military strategy is a coherent, joint strategy based on deterrence, forward defense and global coalition warfare. That strategy underrlies the entire resource allocation process, and the total force product it produces needs no apology.

Development of total force structure is the end product of resource allocation—deciding what to spend our money on. This is one of the most important policy decisions made by the Department of Defense. Far too often those who complain about the process really are complaining about the result. They believe—or hope—that a different process would lead to a lower force structure more in tune with their reduced-defense preferences.

In determining how best to allocate resources, Secretary Weinberger needs our military advice—and he gets it. He needs to hear from the advocates of high tech R&D—and he does. He needs (and now he gets) the views of the Unified Commanders during a minimum of four formal sessions per year, with their principal focus on regional requirements and current readiness, sustainability, command and control, and efficiency of forces assigned. He needs and receives the views of the Services with their emphasis on force modernization, training, and research and development essential to meeting evolving threats of the future. He needs and receives the views of the JCS which must focus on global requirements in support of the national military strategy and the maintenance of nuclear deterrence, and cross-Service program efficiencies. Checks and balances all come into play as critical resource issues are addressed at the Defense Resources Board. It is a finely balanced system under the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense which takes inputs from the Chairman and members of the JCS, the Service Secretaries, the Unified Commanders and independent DOD agencies. The result is a balanced force structure fully consistent with the national policy, a better force structure than one which could have been developed exclusively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in isolation. Our present resource allocation system supports civilian control by ensuring our civilian leadership has full participation in examining alternatives and determining final outcomes. In fact, where there is Service parochialism in force building, it is well exposed in today's process. This process demands that each Service program stand or fall on its own merits relative to the national military strategic guidance given to each Service. It likewise ensures that the civilian leadership has expert military advice from all military commanders in the decision process.

WHAT CAN BE IMPROVED

Does my response to the criticisms imply there is no room for improvement? No. There are always improvements which can be made, but we must not confuse reorganization with reform. I firmly believe that General Vessey and those of us who serve as the JCS today have made real progress.

We have a number of JCS and Service initiatives taking place within the existing legislative framework aimed at improving the performance of the Joint Chiefs and the effectiveness of the Armed Forces as a whole. Recent internal changes within the Joint Staff have been made in an effort to improve the quality of our written advice which, as a result, has been more sharply focused.

One of the Pentagon's leading growth industries is interservice cooperation. We are aggressively examining all aspects of joint interoperability—Navy, the Joint Staff, our Unified Commanders and the other Services have entered into positive dialogue to solve previous shortcomings regarding "jointness." We recognize jointness is not an end in itself, but overall combat effectiveness. Our Services are working effectively together as we accelerate efforts toward improving joint warfighting capability.

My pride in our current JCS system does not blind me to its shortcomings. House Bill 3622 with certain modifications could, for example, form a foundation on which a stronger national security organization can be established. The House-sponsored JCS Reorganization Bill actually codifies many of the improvements which have already taken place under General Vessey and Admiral Crowe; all are aimed at improving our national security structure. These improvements have been substantive in some cases, albeit implemented over the past three years without public fanfare. In addition, the JCS have already embarked on a review of JCS Pub 2. which addresses many of the SASC Report recommendations such as unity of command, authority, relationship among unified commanders, Services, and component commanders. We have set our sights on June 30, 1986 for completion of this first thorough review in many years.

THE JOINT STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN'S ROLE

I could readily endorse the provision of the House bill in placing the Joint Staff directly under the Chairman of the JCS. This would strengthen his ability to complement the advice provided by other members of the JCS and fortify the JCS as a whole.

I would suggest that the Chairman continue to provide not only his own views (which he should give), but both the consensual and divergent views of the other Service Chiefs in the many fora in which he represents the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this regard, I consider the legal requirement to present divergent views essential. Such views are often critically important, especially on the truly hard issues where unanimity is neither the objective nor, in many cases, even possible. Certainly, the Chairman should be required to attend National Council meetings as he does today so that military views of the JCS on key issues can be effectively presented without filter.

STREAMLINED CHAIN OF COMMAND

Second, I believe we can improve and streamline our procedures for execution of military actions across the spectrum of today's crises, since those fall well short of the global conflict scenario for which the more complex unified chain of command was designed. United States military responses to lower level crises are invariably rather surgical in nature and highly sensitive politically. Therefore, while our organization for a major war rests on allowing the Unified Commanders great latitude under broad policy direction from Washington, chain of command procedures for the violent peace in which we live today can be different for each event. Flexibility in adopting chain of command arrangements to best meet each peacetime employment of forces can be improved to meet rapidly emerging events. Changes to the law are not needed to accomplish this objective. I intend to work with my colleagues over the next few months to address this matter.

While all of the JCS should be involved in formulating a course of action, I believe the Chairman should have more authority in execution. Modern communications capability makes this possible while remaining coupled to his principal Service-unique advisors and other experts, as the Chairman recently did so effectively in executing the capture of the terrorists involved in the Achille Lauro piracy and murder. Such a streamlined procedure improves responsiveness, clarifies responsibility, and ensures optimum National Command Authority control in highly sensitive peacetime military operations. It is important to provide a more flexible approach to Command and Control across the set of peacetime-to-wartime chain of command issues. There is no one chain of command panacea for all scenarios across the spectrum of violence.

STRATEGY

Third, we can and should improve the effectiveness of the JCS in focusing more of our energies on the development and review of dynamic, integrated and cohesive military contingency plans in response to national policies. The JCS role is not only to provide strategic advice to the President, but also to ensure that a sound military strategy is developed, fielded, and understood by all key decision makers. The formulation, articulation and presentation of such a military strategy could then become a better standard by which others, like the Congress, would be able to measure our performance. This approach would elevate the Congressional debates to the high ground and avoid proclivity to micro-manage programmatic details as the Staff Report so correctly points out. I also believe that the provisions for a Directorate of Net Assessment within the Joint Staff could help the JCS in this regard.

ACTING CHAIRMAN

Fourth, I would propose the system of "Acting Chairman" be codified. In this connection, we have learned important lessons from past practices. On occasions in the past, the senior Service Chief would become Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence. As a result, as many as three Acting Chairmen in one day was not unusual. Continuity was lost. On assumption of General Vessey's assignment as CJCS in July 1982, however, the JCS immediately adopted a 3-month rotating regime. Continuity in leadership on relevant issues then extant was the objective. Experience has demonstrated conclusively that the objective was achieved. I was the first Acting Chairman under this new policy from July-September 1982.

One particular beauty of this system may not be readily apparent to all. But the Acting Chairman concept allows each of the Service Chiefs the opportunity to learn not only the role of Chairman but to gain an increased appreciation of other Service points of view at the very highest level. It is a concept whose time has come. It is proven, and the concept should be included in any legislation you enact. I consider that it has made me a better CNO, far more sensitive to the Joint approach to strategy, interoperability, and allied and sister Service cooperation.

VICE CHAIRMAN

Fifth, I could support a concept of a Vice Chairman, principally because the Chairman's plate is overloaded. My support, however, is not for the concept envisioned in the House Bill, i.e., one of an alter-ego to the Chairman.

Rather, I believe assignment of a four-star Vice Chairman is essential to relieve the current burden on the Chairman and his two principal assistants. Currently, the Chairman, along with the three-star Assistant to the Chairman and the Director, Joint Staff, carries a number of responsibilities which can best be discharged by a senior officer who has the full confidence of the JCS. A new Vice Chairman would represent the Chairman in the interagency process and would provide him with the same type of support in the internal management of the Joint Staff that the Service Vice Chiefs provide in the internal management of the Service staff. But I am quick to point out that legislation establishing the position of Vice Chairman should specify the incumbent will not supervise the JCS nor act as Chairman in the Chairman's absence. Beyond that, any legislation should allow the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, flexibility to make the most appropriate use of the Vice Chairman. I envision the Vice Chairman would have three broad areas of responsibility. Aided by the existing Assistant to the Chairman he would represent the JCS in the interagency process. Aided by the existing Director, Joint Staff, and his Vice Director, he would supervise the internal functioning of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman could provide continuity in dealing with the Unified and Specified Commanders on most issues on behalf of the Chairman. By strengthening staff management, improving the level of military representation in interagency matters and removing some of the existing burdens on the Chairman, a Vice Chairman would improve the quality of military advice while preserving the best features of the current system.

CONCLUSION

Our organization for national security is uniquely American. Perhaps it would not be appropriate for any other nation—but then, most of the security organizations of other nations would not be appropriate for us. No other nation has our global commitments and far-flung responsibilities. Above all, no other nation has our unique political system, a system like none the world has ever seen, based on the concept of shared power and the freedom for public exposure to diverging views which then clash and compete in their resolution.

The national security structure for this nation with its unique responsibilities must be based on checks and balances, civilian control, and on the joining of responsibility and accountability. It must reconcile the views of Unified Commanders, with their focus on regional needs and their emphasis on readiness today, with a global, long-term view. It must balance the competing needs of military readiness and political acceptability. It must merge the diverse capabilities of our different Services.

The national security structure for America should offer true civilian control, in which the civilian leadership has access to a range of military views and is not limited to accepting or rejecting a single solution proffered by a single individual, no matter how competent. The national security structure for the United States must not separate responsibility for giving advice and accountability for implementing that advice. It must ensure that those who propose military policies do so in the full realization that it will fall to them to implement those policies.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with their diversity of professional experience and their protected right of dissent, offer the President, the Secretary of Defense and the nation the best possible military advice. The fact that these same individuals, as uniformed heads of their Services, will be responsible for organizing and training forces to implement the policies they recommend helps ensure sound recommendations and realistic implementation.

As I have indicated earlier, there are areas in which we can improve. I have suggested some of these areas. They are, by and large, problems which are being dealt with today but, perhaps, codification in law would help ensure long term stability. Since we have been responsive to suggestions and many significant improvements have already been initiated, I can support a number of the proposals as they have been put forth. Additionally, there are others which, with modification, could be adopted to improve the office of the Joint Chief of Staff and how we do business.

Like all uniformed professionals, I welcome these hearings. Under our system of government our security ultimately depends on the wisdom of Congress which reflects the wisdom of the people. I am particularly pleased by the bipartisan nature of your examination and hope that it can lead further to a truly bipartisan national security policy for this nation. What is required now is the best efforts of each of us in the Congress, OSD, the JCS and other parts of the national security organizaiton "to provide for the common defense." I urge this distinguished committee to work with Secretary Weinberger, members of the JCS and with the House committees to provide a bill that builds upon the substantial improvements of the last several years and continues the evolutionary approach to change.

I have been honored to present you my views on how best to organize to preserve the liberties we hold so dearly.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Admiral.

General Kelley.

STATEMENT OF GEN. P. X. KELLEY, COMMANDANT OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS

General KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I will try to make every attempted to avoid being redundant, but I agree with all of the statements made by my two colleagues.

As best as I can recall, I first appeared before this committee when I was the Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and I have appeared before you many times since. There is no doubt in my mind that, because of the subject, this appearance will be the most important of my military career.

As requested by Senators Goldwater and Nunn, I have submitted a written statement for the committee's consideration, and request that it be included in the record of these hearings.

Senator WARNER. Without objection, that statement, together with all that have been provided the committee this morning, will be included in the record in full.

General KELLEY. Let me pause of behalf of my colleague, although he is absent, to wish the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, Strom Thurmond, a happy 83d birthday.

Senator WARNER. Duly noted for the record.

General KELLEY. In view of the extraordinary importance of these hearings——

Senator WARNER. The Senate will be in celebration throughout the day for that event. There are a number of engagements.

General KELLEY. In view of the extraordinary importance of these hearings to the future security of our country, I would also like to make a short oral statement, one which attempts to capture the more important points of my written statement. I will limit my remarks to those portions of the committee staff report which deal with the Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff, since I submitted detailed comments on the Unified command structure and the role of the Military Departments to the committee last March.

First let me say that I believe that the committee and the American people would have been better served had the report more fully recognized and addressed the impact of the many substantial changes, which have been made during the past several years, to the manner in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff carry out their statutory responsibility. For the committee's information I have highlighted a number of these important changes in my written statement which I commend to your review.

In my written statement I have also stressed the importance of the word "improvements", for improvements are central to any change you may make to our national security establishment. The burden must be on the critics to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that tangible improvements will result from the recommendations for change. Moreover, in my written statement I have also expressed a number of personal concerns with the staff report and I also commend these to your review. These examples are illustrative of my concerns. I have highlighted them because I believe that, if the report is to be used as the basis for the recommandations we are addressing, it should not go totally unchallenged.

With that said, I would now like to provide my personal views on the report's key recommendations. Concerning the recommendation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be replaced by a joint military advisory council, I am very much opposed, for all of the valid reasons which have been given by prior witnesses, and so need no further elaboration.

Concerning the recommendation that there should be a Deputy Chairman, I am very much opposed if it is the intention that such a deputy be senior in precedence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would not be opposed to a Vice Chairman, junior in precedence to the Joint Chiefs, if such an officer is required to assist the Chairman in the discharge of his daily duties and responsibilities, and I do believe that he is.

Concerning the recommendation to make the Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority, I could agree in principle, provided that it is clearly understood and explicit in law that in the discharge of these duties he is always acting on behalf of the corporate body and he must always provide the alternative views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In addressing this important subject, we must be ever mindful of the fact that the more you distance the Chairman from the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the less likely you are to encourage the full spirit of participation and cooperation which we all seek to achieve. To the contrary, I believe that it would adversely impact on the professional and harmonious relationships which we now enjoy as a corporate body. We are a team and we have a captain, and to distance this team from its captain would be, in my opinion, divisive and would eventually degrade and diffuse the advice provided to the National Command Authority.

Finally, concerning the recommendation that the Chairman develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty, I encourage caution. To me, a professional joint staff officer would ultimately become precisely what we all so earnestly seek to avoid, a professional bureaucratic compromiser; one who is skilled in perfect syntax in the preparation of numerous position papers and staff reports.

What is required is a continuous infusion of operationally oriented officers, who can provide sound strategic advice based on practical real world experience, not academicians in uniform who provide lofty advice predicated on theory and fluff. In addressing a subject as important as defense organization, we must always be mindful of the fact that there is a vast difference between a system which is inherently flawed and one which has not always functioned properly because of inherently flawed people. With the security of future generations of Americans as the price, I pray that we all have the wisdom to recognize this difference.

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will support any and all recommendations for change to the JCS system after it has been shown that such change will result in improvements to our national security establishment. But, I would oppose any recommendations for change which I obviously believe to be injurious to the security of our country. I think this is in keeping with the oath of office I took over 35 years ago.

In closing, let me share with you a final concern. Unfortunately, the committee staff reports has created a perception among some members of the press and a number of Americans that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are an ineffective corporate body. Whether or not this was the intention of the report is not clear, but it certainly has been one of the results.

In addition, since publication of the report, I have made two overseas trips. During both of these trips I detected a subtle but discernable diminishment in the prestige and credibility of our current military establishment. If this trend is allowed to continue unchecked, it could prove damaging to the best interests of the United States. I merely express this concern, Mr. Chairman, as a caution.

That concludes my oral statement. I thank the committee for its time and patience.

[The prepared statement of General Kelley follows:]

Prepared Statement of Gen. P.X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. For my prepared statement today, I wish to limit my remarks to those portions of the Staff Report—Defense Organization: The Need for a Change—which deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In doing so, let me say at the outset that my overall reaction to these portions is one of disappointment. They are, in my view, a collection of historical citations which emphasize where the JCS system may have failed in the past—but they devote scant attention to how well this system has served our Nation during a period of almost four decades. In this regard, the fact that the United States is at peace today and is still recognized as the most powerful nation in the world should not be disregarded by this Committee. These conditions are due, in no small measure, to the effectiveness of our national security establishment since the end of World War II.

Unfortunately, due to what I believe to be a lack of appropriate balance and objectivity, the Staff Report has created a perception among many members of the press and a number of Americans that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which I am a member, is an ineffective body. Whether or not this was the intention is not clear, but it most assuredly has been the result. While I will not presume to speak for my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom, I might add, I have known and respected for many years, but speaking for myself I must say that such an indictment is both inaccurate and disquieting.

This is not to suggest that each and every recommendation in the Staff Report should not be addressed—each should and each must—inasmuch as we should and must address all recommendations for improvement, regardless of the source.

In my study of the 645 pages of the Staff Report, I was impressed by two general deficiencies:

1. The first is what I perceive to be a disproportionate reliance on selected extracts from outdated reports by groups who have examined the JCS system in the past, and on citations from a few retired military officers who, with the wisdom of retrospection, are now critical of the JCS system which was in existence during their active duty. In this historical context, one could logically ask: Where are the more positive citations from such military giants as General Lyman Lemnitzer and Admiral Arleigh Burke, or the other retired military officers who, while on active duty, went the extra mile to make the JCS system work—and who, by doing so,

made it work effectively and efficiently? My point is that no system, however perfect, will function to its fullest potential without the selfless, dynamic, and positive leadership of "team players" who go out of their way to make it work.

2. Second, is a failure to fully recognize many of the substantial changes which have been made during the past several years to the manner in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff carry out their statutory responsibilities—changes which were made under the very able and effective leadership of General Jack Vessey, our highly respected former Chairman who was not content with "status quo," but who was more than willing to "buy a penny candle than to curse the darkness," and in doing so made the system work the way it is supposed to work. It may be useful to pause here to highlight some of the more important changes which have taken place:

A. The Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency was established to assist the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling their statutory responsibility to review the major materiel and personnel requirements of the Armed Forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.

B. A Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRMB) was created as an instrument of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine potential military requirements; to identify, evaluate, and select candidates for joint development and acquisition programs; to provide oversight of cross-Service requirements and management issues; and to resolve Service issues that arise after a joint program has been initiated. For example, the JRMB has evaluated the MK XV Combat Identification System, developed solutions for associated problems, and recommended a course of action that accelerated the developmental phase of this program. The JRMB assessed 17 interdiction programs and recommended that seven programs be pursued at a savings of approximately $4 billion.

C. The Joint Planning Staff for Space (JPSS) was created as the Joint Chiefs of Staff focal point for space policy, doctrine, and strategy. It coordinates the development of concepts, requirements, and plans for space—including the organization of USSPACECOM, our newest unified command. JPSS also analyzes the responsiveness of space systems to National Command Authority and Joint Chiefs of Staff direction, as well as resposiveness to mission support to the unified and specified commands.

D. To test the adequacy of major contingency plans, and to provide a framework which would help sharpen the perceptions of U.S. interests and objectives, a landmark wargame was conducted in April 1985. For the first time the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commanders collectively participated in a global wargame to prepare themselves for today's and tomorrow's crises.

E. JCS Memorandum of Policy 136 was revised to incorporate procedures for the increased role of the Unified and Specified Commanders in the programming and budgeting process. This statement of policy clarifies the roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders-in-Chief, and the OJCS in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. It allows the Commanders-in-Chief an opportunity to provide input at each major program and budget milestones, including access to Service programs and the Defense Resources Board.

F. JCS Memorandum of Policy 132 was revised. This statement of policy describes staffing procedures for the development and processing of JCS issue papers. The cumbersome "flimsy, buff, green" procedures were replaced with a flexible system which is for more timely and responsive.

G. The Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency was established to ensure the interoperability of tactical command, control, and communications systems for joint or combined operations through the development and maintenance of a joint architecture, interface standards, and interface definition for tactical C3 systems.

Having provided you with the foregoing examples of recent changes, let me share with you several representative concerns with the Staff Report. For simplicity and brevity, I shall limit my remarks to selected statements from the Executive Summary. Let me begin by using a part of the Staff Report's quotation from a statement made by General George Washington when he created the War Office in 1776, as my prologue: "Time will discover its Defects and experience suggest the Remedy, and such further Improvements as may be necessary. . . ."

I believe that the key word in the foregoing is "improvements." This is central to any change you may make to our national security establishment. The burden must be on the critics to provide beyond reasonable doubt that demonstrable improvements will result from their recommendations for change. We cannot afford to err or to make national security an emotional or partisan issue. I implore you, then, to weigh each recommendation for change carefully to insure that it will result in substantive and measurable improvements. The consequences of not doing so could impact adversely upon our Nation's security.

I must disagree with the Staff Report's statement that the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is focused excessively on functional areas such as manpower, research and development, and installations and logistics. This statement has no basis in fact. Had any member of the current Joint Chiefs of Staff been asked about the focus of the OJCS, it could have been proven conclusively that the focus is overwhelmingly on the side of a broad range of subjects which are of strategic importance to our national security.

The Staff Report highlights as a deficiency in the current system the fact that functions such as airlift, sealift and close air support, which are not central to a Service's own definition of its mission, tend to be neglected. If the study group members were to examine the official record of the past five years they would learn quickly that during this period our Nation has made dramatic improvements in both airlift and sealift, and we have reconciled any differences we may have had with close air support. I give, as examples, the C-5A re-wing program—the C-141B stretch program—the C-5B program, which this Committee will recall had a Marine Corps general as one of its principal proponents—the C-17 program, which has the enthusiastic backing of all Service Chiefs—the SL-7 fast sealift program—the Maritime Pre-positioning Program—and the Ready Reserve Sealift program. Let me say, categorically, that as I appear here today, our Nation has far more airlift and sealift capability than it had when I appeared here five years ago as the Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and thanks, in no small measure, to the effort of this Committee.

I will let the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force comment on the allegation that Air Force contributions to sea control are neither easily identified nor pursued. From my perspective as their colleague on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, I find no substance in this allegation. In fact, the present level of cooperation in this vital area is at a new high and getting better daily.

I find the Staff Report's statement that interoperability and coordination requirements of forces from separate Services are not readily identified to be misleading. To say that some cannot be easily satisfied may be an accurate assessment, but to say that they are not readily identified is a distortion of reality.

To say that there is an overemphasis on future needs which deprives operating forces of capabilities needed to respond to today's or tomorrow's crises is a criticism which ignores the complexities of balancing requirements for modernization with those of readiness and sustainability. In addition, it overlooks the significant modernization being undertaken by the Soviets. In this regard, I cannot and will not accept any suggestion that would cause our military forces to go into battle with the Soviets while armed with obsolete or obsolescent equipment. If the Services were given sufficient dollars to both modernize and build their sustainability to the extent they believe required, there would be no problem. But such is not the case, nor would the economy of the United States permit it. Therefore, we are constantly attempting to balance readiness, sustainability, force structure, and modernization. If there is a fault, it is not systemic—it is simple Economics 101—it is as basic as "guns or butter." We develop the most balanced program and budget within allocated resources and the perturbations resulting from the budget process. If anyone is looking for a constituency for readiness dollars, I suggest that he look to the Congress. It has been my experience that operations and maintenance dollars suffer most in that body, for they have no readily identifiable constituency—as do ships, aircraft, and other major items of equipment modernization.

The Staff Report has exploited a cliché which has been picked-up by the media—a phrase known as "logrolling." If I am guilty of "rolling a log," please provide me with specific instances, for without them I cannot defend myself. And, a suggestion that as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I have been guilty of acts that resulted in the political weakening of Secretary Weinberger is not deserving of serious comment.

While the citation attributed to General David C. Jones, that—"The corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful or very influential"—could be an accurate description of the circumstances which existed when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—I can promise you that it is not an accurate reflection of the situation which existed under General Jack Vessey and which exists today under Admiral Bill Crowe.

In this regard, there is no doubt in my mind that some have not liked the advice given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—for the very reasons that they considered it too crisp—too timely—very useful—and very influential on the Secretary of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief. It is, indeed, ironic—for in the past when some received advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which supported their personal positions, we heard words like, "and the Joint Chiefs of Staff support my position." But when the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave advice which did not support their views, it was branded as not crisp, untimely, and not very useful or influential.

As one who works almost daily with the Secretary of Defense, both in my role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a Service Chief, I can find no significant shortcomings in the ability of our current system to address strategy, resource, operational, and organizational issues. Moreover, I find a suggestion that shortcomings in my ability to meaningfully address these important issues have had a serious impact on the ability of the Department of Defense to prepare for and to conduct military operations in time of crisis to be an assertion without substance.

In all of the Staff Reports, I find no paragraph quite as disturbing as the discussion of what is referred to as "dual-hatting." In my view, it should come as no surprise that a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is parochial when dealing in matters involving his own Service. When the law directs him to organize, train, and equip his Service, it goes without saying that he will do so to the best of his ability. It should come as no more of a surprise than the knowledge that a Senator from a state which builds a particular type of aircraft is parochial for his home state in matters involving that aircraft—or that as Senator from a state which builds a particular type of ship is parochial for his home state in matters involving that ship—but to suggest that any Senator from any state would not put aside his parochialism for his home state when an issue of national importance is at stake is as irrational as it is to suggest that a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not set aside his Service parochialism under similar circumstances. To say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have normally been unable to subordinate the interests of their parent Services to the large interests of national defense is an intemperate observation which I do not accept—nor should you!

The Staff Report says that "dual-hatting," a term which appears to be used disparagingly, requires me to shoulder more responsibilities than one person can handle. Apparently, the members of the study group are unfamiliar with the provision of Title 10, which details an Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. This provision states: "The Assistant Commandant has such authority and duties with respect to the Marine Corps as the Commandant, with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, may delegate to or prescribe for him." Under this provision of the United States Code, I have delegated the appropriate authority and duties to my Assistant Commandant. In this way, I am able to devote whatever time is required to my duties and responsibilities as a memnber of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

While there are other concerns with the Staff Report, for brevity let me conclude with the one which deals with the quality of "Joint Duty Military Personnel." As one who has served with all four of our Armed Forces, served on the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for three years, commanded a four-service joint task force, and has served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past 4½ years, I can agree that the Services have not always provided their best officers to the Joint Staff in the past. I can also agree that the quality of such officers has improved steadily during the past several years. How far this trend should go, however, is a subject which requires considerable attention. In fact, I believe that the changes made by the last session of Congress, and codified by Section 143, Title 10 of the U.S. Code, may have already taken us much farther than many realize. This section provides that: "The selection of officers of an armed service to serve on the Joint Staff should be made by the Chairman from a list of officers submitted by that armed force. Each officer whose name is submitted shall be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers (underscore provided) of that armed force."

I am not certain when this section was voted into law that all of the ramifications were fully understood and addressed. When the law states that the services provide only "the most outstanding officers" for duty on the Joint Staff, does this imply that something less than our "most outstanding officers" serve on the staffs of our unified and specified commands? That something less than our "most outstanding officers" recruit young men and women into the armed forces? That something less than our "most outstanding officers" train our recruits? That something less than our "most outstanding officers" attend our war colleges? And, most important of all, does it imply that we assign officers who are something less than our "most outstanding" to command our combat organizations? Many members of this Committee have sons who may some day find themselves on the battlefield. Is it your wish that they be led by a commander who is something less than our "most outstanding?" And when a unit suffers casualties unnecessarily because it was not led by our "most outstanding officers," to whom will their families turn for accountability?

Will they place the responsibility on members of the Congress for telling the Commandant of the Marine Corps that his "most outstanding officers" will be on a joint staff in Washington? I think not. They will ask the Commandant of the Marine Corps. And, what do I tell them? For more than two centuries, 27 Commandants of the Marine Corps, the only ones who have truly understood the strengths and weaknesses of their officer corps, have assigned officers as deemed appropriate in the national interest. I must say, with much regret, that the 28th Commandant and his successors will be denied this privilege. The Congress has taken away some of my authority, but it has left me with the same amount of responsibility.

I regret that circumstances have compelled me to devote so much of my statement thus far to concerns with the Staff Report, but I believe that this document should not go unchallenged—particularly if it is to be used as the basis for the recommendations we are addressing today. With that said, I would like now to address my views on several of the key recommendations in the Staff Report.

Concerning the recommendation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be disestablished and replaced by a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a Chairman and a 4-star military officer from each Service on his last tour of duty, I am unalterably opposed. This could be likened to a recommendation that each member of the Senate be limited to addressing only those matters which involve his particular state, and, to preclude any possibility of state parochialism when it comes to matters of national interest, they should be replaced by a body of 100 "elder statesmen," two from each state. When I took my oath of office, it was to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. For the past 35 years my Country has come before my Corps, and I would be truly concerned if any member of this Committee thought otherwise.

Concerning the recommendation that there should be a Deputy Chairman, I am opposed if the intention is that the senior in precedence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have heard it said capriciously that everyone in Washington has a deputy, so why not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Those who make such a suggestion do not understand the corporate nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Do the Committees of the United State Congress have a Deputy Chairman, or does the senior Senator or Representative take over in the absence of a Committee Chairman? The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a corporate body, now have an effective system for designating an "Acting Chairman" on a quarterly basis. I would not be opposed to a Vice Chairman, junior in precedence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such an officer could assist the Chairman in the discharge of his daily duties and responsibilities.

Concerning the recommendation to make the Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority, I could agree in principle provided it is clearly understood and explicit in law that in the discharge of these duties he is always acting on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he must always provide the alternative views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To do otherwise would disregard the magnitude and complexity of future military operations where the National Command Authority should and must have the views of the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and would presume that one individual could have the background, experience, and wisdom of five diverse military experts. In this regard, there is no doubt in my mind that a responsible Chairman would always seek the advice and counsel of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addressing this important subject, we must be ever mindful of the fact that the more you distance the Chairman from the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the less likely you are to encourage the full spirit of participation and cooperation we all seek to achieve. To the contrary, I believe that it would adversely impact upon the professional and harmonious relationships which we now enjoy as a corporate body. We are a team and we have a captain—to distance this team from its captain would, in my opinion, be divisive and eventually degrade and diffuse the advice provided to the National Command Authority.

And, finally, concerning the recommendation that the Chairman develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty, I encourage extreme caution. To me, a professional joint staff officer would ultimately become precisely what we all so earnestly seek to avoid—a professional bureaucrat and compromiser, one who is skilled in perfect syntax in the preparation of neuter position papers and staff reports. What is needed is a continuous infusion of operationally oriented officers who can provide sound strategic advice based on practical, real world experience—not academicians in uniform who provide advice predicated on theory and "fluff." There are great dangers in the creation of a "cult" of joint staff theoreticians, and the ultimate result could be bland and perhaps dangerous advice. I served three years as a colonel with the Organization of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and I met more than my share of both operationally oriented officers and professional staff officers. As for me, I will take the operationally oriented officer any time. What is not required is a group of professional staff officers, with slick presentations and fancy briefing aids, who will not serve our country well—in fact, they will create many of the problems which we now seek to eliminate.

Please do not consider any of my views as an indication that I espouse "status quo." I have been extremely fortunate in being a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during a period when we have made dynamic and substantive changes to the way we carry out our duties and responsibilities. I have enthusiastically supported each of these, and I shall continue to look for and support further improvements—but first I must always be convinced that the cure is not worse than the disease. We must be mindful of the fact that there is a vast difference between a system which is inherently flawed and one which has not always functioned properly because of inherently flawed people. I see as our joint task the ability to recognize this difference.

In closing, let me be clear and unequivocal. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I shall support any and all recommendations for change to the JCS system after it has been proven that such change will result in improvements to our national security establishment. But I will oppose, with all of my energy, any recommendations for change which I honestly believe to be injurious to the security of the United States. This is in keeping with the oath of office I took over 35 years ago.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, General, particularly for that personal observation in your concluding paragraphs.

Now, General Gabriel.

STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES A. GABRIEL, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General **Gabriel**. Mr. Chairman, let me first say that I too am sorry that Chairman Goldwater could not be with us today and especially that we regret the circumstances for his absence.

I accept fully the target he has given us in his letter and also in the statement you just read. He is right on the mark when he says there is a tendency in any organization—and maybe in the military more so than others—to take a defensive crouch with heels dug in when faced with criticism on operational readiness inspections or anything else, because you tend to think you do the job better than anybody else. Well, I think maybe we do.

But let me say that I agree with my fellow Chiefs that this is probably the most important thing we are going to take part in during our 4-year tenures. We do take this very seriously. I think the staff study is a very thorough look at the way we do business, and I am glad that it was expanded to include not just the JCS organization and what we do, but, also, to review the total decision-making process and all the nodes and people in Washington who make decisions.

Now I do not agree, obviously, with a number of things in the staff study, but I am going to approach it with an open mind. In fact, as Jim Watkins said, maybe we do not blow our horn enough and I think it is probably appropriate that I, in particular, blow our horn a little bit today.

We are taking actions, a lot of actions—and have been for some time—that are consistent with the kinds of things that the Locher report has suggested. In 1982, when Jim Watkins, Jack Vessey and I came in to join Bob Barrow and Shy Meyer, we set specific goals and I would like to talk about those. They were to improve the way we serve the Secretary of Defense and the President and to improve the way we work with each other and the warfighting CINCs.

First, I'll discuss the way we serve the Secretary and the President. The key to that, of course, is the number of meetings that we have with them. We routinely meet with the Secretary as a group at least twice weekly, once in our service hats and once in our joint hats. And we have met with the President, as Jim Watkins has said, a dozen times in our tenure so far. That is about quarterly. And when we serve as the Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence, we also meet daily with the Secretary of Defense and as necessary, of course, with the President when he calls us over for an NSC or National Security Policy Group meeting.

And these are most important. If I have a foot stomper, this is it. I cannot say enough about the importance of being the Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence. I, like Jim, have attended about a dozen NSC meetings in the nearly 150 days I have served as Acting Chairman over the last 3½ years. This is what ties us in to the Chairman and what he does. This is what improves the jointness in our business. So to separate us and have somebody else be the Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence I think would be a gross mistake.

There is a great payback when we are Acting Chairman and we have that personal interface with the Secretary and the President. They get to know us a lot better and, as I have just said, we do our jobs better as service Chiefs and as members of the Joint Chiefs.

I am going to cut my comments short because it has been said before, but I would like to reemphasize what Jim Watkins has said, and that is that it is not a big strain when you are both the Acting Chairman and the Chief. We each have Vice Chiefs to help us accomplish service duties and, if in a contingency or in wartime we are tied up practically 100 percent of the time in the JCS business, the Vice Chiefs handle our responsibilities as service Chiefs. That is the way it is intended to work.

I normally spend about half of my time—more probably—with the joint business in peacetime: you turn up the wick, obviously, when there is a contingency or crisis. In my mind being the Acting Chairman gives us better jointness among the Chiefs, and that leads to the second point I would like to make about how we have improved our jointness.

The jointness we get from being the Acting Chairman, I think, gives us improved service cooperation. I would like to address this with two examples, one programmatic and one operational. First, the programmatic—the 31 initiatives that the Army and Air Force, developed 2 years ago. John Wickham and I had a group of our best people take a look at what we do together to make sure we did not have a lot of duplications and to cover up any voids that we had.

This turned out to be a very objective look, by the way. The only way we could get it, of course, was to lock the group up in a room, away from the field commanders and iron majors in the Pentagon. They came up with some very good initiatives that we have followed through on. We have implemented 19 and have added four more since that time.

As an example, we had an electronic warfare system and were planning to put it in vans all along the front to jam attacking aircraft coming across the border. The Army also planned a series of vans along the border to do a similar job. Both systems were being produced for us by one contractor in the same building, with a partition between the two program officers.

I canceled my program and put my black box in the Army vans and cut out a whole infrastructure of vans that we no longer needed.

Another example you are all familiar with is JSTARS—the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System. The Army planned a series of aircraft—a fleet of aircraft—flying along the front looking not very deep, to give them a picture of the ground situtation like AWACS does for the air battle. We were going to have almost the same thing but with larger aircraft in the rear with a bigger radar to look deep.

John Wickham has now canceled his program and he is joining us. We now have a single platform and single radar that will stand off and do a better job for both of us, and we are going to give him coverage that he needs.

These are the kinds of things that should have been going on all along, I agree. Your committee has encouraged us to do these kinds of things. You support us when we do them, and we appreciate that. But at the same time let me say that no organization, no matter what it is, will ensure this kind of jointness, this kind of cooperation. You have got to have a commitment from each of the Chiefs to jointness in order to get that done no matter how you organize it.

The same thing goes with our work with the Navy in the operational business, the second example I said I was going to talk about. We have turned up the wick a great deal in terms of exercises and training. In every multicarrier task force exercise now held you will find tankers and AWACS out there, and sometimes F-15's to help extend the outer air battle of the task force. Also, the tankers would be very useful, as you can imagine, to help the Navy in force projection ashore.

The B-52's have now been suited out with Harpoon missiles for the antiship role. And this is something—I commend my CNO counterpart here—that had been talked about for years and years, but we never could bite the bullet. We now have two squadrons of B-52's that could help the Navy do that job.

We also practice maritime support of other surface forces of the Navy. It is routine now. Pilots do not have to fumble for frequencies when they go in. They know what they are doing. We do this as a matter of habit today, and our commitment to jointness is the key.

The way we support the CINCs has improved a lot. Three years ago, General Vessey called in the CINCs, one at a time, and asked them to brief us on how they would execute their war plan; how they would fight the war if the war started in their theater; and how they would do it if it started someplace else. You would have a different level of forces in each case.

This was most useful to us and to them. Next, we got together with the Secretary of Defense, all the service Chiefs and the

CINCs; the CINCs again briefed their individual plans so that each of them got a feel for the problems with sequential operations and the kind of decisions that we would be forced to make in resource allocation if that ever happened.

Again, I think our improved warfighting capability is the result of our focus on jointness over these three years or so. As a result, our capability to respond to any kind of contingency—global, sequential or otherwise—has improved a great deal.

We have done a lot to enhance the CINCs role in the PPBS process. The other Chiefs have already told you about that. As John Wickham said, it is the best it has ever been. I also think it is better by far, and I have been in the business a long time. The CINCs four different shots at the PPBS process now, not just inputs to the defense guidance. They join in the preparation of service POM's—the budgets, the programs of the services—and they play all the way through the process, at every milestone.

The component commands know the CINCs priorities. After the components come in for service meetings on a POM or budget milestone they go back and lay out the book and tell the CINC how his priorities made out and the rationale for where they fit. The CINCs can come to us through the components, or they can come directly to us as service Chiefs.

Senator KENNEDY. Could the witness just yield? We are being joined by the Senator pro tempore, who celebrates his 83d birthday today. I think it would be appropriate for us to wish him a very happy birthday.

Senator WARNER. Let us all rise and do that.

[Standing ovation.]

Senator LEVIN. You are welcome as a Democrat, too, Strom, if you want to sit down here.

Senator THURMOND [presiding]. Well, thank you very much for this unexpected applause. I appreciate your kindness.

Go right ahead. I want to explain that we had a meeting we just had to be at this morning with Judiciary, and I want to thank my distinguished and able next ranking Member, Senator Warner, for taking the chair until I got back. I deeply appreciate it. I am sorry Senator Goldwater could not be here.

Have you read his statement into the record, John?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. He is very much interested in this matter and he will read your statements later. We thank all of you for coming and just proceed now where you left off.

General GABRIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Happy birthday. I am about to summarize my comments.

Let me just emphasize that looking ahead we are going to continue to do those things that I have just described—with better jointness in mind—to improve our warfighting capabilities.

Also, let me emphasize that this is a most important effort that we are all engaging in right now. We are most serious about all the recommendations that are being considered. I can agree with many of them and there are others that I do not agree with. The current House legislation is not bad, and what you have outlined in your study, I think, gives us a good point of departure and a basis, a sound framework, from which to address the problem.

I agree with my service Chief counterparts. I agree with what they have said in terms of the Acting Chairman. I told you before that is my foot stomper. I think we have to keep the Acting Chairman approach and stay tied to the Chairman to be most effective in the joint business.

I think a Deputy Chairman certainly could be very useful to spell the Chairman from some of his busy duties and, as General Wickham laid out, there are plenty of things that he could do to be most useful; but he should not be the alter ego and take over in the Chairman's absence. In my opinion, that is the most important thing I could get across to you.

I agree with evolutionary changes. I certainly would not agree with a joint military advisory committee. I think the JCS is the right organization and with modifications we can continue to improve it.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Gabriel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES A. GABRIEL, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

It is a privilege to appear today as you continue your review of Department of Defense organization. The study developed by the committee staff is a thorough look at the many factors and participants in the defense decision-making process. Although I don't agree with every proposal, I'm pleased to report that, for some time, we've been taking action consistent with some of the recommendations. Many of those initiatives resulted from the interest and support of this Committee.

Our recent improvements began in 1982 under the leadership of General Jack Vessey. When General Vessey, Admiral Watkins, and I joined Generals Meyer and Barrow on the JCS, we set some specific goals. One of them was to improve the way we serve the Secretary of Defense and the President. We also made a commitment to improve the way we worked with each other and the warfighting CINCs.

The key to improving the way we serve Secretary Weinberger and President Reagan has been our frequent meetings with each. We meet with the Secretary at least twice weekly, once at the Armed Forces Policy Council where we wear predominantly our Service hats, and once in the "tank" where we wear our JCS hats. Our meetings with the President have been about quarterly and have proven most beneficial as we all take part in an exchange of ideas on defense issues. Additionally, when each of us serves as acting Chairman, we meet with the Secretary daily and the President as necessary during National Security Council meetings.

An open dialogue among the Chiefs has also helped us improve interservice cooperation. We train our forces jointly because that's the way we'll fight. Cooperation in operational and programmatic efforts has led to substantial improvements in our combined warfighting capability. I know you're aware of what we've been doing in this area—it has been the subject of floor speeches and hearings—but I think it's important to highlight a few of our improvements.

Eighteen months ago, General Wickham and I established a Joint Force Development Process. We knew we had to capitalize on each Service's inherent strengths to produce the most effective, affordable air-land combat capability. Our objectives were to develop complementary rather than duplicative capabilities, to work together to fill voids in our warfighting capabilities, and to ensure every dollar is making the maximum contribution to increased total force effectiveness in direct support of the warfighting CINCs.

For example, the Army and Air Force have agreed that our C-18 Joint STARS aircraft is the best system to meet both the air and ground commanders' needs for moving target intelligence. It reduces a program of two platforms and two different radars to a single platform and a single radar system. We have restructured our programs to support that decision and a full-scale development contract was awarded in September. Another example is the Air Force cancellation of a ground-based electronic warfare system, Comfy Challenge. The Army is developing a similar system that can provide us the jamming we need.

Over half of the original 31 initiatives have been implemented, and four more have been added to the list. Number 35 is a Joint Center for Low Intensity Conflict.

We will establish the Center at Langley Air Force Base to address the special demands at the low end of the spectrum of conflict, from unconventional warfare to conventional warfare short of theater conflict. It is an area of growing concern, and from the start, we intend to address it from a joint perspective.

The Navy and Marines are now involved in several of the initiatives. We're also working with the Navy to improve our support of maritime operations and to ensure we share training facilities where possible. Almost half of JCS exercises now involve maritime operations—and our F-15s, KC-10s, and AWACS are helping the Navy extend the outer air battle. We also use B-52s in missions involving mining and sea surveillance. Joint Navy-Air Force operations are now routine. Another good example of joint training is Red Flag. It's the most realistic combat training anywhere in the world. In addition to the Navy and Marines, many of our allies from around the world also participate.

We are also looking at space requirements from a joint perspective. On the 23rd of September, the Unified Space Command was established as our 7th Unified Command. This new Command will ensure that, in peacetime and wartime, all U.S. space assets will be coordinated in support of national objectives and in concert with other military forces.

To help work interservice initiatives, programmers from all four Services agreed to increase cooperation in the areas of programming and budgeting. Additionally, there are not seven Air Force officers on the Army staff, and I have seven Army officers working on my staff. Our goal is to put the dollars where they count the most—warfighting capability.

Our first step to improve our support from the warfighting CINCs was to have each of them brief us on his war plans and show how they would fight a war in their area of responsibility. Then we have all the CINCs meet with the Secretary of Defense and us to discuss their war plans collectively so they could appreciate each others problems and understand the tough decisions we will have to make in allocating forces in wartime.

The CINCs also participate in Defense Resources Board deliberations. This enhanced role in the CINCs in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is only one year old, but we've had good feedback from the CINCs and I'm convinced it's working. The payoffs have been a clear and open line of communication and a better understanding of joint requirements by everyone involved. We can expect greater benefits as this new process matures.

The need to integrate joint warfighting capability and resource allocation is the best argument for my dual role as a member of the JCS and as Chief of my Service. After three and one-half years in both jobs, I am more convinced than ever that these roles are linked and complementary. Wearing both hats allows me to integrate joint strategic planning with Service responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping forces. I am in a better position to ensure that joint strategy and Air Force programs match the defense objectives provided by civilian leadership.

Then, working closely with the Secretary of the Air Force, I ensure programming and budgeting efforts are directed toward obtaining the required capabilities. In short, I can more effectively carry out my responsibilities as Chief because I'm a member of the JCS, and I'm a better member of the JCS because I'm a Service Chief.

This leads me to another important relationship I'd like to discuss—the interface between the military and civilian Service staffs. As Chief, I look to the Secretary for program guidance, oversight, and control in fulfilling Air Force responsibilities; and, the Secretary looks to me for military advice and the implementation of Air Force policies, plans, and programs. The Secretary presents Air Force views to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the policy development process much in the same way I act within the JCS structure. Furthermore, the Service Secretaries are members of the Defense Resources Board, and the Chiefs also participate to back up the Secretaries and the Chairman of the JCS.

Looking toward the future, I can say with confidence that we will continue to ensure that Service initiatives contribute to joint warfighting needs. We will continue to stress warrior qualities to ensure our emphasis on resource management does not detract from the development of combat leaders and operational commanders. We will evaluate continually the balance between the four pillars of combat power—readiness, sustainability, force structure, and modernization. And, under Admiral Crowe's leadership, we will continue to make military decisions that:

Improve the nation's ability to wage war;

Assure timely and useful military advice for the President and Secretary of Defense;

Ensure we strive to meet the CINCs requirements;

Improve our ability to allocate resources efficiently; and

Ensure any changes are consistent with civilian control.

Although we are making progress in these areas, there is much more that can be done. Personally, I support a stronger role for the Chairman through codification of certain functions he performs now as a matter of practice. I also believe that the establishment of a four-star Deputy Chairman position has merit provided the Chiefs continue to serve as acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence.

As we proceed with these changes, and others, we must be careful not to turn the Defense organization upside-down. I remain convinced that the JCS organization is the right organization and that the Joint Military Advisory Council alternative would be counterproductive to improving the way we do busines.

In summary, your study has highlighted areas that warrant further review and action. We're looking objectively at the study and at House Bill; 3622. We also expect constructive results from the President's Commission on Defense Management. We recognize the growing momentum for appropriate legislation and we will support actions that permit evolutionary change.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you. I believe now we will go to questions. I would suggest we have 5 minutes. Better take 10 minutes, I think.

Now, some of the witnesses who have testified before the committee have recommended that the Chairman of the JCS be a five-star officer to distinguish him from the service Chiefs. What are your personal views on this proposal? You can just answer quickly, starting in order of rank.

General WICKHAM. Sir, I do not have any objection to that. I do not think it is necessary as he, in statute, ranks all of us. He does not need the symbolic effect of five stars on the shoulders to do it, nor does the individual in retirement need to be the five-star on active duty all the time to enable us to garner good advice from him. As you have heard from General Vessey yesterday and Gen. Dave Jones, they are up to date and they are able to provide the advice.

There are some down sides to considering that, because where do you cut it off? Must you go back to all of those who have been Chairman before and elevate them to five-stars. What does that do about the wartime five-star individuals and the nature of their responsibilities? So, I do not think it is necessary.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral.

Admiral WATKINS. I would have no objection, as long as he is paid more and not capped. He should be paid more than the four service Chiefs.

Senator THURMOND. As long as what?

Admiral WATKINS. I would have no objection to the promotion. I do believe he should be paid more than the four service Chiefs.

General GABRIEL. I do not think it is necessary, but I have no objection.

General KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think we should take a look at what has happened around the world. To the best of my recollection, I think we would be well served to take a hard look at this subject, because I see now that in some of the NATO countries we do, in fact, have a five-star rank. If indeed that was required for the prestige of the Chairman, representing our country, particularly in those arenas, I think that that would be a very appropriate decision.

I do not think that it will in any way enhance his relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He already, in that forum, is the

Chairman, and we recognize that, but for other forums it may well be the wise decision.

Senator THURMOND. Second question. Admiral Watkins, as you know, seciton 5081 of title X, United States Code, provides that: "The Chief of Naval Operations is the principal naval advisor to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of war." This provision is unique in that no other service Chief is accorded this special relationship.

Can you explain to the committee and to the three service Chiefs sitting beside you why you alone should have a special statutory relationship to the President?

Admiral WATKINS. I do not believe that I alone should have that. I believe the service Chiefs, whether we have it in law or do not have it in law, are considered the senior military advisor representing their services. The President knows that. The Secretary of Defense knows that. He uses us in that capacity.

So whether it is codified in law or not is really quite irrelevant, in my opinion. I do not think it is there because the Navy feels that we should be alone. I really believe it has popped into view there over the years and has stood the test. The President does consider me to be the senior military naval adviser, and I believe the others could either be codified or it could be eliminated and it would make very little difference.

Senator THURMOND. So you would have no objection if that were removed, I presume is what you are saying.

Admiral WATKINS. I would prefer, Mr. Chairman, that you consider elevating the others, if we are going to retain the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as we have so strongly recommended here today. The other service Chiefs should be considered the principal military advisers from their services. In fact, if we all believe that the dissenting views of the Chiefs should be presented, which is in the amendment to the House bill, which I endorse wholeheartedly, then in fact we are saying that we are the principal Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy advisers to the President.

So if it is put in this context in the new law, then I would say that is a good way to handle it.

Senator THURMOND. General Wickham, in your prepared statement you say: "It is important to emphasize the essential role of selecting leaders with joint vision." I completely agree with that. How well do you think we have done in the past in selecting leaders with joint vision? Could this selection process be improved in any way, do you think?

General WICKHAM. Yes, sir; I think it can. We are concentrating on more joint schooling of our younger people and trying to get quality people into joint assignments as they evolve into senior officials. I have had 14 years in joint duty. That service is a signal to younger people. The fact that our current Chairman has had substantial joint experience is a symbol. I think we are moving in that direction with some authority.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much. I think my time is about up. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. I thank all of you for being here again. I have benefited greatly from your testimony. I would like to pose a couple of questions.

We have had testimony here from people both for and against various aspects of the staff report. I suppose the people who were most opposed, according to my recollection, were General Krulak and Admiral Moorer, and they did not agree with the staff report recommendations. Put at the same time, they made it very plain that they thought the big problem was the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

They said that it was too large, it was ineffective, and it continued to interfere with the military operation and advice of the Joint Chiefs. I would like to ask each of the Chiefs to comment on this. Do you have serious problems, I am not saying with the Secretary of Defense, not with Secretary Weinberger, but with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in trying to perform your duties?

I would like your personal views. General Wickham.

General WICKHAM. Senator Nunn, as I indicated, I have seen it from a variety of circumstances down in the Joint Staff, in many tours of duty there, and also as senior military executive to Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Rumsfeld. I would have to say that there has been, is now, probably always will be, a degree of duplication in the staff activities. Every Secretary will have independent sources of advice and that will lead to some duplication. But every Secretary that I have been associated with has worked hard at trying to reduce the degree of that duplication and at trying to make full use of the military staff. Yes, we are frustrated from time to time by people at lower staff levels who sometimes want to pass judgment on advice that we think is important and interfere with that advice. But I do not think that the natural antagonism that takes place there between staffs leads to undercutting of solid advice to the Secretary, because eyeball contact with him and the President is where the straightest advice comes. So I do not see that as a serious impediment. I would like to see—all of us would—lower numbers in staffs, including the congressional side.

Senator NUNN. How about the staff of the Joint Chiefs?

General WICKHAM. Yes, sir. I think that the staff has grown, and I think that the staff growth can be moderated. The Chiefs here have tried to keep all of the Unified Command staffs from growing. I have cut the Army staff over the past 2 years, 5 percent 1 year and 3 percent this year. So I think some reduction in staff makes sense. But in order to do that, requirements have to be lifted and efficiency has to be imposed.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Admiral Watkins.

Admiral WATKINS. I have the same feeling as General Wickham. I believe there are too many staff personnel at all levels. I believe we have failed to establish levels of trust between each of these various levels, with the highest level being here in the Congress. Congress, for example, ought to be looking at our national military policy, strategic policies, and weighing us on the merits of the products that we deliver to support that strategy.

I think that those are the kinds of things that could be done here at this level of trust. I believe as we get down into programmatic line items at every level, there is too much micromanagement, a criticism well laid out in the staff report. If we could, in this process, somehow find a more clearly defined set of levels of trust, while retaining certain elements of oversight which are essential, I believe we could eliminate large numbers of people, at every staff level. Then we could be more efficient and not waste so much time spinning our wheels on redundancy which we now see at each level, each overlooking the same particular program elements at the line item level, rather than focusing on strategic policies and the higher-ground goals that should be the focus here on Capitol Hill.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. I do not think it is a serious problem. We do have duplication, as John mentioned, in the activities in OSD and JCS in some of the staff work. We have recognized that and we have worked that with OSD several times. But there still needs to be more work done in that area.

I also agree that there is room for reductions in staff here as well as OSD and JCS, and we should get on with that.

Senator NUNN. General Kelley.

General KELLEY. Senator Nunn, one of the most serious problems, of course, is that you must address this across the board, because for every question asked you must provide a question answerer. It starts right here on Capitol Hill. I would dare say that you could identify a significant number of Secretary Weinberger's staff who do precious little else except answer questions. I am not suggesting that these may not be essential questions, but before we throw the baby out with the bath water, you will have to take that into consideration.

I do not have problems personally, nor does the Marine Corps have significant problems, with the OSD staff. However, I can see a trend which is being resisted by Secretary Weinberger, who believes in decentralization. I can see a moving trend, because of burgeoning staffs, toward centralization. Moreover, the larger the staff, the more likely they are to become involved in our business—and that is operational matters.

So I believe that in answer to your question directly, we certainly should look at the OSD staff as part of the overall staff structures here in Washington, to see where we can cut out question askers and question answerers.

Senator NUNN. Well, I agree with you, that Congress asks questions for the record and requests too many reports. I think that is a point well taken and we are going to have to address it in this committee and throughout the Congress.

General Kelley, in your written statement you highlight some of the changes that have been made by the current service Chiefs and General Vessey in the JCS system. Four of the seven changes that you cite are new agencies that the JCS has created—first, the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency: second, the Joint Requirements and Management Board: third, the Joint Planning Staff for Space; and then also the Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency.

When Secretary Weinberger testified, he cited his establishment of the Strategic Concepts Development Center as evidence that he has strengthened the planning process.

First, I do not know whether these are additional agencies, whether they are different people, whether they are the same people that are recomposed and so forth. So that is one question. The second question is, Why is it necessary when the JCS has the Joint Staff, people that you as service Chiefs have obvious confidence in since you put them there, why is it necessary to create so many agencies to address these problems?

So, two questions. One is are these additional people parts of these agencies? Second, why do we have to have so many agencies when presumably we are capable of doing that job internally?

General KELLEY. The only agency which actually involves additional people, Senator Nunn—and that was mandated and provided for in legislation—is SPRAA. The other agencies are merely put together, the Joint Requirements Board, as an example, as an ad hoc group. Its principal members are Vice Chiefs of Staff or, in my case, the Assistant Commandant. They are the principal members, so there are no additional personnel resources.

These are all functional agencies, that are part of the Joint Chiefs or the Joint Staff, and address functional problems.

Senator NUNN. Does that mean these functional problems were not being addressed before the creation of these agencies?

General KELLEY. In the case of the JRMB, that is correct, they were not. That was created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an agency to look over the crosscutting service issues.

Senator NUNN. Why do we need, for instance, the Strategic Concepts Development Center in the Office of Secretary of Defense? If the Joint Chiefs are doing the strategy planning, why do we need that kind of agency?

General KELLEY. I would like to turn that over to one of my colleagues. I am not personally aware of the Strategic Concepts Development Center.

Senator NUNN. Does anybody know what it does?

General GABRIEL. Well, I think that is the one that was set up in the National Defense University to do some things with the students there and some of the staff to help us in this area, and it has done some things for the JCS as well as the Secretary.

General WICKHAM. That is right, Senator. It is a small cell in NDU to help with long-range planning. By and large I think P.X. Kelley is right. There has been a rearrangement of people to do some of these tasks, but there is always a tendency to assign people to a new task and to grow, and, therefore, I come back to my statement—and I think Jim agreed with it—that we have to be ever mindful of trying to discipline staff growth.

Senator NUNN. We have a 1982 report that says there are at least 675 officers on service staffs who assist the service Chiefs on JCS matters. That is nearly equal to the number of military officers serving on the organization of the Joint Staff. Do we really need 675 additional people?

General WICKHAM. Sir, let me address that. The size of the Army staff is about 3,000 people, half of which are civilians. That is less than it has been, as I indicated—at least 15 percent less, and we are going down even further. Out of that group, I probably have a dozen officers who are working full time on joint matters. As needs arise in the logistics area and the personnel area and the intelligence area for specific service inputs, then we take an officer who is dedicated to doing other things in the service and he provides that joint input. So, to say that we have 675 officers who are totally dedicated to joint affairs is totally wrong from the Army standpoint.

Admiral **Watkins**. We have the same situation, Senator Nunn. While within those organizations there are members who support my operations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff full time, the very large majority are on other Navy policy, foreign policy, interagency issues, and the like, that we must also deal with on a Navy-only basis.

While they are dual hatted in that capacity and could be counted in the numbers you are giving, it would be unfair to say that 675, at least from the Navy's point of view, is our component that would be dedicated solely to JCS matters.

General **Gabriel**. We have seven dedicated to this, seven officers full time. The rest, of course, respond to these seven whenever it is in their functional area. That is all. You cannot count the whole staff other than that—only seven joint.

Senator **Nunn**. My time has expired. Thank you.

Senator **Thurmond**. The distinguished Senator from Virginia.

Senator **Warner**. Gentlemen, let us turn to the very important role that a Chairman plays with respect to his participation in those issues that come before the National Security Council. Do you remember any change from the current practice?

We will start with General Wickham and proceed.

General **Wickham**. The only change I would suggest that might be codified is making the Chairman the principal military adviser. He now functions on behalf of the JCS. That really is not necessary, but I see no objection to doing it. I do not think that the Chairman should be a full voting member of the NSC. That puts him on an equal level with the Secretary of Defense.

He does, as a matter of fact, participate in the NSC on all deliberations, and when military matters are raised he is available and provides his advice. I have gone to a number of NSC meetings as Acting Chairman. So I do not see a need for major structural changes necessary with regard to the Chairman and the NSC.

Senator **Warner**. Admiral Watkins.

Admiral **Watkins**. I agree with General Wickham.

Senator **Warner**. General Gabriel.

General **Gabriel**. I agree also. It's the President's call.

Senator **Warner**. General Kelley.

General **Kelley**. I think there is somewhat of a misunderstanding of what membership means. These are not bodies where we go in, have a secret written ballot, and vote. These are free-exchange bodies, much like the Defense Resources Board that we all talk about. We are not members of the Defense Resources Board, but you do not vote around the table. You have members, you have ex officio members, you have ad hoc members, and you have us.

But the point is that our voice is as equal in that room as anyone else's, so it is really almost a moot point whether he becomes a formal member or not. He is a full-time participant.

Senator **Warner**. That is a very clear position.

Now turning to a couple of situations—and having served as a service Secretary myself, I express no opinion on this at this time. But in the course of our deliberations this fact should be considered—namely that we have, for those that do not fully understand the system, a Service Secretary with a staff—military and civilian—and a service Chief with a staff—service and civilian.

There is a good deal of duplication in the roles and functions. In my own experience I found that to be competitive—yes, redundant, but very valuable. Do you see any basis for consolidation of part or all of the staff between a service Secretary and a service Chief to effect efficiencies and savings in dollars?

General **Wickham**. In the Army we have about 3,000 officers and civilian professionals on the Army staff, which covers all Army matters. In the service Secretariat there are about 380 individuals. We have already come way down in terms of size and some further melding might be possible, but every service Secretary needs a degree of independence.

In the case of the Army Secretariat, there are unique things. The civil works function legislated by the Congress requires independent authority. The Secretary does need a general counsel that looks at overall policy issues quite aside from the military matters that the Judge Advocate General oversees in terms of the practice of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I think there needs to be a degree of overlap and separation. We are about right where we are right now, in my opinion and I think Jack Marsh will say the same thing tomorrow.

Admiral **Watkins**. In the case of the Navy, for the past few years with Secretary Lehman, as far as I am concerned, we have fully integrated the Navy staff with the Secretary's staff. There are no issues today that we do not work out in common meetings—on preparation of the budget, on readiness, sustainability items for the Navy, on matters of contracting.

We have just eliminated the Materiel Command to cut down layering. We have taken 10 percent cuts across the board, and we are sharing burdens of the pickup of the responsibility of that 10-percent cut within the integrated staffs between us. I know of no function today that is not fully integrated on a real-time basis, not in series but in parallel with the Secretary of the Navy. I believe that is an internal arrangement that is the right way to go.

I see mentioned in the staff report, and I do not understand why, complaints that we are not fully integrated. Also, it says we must prevent the service Chiefs from circumventing the service Secretaries. I do not know how to circumvent John Lehman, and I will not try. We work as a team and I really do not understand why that comment is in the staff report.

Senator **Warner**. Well, I do not attribute any negativism toward the staff report, but it is an issue that we have got to discuss, Admiral.

From a practical standpoint, the Secretary of the Navy still has a section exclusively on personnel and logistics and you have a section on personnel and logistics. What you are saying is they coordinate and work together. But there is still a redundancy, if only in people assigned directly to him and on his payroll, and those persons on your payroll.

Admiral **Watkins**. But my observation, Senator Warner, as it was when you were there, was that those functions are not redundant. They are absolutely essential for each other and supportive, people moving in different directions trying to work with Capitol Hill or in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For example, we in the military side are trying to work with our people in the field, trying to get the information for the civilian side.

I believe the dovetailing of those functions is about right within the Navy, and I do not see any major improvements that can be made in the integration of our two staffs. I think a small amount of redundancy is essential.

Senator WARNER. But bear in mind—and this reflects on an earlier observation you made—we are learning that this present operation under Secretary Weinberger has worked and worked well, far better than I think many had appreciated. But we have got to lay down in statute, and otherwise, a format for successive administrations.

There have been administrations in the Department of the Navy where the Secretary and the CNO have not worked as well as you and John Lehman, and as such there was a little more than competition between the two staffs. Indeed, there has been outright adversity and conflict.

So while we are looking at your situation today, we have also got to plan for the future and the contingency of future Secretaries and Chiefs who do not work as harmoniously as at present.

General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. Yes, sir; we have pretty much the same situation as the Army. We have only about 300 in the Secretariat. Of those, about 120 at least are wrapped up in legislative liaison and public affairs that dual hat and do the same job for both of us. They have to have a special staff of about 20, so it come out that they only have about 160 people that work directly for the Secretary only.

And even at that we have some dual hatting in a sense. For example, Tidal McCoy, in Manpower and Personnel has the military's chief civilian personnel officer working for him. And Tom Cooper of R&D has only about 40 people in his shop. But he receives lots of support from the people we have in the Air Staff in R&D, and this is necessary.

They do get strong support from the service staff, and I think it has worked very well. There is not much ground to be plowed here, I think, if we were looking for people to eliminate on the Secretariat. It is a very necessary arrangement.

Senator WARNER. General Kelley.

General KELLEY. We have not had a problem, and I support what Admiral Watkins has said. There has been a lot more integration, I think, in the serving of two masters with one organization. As you recall from your term as the Secretary of the Navy, we had the Department of the Navy Program Information Center. It serves the Secretary, it serves the CNO, and it serves me. The Navy Comptroller organization is double hatted. So it is also integrated.

There is an awful lot of integration that goes on. For those functions for which one could foresee a redundancy, normally I have found that John Lehman has disciplined his staff to stay with policy matters and keep out of the service Chiefs' hair, and then let us implement whatever policy he felt was correct.

Senator **Warner**. Turning to the question of the unified commanders, we are giving consideration to strengthening their role. One of the options is to provide them with a greater degree of authority over the individuals selected as their component commanders and other subordinates. Indeed one option would give them total authority in this regard.

General Wickham, your views on that?

General **Wickham**. I believe that the unified commanders have almost total authority to reject an individual. I can give you a case where a unified commander did reject an individual and I had to go back and nominate someone else. They do have that kind of authority, and there is consultation that goes on to include assignments to the staff under that unified commander. I think the practice already exists, and one need not codify that.

Admiral **Watkins**. I agree with that, Senator.

General **Gabriel**. I agree. I have also seen examples of some officers that we have proposed turned down and another one submitted. So yes, they have sufficient authority today.

General **Kelley**. I think they do, and you would not want to expand that much farther. When I had the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, I was only interested in retaining control of those things which affected the warfighting capability. I did not particularly care how many paperclips I had or how the personnel were assigned throughout some very substantial components.

Therefore, I think they have as much authority as they need to execute their responsibilities.

Senator **Warner**. Should the service component commanders be required to report through their unified commanders on those matters for which their parent services are responsible?

General **Wickhan**. No, sir; I do not think so. Just as General Kelley indicated, there are certain administrative matters on which component commanders need to deal directly with the services. You said in your beginning comments that a lot of improvements have been made under this current administration. The unified commanders now participate in the Defense Resources Board process thoroughly. I have demonstrated in the building of our annual budgets what the unified commanders' priorities are what are we doing to fulfill those priorities, and why have we not done a better job. I think they are getting the support that they need without creating an additional reporting layer by having the component commanders report through the unified commander. There is now a full interplay of knowledge and full coordination of what takes place.

Admiral **Watkins**. I would just add, Senator Warner, as was mentioned in one of the statements earlier, that we are opening the United Action Armed Forces, so-called JCS Pub. 2, to review. It has not been reviewed in many, many years. Contained in that document, in my opinion, are some bureaucratic hurdles to the progress that we have talked about.

The Chiefs have agreed that there are ways to streamline the process, to identify those things which could provide greater involvement of the CINCs and component commanders with us. A number of ways to streamline may become obvious as we continue this review. As Secretary Weinberger reported through the Chairman in his recent letter, we Chiefs are going to be right in the middle of the process.

There might be some changes that can enhance involvement of the CINCs with the service component commanders in those areas that are rightfully the responsibility of each service, such as recruiting, training, and equipping of forces, since the interface between those and the CINCs responsibilities are clear ones. We will listen to the CINCs suggestions as we have in the past.

We believe we have already strengthened those organizations by putting people in their staffs who will ensure cross-pollination of all budget talk, both those elements of current readiness and future programs.

Senator WARNER. General Gabriel.

Senator NUNN. May I ask one question? Is that Unified Action Armed Forces the same thing that you are referring to?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes, sir, it is. You referred to it heavily—or, that is, the staff report did.

Senator NUNN. I am delighted you are reviewing it.

Admiral WATKINS. Heavily in the Unified Command section. Almost everything therein was taken out of Unified Action Armed Forces JCS Pub. 2.

Senator NUNN. I have read that about 50 times, and every time I read it it gets worse.

General GABRIEL. It is more than 10 years old and does need review, yes.

On the Service components reporting to the CINCs, I think, as I explained in my verbal, that we do this very well now. We open our book on the POM to the CINCs. I do not think that needs to be beefed up, and I agree with what Jim said about manpower and operational improvements that might be possible, and we will work on it.

General KELLEY. I think there has to be an extremely close relationship between the service components and the commander-in-chief of a unified command, even if it is in matters that involve a particular service chain. As an example, I am certain that there was message traffic when we had our Marines deployed to Beirut; that is certain administrative message traffic, that would have been very helpful to the operational chain.

We have to ensure that with that kind of traffic, at least as a courtesy, we are always keeping the operational chain current on what we are doing in the administrative chain: because it can have a serious impact on his capability in terms of operational matters.

Senator WARNER. [presiding]. Thank you, General Kelley.

Senator Nunn, if it is agreeable, and Senator Exon, we will now turn to Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Senator Exon yielding on this.

Gentlemen, I appreciate your being here today because we are not experts up here. We are civilians and we depend upon you for your experience and expertise and advice. But I think in exercising and carrying out our responsibilities it is important to carry them out in a spirit of openmindedness.

For example, the suggestion was made by General Kelley, that advocates of change—there seems to be some negative connotations with "advocate of change"—must carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I do not think that anybody on this committee, no one that I am aware of, is accusing you of criminal misconduct. That is the standard we apply to criminal misbehavior, not to an opportunity to see whether improvements can be made.

But the notion that somehow any change must be carried beyond a reasonable doubt or else it should be rejected, it seems to me, would leave us in a constant state of stagnation. So I reject that particular standard.

I also reject the notion that anyone who is an advocate of change may either by intent, or lack of concern, jeopardize the security of this country. I do not think that "Shy" Meyer would do anything to jeopardize the security of this country. I do not think that Admiral Train would make a recommendation that we jeopardize the security of this country. I no not think Jim Schlesinger, former Director of the CIA and former Secretary of Defense, would make a recommendation that would jeopardize national security; neither would General Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or Senator Goldwater or Senator Nunn or anybody else on this committee.

I think the notion that advocating change will somehow jeopardize the national security is simply wrong. We want to find out whether or not we can make improvements to the current system. I thought I would point that out because there was the implication, at least made to me, that somehow advocates of change do not know either what they are doing or what they are about to undertake, and that this is somehow going to destroy morale.

I do not know what you would say if we had a major failure because we did not make certain changes that could have been made and as a result we had a loss in the field and a situation that caused great loss of life. I think we would not only have disrespect but we would inherit the general contempt not only of our soldiers but of our enemies as well.

I would just like to propose a couple of questions. First, General Kelley, in your prepared statement you indicated and gave a very forceful presentation—I am sorry you did not get a chance to present it all. You said I can find no significant shortcomings in the ability of our current system to address strategy, resource, operational or organizational issues.

It struck me as being somewhat in contrast to the enormous difficulties you had as the first commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Now in that particular case it struck me, if my memory serves me correctly, there was great difficulty, serious infighting, at that time and that the current system had some shortcomings in addressing strategy and resource and operational and organizational issues.

So is this one of the situations in which the Joint Chiefs were able to subordinate the interests of their parent services to the larger national interest?

General **Kelley**. In my personal opinion, Senator Cohen, in the organization of the rapid deployment joint task force, we violated a basic fundamental military concept. We gave the commander terms of reference which were signed or authenticated, at least, by the President of the United States and which told him to do certain things. Then, we put him under the operational command of a commander. That has all sorts of implications in our military mind.

The two were almost in direct conflict. It was almost a prescription for not infighting, but for disagreement. I was told to report directly up one chain, which was direct; on the other hand, I was being loyal to my senior because I was under his operational command. Actually the system created a very serious problem which was corrected, I might add, thanks to your wisdom and your help, when we made the RDJTF a separate unified command.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

Admiral, you gave a vignette of a time at which the President called on each individual Chief for your respective views. In there anything in the staff recommendation that would preclude the President of the United States calling each one of you in and saying, Admiral, tell me what your personal views are?

Admiral WATKINS. Absolutely not, Senator Cohen. But, on the other hand, if the implication of a sole military advisor to the President implies that in the routine scheme of things there might not be involvement of service Chiefs, then I think it would be wrong. But the implication is that they would no longer be recognized in the same capacity which they now serve and certainly have served this President well over the last few years.

Senator COHEN. Senator Exon, why don't you ask some questions? I am about to terminate. You can go ahead.

Senator EXON. I will come back. Go ahead.

Senator COHEN. I am leaving right now. He was kind enough to yield to me, and I have several other questions, and I will submit them to you for the record. Thank you very much.

Senator THURMOND. The distinguished Senator from Nebraska.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your special consideration, but I have an appointment in a few minutes. I will come back.

Senator THURMOND [presiding]. Either come back or you can put your questions in the record, whichever you prefer.

Senator COHEN. In that case, Mr. Chairman, I will ask one more question.

Senator THURMOND. You may continue, Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. General Kelley, in criticizing the staff recommendation that the Chairman develop a management system for joint duty personnel, there again seemed to be an assumption that the Chairman would use that authority to fill the joint staff with professional bureaucrats as such, which raises a question.

Why would you assume that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would run that risk of taking professional bureaucrats who do not have in-the-field experience solely in order to solidify his position as the person reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense? Why would you assume that a Chairman would not seek to have a blend of personnel who had in-field experience and had the kind of rotation that would be necessary to give a sense of continuity as well as expertise?

General KELLEY. I think the whole thrust of what I read in the staff report and the whole thrust of discussions that I have heard really lead you toward the belief that what they are trying to establish is a profession of Joint Staff officers, officers who are skilled and who have been schooled in Joint Staff procedures and in "jointness."

My argument is that you be cautious in how you look at that. A very natural byproduct of that kind of an attitude is professional staff officers who have had no operational experience, and as a direct consequence, people up to and including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been given the full range of advice they should have received.

Senator COHEN. And that is a valid point. But I would simply like to point out to you that one of the major problems cited by the report, which I tend to agree with, is there is a great deal of turbulence in the Joint Staff. People who service there do a tour of duty of 24 months. An average works out to about a year, plus a few months here or there. But you have a great deal of turbulence of people moving in and out, and they do so in groups.

For example, even though Secretary Weinberger testified before this committee that we have cured the problem, the fact of the matter is that 9 out of the 12 senior positions in the Joint Staff have changed this year, and no one who served there during the operation that we had just a couple of years ago, Grenada, is currently on the Joint Staff today. Now that may not be a problem.,

General KELLEY. I think your criticism is a valid criticism, and we have to be more attuned to the amount of time that we keep an officer. I may have been guilty of a self-inflicted wound. I served 3 years on the Joint Staff, but I served a full 3 years. I had an opportunity to see the various kinds of officers that rotated in and out of the Joint Staff.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

The senior Senator from Michigan.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my thanks to each of you gentlemen for your testimony. It is helpful.

Let me first associate myself with the comments of Senator Cohen about the intentions of everybody. All of our witnesses, all of the staff, all the Members are seeking to improve the situation if we can, and that is a positive motive on the part of everybody here. I think any attack on anybody's motives, be they witnesses, nonwitnesses, staff, Senators or whatever, is a mistake on the part of anyone.

Second, the burden. I must say I agree with Senator Cohen's comments here as well. Secretary Weinberger made a comment that there must be conclusive evidence, I think his words were, that a change was necessary before we should make any changes at all. I think, General Kelley, your words are that the burden on the critics is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that demonstrable improvements will result. I think that burden is not the correct burden.

I think that we should be satisfied that improvement will result by the ordinary test of satisfaction on the part of a legislative body and not adopt a criminal standard here, beyond a reasonable doubt, or the standard which was laid out for us by the Secretary of Defense, which I believe was "conclusive evidence", in his case.

It is an unusual standard to be applied to a legislative body and I do not think we can or would accept that kind of a test.

I am interested in the dual-hatting issue. General Kelley again says that that word has been sometimes used pejoratively. I think he is correct; it has been at times used that way. I use it in a different way. I think that you gentlemen are given the responsibility of advocating for your services and, frankly, I want you advocating for your services. I think we need advocates for causes and you should be, as Chief of your service advocating that point of view.

General Kelley points out on the bottom of page 15, he analogizes the dual-hatting that you wear with our situation here in the Congress, and says that:

> To suggest that any Senator from any State would not put aside his parochialism for his home State when an issue of national importance is at stake is as irrational as it is to suggest that a member of the Joint Chiefs would not set aside his service parochialism under similar circumstances. To say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have normally been unable to subordinate the interests of their parent services to the larger interest of national defense is an intemperate observation.

I would like to know from each of you as to whether—let me ask General Kelley first, because he made the statement. How many issues, give me a percentage. Is it a quarter, a half, two-thirds, three-quarters, most, less than most? How would you describe the number of issues which come before you which, in your words, are issues of national importance where you would set aside your service parochialism, again in your words, and act in the national interest?

Is that a common thing?

General KELLEY. I would say that in almost every issue that we address, within the organization or within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that they are all issues of national importance. I would say that 100 percent of my time, Senator Levin—and I hope I speak for my colleagues, and they have the same level of answer—and I defy anybody to criticize me on this, I have set aside my service parochialism to address this as a national issue.

Senator LEVIN. So that the issues that come before the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body you view your role as representing the national interest and not the interest of the Corps.

General KELLEY. First and foremost, yes, sir. Also, I provide inputs that would be of value concerning my service.

Senator LEVIN. So that when you are sitting as a corporate body you are not advocating your needs in the Marine Corps?

General KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator LEVIN. On budget items?

General KELLEY. I discuss the budget items, and we have deliberations on the budget items, particularly those that are cross-service budget items. Yes, we will deliberate; and in that sense, in a deliberative forum, we all become advocates. But when we look at the totality of the deliberations, that is the time when we set aside our service parochialism.

Senator LEVIN. So that when you are deliberating there in the corporate body you are advocating the needs of the Marine Corps?

General KELLEY. When that is necessary for clarity within the discussions.

Senator LEVIN. At some point during the deliberative process you would be advocating the needs of your service?

General KELLEY. When it is necessary for clarity.

Senator LEVIN. When it is necessary for clarity. I am saying at some point or points during that deliberative process.

General KELLEY. When it is necessary, yes.

Senator LEVIN. You would be advocating the needs of the service. At another point during those same deliberations you would then, in your judgmental role, be trying to determine what is in the national interest and that is your goal?

General KELLEY. The ultimate goal is always——

Senator LEVIN. That is your goal individually?

General KELLEY. Absolutely. National interest always comes before my service. It always has.

Senator LEVIN. So you view during those deliberations on all issues involving your judgment, during the corporate deliberation you view your role as representing the national interest?

General KELLEY. I will also, when it is required for information and for a part of the deliberations, provide inputs as to the U.S. Marine Corps.

Senator LEVIN. But do you view yourself in reaching a judgment and coming to a conclusion on that corporate body as representing the national interest?

General KELLEY. We reach a collective judgment.

Senator LEVIN. I know you do altogether, but now I am asking, General Kelley, when you vote, when you reach a judgment on an issue there in that corporate body, during those discussions you are now reaching a judgment and you are voting, do you vote——

General KELLEY. We do not vote, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Do you reach your judgment, do you express your ultimate conclusion, in whatever form it is, representing the national interest or the Marine Corps' interest?

General KELLEY. I think you are trying to set a scenario on how we meet and how we deliberate that really has very little substance.

Senator LEVIN. I am trying to find out what you think. I know how as a Senator I have this dilemma all the time and it is not an easy thing.

General KELLEY. As an example, we spend a considerable amount of our time on strategic issues, whether it be arms control or strategic defense initiatives. These are national issues, and most of the issues, the majority of the issues, that we address as the Joint Chiefs of Staff are either national issues or cross-cutting issues where they cross-cut among all the services. Then we deliberate on those cross-cutting issues and come up with what we consider to be the best conclusion.

We do not always necessarily agree.

Senator LEVIN. But each of you also reach conclusions that you pool and then reach a joint conclusion.

General KELLEY. Well, you are setting a scenario I am not prepared to accept, sir.

Senator LEVIN. I am not trying to be argumentative. I am trying to understand how you conceive your role. Because I conceive of it as essentially being an advocate. I do not have any problem with that. I view myself as being an advocate of the people who I represent. If I could just finish, I view myself as an advocate essentially for the people who I represent, and I do not have any problem with that particular role. There are times when I can see that what is good for my people in my State might be different than what is good for the people of the Nation.

I am just trying to find out from you whether or not in the judgements you reach—forget the word "vote"—in the judgments that you reach that you view those judgments—I am trying to get inside your head—do you view yourself as representing your service of the National interest? Or do you never see a conflict between the two? Is there ever a conflict between the two?

General KELLEY. There may be an inner conflict, but I have always had the ability to rise above it and do what is right for my country, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. So that where there is a conflict——

General KELLEY. Of course, there is always an internal conflict that one has. That is human nature.

Senator LEVIN. Sure.

General KELLEY. Now there is the ability of the person to rise above the conflict, and I say in my statement on page 15, that in my view it should come as no surprise that we are parochial when dealing with matters involving our services. I admit to that as much as you admit to the fact that you are parochial when it comes to the sovereign State of Michigan, and that is the way it should be.

But I know that you can rise above that parochialism in this forum and I just ask you to accept the fact that I may have the ability to rise above that parochialism in our forum.

Senator LEVIN. I do not have any problem in that either, but there are times that we all rise above parochialism. My question is how often is there that conflict and it is essential to rise above it. Is that uncommon, common?

General KELLEY. It is not—let me make sure I have your question. How often do I have the conflict? Very, very seldom, and I always rise above it.

Senator LEVIN. OK. That is a good understanding. It happens rarely, and when it does you are always able to overcome it?

General KELLEY. Precisely.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Senator.

The junior Senator from Alabama.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome you here this morning, gentlemen.

For what it is worth, I believe that the hearings have become valuable. I respect the effort of the staff in having prepared the report, which is more or less the departure point for the hearings, or was in the beginning. In my view, some of the recommendations in that staff report are good, some are bad, some are in a category which I think we should let the hearings clarify further as to efficacy.

I, for the record, would like to say that I share General Kelley's emphasis on caution in making changes. I sense a lot less momentum toward some of the changes which I thought would be passed, and I am less anxious than I was in the beginning. None of that is to gainsay the motivations of anyone, or the respect I have for the staff or my collegues.

Generally we in the Congress are much less informed than the military establishment which we want to change, and I sense much more respect growing for what is being said by members of the military than perhaps would have been the case at the very beginning. I am very encouraged by the fact that quite a broad spectrum of representatives from the military and Department of Defense have been called upon, and I can think of no group more useful in that sense than the four of you.

I acknowledge that I know most of you quite well. Some of us have children who are friends, and that sort of thing, so I guess I am not entirely unbiased in respecting you. But I want to say that of the sets of Joint Chiefs of Staff that I have seen in my lifetime I am especially proud of the four of you and I want to state that for the record.

I think it is unfair to ask members of the military to make candid, forthright remarks and then criticize them when they do so, as happened to General Kelley when he said that the burden must be on the critics to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that demonstrable improvements would result from the recommendations for change. I personally have no problem with that standard. I believe that to pretend that emotional and partisan treatment of this subject would not be a temptation in this or the other body is folly, and I think it is candid and appropriate for a military man to say that he hopes that we do not err as a result of one of those temptations. So for the record, I make that point.

It seems to me, gentlemen, if you have not been following our hearings closely—and I know that as busy as you are that you have not—we have reached consensus on strengthening the roles of the CINCs to some degree, and perhaps on the wisdom of upgrading the authority of the Chairman. Less of a consensus has been reached on putting the Chairman in the formal chain of command, and on making him the sole military advisor to the Secretary and the President.

Creating a deputy chief who would be senior to the service chiefs, I do not think that has a consenus yet, but there does appear to be firm consensus on the impression that you gentlemen are overloaded, that some of your burden needs to be relieved.

I happen to believe that is the case, and I will be asking you about the proposed deputy—maybe we ought to call him a deputy member of the Joint Chiefs rather than deputy chairman. But I have a feeling that, for temporary crises, he might be able to keep a more continuous look on that crisis than is possible by the duty officer, day-by-day method now being used. I will be asking you about that.

Let me get to the specific questions. The first one I have asked every witness and I want to ask each of you. You can answer briefly or at length, as you choose. I am addressing the proposal to disestablish the JCS, allowing the service Chiefs to return solely to service concerns. Granting that the service Chiefs have special responsibilities for and awareness of logistics and training, and therefore knowledge of readiness, it would seem to be essential that any major plans or operations tracking from the CINCs toward the commander-in-chief should be channeled through the JCS as a staff.

Do you agree that we should do that? Do you have major reasons for keeping the JCS other than the one I have mentioned, notably that the feasibililty of the plans could not possibly be sound were you not to participate as you have been?

General Wickham?

General **WICKHAM**. I am not sure I followed that last question, sir, but let me give a shot at both of your questions.

The first one, are the Chiefs overloaded, I have to speak for myself.

Senator **DENTON**. I will be asking you about that later. That was my opening remark. My question deals with the possible elimination of the JCS and permitting the service Chiefs to return solely to service concerns. I gave my reasons for being quite concerned about that.

General **WICKHAM**. I think the burden of our testimony says that we do not believe it is wise for the Nation to do that. We Joint Chiefs need to be plugged into our role as service Chiefs in order to provide joint advice. We have Vice Chiefs who help us manage the services, and I think that the National Command Authority receives better advice by virtue of that dual hat arrangement.

Senator **DENTON**. In other words, on a scale of 1 to 10, you would object to the elimination of the JCS. Is that correct?

General **WICKHAM**. I would object as loud as I could make my voice heard.

Admiral **WATKINS**. I agree 100 percent with General Wickham on that.

Senator **DENTON**. General Gabriel.

General **GABRIEL**. I certainly agree, too. You know, you would be taking the most knowledgeable people—as you have just described, the people that know the most about our capabilities and our capacities—taking them out of the arena that gives military advice. I think that is not very wise. No, I would disagree with disestablishing the JCS.

General **KELLEY**. I completely agree with the disagreement.

Senator **DENTON**. Would you agree that you are overloaded and could use perhaps a little help in, say, a continuum of oversight on a temporary but important crisis through some sort of deputy? No matter what we name him, he would be a guy not senior to you but someone who would give more continuity than the duty officer, as we now have, and let you tend to more other institutional business?

I am not prejudiced one way or another on that. I want your opinions on that.

General **WICKHAM**. The creation of a Vice Chairman or a deputy, the way we see it would be solely to assist the Chairman in the dispatch of his responsibilities, which are growing in importance. In so doing I think that a Vice Chairman could help the Joint Chiefs collectively, but I do not see his role as helping me in particular. I spend 30 to 50 percent of my time on Joint matters, and I would hope that we would continue that arrangement in order to fulfill our statutory responsibilities.

Admiral WATKINS. I have the same feeling, Senator Denton. I believe that when we are Acting Chairman a Vice Chairman in the context of our statements would make some sense, because there is continuity assistance that can be provided—the day-to-day communication with unified commanders in the field and the like, for the routine passage of information back and forth at a high level, where perspectives coming out of national security deliberations and the like can be properly passed. Those kinds of things that we want a four-star to do would be very nicely handled by a Vice Chairman.

I do not think, however, that we as service Chiefs in our role as Joint Chiefs of Staff are overloaded. But the Chairman and his group of two three-stars, the Director of the Joint Staff and his assistant, are 7-days-a-week, 16-hours-a-day people, and I believe that the Chairman agrees with us that a Vice Chairman in the context in which we have recommended makes sense.

General GABRIEL. I think a deputy chairman should function primarily as the relief for the overload on the Chairman. The Chairman is a very busy man, and all of those things that General Wickham said earlier in his verbal do pertain. He is busy, and he could use a deputy, but not as the Acting Chairman, as we have said before, because that would separate us from the Chairman.

The overload I addressed before can be handled by the Vice Chiefs when we are Acting Chairman and, as Jim says, a deputy chairman could provide continuity when the Chairman is not there, continuity for the Acting Chairman.

General KELLEY. As I said in my statement, Senator, I would be opposed, too. I would prefer to call him, because of the connotation of the word "deputy", a Vice Chairman. We all know what that is within the joint structure. We have a Vice Director, as an example, of the Joint Staff, who is the assistant, but junior, I might add, too all the JCS—junior in rank.

So it is not an uncommon thing to have a Vice. And, as I said in my statement, I would be very much opposed if he were senior in precedence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator DENTON. I had to go to a meeting at the White House and I missed your opening statements, but you did enlighten me and I will so adjust my thinking. I think that is informative.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

The distinguished Senator from Nebraska.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, let me add my thanks to those of my colleagues. We appreciate the fact that you came here this morning. And I salute also the staff of the Armed Services Committee, because without the committee staff report I suspect that this issue of organization would remain largely unaddressed.

Nothing is written in stone on the trestle board. There is going to be some legislation passed, obviously, and your input this morning I think has been extremely helpful.

Let me see if I can ask a question or two to clarify some specifics.

First, regarding the organization of the Unified and Specified Commands, is the present structure of seven Unified Commands and three Specific Commands strategically sound? Would you add, delete, or make any significant changes in that?

General Wickham. Let me hit it right off the bat. We are about to undertake a review of the Unified Command Plan. I believe the formation of those commands over the years has been in response to strategically sound evaluations of the world in which we live. The creation of the Unified Space Command, which the President approved just recently, is illustrative of that. That is not to say we cannot undertake some combinations or some adjustments in boundaries for example, and in disciplining the size of the staff structures.

Senator Exon. General, so some changes to the Unified and Specified Commands may be in order because of our proposed reorganization changes?

General Wickham. Yes, sir.

Senator Exon. But you felt that these command changes would be best left to the internal reorganization by DOD that is now going on? Is that a correct paraphrase of what you are saying?

General Wickham. Yes, sir. We are charged, as you know, by statute with preparing forces for combat, and the Unified Command structure is associated with that.

Senator Exon. Do any of you have anything to add to that?

Admiral Watkins. That is essentially it, Senator Exon. We have made significant changes, as you know, such as the establishment of the Central Command and the Space Command. There are a number of others under active review right now. In fact, one that we have agreed upon and that we are going to be working on with the Secretary of Defense is very significant. And we have put off another one because we are not sure yet exactly how we want to go. So it is a dynamic process. An annual look by us at the plan makes sure it meets the current world situation and is the best way to predict command requirement for possible contingency operations.

Senator Exon. Thank you. I assume the other two agree. Thank you very much.

Page 314 of the committee staff report has a short statement that I will read. It says:

> While Unified Commands may be organized to conduct theater campaigns similar to those of World War II, it is evident that they are not organized to respond to lesser threats such as a Pueblo seizure, or the Mayaguez incident.

My question is, do you agree with this finding? What is the proper balance regarding authority between the theater commander and Washington for resolving crises, minor crises—and I use the word minor in quotes—such as these?

General Wickham. To speak from my own experience as a Combined and Unified Commander in Korea, I was prepared with authority and with control over forces, including my components, to accomplish the missions of dealing with any kind of hostile action, such as the *Pueblo* seizure. As a matter of fact, during my time on watch over there the North Koreans tried to shoot down an SR-71 and we were prepared to undertake actions in response to another attempt by them. So I think that there is adequate authority in the exercise of the responsibilities that we give to the unified commanders, from my experience.

Senator EXON. Admiral?

Admiral WATKINS. I agree with that, Senator Exon, except I do believe we have learned a great deal over the last few years in international terrorism. We have had to respond very quickly with Special Forces, with special operations and the similar operations faster than we have had to respond since the end of World War II. We are learning how to deal with crises, the command and control of those crises, and which unified commander should actually run the forces in those situations. In some cases, we have actually taken command of Special Forces, for example, right in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and yet with everybody still involved in the normal wartime chain of command—the unified commanders in the theater, supporting commanders and the like.

Efficient plans to tailor the chain of command to fit contingency crises in peacetime are evolving. In wartime, the basis on which the current chain of command is designed is perfectly legitimate. Sometimes we have to streamline it, however, to short circuit certain elements so as not to compound problems as we try to move very quickly to counter an incident such as the recent *Achille Lauro* operation.

General GABRIEL. I do not think it is so much the organization that determines how well we do in response to varying kinds of crises. In Korea, as General Wickham pointed out, we do have contingency plans at the lowest level, maybe there more so than in Europe, because you would expect—and you are not disappointed if you do expect—a lot of things to happen across the DMZ.

We have a number of contingency plans to deal with those. But contingency plans are not usually pulled off the shelf and used exactly like they are written. It will not happen like that, but, at least your forces and your command and control are geared to respond to something close to what you expect. Possibly in Europe and other places we have a tendency to look at the bigger war a little more than those minor excursions and we may be less well prepared to work the low end of the conflict.

Senator EXON. General, I am interested in your response because you are most likely to be right in the middle of a crisis at any time. What is your answer?

General KELLEY. I think the key word to command relationships and command and control, as I see it, Senator Exon, is flexibility, and I do believe we have that. I think in the Unified Command structure one should not be thinking that we are hidebound because we have a Commander in Chief who happens to be the geographic commander of a particular area. Our scenarios are replete with instances, and if you remember—and I keep harking back to it because we had so many hearings—we established a rapport over the sort of stillborn Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

But that is a good example, because it was a joint task force that was, in fact, subject to the direct command of the National Command Authorities and could go anywhere in the world. In all of our planning we did precisely that. We planned to go onto someone else's turf; but once I arrived on someone else's turf as the commander, he turned over that whole turn to me and became my subordinated commander. I was then the supported commander. That is just one example of the kind of flexible command relationship that we have in being.

Senator EXON. Thank you. One last question. Mr. Chairman, and this will be directed to General Gabriel.

General, in my opinion, both the National Guard and the Air Reserve seem to be carrying out essentially the same mission but reporting to different organizations. Is there any advantage to keeping these two reserve component elements of our defense separate? Is there anything to be gained from possibly streamlining their command structure, or are you satisfied with it the way it is?

General GABRIEL. Off hand—and I have not looked at it lately—I do not see any great gain to combining the two. We are very proud of our Reserve Forces, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. As you know, they do everything we do daily and they are into every new aircraft we fly, except, of course, the bombers. But the others they are.

I do not see a problem with the structure that is set up with the states, such as the Air National Guard. I do not have any problem with that. They are at the highest level of readiness ever and the quality is the highest it has ever been. So I would not want to tinker with that at all, sir.

Senator EXON. Well, I compliment the Air Force for what I think has been an extraordinary effort by the Air Guard and Air Reserve. I think they do a tremendous job, so I did not want to tamper with it either, but I was somewhat worried. They are reporting to different organizations, but you think that that is just a structure and would not be a problem in case they are called on?

General GABRIEL. It would not be, and it is not. They respond very well and many of them respond within a few hours, as you know—rapid reactors.

Senator EXON. Thank you, gentleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

I just have two questions here. A consensus seems to be developing that the authority and the influence of the unified commanders should be enhanced. Although they are all four-star officers, should the unified commanders be made more senior in order of rank than the service Chiefs?

General WICKHAM. I will start off. I do not believe that is necessary, sir. In fact, it might be harmful and may be eminently impractical because of the normal promotion, and the normal nomination process of the services. Actually, the service Chiefs, with the responsibilities they have as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the law indicates, are the senior officers in their services, and I think that ought to remain that way.

Admiral WATKINS. I agree with General Wickham.

General GABRIEL. I agree with that, sir.

General KELLEY. Yes, sir; I agree.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

The other question is, Admiral Watkins, on page 6 of your statement I believe you stated, "where there is service parochialism in force-building it is well exposed in today's process." Given the communications interoperability problems which we had in Grenada, I would like to ask you whether this is the sort of process that is needed to expose parochialism in force-building.

Admiral WATKINS. No, sir. I do not think the communications problems, admittedly legitimate problems in Grenada, had anything to do with parochial force-building issues. They did have to do with a lack of attention to short-fused contingency needs. This has driven us to the recently established Requirements Joint Management Board approach to bring together joint communications interoperability between our services in order to focus full attention on that aspect of operations. And we have now, as you probably know, taken the lessons of Grenada, purchased the equipment, added several hundred million dollars to up-front purchase of those things which were already going to be purchased at higher costs at a lower rate. This year, for example, we are entering into JNTTACS for the first time, the Joint Tactical Communications System, for all services. These changes grew out of the experience—I believe it was a lack of attention by all of us on interoperability.

We started this effort about 3 years ago and the programs are now coming to fruition. We now have pools of special secure voice systems. We have practiced in our joint exercises recently since Grenada, to make sure that we have interoperability packages ready to go on sudden notice. If we have another 48-hour operation of that magnitude we will not have the kind of problems that we had before. So, you got our attention. The Nation got our attention in that operation, and we have taken steps to rectify the problem.

Now on the part of parochial exposure: The Defense Resources Board meets and we have some heavy debates in areas which justify or try to justify our service submissions. All service Chiefs, all service Secretaries, all key members of the Department of Defense are in attendance and we must stand on our own two feet and on the merits of the case, to either defend or have our proposals rejected.

That is where the service parochialism can be exposed, if there is any, and that is the mechanism which allows the Secretary of Defense to look at a proposal to see if it makes sense. Does it back up national strategies reflected in the Defense Guidance? Does it meet the Joint Capability Plan? That is all measured in the process.

We cannot get away, you might say, with some trick that says we can hold the line on some program that is not in the best interest. Proposals are too well exposed in the Defense Resources Board process and in our review process with all of the various agencies, including outside organizations that come in to review what we have been doing.

So, I think the report is heavy-handed in the way it talks about service parochialism and how it drives all the budgets, and if we did not have any of that we would have a better mix of forces. I do not believe that. I do believe the system we have is as good as you can put together in trying to build a total force structure. This is the way we have built it in the last few years.

Senator THURMOND. And here is my last question. Would you please describe the process by which communications equipment is acquired in your service and at what level is service interoperability considered?

Admiral **Watkins**. We have a twofold process, Mr. Chairman: One, a process which deals with Navy-peculiar equipment and interoperability between naval units; and a second group that works with the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the command, control, and communications and intelligence directorate in that area. We also have a Technical Systems Command and an organization within my staff that does nothing but do interoperability with the other services and our allies.

As I say, this process has improved over the last few years and I hope it will eliminate the kinds of sudden-notice problems we saw in Grenada. This is coordinated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and Communications. He in turn forces the services to come together in teams to lay out all of the various linkages between the services, whether it is air-to-ground combat, whether it is ground forces combat, or whether it is ocean-to-beach transition. We are forced to address those problems together and find out where our interoperability weaknesses are.

So, in the Defense Resources Board process and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of command, control, and communications we have interoperability among the services in terms of policy and program development which I think is about as good as you can get. It was a serious weakness in the past. It has been repaired and we are on the way to recovery in that area, I think, very rapidly.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you very much.

General **Wickham**. The Army is about the same, sir, and I subscribe to what Admiral Watkins said.

General **Gabriel**. I will sign up to that, too. There has been a lack of attention here and we are giving it, I think, proper attention now.

General **Kelley**. Like Admiral Watkins said, we have a twofold approach. Because of our size, primarily, we will participate in the research and development of any communication equipment with another service in order to avoid duplication. Then, only in those rare instances when we have a separate requirement for command and control over and above what is being provided by the other services, only then will we do our own independent research and development. In all cases, particularly because we always do work with the other services, interoperability is foremost in our developmental process.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you very much.

Senator Nunn, I have to be on the floor. I have a bill coming up at 1:30. Senator Denton, if you will come up and take charge, I have got to go to the floor.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

General Wickham has laid out 10 different areas where he believes changes can be made, some of them in line with the Senate staff report, some of them in line with the House bill, some of them independent of those. I would like to ask each of you if you agree with these specific changes that General Wickham would agree with—and, General Wickham, if I have categorized any of these in less than precise terms, I would be delighted to have a correction as I go down the list, because I have tried to make it very brief.

First, he has stated he would agree with making the Chairman the principal military adviser by designation. Admiral Watkins?

Admiral WATKINS. I agree with that, with the caveat that we added, which is a very significant one Senator Nunn, that he does so on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. I agree, and codify that alternative views will be submitted.

General KELLEY. I agree completely with everything that has been said thus far. First, I agree with what you said, but it must have the caveat that he is acting on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the corporate body, and also that he must provide the alternative views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Second, General Wickham has stated that we could assign or should assign the Chairman some of the duties currently assigned to the corporate JCS. He says that the Chairman should specify the Joint Staff procedures.

Admiral Watkins.

Admiral WATKINS. I agree that he should assess the Joint Staff procedures.

Senator NUNN. General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. I have no problem with that.

Senator GLENN. General Kelley.

General KELLEY. I would like to hold my comment in abeyance. I have to think about that one.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Next he says we should remove the limits on Joint Staff size and tenure.

Admiral Watkins.

Admiral WATKINS. My feeling is that there should not be a cap put on the staff size. On the other hand, having said that, I do not believe we should allow unconstrained growth across all the agencies. That is my dilemma. I believe we can all do with less here, in Defense, in the JCS, and in the services. In the services we can control size and we are cutting back, as I indicated earlier in my statement.

So I would like to put that little caveat on, Senator Nunn, because I do not believe it should grow. I do not believe the intent to take it off was to encourage growth, but you know as well as I do the tendency in that direction. I would hope there would become overarching kind of involvement on the part of this committee to take a look at growth in general across all of the levels of trust that I have talked about earlier. I think we can readjust downward, and then the cap could come off.

Senator NUNN. I have proposed several amendments, and some of them have gone through in law in partial form to reduce the size of headquarters, but every time I do it I get opposition from almost all quarters of the Pentagon.

Admiral WATKINS. But, Senator Nunn, what happens is, when you put out those directives they are read by different people in different ways. The allocation of the cuts usually come down to us, while the other cuts are not taken in other places. So all levels are not trimmed down together and we don't get some of the questioners and the answerers eliminated at the same time. That is the problem. Cuts never get levied in any kind of ordered fashion.

Senator **Nunn**. I agree it needs to be done overall. It is awfully hard to do that, though, from the Hill. We do not have jurisdiction over everything.

General Gabriel.

General **Gabriel**. Let me review the question. Should the Chairman have responsibility——

Senator **Nunn**. Have a limit on the size of the Joint Staff.

General **Gabriel**. A limit on the size of the Joint Staff and tenure. The tenure—I think I would agree with what has been done already. I think it was set last year in legislation and we all agreed with that. The size of it, that is the 400 you are talking about now and whether or not it should be eliminated?

Senator **Nunn**. Whether that limit should be set in law or eliminated.

General **Gabriel**. I would like to see it eliminated. At the same time, I agree with Admiral Watkins that we have to guard ourselves and all of us would have to be part of that to make sure it did not grow out of proportion. I think it would have a tendency to do that if we are not very careful.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you. General Kelley.

General **Kelley**. If I may be the iconoclast here, I would like to see it kept and enforced. What has happened, I think—as you are well aware—is that the increase in staffs we have been required, while still living within DOPMA ceilings, to place our field grade officers in billets away from our service. At the present time, I have 200 captains who are filling validated major requirements out with the troops in the field. I cannot be a hypocrite and say that I can support burgeoning staffs in Washington while I still have a paucity of field grade officers in the field.

General **Wickham**. Senator Nunn, could I just make an observation about that?

Senator **Nunn**. Yes, sir.

General **Wickham**. The 400 limit to the Joint Staff is an anachronism. The Joint Staff is larger than that now. There are cells that are outside of it, and that is why we have the OJCS, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All we are proposing, and I think the staff report proposes, is to do away with the anachronism. All of us sign up for staff discipline, as you do.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you. I think that clarifies it.

The next is that General Wickham recommends that the Chairman be able to task the Joint Staff. In other words, the Joint Staff reports to the Chairman.

Admiral Watkins.

Admiral **Watkins**. I have no problem with that, Senator Nunn, but I also want to make sure that nothing else is done to separate the service Chiefs in their relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As I said in my formal statement, the taskings that I can give the staff directly to work on and bring to the Chiefs' attention are matters of extreme importance to the United States, as I view them. The sense of urgency that I can stress by having direct access to the staff, the sense of urgency neither recognized nor acted upon in many cases by the bureaucracy down there will not deal with an issue that allows me to bring urgent matters quickly to the attention of the Chiefs.

So I would not want to emasculate that ability to raise issues when I think it is in the best interest. All of us put in memoranda now through our own service system that require the Chiefs' urgent attention. That access is something we do not want to sever. It is linked to the other element, which is whether to sever the Joint Staff from the service staff. I think that would be a tragic mistake.

Senator NUNN. General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. Admiral Watkins explained my dilemma with that. I do not have any trouble with it. In fact, the Chairman does that now. He tasks the Joint Staff and we have our inputs to that formally now. It would be less formal under this arrangement, as I understand it. As long as we had assurances that we can, as Admiral Watkins has just said, enter an issue that we want brought up and discuss it with the Chairman, I do not see any problem with being able to do that.

Senator NUNN. It is my understanding now that the Chairman can task them to do something in an affirmative fashion any time he chooses, but he has a very hard time cutting off projects that have been started, that there is no termination and no prioritization capability.

General WICKHAM. When I was Director of the Joint Staff I would not agree with that, sir. General Jones had authority to reorder priorities, and of course, he may have had to talk to the Chiefs about that. If they put in a memorandum saying that they wanted something done, they have to talk about that. What is being proposed here is to codify the practice of the staff being managed by the Chairman and more authority for him in reordering the priorities. I think that is essential if we are going to strengthen him, and I think there are safeguards that we can impose in the way of artful crafting in legislation.

Senator NUNN. All right. Let me run on down the line on this one. If any of you want to supplement for the record, I need to wrap up this list here.

The Chairman to have a reduced scale personnel management system for joint duty military officers. This is General Wickham's suggestion.

Admiral Watkins.

Admiral WATKINS. I have no problem with that.

Senator NUNN. General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. I agree.

General KELLEY. A what?

Senator NUNN. A reduced scale personnel management system for joint duty military officers.

General KELLEY. What does that mean?

Senator NUNN. General Wickham.

General WICKHAM. Basically we already have a J-1 for personnel matters, and could become involved in such things as joint military education and professional development of officers with a focus on joint matters. He may provide additonal input to the Chairman to make judgments about recommendations of three or four stars. What he might do in the way of judgments and guidance to the services in terms of their own promotion and selection boards would be to emphasize joint matters—those kinds of things.

General KELLEY. Well, you are asking me to buy a smorgasbord and I cannot do that until I know what I am talking about. I cannot buy something that says those kinds of things unless I know what those kinds of things are.

General WICKHAM. Those kinds of things were the foregoing.

Senator NUNN. I am not sure the burden of proof has been carried beyond a reasonable doubt, in General Kelley's mind. [Laughter.]

General KELLEY. Let me say for clarity purposes that I do not agree at this juncture.

Senator NUNN. Any of you can supplement this. This is not the final word. I know you have to think about some of these.

Finally, the Chairman to supervise the CINCs.

Admiral Watkins.

Admiral WATKINS. I think we generally believe that the Chairman supervises the CINCs today. If that needs to be codified, it could be codified. The problem is no one can define what "supervision" is. Right in the House bill, for example, just before it says the Chairman would supervise the CINCs, it denies the Chairman any right to move forces. I think that denial should be retained in the law. If supervising is the day-to-day interface with the CINCs as he carries out his responsibilities on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, I have no problem with it.

The difficulty is with the word "supervise." It is a new word. Last year the law was changed and I believe the word used was "spokesman" for the Chiefs. If "supervise" means "spokesman", if it is a "glad-to-happy" arrangment, then I have no problem. But I do worry that maybe we do not know what the word "supervise" means and we need to define the term.

Senator NUNN. General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. I think he does it now, and I think we would just be codifying it, so I would agree with it.

General KELLEY. I support that and also Secretary Weinberger's letter which gives the caveat that this is done on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator NUNN. I would like to take just 1 more minute, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

How do you have a prohibition in the law for the Chairman moving forces and then also have him supervise something like the Iranian hostage situation?

Admiral WATKINS. Moving forces in his own right, Senator Nunn. He could not actually make a force movement.

Senator NUNN. Without designation from the President or the Secretary of Defense?

Admiral WATKINS. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have a few more questions, but my time has expired.

Senator DENTON [presiding]. Before introducing Senator Levin for his questions, I want to clarify my earlier statement. Just as in the services, where parochialism and jealousies over roles and missions tend to diminish almost to zero when a real fracas breaks out, I have learned that in this body, after our own partisan battles to reach a bipartisan position, when we get into a conference with the House, I have learned that my Democratic colleagues are as loyal as the service colleagues I had in my prior career.

And I have found tremendous mutual respect among us, a great unity among us, and it has been quite an experience for me, and I want to at least mention that to you. But it takes place, just as it does within the services. And, from Senator Levin to Senator Nunn, I feel a great sense of admiration for the manner in which they have conducted themselves.

Senator Levin.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I must totally agree with what you said and agree with what you said previously, that we admire you gentlemen for speaking out and giving us your candid views, and none of you should be criticized for doing that. It is the last thing that I intend to do, even where we might tend to disagree with you from time to time.

Senator Nunn has gone down a list of items and there is a couple of items on the list that perhaps he covered, but if he did, I did not catch it. He may have caught it in his description of an item and I may have missed it. I would like to pick up on that list. In fact, General Wickham has indicated that he could support legislation which provided that the Chairman would assume two new responsibilities. One would be the development of joint doctrine and the other one would be the formulation of recommendations on strategic priorities, defense programs and military budgets. That is at the bottom of page five.

I do not know if this was included in Senator Nunn's list.

Senator NUNN. I do not think I had that. I intended to, but in those questions I do not think I covered them.

Senator LEVIN. If they were not covered, I would like to cover them now. Admiral, at the bottom of page 5, if you have a copy of General Wickham's testimony, it says, and I am sort of boiling it down here, that he could support legislation which would assign to the Chairman certain title X JCS responsibilities, and he mentioned joint training and military education of the Armed Forces.

My question is the next sentence. "Additionally, under that legislation the Chairman would assume two new responsibilities." First let me ask you would you agree that we should in legislation provide that the Chairman assume the development of joint doctrine?

Admiral WATKINS. You can codify it Senator Levin, and it would not bother me. The Chairman is already doing it today with the complete participation of the Joint Chiefs. We have major new joint doctrinal procedures development under way. Three unified commanders have been tasked, one for joint operations in Europe, another within the Atlantic command in maritime operations in support of the Army and the Air Force, in that regard. That is under way within the Readiness Command.

So, there are many things in joint doctrine under way today. If you feel it has to be codified, then it would not be a problem for me, providing again that the Chairman is working on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have to be involved with him on joint doctrine. We have no objection to that. In fact, we have been encouraging it. We have been in the middle of it. I would say it would be only codification of what we are already doing.

Again, if you feel codification would eliminate our successors having these debates again in a few years, then I would say put it into law.

Senator LEVIN. Well, let me go back, if I can, to General Wickham. General, is this a codification you are proposing when you say "would assume a new responsibility for the development of joint doctrine"? It sounds to me like something other than codification.

General WICKHAM. The JCS are not specifically charged by title X with development of joint doctrine. As Admiral Watkins indicated, joint doctrine development is going on, and the Readiness Command is doing some of that. Codification would say to the Chairman, you are the crew chief and you are to see to it that we have joint doctrine. The Chairman would act on behalf of the JCS, full consultation and all of that, but we have got to have a crew chief. I support a crew chief as the voice of the Chairman to do this.

Senator LEVIN. General?

General GABRIEL. That is the way I see it. These are very important programs, by the way, and they are ongoing with REDCOM and the other CINCs.

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree with General Wickham's most recent formulation of what he has in mind?

General GABRIEL. Yes.

General KELLEY. Yes, with the most recent formulation about a crew chief, but with full participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You cannot have joint doctrine without having joint participation.

Senator LEVIN. Now the next point of that proposal is that the Chairman would assume the responsibility of formulating recommendations on strategic priorities, defense programs, and military budgets. First, General Wickham, do you want to expand on that or should I ask the other three if they would agree with it, with the way it was formulated there?

General WICKHAM. I am sure they have got some gas with it. The Chairman already has a degree of flexibility in his role as a principal member of the Defense Resources Board, he does make recommendations on priorities, and he does deal with programs and military budgets. This would legitimize that role with the agency that was created to help him, and would give him legislative authority. In that role, he would still function on behalf of the JCS.

Senator LEVIN. Now with that explanation, Admiral, do you accept that?

Admiral WATKINS. No, sir, I do not. I would be very worried about this. I believe very strongly that the Defense Resources Board process that we have today, which is the acceptance of the National Security Decision Directives turned into defense guidance, turned into joint capabilities plan and then given to the CINCs to build their contingency plans, provides a feedback loop that keeps the system constantly in balance with the services, is the best way to go.

I do not believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with their small organization, even with the new SPRAA organization that has been established to assist the Chairman in preparing for the DRB sessions, has the resources or the knowledge to pull and integrate all of these things together without burgeoning the staff.

So, if the intent there is to make him an independent new addition to the DRB that is not merely associated with interoperability, not just associated with Allied interoperability, not just associated with the Joint service redundancy, in command, control and communications, electronic warfare and the like, then I think it is a mistake. I think it is beyond the scope of his text to integrate the kinds of things that the Secretary of Defense now integrates with his entire organization, trying to pull all of these things together and make decisions as to priority.

I believe the system that we have today is the right system. So if we are going to put anything into law for the Chairman to be a participant in this entire process of building a $300 billion defense budget, then I think we have a whole new organizational problem on our hands I do not believe it is necessary and I do not believe the Chairman feels it is necessary to be able to make such an all—encompassing input. He can always make his own personal input on priorities through the Secretary of Defense. I am sure that in the confines of their offices they talk about this all of the time, and it is very legitimate for him to do that.

Senator LEVINE. Thank you. General Gabriel, do you agree with General Wickham's proposal? I will put it again so we can go back to the question. Do you agree with General Wickham's proposal here?

General GABRIEL. No, and let me explain why. In the DRB the Chairman's voices is golden now and he comes up with the war stoppers, those things that are most important when you are discussing these programs and budgets. I do not see that he has, with the few men now assigned to him, the capability to put together program and budget for the services.

That is not the intent. I think I agree possibly with the intent that General Wickham had in mind originally, to give him the capability to rack up, which is, after all, what SPRAA does for him, rack up those programs in priority order so he can testify before the DRB responsibly. I think he does that and I think that works very well.

General WICKHAM. I think I need to tag on. I have misled you, Senator. I am not talking about giving the Chairman the responsibility for creating a $300 billion budget, an analysis of all that. But he does need greater authority and at least codification of his capacity to provide independent views in the DRB. He already does that now, but his advice is limited to the quality of the effort that he has, and all I am saying is that he needs more quality effort and he needs codification of what he is doing.

Senator LEVIN. Admiral, would you buy that formulation?

Admiral WATKINS. I still am very worried about this quality of effort.

Senator LEVIN. General, would you buy that most recent formulation?

General GABRIEL. I would buy that most recent formulation.

Senator LEVIN. General Kelley?

General KELLEY. No, not in total. I tend to agree more with the Chief of Naval Operations on this particular issue. I think we are lulled into a little bit of a sense of complacency. I think Senator Nunn made a very accurate observation. We cannot build systems based on personalities, good or bad or whatever. But right now we as Chiefs sit in the DRB process so our voices are heard; although, as I mentioned before, we are not members of the Defense Resources Board. But our voices are heard. It is not a formal organization where formal votes are taken.

Under other Secretaries of Defense, the Chiefs did not participate in the Defense Resources Board process, and that could happen again. So what would worry me about the formulation that General Wickham is mentioning is the fact that our voices would then, under those circumstances, not be heard in the Defense Resources Board process.

I think that the current SPRAA organization, which was put together in response to congressional language, is now quite effective, and I think that General Vessey thought it was very effective. It has not been used very much yet by Admiral Crowe, but I think it has served its purpose and continues to serve its purpose.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Gentlemen, I hope I can phrase this well enough to be understood. General Wickham made some remarks about jointness with respect to personnel management, and then we have the interoperability question, which is a joint and even intraservice question. So I want to dwell on the general aspects of more joint understanding—that is, more exposure to that which the other services have—because, failure to have interoperability of communications is in part a result of ignorance about what communications equipment and what needs would arise in order to interoperate with those services.

And, Admiral Watkins, I have great hope for what you were talking about. But I will say to you, in my 34 years service in the Navy, I never remember a time at which the Navy itself could talk globally with one another. I can remember the NTDS being developed in the late 1950's and on through the 1960's. That was going to be the great thing that solved the communications problem both in terms of technology and in interoperability. But when it came out, as you recall, we had incompatibility between types of ships. We have incompatibility between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and this is before we get into worrying about whether we are compatible with the Marines or are able to talk with the Army or the Air Force.

It seems to me a tragedy that we somehow, in going for new equipment which is always going to be better, we get those equipments incrementally. Almost never, never, in my knowledge, has even one service, including my own service, the Navy, had a reliable system out there, and we all know that reliability is the first requirement of communications.

I would, in other words, suggest that consideration be given to having 5-year periods in which we might well be equipped with two orders of magnitude less complexity or technological facility, but we at least have it reliable, we at least are able to talk to one another. And there is no mechanism in the system to do that.

So, Admiral Watkins, you say we are correcting what was pointed out during Grenada. You and I both know that we have had those problems since both of us have been in the service. So it just got public there, and it was just a microcosm of what might happen were we to get into a real major fracas.

Is there any way that we can be fixing up what is out there right now, as well as looking toward JTIDS or something as the final solution, because that final solution is going to be introduced incrementally? Do you get the gist of my question?

Admiral **Watkins**. Yes, I do, and your criticisms are very valid, Senator Denton. For the time you were in the service, it was probably one of the most significant areas of concern that we all had. On the *Achille Lauro* event for example, we have the President in a bakery shop in the Midwest. He is communicating with commanders in the field, with people in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, embassies all over the world. We have all kinds of backup communication links going from his Air Force One, linkages through satellites, relay satellites and the like. With present systems we can communicate with the F-14 pilot in the cockpit from the bakery shop in the Midwest if we need to. I think that is pretty good. In that one operation, we used every single bit of technical communications that this Nation could put together. We maintained communication links from the Commander in Chief to the Unified Commander in Europe right down to the battle group commander and up into the cockpit of the F-14. I believe we have the system today, along with the attention of the Chiefs by the Joint Communications Interoperability Groups in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and in our own organizations to assure such communications remain as the number one priority.

There is not one communication DRB session without a good solid debate on interoperability and command and control. It is a key element in all our deliberations and there are stoppers in the Secretary of Defense budgetary system that disallow us to go forward with anything that we cannot demonstrate has forward and backward interoperability with our sister services, and with our allies as well.

This process is under way. I think interoperability is now under control. It was not under control at the start of the decade, but in the past 3½ years I would say we have come a long way. It has been a high priority item with us for some time.

Senator **Denton**. Anybody else want to comment on that?

What percentage of interoperability do you think we have right now overall, not just with the President and Secretary of Defense? I am informed that they had to talk in the clear, the President and Secretary of Defense. I can recall, that during the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolution, we had so many backed-up coded messages that President Eisenhower had to come out and say, "Ignore them because you are 4 days late decoding them. Just take what I am saying in the press, which is coming out reliably and quickly, as orders."

What degree of interoperability in communications do we have right now, overall, not just the President and SecDef? I am talking about the marine who wants ground-to-air support from maybe an Air Force outfit that happens to be near enough?

Admiral **Watkins**. We have a potential for 100 percent interoperability right now, Senator Denton. But the trouble is that you end up in certain circumstances where this Nation does not have the resources to give us the entire capacity that we would like to have for flexible command and control, on a minute's notice, anytime, anywhere in the world.

Senator DENTON. But do we have the reliability for a period of years while we wait for that?

Admiral WATKINS. Absolutely, and I think we have reliable communications today. Admittedly, we do not have enough satellite channels. Some of the interoperability with allies is poor because they may still be on all 100-word-a-minute systems while we have moved on to systems capable of 2400 band, or 32 times as fast as the 100 words per minute equivalent system. So there are going to be interoperability problems because not all of the allies have these rapid, new circuits.

But the interoperability between the services is 100 percent when we want it to be. We just do not have the resources to have it all of the time in every place. If you want to call up in 5 minutes, to get on secure voice with somebody in the Sudan, for example, it might take us about 15 minutes.

Senator DENTON. Have you got a way that you can at least communicate?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes, sir, we do. We can communicate and we have demonstrated this time and time again in the last 3 years between Washington DC and people on the ground in foreign lands. For example, while we could talk to downtown Beirut anytime we wanted to, we do not have resources available for everybody to do that everywhere in the world at one time. The problem is with the distribution of resources that we have. We have to be careful, however, that we do not set ourselves up for a burgeoning command and control budget, which is already growing at the highest rate in defense.

Senator DENTON. Anyone else want to comment on that? General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. Yes. You mentioned the Marines working with the Air Force and the Army in close air support. We can do that today with what we have. Even secure communications or the antijam which is coming along.

Senator DENTON. How about the Air Force's participation in maritime surveillance? How is that working in communications?

General GABRIEL. It is going very well. That is what I said in my statement earlier. We now have those frequencies checked out. We do not have any problem with B-52's, F-15's, AWACS, and tankers. That is becoming routine now.

Admiral WATKINS. Including NTDS interchange with the AWACS aircraft.

General GABRIEL. Yes, and the E-2C's.

Admiral WATKINS. So Air Force and Navy have worked out the communications arrangement, and we are totally interoperable, not only on voice transmissions but also on data link as well.

General GABRIEL. Yes. The JTIDS will come later for all of us, as well as the Brits and some of our other NATO allies, and that will be a big help. But it is expensive and not all of them can afford it.

General KELLEY. Let me take a different view and share with you, Senator Denton, the frustration of how we all have enough blame for everyone in this particular issue. As long as I have been in the development process, at least certainly for the last 10 years, the Marine Corps has been charged under the TRITAC Program with the development of the Unit Level Circuit Switch. This is an essential node to make TRITAC work. It is an essential node for interoperability.

We have right now in another committee of this body of the Congress, action that is going on, and will go on tomorrow, to cancel a critical part of the Unit Level Circuit Switch because some staffers do not agree with the procurement strategy. That means that if we cancel it, we go back to square 1 in research and development, and it will be another 10 years before the TRITAC system will work.

So what I am saying is, Senator, we all have to pull together on this. There is a hell of a lot of blame to go around, and we ought to all share it.

Senator **Denton**. I was not blaming individuals in the service. I am blaming an existing situation that involves development, research, procurement, and certainly congressional interaction with the service.

General **Kelley**. If you can give me some help with the Senate Appropriations Committee on the TTC 42, I will be most appreciative, sir.

Senator **Denton**. That was the kind of infighting that was going on at the House-Senate conference, and the guys were pretty reasonable on it.

General **Kelley**. That is my recommendation for the day.

Senator **Denton**. How about this one, General Gabriel, while I am at it? Not to denigrate the contributions of other services in Vietnam, but you and I know that the final application of conventional strategic weaponry against strategic targets in North Vietnam won that war militarily. We were operating against a relatively sophisticated air defense environment. We can get into a situation like that again with any of 20 nations that are relatively small but that are supplied by the Soviets with the best in air defense weaponry, and against whom we would not want to resort to nuclear weapons.

Are we maintaining the capacity of our Air Force, TAC and SAC, to work together, and Navy TAC to work with them? Are we really keeping that thing going, rather than putting ourselves in a position where we have to go out there with a parade of elephants and just get all the B-52's shot down because they are not really drilled in?

General **Gabriel**. Yes, sir; we have that capability now and it is well trained. We are keeping some B-52's on board, even as the B-1's are coming in. Among these are the B-52G's that will do the conventional work. In addition to that, of course, we have the dual-role F-15E coming in that extends the range of the F-15 and missionizes to the low-level work that will help the F-111's. The FB-111's, we hope, would eventually come in and also be able to do that tactical—I would say, conventional role.

So we do have a lot of systems, and our people are trained in how to use them. We have dedicated bomber squadrons for conventional operations. We plan to keep that long-range conventional capability, yes.

Senator DENTON. I mean TAC/SAC coordination and things like flak suppression and ECM and counter-ECM and all of that. Is that going along out there at Nellis where you are doing the aggressor versus friendlies in the fighters? It should be.

General GABRIEL. It is. In RED FLAG, of course, and we run that continually every year. By the way, this is the anniversary of 10 years in operation for RED FLAG. It is the most realistic combat training in the world today and a lot of our allies and all services participate in it now. This is where the aggressors come in and bounce the bombers while they are protected. That is being done with both bombers and fighters.

Then, in GREEN FLAG, we add in as much ECM environment as we can get—heavy electronic emphasis.

Senator DENTON. My time is up, but I just wanted to ask one brief question. We have had a lot of complaints about the smoothness with which the CINCs get through to the Secretary of Defense and the President, their access and communications problems. The Joint Chiefs have been put on report for that to a degree. What measures, if any, would you recommend to implement better communications between the CINCs and the Secretary of Defense? Are there improvements in that that have taken place recently?

How about the Marines?

General KELLEY. I think there have been a number of improvements. First of all, and I think it was General Wickham who mentioned before, the extensive participation in the Defense Resources Board process. The CINCs now have total access to the budget and programming, to the whole PPBS system. I think this is a great step forward.

I think another thing which happened, and it gets into the strategy side, and a milestone. One of the most significant milestones in the interface between the National Command Authority, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified and specified commanders was last spring when we all went to Newport. In a series of 3 days we conducted jointly—and I think it is the first time in the history of this country that that has been done—with the Secretary of Defense, a 3-day global war game.

It was a constant interface for three solid days under a controlled working scenario. I will defer to my colleagues, but I think if you talk to the commanders in chief they seem quite pleased with the access they have today.

Senator DENTON. Any other comments, because I know Senator Nunn and the rest of us are interested in that.

[No response.]

Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just two or three more questions here.

Admiral Watkins, Admiral Long testified, I believe it was yesterday—I am losing track of days now—but he testified in his report he submitted to you—I think it was a 1984 report and maybe submitted in 1985—that one of the misperceptions he identified was that many on the staff of the Joint Chiefs still believe that decisions made by the Joint Chiefs are supposed to be unanimous.

I asked Admiral Long about that yesterday and he reiterated this perception was in the report he gave you. He said the Chiefs do not believe decisions must be unanimous, but the problem is that the staffs believe it. Have you all taken any steps or have you taken any steps since you received the Long report to address that issue?

Admiral WATKINS. I think the Chiefs have addressed that at great length over the past several years. This particular group of Chiefs feels very strongly, as we indicated in all our statements, that we want to see constructive alternatives that we believe very strongly in free debate as part of the system. It is true, I believe, that down in the working level of the staff, they would prefer harmony. Many times we Chiefs must grab the issue, elevate it to our level, and solve it ourselves on the key issues, to get away from the sort of rounding off that can otherwise occur.

We are not interested in being rounded marbles. We all like to maintain our rough diamond-cut nature, and we feel we are doing that.

There are criticisms in the staff report that say memoranda are meaningless. How many of our memorandums, Senator Nunn, have you read? We think they are very vital memoranda that do affect the national security. We think they are very vital memoranda that do affect the national security. We think they are fundamental to decision making. We do not think they are rounded-off marbles with quiet and meaningless equanimity. We think they are balanced. We think that the dissenting views have been well aired in them, and that the Chiefs are the only ones who bring the sharpness and crispness to bear that General Jones criticized. The Chiefs and the Chairman bring that crispness, not the staff. Many of the staff are trying to do the best they can for harmony, but many times we Chiefs quit looking for harmony. We want to get things right. What is in the best interest? We are often the ones that have to pull the tough issues out of the staff and up to our level.

Senator NUNN. Do you think staff understands that now?

Admiral WATKINS. If they do not, they should. They are all around us in the room as we are debating these things, and they certainly hear it. I believe we are seeing a product now coming up the line, where on very significant issues we are giving guidance from top-down instead of receiving it from bottom-up. They resist changes; for example, we got rid of the "flimsy, buff green" system and tears were shed by the staff.

My feeling is that we are moving in the right direction. But it takes the Chief top-down guidance to drive out the previous silliness and obstructionism which has been in the bureaucracy. That is why we are revising the Unified Action Armed Forces Pub, and our standard operating procedures. We think they are too bureaucratic. We do not think we have to have everybody in the world chop on things. We move it through when we think it is important. The Chiefs are taking steps to do just that.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

One big issue we obviously have. A number of things have been clarified today, as I see it. There have been a number of agreements. I would say 80 to 90 percent of General Wickham's suggestions have been agreed to by everyone; 10 to 15 percent still somewhat in disagreement.

But obviously one of the big areas in the testimony is in great conflict not between you gentlemen—all of you agree—but we have had very strong and, I would say, overwhelming testimony in favor of a Vice Chairman or Deputy Chairman, whatever the title seems to be, that would not simply perform assistant duties but also be the Chairman in the event the Chairman himself is out of town.

General Rogers testified very strongly on that point. Of course, he has been in the Chief's position, Chief of Staff of the Army, and now he heads up our largest military command in the world. And he feels very strongly on that point. And Admiral MacDonald, Wes MacDonald, testified in favor of the Deputy Chairman performing in lieu of the Chairman.

We have also talked to a number of Chiefs. I know you feel strongly against this, but I want to assure you that this was not dreamed up by the Senate staff. This was not dreamed up by Jim Locher or Rick Finn or Jeff Smith. This came from the CINCs, the people who are charged with fighting.

I think we are going to have a real basic decision to make there because I hear what you are saying—all of you—about why you would like to keep it like it is, and I think everyone would acknowledge that it is better now with a 3-month rotation than it was under the ad hoc system before. I do not think there is any dispute that it has been improved, but we are going to have a real crucial question to face, because it seems to me, what you are saying is that playing that role of Chairman when the Chairman is out of town for a 3-month period is a very educational experience. It helps you do your job as a member of the Chiefs, and it gives you a sense of jointness.

But what the CINCs tell us, the guys out there that have got to fight, is that even that 3-month rotation does not give them the continuity they need. They have a need for continuity. In addition to the testimony we have had here, we have had not unanimous, but virtually unanimous, views about that from the people out there in the field.

So it seems to me we have got a choice between continuity for the people fighting the forces or basically a rounding-out educational type experience for those sitting in Washington, and that is the way I see it at this point. We have even had one CINC—I will not name the service or the CINC—that said his biggest problem when he was CINC was when his own service Chief took over when the Chairman was out of town. So I just want to assure you that nothing has been decided on this issue but there is a real issue here and it is not one of the Senate staff versus you gentleman. Rather, it is one, not unanimous, again, but a very overwhelming view of the people out there in the field that they need that continuity.

General WICKHAM. May I just make a couple of brief comments on that, Senator?

Senator NUNN. Surely.

General WICKHAM. Your comments were very thoughtfully made. I cannot speak for why CINCs out there in the field would say what they are quoted as saying. I have been a CINC, and I would not change my opinion based on having been a CINC. I would think that CINC's would want to have service Chiefs strapped into being an Acting Chairman so that they would better understand the CINCs rather than the other way around.

The essence of your deliberations will have to focus on jointness, "How do we make you folks in that OJCS more joint?" In my humble opinion, maybe I have been in the woods so long I cannot see the trees, but based on 14 years of experience you are going to make us more joint by strapping us into the Acting Chairman's role. If you do not, if you create a Deputy Chairman who outranks us all, who supplants us in that Acting Chairman's role, you will deny the President and the Secretary of Defense the opportunity to size us up so that they would have confidence in us during crisis situations. You will make us less joint than we are today. That is the best I can tell you in the way of candid advice.

Senator Nunn. Well, if I were President or Secretary of Defense I am not sure when a crisis came around that one of my top priorities would be to size up the people who are on the Joint Chiefs. I would want somebody there in whom I had absolute confidence, that had the continuity to make the decisions. The last thing I would be doing is trying to make a personnel evaluation during the middle of a crisis, although I would agree that is a fallout.

General Wickham. He would obviously size us up before the crisis by virtue of our exposure to him as Acting Chairman.

Senator Nunn. Correct.

One other point. General Kelley, on pages 17 to 20 of your prepared statement you complain, I think rather with a great deal of feeling at least, about the provision enacted last year by the Congress which requires that officers considered for the Joint Staff "shall be among those considered to be the most outstanding." The way I read your testimony, you have interpreted this to mean that the Marine Corps' most outstanding can be assigned only to the Joint Staff and nowhere else. Is that correct?

General Kelley. What I meant to say, if I did not say it, is that I felt that the language is intemperate. There are only so many most outstanding officers. That gives me very little latitude. If you want my most outstanding officers, that is a high order up there in the top percentile. That means that in a corps of the size of our Marine Corps I have lost considerable flexibility if you are going to have someone continually monitoring the caliber of people that are going into Joint assignments.

Senator Nunn. Well, how many people do you assign from the Marine Corps to the Joint Staff?

General Kelley. I will have to provide that for the record.

Senator Nunn. Just generally. I do not have any idea.

General Kelley. I just do not have it off the top of my head.

Senator Nunn. Is is 10, 50, 100?

General Kelley. Well, for the Joint Staffs all over the world or just the Joint Staff in Washington?

Senator Nunn. No, I am talking about the Joint Staff here.

General Kelley. It is 20 percent of the Navy number, and I think it is close to about 80.

Senator Nunn. Eighty. How many officers do you have in the Marine Corps?

General Kelley. We have 20,000 officers, but you are talking about—these are not just any officers. These are specific ranks.

The bulk of our officers are in the junior ranks and they are not looking for junior ranks.

Senator NUNN. How many would you have in the ranks that would be selected for Joint Staff?

General KELLEY. The point I am making, and what I am saying, is that we have responsibilities to provide outstanding officers across the board, and I labor with that on a day-to-day basis. Now you have taken one of my flexible instruments in manpower allocation, and have given it to someone else, who can then make a determination as to whether or not all these officers are suitable for him.

Senator NUNN. Well, I would suggest you get your lawyers to read this language very closely, because the legislative intent was I do not think we meant the word "among" to mean "only." It seems to me the way you are interpreting it is "only."

General KELLEY. You have decreed that someone else is determining the qualifications of my officers for assignment to his staff. That is what you have determined.

Senator NUNN. Who is that?

General KELLEY. The Chairman. That is what the language of the law says, Senator.

Senator NUNN. That the Chairman will determine whether you have assigned the most outstanding or among the most outstanding?

General KELLEY. Indeed he will.

Senator NUNN. And what happens under the present law? Are you having a problem with it?

General KELLEY. I have no problem, Senator. Let me make it clear that I have no problem assigning outstanding officers to the Joint Staff. I have no problem with that whatsoever. I just say that when you start having language "among the most outstanding" I do not have that many most outstanding.

Senator NUNN. Any of the rest of you have that problem, not having enough outstanding officers to put on the Joint Staff?

General WICKHAM. We try to be all we can be, Senator. We have a lot of good officers.

Admiral WATKINS. We are putting forward the best we can come up with, in compliance with the law. The Chairman, with his monitoring and his personnel organization can reject the candidates, and does. We had to send five candidates recently for one particular assignment, a very important assignment, and we let him pick the best of the bunch. He interviewed them. So, he has all the authority he needs under the current law to do exactly what you are saying.

Senator NUNN. But you do not object to the current law?

Admiral WATKINS. I do not object to the current law.

Senator NUNN. General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. I think our track record stands for itself. We are putting some of our best officers down there and their promotions and assignments show it.

Senator NUNN. What would the message be if we repeal the provision, that we no longer want the Marines to send their most outstanding people?

General KELLEY. I was not suggesting that. I do not have the language right here. I am saying it is something of a concern that I do not think the language was debated as carefully as it should have been. The point was that I would sincerely hope that because of the nuances of language, which are very important, that when we debate the current defense organization we debate all the language very, very carefully because it is going to be extremely important to us on how we implement the legislation.

Senator NUNN. Well, you do not want to suggest that this requirement will mean the Marines will die because your best officers are on the Joint Staff and not in command. If you really mean that, then we will take another look at that language, and please tell us if you have any specific suggestions. Obviously, the intent of Congress is to try to get better caliber people in the Joint Staff.

We have heard over and over again that that has not been the case historically, and I think that one of the prepared statements said that it had not been. So we have had a real problem with trying to address it.

But if you are taking this so literally that it would mean you have got to deplete your Marine Corps in every other capacity of outstanding people it seems to me we have got a real challenge to either change the statute or you have got a challenge to get more outstanding officers in the Marine Corps.

General KELLEY. It is illustrative Senator, with the hope that, as we draft legislation for the future defense organization, we are very careful in the way we draft them.

Senator NUNN. I would agree with that, but we are left with the situation where your testimony says that there are going to be people dying out there because of this statute.

General KELLEY. No; I say the statute suggests that. I did not say that people are going to die.

Senator NUNN. Well, it was strongly insinuated.

General KELLEY. There is a question mark behind that sentence, as I recall.

Senator NUNN. Well, I think any time something is that strongly said in a statement that we have to take it seriously here, just as you say that you take seriously the legislative mandate.

You say here. Is it your wish that they be led by a commander who is something less than most outstanding? And when a unit suffers casualties unnecessarily because it was not led by our "most outstanding officers," to whom would their families turn for accountability? Will they place the responsibility on Members of the Congress for telling the Commandant of the Marine Corps that his most outstanding officers would be on a Joint Staff in Washington? I think not.

You know, I do not see many question marks there. That seems to me to be more of an exclamation point. I am taking it seriously, just as you have taken the legislation's wording seriously. I would suggest that you give us alterative language which you would consider to be compatible that we could take a look. Again, the spirit of that whole statute, I think, obviously is to improve the caliber of officers, and I do not think we meant that we wanted every outstanding officer to be sitting here in Washington.

General KELLEY. That is the clarification I would like to have.

Senator NUNN. Of course, the question of what is "most outstanding" is a subjective judgment. I think it is the spirit of the statute that you should look at.

General KELLEY. The point I was making in the tail end is that it is no longer my subjective judgment. It is now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's subjective judgment.

Senator NUNN. Well, maybe it was your statement where you said that you would readily acknowledge. You say here on page 17 of your statement. I can agree that the services have not always provided the best officers to the Joint Staff in the past. Now everybody says that. So what do we do about it?

General KELLEY. We are doing, I think, quite a bit. I think we improved the quality of officers that have gone to the Joint Staff. I have not heard any complaints recently, and I think the track record on promotions is indicative of that.

Senator NUNN. Well, are you asking us to repeal that statute?

General KELLEY. Of course not, sir. I did not ask you that at all. I am just saying that the intent was to make sure that in whatever legislation we have, we have crisp language that tells us precisely what you want us to do.

Senator NUNN. Well, I think the intent is pretty clear, that we want good people in the Joint Staff. But, as I say, I would invite you to come back with a rewording of that statute or to supplement your testimony, because what is on the record here seems to me is about as strong an indictment of that particular part of the statute as one can make as head of the Marine Corps.

I am not diminishing your concern because I know you well enough to know your intent.

General KELLEY. What I would like to preclude, Senator Nunn, is the tendency toward professional Joint Staff officers that are a drain on my Marine Corps. In fact, I have great concern that the young marines that we have today, who are high quality marines and whom we pay a lot of money to get, are also led by our most outstanding officers, and there are only so many "most outstanding."

Senator NUNN. Well, I would assume that we would want everybody in the Marine officer corps to be outstanding. Maybe we ought to strike the word "most".

General KELLEY. I could live with that.

Senator DENTON. Would you yield for a question? I am not sure that General Kelley is justified in changing the wording from one paragraph to another. He says, "each officer whose name is submitted shall be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers of that Armed Force." Then in his next paragraph, "When the law states that the services provide only the most outstanding officers for duty on the Joint Staff."

That is not what the law reads. It says, "must be among those considered the most outstanding".

Senator NUNN. I agree he has interpreted it as being only.

General KELLEY. If it is "among the most outstanding", you have narrowed it even further, Senator. Now you are "among" the most outstanding.

Senator DENTON. "Among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers."

General **Kelley**. I think we are in a semantic——

Senator **Denton**. Well, we are. That is what you said.

General **Kelley**. "Among those officers considered to be the most outstanding".

Senator **Denton**. But then you went on, saying provide "only the most outstanding." In other words, if there are 4,000—let us just take a number—4,000 outstanding officers, from among whom you are going to assign 500 to Joint Staffs, that is different from saying you are going to take the top 10 most outstanding among those 4,000 and put them in there.

We have got a little box on the fitness report that says "outstanding" and a lot of guys get "outstanding". The most outstanding would be the most outstanding of those. This clause says "among those officers".

General **Kelley**. It says "among the most outstanding".

Senator **Denton**. Maybe I am interpreting it wrong.

Senator **Nunn**. Well, I would like you to suggest any changes, with an explanation, or get your lawyers to reexamine their advice to you, because the spirit of that was not to take every outstanding officer in the Marine Corps and put him in Washington. I assure you of that. The spirit of it was to increase the caliber of personnel going into the Joint Staff.

I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. Again I want to thank each witness for being here. I think it has been an excellent hearing. You have each contributed immeasurably to the deliberations of our committee, and I can assure you we will welcome your continued advice, whether it is agreeable or disagreeable, as we try to get legislation enacted.

Senator **Denton**. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

I am not going to retain our witnesses. They have been here 3½ hours. I will ask one more question about a suggestion from General Wickham, which the rest of you did not support very much, about the joint training and military education of the Armed Forces being assigned as a responsibility to the Chairman of the JCS.

Everyone is a product of his experience. I happened to have 2 tours at the Armed Forces Staff College, one as a student, one as the Commandant. My impression, which you can kick around, was that the Marines, being small and dependent upon every other of the three services for something, were the most enthusiastic about "jointness". A very close second was the Army because of its massive dependence upon the other three services.

Certainly the Army has to be transported by the Navy and the Air Force and supported by them in many ways. So the Army wants more joint understanding, I think, than the other two services do. I believe that is also reflected in the way they assign their personnel. The Navy, for reasons that I consider to be good, being biased as I am, has a relatively large series of responsibilities below the sea, above the sea, on the sea. In other words, they have a little bit of Army, Navy, and Air Force in them, and they know that the Army does not care what the Navy is going to do on its ships as long as the Army troops get transported on the ships.

So the Navy does not really care about the joint stuff as much, and we do suffer from that. And when the subject of more jointness was brought up in front of Chairman Goldwater, he said that maybe we ought to put a course in the Service Academies on jointness. I buy that.

What do we have going on right now other than the Armed Forces Staff College, the interchange that we have among our respective Command and Staff and War Colleges, the ICAF and the National War College? What do we have that we should have more of? Could we not incorporate some kind of joint training either in formal education or in correspondence courses? Could we not have joint education even in a purely Navy school?

Could we not have some increment of a course, perhaps 5 percent of it, 10 percent of it, devoted to learning about the other services, because the Navy and the Air Force really do not care about jointness and that does result in some ignorance of the other services. I do not mean that you personally do not care about jointness, Admiral Watkins, but looking at the services over my experience that has been generally true and it ought to be improved. How can we improve it?

Admiral WATKINS. I believe the Navy can be criticized for lack of jointness over the past years. Since I have been here, we have increased the quality and the numbers going to the Armed Forces Staff College, for example, by over 400 percent. We are up to snuff now. We are participating jointly on the numbers and the quality.

When I came to this job, there were three commanding officers in a Naval War College course of 150 joint service participants. Now there are over 100 ex-commanding officers. Nearly all ex-commanding officers go there now, that is the best and the brightest are going. They mix with their Air Force and Army counterparts. And, as a matter of fact, one of the great joint initiatives we plan is to hook up the Army, the Air, and the Naval War Colleges, within the very foreseeable future, on our war gaming terminals, so that every single war game we fight will be joint.

I have also directed at the Naval War College that we will not fight any war games unless they are joint war games. We have done that religiously now for 3 years, and we are not going to change that requirement. I think that my colleagues here will support the fact that this has been one of the big initiatives we have had. I will not have the Navy perceived as being a Navy that wants to go it alone.

We are now putting the very best people we can in the Joint Staffs and in the unified commanders' staffs. We have not done that in the past, and I think a lot of it was because of the malaise of the last decade. There was some quesiton as to whether we were putting good money after bad. In my opinion we had a flawed national strategy, as I pointed out in my statement, which is very germane to the treatment that we gave to joint procedures during that era.

Today, jointness is number one in priority and it is moving along rapidly. It is very exciting for us to be participant in it.

Senator DENTON. I am surely glad to hear that. I believe every word you say. In what way is that institutionalized beyond your own personality?

Admiral WATKINS. It is institutionalized in the system, Senator Denton, because I do not think it can change now. We are too wide open among us all. I am bringing in Army and Air Force people to be within my own staff in the Pentagon. Other services have already done that. They have exchanged officers between the Air Force and the Army. We are doing that in my Joint Chiefs of Staff operation within the office of the CNO. So, these are the kinds of things we are doing. We probably have too many spies in our own camp, but we want it that way, because I believe that is going to bring jointness more rapidly, the kinds of things we have just talked about.

Command and control also brings us together. AWACS brought the Air Force and the Navy together for example, more than almost anything else. It is the command and control glue that finds us all. The Grenada operation again forced jointness, because we found a void in our ability to effect rapid communications with each other.

So, I think there is a message in there. We are putting the right people into joint jobs now. We have walked out of the morass of the past concerning jointness. That is my personal observation.

Senator DENTON. I am sure it is greatly improved. General Wickham, do you think we have enough of it, enough indoctrination, understanding, inculcation of knowledge of the other services?

General WICKHAM. In my opinion, no. I think that there is a great dependence on personality, as Jim indicated. We teach a fair amount about other services in our own school structure, and we do it in the joint schools that you are familiar with from your time at the Armed Forces Staff College. I do think we need to go farther. We think we need to imbue our younger officers with more jointness if we are going to go to war jointly. The idea of going to a uniservice is long since dead. My thought here would be that we make the chairman, on behalf of the JCS, the crew chief to see to it that there are core curricula in the various schools and, that teaching it is encouraged. How can we proliferate the concept of jointness further than we do now in the professional development and education of our officer corps, rather than leaving it up totally to the individual services, and to the vagaries of joint perspectives of the heads of services in the future? That is all I am thinking here. I believe it is an easy thing to do.

Senator DENTON. Would you correspond with me on that subject in the future? I do not care if you could give me only a page on it. Just give me something to work on. I grant all the improvements that Admiral Watkins talked about, but I would like to study your opinion on it.

[The information follows:]

JOINT OFFICER TRAINING

Because the JCS Chairman is the proponent for joint planning and operations, it is appropriate for him to oversee joint education and training, by as a minimum establishing common standards, core subjects to be taught at various levels of educational institutions, and by reviewing quality of instruction. The National Defense University (NDU) could act as his agent to develop joint training materials, to assist the service schools in the conduct of training, and to evaluate and improve the training product. There exist good communications now between NDU and the service schools, including both formal and informal arrangements. In other words, the mechanism is there to make a coordinated training effort succeed. However, we would not propose a single joint training instructional package for use at all equivalent service schools. Each service school can adapt war gaming instruction, readiness exercises, and operational planning instruction to emphasize the joint dimensions.

Senator DENTON. General Gabriel.

General GABRIEL. Just like we will never have enough reliable communication, we never have enough jointness. I think the things that Jim has talked about and I talked about earlier in my verbal shows that it takes a commitment to jointness on the part of the people and not just the Chiefs, but everybody.

As far as the school systems and the chairman being the crew chief of the team, I have no problem with that. As you know, we are briefed occasionally in the tank by the NDU commander and the ICAF, National War College and Armed Forces Staff College commanders. They come in and brief us on their curriculums and we make comments on them and there are some adjustments. The Armed Forces Staff College has great credibility, certainly in the Air Force. Our people are clawing to get in because when they come out they get those assignments that lead to good jobs and early promotions.

Senator DENTON. But how many guys are going? The typical sharp guy, when I was in the Navy, did not get to a school until he went to the National War College.

General GABRIEL. The opportunity.

Senator DENTON. The sharpest, and the next sharpest would go to the Naval War College, and the next third would go to one of those other ones, and that is scratching the surface, maybe. I am just asking whether or not we are really getting below scratching the surface.

General GABRIEL. I think that is an area we could look at, providing an opportunity for more people to go.

Senator DENTON. General Kelley. And I am not trying to take away from operations.

General KELLEY. I can agree with all the things that have been said, and I would just like to let the record show, so it does not go unsaid, that the Armed Forces Staff College, is probably one of the finest, if not the finest institution of its kind in the world for jointness. It is there today because of the tenacity of the commandant who existed at the time when there was a movement afoot in a prior administration to do away with it.

So I compliment you, Senator Denton, on the great job you did at the time.

Senator DENTON. I had forgotten about that, but now I remember.

General KELLEY. It was quite vivid in your mind when you and I discussed it in the 1970's. I support everything that has been said.

Senator DENTON. I want to thank the four of you very much, and express my admiration again to the ranking minority member, who has been here the whole time. I do not know how he is getting away with it, with all the responsibilities he has, but it is certainly testimony to his interest, testimony to his sincerity, and testimony to his well-earned reputation as a Senator who cares very much about national security.

I would state again my pride in the four of you and my gratitude for your valuable testimony today.

Senator NUNN. I also want to thank all of you, gentlemen.

[Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

BEIRUT/IRAN/GRENADA OPERATIONS

Senator **KENNEDY**. I served on the task force that originally went through this staff report and discussed the various problems and proposals relating to JCS reform. And I attended the retreat at Fort A.P. Hill where we talked at some length—informally—with former Chiefs of Staff, former CINCs, and former Chairmen of the JCS.

We have heard strong opinions—both pro and con—on this question, and I can understand why people feel so strongly.

But one of our greatest concerns in this area as a committee is our ability successfully to run a joint operation in the real world. Are these problems of dual-hatting or inter-service rivalry getting in the way of our ability to fight a war?

The evidence that has been most powerful to us on this question has, to be quite honest, not been the individual experiences of individual generals or admirals or defense secretaries, although that experience has been instructive. Rather it has been our examination of those instances in history where we have had to use our forces and where we went wrong.

For that reason, I am extremely disappointed that no one on this panel addressed the problems raised by the historical examples that were cited in this staff report. You know the problems associated with the Beirut tragedy, with the Iranian rescue mission, with Grenada as well—if not better—than we do. And yet no one who is presently serving in the Pentagon—the Secretary included—has testified about the issues raised by these historical incidents.

There were serious problems with those operations, were there not? And many of those problems stemmed from organizational causes, did they not? And should we not be working today to correct those problems so that they do not hamper our operations again?

What is your analysis of what went wrong in Beirut, Iran and Grenada?

General **WICKHAM**. In Beirut, there was a suicide attack, resulting in the tragic death of many Marines. Their physical position contributed to the disaster. The JCS investigated and concluded that some changes had to be made. I don't think the changes would have prevented the attack from taking place. I don't think the tragedy resulted from any organizational defects.

In Iran, the concept of a small clandestine operation was valid and consistent with national policy objectives. It offered the best chance of getting the hostages out alive and the least danger of starting a war with Iran. The operation was feasible. It probably represented the plan with the best chance of success under the circumstances. The decision to execute was justified. The rescue mission was a high-risk operation. People and equipment were called on to perform at the upper limits of human capacity and equipment capability. The first realistic capability to successfully accomplish the rescue of the hostages was reached at the end of March 1980. Operations Security was an overriding requirement for a successful operation. Success was totally dependent upon maintaining secrecy. Command and control was excellent. External resources adequately supported the Joint Task Force and were not a limiting factor. Planning was adequate except for the number of backup helicopters and provisions for weather contingencies. A larger helicopter force and better provisions for weather penetration would have increased the probability of mission success. Preparation for the mission was adequate except for the lack of a comprehensive, full-scale training exercise. Operational readiness of the force would have benefited from a full-dress rehearsal, and improved command and control. Two factors combined to directly cause the mission abort: Unexpected helicopter failure rate and low-visibility flight conditions en route to Desert One.

In Grenada, while the operation was an unqualified success, we learned some new lessons and relearned a number of old ones. Army ground communications were generally good and we are working to improve interoperability of communications equipment between the services.

Admiral **WATKINS**. The problems of the Iran Rescue Operation are well documented in the Holloway Report and I cannot add to this assessment.

The problems of the Beirut tragedy are equally well documented in the Long Report. I agree with the Long Report in its assessment of the cumbersome chain of command. We have learned a great deal with regard to international terrorism. We have to respond more rapidly with special forces than we have had to any time since World War II. We are learning how to deal with crises and the command and control of those crises as each occurs. I believe we can improve and steamline our procedures for execution of military actions across the spectrum of today's crises, since those fall well short of the global conflict scenario for which the unified chain of command was designed. United States military responses to lower level crises are invariably rather surgical in nature and highly sensitive politically. Therefore, while our organization for a major war rests on allowing the unified commanders great latitude under broad policy direction from Washington, chain of command procedures for the violent peace in which we live today can be different for each event. Flexibility in adapting chain of command arrangements to best meet each peacetime employment of forces is required to meet rapidly changing events. There is no one chain of command panacea for all scenarios across the spectrum of violence.

Urgent Fury was a highly successful joint operation in which units from all the services provided necessary unique capabilities to meet the mission requirements, involving the simultaneous seizure of several geographically distinct targets. The differing threats and environmental requirements dictated uniquely capable units from all the services. For example, the unfavorable surf on the east coast demanded a helicopterborne assault of Pearls airport by the Marine Amphibious Unit, while the Cuban and Grenadan anti-aircraft capability at Pt. Salines airstrip demanded a low-level airborne assault by Army Rangers.

The command and control of these diverse elements in a joint operation is complex and requires coordination by all elements in the planning stages. The planning and execution of an operation as complex as Urgent Fury in barely more than a weekend was a significant achievement and was a testament to the knowledge, skill and professionalism of all concerned. As might be expected, however, the compressed time frame and the necessary tight operational security hampered full development of comprehensive joint communications arrangements. The most serious problem encountered in Urgent Fury was joint service communications interoperability, but the problem was overcome imaginatively and quickly. Standard Navy narrow band secure satellite communications systems were not interoperable with the Army/Air Force broad band system. This was known by the Joint Task Force Commander who directed that portable Army/Air Force systems be brought aboard his flagship, enabling command and control communications among the joint task force units. Most of the communications difficulties encountered in Urgent Fury were the direct result of insufficient prior coordination in the development of a comprehensive communications plan. There were instances of Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) units, for example, that initially lacked correct information concerning frequencies, call signs and authentication requirements. These deficiencies were quickly corrected and there were no further technical problems associated with naval gunfire support. There were, however, procedural impediments in getting naval gunfire missions approved. The rules of engagement for Urgent Fury demanded a minimum of collateral damage within Grenada. Toward this end, the Joint Task Force Commander personally approved all requests for naval gunfire. This deliberate decision to retain tight control of naval gunfire added requirements to the normal procedures for gunfire support which at times delayed and, in same cases, denied requests for support. These delays were at times incorrectly attributed to communication problems which were not a cause.

Interoperability deficiencies were a concern of all the services even prior to Urgent Fury. Several programs were already initiated to overcome these deficiencies, but these programs take years to become operational. As a result of the Grenada operation, however, these progrms have been accelerated. For example, Navy secure satellite communications systems have been modified to accept encryption devices that are compatable with Army/Air Force secure satellite systems. This program, still in progress, is sufficiently complete to enable all deploying battle group units to have this capability. Additionally, joint procurement programs, such as Havequick and Sincgars, were accelerated by the lessons learned from Grenada, and will provide indentical communications systems to all the services, further ensuring future joint communications interoperability. In addition to the efforts to ensure hardware compatibility, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the implementation of JINTACCS—Joint Interoperable Tactical Command and Control System. This system, designed for joint tactical operations, provides for standardized communications between environment by all the Service elements involved.

General GABRIEL. I will address Iran and Grenada. The Air Force did not participate in Beirut.

Prior SASC analysis of the Iranian hostage rescue mission decribed organizational problems, inadequate planning, and uncoordinated training as causes of the disaster at Desert One. The analysis ascribed these failings to service parochialisms, which forced the formation of an ad hoc JTF and the disregard of a CONPLAN that could have eased planning for the operation.

The organizational problems previously identified by the SASC are accurate. Their cause, however, was not service parochialism, but the need for absolute secrecy in planning and exercising for this extremely complex mission. That need drove a requirement for compartmentalization in planning and training; the decision to create an ad hoc task force was made because it was though that this would decrease the chances of the operation being compromised. The CONPLAN noted by the SASC had insufficient detail to be used as a basis for planning this operation.

Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) is generally considered to have been a resounding success. We believe the problems encountered during Urgent Fury should only be discussed in the context of the short time available for planning and execution and the extreme secrecy required. We realize these timing and security constraints are becoming the norm; therefore, we have placed great emphasis on resolving the difficulties we experienced as a result of Urgent Fury.

We would expect to address any organizational problems which may have contributed to difficulties in coordination during the Grenada operation during our review of JCS Pub 2.

General KELLEY. In the operational sense, the Iranian rescue mission, Beirut peacekeeping, and Grenada were very different. We learned valuable lessons from each operation and have profited from them. To categorize the problems in these operations as organizational in nature is a bit of an over generalization.

As you also know, there have been a number of analyses of those operations. The separate reviews conducted by Admirals Holloway and Long are perhaps the most important. The JCS have used those reviews to make improvements which will enhance our chances of success in future joint operations.

Senator KENNEDY. General Kelley, there are a series of historical examples cited in the staff report of problems caused by interservice rivalry, of operations that were improperly coordinated and badly managed. I would like to ask you about two of these examples: the Iranian rescue mission and Grenada.

We heard yesterday that we should not really pay much attention to the example of the Iranian rescue mission because it was a "high risk mission" anyway, the dangers of failure were great under the best of circumstances, and it really is not fair to include that example as evidence to show the need for organizational reform. Do you agree with that?

General KELLEY. Every operation must be viewed in the context of its own special circumstances. If problem areas are identified which are applicable to other situations, they should be addressed and corrected. In the case of Iran, we have done that. The Holloway report has assisted in initiating actions to correct identified problems in joint command, control, and coordination.

In this particular case, the experience gained from the Iranian rescue mission can be easily overemphasized as an example to illustrate need for organizational reforms. The tragedy of the failed mission shocked our nation's consciousness and vividly demonstrated the military complexity of the operation. It is the responsibility of both the military and the lawmakers to ensure that the proper actions result from the experience. I feel that the proper steps have been taken to increase our options in future situations. Organizations, equipment, and training changes have evolved in areas such as the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Special Operations Advisory Panel (SOAP), Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA), and Special Operations Forces (SOF). Lastly, I can assure you that the specific allegations in the Holloway committee's report that Marine pilots were chosen to fly the helicopters because the Marine Corps lacked any other role in the mission is simply not true.

Senator KENNEDY. One of the strongest criticisms of the Grenada operation was that the intelligence about the second campus did not reach the commander on the ground until two or three days into the operation. If there had been any real threat to the welfare of American students there, if the Cubans had wanted to harm those students, because of our intelligence failure we would not have been able to prevent it.

With respect to Beirut, are you staisfied that our military people in Beirut were given adequate intelligence about the possibility—the high probability—of a terrorist truck bomb attack on the Marine barracks? Are you aware of any significant intelligence information that the Marine commander on the ground should have had but did not have?

Generally KELLEY. Both the House Armed Services Committee and the Long Commission reports on the bombing of the Marine Headquarters in Beirut detail intelligence inadequacies. These intelligence shortcomings directly affected the ability of the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) commander to confront the full spectrum of threats to his unit—threats which included not only terrorist activity, but also possible attacks by artillery, rockets, heavy machine guns, anti-tank rockets, other crew-served weapons, and small arms.

In general, the reports cite two problems. First, a voluminous quantity of raw intelligence information deluged the small MAU intelligence section. Secondly, this profusion of raw data was usually imprecise and general in nature; it proved of little value in pinpointing specific terrorist threats. Indeed, the MAU Commander testified that in the three- or four-month period before the bombing, the MAU received over 100 threats of possible car bomb attacks against the Multinational Force, most of which were vague and not specific as to date, time, place of attack, type of vehicle, etc. Intelligence never determined that there was a high probability of a terrorist truck-bomb attack on the Marine barracks.

In response to the second part of this question, I am not aware of any significant intelligence information that the Marine commander on the ground should have had but did not have. On the contrary, the MAU was inundated with raw information. Little of this information could be reduced to intelligence useful to the commander.

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Watkins, with respect to the incident involving the hijackers of the Achille Lauro who were forced down by F-14's in Sicily, could you tell me the following:

Who was in charge on the ground during the Achille Lauro operation? Was there any single unified Commander of that particular operation actually in theatre?

Admiral WATKINS. USCINCEUR was in charge of the Achille Lauro operation, and he was in theatre.

Senator KENNEDY. [Deleted.] Was the decision cleared with the Italians before hand? Was that decision approved in advance by the National Command Authority?

Admiral WATKINS. The President, after conferring with the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor, and based upon military advice of the Chairman of the JCS, approved the [deleted] forces at Sigonella. The Italians were informed just prior to the plane's landing.

Senator KENNEDY. There were reports that [deleted]. Is that true?

Admiral WATKINS. The Italians were informed just to the plane's landing.

Senator KENNEDY. There were also reports that an American general followed the Italians to Rome when they took the highjackers there—that he did so in an Air Force jet without permission of the Italians and in violation of Italian air space. Is that true? Who gave the order?

Admiral WATKINS. That occurred, except that it was a military staff officer, and not a General, who was assigned the mission of assuring that the Egyptian 737 did not escape. In an effort to assure accomplishment of that mission, the aircraft took off without proper clearance. The President approved the request to follow the aircraft.

MALTA OPERATION

Senator KENNEDY. General Wickham, with respect to the hijacking that ended in Malta with the assault by the Egyptian military on the airplane, there have been newspaper reports that three U.S. military officers were with the Egyptians when they landed at Malta. Who was in charge of that operation on the ground, if anyone?

General WICKHAM. The information request is classified and is being provided to the committee separately.

Senator KENNEDY. Did the National Command Authority know in advance that those U.S. officers were flying in with the Egyptains? Did the senior military officers in charge of the Malta operation know in advance? Who gave the order for them to do so?

General WICKHAM. The information requested is classified and is being provided to the committee separately.

Senator KENNEDY. Who was coordinating the movements of American forces in the area? There were reports that U.S. jets escorted the Egyptians to Malta, that U.S. jets were ready to force down the commercial aircraft in the event it took off from Malta, that there were Navy vessels in the area [deleted]. Who was making these decisions and where?

General WICKHAM. The information requested is classified and is being provided to the committee separately.

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Watkins and General Kelley, in your comments about chain of command you make a good observation that we should have "a more flexible approach to command and control across the set of peacetime to wartime chain of command issues."

The report prepared by Admiral Long about the Beirut tragedy made the observation that there were too many layers in the chain of command between the Marine Commander on the ground in Beirut and the National Command Authority in Washington DC. Do you agree with that conclusion? What, if anything, has been done to correct that problem?

Admiral WATKINS. I agree with the Long Report in its assessment of the cumbersome chain of command. We have learned a great deal with regard to international terrorism. We have to respond more rapidly with special forces than any time since World War II. We are learning how to deal with crises and the command and control of those crises as each occurs. I believe we can improve and streamline our procedures for execution of military actions across the spectrum of today's crises, since those fall well short of the global conflict scenario for which the unified chain of command was designed. United States military responses to lower level crises are invariably rather surgical in nature and highly sensitive politically. Therefore, while our organization for a major war rests on allowing the Unified Commanders great latitude under broad policy direction from Washington, chain of command procedures for the violent peace in which we live today can be different for each event. Flexibility in adapting chain of command arrangements to best meet each peacetime employment of forces is required to meet rapidly changing events. There is no one chain of command panacea for all scenarios across the spectrum of violence.

General KELLEY. Marines afloat in the Mediterranean today are in the same chain of command in effect during the 1983 Beirut bombing. Due in part to the extended period our forces remained in Beirut, Joint Task Force (JTF) Lebanon was formed. This attempt to streamline communications enabled the commander to report directly to and come directly under the operational command of Commander-in-Chief European Command (USCINCEUR). This is in accordance with then-current and present JCS plans. I do not believe that the failure to accurately identify and react to the threat was attributable to the chain of command.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Senator KENNEDY. General Wickham and General Gabriel, in his testimony, General Kelley states that "We have reconciled any differences we may have had with close air support." Is that true? Do you agree with that? If it is ture, how have you reconciled those differences? And how was it achieved?

General WICKHAM. The Army concurs with the Air Force response.

General GABRIEL. The Air Force's close air support in Grenada was uniformly effective, both from the tactical standpoint and with regard to the command and control arrangements used. Army units praised the AC-130s supporting them, commending these gunships' responsiveness, accuracy, and heavy firepower.

Some problems surfaced during Urgent Fury, however, that have caused the JCS and the services to take a close look at our interoperability. These problems were primarily technical. These are being addressed at various levels within the services, with careful review by the JCS and DOD. This is an area strongly emphasized in DRB proceedings.

Procedural issues also played a role in Urgent Fury, and have also been addressed. All four Services agreed on the Joint Application of Firepower (J-FIRE) manual published by the Air-Land Forces Application Agency (ALFA) in July 1985. These procedures, of course, are useful in combat only if they are practiced in peacetime—"train as your plan to fight"—and we have increased the scope and realism of our joint exercises since Grenada, in part to test the effectiveness of these procedures.

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Watkins, you suggest that this reform movement may be the product of our unhappy history in the seventies and sixties where Presidents did not get along with or did not rely on Chiefs of Staff. But that point, which may be true in part, misses the facts of history.

For example, we have not been able to achieve interoperability in communications between the four services since the second World War. We have certainly known how important this capability is to our ability to coordinate operations. And yet we apparantly have not yet focused on the problem enough to find a solution.

Is this failure not evident of a real, deep-seated structural or organizational problem involving the services' difficulties in working together?

Admiral WATKINS. The services are interoperable in communications. We have the potential for 100 percent interoperability right now, but the trouble is that this nation does not have the resources to provide the entire capacity that we need for flexible command and control on a minute's notice, anytime, anywhere in the world.

The services are working together. One of the Pentagon's leading growth industries is interservice cooperation. We are aggressively examining all aspects of joint interoperability—Navy, the Joint Staff, our unified commanders and the other services have entered into positive dialogue to solve previous shortcomings regarding "Jointness". We recognize jointness is not an end in itself, but overall combat effectiveness. Our services are working effectively together as we accelerate efforts toward improving joint warfighting capability.

RED FLAG OPERATIONS

Senator **Kennedy**. General Gabriel, you say that you have "joint exercises" at Nellis in Red Flag operations. Do you mean to say that Navy pilots actually fly with Air Force pilots in the same exercise—or do you mean that both Navy and Air Force pilots go through the same kind of aggressor training at Nellis Air Force Base?

General **Gabriel**. Navy pilots do actually fly with Air Force pilots during Red Flag exercises. Since 1976 each Red Flag exercise has normally had Navy participants who fly the same type missions as their Air Force counterparts. For example, USN A-7 and A-6 pilots fly in composite force ground attack scenarios with USAF F-4, F-16, and F-111 pilots. Air Defense missions are flown with Navy F-14s and F-4s in combination with USAF F-15s and F-4s. Joint suppression of enemy air defense missions are flown with combined Navy and Air Force suppression aircraft against the simulated Soviet threat assets on the Nellis national ranges.

Senator **Denton**. On that note, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the hearing adjourned.]

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in room SDG-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.

Present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Gramm, Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, and Glenn.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Richard D. Finn Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., and James R. Locher III, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz and Russell C. Miller, research assistants; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR PHIL GRAMM, PRESIDING

Senator GRAMM [presiding]: Our distinguished chairman, Mr. Thurmond, has been delayed in getting here today, and I thought in the interest of the time of those who are here to testify and those who are here to take their testimony that we might begin.

I know that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft, has to go for another meeting at 11, and so I thought, being ever mindful of his heavy commitments, that we would go ahead and begin without our Chairman being here. He can make his opening statement when he arrives, and in the interim, Secretary Taft, we will go ahead when you are ready and take your testimony.

On behalf of both Senator Thurmond and our distinguished Chairman, who is not in town because of the health of his wife, we want to welcome you gentlemen here before the committee to testify on this important subject.

Senator Dixon has a prepared statement which we will submit for the hearing record at this point.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALAN DIXON

Today, Mr. Chairman, we will be hearing from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William H. Taft, the Honorable John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, and the Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army. I look forward to the testimony of these distinguished witnesses.

Mr. Chairman, I was pleased to read Secretary Weinberger's letter to you of December 2, 1985, in which he supports some of the changes that have been recommended by the staff report. This is a positive step for the Secretary to take. Along with you I await his findings on the remainder of the staff study.

The staff study was not a negative attack on this administration, nor on any individuals who serve this country presently in a civilian or military leadership position. The study reviewed the institutions of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Commands, and even the Congress. Any organization can have outstanding leadership and that leadership can overcome problems inherent in any out-of-date organization. Even with outstanding leadership, however, an organization in need of change should undergo change. The day will come when even strong leadership fails, and the structure of the organization fails to accomplish its mission. Our country remains great because, when we see problems, we are not afraid of making changes.

I am strongly convinced that we need to make changes in the entire Defense Department organization. It is my firm hope that this committee will not back away from this challenge. If we do a thorough job, we will have the support not only of our Senate colleagues, but also the support of the civilian and military leadership throughout the military services.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GRAMM. Secretary Taft.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TAFT IV, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here this morning. I have submitted a formal statement for the record which reviews the status of the Department's consideration of the committee staff report. In your letter of invitation, you asked me to address specifically three chapters of that report at this hearing, and I would like to do that very briefly now.

The three chapters you identified concerned OSD, the military departments, and the planning, programming and budgeting system. While the Department has not completed its consideration of these chapters, I am glad to have this opportunity to share my initial reaction to them with you.

On the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the principal thrust of the report's analysis of OSD is that in order to perform better its function of mission integration its organizational structure should give greater prominence to the mission-oriented offices. The establishment of the Under Secretary for Policy in 1977 was certainly a step in this direction. That office has been steadily strengthened in the past 8 years. It is likely that it will be further strengthened in the future.

Whether that means three Under Secretaries, as indicated in the staff report, instead of the current one Under Secretary and two Assistant Secretaries seems to me, frankly, to be of less importance than that we evolve toward any new structure gradually and with opportunities built in to adjust course as experience may suggest.

The report's excursion into the concept of matrix organizational structure, whatever else it may do, certainly demonstrates conclusively the complexity of the organizational relationships that need to be developed and accommodated in OSD. These relationships, of course, are necessary in any organization the size of DOD that must pursue a number of objectives simultaneously through various means, and they exist, I am pleased to say and assure the committee, in OSD today.

They are best preserved and maintained in an environment of evolutionary change. That is what we have in OSD today. And the thrust of change in the past 8 years has been toward stronger mission-oriented offices. My guess is that this trend will continue in the future.

I would add that as a general principle it seems to me wise to leave the details of the organization and operation of what is, after all, only a 1,750-person office as much as possible to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense without statutory restrictions. In that case, the pace and direction of necessary change—and there will always be some necessary change—can more easily conform to the Secretary's personal management style.

On military departments, let me refer here just to three aspects of the staff report. My view of the service Secretaries in DOD is that they can serve a most valuable role of developing policy and promoting the Secretary of Defense's and the President's programs if they are given adequate authority. Secretary Weinberger has given them that authority and has invited their participation in policy formulation. His confidence has been rewarded.

Many of us in the Department devote considerable effort to coordinating cross-service activities and defining service missions and roles. The Chiefs of those services have, I dare say, discussed some of their initiatives in this regard on operational matters, training and doctrine and so forth. The DRB performs a similar function in the resource allocation process.

Perhaps the Under Secretaries of the services should have special responsibilities assigned for cross-service issues, as suggested in the report. My guess is many people in the Department will nonetheless remain concerned and dedicated to continuing work on this subject.

Finally, with regard to military departments, let me address the matter of the interaction of the service Secretaries and the service staffs. I wrote a letter to the committee earlier this year which is quoted considerably in the report. The different character of the division of labor that the services have adopted is set out in that letter and repeated in the report.

The main point is that there is a division of labor, not a duplication. I am not aware of situations in which Chiefs have circumvented Secretaries of the services when there are different views, and of course, there are from time to time. Usually the Secretary of Defense and I are made aware of that fact by the service Secretary himself, hardly a circumvention. Incidentally, I have been careful to avoid inviting circumvention of service Secretaries in the budget process by declining to establish a formal role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an institution in which they would critique their own service program proposals.

The staff report appears to recommend, at one point, institutionalizing such a circumvention, although at another point it deplores that practice. My preference has been to assure that the service Secretary and the Chief work together on their budgets with the Defense Resources Board members as individuals, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands, as well as CSD staff providing the joint perspective.

On the PPB system, the staff report stresses the need for more emphasis on the planning process. We agree, and the record will show that we have done much to strengthen the planning cycle. This is particularly true of our efforts to engage the commanders in chief of the Unified and Specified Commands in development of defense guidance. We continue to review and adjust our system, and I believe improvements have been made and, I am confident, will be made in the future.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt Secretary Taft to commend him for that initiative. I believe that it is an important initiative. I think it is, by all accounts, having a positive and constructive effect. We make a number of recommendations in terms of strengthening the CINCs and I think we have adequately acknowledged in the report the initiative that has already been taken.

Mr. TAFT. Thank you, Senator. My principal objective has been to enlarge the opportunities for participation by the operational commanders and to run a highly self-conscious, self-critical, and self-correcting system. I believe that we have done this. The result has been better planning, which I would agree with the report was the weakest part of the cycle 5 years ago. But I think it has also been better programming and better budgeting.

I have already spoken about the role of the JCS in the program. I should say I have benefited enormously from the participation of the individual Chiefs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the program review. I have, however, as I said earlier, resisted the notion, though we have considered it several times, of institutionalizing a JCS role in commenting on service programs for the reason that it would split the service Chief and the service Secretary.

I have also resisted the suggestion that the JCS act as a filter for the views of the commanders in chief of the Unified and Specified Commands, for the additional reason that I believe we must have the benefit of getting their views directly, and we have seen that operate very effectively in the program review this year.

Finally, on the matter of an evaluation cycle for the PPB—an "E" in the PPBS, which is discussed in the staff report—I should say I have given considerable thought to this subject over the past few years, but without reaching a definite conclusion on to how to go about making any necessary reforms in the context of that system.

Such an evaluation cycle could integrate a variety of management systems that currently exist—secretarial performance reviews, DSARC's, the DCIMI, some of the budget process in the PPB, as well as many others—audit, investigation and things of that nature. It could integrate some of these, but not others.

It is a complicated matter in practice to establish such a budget system. I am continuing to review this and expect to make changes from time to time in our evaluation efforts. I would be glad to explore the possibilities in this connection with the members of the committee as we go about it, which we do on a regular basis.

I thank the Chairman for the opportunity to present these views, and I hope they have been responsive to the items that you asked about in your letter, but of course I will be prepared to discuss any matters the members might wish. We have, of course, the service Secretaries here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taft follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TAFT IV

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss with you the organization of the Department of Defense and, more specifically, the staff report released several weeks ago which proposes a number of far reaching changes in the Department's organizational structure.

As Secretary Weinberger noted in his testimony before this committee last month, this is a matter which we take very seriously and which we approach with an open mind. This administration's commitment to seeking improvements in the Nation's military capabilities and its willingness to undertake management changes in pursuit of this goal have, I believe, been clearly established over the past 5 years.

Although we have made a number of organizational changes during this period, we have primarily concentrated on improving management systems and processes. Generally, such changes accomplish substantive managerial improvements more quickly than organizational changes and achieve their objective without the turbulence, disruption, and uncertainty which accompanies a major organizational shake-up.

The improvements we have made in the planning, programming, and budgeting system are a case in point. These changes have enhanced the participation of top DOD officials and service line managers, and ensure that the military advice of the unified and specified commanders, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is given full consideration in departmental planning and resource decisions. These changes have significantly improved the way we make such decisions in the Department and have gone a long way toward instilling a joint perspective which takes into consideration the views of operational field commanders.

We have demonstrated, as the Secretary stated in his testimony, that we are in favor of change when it will provide a net benefit. By the same token, however, any proposed reorganization of significant scope should be subjected to a rigorous needs test and the implications of its implementation should be carefully considered. Furthermore, we favor an evolutionary approach to organizational changes, which preserves that which is functioning effectively and modifies only that which needs fixing.

Our evaluation of the staff report began on October 16 and is continuing. Each issue raised by the report is receiving a comprehensive evaluation during this review. A progress report on the review was submitted to the committee by Secretary Weinberger on December 2. As indicated during the Secretary's testimony and demonstrated by this progress report, we believe we will be able to reach early agreement on a majority of the issues raised by the staff report. Some, however, will require further discussion, and some will not be supported by the Department.

The progress report describes the conclusions we have reached in three major areas of concern: Provision of military advice to the President, command and control of the combatant commanders, and management of the joint military staffs at Department headquarters.

Also, we concur with the recommendation to reduce micro-management of Department of Defense business which has increased substantially in recent years. In this regard, the Secretary has indicated to the committee that we can reduce the size of major Defense headquarters staffs if hearings, reports and regulatory requirements are reduced by Congress.

The Secretary has also indicated that, with the addition in recent years of new functions and activities to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, consolidation of a number of assistant secretaries under a new Under Secretary of Defense, as suggested by the staff report, appears to have merit and we will give it serious consideration.

In addition to our internal deliberations, we have been following the activities of this committee and the statements which have been presented by the distinguished witnesses who have appeared before you recently. Even though substantial differences remain, it appears that a consensus is evolving, both within and outside of the Department, regarding a number of principles that should guide our determination of the method for implementing those changes which we settle on as desirable:

First, the Secretary's flexibility to manage the Department in a rapidly changing, complex, and dangerous world should be preserved. Neither the administration nor the Congress can foresee all the circumstances that future Secretaries of Defense may face. They should not be so constrained that the organization cannot be readily adapted to whatever future contingencies may arise.

Second, we should assure continued and effective civilian control of the military. This is a fundamental constitutional principle which must not be abridged.

Third, we should not only avoid, but actively discourage, micro-management—whether by the Congress or top-level DOD staffs.

Fourth, we should maintain the Department's philosophy of centralized policymaking and decentralized operations. This is a fundamental management principle of this administration and one which has proven its value over the past five years.

And finally, we should build on the acomplishments that have been made to date. These accomplishments have been substantial and have gone a long way toward improving past deficiencies in DOD operations. They should be neither discarded nor disregarded, but used as a foundation upon which to build further and more lasting improvements.

As the committee is aware, the House Armed Services Committee and the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management are studying many of these same issues. We believe that the best solutions will evolve from close and continuing cooperation among the Congress, the administration, and the Blue Ribbon Commission. For this reason, it is essential that the Nation obtain the full benefit of all current and pending proposals prior to making a commitment to a specific course of action.

In the final analysis, it is essential that the Congress preserve, not just for this Secretary, but for all future Secretaries of Defense, an advisory function that allows for diversity and a balanced input from cognizant civilian and military officials, and the flexibility to adapt specific Defense organization and management arrangements to meet the demands of on-going national security requirements. We are confident that this will be accomplished through mutual cooperation with the Congress.

I am prepared to answer your questions.

Senator, THURMOND [presiding]. I will just put my opening statement in the record here.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Today's hearing is the seventh in the series of committee hearings on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense and the Congress. We are privileged to receive testimony today from three of the four principal civilian assistants to the Secretary of Defense. Our fourth witness, Under Secretary of the Air Force Aldridge, is representing the Air Force because of the uncertainty over the confirmation date of Mr. Russ Rourke. As it turns out, the Senate confirmed Mr. Rourke as the new Secretary of the Air Force late yesterday afternoon.

On behalf of the committee, I welcome the Honorable William H. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army; the Honorable John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy; and the Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr, Under Secretary of the Air Force. Each one of today's witnesses has served in the Department of Defense since the beginning of the current administration and two of the witnesses—Secretaries Marsh and Lehman—have served in their current positions throughout this period. The substantial period of service of our four witnesses should add a valuable dimension to their testimony.

Today's hearing is to focus on the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, and, to a lesser extent, the acquisition process. These topics have received limited attention in the committee's hearings so far. I hope that today's testimony will serve to improve the committee's understanding in these important areas.

On an administrative note, I understand that Secretary Taft will need to leave at 11:00 a.m. I would suggest that my colleagues question Secretary Taft before he has to leave.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Marsh.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary MARSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the committee. I recognize that you have spent many, many hours in testimony and studying the report, and therefore you have views and perspectives, and I hope I can amplify on that. I also recognize that my own Senator, Senator Warner, has also held the post of a service Secretary, and I suspect brings to the committee a somewhat different dimension by way of background.

Your report is a broad and far-ranging one. I thank the committee for their afforts in preparing such a far-ranging report. You are to be commended for giving the staff the resources to carry it through. I think everyone here at this table and in the Pentagon, both civilian and military leadership, would agree that it is necessary to improve our organization, and I think that this has probably occurred a great deal more in recent years than has probably been recognized either by the Congress or by the general public.

The Department of the Army is a very vast organization, with the active force, paid civilians, and the National Guard and Reserve, it numbers approximately 2 million people. It is larger by far than any other institution of Government or any private organization in the United States. So consequently, if you adopt the principle of civilian control, it is very important that there be positioned in the Department of Defense and the heads of the various services civilian control that can address the problems and provide the policy leadership that you would want.

I would say to you that the organization that we have today in the Department of Defense is based on 40 years of empirical experience, and we are not able to project at this time what impact would occur because of some of the changes that have been proposed here.

At the outset—and I think it is very important to make this comment—relationships with General Wickham have been outstanding. He keeps me informed on matters where I should be involved that relate to the military. He communicates my views in a very forceful way to the General Staff of the Army, and he has taken a very strong effort to ensure that the initiatives that I have suggested are followed and implemented in the Army. He also advises me of actions of the Joint Chiefs.

In fairness, I would also say to you that General Meyer and I had a very fine and strong relationship.

If you look at the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army, I am sure you will realize that my observations will be based on my background and my experience. It will relate to the fact that I was commissioned in the Army in World War II, served after the war for 25 years in the Virginia National Guard, 4 years in the Reserve, was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, 6 years on the House Appropriations Committee, 2 years on other committees of the House, advisor to the Vice President, and also counsel to the President, with experience working in the NSC and working with the NSC on national security matters.

I also chaired the internal task force for the reorganization of the American intelligence community in 1975 for President Ford.

Now, one of the things that I would observe is that Secretary Weinberger has structured the Department and his office in a management style that is consistent with his own leadership concepts, and he has sought and he has achieved, I believe, to shift more authority and accountability to the service Secretaries. I can say that without any question.

Now your report raises questions about the role of the Secretaries of the services and whether or not there is some need for change. I would say to you that to me the benchmark by which we should measure all of our overview of the Department is the absolute essentiality of civilian oversight and civilian control.

I am of the view that title X of the United States Code provides the adequate guidance and sets out the roles and responsibilities of the Secretaries in order to achieve that. I would not recommend to you that the statute be modified.

Now, the authority is there for the service Secretaries. The report raises the question of strengthening the service Secretaries in DOD policymaking. Again, I would say to you that I think Mr. Weinberger and Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft have sought to do that. I would read to you the operative sections of the law that relates to the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army, and there are certain similarties, of course, with the Air Force and the Navy.

"Functions necessary for training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare and preparedness, and research and development." I underline the word "operations" as being a part of the responsibility of the service Secretary. I emphasize that because I think there has been a failure of understanding or awareness of the service Secretary's role in the operation of the Department.

I would say to you that also within the last several years, largely unnoticed, there has been an enhancement of the responsibilities of the Army Secretary in the field of intelligence, which is a very important dimension of his policy formulation and oversight responsibilities. This enhancement has occurred because of the interest and support of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Questions were raised as to cross-service responsibilities of the Under Secretary. I would say to you that I suspect that in the Department of the Army and the other departments there is a great deal more cross-service coordination than is generally understood. But I will also say to you that the office and the role of the Under Secretary of the Army has been significantly strengthened. Mr. Ambrose has brought to that office expertise, background and knowledge in the fields of manufacturing, research and development, and in the field of contracting.

Now, the report asks the question of the service Secretaries, and we were asked to respond to the question whether or not the Office of the service Secretary is circumvented by the service Chiefs or by their staffs, and indeed whether it is circumvented by the Secretary of Defense. I will address the question of circumvention a little later in my comments, but I would say to you that the situation that is most likely to prevail in the department is the noninvolvement of the service Secretary. This occurs in large measure, in my view, because of an inadequate understanding of his role in operations.

Non-involvement is not as much intentional as it is an unawareness of mutual roles. In operations that involve the National Command Authority, the service Secretary is not intended to be a participant in these decisions. Consequently, over a period of time a perception has developed that assigns operational responsibilities exclusively to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When operational tasks occur that involve the National Command Authority and the JCS arena, tasks may flow directly to operational elements in the Army without the involvement of the service Secretary.

This does not occur—and I want to emphasize this point—this does not occur, in my view, because of any effort on behalf of the JCS to bypass him or to not involve him, but it occurs because of a failure to involve him rather than to circumvent him. It is based on the view of custom that he simply is not involved.

Ultimately, however, the service Secretary will become involved because of the statutory requirement as it relates to logistics, training and personnel will usually flow from any operational decision. But his participation may not have been timely. Also, because actions within the service in the area of operations can occur without his being aware of them.

Now, I would say to you in recent years in the Army there has been a gradual, but, significant remedying of the situation and a better understanding of the service Secretary's authority. In large measure this has been due to the support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to the leadership of the Chief of Staff, who have made concerted efforts to establish a practice of awareness of matters in the JCS arena that will impact on Army units.

Intelligence matters, by their very nature, are a gray area when defining the scope of operations. As I indicated to you earlier, there have been significant changes in the authority of the service Secretary in the matters that relate to intelligence. This relates to the identification of problems, corrective action, controls both operational and financial, as well as continuing reporting and oversight. All of these changes have occurred with the knowledge and support of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Now speaking to circumvention of the service Secretaries, there is the possibility that some circumvention does happen, but it is not a practical problem. Under the statute, the service Chief is a member of the JCS authorized by statute to provide direct advice to the Secretary and to the President, and that relationship between the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense is a straight one, not involving the service Secretary.

However, in addition to performing these functions, the statutory duties of the Chief of Staff require that he preside over the Army staff, that he serves as senior military adviser to the Secretary, and he represents the Army in the joint arena. The common thread of all three roles is to keep the service Secretary fully informed, including joint matters. If the service Chief adheres to this principle, circumvention is not considered to be a problem.

This is also aided, I would say, by the presence of written procedures in the Office of the Secretary of Defense which require that all taskings to the military departments flow through the service Secretaries. I believe that is reinforced by statute.

You raised certain questions in reference to staff layering and duplication. I would mention to you that in one of your proposals you point to the three staffs—the OSD staff, the military staff and the service Secretary staff—that you would eliminate the middle staff, the service Secretary's staff. I would ask you to consider that very, very carefully. It is the smallest of the three staffs. It is one of the most vital because it provides the advocacy that examines the positions being advanced by the military staff.

You also suggest of the five Assistant Secretaries that you would abolish the Assistant Secretary for Civil Works. That position was created pursuant to direction of the Congress to operate in a semi-autonomous fashion because of the unique and unusual roles of the function of the Department of the Army. Indeed, it is not even a part of the Army budget but is a direct relationship between the civil works performed by the Office of the Corps of Engineers and OMB.

You suggest the abolition of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs in the Army, which I would strongly urge that you not do because the Army is a wheelhouse of the All-Volunteer Force. On the contrary, consistent with your report to strengthen the service Secretary's role. I need that kind of support.

You also suggest the abolition of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Installations and Logistics. I would strongly urge you to reconsider that. You would also abolish and do away with the Administrative Assistant of the Army, which is a very unique role that goes back to the founding of the Army. That office provides day-to-day administrative support not only to the service Secretary but to the military staff, and continuity during the transitions of administrations. I ask you to reflect very strongly on these types of what I would consider to be major changes.

In the area of involving the service Secretary in the major policy-making roles and decisions of the Department of Defense, I would say to you that there has been an enormous enhancement and change in the Defense Resource Board that gives the service Secretaries a new platform and a greater opportunity to inject their views into policy.

In the interest of time, I will not continue with my statement because it is set before you. I ask when you look at the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business, which you would downgrade, that this would be, in my view, counter productive. It was established in response to requests from the Congress and is underscored by over 200 inquiries a month from Congress or others. The Army has the largest small business contracting operation in the Government, probably the largest in the United States, and that small Office of Small and Disadvantaged Businesses has been placed there to be a helpmate, and to assist the civilian sector that wants to do business with the Army.

I would summarize by saying to you that we have a very dedicated and a very capable military organization, led by individuals of great ability, both men and women. Their service and dedication to this country is without question. I would ask simply that you join with us in providing that civilian help and leadership to make it the finest force that it can possibly be in order to meet the challenges of our time.

I appreciate this opportunity to be here.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Marsh follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity today to discuss issues so important to our shared duties of providing for the common defense of the nation. I commend the committee for commissioning such a wide ranging study and providing the staff resources needed to carry it through to completion.

I agree we must continue to improve our organization. I think this has occurred more than the congress or the general public is aware.

I would also suggest we have had nearly 40 years of experience under the present organization of the department. It is impossible to tell now what impacts the proposed change might have on the long term operations of the department and whether they would result in the economies and efficiencies sought.

At the outset, let me point out that my relationship with General Wickham has been excellent. I can assure the Committee that General Wickham keeps me informed and is very attentive to ensure that my views on key matters involving the military and questions of policy are communicated to the General Staff of the Army and to the Army at large. He has been a strong supporter of initiatives I have undertaken. He also apprises me to the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I can also say I had a good working relationship with the Former Chief, General Meyer.

My views on the operation of our Defense Department are drawn in part from my own personal experience. To summarize that experience:

I enlisted in the Army in World War II and was commissioned through infantry OCS, later serving in the Army of occupation in Germany. Upon leaving the service, I maintained my military interests by serving four years in the Reserve and 25 years as a member of the Virginia National Guard, holding a series of positions from company commander to division staff officer.

As you are aware, I served in the Congress for eight years, six or which were spent on the Appropriations Committee.

Executive positions in our Government I have held in addition to the post I now occupy, included;

Service as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in 1973;

The National Security Advisor to Vice President Ford; and

Counselor to the President with Cabinet rank after President Ford assumed the Presidency.

In this latter post, I had occasion to work with the National Security Council, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Defense. I chaired the President's Internal Task Force for Reorganization of the American Intelligence Community. I participated in deliberations with the President and the NSC on the evacuation of Da Nang, Phnon Penh, Saigon, the Mayaguez situation, and the evacuation of American citizens in two crises in Lebanon.

I have served as Secretary of the Army for nearly five years. Prior to appointment to this post, I have lectured or taught at the infantry school at Fort Benning, the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Army's Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee.

My presentation will focus on that portion of the committee staff's report pertaining to the Army Secretariat. I will be pleased to respond to questions you might have on the other issues and recommendations.

Secretary Weinberger has structured his office to his particular management style and as the committee report indicates—"has sought to shift more authority and accountability to the service secretaries." With respect to the report's recommendation to hold service secretaries accountable for guidance by the Secretary of Defense, I think this should be the case and has been the case.

AUTHORITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, ROLES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES (TITLE 10, U.S.C.)

The report raises questions as to confusion about the role of the service secretaries. However, there is no confusion as to the need for civilian oversight. I believe that the roles and responsibilities as set forth in title 10 U.S.C., are quite clear. Consequently, I see no reason to clarify or modify the statutes that describe these roles.

Another report recommendation dealing with the statutes seeks to repeal the authority of the service secretaries to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress. In this regard, I agree with the historical position of the House that this should be retained. Even though it may never have been used, I see no need to repeal it.

STRENGHTEN THE ROLE OF SERVICE SECRETARIES IN DOD POLICYMAKING

In discussing the confusion of service secretaries' roles, it should be pointed out that the report does urge that the role of service secretaries be strengthened in DOD policymaking and other DOD-wide activities.

The service secretaries role in my view can be significantly strengthened in defense-wide activities and in the uniformed services under the present statute simply by exercise of authority granted therein. Also, there must be a recognition of his duties currently imposed by law.

"Functions necessary for training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare and preparedness, and research and development."

In fact, the duties are not limited to the above, but include other significant activities.

It is clear by statute that the uniformed chiefs of service are responsible to the service secretaries for the efficient operation of the organization and for operational as well as war planning matters. This, if adhered to, assures military effectiveness and civilian oversight. Largely unnoticed, there has been in the last several years enhancement of the responsibilities of the Army Secretary in the field of intelligence which is an important dimension of his policy formulation and oversight responsibilities.

STRENGHTEN THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS IN MISSION INTEGRATION

The report also recommends that the military departments mission integration efforts be strengthened by formally assigning the service under secretary responsibilities for cross-service cooperation and coordination.

In my view, cross-service cooperation and coordination is effectively carried out currently at multiple levels in the Army. For example, at the uniformed level, action officers are formally exchanged on an annual basis between the Army and Air Force. The Vice Chief and Chief of Staff regularly meet with their service counterparts as do other staff members. At the Secretariat level, there also are regular contacts with counterparts in the other services. Thus, as a practical matter, there is substantial cross-service discourse and coordination at many levels.

Additionally, the Under Secretary has a broad authority, express and implied, in the conduct of his office. This includes cross-service cooperation and coordination, and it is done well and effectively. However, it would be impractical and unnecessary to legislate that one individual or office, such as that of the service under secretary, be charged with cross service coordination.

CIRCUMVENTING THE SERVICE SECRETARIES

The report raises questions as to "circumvention" of the service secretaries by the service Chiefs of Staff.

The question of "circumvention" is addressed later in my comments; however, the situation that is most likely to occur is "non-involvement" of the Secretary. This occurs in large measure because of an inadequate understanding as to his role in operations. This non-involvement is not as much intentional as it is an unawarness of mutual roles. In operations involving the national command authority, the service secretary is not intended to be a participant in these decisions. Consequently, over time, a perception has developed that assigns operational responsibilities exclusively to the JCS. When operational tasks occur involving the national command authority and the JCS arena, tasks may flow directly to operational elements in the Army without the involvement of the service secretary. This does not occur because of an effort to bypass or circumvent him, but arises from a view based on custom that he is not involved. Ultimately the service secretary will become involved inasmuch as logistics, training, and personnel will usually flow from the operational decision, but his participation may not be timely. Also, actions within the service in the area of operations can occur without his being aware of them.

In recent years, in the Army there has been a gradual but significant remedying of this situation and a better understanding of the service secretary's authority. In large measure this has been due to the support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to the leadership of the Chief of Staff who has made a concerted effort to establish a practice of awareness of matters in the JCS arena that will impact on Army units.

Intelligence matters by their nature are a gray area when defining the scope of operations. As noted previously, there have been significant changes in authority in the office of the service secretary in matters that relate to intelligence. These pertain to identification of problems, corrective actions, controls—both operational and financial—as well as continuing reporting and oversight. All of these changes have occurred with the knowledge and strong support of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

It should be clearly stated that the Secretary of Defense has taken pains to ensure he does not bypass or encourage others to bypass the service secretaries. The point is stressed that the statutory authorities are adequate and structural changes are not necessary in reference to non-involvement or circumvention.

Speaking to "circumvention" in the services, the possibility of some circumvention, while a practical reality, is not considered to be a problem. For example, the service chief as a member of the JCS is authorized by statute to provide direct advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In fulfilling statutory responsibilities the Chief of Staff carries out three tasks. He presides over the Army staff and exercises supervision over the organizational elements of the Army, serves as the senior military advisor to the Secretary, and represents the Army in the joint arena.

The common thread of all three roles is to keep the service secretary fully informed, including joint matters. If the service chief adheres to this principle, circumvention is not considered to be a problem. This is aided by the presence of written procedures in the Office of the Secretary of Defense which require all taskings to the military departments flow through the service secretariat

STAFF LAYERING AND DUPLICATION

Fully integrate service secretariats and service staffs

The report concludes that there are unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort within the top management headquarters of the military departments. To overcome this, the SASC staff recommends that we fully integrate the secretaries and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy.

The report and previous studies of DOD management have focused attention on the problem of layering. With the existence of three staffs (OSD, service secretariat and military staff) the conclusion is readily drawn that if layering is undesirable and is to be eliminated, the prime candidate is the middle element—the service secretariat. This conclusion fails to distinguish between the size of the individual staffs and the layering within each staff.

Study and examination indicates that the Office of the Secretary of the Army is quite small and not heavily layered in any of the functional areas. Experience indicates that the service secretary's small secretariat performs a very useful function as a focal point for planning, coordinating, supervising, and expediting staff interface between OSD and the military services. The advocacy role of the service secretariat should not be overlooked. In my view, the service secretariat, in fact, expedites staff relationships and would be even more effective if strengthened. This conclusion is consistent with the general conclusion for enhancing and strengthening the role of the service secretary.

To deal with the problem of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort . . . one proposal of the report eliminates three of the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and the administrative assistant. The two assistant secretaries that are retained are subordinated to the director of the Army staff. This is also true with the general counsel, the Director of the Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization Office, the Chief of Public Affairs, and the Chief of Legislative Liaison. The report then suggests that the comptroller and auditor general report to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) and that the judge advocate general report to the general counsel.

The general conclusion of the SASC report is there is a need to enhance and strengthen the position of the service secretary. The recommendation to eliminate the Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and Installations and Logistics would not be consistent with this conclusion. There is no surer way to weaken a senior appointed official than to increase his workload while concurrently denying him key subordinates needed to assist in the oversight and management of the functions for which he is responsible.

The report recommends the service secretary take on additional and substantive assignments of a DOD-wide nature for the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Weinberger has done just this through the Defense Resources Board in which the service secretaries have key roles.

The Assistant Secretary for Civil Works position was specifically directed by the Congress. This position is unique, having a special role and function with relationship to the Congress. It operates in a semiautonomous fashion, with its budget being separately appropriated and not contained in the Department inasmuch as these funds are used for civil works as opposed to military endeavors. Within the Department of the Army, the responsibility for supervising the civil works program, for several years, had been assigned to the general counsel of the Army, who in this capacity acted as the special assistant for civil functions to the secretary.

In January 1966, the Secretary of the Army released a report in which the Congress concurred. The report, prepared by the Civil Works Study Board, covered the civil works program of the Corps of Engineers, and recommended establishment of an Office of an Assistant Secretary of the Army with responsibilities primarily for the civil works missions. This recommendation was based upon the conclusion that the importance of the civil works program to the Nation and the Army warranted a higher degree of personal involvement at the secretarial level. Inasmuch as this office has special responsibilities and important tasks, its senior leadership should be a dedicated office at the assistant secretary level. It should not be involved in the other operations associated with the military aspects of the department.

Positioning the research and development function at the Army staff level reduces or eliminates the Secretary's capability for independent analysis and evaluation of service research and development programs. It would also have a limiting effect on the service chief's ability to influence important research and development decisions, thus diluting the effectiveness of military advice in the critical systems acquisitions process. Finally, with a civilian head, it could tend to divorce the research and development element from the remainder of the military staff thereby inhibiting the data flow between research and development and other vital military staff elements with which it must interface.

Under the staff's organizational proposal the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and Research and Development are both shown as reporting to the Office of the Chief of Staff, specifically to the Director of the Army staff, as is the case with the general counsel. I believe it would be extremely unwise to politicize the Chief of Staff by having him supervise Presidential appointees and that it would be a disservice to the Senate who is asked to confirm the Assistant Secretaries. I also disagree with having the general counsel directly supervise the Judge Advocate General. The general counsel is my senior legal advisor on matters concerned with civilian oversight while the Judge Advocate General advises the Chief of Staff and through him, myself on legal matters of the military to include administration of military Justice. It is important those two posts remain separate.

In 1979, the Army was the first of the services to remove the director of small and disadvantaged business from under the supervision of an assistant secretary after Senator Pell and others pointed out that the intent of legislation dealing with this function in government was to have it answer directly to the agency head without being buffered by intermediate supervision. Continued interest is underscored by the over 200 inquiries to this office by Congress or others monthly. To change it would be contrary to the spirit and intent of that legislation and would ignore the need for input at the secretariat level of the Department's responsibilites to support the national policy on small and disadvantaged businesses.

In reference to the question of the need for continuity and the observation that this is lacking under the current military and civilian leadership arrangement, the report would eliminate the administrative assistant's position. This is a key post that not only provides essential continuity during transition of administrations and secretaries, but performs a vital role in the administrative operation of the Department on a day-to-day basis, serving both the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army in such areas as personnel, procurement, resource management, and departmental administrative policy. The post, established by law, is historic and traces its origins to the early days of our Nation.

The Chief of Legislative Liaison and the Chief of Public Affairs are considered by many to be an example of an integrated secretariat and military staff element since they act as single staffs to serve both the Army staff as well as the secretariat. These positions are more aligned to my duties than to the Chief of Staff's. Consequently, they are organizationally placed at the secretariat level but have concurrent responsibility to the chief. Conversely, the inspector general and the auditor general are at the Army staff level and report to me as well as to the chief. I hasten to point out that these are specialized and technical positions with highly defined duties which do not have the same responsibilities for articulating administration policy as an assistant secretary, the general counsel, or the administrative assistant. In effect, this is in line with the option of the selective staff integration to counter the layering problem although it doesn't reflect the same choices for selective integration. It is my belief that further integration would be counterproductive.

Staff report option: Reduce size of service military headquarters staffs

In lieu of integrating the staffs, the report raised reductions in the size of the service military headquarters staffs as another option for reducing layering. We are already doing this. I assure you that General Wickham and I intend to seek ways to further streamline and reduce the size of the Army staff, including delegating more responsibility from the headquarters to the major Army commands.

The report implies that there are too many military in the service secretariats (the Army with 31.8 percent has the least). I have never considered this a problem, as each secretariat office has so few.

POLITICAL APPOINTEES

I agree with the report's conclusion that we must seek the very best qualified individuals to serve as appointees in the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, there are four recommendations dealing with this matter. I shall state the report's recommendation and my position on each.

Correct the unfavorable perception of political appointees

The report states that we must correct the unfavorable perception of political appointments within the military departments.

If this term relates to Presidential appointees, it should be noted they must be confirmed by the Senate after being reviewed by the jurisdictional committee. The appointment of civilians in leadership roles is historic and traditional, tracing its beginning to the founding of the republic and the emphasis on civilian control of the military.

Currently, Presidential appointees comprise only one-tenth of one percent of all Federal employees, yet they participate in decisions which have substantial and long-standing impact on the quality of life in the United States and around the world.

Since these individuals generally hold key positions which formulate policy, it is therefore essential, without regard to political disposition, that the appointee share views on important policy issues that are attuned to those of the President to ensure that the President's policies for the departments are both implemented and advocated.

Ultimately the accountability of an administration, and those in positions of leadership, is determined by how the public judges their performance.

Require DOD political appointees to have strong defense management credentials

The report recommends we require that military department political appointees have strong defense management credentials.

Appointees in the military departments should be people of ability with varied backgrounds rather than limited to the specific criteria of "defense management." This assures a broad spectrum of experience, maturity, and judgment in the exercise of civilian control and in providing sound advice and assistance.

Possessing varied backgrounds helps provide a better overall decision process than if only military skills and points of view are represented. To require that defense management credentials be the primary deciding factor of appointment would severely limit the number of candidates available and willing to serve. Also, the department would be deprived of a wide variety of diversified, professional backgrounds such as academia, congressional staff experience, law, finance, and diplomacy. Moreover, the military skills necessary to complement the backgrounds of the appointees are available from the Army staff, headed by the Chief of Staff who is the senior military advisor to the Secretary.

Additionally, to limit appointees to those with backgrounds in defense management would erode credibility in the Congress and the public. It would create vulnerabilities to the charge of military-industrial complex.

Further, it is difficult to use the talents that might be available of seasoned defense managers because of restrictive procedures applied by the Senate committee on questions that relate to conflict. These restrictions have dissuaded many able people from pursuing appointments in the department.

Seek longer term of commitment for political appointees

The report's third recommendation suggests that we should seek a longer commitment of service from military department political appointees. The four-year term of appointment provides consistency and continuity for the Department. To seek a longer term of commitment would not be realistic and would be inconsistent with our national election process. Further, prohibiting appointees from voluntarily resigning prior to the end of an administration is equally unrealistic. Many of those who leave during an administration do so because of financial reasons. They find that the personal expense (with very little offset) of moving their family to Washington to accept these positions, the relatively low pay, the high cost of living in the national capital region, and the cost for many to maintain two residences reduce their personal assets beyond expectations.

Notwithstanding these disadvantages, this has been a stable administration. With very few exceptions, the Department of the Army has experienced a relatively low turnover of its key policymaking and top managerial positions. Of the 19 individuals appointed (PAS, PA, noncareer SES) in 1981, 14 still serve in Government. Of the five who left, three served at least 3 years.

Alter Federal tax laws

Finally, I heartily favor legislation that would encourage others to be available for public service.

I have not addressed all the areas covered by the report; however, I will be happy to try to answer any questions which you may have.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. That was a very good statement, Mr. Secretary, and extremely helpful to this committee. Thank you.

Secretary LEHMAN.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN LEHMAN, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Secretary LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here. Let me applaud the initiative and the interest of the committee in facing up to the problem that it is, in fact, time for major changes in how we provide for the national defense.

I think that the committee has rightly focused on the fact that the problems spring from sources both in Congress and in the executive branch. I think we now have sufficient recognition of the problem both nationally, and here in Washington, to really make some fundamental changes to improve the way we provide for our defense, in the kind of partnership envisioned by the Founding Fathers.

I would urge that the committee keep in mind two basic principles as they consider just which legislative changes to enact. I believe, those fundamental principles should be civilian control and the maintenance of the balance between the branches that was envisioned by the Founding Fathers. In whatever combination of changes that are made to the organizational structure on both sides, in management, procurement and operations, those principles should be kept foremost in mind. It is a delicate balance. Nowhere is it dictated in detail, and it can be lost gradually and unintentionally.

The reforms should be built around a principle of accountability. Restore the accountability that our entire system really is premised upon. In my judgment, the changes that are needed are changes of decentralization and debureaucratization of the approach to providing for the common defense in both Congress and the executive branch.

I don't think that due attention has been given to the enormous change in philosophy and action that Secretary Weinberger has brought to the way we manage the Pentagon. He has reversed a nearly 40-year trend that preceded him of more and more centralization and larger and larger bureaucracies as an approach to management. He has really provided a new dimension of accountability, of reward and punishment based on performance that had been lost in the years of growth that preceded him.

And while much of this does not appear in organizational charts, the reality of how the Pentagon is run today and the enormous changes that have been made should provide, I think, enough empirical experience for you to adopt that as the direction in which the reforms you would enact should go.

Too few people really grasp the orders of magnitude of scale of what goes on in the Pentagon. Just the Navy Department, for instance, has a larger budget and manages more operational activity and more people than all of the other Cabinet agencies combined, if you take out Treasury and HHS. There are 2 other military departments and more than 10 Defense agencies in addition to that. So the scale of what it is we do must be kept in mind by the committee as you address the problems.

It is too easy to conceptualize the Pentagon as a simple, straightforward organization that lives in a five-sided building that one can put one's mental arms around. We are far vaster and more complex than that. To try to run the overall management or the materiel management, as the training or operations of that immense activity through one, two, three, or four small centralized entities, as if that will change the problems that we have, is to miss the entire point of what is really wrong with the system.

We need more decentralized authority based on a strengthening of the centralized policymaking that Cap Weinberger has enforced so effectively. There is no doubt in any of our minds at this table as to who sets policy and what we are to be held accountable for. Secretary Weinberger does not try to micromanage us, to tell us how to negotiate a contract with General Dynamics, or how to organize the Naval Air Systems Command. But weekly and daily, he very definitely calls us to account as to how we are implementing these principles of more accountability, more competition, more discipline in requirements and in procurement in general.

That is the right philosophy. It has produced a sea change in the way business is done in the Pentagon. The results speak for themselves. These accomplishments, the increase in competition and improvements in contract discipline have gotten far more out of the end of the pipeline with 4 years of 7.5 percent real growth for the Navy Department than just 7.5 percent real growth. By my estimation, we have achieved more than 100 percent increase in overall capability because of the increases in management, discipline, and competition and the other reforms in procurement that Secretary Weinberger has brought about.

That should be a lesson as to what needs to be done. More does need to be done. We do need help to carry forward the lesson that has been put before Congress. We need less bureacracy. We need less legislative interference from entities in the legislature who do not, as this committee does, have oversight and the overall responsibility for how the Pentagon is run.

We need to thin down and streamline all of the entities in Congress and the executive branch that have these responsibilities and bring more accountability to the performance of the human beings involved. That, I think, is the path to real reform. We need your help to see that that type of reform is enacted, and we certainly urge you in that direction.

You asked me in your letter to specifically address the recommendations regarding the Office of Secretary of Defense and the military departments. With regard to the recommendations in the report having to do with OSD, I basically take a neutral position. I think some of the recommendations are very interesting and could be very useful. I am troubled somewhat, however, because the sum of all of them is clearly in the direction of creating more staffs and more bureaucracy, not less, more effective bureaucracy.

The organization as outlined could certainly be made to work very well and in many ways bring about improvements to the current organizational structure. But, I strongly agree with Secretary Taft that it really ought to be the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense to organize his office the way he sees fit. I do, however, think that some of the recommendations have merit and are interesting.

With regard to the military departments, let me first associate myself with Secretary Marsh in his concern about the noninvolvement in certain issues of the service Secretaries. I think that a perception has evolved over the past 30 years, certainly since the 1958 act, that service Secretaries simply do not play in policy. Although they very much play in management and contracting and so forth.

I think this is unfortunate. I think the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent acts envisioned a major role for the service Secretaries parallel to that of the JCS structure of the Armed Forces Policy Council, as the Senior board of advisors to the Secretary on defense policy issues, and that board, including the service Chiefs, the service Secretaries, and the Under Secretaries, has evolved over the decades into a very different entity than was intended.

I believe the service Secretaries need to be more involved in giving advice. They should not be reinserted into the chain of command. I am very pleased with the approach taken in your study, of the need to maintain the clear chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the CINCs. I applaud the recommendations that there should be no intervening entities in Washington inserted in that chain. It should remain a clean chain of command.

But, I do believe that the service Secretaries need to be more involved in advice-giving on operational matters than they are today. I think that the role of the CINCs and the service Chiefs, of giving advice on contracting, and budgeting, and resource allocation, on training, retirement, and personnel policy has been institutionalized. They sit on the Defense Resources Board (DRB), and they sit on all of the policy committees, as they should.

The reverse is not true. The service Secretaries do not have a formalized say or input in matters of operational descisionmaking with regard to the forces under their administrative responsibility, although, of course, we do informally. If there are things in your legislation pointing directions rather than legislative requirements, I think that is an area that could well be addressed. We do not need any statutory authority to do that. That authority is on the books. But the clear practice and intention of the last 20 years has been different.

There are just a few recommendations on the military departments and, if you would like, I could address each of those, but perhaps we ought to let that go until questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Lehman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN LEHMAN, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before your committee today to discuss the issue of defense organization.

As I am sure you have observed in your study of government, no amount of fiddling with organizational charts can replace good managers, strong leaders, and excellent performance up and down the line. Indeed, an undue concentration on organizational structure often leads to ignoring the importance of individual accountability and responsibility, and this in turn generates bureaucratic solutions that frequently create more problems than they solve. In my view, a major contribution of this Committee, in this area, would be to remove rather than add organizational obstacles that stand in the way of good men performing well.

This is as essential now as it has ever been. Today, American defense organization must meet the rigorous demands of national security in the modern age: coping with rapid technological changes that affect both our own and our adversary's capabilities; meeting a wide range of potential threats in many arenas, quickly and consistently and maintaining an adequate deterrence to both nuclear and conventional war, now and in the future. To meet these challenges effectively, the defense establishment must take advantage of every lesson our nation has ever learned about capable organization—in both the public and the private sectors.

Forty years of centralization

Debates over the best form of modern defense organization have been going on for some forty years now. Scores of proposals have been advanced and adopted, modified, or rejected. Discarded proposals have come to life again in new guises. Ironically, the outcome of much of this effort has been the relentless accretion of new bureaucracy and the over-complication of some of the simplest tasks. In the process, the fundamental principles of defense organization have frequently been overlooked.

The first of these fundamental principles is that ultimate control of defense must remain, in both concept and substance, in the hands of civil authorities. This is not some esoteric concept. The ability to determine our nation's defense policy is crucial to us as a free people. Final decisions regarding such policy—from administration to strategy—must always rest in the hands of accountable, democratically-responsible officials.

The second fundamental principle is that those who have the responsibility to carry out a function must also possess the requisite authority—and those who have the authority must be held to account. Another way of putting this is that we must simplify, simplify, simplify. In business, giving responsibility for performing a task to a line manager while giving the authority to perform that task to a central staff V.P. would lead to confusion and bankruptcy. In defense, the consequence of separating authority and responsibility would be military disaster.

I would like to briefly discuss what these fundamental principles imply for defense organization, and how they have been implemented.

CIVIL CONTROL

The principle of democratic control is rooted in the Anglo-American tradition, and it was well recognized by our Founders. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay named national safety as the first object of attention for a wise and free people. The framers of the Constitution understood that any decision to use military force—or to refrain from using it—would have a profound impact both on our citizens and on the survival of the United States as a free nation. Thus, the Constitution explicitly places the powers relating to that concern in the hands of elected leaders.

Occasionally, one hears defense intellectuals speaking about the difficulty of national security decisions as if our Founders were naive to place so much reliance on elected leaders, rather than military experts—or defense intellectuals. Of course, the framers of the Constitution recognized that representative government was not always perfect. Indeed, on military matters, the view of a "professional" may sometimes be better than that of an elected leader. But it may also be worse. And the framers believed that the risk of the citizenry making mistakes in its own behalf by an unaccountable authority.

Other nations have learned this at great cost. The 19th and early 20th Century German General Staff, which functioned solely as an Army staff and never as a joint one, used its powers to become deeply involved in political and foreign policy affairs, yet for all its influence—and renowned tactical expertise—it was unable to formulate a successful national strategy and brought its country to defeat. In World War I, Britain briefly empowered a Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, to dominate strategy-making, suppress alternatives to his views, and bypass the civilian Secretary of War. As Winston Churchill later put it, the notion that civilians are incapable of making wise decisions in wartime was nothing but a "foolish doctrine"—and that foolish doctrine subjected Britain to a strategy of prolonged trench warfare in which hundreds of thousands of young men died.

American military theory has undergone much change since the founding of our Nation, but not the idea that ultimate control rests with elected leaders and their appointed, politically-accountable subordinates. It has been—and must continue to be—a principle of our form of government that professional military officers will not be held responsible for making essentially political decisions regarding the use of military force. Uncertainty on this sensitive point will dilute the quality of advice our military provides and lead to confusion over who is responsible for political and military decisions that involve the use of force.

Current Defense organization is designed to ensure strong civil authority. Reporting directly to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is an appointed Secretary of Defense who is responsible for the overall direction and management of the Department of Defense. The three appointed Secretaries of the Military Department serve as his chief executive officers, managing the day-to-day function of the military Services. Through the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and their immediate offices, civil control permeates the management of the Department of Defense.

Indivisibility of civilian control

Several misconceptions have plagued the concept of civilian control. Among them is the idea of a division of labor between military and civilian officials. In this view, there are certain tasks which are military, and certain that are civilian—for instance, that the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense should concern itself with paper clips and contract policy, while the uniformed leadership should handle operations, strategy, and combat readiness.

Such was never the case in the roots of civilian control in the Anglo-American tradition, and there is certainly no basis for any such division in today's statutes.

Civilian control, as the United States Code notes with regard to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, is indivisible. Put another way, the authority of the elected President and his appointed, civilian executives, extends throughout security affairs, from procurement to national strategy.

10 U.S.C. 133, for example, specifies that the authority of the Secretary of Defense over all the military services is complete and indivisible. Under 10 U.S.C. 5011, for example, the Department of the Navy:

"is separately organized under the Secretary of the Navy. It operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. It is composed of the executive part of the Department of the Navy; the Headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces, including naval aviation, of the United States Navy and of the United States Marine Corps, and the reserve components of those operating forces; and all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control of the Secretary of the Navy. It includes the United States Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy."

Under 10 U.S.C. 5031,

"(a) There is a Secretary of the Navy, who is the head of the Department of the Navy. He shall administer the Department of the Navy under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

"(b) The Secretary of the Navy shall execute such orders as he receives from the President relative to—

"(1) the procurement of naval stores and material;

"(2) the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of naval vessels; and

"(3) all matters connected with the Department of the Navy.

"(c) The Secretary of the Navy had custody and charge of all books, records, and other property of the Department.

"(d) The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title. The authority of the Secretary under the preceding sentence is in addition to the authority of the Secretary under section 6011 of this title."

In addition, under 10 U.S.C. 5082, the Chief of Naval Operations is empowered to carry out specified duties, "under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy." Under 10 U.S.C. 5201, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is authorized to carry out specified duties, "under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy." In this manner, throughout the U.S. Code, there is a strong fabric of statutory authority that underpins authoritative civilian control.

Misconceptions about civilian control

Besides those who have misunderstood the indivisibility of civilian control, others have confused the concept of civil control with civilian—e.g., civil service—functions. Yet civilian control of the military is totally unrelated to the civil service. Unlike an "independent" professional corps, civil leadership in the Department of Defense is—and should be—directly answerable to elected authorities.

Still others have confused civilian control over defense affairs with the assumption of tactical command. During the Vietnam War, there was a tremendous sense of frustration among military commanders on the scene because they lacked independence. One need only reread any history of the Civil War to be reminded that this is no new phenomenon in American military affairs, yet in Vietnam it reached absurb proportions. What is not widely understood, however, is that there was much more Washington meddling by uniformed military officials than there was by civilian officials. Bad management is bad management. But this is not an issue of the ultimate control by elected leaders over defense.

In addition to these confusions, there exists a view that concern over preserving civil control is an exaggerated response to the hobgoblin of military power. To dismiss civil control in this manner is mistaken. No military in the world is more professional, and more dedicated to upholding the principles of democracy, than our own. The principle of civil control over defense policy refers to quite a different issue: the ability of elected leaders and their appointed, responsible subordinates to make the ultimate decisions regarding defense. That civil authority is retarded, not advanced, by structures which isolate properly elected officials, cut off the flow of full information on which decisions are based, or inhibit the direct transmission of orders.

In this context, it should be noted that in this administration, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger is fully aware of the importance of this principle. Daily meetings with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as part of his regular, frequent meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensure the Secretary has a close working relationship with his senior military advisors. Both Secretary Weinberger and General Vessey have testified that the current arrangement is a good, solid, useful one. In addition, the appointment of civilian Service Secretaries to the Defense Resources Board has increased the role of senior civil leadership in the overall policymaking process. And a new stress on the views of top operational commanders around the globe ensures that the Secretary is fully informed of operational affairs—and directly involved in decisionmaking.

These actions have been taken within the framework of the Department of Defense, as established in 1947 and modified in later enactments. That framework has been flexible enough to have accommodated strong civilian leadership, as in this administration, as well as less strong leadership. Changing the organization of DOD will not strengthen civil leadership, because organization cannot determine the character of the administrations that manage DOD, nor the policies they pursue. Only our citizens can do that. And they get leadership they elect. That is the fundamental fact of civil control.

AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

At no time since its creation in 1947 has the Department of Defense been in a better position than it currently is to become truly efficient. The reason is a major shift toward a decentralized approach which tightens up centralization of policy-making under the Secretary of Defense, while it tightens up execution by returning authority to the responsible Secretaries of the Military Departments, and holding them strictly accountable. In joint operational matters, the same emphasis is seen: a close working relationship between the Secretary of Defense and his principal military advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and an increased voice for the operational commanders—the Commanders-in-Chief, or CINCs—who bear direct responsibility for our combatant forces.

The present administration's well-estalished management philosophy of "centralized policy formulation and decentralized . . . execution"; is a movement away from the damaging trend to consolidate, centralize and bureaucratize essential management functions in defense. Yet the Defense Department is still hampered by decades of central growth. Remote staffs and bureaucracies each have a share in a heavily centralized decision-making process. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, originally fifty people, is now two thousand people. The JCS organization, originally one hundred officers, is now thirteen hundred and seventy-eight people. The Defense Logistics Agency, originally to be the "coordinator" of commodities, is now fifty thousand people. There are eleven central defense agencies and nine joint and specified commands with staffs that run into the thousands each.

Unfortunately, the common wisdom in government still equates centralization with improvement. Certainly in an enterprise as large as the Department of Defense, the reverse is true. But even generally, the experience of government has been that large, central organizations lack the accountability, the responsiveness, and the efficiency needed for effective management. Moreover, big bureaucracies tend to get bigger—more staffs, more management layers, and more make-work, all to produce the same outcome.

Private sector efficiency

This is not simply the lesson of government. Recent trends in the private sector have spurred a new look at the way busines enterprises succeed. More and more companies in the private sector are discovering that reduced staffs and greater line authority produce more productive, more efficient operations.

A recent article by management expert Tom Peters in The New York Times cites a study by A.T. Kearney Inc., which found that superior business performers had on average 500 fewer staff people per $1 billion in sales than did their less successful counterparts ("Why Smaller Staffs Do Better," 21 April 1985). Moreover, successful businesses averaged four fewer layers of management between top executives and line divisions.

The current movement towards conferring greater authority on line organizations is called "radical" decentralization—in other words, getting back to one's roots. In Defense, our roots are those who do the job: the expert Military Services, who maintain, equip and train our forces; and the operational Commanders-in-Chief, or CINCs, who command our joint forces around the globe. By making the accountable Service Secretaries his principle executive agents in fact as well as in name, Secretary Weinberger has worked to restore effective managerial control over the Department as a whole. By maintaining a close relationship to the CINCs, and by increasing their input in policy, the Secretary has improved the effectiveness of our operational forces.

Department of the Navy initiatives

Within the Department of the Navy, we have also moved to increase effective, efficient management. While the services generally are the only major component of the Defense Department whose headquarters staffs have actually declined in recent years—a drop of 50% between 1960 and 1983, and still falling—there is more progress to be made in the way of encouraging line responsibility and decreasing bureaucracy. Thus, in April, I announced the abolition of the Navy Materiel Command. This eliminates an entire horizontal layer of bureaucracy between operational systems commands and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. In addition, we have tasked each of the systems commands to come forward with proposals to decentralize their own structures, to increase line accountability, reduce overhead, and cut headquarters manning. At the same time, to emphasize the importance of line responsibility, we have established a new career path for expert professionals in Materiel management. Professionalism in development, research, and business management will be accompanied by real authority—real professional rewards—and real accountability.

BAD OLD IDEAS

While significant steps are being taken, it is not surprising that criticism of DOD continues. Defense is still saddled with the consequences of decades of bureaucratic growth and centralization, all in the name of reform. Big bureaucracy has promoted overmanagement and a lack of accountability. Much of the functional authority of line organizations still rests with remote central staffs and agencies. And the execution of tasks is often bound by complex and rigid procedures imposed by law. Frustration with resulting problems has led to a number of proposals to reorganize DOD further. Unfortunately, none would do away with the roots of the problem—instead, they go in the same direction: centralization, bureaucracy, separation of authority and responsibility, and diminishing civil control.

The primary focus of much reorganization effort is the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, which has been accused of failing to provide effective direction of our armed forces due to its corporate nature. It is proposed, therefore, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs be elevated to become the sole principal advisor to civil authorities; that he supervise the operational commanders; and that he assume personal control of the Joint Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be abolished and replaced by a National Advisory Council of soon-to-be-retired officers, without responsibility for our forces.

Advice, not command

What is overlooked in these proposals is the fact that JCS does not have, nor was it ever intended to have, command authority. Its function is to advise civil authorities, and the function dictates its form. The JCS offers the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense the expertise of the senior military leadership of our armed forces. That advice may concern relatively obscure issues of military policy; it may also concern major conflicts, and war policies that involve not only military but political and diplomatic considerations. In these cases, it is critical that the President and his appointed officials benefit from a full range of professional, fully-informed, fully-responsible military views. During World War II, for example, Franklin Roosevelt established the Joint Chiefs to advise him on all aspects of the war. Where there was disagreement, as over how to assign resources between the European and Pacific war—an isssue that involved non-military considerations as well—Roosevelt listened carefully to the conflicting advice of this chiefs and then made the final decision: Europe first.

The balanced views JCS offers are critical to decisionmaking. They prevent civil authorities from becoming mere rubber-stamps to the views of a single military officer. As former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey once observed, "Through the device of the Joint Chiefs of Staff our Nation possesses a means for strong, wise and effective military planning at the seat of government without having to utilize the form of highly centralized Supreme General Staff system which is anathema to every concept of democracy."

Moreover, as the military Chiefs of the Services, the Joint Chiefs combine their authority as advisors with actual responsibility for preparing and maintaining our forces. Again, former Vice President Humphrey's observations still hold true: "In every walk of life the combination of authority and responsiblity is an accepted and fundamental concept." This is especially true in military affairs, where national survival depends on sound advice—and leadership. Replacing the Joint Chiefs by a single officer with a personal staff and a unresponsible Council would cut off elected authorities from the range of advice they need and lead to breakdown in the responsible exercise of authority.

But, even if we were willing to tolerate such a breakdown, the assumption by a powerful Chairman of the JCS' principal advisory role would not streamline the process. Instead, it would utterly confuse the important difference between setting national policy and the successful conduct of military operations.

The House Armed Services Committee wrote, in its 1958 Report on defense reorganization, that "it is an axiom of war that, in battle, any decision, however faulty is better than no decision." Thus, combat operations require a staff organization capable of "the swift suppression, at each level of consideration, of alternative courses of action, so that the man at the top has only to approve or disapprove—but not to weigh alternatives."

However, as the Report also noted, an organization that "is unswervingly oriented to quick decisions and the obliteration of alternative courses, is a fundamentally fallible, and thus dangerous, instrument for determination of national policy." Such an organization does not permit the careful deliberation that national policy demands, and "serves to isolate the politically responsible civilian official from all points of view but its own, so that, while he, in theory at least, retains all power, this power becomes increasingly captive to the recommendations of the general staff."

Cutting off civilian authorities

These truths have not changed. Military hierarchy does not cultivate divergent opinions from subordinates, nor does it exist to encourage competing views from those who are less senior. An advisory system that is *not* corporate—that is characterized by command relations—would cut off civilian authorities such as the President from the range of choices currently offered from a small group of equals.

Civilian authorities would feel themselves restrained from making real choices about national strategy, because they would lack confidence that the military options they had received had been fully deliberated. Most important, the inability of civilian leaders to compete with the view of a single, all-powerful senior officer would leave a President no choice but to disregard completely or accept without question the opinion of his sole military advisor. The result would be to inhibit civilian authorities from directing national defense.

Bureaucratizing the CINCs

At the same time that the President and his advisors try to come to grips with these problems, the newly-empowered Chairman would be delegating "minor" decisions to his burgeoning staff, whose members would advance their careers by second-guessing combatant commanders and generating make-work. Operational commanders would find their own staffs growing, as they are distracted from their proper military function in order to fight the Washington bureaucratic wars of paperwork and procedure. In short, the proposed system will turn bureaucrats into commanders and commanders into bureaucrats—a receipt for military diseaster.

The JCS system works

The arguments for creating a single defense chief fail to deal with these flaws. It is claimed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as currently empowered, has insufficient authority to manage the Joint Staff—yet law and DOD directive already permit and mandate the Chairman to manage the Joint Staff and the current Chairman has done so effectively. General Vessey recently noted that "As can be seen from the words in the law and from actual practice during my tenure as Chairman and in my observation of past Chairman, the Chairman has extraordinary authority over the Joint Staff in directing its use to serve the JCS."

It is claimed that giving the Chairman control over the Joint Staff, and removing any responsibility the staff has to the Joint Chiefs as a whole, would strengthen Joint Staff work by abolishing the "Service veto" over Joint Staff positions. But there is no "Service veto" in the Joint Staff—whether by law or DOD directive. If those who have managed the Joint Staff have permitted the exercise of such a power, this was their management problem. It is not a structural or statutory one.

It is claimed that creating an independent Joint Staff, solely responsible to the Chairman, would improve the quality of Joint Staff officers. But creating a Joint Staff whose career path is divorced from line responsibilities would reduce the expertise, and hence, the quality, of Joint Staff officers. It is widely acknowledged that General John W. Vessey has done an outstanding job as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Yet his training for this critical joint position did not come from extensive tours of duty on various staffs. It came from years of operational and Service responsibility.

Generals, Presidents—and staffs

History records that Lincoln took up the study of military strategy—he ordered books from the Library of Congress—at a moment of great disillusionment with his sluggish generals. Generalship, however, was not a role Lincoln wished to assume. The point he recognized was that his proper function was political leadership. One element of that, however, was the successful prosecution of the war—for which he had to rely on those who were expert in that field: generals.

In this administration, relationships of trust based on a proper understanding of the differences between political and military expertise have been bolstered by daily meetings between the JCS Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, and weekly meetings between the Secretary and the full Joint Chiefs. The President as well meets routinely with the Chairman, and with the other Joint Chiefs both together and when they are acting for the Chairman. These personal relationships are important elements of the meeting of minds on which mutual respect is based.

But it is the expertise of the Chairman and the other Joint Chiefs that provides the solid professional ground on which the President and Secretary of Defense can rely for advice. It is not, after all, the organizational chart or the volumes of staff reports but the principals who provide advice. Confidence in their knowledge and military art contributes to strong working relationships of mutual trust. In the absence of such confidence, no organizational arrangement—and certainly no flow of well-staffed paperwork—can ensure or supplant respect for an advisor's views. The point is critical: staffs scribble, the President and his military advisors talk. Paperwork. and organizational arrangements assist strong leadership. They cannot substitute for it. Trust in such auxiliary means is misplaced, and, ironically, only underlines a central tenet of the system we now have: there is no substitute for relevant experience.

Like a Joint Chief, a Joint Staff officer needs the most state-of-the-art and intimate familiarity with current military capabilities. A Joint Staff composed of officers whose staff duties had kept them out of the field for successive years would necessarily rely on outdated information about Service capabilities. Their knowledge would be as out-of-touch as those critics of defense organization who rely on information about Defense Department procedures that was acquired during their tenures in office. Such a Joint Staff would function in an Ivory Tower. And Ivory Towers have few windows. They are isolated from the real world. Even worse, they would become increasingly like those think-tank Clausewitzes, innocent of any military or government service, whose entire expertise is academic and, of necessity, secondhand.

Preserving a clean chain of command

It is claimed that the chain of command is confused by the role of the Joint Chiefs, as a corporate body, in running the National Military Command Center and transmitting the commands of the President and Secretary of Defense. Yet those who serve in the chain of command, as Secretary Weinberger noted, are not confused. The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as the military staff to the Secretary of Defense—just like the staffs that serve commanders up and down the line. The chain of command is clear—it runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS to the unified and specified Commanders-in-Chief. No critics outside the chain of command have been able to explain how adding a new layer of authority in the chain of command would improve it. As former President Dwight D. Eisenhower observed when he streamlined the command chain in 1958, "every additional level courts delay, confusion of authority, and diffusion of responsibility."

Moreover, the President's exclusive constitutional command prerogatives, as Commander-in-Chief, must be preserved. That is as important for practical, effective command as it is important for civilian control. In fact, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs already transmits communications, directives and orders of the Secretary of Defense and President, a system that General Vessey has said is working well.

Timeliness of JCS advice

It is claimed that JCS advice is not timely. Yet JCS procedures already provide for rapid action where rapid action counts—and the current Administration has been satisfied with JCS performance. Measures passed by Congress last year now give the Chairman unprecedented power to determine when issues before the JCS are to be decided. No one with such powers can have a legitimate excuse for late advice. Indeed, we can only hope that future Chairmen will be as wise as the present one, as that power is put to use. Furthermore, JCS Chairmen have for many years had the authority to meet crisis situations promptly, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, and then inform the other Joint Chiefs. As former JCS Chairman, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, has remarked, time-sensitive issues "can arise quickly, twenty-four hours a day . . . under such circumstances, particularly in wartime, the Chairman can and does take action . . . He notifies the Chiefs of such action at the first opportunity. I used this procedure during the Vietnam war, the Israeli-Arab war, and the India-Pakistan war, without any difficulty." In short, what is required for expeditious action is not structural change, but leadership.

Structure no substitute for leadership

It is claimed that the Joint Chiefs give "bad advice" regarding long-term national strategy. Yet the views of a single officer, however clear-cut, could never substitute for the careful deliberation and full perspective of a joint body. What is required to make good use of that advice is not structural change but strong and able leadership.

Moreover, ignoring the evidence of significant joint coordination, it is claimed that the JCS is dominated by Service views rather than a "joint perspective." Yet no critic has ever been able to explain what a joint perspective is if it does not include the expert views of the Services. Again, what is required to make use of that advice is not structural change but strong leadership.

It claimed that the requirement for unanimity among the Joint Chiefs produces weak, over-compromised advice. Yet there is no legal requirement for unanimity among the Joint Chiefs. What there is is a long-standing policy that no Chief will be forced to sign his name to a view with which he fundamentally disagrees. If an administration demands a unanimous view, it will get one—though such positions may well, as has been observed, reflect a lowest-common-denominator. But administrations such as this one that have permitted and encouraged a range of views have also gotten what they wanted—and, in my view, been better served.

In sum, the problem with these proposals is not merely that they are unnecessary to achieve good management and strong leadership. The problem is that these changes will bring about bad management and poor leadership. The result of creating a single advisor to civil authorities is to suppress the serious options and alternatives that a corporate body provides—perhaps a welcome prospect for civilian leaders who hope to avoid tough decisions, but bad for the nation. The consequence of empowering that defense chief to supervise operational commanders, serve in the chain of command, and personally control a central staff of some 1,400 people is to create a new bureaucratic hurdle for all—slowing critical decisions and diminishing the ability of operational commanders to act flexibly and knowledgeably in military situations. The consequence of a Joint Staff divorced from operational and Service expertise is to add simply one more layer of remote Washington bureaucracy.

To find that current proposals are an unsatisfactory answer to problems in defense organization is not to say that the current system is perfect. Indeed, my criticisms of over-management, bureaucracy, and centralization should indicate I see need for major changes. But we must not toss the baby out with the bathwater. The virtues of the current system are irreplaceable. Access to full, joint advice is absolutely necessary if we are to meet the global threat of an ambitious enemy whose capabilities are rapidly becoming as diverse as our own. Direct linkages between the Secretary of Defense and his top operational commanders is critical to the decisive direction of our global defenses.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

My argument is not against change—only the tried and failed theme of further centralization that has formed the basis for most of the changes currently masquerading as reform. The system could benefit greatly from some prudent modification. Such changes should strengthen the authority of those to whom the people have granted executive power. The changes should reduce stultifying layers of lapping and overlapping central bureaucracy. They should decentralize authority more—and give accountability back to the responsible, knowledgeable line managers in the Services, as Secretary Weinberger has done, and through which he has been able to unify all efforts to a central policy. And they should vest more authority in the hands of the Unified Commanders—those whose technical expertise and familiarity with the region allow them to have the closest view of actual operations. It is they, not any bureaucracy in Washington, who must carry the battle and accept the consequences.

Armed Forces Policy Council

I would like to discuss what can be done about each of these briefly. The Armed Forces Policy Council was formed in 1949. It is composed of the Secretary, Deputy and Under Secretaries of Defense along with the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs. As a council that combines the professional expertise of military leadership with the responsible political judgment of appointed civilian officials. The AFPC is highly qualified to deliberate on and decide major defense issues. Elevating the AFPC's importance in the policy process would guarantee in the future that important defense decisions are subject to the most expert views available within the Pentagon—and that those views benefit from direct exposure to competing ones. The Armed Forces Policy Council should become the major defense policy board.

Gates memorandum

On questions that are fundamentally military—those on which JCS advice plays a major role—there is a simple, direct way of assuring that the Secretary of Defense will be able to consider the full range of arguments that support the advice JCS offers. Back in 1959 a memorandum issued by Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates required that JCS should inform him whenever the Chiefs found that they were unable to come to agreement on an issue. The Secretary also said that he would then meet with the Chiefs to resolve the question. The Gates Memorandum stressed two elements of effective military advice. It recognized that disagreement among knowledgeable military advisors is both likely and acceptable—even necessary. And, rather than doing away with such disagreement by imposing a single dominant military view, the Gates Memorandum emphasized the ultimate decisionmaking role of civil authorities.

By accepting the fact of expert disagreement and by bringing the Secretary of Defense into a close working relationship with the Chiefs, the Gates approach discourages the false expectation that the Chiefs must always be unanimous in their views. This approach is fully consonant with the philosophy and working relationships of the current administration. Indeed, Secretary Weinberger has gone beyond the spirit of the Gates Memorandum in actively soliciting the views of individual JCS members, particularly the Chairman—a procedure that is completely in keeping with current law and DoD directive. All the evidence is that both the Secretary and the current JCS have been highly successful in formulating and considering military advice. Those who wish to ensure that other administrations will benefit from this experience and pursue a similar course should consider codifying the approach of the Gates Memorandum, with its requirement that the JCS keep the Secretary of Defense fully informed, along with a statement of the fact that disagreement is an expected and important aspect of any corporate advice.

Reducing the bureaucracy

There is nothing, however, that is more critical to improving defense organization than removing the layers of joint bureaucracy that impede swift, effective decisionmaking and policy implementation. Central bureaucracies with no responsibility for carrying out line functions should not have the authority to veto and second-guess those who do. Operational commanders should be allowed to do their job without constant meddling by remote Pentagon staffers in and out of uniform. That kind of system just leads to confusion, ignorance, mistakes and disaster. We saw that in Vietnam, when, for instance, a Washington staff alert to our fighter pilots to avoid the SA-2 SAM envelope was passed through the joint bureaucracy and emerged as an order to fly below 800 feet—where, of course, our fighters were riddled with antiaircraft fire. Then-Commander Wesley McDonald, now Admiral, wired back, "They're killing us"—but if he'd had the authority to command his own pilots in the first place, that never would have happened. There's no excuse for that, and there's no excuse nowadays for allowing an officer on a Pentagon joint staff to instruct an operational commander in the field what his targets will be. But that's just what we will get if we create more Washington-based joint bureaucracy.

It is essential that we cut back on the legions of extraneous military and civilian bureaucrats whose chop is needed to initiate even the simplest actions.

This Committee has a critical role to play in these efforts. What must be done now is to recognize the current calls for more bureaucracy and centralization for what they are: old, misguided and mistaken. Then we must begin to apply the lessons practical experience has taught us.

One would have thought that if there is one simple lesson evident from conflicts such as Vietnam and Lebanon, it is that the selection of targets, the tactical planning, the micromanaging of time-over-target and of weaponeering should be left to the accountable operational commander in the field. Putting the Chairman's new Joint Staff in the chain of command, thereby moving such authority to professional staff bureaucrats-in-uniform in Washington, violates every sound military axiom. Joint theater and operational commanders need more, not less authority; and less, not more, meddling by civilian and military higher authority alike. They need fewer layers of joint staff and civilian bureaucracy between them and the Secretary of Defense, not more.

As in the past, proponents of this old bad idea have mistaken the need for excellence and accountability with tinkering with organization charts. No system ever devised in time of peace has kept real leaders from excelling in time of war and no system ever devised has compensated for the damage done by the lack of real leaders in time of peace.

These issues, the real issues, are hardly addressed by the would-be reorganizers. The bad idea—that a Prussian-style organizational chart will solve our military problems—threatens to drive out the very good idea espoused by President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger: that a more accountable, responsible defense establishment cleansed of forty years of uniformed bureaucratic growth will help good men do their best, in the context of a supportive nation.

It is not the structure of the JCS or the joint command system, but the size of the bureaucracy, that is the problem. We need no more centralization and unification. What has been accomplished by this administration in reduction decades of gold-plating, cost-overruns, and contract sole-sourcing has been done because we have begun to reverse thirty years of overcentralization and to restore accountability. In shipbuilding alone, competition has been increased from fifteen percent to eighty-four percent in only four years, with a payoff of $2.4 billion in cost under-runs. We need more decentralization, in order to create a responsive defense establishment in which strong leadership can implement the policies they were elected to execute.

Ten years ago, four Congressional committees wrote legislation on defense. Today, twenty-four committees and forty subcommittees oversee Defense. Thousands of new pages of legislation and regulation are enacted every year and almost none removed.

Congress and the defense establishment must work to liberate the dedicated defense professionals in both institutions from their bureaucratic bondage, and allow their common sense to prevail.

We need Congress to end the current chaos of subcommittees and reassert an orderly, strong role in meeting its constitutional responsibilities through a reasonable number of serious, expert Committees like this one.

We need no new legislation now. We need the repeal of existing statutes and regulations that foster rigidity, confusion, and excuses—in both management and operational affairs. By actual measurement, existing law and regulation on procurement alone take up 1152 linear feet of law library shelf space.

We need no new bureaucratic entities now. We need a large reduction in the number and size of existing ones.

The Defense Department does not need reorganization. It needs to be de-organized—if those who possess professional responsibility to safeguard this nation are to succeed.

Thank you.

Senator THURMOND [presiding]. We will now hear from you, Mr. Aldridge.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD C. ALDRIDGE, JR., UNDER SECRETARY OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. ALDRIDGE. Mr. Chairman, I have provided a formal statement for the record, which I request be inserted.

Senator THURMOND. Without objection, that will be done.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I would like to provide a very brief summary of that statement and perhaps some additional——

Senator THURMOND. Give us the heart, give us the meat in a few words—what you recommend on this matter. If you have any recommendations you think are worthwhile, give them to us in a brief, concise form.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I hope my statement is that way, independent of what I am going to say. Hopefully, it has a lot of meat in it. What I would just like to do is provide a very brief summary of that statement in probably less than 5 minutes.

As you know, I am sitting here today as the backup quarterback. Mr. Rourke, the new Secretary of the Air Force was confirmed last night by the Senate, and he is receiving his commission hopefully this morning from the President and will be in that job as soon as he can.

Let me say I have spent 18 years in the Washington area of which 13 years have been Government service. I spent 8 years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as a matter of fact with Jim Locher at one point, 1 year in the Office of Management and Budget, and over 4 years as the Under Secretary of the Air Force. I have seen the planning, programming and budgeting system operate in the Department of Defense under six Secretaries of Defense and have seen many proposals for organizing and improving that particular capability.

I believe the PPBS system in the Department of Defense planning process is by far number one compared to any other bureaucracy. But when we do see a need or will see a need for improvements we do implement them and we have implemented them, as I will discuss in a minute.

Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed each of the recommendations and conclusions of the report and from my experience there are two factors which I think should be considered in reaching a final decision on how to reorganize the Department of Defense. First, there seems to be a misunderstanding in the report of how the current planning, programming and budgeting process works at the Department of Defense, particularly the role of the Defense guidance, which is our policy strategy document, how the military departments program objective memorandums process works, and the role that the various four-states and CINCs and specified commanders play in that process, and how the Defense Resources Board process works.

I believe a careful review of how it works today would indicate that many of the problems that have been identified regarding that roles of the CINCs, the mission-oriented planning, the long-range planning, and the roles of the service secretaries are simply out of date. One example is the active participation of the CINCs and the secretaries of the services in the planning and resource allocation process in DOD, and the other service Secretaries and the Deputy Secretary have already mentioned that.

Second, the study report does not highlight the difference between the wartime and operational planning responsibilities of the JCS and the unified commands and the peacetime responsibilities of the military departments for equipping, manning and training our military forces. I believe this has led to an inaccurate perception that problems exist between the service Secretaries and the service Chiefs.

I know of no instance where the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has attempted to circumvent the service Secretary regarding peacetime functions, as I know of no circumstance where the Secretary of the Air Force has attempted to circumvent the Chief regarding operational or wartime functions.

From the Air Force point of view, we do not perceive that there are such fundamental problems with the current organization or planning process in DOD or the services. The only problem we can identify is the lack of fiscal stability through the PPBS process, leading to wasted staff effort and inefficient program planning and exeuction. My formal statement outlines areas in which the Air Force can agree with the conclusions and recommendations as well as the areas with which we disagree from the Air Force secretariat point of view.

One area of disagreement I would like to highlight is the recommendation to combine the staff of the military departments—that is, the Air Staff—and the secretariat. Further consolidation beyond that already undertaken, such as with the legislative affairs offices and the public affairs offices, would be counterproductive by weakening the role of the Secretary and reducing the independent review and policy development necessary to maintain civilian authority over the military.

As a final comment, the strength or weakness of a service secretary is not influenced by organizational structure but by the qualifications and skills of the individual secretary, his relationship with the Secretary of Defense, and what the Secretary wants to accomplish in his job.

Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aldridge follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD C. ALDRIDGE, JR., UNDER SECRETARY OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is an honor for me to appear before this committee to express my views on a subject as important as the organization of the Department of Defense. Let me commend you and your distinguished colleagues for the in-depth objective analysis you are conducting.

I have worked in the Washington area for almost eighteen years and have spent thirteen years in government service, serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (8 years), Office of Management and Budget (1 year) and as the Under Secretary of the Air Force (over 4 years).

I have had the opportunity to closely observe the workings of the JCS, OSD, Service and congressional staffs and have personally participated in the PPBS process for six Secretaries of Defense. At one point in time, Jim Locher even worked for me in OSD.

If I had to rank the DOD planning process as we do college football teams, we would be No. 1, far and above any other government bureaucracy. However, any organization can improve—no matter how well it works. We, in the Department of the Air Force, recognize the benefits which can be accrued from constructive criticism. I have reviewed each of the study's conclusions and recommendations. While we may not agree with every recommendation, I can assure this committee that we will vigorously pursue any suggestions which may increase the efficiency of the operation of our Department.

The study just concluded by your staff, and I commend them for their diligence and perseverence, recommends numerous changes to the current defense structure. Some of these changes are quite revolutionary. As you are well aware, evolutionary changes in the Department of Defense structure have been pursued by this administration with considerable success, and I have no doubt that this process will be continued in the future. Mr. Weinberger detailed these changes in his testimony last month to this committee, and they included:

A redesigned and strengthened strategic planning process;

Significant improvements in the planning, programming, and budgeting process;

A comprehensive review and update of the acquisition process.

Likewise, in testimony before the committee yesterday, General Gabriel addressed Air Force initiatives which are enhancing cooperation in joint endeavors with the other services, are increasing our warfighting capabilities, and are more fully integrating the requirements of the CINCs into the planning, programming and budgeting system.

My testimony today will focus on the conclusions and recommendations relating to the Air Force Secretariat. First, let me address some of the points on which we agree.

We all do too much micro-management—Congress, OSD, and the Services—but reorganization will not solve that problem; organizational discipline will. Someone has to micro-manage, but let's make sure it is at the lowest level feasible in the organization. Unfortunately, some of the procurement reforms force micromanagement higher in the organization, not lower.

We agree that the role of the Service Secretary in DOD policymaking needs to be stronger and we have taken steps to do just that through the Defense Resources Board process.

We agree with any steps that will reduce the financial burden of political appointees so as to make government service more attractive to quality individuals and to encourage their longevity in these critical positions.

We agree that inconsistencies may exist in the statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of the Service Secretaries. To that end, we will encourage an effort by the Services to study the statutory provisions to determine whether legislative modification is necessary from the perspective of management authority.

And finally, we would not object to the repeal of the Service Secretaries' authority to submit matters on their own initiative, directly to the Congress. We believe such actions could be interpreted as circumventing the chain of command and undermining the Secretary of Defense's role as chief architect of DOD policy.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to discuss several of the more significant conclusions affecting the Air Force Secretariat on which we disagree.

First, and most importantly, is the recommendation to integrate the staffs of the military departments. The Air Force strongly disagrees with this recommendation. we have already reduced the Air Staff and the Secretary's staff and have eliminated duplication (e.g., we share the Legislative Liaison and Public Affairs staffs). We do not believe that 165 people directly supporting the Secretary of the Air Force is too many to provide the independent review and policy development needed to maintain adequate civilian authority over the military. Forcing the Secretary to be more dependent on a military-oriented staff would be counterproductive in this regard.

Secondly, although it may be desirable, there should not be a requirement for political appointees to have defense management credentials. There is no one who can claim that Verne Orr was not an effective Secretary of the Air Force, yet he had no defense management experience.

We strongly disagree with the conclusion that Service "logrolling" denies the Secretary of Defense critical decisionmaking information. I know of no circumstance where the Secretary of Defense has ever been denied critical information by our Service. In fact, the irony of this particular aspect of the study is that when the Services agree on a joint plan and present it to the Secretary of Defense we are often accused of "logrolling." On the other hand, when we cannot agree, we are accused of lacking "joint perspective."

Finally, we disagree with several conclusions which imply that our planning process long range planning, mission integration, and the effect of fiscal constraints on long range planning—needs significant improvement. Strategic planning should be formulated against a threat projection, not a fiscal projection; our PPBS process should incorporate fiscal constraints for assessments of the near-term capabilities and risks measured against the threat projections. We now include all interested and affected players in this critical process: CINCs, Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries, OSD Staff, CJCS and the Secretary of Defense to insure we have balanced future and near-term requirements as well as global and theater requirements against realistic fiscal constraints. Finite resources dictate tough decisions by *all* players. Too much influence by any one group of advocates competing for limited resources can be just as detrimental as too little influence. The key to effective management of DOD resources is balance, and we are achieving a balance approach through the effective administration of the PPBS process.

Mr. Chairman, one last comment. The report recommends that we seek a longer commitment of service from political appointees. We certainly concur in this regard, however, please note that the criticism of past appointees' longevity cannot apply to this administration. For the first time in the history of the Department of Defense, the Service Secretaries and Under Secretaries have, until last Sunday with the departure of Verne Orr, served throughout the entire period of the Reagan Administration. I believe this is a direct result of the leadership of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and the honor we all have in being able to serve them both.

In conclusion, let me say that I sincerely welcome the opportunity to work closely with this committee improving the organization and management structure within DOD. There is always room for improvement and we have made significant strides in this direction already. We fully support any actions which will result in a stronger national defense. I look forward to continuing to work with this commiitee as you labor on this very significant endeavor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Thurmond**. I want to thank all of you gentlemen for your presence here.

Secretary Lehman, in your prepared statement, I believe you emphasize the importance of good people and strong leaders in the U.S. military establishment. You appear to also suggest that we are forced to choose between good people and sound organizational arrangements. Can we not emphasize both good people and sound structure in seeking to improve the performance of the Department of Defense?

Secretary **Lehman**. Yes, we certainly should do exactly that. But I believe that too often the perception emerges that you can compensate for mediocre people with a good organization chart. People take that to an extreme and say, as some have in recommending some changes, that a man who becomes Chief of his military service cannot escape the narrow parochial prejudices of that service and so organizational changes need to be made to fix that.

I believe that the philosophy that should govern the legislative changes that need to be made is that human beings should be held accountable for their decisions, not matrix organizations and large entities. You will attract and hold better people if you allow them the opportunity to exercise their common sense and to give them the authority in a decentralized line of accountable execution, and hold them accountable for the consequences.

We have been criticized in the Navy recently because, in the past fiscal year, we have removed 100 commanders of programs on stations and in command of ships for cause. But we have accelerated the promotion of several times that number for superb performance. That is what we mean by accountability. If you put too much emphasis on fixing problems through rearranging organization charts, you do so at the expense of good people.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you.

Secretary Taft, the study by the committee staff identifies mission integration as the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense. In this context, mission integration is defined as integration of sustained military capabilities of the four services to prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military missions.

Do you agree that mission integration, as so defined, is the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense?

Mr. **Taft**. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe, the way I read the report, the assertion was that this was why we had a Department of Defense as distinguished from the previous organization of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy and, for a while, the Department of the Air Force. As for the reason for putting them together, that indeed was the principal reason and I have no quarrel with that.

I would certainly not suggest that the other functions of the preexisting organizations stopped existing at the time when we assumed that additional responsibility as the Department of Defense. Those were, of course, to provide for the execution and operation of the missions that are necessary within their own services. Some single-service missions certainly still remain, and they probably dominate the activity that we retain those responsibilities.

They are very major, and I would not say that the mission integration function superceded those. It was merely placed along side of it. They remain there.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Taft, in your prepared statement you indicate that the Department finds merit in the staff study's recommendation to consolidate a number of Assistant Secretaries under a new Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness, Sustainability and Support.

Are you now prepared to fully endorse this proposal?

Mr. TAFT. I stopped a little bit short of fully endorsing it, Mr. Chairman. We have said, and the Secretary when he appeared before the committee and in his response to questions said, that it is something we have looked at. I think we would want to discuss with the committee, how it would interact with any of the other proposals that may be under consideration.

But it seems to me that is something that you are looking at in the staff report. It is something that we could see the benefit of. We have quite a few organizations—health affairs, reserve affairs, manpower, which is now force management, the acquisition, logistics operation, also installations—that have relationship to readiness, which could be well focused in a single large organization.

You do run the risk of deemphasizing or seeming to deemphasize those other operations when you put an Under Secretary in over them, and that is something I think we would have to very carefully take up with the Congress, which has been the leader, if I may say so, in forming those smaller offices with a direct reporting relationship to the Secretary of Defense, particularly in the Reserve Affairs office.

But for the reasons that went into that, Congress felt very strongly about, and we would like to talk with you about those as we consider this Under Secretary position.

Senator THURMOND. If you decide to support the establishment of this position with appropriate consolidations, would it differ in any significant way from the staff study's recommendation?

Mr. TAFT. I do not think that we would have any difference as to what the items are that would go in there—installations, logistics, health affairs, reserve affairs, and force management and personnel. I think those are basically the items recommended in the committee staff report, and those are the offices we would be considering ourselves.

Senator THURMOND. The distinguished Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to express my appreciation to each of you for being here. I have a good many lines of questioning, and I am sure we will have to come back for more than one round here before we get to the end of it.

Secretary Taft—and the others can comment on this—we have different statutory duties of the service Secretaries set forth in law. The Army Secretary has certain statutory duties, primarily related to "the affairs of the Department of the Army", and you have also given Secretary Marsh the duty to "perform such other functions as the President and Secretary of Defense may prescribe."

The Secretary of the Navy is given broader authority to "execute all such matters as he receives from the President relative to all matters connected with the Department of the Navy."

Is there a reason for these distinctions? Or should we have consistent statutory provisions relating to the various service Secretaries?

Mr. TAFT. Well, I would say from my perspective, Senator, as a practical matter there is no difference in the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and myself and each of the service Secretaries. I believe the differences you identified in statutes have a historical origin rather than contemporary practical significance.

Senator NUNN. So from your perspective the duties are the same?

Mr. TAFT. The duties are not the same.

Senator NUNN. By that I mean the statutory duties.

Mr. TAFT. But the relationship to the Secretary of Defense is the same. They all operate subject to his direction and control, which, of course, is in the statute establishing his authority over anybody in the Department of Defense—his direction and control—and that applies to all service Secretaries equally.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Marsh, do you see any distinction that ought to be made in law between the role of the respective Secretaries?

Secretary MARSH. I believe if you look at the statutes, the Army statute and the Air Force statute track. The Army statute has a few more duties than the Air Force statute that relate to facilities and that sort of thing. The Navy statute is, as you have defined it, Senator Nunn. From my own point of view the statute empowering the Secretary of the Army is sufficient. It is broad enough and comprehensive enough. It establishes roles and relationships sufficient for the operation and management of the Department of the Army and the roles the service Secretary might have to play.

I am not really in a position to comment on the Department of the Navy.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Lehman, is there a distinction that should be made in the law between the Secretaries?

Secretary LEHMAN. I think that the distinction is the result of the historical evolution from two separate Cabinet departments. The Navy Department is different in that there are two military services within one department. It is different because of the way that the buying and building of ships and shipyards has evolved, a system very different from that within the War Department.

It is still very different today. The Navy Department is the only department with such a massive industrial establishment, an establishment that has caused the evolution of the kind of legislative attention that has been given to it over the years. I find the functional exercise of the statutory authority indistinguishable between the service Secretaries. The authority I have in title X is fully adequate to carry out all the responsibilities that are laid on me by this Secretary and by the job itself, at least in theory.

Senator NUNN. Would it be fair to say, then, that you do see a difference in the functions of the Navy Department from the Army and the Air Force, but you do not see a statutory distinction that is required in terms of the duties of the Secretary?

Secretary **Lehman**. I think that the current legislation has evolved in a sort of common law way based on the wisdom of the debates that have gone on over the years. I do not think it should be tampered with. A lot of Secretary of the Navy instructions have been written on each of the subparagraphs and so forth.

Senator **Nunn**. Let me go ahead. I have a lot more questions.

Mr. **Aldridge**. Senator Nunn, we have no problem with that. The authority that we receive from the Secretary of Defense is unambiguous and the statutory authorities as written are fine with us.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you.

Secretary Lehman, you have been quoted in the press—and again I do not know whether it is accurate or not; you could tell us first of all if it is—as saying "this building"—that is, the Pentagon—"could be run at a 20-percent savings if we could get rid of those 6,000 bureaucrats in OSD who are accountable essentially to nobody."

Secretary Weinberger told us the OSD staff was 2,000 and that you had never furnished him any specifics. I am very anxious to work with you on this. [Laughter.]

Senator **Nunn**. I have proposed more legislation to try to reduce the size of the bureaucracy in the Department of Defense and headquarters staff than anybody in the Congress with whom I am familiar, and I cannot ever remember being supported by any part of the Pentagon on any such proposal I have made. In fact, they have always been opposed.

Interestingly enough, the staff study recommends a merger and a reduction of bureaucracy in at least one area. You said that the overall net effect would be increased bureaucracy, and I want to explore that with you because that is certainly not what I want to vote for and do not intend to.

It is my view that all three Secretaries have vigorously opposed this morning the one area where there would be a reduction in bureaucracy, which would be through combining the staffs of the service Secretaries with the staffs of the service Chiefs. So I guess there are two or three questions here.

One is, can you identify these 6,000 bureaucrats and tell us where we can weed them out?

Secretary **Lehman**. What the Secretary of the Navy meant to say, Senator [laughter] was 60,000, not 6,000, and in fact that was a statement I made in a certain mood of pique about 2½ years ago. The number I should have used was 85,000, because what I was referring to was not the immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is lean and mean, but the asymptotic growth of defense agencies over the last 30 years, numbering now, I think, about 85,000.

Senator **Nunn**. Have you made some specific suggestions as to where we ought to cut there, because I know we would be interested in that? Secretary Weinberger said he would be.

Secretary **Lehman**. I have indeed, and I have not been shy on that account, as you know. But, I think it was best capsulated by the Secretary of Defense when he said that he and all of us would applaud making substantial reductions in our headquarter staffs if

Congress would do the same, because the congressional staffs drive a great deal of the need for our bureaucracy.

Let me say that it is not that hard to do once we are allowed to do it. I would point to the abolishing of the entire Navy Materiel Command that the Navy Department did under the encouragement of the Secretary of Defense last May. That was a net reduction of 450 people and the elimination of one entire layer.

Senator NUNN. Well, I applaud that. I think that is a good initiative.

Secretary LEHMAN. What was the second part of your question, Senator?

Senator NUNN. Just where the specifics are, if you could furnish them.

Secretary LEHMAN. By the way, I am very sympathetic to the intent of your report regarding the issue of consolidation of the service staffs. We need to eliminate any additional layer that causes delay in processing. But, in spite of the way the staffs have operated in the past, a tremendous amount of integration has, in fact, gone on in the military departments.

In the Navy, for instance, there is now one integrated intelligence staff that reports to both——

Senator NUNN. I applaud everything you have done in that respect. What I am looking for is where we cut those 60,000 to 85,000 out.

Secretary LEHMAN. Start with Congress. Your report points out that if you would reduce the number of reports that committees outside your jurisdiction——

Senator NUNN. I think that what we do here has a great effect on what happens in your department and all the departments in OSD. I do not think it has anything to do with the Defense Logistics Agency or the Defense Communications Agency.

Just for the record I do not know any way to measure bureaucracy, so I grabbed the Department of Defense telephone directory, and turned to the yellow pages where it says "Organizational Index." And this is the telephone book that just came out.

The first pages, 1 to 52—this says Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary. We have next the listings of all the telephone numbers of OSD, DOD field activities, JCS, Defense Communications Agency, DARPA, DIA, DIS, Defense Mapping, DNA, DLA—a total of 21 pages.

Then we have the Department of the Army, that goes from page 23 to 52. That is 29 pages. We have got the Department of the Navy that goes from page 53 to 111; that is 58 pages. The Marine Corps is six of those, leaving a net of 52 pages. And the Department of the Air Force is 15 pages—113 to 128.

Now I am not saying this is a statistically accurate survey of organizations, but it does indicate something.

Secretary LEHMAN. We have more telephones. [Laughter.]

Senator NUNN. No doubt about it. I think my time has expired, but I would very much welcome and I think we would like to incorporate in here, any changes that you could suggest to us that would really get at this problem. I agree with you. I think the bureaucracy is out of hand and out of control. We have got to do something about it.

Mr. TAFT. Senator, may I, just for the record, establish the population of the Office of Secretary of Defense? It seems to be falling fast. It was 1,765 this morning, which is the same as last year and the same as the year before.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. First, I want to make an observation that I think there is a historical precedent that has been set under President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger in that it is the first time in history that all four service Secretaries have remained in their positions throughout the full term of the Presidency.

Am I not correct, Mr. Marsh? You are the historian.

Secretary MARSH. I think that is right, sir.

Senator WARNER. And that certainly is to the benefit of this hearing because you bring to bear those 4 years of experiences on the inquiry and the issues before the Congress at this time. I want to compliment each of you who have stayed those 4 years. Secretary Orr has departed, but he has always had a very steadfast No. 2 there to back him up and, Secretary Aldridge, you have done well in that capacity.

Gentlemen, no matter how well the administration of Secretary Weinberger and the service secretariats have functioned in these 4 years, it is the duty of the Congress in the context of this reorganization inquiry to try and lay down a format that, while it will have an impact, on the present administration, will lay down that format for the future administrations, when perhaps we would not have the degree of harmony that exists today between the Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary, the service Secretaries, and the degree of harmony that apparently has existed between the service Chiefs and the service Secretaries.

So much of the building—as you have noted, Secretary Marsh, I did serve there over 5 years, as a matter of fact—is dependent upon the personalities and personal relationships. But I think it is now our responsibility to see what we should do by way of law to ensure that we are not operating a system predicated on the presence or absence of these strong personal relationships.

In that context, I would like to return to this issue of circumvention. That is one I experienced myself, without suggesting that I was circumvented, but I was there and observed firsthand how it could be done. And yet I do not have the answer to it. I do not believe we should try a statutory remedy. Are there any further right-to-the-point recommendations you would have as to how to law down, on the assumption that this reorganization plan will go forward for further administrations, a cornerstone that would prevent the circumvention issue?

Secretary Marsh, would you like to lead off?

Secretary MARSH. Well, Senator, I avoided the use of the word "circumvention" and sought to address it by "noninvolvement." The results may be the same, but one relates to motive. Circumvention indicates some motive to avoid involving the service Secretary. I think it is one that has evolved by custom.

I believe that I can probably show you the problem, where it exists. To give you a shorthand summary of the organizational structure of the Department of Defense, I would say to you that there are two water lines in the Department of Defense—a hot water line and a cold water line.

The hot water line is the one that comes down from the National Command Authority to the unified commands. That is directing the establishment of some program that is operational. The cold water line is one that relates to management and logistics. As you know from your own experience, the service Secretary, by the nature of his role, is over on the cold water line. But, in order to have an operative hot water line, at some point in time you are going to have to get back over onto the management, logistics, and personnel side.

I think I can show you here on this chart. Here is the President, the National Command Authority, the Secretary of Defense, JCS. This is your National Command Authority right there. JCS is just a conduit, as you know.

If you go down from the JCS, we will just take the unified commands here. You have Pacom—Pacific Command—and Socom—Southern Command—and Lantcom—Atlantic Command—a program or project. If the President is sending a mission, that mission comes down from the President to the Secretary of Defense. It is passed by the JCS down to that unified command that has responsibility to execute that mission.

The Secretary of the Army is over here on this line. This connecting link is the Director of the Army Staff, a three-star general. The Director of the Army Staff is the interface between the military side of the Department of the Army and the civilian leadership. You have the Director of the Army Staff here. You have the Secretary of the Army here.

At some point in time in the execution of this operation—and it may not be a deployment like Grenada; it may be a program or mission executed in the Unified Command. You are going to have to have money, you are going to have to have logistics, you are going to have to have maintenance, you are going to have to have personnel. So that has got to come back up around through the service Secretary.

When the mission comes down to the JCS, it is tasked to Army operations. They task the various components of the Army to put that mission or that operation together. The service Secretary is here. He is not in any of these chains. He has no role in those chains.

The law gives him a responsibility for operations, but he is not in the chain. So what has to happen, is the establishment of an information link over here to involve the Secretary of the Army. I suspect I am not too far off for the Navy and Air Force. At some point in time when all this is put together, if things go wrong the Secretary of the Army is the one who answers.

When I testified as the Secretary of Army within 3 weeks of assuming that post, I had to report by law that there were five programs in the Army that had exceeded the limitations established by Senator Nunn's amendment, the Nunn-McCurdy amendment. I had to answer for what had happened years before I got here. I had nothing to do with those weapons systems. But you have put the responsibility on me to come over here and tell you.

When you fail to involve the Army secretariat, the civilian side, in that operation, you are cutting off your link to the Congress, and the public to explain or build support for those operations. What you have got to do, what we need to do, is establish by practice an involvement and awarness of the service Secretary in the development of the operation—I knew that Grenada was going to occur. I was briefed on that.

Under Mr. Weinberger, there is a very conscious effort to get the Army Secretary, the Navy Secretary and the Air Force Secretary more involved in what is happening in this JCS arena.

What we must do is——

Senator **Nunn**. When you say the law puts operations, do you mean by that the furnishing of men and equipment and so forth for operations? What is that exact word you are talking about?

Secretary **Marsh**. I have them right here. You see, I am not saying that the Secretary of the Army should be a decisionmaker whether you become involved in these operations. I am saying that he must because of operations for him to carry out his statutory authority you have established by law which says "functions necessary for training, operations, administration, logistics support and maintenance, welfare and preparedness, and research and development."

Senator **Warner**. I am reading all three, as you are. Let us just look at the word "operations". The word appears in the Secretary of the Army under title X. It appears in the Secretary of the Air Force, reading "all functions necessary and appropriate for the training, operations, administration." It does not appear in the statute for the Secretary of the Navy, but there is this rather all-inclusive phrase. He is responsible for "all matters connected with the Department of the Navy," which I suppose sea lawyers could interpret as embracing operations.

So I think the statute has clearly indicated that you are to be in some manner involved in operations, but over the years the practice has grown up that you learn about it secondhand, if at all.

Secretary **Marsh**. That is correct. Senator Warner, the classic example of that practice is one that you remember. It was the Secretary of the Air Force in 1971, Secretary Seimans, who was not aware of or appraised of cross-border bombing operations that had occurred.

Senator **Warner**. I remember that so well because I was there, and I recall the consternation throughout the bureaucracy when that occurred.

Secretary **Marsh**. General Wickham has made a very determined effort to keep me appraised in this field. Where we tend to develop a more serious problem of communication is in the field of intelligence, because that is a gray area and its role is different.

Senator **Warner**. General Wickham said himself that relationship is predicated on solely professional respect and personality. What we are doing is we are operating on the basis of personalities, and those things fluctuate and change. That is the issue we have got to address.

Now have you had adequate opportunity to explain what you would recommend that the Congress do to cure this problem and, if not, we ought to refocus on it and ask you to restudy it.

Secretary **Marsh**. Sir, I would say to you as far as I am concerned the statute is clear, and Mr. Weinberger has taken pains that this is one area especially where we have reordered things so they would occur. They have occurred with tremendous support from him, the Deputy Secretary and the Chief of Staff. The authority is there in the statute, but by custom there is no institutional continuity in the secretarial post as there is in a uniformed military post. Consequently, there is a lack of awareness, I believe, that grows up with new service directors coming in as to what their authorities are.

Senator **Warner**. My time has run out, and I do not want to infringe on my colleagues. I served under three Secretaries, and I know one brought me in every time to talk with the service Chiefs. Others did not. So it fluctuates as a matter of personality. We have got to address it.

I now turn to Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for coming here. We have had a lot of interesting hearings and you have been very helpful and very forthcoming this morning.

Let me clear up one thing to start with. Secretary Lehman, in your testimony you did not mean to imply that under Secretary Weingerger there has been a drop in the number of the bureaucrats in the Department of Defense, did you?

Secretary **Lehman**. I think that there has indeed been a total change in philosophy that has enabled the problem of too many layers to be much of a problem less in actual practice than the organization chart would imply. In fact, with his encouragement, we have done away with layers in the Department in both the chain of command and in the systems commands.

Senator **Exon**. But there is no question but that the number of bureaucrats have gone up?

Secretary **Lehman**. Yes.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that. I am not saying that is necessarily bad or good, but in listening to you I was not sure what you were saying. In other words, what you have said is that you are proud of the job that you have done in restructuring that bureaucracy over there to make it more responsive to the task of managing our Nation's security?

Secretary **Lehman**. But if we want to reduce it, we need your help, starting with the congressional drivers of that bureaucracy.

Senator **Exon**. Talking about internal organization a little bit, Secretary Taft, I have a question that has to do with the organization of the bureaucracy in the Department of Defense.

What is your reaction to the Washington Post story this morning regarding DOD enactment of the previously announced reforms with regard to the procurement? Did you see the story this morning?

Mr. **Taft**. Yes, I did. What the story was addressing was the disignation of myself as the defense acquisition executive, which is a post which is established by the OMB directive 109. Previous to the establishment of the acquisition and logistics assistant secretary, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering had been the defense acquisition executive. Previous to that, actually, the Deputy Secretary had been the defense acquisition executive.

When we pulled out the acquisition system functions from the Research and Engineering Under Secretary, I had hoped to be able to keep the Defense acquisition executive at that level of the Department and not recall it to my own office, where it had been previously. The problem—I was not sure that I would be able to succeed in doing this, but we tried it and made Acquisition and Logistics Assistant Secretary the Defense acquisition executive.

Unfortunately, because that function involves the integration of budget responsibilities, resource allocation, as well as contract administration and execution and procurement policy, what I discovered over the last 6 months is that although I did not want that responsibility in my office that is the only office at which it can be integrated. And so I concluded that and, as we do in the Department of Defense when we find a good idea, implemented it at once.

Senator EXON. Does this change mean, then, that you are taking direct responsibility for procurement concerns that many of us, including yourself and the Secretary, have? In other words, if we have more $286 hammers, do we go to you for information on that?

Mr. TAFT. The principal responsibilities of the Acquisition and Logistics Assistant Secretary will remain as they were, and they will involve procurement policy and are exactly that. The only thing that the Defense acquisition executive does that could not be done at that level is this integration of contract management with the budget and those larger policy issues that are really in my office, and there is no way I can pretend that the Acquisition and Logistics Secretary has those responsibilities or would have the ability to integrate them.

The basic responsibility for procurement policy is in the Acquisition and Logistics Office, has been there, and will remain there, and when we have successes to report to you they will be because he has done a great job.

Senator EXON. And who does the report come from if the successes are not successes?

Mr. TAFT. We take those one at a time, and I hope there are very few of them. We will tend to hear about them very rapidly, and you tend to hear about them more rapidly still. I cannot say how they have developed, but we have hot lines. We have reward programs. We have every auditor out there, investigator out there, trying to find out what is wrong with the Department.

We have found a few things and we go about correcting them. But there are any manner of follow-up monitoring systems designed to track what we are doing and where we are not doing it as well as we should, to tell us that, not to cover it up, and to fix it.

Senator EXON. In that regard, Secretary Lehman, let me turn to you with a question. I think this is imporant because all too often we get tied up on drawings and charts and chain of command. I want to get down to how it actually works and not throw any roadblocks in the way of efficient handling of procedures that you have to grapple with all the time.

See if you can explain for me briefly the recent rather confusing situation with regard to General Dynamics, where they were canceled one day, and then evidently reinstated the next day on the basis that they were one of only two sources for our attack submarines.

What part did the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense play in your decision to suspend General Dynamics as a result of the recent indictments, and then to at least reinstate them 24 or 48 hours later? Or, were those reports that we read in the newspapers simply not accurate? How do these things work and can we be of any help to straighten it out?

Secretary **Lehman**. Senator, I think you can be of help in recognizing the difference between the way business is done now compared to the way it used to be done. Now, if there is a problem with General Dynamics and submarines, the buck stops right here. I am responsible for whatever happens in cost overruns or underruns or screw-ups in Navy procurement. The policy on what kind of management philosophy to apply comes directly from Secretary Taft and Secretary Weinberger.

As with the case of General Dynamics, they have set a very clear policy, across the services, for dealing evenhandedly with contractors in cases that might warrant suspension or debarment. They have made the policy very explicit, and whenever an instance comes up when there is an indictment, there is a prima facie requirement for us to protect the taxpayers' interests and to hold up further contracting with that company until we see what the causes of the problem were and see that they are rooted out before we resume any contracting with them.

It was on this kind of an instance, just last week, that Secretary Taft and I talked several times. Secretary Weinberger is out of town, so Secretary Taft is the acting Secretary. In the previous suspension last spring, we had quite a few hours of meetings—Secretary Taft and I, and the other service Secretaries—and we got guidance directly from Secretary Weinberger. But the decision is a Navy decision.

When it is a major issue like the General Dynamics issue, before we go ahead and make a decision in the line departments, we discuss it and get direction, approval, and policy from Secretary Taft. Then we go ahead and act.

You are right in that the reports were misleading. We have not restored General Dynamics. General Dynamics, all of its divisions, are still under suspension. What I did was to delay the deadline on the RFP submittals for the 688 class submarines from the 1985 buy so that I would still have competition between two suppliers down the road.

As you know, Congress gives us 5 years to award those contracts from appropriation. So we have time to wait and see what happens with General Dynamics. I would rather wait in hopes that we will end up with two contractors able to bid rather than have to go sole-source with one of those contractors. So that was the reason for that action.

Mr. **Taft**. Senator, if I may just add to that, because the policy is one that I established, the policy is very simple. It is when there is an indictment or a conviction of a felony offense by a contractor of the Department of Defense. That, in my judgment, calls into question the responsibility of that contractor. We suspend them and ask them to come in and work with them to assure that whatever the problems are are corrected so that the taxpayer is protected.

This is not, as it has been characterized in some of the newspapers, a punitive action on our part. It is a requirement that I have established to be sure that the taxpayers are protected from contracting with an irresponsible contractor who may not have—and the indictment or a conviction might suggest this—systems in place that will assure that we are getting good value for our contracts.

We go and try to assure ourselves of that and then the suspensions are lifted. That is the condition that General Dynamics is in. Rockwell International is in it today also. We are working with these companies to protect the taxpayer. When you come to a situation that Secretary Lehman had, where the taxpayer in that context now has an opportunity to waste a lot of money by going back to sole source, that is not going to help us. We are not interested in that.

So what Secretary Lehman did was exactly right. He said this company is in suspension, but that is to protect the taxpayer, not to hurt him. So I am not going to, as a result of that suspension, insist on getting these bids right now when I cannot have competition. I am going to wait until competition will be there, until General Dynamics has corrected their problems and become a responsible contractor again, and corrected the things we think are necessary, and then the taxpayer will win on that ground and will also win on the competition side.

You cannot have both.

Senator EXON. MR. Chairman, my time is up, so I will not take the time of my colleagues. I would just say that I still think this is a highly confusing situation. I think you are trying to do something about it. The only thing I can say is if you extend into the future the policy that you have just set out, then you could have one contractor that has not been indicted and two, three or four who have been, and it seems to me like I do not know where you stop with a policy like that.

If you have one contractor that has not been indicted and therefore is clean and cannot only build but can bid, and you have got three or four questionable others it seems to me like an extremely confusing policy.

I am afraid you are going to get tangled up in your own mechanism somewhere down the road.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAFT. We are working our way through that and we are making adjustments as we go. I will say we have, as a result of this policy, received a very significant positive response from industry. A great many changes have been introduced by companies who have been subject to the suspension policy, and you can ask Jack Welch of General Electric or any number of people who have been through this process. I think they have found it a good one and they have improved their companies, and we have helped the taxpayer.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all of you.

Secretary Taft, first of all I think you might want to use a different word than "suspension" for what has happened, It does not sound like a classic suspension to me as a description of General Dynamics. It sounds like some kind of special review status. But I would just suggest that I think we are using "suspension" with different meanings when you use it in the way that you have relative to them. But I will drop it at that, and suggest that you look at the way we have used it.

One of the paragraphs of this staff document reads as follows: The right of the service Secretaries to present recommendations to the Congress is still in law 36 years after the military department lost their executive department status and 38 years after the service Secretaries became subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. It continues to contribute to the confusion surrounding the role of the service Secretaries. By continuing the authority of the service Secretaries to present independent recommendations to the Congress, the Congress has encouraged service Secretaries and their staffs to take the case for their point of view outside of the DOD."

I think Secretary Aldridge this morning—or at least in his statement—has indicated he would not object to the elimination of that authority. Secretary Taft, I would like to know is it the position of the DOD that we should eliminate that authority?

Mr Taft. I believe that authority was put in there by the Congress. They felt very strongly about it at the time they considered it. They considered it several times, I think, in 1958, 1953, and I think if Congress wants to have that channel left open, we do not object to it. But it is really your call if you want that channel there.

From our point of view, it has not disrupted the operation of the Department. We can do it round or flat.

Senator Levin. You do not object to it being either left open or closed?

Mr. Taft. No. I do not think it is important from the point of view of the administration of the Department. It has not presented any difficulties to us that the service Secretaries have this authority. My understanding is that Congress feels very strongly about it, or has in the past, when it has considered it, the House particularly.

Senator Levin. Secretary Marsh, you have opposed closing of that channel in your testimony, I believe, so let me ask Secretary Lehman.

Secretary Lehman. I would strongly oppose it being——

Senator Warner. Excuse me, if I might interrupt the questioning. Secretary Taft, your office has indicated you have only a few more minutes left here. Senator Levin, I wonder if perhaps Senator Kennedy or Senator Humphrey had questions of Secretary Taft. Otherwise, we will ask that he be excused.

Any further questions, gentlemen, to Secretary Taft?

If not, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Taft. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Secretary Lehman. Senator, I would oppose it very strongly because I think it does recognize the fact that the intent of Congress was to leave the heads of the military departments as different kinds of creatures than Assistant Secretaries of Defense. That is why the proposal in the 1949 study to create Under Secretaries for the military departments was rejected.

It was to be a clear indication that these are line-accountable not staff people. They are held accountable by Congress and by the President and by the Secretary of Defense. And that is an important symbol.

Second, even though I know of no instance where it has in fact been utilized, it is nevertheless a very healthy signal to the rest of the bureaucracy. But, it is shared with the service Chiefs. And if Congress decides that they do not want the symbolism of that strength and the diversity of opinion that can come with it on major issues, then they should not single out the civilian chief and leave the power solidly with the uniformed chief.

The Chiefs, as you know, have this same authority in statute. If you are going to do away with it—which I strongly recommend—do it without further weakening civilian control, which you would by leaving it with the uniformed chiefs and not with the civilians.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Secretary Marsh, if you could go back to your chart just for a moment that you drew for us——

Secretary MARSH. This is the same chart.

Senator WARNER. No; it is not.

Senator LEVIN. No; go back to yours. Yours is a lot more colorful.

Senator WARNER. This one is likely to be a little controversial.

Senator LEVIN. Go back to your chart.

Why can't the notification you are looking for—which seems logical to me—come simultaneously from the Secretary of Defense when it goes down to the JCS?

Secretary MARSH. Well, what does happen, Senator, if I can go over this chart, when it comes down, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Wickham, tells me.

Senator LEVIN. I think you may be messing up Senator Warner's chart. I do not know if you wanted that for a different purpose or not.

Senator WARNER. No; it is all right. It dramatizes my point, which is it is just based on personality and courtesy. He walks across the hall and tells him.

Senator LEVIN. Well, if you are not messing up that chart, go ahead. I do not know who put that up or for what purpose.

Secretary MARSH. Senator, the way that it flows, the hot water line comes from the President to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS down to the operational commands or up this way, either way, but at some point in time it has to move over on this side and get on to logistics, management, and personnel. If you have hospitals or wounded and evacuation, budgeting, advising Congress, discussing it with the press or the public, you have got to get over on this side of the chart. What is happening instead is that the effort comes down to the JCS, then it is tasked into the Army Staff, the subdivision of staff for operations, and it stays pretty much in the Army operations staff.

Senator LEVIN. My question is why can't a copy of that tasking go to the service Secretary?

Senator WARNER. That is the question I wanted to pose, and that is why if you have that line drawn as an informational copy from the Secretary of Defense to the service Secretary.

Senator LEVIN. Why can't a copy of that tasking go from either Secretary of Defense to the service Secretary or JCS to the service Secretary, either one?

Secretary MARSH. I would say to you that——

Senator LEVIN. Without statutory change. Why don't you folks just do it?

Secretary MARSH. I was just going to say you can do it within the statute now.

Senator LEVIN. Well, why do you not do it?

Secretary MARSH. I think because the perceived authorities of the Secretaries of the services has atrophied over a period of 40 years.

Senator LEVIN. Have you urged the Secretary of Defense to make that change in copies of tasking?

Secretary MARSH. As a point, Mr. Weinberger has sought to do that. You asked me, Senator, what might be done that would be helpful. I think language should be drafted that indicates there is a role there, or that Congress wants the implementation of the statute, I think that would be helpful. John.

Secretary LEHMAN. Could I just add one thing? I completely agree with Secretary Marsh, but one of the sources of the problem is in the structure of the national security agencies. For instance, 15 years ago, when I was a member of Henry Kissinger's general staff, the system required attendance at NSC meetings and much more input from me than I am allowed today.

Service Secretaries are just not on the list to be invited to meetings. They are not included on the distribution list for things. It is a built-in bias. It is an imbalance, and it is wrong.

Senator WARNER. And it is contrary to statute, if you interpret "operations" as embracing that.

Secretary LEHMAN. That is right.

Senator LEVIN. Do you interpret, all three of you, "operations" to include military operations as well as the operations of the Department? Do you interpret the word "operations" to be inclusive of military operations as well as all of the departmental operations? Could each of you answer?

Mr. ALDRIDGE. Yes, Senator. I think you have to distinguish, though, between a wartime command. If we are in a wartime operation, I am not sure that the Secretaries of the services should be in that chain of command.

Senator LEVIN. I am not talking about chain of command for the moment.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. If you are talking about information regarding the operations of air forces, naval forces, yes, sir, I do.

Senator LEVIN. Do you consider the Secretary of the Air Force to be responsible for and have all the authority necessary to conduct all of the affairs of the Department of the Air Force—I am now reading from the Army statute, but it is the same general thing—including functions necessary or appropriate for the operations? Do you include in "operations" the military operations?

Mr. ALDRIDGE. Shy of wartime, yes, sir—shy of wartime operations.

Senator LEVIN. You mean declaration of war?

Mr. ALDRIDGE. Well, operations could include exercises, for example, training operations those kinds of things. Yes, sir, very definitely, but not in the chain of command.

Senator LEVIN. Not combat?

Mr. ALDRIDGE. Not combat.

Senator LEVIN. Not combat operations. Secretary Lehman.

Secretary LEHMAN. I think we all agree that none of us want to be in the chain of command to fight wars or to move forces around. But we do need to know what is going on, and the system does not build us into the information process today, although Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Taft and our Chiefs, bend over backward to try to pass on the dope. But we are not built into the structure.

Senator LEVIN. Even though the word "operations" is not in the Navy statute, you do consider that the word "operations," if it were there, would be all operations short of combat?

Secretary LEHMAN. No, combat included, but not for us to be in the chain of command, but to know about it.

Senator LEVIN. Combat included, but not that you are responsible for, just notified of?

Secretary LEHMAN. Just that we know and have the ability to say——

Senator LEVIN. Let me be real clear. My time is up. You are not responsible for and in charge of it in some sense, only notified of combat operations, in all other senses?

Secretary LEHMAN. Able to have an input and to recommend.

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Marsh.

Secretary MARSH. I share the views that have already been expressed, and I think I have probably stated it several times here.

Senator LEVIN. OK. That is going to be repetitious. My time is up.

Senator THURMOND [presiding]. The senior Senator from Massachusetts.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join in welcoming the panel here this morning.

Secretary Lehman, in your testimony you pointed out, on page 3, "the second fundamental principle is that those who have the responsibility to carry out the function must also possess the requisite authority, and those who have the authority must be held to account." I imagine the corollary is that those who do not have the responsibility or authority should not be held accountable.

I happened to have the opportunity last spring to visit the Navy Air Station at Miramar in California, and I was out there at a time when the newspapers announced the cashiering of Admiral Cassidy. And, as a matter of fact, I was actually in a meeting with Admiral Cassidy when he received a call from the Secretary about the fact that he was relieved of command.

I had a very brief conversation with him at that time. He had other things on his mind, but he did express the view that he felt he had been poorly treated. Subsequently, I wrote him a note to express my appreciation for the cooperation and hospitality that I had received while on the base, it was superb. And then, recently he wrote me a note indicating that there had been a complete investigation of this particular case. He also indicated that he did not want to write me until he had actually retired, which was September 1. He referred to the Boxler report and hoped that the report itself would be made public.

I then wrote to you on November 4 asking about the decision to relieve Admiral Cassidy. I asked for a copy of the Judge Advocate's investigative report, the Boxler report, and copy of any public statements made by DOD and other U.S. Government personnel relating to this matter.

Now he has been dismissed summarily, with headlines across the country about his dismissal. Then on November 21, I received a letter from your office, and this is from the Navy's Congressional Correspondence Branch. It states: "The interim response is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 4 to the Secretary of the Navy requesting information on the release of certain officers of the U.S. Navy station at Miramar. A substantive reply will be provided to you at an early date."

Now how long is it going to take you to release that report? As you point out, those who have requisite authority and those that have responsibility should be held accountable. That guy has been out there swinging in the breeze since May. You have got, evidently, a report. I do not know the details of it, the Boxler report, but, evidently, it reflects on both his alleged responsibility and, as he mentions in his letter to me, his innocence.

When is his innocence or guilt going to be at least stated, publicly, by the Secretary of the Navy? I would imagine that his family would have a very keen interest.

Secretary LEHMAN. I did that in July, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Did what in July?

Secretary LEHMAN. I restored him to command, as a result of that report. In fact, it was June. It was before he retired. He retired having been exonerated and reinstated, as a result of that report, and not just that report, because we also had a separate IG report done as well. As a result of the reports we found a strange anomaly in what we call the TOR's, or terms of reference for functional wing commanders which do not exist in any other service.

It turns out there were no written terms of reference which held him accountable for the sound management of his command. So as a result, he had not felt that it was his concern to worry about the price of spare parts. We have since changed that and changed the TOR, but we could not hold him accountable for the earlier policy. So we restored him to command.

Senator KENNEDY. All over the country—the $600 aircraft ashtrays, they were publicized all over the country. This person who has been in the service for all these years, everybody in the Nation knew about the $600 ashtrays. And, to be very frank about it, I did not know at the time whether he should have been court martialed or should have been exonerated.

But is your statement now—that you will release the Boxler report? Is there any problem with that?

Secretary LEHMAN. I will see that you get a full substantive reply.

Senator KENNEDY. I will be delighted to receive it. I think that's just with regard to the Admiral's service and his career, we all want to eliminate waste and fraud, but I am very much concerned about a man who has served for many years in the Armed Forces and is going to be strung up needlessly, evidently from this report, and what action is being taken within the department.

I would also ask you what action is being taken that brought you to the decision to fire this fellow, and what disciplinary action are you taking against those individuals to ensure that that is not going to happen again?

Secretary LEHMAN. Yes, Senator. The reason was that we did a full IG investigation. We did a Supply Corps audit of 476 commands. Only five of them had problems with pricing. Those five had ignored the Navy policy directive of 2 years previous, and Miramar was the worst of them all.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Secretary, I have got a short time. If this guy is guilty, he ought to be court martialed. If he is not, he ought to be exonerated.

Secretary LEHMAN. He has been exonerated.

Senator KENNEDY. Would you give me the details and the statements that have been made on this issue?

I would also like to know what steps are being taken so that it is not going to happen to somebody else. I hope, we are not just out there finding a lot of press about waste, fraud and abuse in order to cashier some guy and eventually he is exonerated when he is retired and no steps are being taken within the service to make sure it does not happen again. I would think that would be of concern to you.

Secretary LEHMAN. Senator, your characterization of the situation is not a fair or accurate characterization.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, you could certainly ask Admiral Cassidy whether he thinks it is, and there is not a person in Miramar who hadn't read the newspapers that day about him being relieved, and fired.

And if he has been exonerated, then somebody within your shop ought to know who was involved in that kind of misinformation and make sure it does not happen again.

Secretary LEHMAN. Well, it was not misinformation, Senator. It was the fact that he had ignored the spare parts pricing policy of his buying command. The fact that he was restored was based on the judgment that the direction was not clear enough. But, he could have avoided the program had he applied a little more common sense to the sound buying of spare parts in his command, which 471 other commands had done and had gotten a check on. His did not. The captain is responsible for the ship.

Senator KENNEDY. Will you please respond completely and fully to the letter?

Secretary LEHMAN. Yes.

Senator KENNEDY. I have one final question. On page 28 you point out that they should vest more authority with the unified commanders, those whose technical expertise and familiarity with the region allow them to have the closest view of the actual operations.

Now there are specific recommendations on that particular item in this report. On page 582, on this very point, it states "increase the stature of the unified commanders by making them more senior in order of rank than the service Chiefs." Do you agree with that?

Secretary LEHMAN. No; I disagree with that recommendation.

Senator KENNEDY. Would you tell us how you would implement that?

Secretary LEHMAN. I think the other recommendations point in the right direction.

Senator KENNEDY. I want to know what recommendations you have today to implement what your testimony here stated. "Vest more authority in the unified commanders", what is your specific recommendation to do so?

Secretary LEHMAN. I think that we need to include them more in the policymaking and see that whatever impediments there are to exercising operational control over their component service commands ought to be cleared up. They need to have unity and firm control over integration of their components at that level. If there are impediments in the UNAAF (Uniformed Action Armed Forces) then they ought to be removed, and it ought to be clear that that is where decisiveness and complete unification of cross-service components takes place, at the theater CINC level.

Senator KENNEDY. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. The distinguished Senator from Virginia.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the Senator from Massachusetts. Indeed, I have looked into the case of the Miramar problem and Admiral Cassidy, Mr. Secretary—and this is not the time or place. We have talked about it. You and I have some difference of views on the manner in which it was handled, and I think the Senator from Massachusetts likewise described some concern that other members of this committee share. Enough said for that. I just hope that we do not have another incident of that type.

I would like to go back with Secretary Marsh and then refer this issue to the other Secretaries. This is a chart that I have asked be sketched, Secretary Marsh. Again, as you described the first two boxes, the President and Secretary of Defense as being the policymakers.

Secretary MARSH. To elaborate, that is the National Command Authority.

Senator WARNER. The National Command Authority, where policy as such is formulated. To the extent the Secretary of Defense consults with the service Secretary before finalizing that policy, that is a matter again of personalities and the working relationships. I do not think that Congress should try to legislate in that area.

Once that policy is established, once that order is directed down from the Secretary of Defense to JCS, my thought would be that an informational copy could go to each of the service Secretaries, and it is a formalized procedure of an informational copy of that execution order. That would then enable the service Secretary first to make his own determination as to the advisability of this policy, and then on an informal basis or whatever the working relationship between the Secretaries may be go back up and consult with the Secretaries as to some refinement or execution or otherwise. But at least you have what I would call real-time notice of that order.

It would also enable the service Secretary, in a more timely and in a better prepared manner, to address the issue with this service Chief. After all, his service Chief, in all probability, is quite busy and although he steps across the hall to orally inform you, you would have the opportunity to have the order, examine it, have read it and be prepared to consult with your service Chief.

So let us call in the Warner plan, if you wish, for the moment. I do not want anybody else to be associated with it that does not wish to. What do you think about that as a possible solution, that in the law we require that an informational copy be passed to a service Secretary?

Secretary MARSH. I would have no problems with such legislation.

Senator WARNER. Would you endorse it?

Secretary MARSH. I cannot speak for the Department of Defense, I can only speak for the Department of the Army. You are trying to institutionalize that in the out years?

Senator WARNER. That is correct.

Secretary MARSH. I would have no problems with that, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Would you endorse it?

Secretary MARSH. I think it would be helpful; yes.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Lehman.

Secretary LEHMAN. I think it is a great idea, but I would also include verbal directions as well, because often they are as important.

Senator WARNER. As a practical matter, your Secretary today is in England. He cannot verbally tell you anything if he runs an order down.

Secretary LEHMAN. I mean when the Chiefs implement something as a result of verbal instructions that we be made aware of those as well. But, I think your approach covers 98 percent of it.

Senator WARNER. I remember Secretary Laird, in working with him for 3 years, he was very careful in almost every instance to have that in writing, to my recollection. He may have verbalized it, but within a very brief period of time he had it in writing.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I would endorse that for the additional reason that it would keep the service Secretaries informed as to how their equipment, and men and training, is being carried out. But it also gives him a better perspective of when he has to make those future decisions with regard to acquisition, operation and training of forces. It helps him understand that better and makes him a better Secretary of the service.

Secretary MARSH. Senator, could I give you another dimension to operational control? It is not just operational orders coming down, you have operational proposals coming up. If a unified command makes a recommendation for some program or operation it would come up to the JCS from below, and then it will go into the operations subdivisions, as you know, of the various services. So if you are going to do it, you have to catch it going down and you have to catch it coming back up.

Senator **Warner**. I agree with you, and that is also included in my recommendation—that you receive informational copies as it goes up as well as it comes down.

In the politics of the E ring that is quite a study in itself, and that would, I believe, give you a little more recognition around the hallway. I see a lot of smiles and I take it you agree with that.

Secretary **Lehman**. The voice of experience.

Senator **Warner**. I wonder if you gentlemen would look at that, staff it, and come back to the committee with a supplemental statement on that point or any other aspect of this issue.

Secretary **Marsh**. Senator, may I request the involvement of the Secretary of Defense in this?

Senator **Warner**. Of course. We will task the Secretary to do this likewise.

Secretary **Marsh**. Thank you, sir.

Senator **Warner**. Would you do that within a week's time? Thank you very much.

[The information follows:]

Informing Service Secretaries on JCS Matters

Secretary **Lehman**. DOD Directive 5100.1 of 1 May 1985 says, "Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other than the Chairman is responsible for keeping the Secretary of his Military Department fully informed on matters considered or acted upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

I support changing that directive so that the Joint Chiefs are required to provide to the Service Secretaries an information copy of (1) operational orders transmitted by the NMCC and (2) operational proposals made by Unified/Specified Commanders.

Secretary **Marsh**. Senator Warner's proposal to provide the Service Secretaries information copies of key orders implementing National Command Authority decisions would formalize the process which today relies heavily on personal relationships. Additionally, the Service staff should inform the Secretary of messages from the CINC's where such correspondence relates to Military Department support for the Unified and Specified Commands. Such a formal process would allow the Service Secretary more time to react to the needs of the forces which he supports. This process would assist the Service Secretary in being better prepared to discuss National Command Authority matters as they relate to his service and to better meet the needs of those forces he provides to the Unified and Specified Commands. Implementation of this proposal should be accomplished through DOD directive rather than legislation.

Senator **Thurmond**. The distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Senator **Nunn**. I would just say that is a proposal I would like to take a look at, too. I think the key is not putting another layer in what is, I think, everyone's definition of a complicated enough organization now.

The matter of information, as I understand it is being done now—seems to me to be in order. The question is to draw a statute so as to avoid creating another bureaucracy to shuffle papers back and forth between existing layers, and that is something we would have to watch.

So when you look at that, would you address it in a way that we can make sure we do not add to the problem that Secretary Lehman has already laid out?

Senator **Warner**. I would reply to Mr. Nunn the way this administration under Secretary Weinberger operates in effect this is done on an informal basis, so whatever additional staffing or paperwork is probably in existence today, at least on the way down. I do not know about on the way up. All we are doing is recognizing this practice as being beneficial to the overall management of the Department and to institutionalize it in some manner in whatever rewriting we will probably do on the charters for the three service Secretaries.

Senator **Thurmond**. Would you just give us the benefit of your thinking, not influenced by anyone else? We want your opinions.

Senator Nunn.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you.

I want to use my time on this round, Mr. Chairman, to ask a series of questions to each one of the Secretaries and I would like for you to give me a yes or no answer. If you are not certain, you could just say you reserve judgment. These are various suggestions that have been made in recent days before the committee about things that could be changed, some of them by statute and some of them otherwise. I know that some of them may not be things you have thought about. If you want to reserve judgment, that is fine with me. I just want to get some idea.

General Wickham made a series of suggestions in his testimony, about 10 of them. General Gabriel, Kelley, and Watkins all commented on them.

The first suggestion was making the Chairman the principal military adviser. Can I get you to comment on each one of these as to whether you agree with it. First, making the Chairman the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary **Marsh**. I agree with it.

Secretary **Lehman**. I disagree with it.

Mr. **Aldridge**. I agree.

Senator **Nunn**. Two, give the Chairman statutory authority for joint training and military education.

Secretary Marsh.

Secretary **Marsh**. I would like to reserve judgment. I am not that familar with the proposal.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you.

Secretary **Lehman**. Reserve judgment.

Mr. **Aldridge**. I have no comment on that.

Senator **Nunn**. Three, give the Chairman the authority to develop joint doctrine.

Secretary **Marsh**. I agree with that.

Secretary **Lehman**. I agree.

Mr. **Aldridge**. I am going to have to think about that one. I am not sure what he means by "joint doctrine."

[The information follows:]

JOINT DOCTRINE

Senator **Nunn**. General Wickham made a series of suggestions in his testimony, about ten of them. Do you agree with him that the Chairman should have the authority to develop joint doctrine?

Mr. **Aldridge**. I agree, with one reservation. DoDD 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," specifies among the functions of the JCS to "establish doctrines for unified operations and training." This is a stronger measure of authority than the development of doctrine, as stated in your question; it entails the development of doctrine, resolution of Service differences, and the promulgation and implementation of the doctrine once it is approved. If the chairman is given the authority to direct the joint staff, he should maintain the same responsibilities in establishing doctrine as are now given the corporate JCS.

Senator NUNN. All right. You can supplement any of these answers that you would like to.

Four, give the Chairman authority to formulate recommendations on the strategic priorities of defense programs and military budgets.

Secretary MARSH. It depends on the scope of that.

Senator NUNN. I think it is clear General Wickham is not talking about a complete $300 billion budget but simply the Chairman having the authority to come in with his own recommendations as to priorities in programs and activities, what he chooses to. It would be basically discretionary.

Secretary MARSH. I would agree with that.

Secretary LEHMAN. Agree, if it does not spawn a new layer of bureaucracy.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I have the same comment on that.

Senator NUNN. As Secretary Lehman?

Mr. ALDRIDGE. Right.

Senator NUNN. Fine. Five, give the Chairman the authority to specify procedures and determine the tasks of the Joint Staff.

Secretary MARSH. I agree with that.

Secretary LEHMAN. I agree with that, as long as it is on behalf of all the members.

Senator NUNN. As long as——

Secretary LEHMAN. As long as it is recognized to be on behalf of all the members.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I agree.

Senator NUNN. Next, do away with the distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS offices.

Secretary MARSH. I would have to think about that. I am not familiar with it, Senator.

Secretary LEHMAN. I think it is a good idea.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. Again, if it combines the staff and gets a single organization.

Secretary LEHMAN. And makes it smaller.

Senator NUNN. Next, give the Chairman the authority to administer a reduced-scale personnel management system. I know he means by that for the Joint Staff positions.

Secretary MARSH. I agree.

Secretary LEHMAN. I disagree.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I am going to reserve judgment. I am not sure what he really means by that.

Senator NUNN. Next, create a Vice Chairman who would not outrank the JCS and who would not substitute for the Chairman.

Secretary MARSH. I strongly agree.

Secretary LEHMAN. I agree.

Senator NUNN. He did not recommend this, but your views on what if we created a vice chairman, as the House bill has done, that would be in effect the number two man, the alter ego.

Secretary MARSH. I would disagree with that. The rotational system that is being used now for the acting Chief I think is a very helpful one for each of the Chiefs as they rotate through.

Senator NUNN. I do not want to cut you off, but I have got 10 or 12 more of these.

Secretary LEHMAN. I disagree.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I disagree as well.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Specify in statute that the channel of command runs through the Chairman. There has been a distinction made in these hearings between "channel" and "chain". "Channel" means passing through; "chain" means part of.

Secretary MARSH. I would have to reserve judgment on that.

Secretary LEHMAN. I think it is a good idea.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. If the question is it is through the JCS, I would agree. If it is in the chain, I disagree.

Senator NUNN. Now, Secretary Weinberger has made six or seven proposals here in a recent letter he sent to Chairman Goldwater. Let me go over each one of these.

Secretary LEHMAN. I think we can save a lot of time on that list.

Senator NUNN. I want your personal views, really, even if you disagree.

Secretary MARSH. I was aware of the letter before it was sent.

Senator NUNN. There is precedent, I think, Mr. Secretary for disagreement.

Secretary LEHMAN. Yes, but you have threatened to take away my authority to do it.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Marsh, did you read that letter?

Secretary MARSH. I was aware of the subject matter.

Senator NUNN. Maybe I can simplify by asking you if you have read his letter and personally do you agree with all of the proposals in his letter?

Secretary MARSH. Yes, I do, Senator, because I think they are very sound.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Lehman.

Secretary LEHMAN. I agree.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I would disagree with one thing, which I have already stated. I think he recommended that the JCS be put in the chain of command, and I think it should be through the chain of command. That is the only disagreement I have.

Senator NUNN. I think he said "channel" of command.

Secretary MARSH. I had the same question about that.

Secretary LEHMAN. I think that what he said was that he wanted the authority to do that. He did not say that he was going to do it.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Secretary LEHMAN. Just one other question. You particularly have been critical of the Defense Logistics Agency. I think you have said, if my quote is correct here, that it is without question the worst-managed of an enterprise in the Pentagon.

Do you have specific recommendations that you could make to this committee or have you made any to the Secretary of Defense about what to do with the Defense Logistics Agency or, for that matter, any other Defense agencies?

Secretary LEHMAN. Well, surely these are my personal views, you understand. I am not speaking for the Department.

I think a great many of the things that have been shifted over to it should be put back under the line management of the military departments. The Defense Logistics Agency now buys about 65 percent of my end items, and it was never envisioned that it would absorb all of that. It is too big, I would like to see its size cut in half and the functions shifted back to the military departments, where it makes sense to have them, without any increase in the military department's apparatus, which is already in place.

Senator NUNN. You are saying you could cut it in half and basically have those functions absorbed in the existing military departments without increasing them?

Secretary LEHMAN. Absolutely. There is too much duplication. Many of the functions should be centralized, like buying petroleum and commodities that are common. But, when we need toilet seat covers for P-3s, we ought to buy them and not have the Defense Logistics Agency buy them, as happens now. I would say cut it in half and return the things that make sense, those things that are bought in small amounts, back to the military departments. I think you could save an enormous amount of bureaucracy.

There are, I believe, 52,000 employees of the DLA right now.

Senator NUNN. Have you put anything in writing on that? Have you ever gotten a study?

Secretary LEHMAN. I am not sure whether I signed them or not.

Senator NUNN. You what?

Secretary LEHMAN. Whether I signed them.

Senator NUNN. Well, if you see anything roaming around over there that can be copied and sent over, we would like to look at that. I think it is an interesting proposition, particularly looking at the scope of where they were intended to go, which was clearly for common purposes. You are saying now that it is not as efficient as if it were put in the departments.

Secretary LEHMAN. Those things clearly belong in a centralized buying agency, but now, as I say, 65 percent of our 2.2 million end items have devolved and been absorbed by the DLA and most do not belong there.

Senator NUNN. Either of the other Secretaries want to comment on that?

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I agree with John. I think we have gone too far. We have a different point of view in the Air Force, but I think too much has been shifted out of the Air Force into the DLA and we would like to get it back.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Marsh.

Secretary MARSH. I agree. I think you reach a point of diminishing returns with consolidation of service functions in an organization as large as the Department of Defense, and I think there are a lot of economies that can be achieved if you stayed at the service level in this field.

Senator Nunn. And if we were to cut some of these agencies very substantially you believe you could absorb, without asking for increases in personnel, those functions within your own departments? That will be the key, because if we are simply shifting people around I do not think it makes much sense.

Secretary MARSH. I would have to study that, and I could give you a figure on it, Senator.

Senator NUNN. I would like your analysis of that. Have you looked at any other of these agencies, these joint agencies as to whether any of the others could be cut? Do any come to mind, Secretary Lehman—personal views?

Secretary LEHMAN. Yes. I think others could be reduced or done away with, and I would be happy to provide you with a personal views only list on the basis of devolving it back to the military departments with no personnel increase. Certainly I would sign up right now to take back those commodities without any increase in personnel.

Mr. Aldridge. I agree. I think we could. I think the system is already in place to handle that group of items. We can do it within our existing resources. The problem that we have to worry about is, we are finding ourselves being forced to increase these staffs. We put 2,000 more people into our logistics system to avoid these horror stories. So we are finding demands, more demands for people to make sure that we do things right.

So while we can cut it in some areas, in other areas we are having to increase. We have to take that into account.

Secretary Marsh. Senator, I think there is much to be achieved by that recommendation, but I would want to look at whether or not you would not have some modest increase in personnel if you took it all back in your own operation.

Senator Nunn. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of the answers, and any supplements on this line of questioning I would welcome.

[The information follows:]

Service Management of DLA Items

Mr. Aldridge. DLA performs many valuable services to the Air Force through its management of assigned assets. By combining buys for the Services within one agency, the Air Force saves money through quantity buy discounts. This centralization also eliminates duplications within the Services and frees Air Force resources to deal with the important weapons system issues.

The Air Force recognizes that there are many assets needing no special handling that can be and are managed effectively by DLA. However, there are other weapon system items managed within DLA that should be returned to the Services. DLA was never envisioned as a weapon system manager and does not possess the structure nor the skills to perform this function.

The central issue is what criteria should be used to detemine the proper distribution of items between a service and DLA. Under a DOD charter, the Air Force has worked with the other services and DLA to develop a Defense Integrated Materiel Management Manual for Consumable Items. A draft is currently under review. The manual will provide a series of criteria to determine whether the services or DLA should manage a particular item. It is the Air Force view that this manual, when it is finalized, should govern the assignment and management of consumable items.

Once the criteria has been applied to all DLA-managed items, those candidates for service management can be reviewed. Only at this point in time can the Air Force assess the resource implications, both funding and manpower, to determine additional needs.

Secretary Marsh. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides common parts for consumable items and has historically supported Army requisitions at a 90 percent or better stock availability level. In some instances, these items are critical to the support of Army Weapon Systems and perhaps should be managed by the Army. As recently as 1982, an effort was made to transfer all DOD consumable items to DLA for managmeent due to its supposedly lower ratio of items to item managers. At that time, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Services to transfer some 200,000 items to DLA, the Army's share of this was 36,000 items. Army lost some 408 spaces as a result of this transfer before agreement was reached to revise the DOD Item Management Coding criteria. We would not favor bringing items back to Army management enmasse without resources to manage them. A gradual transfer would also result in a requirement, albeit a more gradual one, for additional manpower.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank you.

Senator Thurmond. I think everybody has had a chance to go around. Senator Levin, could you take 10 more minutes?

Senator Levin. I will be shorter than that.

I think on Senator Nunn's first round of questioning, Secretary Lehman, you indicated that you had actually made recommendations relative to the reduction in the bureaucracy. Could you submit for the record all recommendations that you have made relevant to that subject?

Secretary Lehman. Sure.

[The information follows:]

Cutting Bureaucracies

Secretary Lehman. I have made the following recommendations numerous times. I believe that their adoption would go a long way towards reduction of the bureaucracy.

Congress must reduce its own bureaucracy. There are currently 44 subcommittees writing legislation on DOD. Those subcommittees must be subordinated to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Congress must agree to the streamlining of the laws and regulations now constraining DOD acquisition policy. There are currently 1152 linear feet of acquisition regulations and other documents on our shelves which implement over 4000 provisions of law. The laws and regulations are so cumbersome and complex that no one acquisition manager could be expected to understand them all.

To be more specific:

Procurement regulations have been made analogous to regulations issued by EPA and other regulatory agencies. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, The OFPP Act, and others, have lengthened the process with no real benefit to acquisition managers.

Current legislation goes well beyond policy and into detailed procedures. This makes it extremely difficult to correct procedures that prove unworkable or that don't handle specific situations well.

Civilian agencies have an equal voice (or even veto power) in the FAR System even though DOD has over 80% of federal procurement. OFPP would propose civilian agency involvement even on matters unique to DOD.

The centralization of detailed procedure development in OSD takes authority away from acquisition managers who have the responsibility to acquire the goods and services and gives it to non-accountable bureaucrats. It also makes utilization of the market difficult.

We do not need additional people. We need a few good people.—If we promote the acquisition and retention of a few good people, we will be better able to promote the entrepreneureal and managerial excellence inherent in smaller, decentralized units.

For our military personnel, our Material Professional (MP) Program provides a career path with the training and education required for acquisition and logistics manager. More importantly, it provides career incentives to attract some of our brightest officers from all professional communities.

For our Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel some problems still exist.

Members of the Senior Executive Service are our top-level managers. They have responsibilities equal to those of CEO's and vice presidents of major industries.

SES members can receive bonuses and major rank awards and have some flexibility to move upward in the system. However, SES pay is much lower than their civilian counterparts because it is tied to congressional pay and it is capped. Consequently we lose people—the best people.

In order to give our SES members a better range of experience and to help them understand a wide variety of Navy programs and areas, I have mandated a five-year rotation plan. This plan is based on the private industry philosophy that, as an executive advances, he needs to understand—hands on—all aspects of the company's business.

This initiative will help train our SES members, but it won't be enough. We need pay relief. Without basic compensation equity, we will continue to lose our best people to the private sector.

For our Presidential and New Career Appointees:

Salaries are too low to compete. Without independent means, a successful manager from outside government cannot live on current salaries.

While revolving door abuses exist, they can be corrected without the Draconian legislation now circulating.

High standards of experience/accomplishment should be required. That experience can be a variety of fields.

Four year commitments should be required. Average tenure now is about 22–24 months.

The link of accountability between the services and SECDEF is still rather torturous. Currently, ASD (A&L) is not alone in the accountability chain. USD (R&E), OSD (COMPT), and D (PA&E) play significant roles as do the DOD Inspector General and General Counsel.

For major systems, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) serves as a good direct link, although it can be, and is, muddled at times by the influence of other bureaucratic elements. The DSARC process should be strengthened with emphasis on closer links between SECDEF and the Service Secretaries. The acquisition role of OSD Offices should be limited to advisory to SECDEF, with less direct influence on Service Program Managers.

Service program managers often must await audit service reviews from an independent audit agency and contract administration services from an independent contract administration agency. Neither of the organizations has any affiliation with the goals of the program. It doesn't work.

Decision making must be located at the program manager/contracting officer level whenever possible. DOD should be decoupled from other agencies possessing little in common with the responsibility of DOD in acquisition. Regulatory guidance should be broad. Program managers and contracting officers should be held accountable for business judgments, not for their ability to successfully withstand a complex, painstaking procedural process which dilutes accountability.

At the same time we are decentralizing execution, we need to tighten up and centralize acquisition policy-making. This function should be in the hands of a new Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense who has decision power. The members should be the three Service Secretaries only, with ASD (A&L) and USD (R&E) attending as advisors (as CIA and CVCS do for NSC). Their staff would be the current DAR council staff reduced by half.

The current DAR council would be abolished.

The first task of the new DAC would be to reduce DAR to manageable proportions.

Joint service programs provide an opportunity for further improvements in DOD acquisition. DOD must force joint requirements. Their involvement here is critical. The Joint Requirement Management Board is a step in this direction, however, stronger DOD emphasis is needed. The development phase of joint programs should be assigned by DOD to a Lead or Executive Service. That service would bear full responsibility for managing and funding the Development Program. Other services would find service unique requirements and service procurements.

SUMMARY

Decentralize management: delegate responsibility, authority, and resources to small, highly skilled units of program management whose people as individuals are accountable for efficient, effective program execution.

Eliminate layers of bureaucracy, conflicting management roles, and micromanagement.

Improve acquisition personnel quality.

Streamline acquisition laws and regulations.

Return audit and contract administration to the services.

Bring order to congressional committee proliferation.

Centralize acquisition policy.

Form a new Defense Acquisition Council.

Senator **Levin**. I am wondering if you would do the same thing, Secretary Aldridge and Secretary Marsh. Can you do the same for the record, submit to us any recommendations that you have made relative to reduction in your bureaucracies?

[The information follows:]

Reducing the Air Force Bureaucracy

Mr. **Aldridge**. I have not personally made any specific recommendations on reducing the Air Force bureaucracy and it would be inappropriate for me to speculate on whether Secretary Orr did during his tenure.

Secretary **Marsh**. Yes. Senator, there might be some restraint of communications that I personally have sent to the Secretary of Defense as a recommendation on which there has been no decision yet. In good faith, I do not think I can give you those, but I can give you now things that I have implemented or directed that the Army do.

Senator LEVIN. No, not the ones you have implemented—the ones that have not been implemented.

Secretary MARSH. Senator, I am not in a position to give you, without the consent of the Secretary of Defense, a recommendation I have given him on which there has been no decision.

Senator LEVIN. Would you then, all of you, let us know what recommendations you are not able to give us—not the substance but the fact that there has been a recommendation, the date of the recommendation and the fact that it has not yet been resolved by the Secretary of Defense? Just tell us that much, that there is a recommendation made to the Secretary of Defense on such-and-such a date and it has not yet been resolved. Can you do that?

Secretary MARSH. Senator, I am still cautious in responding to that request because I am a subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, and I do not disclose recommendations I make to the Secretary until he makes a decision. I will take this and I will go back to discuss your request with the Secretary of Defense.

[The information follows:]

Secretary MARSH. The Army is in the process of studying the feasibility of consolidating the National Guard Bureau Joint Staff and Army elements in the National Capital Region. The objective of the study is to determine if cost and manpower savings, as well as increased efficiency, can be achieved by placing all elements in one field location in addition to the Pentagon. The study, to be completed by early next year, will assess the cost of operations continuing status quo versus those associated with consolidation.

With regard to reductions in Army's organization, Army is in the process of completing an efficiency review of the Headquarters structure and related field operating agencies. Recommendations have slated some agencies for elimination or consolidation. As a minimum, all agencies will be reduced by 3 percent. Related to this is a recent request to our senior commanders to likewise embark on a review of their Headquarters' organizations. The Army Materiel Command has recently finished such a review. As part of this review, the Army Materiel Command Headquarters will be reduced by 10 percent over a 3-year period.

It is Army's practice to implement improvements in its organization and management structure when supporting evidence illustrates positive outcomes are possible to achieve.

Senator LEVIN. Let us know the answer to that question.

Now on the word "operations" again in the statute, let me go back to that. Secretary Marsh, let me start with you. Section 3012 says that there is a Secretary of the Army, who is the head of the Department of the Army, who is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army, including operations.

Do you have responsibility for the conduct of combat operations? Despite that statute you are saying you do not?

Secretary MARSH. No, I do not. The conduct of combat operations is within the purview of the National Command Authority, the Commander in Chief, the President, through the Secretary of Defense.

Senator LEVIN. Is it fair to say, then, Mr. Secretary, that despite the fact that the statute seems to give you the responsibility and the authority necessary to conduct all affairs, including operations, that that means "other than combat"? I am trying to see if the statute is ambiguous or not relative to your authority. Does this mean day-to-day operations of the Department?

Secretary **Marsh**. It is the day-to-day operations of the Army. The term "operations" does include all types of training operations, the movements of the fleets, the jumping of the 82d Airborne Division. The command structure for the deployment of our forces in combat is direct from the President to the Secretary of Defense down to the Unified Command by law.

[Additional information follows:]

Definition of Operations

With regard to the Service Secretaries, "operations" should include everything from training through exercises to combat operations. That does not mean being included in the chain of command to fight wars or to move forces around. It means being in the informational loop. The Service Secretaries must be kept informed, be able to have an input, and be able to make recommendations.,

Senator **Levin**. In order to save time, I would ask each of you for the record to submit any suggested change—you may like the word "operations"; you do not even have it, Secretary Lehman, in your statute—any suggested redefinition of the word "operations" in your statute to make clear what operations you have authority over and what operations you do not.

[The information follows:]

Mr. **Aldridge**. It is clear that, notwithstanding the reference to "operations" in section 8012(b)(1), the Secretary has had, since the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-599), no authority over the combat operations of Air Force individuals, units, or components. That Act set up a combat command system which ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense, *through* the Joint Chiefs of Staff (who, however, do not exercise command) to the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands, who exercise immediate combat command. The statutory basis for this system is found in 10 U.S.C. 124, which was originally part of the 1958 Act:

(a) With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall—

(1) establish unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands to perform military missions; and

(2) prescribe the force structure of those commands.

(b) The military departments shall assign forces to combatant commands established under this section to perform the missions of those commands. *A force so assigned is under the full operational command of the commander of the command to which it is assigned.* It may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only by authority of the Secretary and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary with the approval of the President. A force not so assigned, remains, for all purposes, in the military department concerned.

(c)(1) *Combatant commands established under this section are responsible to the President and the Secretary for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary with the approval of the President.*

(2) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the Chairman acts as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirements.

(d) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, each military department is responsible for the administration of forces assigned by that department to combatant commands established under this section. The Secretary shall assign the responsibility for the support of forces assigned to those commands to one or more of the military departments.

[Emphasis added.]

Conforming amendments clarify this command system: 10 U.S.C. 142(d) provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces"; 10 U.S.C. 143(d) states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces"; 10 U.S.C. 143(d) states that the Joint Staff "shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority".

Finally, 10 U.S.C. 8034(d)(4), dealing with the powers of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, states that he shall: "exercise supervision over such of the members and organizations of the Air Force as the Secretary of the Air Force determines. *Such supervisions shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the full operational command vested in unified or specified combatant commanders under section 124 of the title.*"

[Emphasis added.]

When these sections are taken together, it is clear the authority of the military departments (and thus that of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff) is limited to the training, equipping, organizing, and administration of the armed forces. Combatant command is quite separate, being lodged in the system described above.

In light of this, I personally doubt whether amendment of section 8012 is necessary. However, if it is desired to remove any facial ambiguity, that could be done by importing language similar to that used for the Chief of Staff in section 8034(d)(4), to make it explicit that the "operational" authority of the Secretary is to be exercised only in a manner consistent with the full operational command vested in the unified and specified commanders under section 124.

Secretary **Marsh**. Senator, if I can add to what you say, the situation occurs. Use the word "operations." Then you have several other duties that are training, personnel, management, logistics, et cetera. Even in the combat situations you are going to have a role that is played by the service Secretaries through things other than operations—logistics, personnel and training.

Senator **Levin**. I understand. Just any suggested definitional change or explanation of what that word "operations" means in the two sections would be helpful, at least to me, because it does relate a little bit to that other issue which is on the board.

[The information follows:]

Secretary **Marsh**. The Secretary of the Army's authority over "operations" of the Department of the Army is established by Chapter 303, Section 3012, U.S. Code, Title X. The term "operations" in this context means the day-to-day responsibility of running the Department's non-combat missions.

Under the provisions of Chapter 3, Section 124, U.S. Code, Title X, the Secretary is responsible for the administration and support of the Army forces assigned to a combatant command. The law further states that a force not assigned to a combat command "remains, for all purposes, in the military department concerned." Thus, the Secretary has operational authority over those Army forces not assigned to a unified or specified command.

Senator **Levin**. I just want to, for the sake of time, just ask one last question and then save those answers for the record.

Secretary Lehman, you at one point are quoted as saying that had you been Secretary of the Navy in the 1950's you would have opposed the deletion of service Secretaries from the chain of command.

Senator **Levin**. Those were my views about 3 years ago. Older and wiser that I am, I would not now recommend putting the service Secretaries or the service Chiefs back in the chain of command as they were then.

Senator **Levin**. Secretary Aldridge, would you agree with that?

Mr. **Aldridge**. I think you asked Secretary Lehman on the subject that he made a statement on.

Senator **Levin**. Would you agree they should not be in the chain of command?

Mr. **Aldridge**. They should not be.

Secretary **Marsh**. I agree with that, Senator, and Secretary Lehman expressed my view.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you. I am glad that wisdom does come with age, by the way. I look forward to a little myself.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Thurmond**. Additional questions for the hearing record will be inserted at this point.

[The questions with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeremiah Denton

Senator **Denton**. Gentlemen, we know that feasibility and readiness, logistics and training, the possibility of losses, are important determinants of the success or failure of any military operations. In that light, can you comment on the advantages or disadvantages of proposals to disestablish the JCS and allow the service Chiefs to return solely to service concerns, particularly in the area of bringing to bear knowledge of service logistics and training upon the preparation of advice for the National Command Authority?

Mr. **Taft**. The military advice received by the President must be based upon the best available knowledge, experience and expertise in military matters and must present all feasible options from every viable military perspective. It should contain objective and thorough evaluation of the pros and cons of all options. The mechanism for developing and providing the advice should be structured in a manner which guarantees that decision making and policy formulation are actually (not just nominally) reserved to, and exercised by, the President.

We believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the best entity for providing such military advice to the President. As heads of their respective Services, the JCS are the most knowledgeable of the special and particular capabilities and capacities, as well as the state of training and readiness, of the forces under their responsibility. Furthermore, the JCS system ensures the continuity between policy making and subsequent implementation that is essential to success, and it provides a sound balance between responsibility and accountability that would be absent in a group of advisors who possess merely advisory duties and functions entirely outside the operational or resource structure.

Replacing the JCS with a Joint Military Advisory Council as proposed in the SASC Staff Report would dramatically compromise the quality of military advice and would have a net harmful impact on our national security. The President and the Secretary of Defense have found the advice provided by the JCS to be consistently timely, accurate, competent and innovative. We believe, therefore, that the basic concept of the JCS system should be maintained.

This is not to say that the advice-giving mechanism of the JCS cannot be improved. For example, we would support certain proposals to strengthen the role of the Chairman of the JCS in this process, such as codifying the following functions now being performed by the Chairman: heading the JCS; attending NSC meetings subject to the direction of the President; and providing alternative views of the JCS. We could also support designation of the Chairman as the principal military advisor provided that his duty to present the alternative views of the JCS is clearly established in law.

JCS DISESTABLISHMENT PROPOSALS

Secretary **Marsh**. I subscribe fully to the view Secretary Weinberger expressed on this subject in his letter of December 2, 1985, to Senator Goldwater. Removing the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice would dramatically compromise the quality of that advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. By virtue of the daily decisions and information that comes before him, the Chief of Staff of the Army is the single uniformed officer best qualified to bring the full knowledge of the Army's capabilities to the joint arena. No other officer can combine the Chief's currency and integrated perspective on the entire range of the Army's business, including logistical and training readiness.

Secretary **Lehman**. Today, the necessity for truly joint military advice as well as fully responsible military planning is as great as when the Department of Defense was founded after World War II. I favor the continued double hatting of Service Chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Uniformed Chiefs of their respective services. To do otherwise would divorce the senior uniformed member responsible for strategy formulation, operational planning and advice to the National Command Authority from a genuine knowledge of day-to-day service readiness to carry out its missions. Our experience in war and peace bears out the wisdom of embodying in one man the thorough knowledge of service capabilities and the authority to plan for their operational use. To do otherwise invites confusion, delay and, in time of war or crises, disaster. Each Service Chief has a duly appointed assistant of four star rank whose job it is to relieve the Chief of some of the day-to-day burdens of administering the Service. This frees a Service Chief to devote adequate time to both his service responsibilities and his duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the case of both the Navy and Marine Corps, the system and the Service Chiefs are performing admirably. They manage Service and Joint Chiefs of Staff duties with no evidence whatsoever that Service responsibilities or loyalties temper their joint decision making capacity or advice to the detriment of the greatest national good. By avoiding fatal ivory tower theorizing which has historically characterized supreme staff organizations, dual-hatting assures realism in our nation's top military planning.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I see no advantage to the disestablishment of the JCS. In fact, I believe it would be a mistake to do away with the JCS. The knowledge of their services which the Service Chiefs bring to the JCS is essential to the development of effective and realistic joint plans and operations. At the same time, by participating in the JCS, the Service Chiefs gain time, by participating in the JCS, the Service Chiefs gain insights essential to effective and realistic Service planning for readiness, procurement, and training. This is essential in order for the Services to provide the most capable forces to the Unified and Specified commanders. Doing away with the JCS would degrade the Service Chiefs' ability to prepare their Services to fight and would also degrade the quality of military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

ADVICE TO NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

Senator DENTON. Gentlemen, we have heard a great deal thus far in our hearings about the actual or, more often, alleged deficiencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, it sometimes seems as if our series of hearings is really focused upon a possible reorganization of that body.

In consequence, we have been relating possible needs for changes to organizational structures to mistakes in wartime. This may be the wrong rationale for change. For example, in Vietnam the problems lay not with the military services and the JCS but with the policies followed or advocated by the President, the Congress, and the media, the makers and manipulators rather than the executors of policy.

Keeping in mind that there may well be a distinction between "routine" advice and advice that directly affects the conduct of large-scale military operations in a way, or actions in a high visibility crisis, such as military action, required in Lebanon, how would each of you evaluate the quality of advice provided to the National Command Authority by the JCS?

How could the advice be improved?

Would the creation of a deputy chairman of the JCS help, and if so, what should his role be?

Mr. TAFT. As the Secretary indicated during his testimony before this Committee, he is well satisfied with the quality of advice he receives from the JCS and believes that, as an institution, the JCS is the best means for providing military advice to the national command authorities. We would not, therefore, favor any change which eliminates the JCS or substantially alters its role in the national security decision-making process.

At the same time, however, we recognize that there is room for improvement in the advice-giving mechanisms of the JCS and we would support efforts to effect constructive change in those mechanisms. For example, we would support certain proposals to strengthen the role of the Chairman of the JCS, such as codifying the following functions now being performed by the Chairman: heading the JCS; attending NSC meetings subject to the direction of the President; and providing alternative views of the JCS. We could also support designation of the Chairman as the principal military advisor, provided that his duty to present the alternative views of the JCS is clearly established in law.

With respect to the second part of your question, we believe that the establishment of a four-star Vice Chairman would be particularly useful in strengthening the management authority of the Chairman over the Joint Staff, and we would have him concentrate his attention in this area. We do not believe, however, that the Vice Chairman should out-rank the JCS, or chair the JCS in the absence of the Chairman. The current system of rotating the acting Chairmanship on a quarterly basis among the JCS broadens their joint perspectives and enhances their effectiveness in both their joint and service roles. It gives each Chief the opportunity and experiences of serving as Chairman, and it settles, a year in advance, who is to be the acting Chairman.

Secretary MARSH. The President and Secretary of Defense are the best judges of the quality of JCS advice. They regard it highly as the Secretary of Defense has testified. I support that assessment. Several observers have drawn a distinction between JCS advice on key issues, especially when given in person, and their advice on other matters, for which they rely to a greater extent on the work of the Joint Staff. To the extent this distinction is valid, the JCS have already taken steps to improve the broad range of advice they provide, through recent changes to the joint staffing process, improvements in staff quality and better staff officer training. Creating a Deputy or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could help. The Chairman would determine his specific duties, but I could envision a Vice Chairman very effectively employed overseeing selected functions within the Joint Staff such as contingency planning, joint exercises or representation of CINC resource interests.

Secretary LEHMAN. The Secretary of Defense has stated on many occasions that he is satisfied with the quality of advice he receives from the JCS.

I agree that a four star Deputy/Vice Chairman should be established. However, the Vice Chairman should not out-rank the Service Chiefs and he should not act as Chairman in the absence of the Chairman. The current system of rotating the acting chairmanship on a quarterly basis among the JCS broadens their joint and service roles. It gives each Chief the opportunity and experience of serving as Chairman, and it settles, a year in advance, who is to be the acting Chairman. Both the Vice Chairman position and the acting Chairmanship system should be established in statute.

Mr. ALDRIDGE. I agree with your assessment concerning the impediments placed on military advice during the Vietnam war. I can say that so far as I am aware the advice provided by the JCS to the National Command Authorities during the last five years has been useful and timely. Despite occasional misperceptions to the contrary conveyed through the media, in my view, the JCS have consistently provided realistic assessments and made correct and timely recommendations on the various issues they have been asked to address by the national leadership. I believe the best way that the advice provided by the JCS can be further improved is for the close working relationship between the civilian leadership and JCS to continue.

The creation of a Vice Chairman would be useful to assist the Chairman and the JCS arena. A Vice Chairman could also serve to assist the Chairman in working with the joint staff to provide the necessary background information and supporting data needed by the Chairman and the JCS to make informed decisions. Structured in this manner the JCS could be even more responsive to the National Command Authorities in providing carefully developed advice to support our national security objectives. I agree with the Service Chiefs that the Vice Chairman should not function as the Chairman in his absence. The current procedure of the Chiefs rotating in the Chairman's position in his absence should be continued.

DOD MISSIONS

Senator DENTON. Gentlemen, the Senate Committee staff report contains a listing of Department of Defense missions, and the subsequent analysis is based upon the evalution of the abiltiy to fulfill those missions. The missions defined are nuclear deterrence, maritime superiority, power projection superiority, defense of NATO Europe, defense of East Asia, and defense of Southwest Asia.

I do not recall having seen those missions defined as the missions of the Department during my time in the service, or in official DOD documents since that time. Are they familiar to you, and do you consider them an adequate or effective presentation of the mission of the Defense Department and the military Services?

Mr. TAFT. The mission formulation presented in the study report is one that is frequently used to aggregate similar policy and resource management activities. Those activities identified in the report's recommendations are currrently given cross-functional focus and top management attention by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Within his office, the Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy is responsible for strategic nuclear matters, NATO, and European affairs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs handles general purpose forces and other regions of the world.

The military definition of mission, on the other hand, is more specific and clearly relates military purposes to the operational tasks to be performed. This formulation breaks out into the following representative list of missions.

Army: Sustained combat operations on land to include:

Infantry, armor, artillery, air, and airborne missions and their related support
Air defense
Special operations
Tactical air lift
Reconnaissance
Space operations

Navy-Marine Corps: Sustained combat operations at sea to include:

Protecting sea lanes of communication
Submarine and anti-submarine activities
Amphibious
Air operations, to include—close air support, air superiority, interdiction, air defense
Strategic and tactical nuclear
Minelaying
Reconnaissance
Strategic and tactical air lift
Special operations
Space operations

Air Force: Sustained combat operations in the air to include:

Strategic air warfare
Air superiority
Close air support
Interdiction
Air defense
Stragetic and tactical nuclear
Reconaissance
Special operations
Strategic and tactical nuclear
Space operations

Experience has demonstrated that the above mission formulation is more responsive to effective accomplishment of Military Service operation objectives than would be the case with the mission structure proposed in the study report.

Secretary **Marsh**. The missions are familiar to me, and they are being performed every day within the current organizational structure of DOD. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has the responsibility for integrating across broad mission areas, including the six missions stated in the staff report and others, such as security of the Western Hemisphere.

Secretary **Lehman**. The major missions structure proposed in the DOD reorganization report are interesting but inadequate for capturing the full scope of the Department's policy making, operational, and resource responsibilities. The proposed framework does not adequately address such future challenges to U.S. interests as Latin America, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin, and Africa or the role of U.S. forces in confronting terrorism or in low intensity conflicts not involving the Soviet Union.

The Services carry out their missions within a framework of national strategy, in coordination with one another and in combined planning with U.S. allies. U.S. National Strategy can be summarized as follows:

To deter aggression and coercion against the United States and its allies, friends, and vital interests.

Should deterrence fail, to seek the earliest termination of conflict on terms favorable to the United States, our allies, and our national security objectives, while seeking to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict.

In order to achieve these objectives, the respective services are tasked with primary and collateral functions by Department of Defense Instructions 5100.1.

The Department of the Navy is tasked:

To organize, train, and equip the Navy with forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea based aircraft and land based naval air components-specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces, and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in areas of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land and air operations as may be essential to prosecution of a naval campaign.

Mr. **Alridge**. The missions identified in the SASC staff study are currently incorporated within the Department of Defense through a cross-functional focus and top management attention by the Under Secretary of Defense of Policy. The functional approach to the organization of OSD provides the best means for integrating the capabilities of the military Services with as few people as possible. Although there may be circumstances in which a mission-oriented approach should be used to deal with a specific matter, it should not be applied as a general practice because it would lead to unnecessary duplication at higher staffing levels and would impair the ability of the Department to promote economy and efficiency across mission lines.

The current organizational design of the Department's major military headquarters components is compatible with and responsive to mission objectives. I believe that this sets the proper balance between missions and functions.

Senator **THURMOND**. We thank you for your presence and be assured your testimony will be very beneficial to this committee.

We now stand ajourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SDG-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond, (acting chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, Wilson, Nunn and Levin.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; and Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Richard D. Finn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, and Patricia L. Watson, research assistants; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; Nancy Soderberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND, PRESIDING

Senator THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

This morning the Armed Services Committee meets to conduct another in its series of hearings on the organization and decision-making procedures of the Defense Department and the Congress.

The committee is privileged today to receive testimony from three former civilian officials of the Department of Defense. All three have had long experience in national security affairs, especially in defense organization matters.

Our first witness, Hon. Melvin Laird, is well known to all of us for his active and distinguished record of public service. Mr. Laird served as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973. Before assuming that important position, he served as a Member of the House of Representatives for many years.

It is particularly relevant to keep in mind that Mr. Laird was a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee when

President Eisenhower submitted his defense reorganization proposals in 1958.

The second witness on our panel is Dr. Lawrence Korb, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Installation and Logistics. Earlier this year Dr. Korb left the Defense Department after more than 4 years of service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Before joining the Reagan administration, he taught on the faculties of several schools, including the Naval War College, and wrote an interesting history of the institution of the JCS entitled "The Joint Chiefs of Staff; The First Twenty-Five Years."

The third witness from whom we will hear today is Mr. Philip Odeen. Mr. Odeen has had extensive experience on the National Security Council Staff and in the Department of Defense, where he was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis.

Most recently he served as chairman of the Defense Organization Project sponsored by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. That project issued a very useful report entitled "Toward a More Effective Defense."

Gentlemen, I would like to thank you for taking the time to testify before the committee this morning. The three of you offer a valuable combination of "Hands-on" experience and academic scholarship in the area of defense organization.

I would ask at this point that the statement of Senator Dixon be included in the hearing record.

[The opening statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, this is our seventh hearing on the comprehensive staff study of the Department of Defense. Today we will receive testimony on organization and decisionmaking procedures from Hon. Melvin R. Laird, former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lawrence J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, and Mr. Philip A. Odeen, chairman of the Georgetown CSIS Defense Organization Project.

Mr. Chairman, my review of the staff study has led me to believe that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff have a little authority but not enough. The Secretary has too many people to control. The study by the staff recommends realigning the Office of Secretary and cutting his span of control. One area the Secretary should have more over is the procurement process. This process is now dominated by the individual services. The services determine their requirements and do the buying. The Secretary must approve new weapon projects and supervise them somewhat during the research and development period. But the individual military services manage the projects. This system does not provide weapons to fight a joint service military engagement (one only has to realize that the Navy has communication systems that can't talk to the Army) most efficiently, but more importantly each service makes procurement decisions based on its own ideas of military strategy. I think that the system must be changed to give the Office of the Secretary of Defense more control in this area. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also must enter into this chain with more authority.

As I understand the system, the present Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is composed of the four services plus the Chairman. However, even though the Chairman is the senior man, the Chairman has little power. Instead of providing joint advice to the President and the Secretary, positions are arrived at through "log rolling." No service will attack another's vital interest. This system should be changed. Recommendations should be strong. There should be strong, forceful dissent and expression in each service, but then the Chairman should be the military statesman not the services' partisan. Mr. Chairman, I do not agree with the staff study's recommendation to forming a new organization called the Joint Military Advisory Council but I do believe that we should make the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a much stronger position, just as we should strengthen the unified commanders. Also, I believe that the service Chiefs should be warriors not businessmen.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing these ideas today.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Laird, do you have a written statement?

Secretary LAIRD. I have some notes, Mr. Chairman, that I would refer to, if I could.

Senator THURMOND. If any of you have written statements, we will put your entire statement in the record. If you can give us the thrust of it, maybe in 5 or 10 minutes, it will save time.

Mr. Laird, we will be glad to hear from you first.

STATEMENT HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to express my appreciation to the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and especially to you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Nunn.

I regret that I am here on a day when the chairman of this committee, Senator Barry Goldwater, lost his wife. I have known the Goldwaters for a long period of time. I want to express my regret over the passing of Mrs. Goldwater.

I was out in Arizona quite recently. I knew Mrs. Goldwater was not in very good health. I regret that I am here on a day that arrangements are being made for her funeral.

Senator THURMOND. We are indeed regretful, of course, about Mrs. Goldwater's passing.

I would ask at this time if Senator Nunn has an opening statement.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming our distinguished guests this morning. I know all of them personally. They span a great deal of wisdom and experience in the defense industry.

When Secretary Laird was in Congress, he worked on the 1958 Reorganization Act when President Eisenhower was pushing some changes.

Mr. Korb has been here in the most recent administration under Secretary Weinberger.

Mr. Odeen not only has been in the Defense Department, but also has had tremendous influence in the Georgetown study.

All of them are very distinguished.

I share Secretary Laird's statement about Senator Goldwater. I know all of us have our thoughts and prayers with Senator Goldwater and his whole family this morning.

Also, I might note General Abrahamson, who heads up the Strategic Defense Initiative, has lost his wife in a tragedy. Our heartfelt sympathy goes out to General Abrahamson and his family, too.

Senator THURMOND. I would like to extend my sympathy to General Abrahamson. I had not heard about the tragedy in his family.

Mr. Laird, you may proceed.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I regret I was unable to accept the invitation of the chairman and Senator Nunn to spend a weekend this fall at your retreat at Camp A.P. Hill. It is always a pleasure for me to visit with my former colleagues here in Congress, particularly so when it is to discuss such an important issue as defense reorganization.

During my nine terms on the House Defense Appropriations Committee and in my 4 years as Secretary of Defense, I have found that my congressional experience in dealing with defense matters stood me in good stead.

Although I have been the only Secretary of Defense to have served on any of the four committees in the House and the Senate that dealt with the Armed Forces, I would recommend that congressional service be a requirement for future Secretaries of Defense.

For the past 2 years I have had the opportunity to serve with Phil Odeen and with Gen. Andy Goodpaster on a study which was sponsored by the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University. This was the so-called Defense Organization Project.

This project involved a very extensive study of the entire defense establishment. It involved 70 former civilian and military officials, retired military officials, Members of Congress, and others. I commend this study to you.

It is my firm conclusion that the current national defense debate has maintained a myopic focus on the level of defense expenditures, a few controversial weapon systems and some perceived abuses by defense contractors.

The debate has neglected the more fundamental issues of how to give coherent direction to the integrated military planning and operations necessary to our national defense effort. This neglect of organizational issues, particularly the organization of the military command structure, is self-defeating.

Without an effective command structure, no level of defense spending, whether it is dictated by Gramm-Rudman or any other way, will be sufficient to meet the needs of our Nation's security.

It was my pleasure in 1958 to be involved with the recommendations of the then President Dwight D. Eisenhower. At that time he sought to transform the military command structure in order to achieve three objectives.

First, to provide cross-service military advice to civilian leaders.

Second, to develop strategic plans that link military capabilities to national objectives.

And, third, to ensure the unity of operational command of the U.S. Armed Forces in the field.

None of these objectives, although they were first set forth by President Eisenhower in 1958 when he came to the Congress, have been fully achieved.

It is the finishing of the work of President Eisenhower and achieving these three objectives that the Congress should direct its reform efforts, I believe.

I have gone over the report of your staff. I feel your staff report has considerable merit, but I do feel that it goes too far and I believe that the recommendations of the Georgetown Institute in our study are practical and can be achieved.

First, let us look at military advice.

MILITARY ADVICE

Professional military advice that rises above individual service interests to provide a broader service prospective is an essential ingredient for the effective direction and management of the Defense establishment.

In all Defense activities from the formulation of an overall national security strategy to decisions to use the Armed Forces civilian leaders need sound and timely military advice. Today that advice comes primarily from the services, reflecting their traditions and interests as well as their expertise.

What is lacking is an independent cross-service perspective. As now organized, the JCS are too frequently unable to provide effective cross-service advice on issues that affect important service interests and prerogatives. These issues include the most important on the JCS agenda.

The formulation of national military strategy.

The distribution of service roles and missions.

And particularly, the allocation of scarce defense resources among competing needs.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The absence of a strong independent joint military voice also undercuts the strategic planning process that links ends (national objectives established by the political authorities), and means (the military forces, weapons, and capabilities developed by the service departments).

The Chairman is the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who is unconstrained by current service responsibilities. But he lacks both staff and the statutory mandate to make consistently meaningful strategic planning recommendations on the broad range of strategic subjects required.

The service Chiefs, on the other hand, control large staffs, but the inherent conflict between their joint and service responsibilities has precluded their effective participation in resource planning.

As the 1978 Steadman report on military command structure pointed out, a Chief cannot be expected to argue for additional aircraft carriers, Army divisions or Air Force wings when constructing a service budget and then argue in the joint forum that such programs should be dropped in favor of another service's program.

As a result, the JCS are unable to help civilian leaders set cross-service priorities and make the necessary trade-off to construct the defense program and budget.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

This is another point that President Eisenhower stressed rather strongly in 1957 and 1958. The commanders of American combat forces, the unified and specified commanders, so-called CINCs, labor under a structure that assigns operational control of all forces in the field, but denies them adequate influence over such vitally related matters as training, logistics and readiness of their forces.

As a consequence, these commanders face fragmented logistics on many occasions. They have had excessive layering, and I am sure you have noticed this on your visits, excessive layering of headquarters staffs, and lack uniform command-wide assessments of the readiness of their forces.

Moreover, they often command several component forces, each of which has been designed to fight a different type of war. In short, American combat commanders may well lack the peacetime authority to fulfill their wartime operational responsibilities.

The causes of these deficiencies in military advice, planning, and operations are structural, not the product of any given set of incumbents.

Indeed, it has been my experience that the caliber of our military leaders has been exceedingly exceptional. These officers, however, have had to operate in an unbalanced system. The system allows strong vertical inputs from the individual services, but fails to promote adequate horizontal integration of those inputs by joint military institutions.

There is an urgent need for reform to eliminate the weakness of the Joint Military Command and the staff apparatus to enable them to execute the cross-service integration for which they were conceived.

Specifically, three components of the National Military Command structure require strengthening. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Staff, the Joint Staff and the unified and specified commanders.

Let me refer to the Chairman. To improve the utility and relevance of the military service and planning, the National Security Act should be amended to have the Chairman replace the corporate JCS as the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.

Although the view of the service Chiefs should continue to be provided to the Chairman on all issues and to the civilian leaders on those few issues of crucial importance, the Chairman should have the authority and the staff to ensure that the political leaders receive professional military advice not tied to the individual service perspective.

As the only member of the JCS who is not also a service Chief, the Chairman is uniquely situated to provide such broad-gauged independent military advice.

I should like to state that during the 4 years that I was Secretary of Defense, I operated this way, although some say it was contrary to the law. I handled all of my orders to the CINCs and initiated every order going to the CINCs, but issued them in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He actually signed all operational orders. However, no operational order was issued without my initials on that order.

As you know, under the current 1958 law, the order should have come directly from me through the CINC, but I did it through the Chairman because I felt that was the best way of operation.

THE JOINT STAFF

To support the Chairman in the effective development of the cross-service and recommendations, the Joint Staff should report directly and exclusively to the Chairman. He should also be assigned a four-star deputy to promote continuity and joint military leadership.

But giving the Chairman greater authority over the Joint Staff and his deputy will only improve cross-service military integration if the military personnel system is also modified. Officers must be attracted to, trained for and rewarded for service in joint positions. Toward this end each service should establish a "joint specialty" that selected officers could enter, in addition to their traditional service specialities.

THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDERS

As the primary operational commanders of U.S. forces in wartime, the unified and specified commanders should be assigned greater peacetime authority over the training, readiness, and logistics of their forces.

Congress recently took a step in this direction by designating the Chairman of the JCS as the commanders' representative in Washington for operational requirements. Further measures are needed, such as those contained in the House bill that recently has received favorable action in the House.

However, in particular, the commanders themselves should have more direct input in the formulation of programs and budgets intended to increase combat readiness. They should also have direct control over some of the financial resources, particularly those appropriated for operational expenses of forces in the field.

Moreover, in order to eliminate the confusion and the imprecision of having a committee in the operational chain of command, the Chairman should replace the JCS as the transmitter of civilian orders to the unified and specified commands.

The proposals outlined above would strengthen the influence and authority of the joint military establishment to ensure that timely cross-service military advice and planning is provided to civilian leaders.

Nothing in these measures would determine civilian control of the military. To the contrary, better professional military advice and planning would give civilian officials a sounder grasp of the implications and likely outcomes of employment of Armed Forces, thereby enhancing their practical control of the military as a complement to their existing statutory authority.

The waning years of the 20th century and the early years of the next will be difficult ones. Our adversaries will continue to test and probe our defenses while our allies will continue to look to us for leadership and support. U.S. interests around the world will demand constant vigilance and preparedness for action.

We cannot afford to waste the scarce defense dollars, nor can we afford to allow organizational deficiencies to impair the effectiveness of our military forces. The stakes, Mr. Chairman, are just too high.

Thank you.

Senator **THURMOND**. Thank you very much.

Now I think we will hear from all the witnesses first and then come back to questions.

Our next witness is Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Installations and Logistics.

Dr. Korb, we are pleased to have you with us. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE J. KORB, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

Dr. **Korb**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn and Senator Cohen.

I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Secretary Laird about the untimely passing of Mrs. Goldwater.

I spent most of my adult life being concerned with questions of defense organization, first from an academic viewpoint and then in the last 4½ years being deeply immersed in the process.

My conclusion, as I point out in my prepared statement, is that the system is broken and needs to be fixed. I commend the Congress and particularly this committee for taking a lead in this area because too often in the past it has been the Congress that has resisted efforts by the executive branch to reorganize the Department of Defense.

I also would like to commend the report of this committee. I have read everything that has ever been written on Defense organization during my academic career and this is a very first-rate job.

We have had a longstanding problem in this country in deciding basically how much centralization we want to have in the Department of Defense. I think this is at the heart of the issue that we need to deal with.

The leaders in the Department of Defense, because of statutory restrictions, as well as historical traditions, many times have to act more like weak mayors than strong executives.

We need to acknowledge the fact that we will have to leave intact the separate services or the separate military departments, but increase the formal powers of the two executives in the Department of Defense who represent the centralizing tendencies, that is, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I agree with the thrust of the report by the Georgetown Center which notes that any proposals for change must be modest rather than radical to have a realistic chance of being accepted. Therefore, I recommend that the two most critical areas that the Congress and the committee must deal with are the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the span of control of the Secretary of Defense.

I urge the committee in the strongest possible terms to support H.R. 3622 which increases the formal powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my view, this would enable the Chairman to give to the civilian leaders good cross-service, but, more importantly, would enable this Nation to conduct our military operations more coherently than they have been in the past.

I also urge the committee to do something about reducing the span of control of the Secretary of Defense. In my view, the Secretary of Defense should deal with approximately eight people, four Under Secretaries, one in the area of research and engineering, and one in the area of readiness, one in the area of policy, one in the area of financial management; a strong Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and three service Secretaries. Every other individual occupying a statutory position in DOD should report to the Secretary through one of these individuals.

We simply cannot create a new Assistant Secretary level position reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense every time there is a perceived problem. In the time between when I went into the Pentagon until now we have forced certain issues up to the Secretary of Defense level that used to be handled below him. Issues like total force, readiness and acquisition have been forced up from Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary level to the level of Secretary of Defense, forcing him to deal too often with issues that should not reach his level. Because of that, he does not have the time to deal with the issues that only he can.

I do not think, as the committee's report suggested, that we need to have a Joint Military Council. That is too radical a proposal. We do not need to separate authority and responsibility from the members of the JCS.

H.R. 3622 will give the Chairman all the authority he needs to transcend those service viewpoints.

I do not believe, as the committee recommends, that we need a mission-oriented system of Under Secretaries. The functional system will work if we cut out the span of control of the Secretary of Defense.

There are many other changes that need to be made. Let me mention a few. I am glad that Congress is considering the subject of biennial budgeting and that the Congress recognizes it is asking DOD to submit too many reports to it each year.

We also need to be concerned about getting and keeping good people in the Department of Defense. It is important that we act now because if we do not cure these real organization and management problems, we will never restore the confidence of the American people in the Department of Defense and we will not be able to rebuild the consensus that existed but a few short years ago that we need to keep improving our defense capabilities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Dr. Korb follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Vice President, Corporate Operations, Raytheon Co.

It is indeed a pleasure and a privilege to appear before the committee today to discuss the critical area of defense organization. I can think of no subject that is more important to the future health of our national security, and I commend the committee for having its staff prepare the detailed report on this subject. It is a landmark study of defense organization.

The organization of the Department of Defense is an area that has concerned me most of my adult life. From the late 1960's through 1980, I approached the subject from an academic perspective. My research focused primarily on the JCS and the distribution of functions between OSD and the services. From early 1981 through September of this year, I served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense with responsibilities for the areas of Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics. Thus, I was a participant in and a direct observer of the decisionmaking process within the Department.

Based upon my research and personal involvement in the process, I am convinced that the system is broke and that there is need for change. It is significant that this committee is taking the initiative in this area. Too often in the past, Members of

Congress have resisted efforts by the Executive Branch to fix the organization problems of the DOD.

The organization of the DOD has been defective since its establishment almost four decades ago. DOD's organizational structure was a compromise between those who supported a unified department and those who wanted a bifurcated structure. Several Secretaries of Defense and Presidents have tried to fix those shortcomings but have been thwarted by a combination of bureaucratic inertia and inaccurate historical analogies, for example, the "man on horseback" and the "German General staff". What is surprising is not that the Department functions poorly but that, given its organization problems, it functions at all. If we were designing the Department from scratch, we would not have created such an organizational monstrosity. Indeed, it is a tribute to the management skills of many of the people who have occupied the post of Secretary of Defense that DOD has performed as well as it has.

The basic problem with the Department of Defense is that it is not one department. In reality it is at least four departments each with its formal powers and constituencies that force the top civilian and military executives, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS, to act more like weak mayors rather than chief executives. The Department of Defense still is much more a confederacy than a unitary form of organization.

However, given the fact that the separate military departments have long histories and proud traditions, as a practical matter they cannot be eliminated. What any organization reform must do is to increase the likelihood that the top executives in the Department can manage DOD in spite of the centrifugal tendencies caused by the existence of the separate departments and services. Given these tendencies, I do not believe that there can be too much formal power given to the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman.

However, my research and experience tells me that increased centralization must be done on an evolutionary basis if it is to have any hope of gaining the necessary political support. Therefore, I recommend that two comparatively modest steps be taken now. First, the formal powers of the Chairman of the JCS must be strengthened. Second, the span of control of the Secretary must be reduced. These steps will not only alleviate the most critical problems currently facing the Department but they also have an excellent chance of gaining the necessary support.

The bill recently passed by the House, H.R. 3622, goes a long way toward accomplishing the first objective. Along with many other former defense officials, I signed a letter supporting the bill before the House vote. I urge you in the strongest possible terms to support the bill. H.R. 3622 will enable the Chairman to manage the OJCS more effectively and to provide the Secretary and the President with advice on operations, budgets, and strategy that transcends service viewpoints.

It always amazed me how we could expect a Chairman of the JCS to function effectively without his own staff or own deputy. It would be like expecting the captain of a warship to operate a ship effectively when its crew was responsible not to him but all the officers on the ship and where different officers, rather than the executive officer, would act in his stead.

I do not believe that at this time we need or could get consensus to replace the JCS with a Joint Military Advisory Council. We ought to see if the evolutionary changers brought about by H.R. 3622 will be sufficient to accomplish the same purpose.

Because of its centrifugal tendencies and because of the scope of its activities, the Department of Defense is extremely difficult to manage. If the span of control of the Secretary is too great, it is practically impossible. At the present time, the number of people reporting directly to the Secretary is far too numerous. In fact it is almost ridiculous. It seems like every time DOD has an actual or perceived problem, a new Assistant Secretary level position is created. During my four and one half years in the Pentagon, the positions of Reserve Affairs, Command, Control and Communications, Acquisition and Logistics, and Test and Evaluation were added to the rolls of those reporting directly to the Secretary.

Nearly every problem in the DOD must be resolved by the Secretary or the Deputy. Everything from AIDS to acquisition seems to require the direct involvement of the Secretary. The situation is getting worse instead of better. Two years ago the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering was the acquisition czar while my office handled readiness. Now both of these responsibilities have been shifted to the front office.

The Secretary of Defense should control the Department through eight individuals: a powerful chairman, the three services secretaries, and four undersecretaries, specifically research and engineering, readiness, policy, and financial affairs. All other officials, except for the secretary's immediate staff people like the general counsel, and the assistants for public and legislative affairs, ought to report to the Secretary through these eight individuals.

If the 98th Congress can take at least these two modest steps it will have gone a very long way toward fixing the problems that exist. If these two steps do not accomplish that objective serious consideration should be given to the other recommendations in the staff report. The time for action is now.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Dr. Korb.

We are very pleased to hear from Mr. Philip A. Odeen, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, chairman of the Georgetown CSIS Defense Organization Project.

STATEMENT OF PHILIP A. ODEEN, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, CHAIRMAN OF THE GEORGETOWN CSIS DEFENSE ORGANIZATION PROJECT

Mr. ODEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

Again, I would like to say I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to testify on this most important issue. I compliment the committee for its rigorous searching and detailed look at this issue which is one well worth your time and talent.

Second, I would like to compliment the staff on the report which I find very, very useful and will I am sure be a source document on this topic for many, many years.

In my prepared remarks, which I will insert in the record, I talk about the major organization problems, as I perceive them, that the Department of Defense faces today. The committee staff report lays them out quite clearly, but there are three that I believe deserve particular attention. Let me very briefly mention them and then I will shift to my specific recommendations.

The first major concern I have is the inadequacy of planning, starting with the strategic level in terms of laying out the strategic direction for structuring our forces, developing our weapon systems, and making decisions on overall defense capability. As Secretary Laird stated earlier, that has been a problem for many, many years.

Second, we do not do a good job of planning our forces, the kinds of weapons, the number and type of combat units and the balance of readiness versus modernization.

Finally, and perhaps most serious, our war and contingency planning is seriously flawed. The major exercises, going back several years to "Nifty Nugget," have repeatedly shown that our plans for major wars are not well prepared. Moreover, past crises have shown that our contingency planning is weak; the plans are often not realistic and often have serious shortcomings.

My second broad concern is that the resource allocation process, planning programming and budgeting, is weak in many cases. It is not soundly based on clear strategy. The overall process is extremely detailed, complicated, and so long and time consuming that it exhausts all parties. Resource allocation has a very heavy input focus, emphasizing manpower, research, and procurement, rather than outputs. We give little attention to the missions of our forces which should be a major focus in making budget decisions.

Finally, in my view, and I know it is shared by many participants in the executive branch, the congressional role in recent years has become so demanding, so time consuming and repetitive, that it diverts defense leadership from the internal management tasks that should be taking more of their time.

I see four areas of specific reform that I would propose for your consideration today.

The first and I think perhaps the most important is to try to refocus and redirect the energies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. OSD, the staff group that supports the Secretary, is clearly the most critical, the most powerful and influential element in the Defense establishment. Unfortunately, today I do not believe it carries out its key functions as effectively as it should. It's basic functions are:

First, to provide overall direction to the Department.

Second, to make tough resource allocation decisions.

Finally, to follow up and evaluate the performance of the services to be sure they carry out the directives of the Congress and the President's strategy and objectives.

To do this job better, I think four things are needed:

First, I concur with the staff report that there needs to be a stronger mission or output focus to the office of the Secretary of Defense. At present it is heavily input-oriented by such things as manpower, personnel, research, finance, and so forth.

There is relatively little attention to the output or missions of the Department of Defense. This can be achieved in many ways, including the approach the staff report suggests which is to fundamentally reorient and restructure the entire office.

It can also be done along the lines of the Georgetown study that I chaired with Mr. Laird which recommended taking the policy office and restructuring it along mission lines so that you will have one major element of OSD that is worrying about output. You still have the functional or input focus to ensure those functions are carried out well.

The third approach which Secretary McNamara and Secretary Brown carried out when they were Secretary is to have a strong PA&E or system analysis staff which does the cross cutting analysis and focuses on the missions.

Any one of these three approaches will work, but some movement in that direction is essential.

Second, OSD must give greater attention to the provision of strategic guidance and in setting priorities for the service programs. We simply have not historically done a good job of laying out for the services what kinds of military capability they should be developing to support the President's objectives. We often fail to set clear priorities. In other cases we have laid out too many objectives and then failed to set priorities. When choices had to be made, they were not made with some sense of priority based on the President's objectives.

Third, we need to reform the budget process. It is a complicated problem, but let me mention two things which could help. One is a biennial budget and biennial authorization would be a great benefit to the Department as well as to the Congress.

Second, the budget should have more output or mission focus than it does at present. I have already discussed the reasons for this.

Finally, the focus for OSD's management should be to follow-up to exercise oversight and evaluation of service efforts rather than being as involved in the nitty-gritty details of service programs as they are today.

The second major area of reform is the need to provide better cross-service military advice. Both Secretary Laird and Dr. Korb discussed this issue, so I will not repeat my comments here. I am largely in agreement with what they said. We need to move to strengthen the Chairman and, again, I believe the House bill makes sense.

Second, it is essential we take steps to improve and strengthen the CINCs and give them greater authority in such areas as planning, resource allocation, and operations.

The third area I would suggest needs reform is internal management of the Department of Defense. First, we have to fix responsibility. At present everyone is doing everything and authority and responsibility for the actual day-to-day management of programs is diffused and unclear.

It seems to me that only the services can, in fact, do that job. Defense is too large for OSD to manage on a line item basis, let alone have the Congress try to do that. We have to give the service Secretaries and the service Chiefs, that responsibility. We must make it clear to them that is their key role and we must give them the authority to carry out that responsibility. I might add that a side benefit of JCS reform is that it would free up some of the time the chiefs now spend on solving the routine joint issues and enable them to spend more time on the management issues of the services.

Second, I believe we have to simplify the service management structures. It makes sense to consider combining the civilian Secretariat and military staffs to eliminate at least one layer of staff and have the service Secretaries and key assistants rely more heavily on the military staffs.

It is also important that we look hard at the service systems commands. They are large, complicated bureaucracies that develop, procure and maintain all the weapons of the services. Thus, they play the key role in the weapons acquisition and support effort.

Here I might commend the step that Secretary Lehman took a few months ago to abolish the Navy Materiel Command Headquarters which has been done without any loss of effectiveness or without any negative impact. In fact, it has had many positive aspects including saving money and time.

Finally, I believe the headquarters staffs can be pared down, but to do this will require OSD and probably the Congress as well to back down on some of the detailed involvement in day-to-day management. If you expect their headquarters staff to be cut, the higher authorities that create much of their paper work also must be reduced.

The final area of reform is acquisition, an issue this committee and the Congress have spent an enormous amount of time on in recent years. I do not claim to be a great expert in this field, but let me make a few general comments.

My sense is, and I believe most of my colleagues who have been deeply involved in this process, feel that the current system has become so cumbersome and complex, that it is about to collapse of its own weight. The acquisition regulations resemble the Tax Code in its size and complexity, which is no endorsement.

We have to consider taking a fresh start in this area, not simply going back to make marginal changes to this excessively cumbersome system. I believe the Packard Commission will be looking at ideas along this line. I certainly hope they come up with some fresh ideas that will be worthy of your attention.

There are a number of things we should look hard at related to the procurement process. We should look at large commercial enterprises and see how they buy complex equipment, spare parts, and more routine items. We can learn from them and we can also learn from some foreign countries.

We need a procurement system that relies primarily on incentives, not on regulations to make sound decisions. The present process is almost entirely focused on regulatory controls. That is the wrong thrust. The task is too big, too complicated to rely on regulations. We have to put in better incentives for the contractors and for the services in the process.

We obviously need more competition, but it should not be simpleminded awards to the lowest bidder in all cases. We have to make sure the bidder is capable of doing the job and will provide a quality product.

Moreover we have to have continuous competition, not just up front, paper competition. We should continue competition whenever possible as the weapons are developed and produced.

Before I close let me make one final comment regarding the people equation. We often hear the statement that it is people that count, not organization boxes. I certainly would not disagree that people are important. But organization matters do, in fact, have an impact on effectiveness.

The staff report's covering letter has a wonderful quote from Jim Schlesinger about the way poor organizations can, in fact, impede the very best people from doing a good job. There, we have to focus on organization as well as people problems.

Nevertheless, the people issues are, in fact, serious. My sense, at least, is that over the last 10 to 15 years we have lost more and more of our best people in the Pentagon on both the civilian and military sides of the ledger. Moreover, it is much more difficult to recruit good people for senior Defense positions at this time.

Unless we can get good people running these organizations, we have no hope of really solving the management problems. This requires addressing tough issues such as the pay caps which I think are a major problem. It means taking a hard look at the conflict of interest statutes that have been passed. I understand the reasons for them, but they make it very difficult to attract the best technical and engineering talent to our Government, the kind of people we need very badly to manage these programs.

I urge you [illegible] look not only at the organization issues, but to consider the people equation as well.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the chance to testify this morning. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The statement of Mr. Odeen follows:]

Prepared Statement of Philip A. Odeen

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee:

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. You are considering a most critical issue, how to best organize and manage the Department of Defense to increase the ability of our forces to carry out their combat missions and to minimize the cost to the taxpayers of supporting the defense establishment. This matter is of great consequence to our country and I commend you for addressing it in such a rigorous and searching manner. I also commend your staff for the outstanding report they prepared. While I disagree with a few of the recommendations, the historical perspective, analysis of current problems, and assessment of the options to remedy the problems are all excellent. I am certain this report will serve for many years as the point for anyone examining these issues.

Defense organization and management is always a matter of great consequence for our Nation. But, in my view, it is especially critical at this point in time. There are three primary reasons for this judgment.

We face a period when defense budgets will be under heavy pressure. To be realistic, essentially flat funding levels seem likely for the next several years at least.

The threat from the Soviet Union continues to grow and instability in many areas of the world poses increased risks to U.S. interests and the interests of our allies.

Public confidence in the military establishment has declined sharply, undercutting your efforts to provide needed funds. This trend is unlikely to be reversed unless the public is convinced that real reforms are being made to the way the Department conducts its affairs.

I do not intend to summarize the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies report, "Toward a More Effective Defense." I will, of course, be delighted to respond to any questions you may have on that study. Instead, I will focus on three topics:

1. The problems we face which make restructuring and reform essential at this time. The Staff Report does this most effectively, but I would like to highlight a few specific areas that I believe are of particular concern.
2. The most criticial changes to present organization and management procedures that are needed to solve these problems.
3. A brief assessment of the benefits to our military posture and defense management we can expect to gain from these reforms.

I. PROBLEMS WHICH MAKE CHANGE ESSENTIAL

There are three primary reasons why change is needed and is needed now. Each is discussed briefly below. I would be happy to elaborate on them later in the discussion period.

We must improve planning.—Planning at all levels is weak. By planning I don't mean vague, all inclusive goals, but clear statements of what must be done, how we will do it, and the output we expect from our efforts. We need improvements in at least three areas.

First, we must do a better job of strategic planning, laying down clear goals that our forces must be able to achieve and outlining how we will accomplish them. These goals should not be so ambitious that we cannot afford the military capability required to meet them. Rather they should be in range of affordability given other demands for resources and a sound fiscal policy. On the other hand we need to know what we in fact can do with the forces we plan so any decisions on limiting our capability are made explicitly and in light of the risks to our security. Thus, strategic planning is an iterative task, whereby we balance our security objectives and available resources.

Planning for the types and numbers of forces, and weapons we will maintain is also weak. In particular, we give insufficient attention to planning for cross-service needs such as communications, troop lift and support for other services. Our force planning is primarily single service in its orientation. The joint service considerations get little attention. In addition, our planning must be made in light of fiscal reality.

Finally, and perhaps most serious, is the relative neglect for planning for wars and contingencies. Major exercises, dating back to "Nifty Nugget" which was held seven years ago, regularly expose serious weaknesses and vulnerabilities in our plans for large scale conflicts. Past crises also have exposed critical inadequacies in our plans for contingencies including unrealistic political-military assumptions, plans to use forces which are not likely to be available, too few or too narrow options, and simple but crucial gaps in the planning.

I might add, that weaknesses in our Chain of Command which is often unduly long and unwieldly, compound the shortcomings in our military planning. The Committee report documents many examples of this including experience during the Mayaquez and Lebanon crises.

The second major factor arguing for change is weaknesses in our process for allocating resources. Making choices between competing programs and service needs is never easy. But it will be especially difficult in the days ahead as we are forced to allocate flat budgets among a myriad of programs built on the assumption that significant, real increases in dollars would continue to be available during the late 1980s. There are at least four shortcomings in our current resource allocation process.

The allocation process is not soundly based on clear, well understood strategic guidance and a set of clear priorities, as was noted earlier.

Process tends to overwhelm substance in the present PPB system. It is long, repetitive, and paperwork intensive. Far too little time and energy are available to focus on longer term considerations or issues of cross service needs.

The focus is heavily on inputs (personnel issues, procurement, etc) not on outputs—the missions and tasks our forces are designed to carry out. Thus we seldom understand the true military implications of the decisions on budgets.

The Congressional review is repetitive and seemingly endless. The respective roles of the three sets of Committees regularly involved is unclear and broader issues of strategy and major allocations by mission or theater are seldom addressed. Moreover, other Committees are increasingly dabbling in Defense issues, placing further demands on the time and energy of DOD leadership.

The third principal reason change is necessary now is that events and public attitudes no longer permit us to defer strong action to manage our defense programs more efficiently. There are a number of reasons for the shortcomings in DOD management. The resource allocation process (including Congressional review of the budget) is so time consuming and demanding that the task of program implementation gets short-shrift by senior Defense management. Moreover, responsibility for management is diffuse and authority is seldom clearly granted to someone who in fact could make things happen. Too many players, including the Congress, OSD, and the Service headquarters staff, dabble in program execution making the lot of the program manager a difficult one at best. Over time the layers of oversight and review have multiplied slowing the process and suffocating the participants.

The wise and perceptive book, *Augustines' Laws* [1] puts it this way: "The problem with the existence of large bodies of administrators is not merely a consequence of their numbers, per se, but rather is a result of the number of layers they constitute . . . with each layer having an opportunity to reject, deny, modify, eliminate, reduce, stretch, or otherwise retard every suggestion that has the audacity to seek to wind its way through the labyrinth-like approval process. . . . An individual working at the bottom level at the Army's Missile Command is looking up at 44 layers through which must be gained support for any new idea before it can be funded."

This leads the author to formulate the Law of Propagation and Misery (Law number XIV) which states: "If a sufficient number of management layers are superimposed on top of each other, it can be assured that disaster is not left to chance."

The procurement process suffers from similar problems. It has grown so complex and cumbersome that it resembles the tax code. Few understand it and it appears to be designed to ensure that all decisions take two or three times as long as needed and that any spark of innovation or creativity is quickly snuffed out. The system has reacted to the intense criticism of recent years in a predictable way, stressing caution and the reduction of risk rather than trying to make sound business judgments which later could be subject to criticism.

II. ESSENTIAL REFORMS

There are no simple, magic fixes to the problems the Committee report so clearly and effectively lays out. Rather a set of reforms are needed, impacting all the key players and all of the major management processes. Changes should be made to the joint side of the military structure, to OSD, the Services, and the Congress as well as to the resource allocation and acquisition processes. Unless a number of basic changes to organization, procedures and responsibilities are made, it is unrealistic to expect any significant improvement in the capability of our forces or the management of the defense establishment.

---

[1] *Augustine's Laws*. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, New York, N.Y. 1983, pp. 82–86.

I feel change in at least four areas is needed, indeed is essential, if we are to overcome the problems troubling the defense establishment. Each is discussed briefly below.

Refocusing OSD's energies.—the Office of the Secretary of Defense plays a critical role in virtually every area of Defense management. Despite its size, clout and the drive of the civilian and military staff, it fails to fulfill certain basic tasks and is involved to excess in others. Several changes are needed if OSD is to play its proper role, which I might add, can and should be done largely without legislation.

As is strongly suggested in the Committee report, OSD needs greater focus on outputs or missions rather than its current focus on inputs (manpower, R&D, C ^{3}I, etc.). This can be done in various ways, such as (1) a significant strengthening of the Planning, Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) staff, the approach taken by Secretary McNamara and to a lesser degree by Secretary Brown; (2) giving greater responsibility to the Undersecretary for Policy and organizing his staff by major mission (the approach suggested by the CSIS study); or (3) a fundamental restructuring of OSD as proposed by the Senate Committee Report. I personally lean toward the first two options, but feel this more radical approach is also worthy of study.

Making it clear that OSD must give priority attention to the formulation of strategic guidance and then policing the service programs to ensure that the guidance is implemented. Periodic efforts in the past to provide appropriate policy and strategy guidance foundered when failures by the services to follow the guidance were not corrected, or overly ambitious guidance and the lack of priorities made the guidance impossible to enforce.

Reformatting the DOD budget along mission or output lines, again to support efforts to focus key discussions on the primary objectives Defense forces are to serve rather than on inputs.

Shifting to a biennial authorization and budget. This will free time for all of the players to focus on strategy and broader issues and permit the services to give greater attention to implementation.

Emphasizing the monitoring of Service implementation efforts rather than detailed involvement in the nuts and bolts of program decisions. OSD must perform three key functions—providing clear guidance and priorities, making the tough resource allocation decisions by mission, service and major program and then monitoring and evaluating the implementation and management efforts of the services. It cannot manage programs directly.

Providing effective cross-service advice.—The Secretary gets ample military advice today, much of it is clear, concise and of value. But he gets little useful advice from his military advisors in cases when tough choices must be made between service needs, missions or major programs. The Chairman and the CINCs often provide useful, cross-cutting advice but they are constrained by procedures, regulations and the lack of effective staff support.

The package of reforms recently passed by the House would be a major step toward remedying these problems. These actions to strengthen the roles of the Chairman and give him greater control over the Joint Staff are long overdue and should be adopted by the Senate as well. I was pleased to see that the Secretary of Defense in his recent letter to Chairman Goldwater now supports most of these changes.

An important responsibility for the Chairman, with input from the Services and the CINCs, should be to provide the Secretary with a proposed set of force requirements that recognize fiscal realities. The Secretary needs such military thinking in addition to the views of his civilian staff and Services Secretaries when making his critical decisions on our force structure and major weapons programs.

A second area of needed reform relates to the role and authority of the Unified and Specified Commander (CINCs). Useful reforms have been made in this area in recent years, but more needs to be done. Again, the ideas suggested in the Committee report deserve support. In particular, I recommend the following changes.

Giving the CINCs authority in peacetime as well as wartime to direct the planning, exercises and training of the forces in their component commands. This would include authority, within limits, to organize the Command in the way the CINC feels is best to carry out his wartime mission.

Strengthening the CINCs authority in the area of personnel, especially in selecting their own staff and commanders of the major elements of the components.

Increasing the CINCs influence in the resource allocation process to include the right to review and change the broad allocation of funds by the component commands, and to have more direct control over the funds allocated for training and exercises. In the scramble for funds in program and budget process, the CINC's voice which normally advocates readiness and sustainability deserves to be heard.

The reforms noted above will not be fully effective unless concurrent steps are taken to ensure the joint system gets its share of our best officers. Moreover, we must ensure that a reasonable portion of the officer force receives regular and in-depth experience in Joint organizations and operations. The lack of joint experience by officers serving in key positions in the Joint and CINC staffs have been well documented. The "Joint Service" officer must be assured of a rewarding career if we are to attract excellent officers to joint duty and we must provide them with the training and experience to be effective.

War and crisis planning is another area that deserves greater attention from the joint military structure. This task should be seen as one of critical importance by the Joint Staff and the CINCs. It also deserves the support and involvement of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. Without their support any improvement is not likely to be sustained.

Internal DOD Management.—Given the scope of the Defense management task, its technical complexity, and the myriad influences that buffet the DOD manager, it should be no surprise that problems abound in all areas. Nonetheless, there are reforms which can make a real difference in the way we manage our programs. Let me emphasize two primary areas:

First, we must fix responsibility and authority for management. OSD, let alone the Congress, cannot manage the research, acquisition, maintenance and personnel programs of the departments. This reponsibility can only be carried out by the Services and the Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff must be granted that responsibility and the needed authority. It should be made clear that this is their principal role—managing the dollars, materiel, and personnel under their control. Indeed, one of the side benefits of strengthening the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that it will reduce the time and energy the Service Chiefs spend on JCS matters, giving them the time they so badly need to focus inward on management issues.

Second, the Service management structure needs to be overhauled with a clear goal of simplifying the staff organization and removing management layers to speed decisions and make it easier to fix responsibility. Several areas deserve attention.

Separate civilian and military staffs in the military departments are not needed. Instead the Service secretary and his key assistants should rely primarily on the military staff, reducing overlap and essentially eliminating a review level.

The Service headquarters staffs are large and ponderous and need to be streamlined and reduced in size. But before this can be expected to happen, OSD and the Congress must change their way of operating, since much of the Service staff effort is responsive to question, study demands, and overly detailed management from above.

The service system commands also need hard scrutiny. Their size, multiple layers, and complexity clearly slow the acquisition process. The steps the Navy is taking in this area should be commended, and hopefully emulated by the Army and Air Force.

Acquisition reform.—No area of management has received greater attention and criticism in recent years than the way DOD buys weapons, equipment and supplies. Indeed, no area has been so subject to reform—via internal DOD regulation as well as legislation. Yet the problems persist, and in fact seem to be more difficult. I don't claim to be an expert in this area. But let me suggest several themes when considering further change.

As noted earlier, the current acquisition process is collapsing from its own weight. Further tinkering is at least as likely to be counterproductive as helpful. If we are to make change, it must be fundamental and broadranging, and the fixes must be systematic, not at the margin.

Fresh new approaches are needed to simplify and speed up the process. We should look hard at how large commercial enterprises buy equipment and supplies, as well as what the practice of foreign governments can tell us.

The system should rely primarily on incentives to make sound decisions rather than complex rules and regulations. Industry should have profit incentives to hold down costs and meet schedules. The Services should be rewarded for good management by being able to buy more or better weapons.

Greater competition is needed, but not simple minded awards based on bid price, with little attention to a firm's past performance, including its ability to meet quality and schedule goals. For example, in the area of procuring services (some $10 billion a year) awards are increasingly made based on low price, with little attention to the quality of the services or the resultant value to the government. But using the low price to determine the award is the "safe" approach, even though it may not serve the government well in the end.

I am hopeful the Packard Commission will chart new approaches for you to consider. Another promising effort is the Georgetown CSIS study on weapons acquisition which was launched a few months ago. Its goal is to explore fundamental, root and branch reform, not mere change on the margin. Drastic reform, not tinkering, is needed and these studies may well point the way.

III. BENEFITS

The reforms suggested above would, I believe, over time make a real difference. I see three major benefits:

A more coherent defense program with funding focused on those programs deserving of priority. In particular, I would expect a sensible balance between force structure, modernization and readiness as we adjust to the realities of no growth Defense budgets in the late 1980s.

Better planning for crises and conflicts, better prepared forces to fight if needed, and a more responsive and effective command structure.

Improved program implementation to include more efficient and timely program execution and greater attention to value in return for the resources we expend on the programs.

IV. THE PEOPLE EQUATION

You frequently hear that it is people that matter not the boxes on an organization chart. I wouldn't dispute the importance of people in the management equation. Yet structure and process also matter. They can be and often are real impediments to effective management. So change is needed and it can make significant differences in the way DOD is managed and carries out its missions.

Nonetheless, we must give greater attention to people. Without good people no organizational scheme, regardless of its perfection, will work. I am deeply concerned by the decline in our ability to attract the best people to government service. Moreover, we are steadily losing many of the best career staff as they see the rewards and opportunities available in other areas. This clearly impacts defense management, and the problems are growing steadily worse. In my view at least, this area also deserves your most careful consideration.

We must now take steps to change this trend and attract and retain the best people to public service. Among the actions that should be taken are:

Remove or relax pay caps for senior people, career as well as those in appointive positions.

Make conflict of interest and related rules more realistic. We must be able to attract able technical people from Defense industry if we hope to manage complex weapons development and production programs effectively. Such individuals will not take government positions if their future careers are seriously limited.

Provide a sense of importance and worth for those that accept jobs in the public sector. Psychological income can offset, at least to a degree, lesser financial rewards. But today's government jobs often provide less in both categories.

Gentlemen, that completes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator THURMOND. First, I want to compliment all three witnesses today. I think you have presented some of the best testimony we have had during these hearings.

Now we are going to propose questions. I am going to ask each Senator to take about 10 minutes. He will be notified when his time is up.

The questions I have will be for all three witnesses. You can answer them rather briefly, I think.

Some of the witnesses who have testified before the committee have recommended the Chairman of the JCS be a five-star officer to distinguish him from the service Chiefs.

What are your views on this proposal?

Secretary LAIRD. My view would be no.

Dr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, I made this recommendation to the Steadman Commission back in 1978. I still support it because in the military, rank does play a part and three-star officers pay attention to four-star officers and I think a four-star officer would pay more attention to a man who is wearing five stars.

Senator THURMOND. You would suggest five stars for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

Dr. KORB. Yes. As you know, we have had one Chairman who was a five-star officer.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Odeen.

Mr. ODEEN. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Secretary Laird on this point. It is an interesting idea, but it is not necessary at this point in time. It would be best reserved for a real crisis or wartime situation.

Senator THURMOND. It seems to me that Presidents and some Secretaries of Defense have increasingly relied on their civilian staffs for advice they should be getting from professional military sources.

What do you think explains this trend?

Would the House bill on JCS reform and staff study recommendation enhance or lessen the influence of professional military advice?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, the House bill as passed would enhance the opportunities for military advice to be more effective.

Dr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, if you go back and you look at the history of the Department of Defense, you will discover that the initial intentions of Secretary Forrestal were to rely on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He expected the Joint Chiefs of Staff to perform for him the same functions that the Navy staff had performed for him when he was Secretary of the Navy.

When he found out that the JCS were institutionally incapable of providing that advice, he came back to the Congress to increase the number of civilians on his staff and I think we have seen that trend continue over the last 40 years. Secretaries do want to rely for military advice on military people, but since they are not getting the trans-service advice that they need, they turn to civilians.

Mr. ODEEN. Mr. Chairman, I got my start in the Pentagon in the 1960's working on the system analysis staff. We were the so-called "whiz kids." We received much for giving military advice. We did provide such advice in many cases, but we did so in large part because we were filling a vacuum.

As Dr. Korb suggests, the military staff, for institutional and other reasons, simply were not providing the kinds of advice the Secretary needed. There was a vacuum and civilians filled that vacuum.

While civilians clearly have a role and should continue to have a role in this area, I feel very strongly we need more and better military advice. The reforms that have been suggested in the House bill and are being considered by you will help assure that we get good, responsive military advice from the military.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I had no problem getting good military advice. I met with the Chairman every day at least once. I met with each Chief of the military staff without the service Secretary present at least once a week, each service Chief once a week.

Then I would meet with them at least once a week as a corporate body. But the Chairman I would meet with every day, at least once and usually three and four times a day.

So, I did not have a problem getting military advice. It was just a question of making the proper time available on my schedule and just insisting that you have that set forth every day. I always did that. So, I did not have a problem getting military advice.

Dr. **Korb**. Mr. Chairman, could I amplify my remarks and give you an example which I am sure Senator Nunn is familiar with as well as Senator Cohen. It is the subject of European troop strength.

When I was in office, I tried for years to get the JCS to deal with the congressional situation and come up with a plan but they simply were not able to agree on how to deal with the ceilings. Thus my office was forced to get into an area which should properly have been the province of the military people.

Mr. **Odeen**. Mr. Chairman, let me add that I certainly do not disagree with what Secretary Laird said. I think the problem is not so much personal advice as it is more institutional kind of advice.

For example, I remember when Secretary Laird made a major effort to get the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs to provide useful input for the tough budget choices that we were facing in the early seventies as we reduced the Defense budget as Vietnam was winding down. The joint system was simply not able to provide useful views. The Chiefs could not agree on where the cuts ought to be taken.

Secretary **Laird**. That made it easier for me.

Mr. **Odeen**. I worked on the NSC staff on arms control during the early 1970's as well. The input we received from the JCS on major arms control issues was of almost no value. It was long, involved, ponderous. It was not tough minded, not responsive to the issues we were facing. A strong Chairman with a Joint Staff supporting him could have been more effective in terms of providing hard-nosed military advice that would have been very helpful in that arms control process.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you very much. Some critics of the House bill on JCS reform and recommendations of the committee staff study have argued they would diminish civilian control of the military.

As former civilian officials in the Defense Department, our three witnesses today should be less sensitive to this criticism.

The question is: Do you believe that these proposals would weaken civilian control of the military?

Secretary **Laird**. No, I do not. I believe it would strengthen. I tried to point that out in my opening remarks. I think it will strengthen civilian control and leadership of the Department of Defense.

Dr. **Korb**. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Secretary Laird. It will strengthen civilian control because the civilian officials will get advice free from service interests and thus will be able to make more intelligent decisions.

Mr. **Odeen**. I agree with both those statements.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you.

As you know, the Secretary of Defense has an excessive span of control with 42 senior civilian and military officials reporting directly to him.

The staff's study proposes to lessen this problem by grouping OSD officials on a new or existing Under and Assistant Secretary of Defense. Most notably in this regard is creation of an Under Secretary for Readiness, Sustainability and Support under which all the manpower, installation, logistics and medical officials in OSD would be grouped.

Now the question. Do you agree that the Secretary of Defense's span of control is excessive and do you agree with the staff's study approach to solving this problem is the creation of an Under Secretary for Readiness, Sustainability and Support?

Secretary **Laird**. Mr. Chairman, I have no problem with the Secretary being in a position to handle those matters very effectively. I would like to say that the greatest problem the Secretary of Defense has today is not dealing with people in the Department of Defense; it is dealing with people up here in Congress.

When I was Secretary of Defense, I only had 16 committees and subcommittees to report to. Now the Secretary of Defense has 48 subcommittees and committees to report to. That is absolutely ridiculous.

This idea of the Secretary of Defense being requested to appear before so many committees and subcommittees makes it almost impossible for him to attend to the kind of business that is needed and necessary for him to address his attention to in the Department of Defense.

I think the Congress has got to get its own house in order. I think you ought to look at that when you look at the whole reorganization of the Department of Defense. You ought to look at reorganization of the Congress and inasmuch as the time that is spent up here with so many different chairmen and so many different ranking members, so many different subcommittees, so many committees getting involved with it, it has really gotten out of hand, Mr. Chairman.

I cannot sit here and not point that out to this distinguished committee because I think it is time for you to get your hands on this problem that exists up here in both the House and in the Senate.

Senator **Cohen**. We are trying very hard to abolish the Appropriations Committee. [Laughter.]

Dr. **Korb**. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the creation of an Under Secretary for Readiness, Sustainability and Support. I made that recommendation to Deputy Secretary Carlucci in a 1981 analysis, which is very similar to the material that eventually came out in the Georgetown study and in your own report.

This action will not only reduce the span of control of the Secretary, but it will also mean one person in the Department, one civilian official, will be concerned about the critical area of readiness, an area that too often gets lost in the shuffle because too many people focus more on hardware and technology issues.

Mr. **Odeen**. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Dr. Korb on that issue.

I think back to my early days in OSD when we had a relatively small number of people at the Assistant Secretary level reporting to the Secretary. Over the years there has been an enormous proliferation of Assistant Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and so on.

Clearly, there are too many people at this point for the Secretary to manage. The Readiness Under Secretary makes sense. There is overlap and relationship between such matters as logistics, manpower, reserves, health, etc., that are now split among separate assistant secretaries. It makes good sense to put them under one person who can pull the issues together and coordinate them.

Senator THURMOND. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Laird, I notice you stated you met once a week with the service Chiefs without having the service Secretaries there.

My question to you is; Was Secretary Warner excluded on the basis of substance or personality? [Laughter.]

Secretary LAIRD. I also met with him, too, but I probably met with him oftener than that because he had more problems. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. You did always have the service Secretaries and the service Chiefs.

Secretary LAIRD. Once a week I did that. I did it once a week with both of them present, too.

Really the point I make, and I do not like to do this on your time, but the requirement for the Secretary to spend as much time as he does with the various committees of the Congress, somebody ought to look at that.

I complained about SALT I. I had to spend 44 days up here testifying on SALT I because I was the principal witness on SALT I. It had to be the Defense Department selling SALT I because the State Department could not sell it, the disarmament agency could not sell it. So, they made the Secretary of Defense the principal witness and I spent all my time up here.

Now, the Defense Department suffers when you spend too much time up here on the Hill. I do not know if I am making my point.

Senator NUNN. We understand completely because we just had a week of trying to go through sorting out jurisdiction with the Appropriations Committee. That is not the only problem.

Secretary LAIRD. You are going to have more problems when you get into 1987 and you implement the Gramm-Rudman bill.

Senator NUNN. I am taking next year off, thank you. [Laughter.]

On the question of the organization of OSD, could each of you respond to this:

The staff has recommended that we move much more toward a mission-oriented organization.

The staff has also recommended, as I think at least two of our witnesses have this morning, that the span of control be greatly narrowed so that the Secretary has only, I believe Dr. Korb said, about eight people reporting to him.

Should we lay out a general scheme of the organization of the Secretary's Office in statute or should we perhaps take another approach and eliminate any obstacles to his own reorganization with certain suggestions to him?

Do we mandate a defense organization or do we suggest it or do we let it alone?

Let me start with Secretary Laird.

Secretary **Laird**. Senator, I would hope you would not mandate it. I would hope that you would set forth broad general guidance of what you expect of the Secretary of Defense, you limit the number of Presidential appointments, and so forth, that are involved at the Presidential level.

I hope that you would not set forth specifically the complete organization of the Secretary of Defense Office. I think each Secretary has to be able to run his shop to meet his particular needs, and then hold him responsible.

Senator **Nunn**. Dr. Korb.

Dr. **Korb**. I agree with Secretary Laird's approach. I think what the Congress needs to do is give him permissive authority, that is, so many Presidential appointments to use as he sees fit.

What I became concerned about during my tenure was the creation of the new Assistant Secretary level positions mandated by law to report directly to the Secretary.

Senator **Nunn**. That is what I mean by removing all obstacles. One approach would be to eliminate any statutory requirement on organization and basically say to the Secretary of Defense, we strongly suggest that you move toward an organization with less span of control, fewer people reporting, and also much more mission-oriented.

That is what I mean by the alternative of suggesting rather than mandate.

Dr. **Korb**. I agree with that. Secretary Laird said every Secretary is going to have a different decisionmaking style and management style and needs that flexibility.

The problem right now is that there are too many mandated in law.

Mr. **Odeen**. I agree with what the other witnesses have said. That is the right direction to go.

I sympathize with the idea of more mission orientation. As I suggested in my remarks, it can be done in several different ways. Secretary Brown relied on his strong PA&E staff to provide the mission thrust. Under another Secretary, something more extreme, along the line of the staff report, would make sense. Any of these approaches will work. It depends on the Secretary's personality and the people he has.

Senator **Nunn**. Let me ask some quick questions for a yes or no answer.

One thing we are going to be in real contention with is the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It seems that everybody now is saying that we need a Vice Chairman. There is a fundamental difference.

The Chiefs testified unanimously they want to make him clearly No. 6 in terms of the structure. There are numerous other witnesses, including in the House bill, who clearly believe unless he is made No. 2, that is, someone who is really the alter ego of the Chairman, he is not going to be effective.

Could I get each of you to comment on that?

Mr. Odeen, No. 6 or No. 2?

Senator **Warner**. Would the Senator yield?

Also include in the question whether or not as No. 2 he would serve as a full alter ego and you would not have the rotating action.

Senator NUNN. That is what I mean by No. 2, so you would eliminate the rotation of Acting Chairman. He would clearly be acting in the absence of the Chairman.

Mr. ODEEN. Unless you make him No. 2, it is not worth doing. To make him No. 6, you have given him the Director's job and given him another star. It is not a change of any consequence.

The rotation of the Chairmanship as a fall-back is an interesting idea. I think it has been a valuable step forward. But it is clearly inferior to having a full-time Deputy who on a day-to-day basis works clearly with the Chairman, sharing with him the responsibility for supervising the CINCs. That is a much better way to go. The Vice Chairman idea is not worth doing.

Dr. KORB. Definitely No. 2. If it is No. 6, it would be most like the other JCS reforms that have been made over the years. They will be cosmetic and they really will not achieve their objective.

Secretary LAIRD. No. 2, I would come down very strongly on that. I want to point out—I know you want a yes or no—I say No. 2, there is no question about that.

But it is very difficult to take just a Chief of one of the services to a National Security Council meeting because they are not up to date as far as the planning that goes on with the Joint Staff, particularly when you are in a wartime condition.

I always took the Director of the Joint Staff with me if the Chairman was out, even though there was an alternating——

Senator NUNN. This is extremely important because the committee is going to really have a debate on this one. This will be a tough one.

Secretary LAIRD. I would take Johnny Volt over there. I would take others with me when I went because if the Chairman was out of town, the person that was really up to date on what was going on around the world was the Director of the Joint Staff. The various Chiefs were really not up to speed on the operations that were going on around the world.

So, if the Chairman was gone, I would usually ask John Volt, or whoever was serving as Director of the Joint Staff, to go with me. I took the Marine Chief, too, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I think to the National Security Council for the first time.

But I did have Johnny Volt go with me on that particular day because it was very important to have that Joint Staff input.

Senator NUNN. I think my time has expired.

Secretary LAIRD. I am sorry, I did not mean to filibuster.

Senator THURMOND. The Senator from Maine.

Senator COHEN. You said you thought the staff report was a first-rate job.

Mr. Laird, do you agree the staff report is a first-rate job?

Mr. ODEEN. Let me answer. I think it is an excellent job. The historical analysis is excellent. I think it picks up the right problems and analyzes them well. It looks at the interesting options and analyzes them well also.

While I do not agree with every one of the recommendations. I think most make sense. It is a fine job.

Secretary LAIRD. I think it is a good job. I believe from a practical standpoint, you cannot go that far.

I hope that you will support the House bill. I would like to put a plug in for it because I think that you are going to have trouble if you get into this and nothing is going to be done if you go as far as the staff report.

Senator COHEN. Let me raise a question on the quality of the staff report.

It was suggested in the last hearing that the report, both in tone and content, was somehow undermining the morale in the field.

The discussion of command and control problems, cross-service rivalries or collusions, somehow it was having a negative impact on our personnel in the field, perhaps lending some credence to the notion that if it is broke, we cannot fight, and these people are contributing their time and effort to something that will not work in a time of crisis.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not think it is broke, but I think you can always improve it. I think this is the time to have these kinds of discussions, not when you get into a serious crisis.

I do not believe our system is broke, however, I think it can be improved.

Dr. KORB. I think one has to be careful about shooting the messenger. The problems are there. People who have studied this situation for years know it, people who have served in the Department of Defense know it.

Only if you do not blame the people who prepare the report, can we have meaningful public policy debate on the subject.

Senator COHEN. There seems to be an across-the-board opposition from the members of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense—his is sort of a 50-percent opposition. He liked the 50 percent which cuts down congressional oversight or reporting which you touched upon, Secretary Laird.

But, generally speaking, there appears to be opposition across the board from within. Yet, by the same token, it seems almost all the witnesses with the possible exception of one who formerly served either in the Joint Chiefs or in the Secretary of Defense's Office are unanimously in favor of the House version or some version of the Georgetown study on reform.

Can you explain that phenomenon to me?

Secretary LAIRD. I can explain it. I do feel it is very difficult for the Chiefs of the various services to go along with the No. 2 person in the directorate of the Joint Staff. I think they all have some problems with that.

I think the improvement is going forth and you have to set aside their particular desire and I think it is so important to have that Director in the No. 2 position and insist that the Chairman and the Director cannot be out of town at the same time.

I had all sorts of problems on that. I would like to even see that in law that you both cannot be out of town at the same time. I would not let my Deputy Secretary of Defense be out of town if I was going to be out of town. I got into certain situations where you were not protected from the standpoint of military advice as well as you should be.

That is why I think that putting somebody just a little layer above the Chief of services and making him Director of the Joint Staff is a very important consideration.

Dr. KORB. I would like to amplify Secretary Laird's remarks.

The JCS cannot be expected to endorse a proposal which reduces their ability to protect their service interests.

Secretary Weinberger is in a very difficult position on this. He needs support of the JCS on a lot of matters. He also knows that many people will use his admission or his concern with these organization and management problems to cut down on resources.

Ever since this administration came into office a lot of people have argued "get your act together before you come in with a request for more resources." Because of that approach, it is difficult for Secretary Weinberger to admit there are problems because they would not be used in the proper context by a lot of people.

Mr. ODEEN. It is very hard to make major organizational changes when you have the key people already in place. The best time to do it is at the beginning of an administration, before you settle people in their roles.

We now have a situation where we have a group of Chiefs who have been in their positions for several years, the Secretary and his key staff in their positions for a time. It is hard to ask them to agree to change their roles and diminish their functions in many cases. It is human nature and their opposition should not be surprising.

The other issue is Mr. Weinberger's concern that questions about organization will be used as a weapon on the budgetary front. I know he feels strongly that it will divert attention from the requirement for more resources.

Senator COHEN. One of the concerns I have is that we are not significantly prepared to respond to an increasing threat from the lower end of the spectrum, while some of the other nations, Britain, Israel, and others, have had some repeated successes with special operations forces.

Yet we continue to have some frustration. For example, the British used their special operations forces to put down a Communist guerrilla insurgency back in Malaysia in the 1950s. They had an operation when the Iranian Embassy was taken over and they had a rescue mission in that sense. They use special operations forces with fairly good success during the Falklands.

By contrast, we seem to have had some real setbacks. In the *Mayaguez* affair we lost more lives than we saved. We had a serious problem with the Seal and Delta forces in the Grenada operation.

Is this just a string of back luck? Is it something more systemic?

Is it that the special operations forces do not have an effective spokesman or voice within the services, they are not getting the kind of representation they need?

Frankly, I think this is the major kind of conflict we are going to see in the future, not the all-out war between the Soviet Union and the United States, but rather the kind of low-end threats, low-intensity threats, I should say, at that end of the spectrum.

Secretary Laird?

Secretary **Laird**. All of the examples you gave are examples where responsibility was shared with all of the services. You cannot run an operation that way.

I would like to go back and tell you about a few operations that I know about, and I do not mean to be tooting my horn, in the Defense Department while I was there.

We had several special operations. One of them was the Sontay operation. Regardless of what you think about the Sontay operation, there was one person who was put in charge of it and he had complete and total control.

They practiced that mission down in Florida for 6 months. they had all the resources they needed and there was no cross-service responsibility in any way. One man ran it. It happened to be an Air Force general.

The operations command of the mission itself happened to be an Army man by the name of Bill Simon who was a great operator, but there was no joint service responsibility in that mission at all.

Once the approval was given for the mission, there was no White House interference, there was no Secretary of Defense interference, and it was run by one particular individual who had full and complete control.

Now, when you get into some of the other things you are talking about, that responsibility was not fixed and that is where you have trouble.

Senator **Cohen**. Dr. Korb?

Dr. **Korb**. I think one of the reasons why it is difficult for people to act the way Secretary Laird mentioned is that the Chairman has to share power. As the situation exists now, it is difficult for him to order the other service Chiefs to do something. A strengthened Chairman with more formal powers, would not need a Secretary of Defense who wanted to get that involved like Secretary Laird.

Mr. **Odeen**. I think this is a good example of some of the "orphan" missions that do not get adequate attention from the services. There are bigger fish to fry, from their point of view. Unless you have strong Chairman, Joint Staff and CINC organization, these orphan missions will not get the attention they need.

The same kind of problems also arise in such missions as airlift and close air support, a situation where one service has to support another service. There are a number of missions that do not get proper attention under the current system that would get more attention and priority under a stronger Chairman.

Senator **Cohen**. My time is up. Thank you.

Senator **Thurmond**. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome everybody.

Secretary Laird, you indicated something about the inability of the Chiefs as now constituted to give useful advice when it comes to budget cuts. I think you said perhaps a bit jokingly, but I am not sure, it makes it easier for you if they are unable to come to a unified decision on that.

Secretary **Laird**. When you are cutting, it is easier if there is a disagreement. I was in a position where I was cutting a million civilians and 1,200,000 military. I was there when we were phasing down the Vietnam operation. You just had to make the decisions yourself because you could not get the agreement.

Is is easier if you have that authority and you do have the authority, but if you cannot get the Joint Chiefs to agree on the priorities within those various authorities, you do not have to be concerned about general agreement because it was just impossible to get. That is why I meant it is a little easier.

Senator LEVIN. To the extent that the Chiefs are not in agreement in some sense, under some circumstances, it has been easier for the Secretary of Defense to operate?

Secretary LAIRD. I like to get them together. I want you to understand that I made every effort to get them together on all matters, in my posture statement, in my budget presentation, and I usually did have them together.

When you get into the business of assigning priorities in reducing the budget, it is almost impossible to get them together. When you are going on the increase, it is very easy to get them together.

Senator LEVIN. I gather from your testimony and something that Mr. Korb said that, at least under some circumstances, the Secretary is in a stronger position if the Chiefs are not united in a position against his own?

Secretary LAIRD. I never had the Chiefs united against me. I always had them with me.

Senator LEVIN. Let us assume you were trying to sell SALT III and the Chiefs did not like it.

Secretary LAIRD. I would rather have them together.

Senator LEVIN. With you?

Secretary LAIRD. I would rather have them with me and together. You have to make certain accommodations to do that. As you know, the accommodations that I made had to do with the B-1 and the Trident submarine.

The President had indicated he was going to cut those out of the budget and I got those back in the budget and I got the Chiefs to agree that they would support SALT I. You have to make a certain amount of accommodation there. You understand how that works up here. You have to do that sometimes in the Defense Department.

Senator LEVIN. I sure understand how that works.

When it comes to the question of civilian control it is something that we have to give a lot of deliberation to.

You indicated that strengthening the Chairman, in a sense strengthening the Chiefs, giving him a Deputy, giving him a staff, will strengthen civilian control. Yet there are a couple comments here this morning and comments from other witnesses which indicate that the Chiefs are in a strong position now, you need their support to sell a treaty at times; indeed, you have to negotiate with them on some items to get their support.

Secretary LAIRD. I had to negotiate with some of you, too, to get your vote.

Senator LEVIN. Here we have civilian control. There the question is whether or not by strengthening the Chairman and giving the Chairman a staff and Deputy, you are, vis-a-vis the Secretary, putting them, the military, in a stronger position than they are now.

I am asking this question because I think it is important. I generally agree with your conclusion that we should have a stronger Chairman.

So, I am not coming at this from the point of view of an opponent at all. I am having to think very thoroughly about the implications of a stronger Chairman on some of the issues that we are talking about.

Secretary LAIRD. I tried to answer that in my letter to you which I sent you maybe a month or so ago. I really do feel that it will give better military input under the House bill.

Senator LEVIN. Dr. Korb said Secretary Weinberger needs the support of the JCS on lots of matters and I agree, Secretary Laird, you need their support, you want their support. That means they have a bargaining position.

In strengthening them, in a sense we are making it more likely that they will be in a stronger bargaining position. I think that that is inevitable if we are going to strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

It also may be acceptable. I think it is inevitable. There are real pluses in terms of getting good advice, in terms of budget priorities.

Secretary LAIRD. I think that has changed under the bill as it has passed the House. I do not think that has changed. I still think they have an important role to play. If they disagree, they will have an opportunity not only to talk to the Secretary of Defense about it, they will have an opportunity to go to the Congress, they will have an opportunity to see the President of the United States who is Commander in Chief.

So, I feel that bargaining authority, bargaining chip that you are talking about, is available to them.

Senator LEVIN. My question is whether it might be strenthened if there were more unified command, if the Chairman were given greater powers, whether the Chiefs are put in a stronger position, vis-a-vis the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. ODEEN. Senator, could I comment on that?

It seems to me that the Chiefs have a tendency, I think your staff report calls it logrolling, to say "I support your program and you support mine." This complicates the Secretary's problem because you end up having the Chiefs unanimously supporting a wide variety of programs which together do not fit in the budget.

If you have an independent Chairman with good staff support do the kind of staff work you have to do to be helpful on budget and resource allocation issues, you then have a separate, independent voice which in many cases will have a different perspective than the log-rolling position you often get out of the Chiefs. This different perspective gives the Secretary the opportunity to select among different positions.

Senator LEVIN. I agree in that circumstance it would be enhanced. I think there are some circumstances it might be reduced and that is the question I wanted to get to.

Perhaps I could ask each of you quickly about the House bill recommendation that the Chairman of the Chiefs be given a 4-year term that will be renewable as it relates to civilian control.

I presume the House bill keeps the provision that the President can relieve the Chairman of duty any time he wants, that he serves at the pleasure of the President. That puts an incoming President, however, in a difficult position of having to act against the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. No incoming President wants to do that.

If the Chairman's term expires on its own, it is a lot easier to wait for that to come along and not be put in the awkward position of discharging the existing Chairman.

That part of the 4-year provision does trouble me.

Secretary LAIRD. It was the idea that the 4-year terms would run 6 months after the new President took office and the new President would have a Chairman for 6 months when we went into this study.

Senator LEVIN. Is that in the House bill that the term runs out 6 months after the new President comes in?

Secretary LAIRD. It is not in the House bill as presently drafted. That was the recommendation we made. I do not believe they included that in the House bill. I think it is important.

I came up to the Senate, to your committee, to get General Wheeler's term as Chairman extended because I had worked with General Wheeler as a member of the Appropriations Committee and your committee gave me the authority which passed both the House and Senate, and I was able to extend General Wheeler on two occasions.

So, you can always do that through congressional action. I think it would be better if the term ran from 6 months after the Presidential Inauguration and then the change be made and you have continuity for at least 6 months after a new President takes office.

That was the recommendation that we made and discussed in the Georgetown study.

Senator LEVIN. I am glad to hear you say that. I think that is a critical change from the House language.

Do the others agree that that 6-month provision is important?

Dr. KORB. I think it is very important. As you correctly point out, the Chairman has a unique relationship with both the Secretary of Defense and the President and it is important to give them as much flexibility as they need.

As a practical matter, you do not like to get rid of somebody in the middle of his fixed term. I do, however, believe it is a good idea that the individual be appointed for 4 years, like the other Chiefs, because that enhances the Chairman's formal power.

Mr. ODEEN. I agree with what they say.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Senator THURMOND. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will talk about an issue we cannot put into law, that is the force of personality. When I was in the Pentagon, if Secretary Laird wished to communicate with a service Secretary, even though we were distances of perhaps even a quarter of a mile apart, if he was mad, he raised his window and did not use a telephone.

The force of personality of the individual we cannot write into law. Certainly you possessed that and exhibit it and it was a hallmark of your administration, not only in your ability to achieve many things, but your ability to attract outstanding individuals to the Department of Defense and your selection of certain key military persons to take on the top offices.

I think the key to a Secretary of Defense is to have the confidence of the President, and second, that you had to have a perception of what the people of the United States expect from the military when crises arise, and, indeed, you had the most serious one since World War II in terms of Vietnam, the ability to communicate with those people and to build up a sense of confidence and hope that the crisis can be resolved.

Also, your perception of the Congress. No one had a better understanding of the Congress and a better working relationship than you did.

You also had the unique opportunity to outfox the Secretary of State. On a number of occasions you were able to deal with that situation, and deal with it most effectively.

I wonder if you might address that issue because it impacts on the breadth and specificity that we might apply to the statutory reform. You touched on it briefly when you said do not try to be too specific with the assignment of Assistant Secretaries, give the Secretary the maximum flexibility.

Do you wish to add anything else on that point?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Warner, I had an opportunity when I was Secretary of Defense that I do not think other Secetaries have had and that is that President Nixon gave me the authority to pick all civilian and all military leaders in the Department of Defense.

Senator WARNER. I remember that.

Secretary LAIRD. I did not have to interface with the White House. I had the opportunity. I announced the appointment, myself. I interviewed even the watch officers in the JCS and the Joint Staff.

Senator WARNER. My recollection is that that was a condition precedent to your resigning from the Congress of the United States and your taking on that responsibility.

Secretary LAIRD. That is right. I was sort of the second choice of President Nixon. As you know, I convinced President Nixon to appoint Scoop Jackson, a member of this committee, as Secretary of Defense. He backed out the day before President Nixon was going to announce his cabinet.

The President said to me, "You have to do it now, you got me into this thing with Scoop Jackson and you are going to have to get me out of it."

We had a nice visit. Bryce Harlow was with me at the time. I said, "On one condition, that is, I control all civilian and all military appointments, I do not want interference from anybody."

I think that worked out very well because everyone knew that they were responsible to me as Secretary of Defense and not to somebody from outside.

Then I was able to get people like you and Senator Chafee and I had an outstanding Deputy in David Packard. I went out and recruited those people, myself. You were part of that personnel recruitment program along with Congressman Glenn, Lipscomb, Frank Sanders, and others. We went out and did that.

I think that kind of control over people, both military and civilian, in the hands of the Secretary of Defense is very important.

Whether it can ever happen again, I do not know because no Secretary has had that authority since I did.

I should like to point out that is a very important part of running a big department like the Department of Defense, to have that kind of authority. I do not think you can legislate it, but I think you should be aware of it.

Senator **Warner**. That is precisely why I asked the question. I think in the report language we might refer to this chapter, Secretary of Defense, and how effective that authority was.

Secretary **Laird**. You had to have the President, and I had President Nixon, and he assigned that authority to me. It did not take long for him to decide to do that. I was not blackjacking him on anything else at the time. He needed a Secretary of Defense.

It was one of the things that Bryce Harlow, who worked on the House Armed Services Committee felt was important. I felt it was important, Andy Goodpaster felt it was important, and the President agreed.

Senator **Warner**. Now, a question to all three witnesses. We briefly touched with Mr. Odeen this morning on the question of defense procurement. Each of you have had extensive experience in this area.

Would you give your views on what this committee ought to do to improve this process, especially any organizational adjustments that might be addressed in statute language?

Dr. **Korb**. In terms of statute, we are dealing with the situation that Senator Nunn and I discussed earlier. I do not think the committee ought to hamstring the Secretary of Defense or the Congress by saying we want DOD to separate the test and evalution from research and engineering.

I think the Congress ought to authorize the Secretary of Defense to have one individual handle the entire acquisition process and not create a separate Assistant Secretary for command, control communications and intelligence which makes the acquisition process even more cumbersome.

There is another thing that Congress can do to improve the acquisition process. There has been a tremendous amount of changes in the laws. Congress ought to assess the impact of the laws that have already been passed, the Competition in Contracting Act, for example. It ought to make sure that we know how those laws will work out in practice before we start passing new laws.

In summary, I think the best thing the Congress can do organizationally is to allow the Secretary to organize his office the way he wants in order to handle acquisition and take a look at how the process will settle down after all the changes have been made.

Mr. **Odeen**. I agree with what Larry suggests. The committee needs at least to suggest to the Secretary that he focus responsiblity on one individual and not break it up among several people. The best thing the Congress can do right now is probably nothing. There have been so many changes in the last 2 or 3 years that we really need a period of time to settle down and assess the impact of the changes that have been made.

Second, I suggest you wait to see what the Packard Commission comes up with. I believe they are looking hard at some fundamental questions about our approach to buying weapons. They are taking a hard look at such questions as the excessive use of military specs, greater use of commercial products, and simplifying the acquisition process in some fundamental way.

We are at a point in time, when we do not need more marginal changes. We need fundamental changes, root and branch changes and, hopefully, the Packard Commission will give us some direction along that line.

I would hope at this point in time the Congress will sit still and see what the Packard Commission comes up with. Then I hope you will be willing to address major and fundamental change, and stop tinkering at the margins of this very complicated process.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Odeen.

The Chairman takes note Mr. Laird is politicking at the moment. [Laughter.]

Secretary **Laird**. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Warner**. Never did I expect to see the day when I chaired a committee and you were the witness.

Secretary **Laird**. I was having a little discussion with your colleague because I was supposed to be with him at dinner Thursday night in San Diego and I did not see how he could get there Thursday night. I thought maybe I could cover for him.

Senator **Warner**. We are on the subject of procurement, Mr. Laird, and whether or not you feel at this time this committee has any statutory obligations in that area?

I wish to point out in response to Mr. Odeen's important observations, that this committee will coordinate its work with that of the Packard Commission and, therefore, whatever result comes out of the Packard Commission is certainly to be scrutinized and evaluated and then incorporated in our bill.

Do you have anything further?

Secretary **Laird**. No, I do not have anything further.

Senator **Warner**. Do you have further observations?

Mr. **Odeen**. The Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, that sponsored the organization report that Mr. Laird and I worked on, is not launching a look at the procurement process as a follow-on to our study. It is trying to look at fundamental issues. They have put together a fine group of experts in this field. I think they will be coming up with some ideas in the next 6 months to a year as well. I commend that effort to you at the appropriate time.

They are working closely with the Packard staff. I suspect their effort will be consistent with the Packard report, perhaps go a little bit farther in some areas. This is another opportunity to have fresh thinking cast on this difficult problem.

Senator **Warner**. The staff brought to my attention a question we have put to all panels and I intended to raise it, myself. That is, integrating the service and Secretariat staffs.

The committee staff study agrees with other reports in recommending that the staffs of the Secretariat and service Chiefs should be integrated. If this were done, the staffs would be streamlined. I personally have concern about this.

Mr. Laird, do you have any views on that subject?

Secretary **Laird**. I understand what they are talking about and as far as having fewer people report to the Secretary and having fewer Assistant Secretaries, I assume that is what they are referring to?

Senator **Warner**. The thought being that the Chief of Naval Operations has his personnel section. The Secretary of the Navy has his personnel section. Each has his logistics section.

Secretary **Laird**. We recommended they be integrated. I think the Navy has done a better job in that area than the other services.

Senator **Warner**. That was pointed out by the Secretary of the Navy when he appeared here. Then Senator Nunn brought his attention to the telephone directory. There were more listings in it than any other service Secretary staff on both sides. That still remains to be determined.

Secretary **Laird**. The real expert I have on that is Larry. Larry and I participated in a study 8 years ago that touched on this particular subject. We published it at the American Enterprise Institute at that time. It was called "People, Not Hardware, the More Important Defense Asset."

Larry, I think, is best to answer that question.

Senator **Warner**. I will turn now to Dr. Korb, but the extreme would be that a service Chief and a service Secretary would turn to one individual who is in charge of personnel for the Department of the Navy. That seems to me the model that should be addressed and then peeled back from that.

Dr. **Korb**. I do not have very strong feelings on this subject. I do not believe it is as important as some of the other issues that we have been talking about.

My experience has been that usually you have a de facto centralization. When I was sitting up at the OSD level, there was either a civilian or military individual on the service staff who was the key player in the logistics area I had to deal with that person because the Chief or the service Secretary relied upon him.

Thus, if I confined myself, for example, only to counterparts, the Presidential appointees on the service staffs, I might be wasting my time in some cases. I need to deal with the service personnel chief. So, you find out there really is a kind of de facto integration already.

We do need to cut down on the size of staffs, i.e. service staffs, OSD, and congressional staff, because we spend too much time coordinating things.

Sometimes I would get the assistant service secretary to buy off on an issue. Then he would have to coordinate with the personnel chief. That's an unnecessary procedure.

Senator **Warner**. I understand that it is an issue we have to address. Take the Department of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of Personnel. You have a Chief of Bureau Personnel and then on the CNO staff is another three-star admiral in personnel.

What would you recomend?

Dr. **Korb**. I would have one person on the Navy staff that the Secretary could appoint, civilian or military, to be in charge of personnel and that person would be the person with whom OSD and the Congress would deal.

To give you an example, I can remember holding a meeting on the GI bill to ascertain how the services would fund it. We had an individual from one of the services agree to a position which I knew his service did not support.

When I got back to my office I told my staff, "In 5 minutes this flag officer will call and say that they do not buy that position." That exemplifies the problem because, that individual, even enough by title he was in charge of manpower, he really was not the individual to whom the service Secretary and the service Chief turned in this area.

Senator **Warner**. An interesting observation.

Mr. Odeen?

Mr. **Odeen**. I agree with Larry in the sense this is not a crucial issue and I think it is much less important than coming to grips with some of these other issues we talked about.

Nonetheless, it seems to me there are two separate issues.

First, do you have an Assistant Secretary to support the service Secretary or not? You can rely on the top military person in lieu of a political appointee.

The second issue is if you have an Assistant Secretary, do you have a large civilian and military staff under him or do you use the military staff to support the civilian appointees?

It seems to me in most cases you want to have civilian support to the Secretary of the service and you probably want an Assistant Secretary. The Secretary needs a few people he can trust and that he selects that are loyal to him to help him do his job. Hopefully, he will have the power to select them himself and not have them imposed on him by the White House. This happens in many, many cases, which makes them of doubtful value. If he has a chance to pick people loyal to him and people who will do the job, it is a big plus.

I have a different view on the second issue, whether it is necessary to have a large independent staff under each of the Assistant Secretaries. I believe they should primarily rely on the service military staffs for staff support.

In the Navy, for example, this is a single military budgetary staff. The Assistant Secretary of Navy for Financial Management uses that staff which is part of the Chief of Naval Operations staff. That approach works very well. The Assistant Secretary relies on one staff rather than having two staffs, with additional, repetitive, reviews, and the resulting delays and paperwork.

There is virtue in having an Assistant Secretary, a senior civilian aide to the service Secretary. But you can do away with a large part of the permanent staff, and merge them with the military Staff.

Senator **Warner**. The last subject would be the role of the service Secretaries. During the course of their testimony, Secretary Marsh led off on the issue and then he was joined by the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the problem that they faced when an operational order went from the Secretary of Defense down eventually to the CINCs. I suggested one option which they might consider is to have an informational copy of that order directed to the Secretary.

He is not in the direct chain of command in executing an operational order. Nevertheless, for support purposes and a lot of other reasons it would be helpful if he knew on a real time basis of those situations in which there were other dramatic functions being prepared and executed by the operating forces.

Do you have any comment on that?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator, as you know, I tried to keep you informed and I tried to keep the service Secretaries informed about operations.

Senator WARNER. Indeed, you did that.

Secretary LAIRD. The problem is when you are assigning at least three or four operational orders a day, as I did, and I signed off three or four times a day on operational orders——

Senator WARNER. And you always did it in writing, it is my recollection.

Secretary LAIRD. Right. I also initiated every order that went to the Chairman. There were no orders ever issued on any raids or any other military operations that I did not sign off on.

It would be very difficult to send copies of those operational orders all over the Pentagon and to the service Secretaries, to their staffs. You just cannot get them signed off and get their input that rapidly.

I think they should be informed and I think there are ways and means of doing it, but the operational orders going to, say, McCain, or going to Abrams out in Vietnam, I really did not think it was a good idea to have circulating all over that building.

I think the service Secretaries can be kept informed through the weekly meetings we had and luncheons we had, and so forth, but you cannot do it four times a day with all of the other things you have to do.

Senator WARNER. I know we come back again to the force of personality and style of management. Indeed, you did keep service Secretaries well informed on a real time basis. But then we did have that one situation when Secretary Seamons was away.

Secretary LAIRD. I am sorry about that, Secretary Seamons' comment on that, but I had informed the Under Secretary and John Lucas will tell you that Secretary Seamons was out of the country for a week during that period of time and the Under Secretary was informed by me of that particular operation.

Now, it was up to him to inform the Secretary of the Air Force, not me.

Senator WARNER. I hear you, Mr. Secretary. [Laughter.]

I was in the Navy Department at that time. Again, it is style of management and if a subsequent Secretary—remember we have to lay down a format to govern, hopefully, for many years—if a subsequent Secretary chose not to do that, then the Secretary is out here and hopes he learns of it through some other means.

It seems to me that puts him in an awkward position.

Secretary LAIRD. I agree with you that there should be an informational copy. I am not sure about the informational copy. When you get into this business of targets and targeting, I think the general information should be available, but the specific target in wartime conditions, no, I do not think the service Secretary needs to know all that.

Senator WARNER. Let us stop and think. He sits there side by side with his Chief of service. In effect, what you are saying is that the Chief of service should have that information, but that he should not on a real time basis.

Secretary LAIRD. The Chief of service does not get that information.

Senator WARNER. He gets it through the tank, JCS.

Secretary LAIRD. He can get it through the tank, that is where he gets it, but he does not sign off on it.

Senator WARNER. I know he does not sign off, but for informational purposes he has the ability to get it on a real time basis.

Secretary LAIRD. I think on the general operations it is all right for the service Secretaries, they should be kept informed. As far as target boxes and things like that, I do not think they need to know that.

Dr. KORB. I would like to make a comment on that because it is an important subject.

The problem that you have, as I see it, in the Department of Defense, is that you really do not have one department. In many cases, you have four departments. The real powers of the service Secretary are not clearly understood. People do not realize, for example, that a service Secretary is not in the chain of command.

This creates a great deal of confusion sometimes in the Congress, sometimes in the public. I think one has to be careful to ensure that people realize that the service Secretary is not in the chain of command and anything that gives the impression that he should or might be in it, is something we have to be careful to avoid.

The law says that the service Chief must keep the service Secretary informed of operations that he learns through the JCS arena. That is about as far as we need to go. It is very important that people realize that the Secretary of the service is not, for example, picking targets, say, in the Middle East.

There was some confusion when Admiral Watkins was asked at a breakfast with some reporters about one of the statements his service Secretary had made. Admiral Watkins had to remind the reporters that the service Secretary was not in the chain of command.

Senator WARNER. The law prescribes in a somewhat gray way that he has authority over operations. It is written into the law.

By the way, one of the objectives of this committee, I hope, will be, and I urge it, to make absolutely parallel the statutory title with respect to all three service Secretaries. I do not think they need to have a different job description or any differences in their job descriptions.

I presume you all concur with that?

Mr. ODEEN. Let me comment on that.

I agree with what you say. It seems to me one of the problems we have, as I suggested earier, is that everyone does everything. Anything that encourages a service Secretary to be involved in operations and that sort of thing is not a good idea.

We want to focus the service Secretary and, to a larger degree, the service Chiefs of Staff, on running those very large, complicated departments. They have $100 billion budgets, complex weapons systems, to develop, produce, and maintain. They have people to recruit and train.

This is their primary function under the 1958 Reorganization Act. We should focus them on that management task and give them the necessary authority to do that, not distract them by getting them involved in operations.

Senator **Warner**. An informational copy does not involve them.

Secretary **Laird**. You talk about informational copy, where are you going to put the carriers next week?

I do not see anything wrong with the service Secretary getting that information. But if you are going into the operational orders which the Secretary of Defense has to sign off on, if you are in a wartime situation, you just cannot, there are so many of those orders.

Abrams comes in with a target box he wants to hit someplace in Laos or Cambodia. You have to look over the darn thing and if the Chairman recommends it. I never turned down any box that Abrams wanted to hit. But I never thought it was my responsibility to go to each of the service Secretaries or to the Joint Chiefs to get their approval.

Senator **Warner**. I am not suggesting approval, Mr. Secretary. It is simply to keep him informed of what is taking place with those operating forces for which he is responsible, logistically, or otherwise.

Secretary **Laird**. Well, we did not send a lot of those copies all over the Pentagon.

Senator **Warner**. I understand that. That is the issue we have here.

Have you finished, Mr. Odeen?

Mr. **Odeen**. Yes, sir.

The point I am trying to make is that I see the service Secretary's role as one that ought to be made more important and more central to running the Department of Defense. In an organization of that size, you simply have to have very strong service Secretary leadership. You have to have good, effective people in that position.

Their job is management of personel and logistics. Let us not do anything to distract them. I would be very careful about making it appear they have responsibility for operations.

Senator **Warner**. Gentlemen, thank you.

I want to say, Mr. Chairman, this has been probably one of the most profitable days in this rather lengthy series of hearings. We have had three eminently qualified individuals to address the number of issues that we are considering.

I thank each of you.

Senator **Thurmond**. My thanks to you, too.

I have just one question here.

The staff study concludes that efforts to reorganize the Defense Department will prove imperfect unless accompanied by changes in congressional review of the Defense program.

In other words, the Congress had contributed to many of the Department's organizational problems.

Do you agree with this criticism?

Secretary **Laird**. Yes, I do.

Dr. **Korb**. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ODEEN. I echo those responses very much. It is essential that all players change, the Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the joint military structure services.

Senator THURMOND. What congressional changes would you recommend to alleviate this problem?

Do you have anything specific that you would recommend?

Secretary LAIRD. First, I would hope that the Congress could get its act together on the number of committees that have to review the budget, not only the authorization budget, but also the appropriations process.

Senator THURMOND. Did you mention 48 committees and subcommittees?

Secretary LAIRD. Forty-eight committees and subcommittees that have defense oversight responsibility at the present time. That is just getting out of hand.

Senator THURMOND. This sounds unreasonable.

Secretary LAIRD. I would hope that the Congress sometime along the line would give consideration to your authorizations and there are other things that I think can be improved.

One of the most important improvements is the improvement that is already on the track as far as the House of Representatives is concerned. I hope that it does not get held up here in the Senate because I think that is important before you do all these other things.

Senator THURMOND. We are glad to get the recommendations of each of you today. After you leave today, if you can think of any additional specific recommendations that you can make on this particular subject, it will be very helpful to us.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. KORB. I think we need to move toward biennial budgeting. In other words, a 2-year authorization process.

I think that, as Secretary Laird pointed out, we need fewer committees.

Finally, the Congress has to demand fewer reports, particularly on very insignificant items, from the Department of Defense. Last year there were something like 450 reports due to the Congress from the Department of Defense since you have 1,600 people in OSD, that basically means you have one report for every four people.

Mr. ODEEN. Mr. Chairman, the only other thing I would add is the thought of looking hard at the roles and responsibilities of the three major committees involved. The Budget, Authorization and Appropriations Committees.

I take it from the comment earlier of one of your colleagues, that the Appropriations Committee and Armed Services Committee have been talking about their respective roles. There is clearly overlap between those committees which complicates the review process and takes an enormous amount of time. If you can think of ways to focus your efforts differently from the Appropriations Committee, it would be a great benefit.

There are a large number of broad, difficult issues that the Congress as well as the Secretary of Defense ought to be coming to grips with. I believe this is an area that the Armed Services Committee, given its membership and staff support, could make a real contribution, examining the broader issues, the longer-term issues, and being involved less in the day-to-day details of the authorization process.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much. I want to express again our appreciation to you for the splendid testimony you have given here today.

We now stand adjourned.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to other business, at 9:13 a.m., in room SD-G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.

Present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Wilson, Denton, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, and Dixon.

Staff present: Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Richard D. Finn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, research assistant; Barbara B. Brown, and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; and Nancy Soderberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND, PRESIDING

Senator THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

This morning's hearing is the ninth in a series of committee hearings on the organization and decisionmaking procedures on the Department of Defense and the Congress.

Testifying this morning is Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., the 11th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is important to note that Admiral Crowe has had more joint experience than any other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is also the first Chairman to come directly from a Unified Command position, having served prior to his appointment as the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, since July, 1983.

Other key assignments during Admiral Crowe's distinguished military career include Commander, Middle East Force; Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations; Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces, Southern Europe; and Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Admiral Crowe's background has prepared him well for his difficult role as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has also provided him with substantial expertise on the organizational issues to be addressed today.

This hearing will focus on three major topics: the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, the Unified Command system, and the preparation and reward of military officers assigned to joint duty.

Admiral Crowe, on behalf of the committee, I extend a warm welcome to you. We are privileged to receive testimony from you today.

Before you proceed with your statement, I would like to yield to Senator Nunn for any comments he may have at this time.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

As I said when he was confirmed, I believe Admiral Crowe is a man in the right place at the right time. He has had an outstanding career. He has had more joint leadership than anyone we have had in recent years, for the position he now holds, which is our top military position. I might add, as I mentioned to Admiral Crowe, that I think his timing, from the country's point of view, is very fortunate. From his own point of view, considering the task he is going to face, it may be one of the most difficult jobs any Chairman has had in peacetime.

I don't know when the Department of Defense will have the simultaneous challenges in peacetime that it is going to have in the next couple of years. Challenge number one will be budgetary.

Based on my computations—and these are assumptions and estimates—including the cuts that have already been made, the likely compromise in conference on appropriations, and the 1986 cuts that will be required in defense from Gramm-Rudman, (about $5.5 billion in outlays) indicates to me that we are going to have a negative growth in defense this year, compared to last year's final appropriations act, of from 5 to 9 percent.

That means, if the President expects to maintain the 0-3-3 growth rate, which he indicated in the news media yesterday—then, based on the new lower base, next year he would have to ask for a real increase of some 11 percent in defense to get the same numbers he would have had on a 0-3-3 growth. That would be something that would be, to say the least in this fiscal environment, enormously difficult to even have seriously considered.

That is one challenge.

The other challenge is defense reorganization, which we are talking about now. It may be fortuitous that both of these are coming at the same time because they do somewhat go together. I think we can do a much better job with the existing resources with a reorganized Defense Department. But the challenges are going to be very, very significant. I, for one, am pleased that Admiral Crowe is in his position.

We look forward to hearing his views this morning on these important matters.

Senator THURMOND. I shall now turn the meeting over to the next ranking officer, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, Mr. Warner.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, before you leave may I just say that I was distraught to hear the news about Mrs. Goldwater. I would ask that you convey the heartfelt condolences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Senator.

Senator THURMOND. We would be glad to do that.

Thank you very much.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. If there are no further statements from members of the committee, we will proceed now to receive the direct testimony of Admiral Crowe.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the kind words. I also don't know that I was comforted by what you said, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. I know.

I am not comforted in having to say it.

Admiral CROWE. I welcome this opportunity to share my views with the committee on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Joint Chiefs and also the Unified Commands.

I believe that your current review of these matters is timely, appropriate, and extremely important to the nation.

Mr. Chairman, it is my intention, with your permission, to summarize my statement rather than to go through the entire statement.

Senator WARNER. Before you get underway, I would want to say to my distinguished colleague from Georgia with respect to his views on the defense budget, as we look at Gramm-Rudman, this will impose on the Congress the issue of whether or not taxes should be raised, as opposed to the cut, in order to protect our national defense. Gramm-Rudman will bring into very, very clear focus the choice the American citizens, our President and the Congress will have to make on taxes versus a cut, which cut, in the judgment that will have to be rendered at that time to determine the magnitude and the type of the cut, will or will not jeopardize the national defense of this country.

Senator NUNN. I agree with that assessment, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Now, Admiral, we will hear your summary statement, and your full statement will be admitted to the record.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, sir.

As you are aware, I have only been at my post for 10 weeks. It is probably a little premature for me to be making grand pronouncements on this subject or any other about the duties of the Chairman since I am still looking for the light switches in my office.

However, I am not a newcomer to the general subject, having served the last 5 years in command of joint, and unified forces and 3 years before that with the JCS as the Operations Deputy to the Chief of Naval Operations.

In any event, despite my recent arrival, I intend today to call the shots as I see them at this juncture.

As you know, we are engaged in a three-track process of review and possible reform of the national security machinery. Thus far, I have not seen any of the works or products of the Packard Commission, so I cannot comment on its findings.

However, I have read the record prepared by your staff. Similarly, I have studied the House Armed Services Committee report on H.R. 3622, as well as the bulk of the testimony that has been taken by this committee.

The SASC staff report includes some excellent historical material, it treats selected subjects thoughtfully, and illuminates a number of problem areas that deserve examination, which I would agree with.

Nevertheless, I would argue that, the JCS is concerned, it is flawed in three respects. First, it builds an imbalanced case by quoting extensively from critics of the system, ignoring hundreds of issues the JCS effectively and successfully addressed, and leaving the impression that the Chiefs of service are unduly parochial and self-serving.

Even in the short time that I have been aboard, it is manifest to me that such a description does the JCS an injustice. I have never served with a more thoughtful and broad-minded group of senior officers.

Second, this same study has given short shift to changes made in the last 3 years by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS to improve internal management, to encourage cross-service cooperation, and to promote joint solutions to problems. The testimony of the four Chiefs of service this week treated these steps in some detail, so I will not dwell on them.

Last, and perhaps most disturbing, the principal recommendation of the report, to replace the JCS with a body of advisors divorced from both the operational and administrative worlds of the services, would be, in my view, a very serious mistake. I will have more to say on this question later.

The House Armed Services Committee report differs from the Senate staff effort in that it does not attempt to judge the JCS performance over the last 4 years, a matter on which I suspect people can sincerely disagree. Rather, it draws attention to the needs of today, suggests further improvements in organization, and recommends some shift in lines of authority of the JCS structure.

At this point, I believe a few words about my own view of these questions is in order.

You are generally familiar with the functions assigned to the JCS and the Joint Staff by public law and DOD directive. To a great extent, these functions cut across a wide and deep spectrum.

Let me just sample a few.

They involve strategic concepts, threat assessments, force development, current military planning on a global scale, peacetime assignment of forces to the Unified Commands, joint reconnaissance activities, worldwide exercise schedules, security assistance, overseas base negotiations, host nation support agreements, options in support of diplomatic objectives, crisis management, counter-terrorism, and a host of complex issues surrounding arms control initiatives.

Given such a range of demands, I would argue that the JCS have served the Nation rather well over the last 40 years.

At the same time, I would readily admit that the global and strategic military environments are in flux, and keeping pace with these developments is straining our capabilities.

Recognizing this, Secretary Weinberger, working with my predecessor, General Vessey, and the service Chiefs, has for some time been seeking ways within the bounds of current legislation to improve defense organization and introduce more efficient procedures.

Moreover, you have had a succession of government witnesses testify that there is indeed room for further organizational changes. I would readily concur with this assessment.

With this background, and in the light of my own experience, I would like to share some personal observations which condition or guide my approach to a reorganization. At the very outset, I would say that these thoughts are not new, but they seem to me to have a tendency to get lost or to be neglected as the debate intensifies.

First, the principle of civilian control in my view is deeply rooted in our services from top to bottom. This is not just a product of carefully crafted rules, but of our society's moors, our educational institutions, our recruitment and training system, our history, and our way of life.

In the spate of recent reorganization studies, I have seen no serious recommendations that would threaten civilian control.

Clearly, national security is a complex and challenging business. The predominant reason, but by no means the only one, that defense organization does not always perform as desired, is that the issues and choices facing the decisionmakers are complex, diverse, and thorny. This fact of life will not change no matter what organization we adopt.

Where so many interests and threads come together, evolutionary steps are, in my view, preferable to sharp and dramatic reform. If change is to be successfully implemented in the Defense Department, it must be done in modest steps, with at least a modicum of agreement among the competing elements. I really don't see how it can be done in any other way.

Unintended and unpredictable consequences will inevitably attend every change. Moving in a deliberate rather than a precipitate fashion will allow managers to uncover and better deal with such consequences as they emerge.

The Joint Staff is directly dependent on contributions from all the service staffs and/or from the service Chiefs themselves. Organizational changes that we contemplate must honor this fundamental reality or otherwise court failure.

Similarly, no matter how much authority the Chairman has, he cannot know everything. He will, of necessity, be relying on others for assistance. Thus, it is imperative that the Chairman's ties and two-way channels of communication with the service Chiefs be kept open in some manner.

Lastly, no matter what changes are made, it is, in my observation, vital to preserve the JCS channel for getting unvarnished military advice to the National Command Authorities, even though it may be unpalatable at times.

Let me now move from the general to the specific. It is my intention to comment on some of the specific issues which I consider most significant. I would be happy to comment on others, of course, during the questioning period or to elaborate on these rather brief comments.

Regarding the JCS system itself, overall, I believe that the JCS system is the best mechanism this Nation has for coordinating the preparations for war and formulating advice to the National Command Authorities. It brings together, as no other system would, the views of the service Chiefs responsible for building forces and the advice of the unified commanders who have the responsibility for carrying out operational missions.

It is also flexible enough to furnish a mechanism for the President to direct discreet military operations as in counter-terrorism or other surgical actions with a high political content.

In essence, I oppose replacing the JCS with a new body of advisors, such as the Joint Military Advisory Council recommended in the SASC staff report. I strongly believe that such a group would not be as effective as the current JCS in rendering National Command Authorities practical military advice, in influencing service programs to support the needs of the operational forces, or in assisting the Chairman to carry out his duties.

With regard to military advice, under the existing rules and practices, I do not feel particularly hampered in furnishing my personal advice either to the President or to the Secretary of Defense. I believe there is merit, however, in designating the Chairman as the principal advisor so that there is no question about his right to express his own views on military issues.

Some of the Chiefs testified last week that they would like to see the Chairman act as the principal advisor on behalf of the JCS. I personally have no problem with this proposal.

As to management, I join a commonly held view that the management of the Joint Staff needs more attention. I don't think there is any doubt about it. In this regard, I already have considerable authority. As Chairman, I set the agenda for the JCS, I can now force items forward, whether there is agreement or not, and can task the Joint Staff to meet my own requirements.

The one area that concerns me now is the control of the staff's workload. As others have noted—and I elaborate in my statement on the many sources which suggest taskings for us—the Joint Staff handles thousands of issues annually. I am very concerned about those actions which may be diverting my personnel from more important and relevant business. Thus, I strongly believe that the Chairman, assisted by the Director, should be authorized to review and screen all taskings to the Joint Staff with discretionary authority to return low priority or ill-defined items to the originator. The Chiefs and I have discussed this problem and I believe that we can resolve it without legislative action.

As for the military chain of command, I tend to agree with those concerned about having the JCS as a corporate body in the military chain of command. As indicated in my statement, DOD Directive 5100.30 partially solves the committee problem by specifying that for certain time-sensitive operations, the channel of communication shall be from the National Command Authorities through the Chairman, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the executing commanders. Additionally, I favor the chain of command running through the Chairman as a standard practice if the Secretary of Defense or the President deem it desirable.

One proposal which has obviously generated some heat has to do with a Deputy or Vice Chairman. I understand that the rationale for this is to strengthen the Chairman's position. I personally concur with promoting the Director to four stars and designating him as a Vice Chairman.

To me this is a logical step. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I used to feel this way when I served as a Ops Dep with the JCS, that the Director would be better off with four stars. To me this is a logical step toward sharing the Chairman's duties, thereby permitting him to better control his time and strengthening the management of the joint staff, which needs to be done.

I do, however, subscribe to the present arrangement where the Chiefs of service act in the Chairman's stead during this absence from Washington and assume this responsibility for a set period. I suspect you will want me to elaborate on that later.

Let me say one last word about the authority of the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands.

Having just completed serving as a unified commander for 2 years in the Pacific, I am concerned with that issue, the role and authority of the CINCs. It is my strong conviction that the directives governing the CINCs placed in the chain of command should be reassessed and their roles strengthened.

The JCS have discussed this issue and have already initiated a review of the governing document, Unified Action Armed Forces, colloquially known as JCS Pub. 2. At this reading, it appears we can achieve what needs to be done without legislation. We hope to report to the Secretary of Defense inside of 6 months, and I would urge you, if you could, to hold off taking action until you see the results of our efforts.

Mr. Chairman, these remarks cover my principal concerns and suggestions. I should say that I am deeply impressed with this committee's effort to come to grips with defense organizational issues which, to quote your staff, have, over the years, confounded some of the "most thoughtful, decisive, and experienced" minds we have.

I can assure you that I and the Chiefs collectively and individually are taking seriously your efforts to refine the machinery. We have a vested interest in improving our ability to carry out our responsibilities and we are determined and committed to work with you in this effort.

That covers my summary, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Crowe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity to share with you my views on the organization and decision-making procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified commands. I believe your current review of these matters to be timely, appropriate and important to the Nation.

As you are aware I have been in my post only ten weeks. It is probably a little premature for me to be making grand pronouncements about the duties of the Chairman since I am still looking for some of the light switches in my office. However, I am not a newcomer to the general subject, having served the last five years before in command of joint and unified forces and three years before that on the JCS as the Operations Deputy to the Chief of Naval Operations. In any event, despite my recent arrival, I intend today to call the shots as I see them at this juncture.

SENATE STAFF REPORT AND HOUSE BILL

As you know, we are engaged in a three track process of review and possible reform of the national security machinery. On November 20th, the House of Representatives passed by a wide margin H.R. 3622, modifying the organizations of the JCS. Concurrently, this committee is considering the House bill and the Senate Armed Services Committee staff report with a view toward legislation not yet defined. Finally, a Presidential commission, headed by the Honorable David Packard, is examining operational and organizational arrangements in the Department of Defense, including but not limited to the JCS.

I have not as yet seen any of the work or products of the Packard Commission, so I cannot comment on its findings. However, I have read the report prepared by your staff on "Defense Organization: The need for Change." Similarly I have studied the House Armed Services Committee Report on H.R. 3622 entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985" as well as the bulk of the testimony taken by this committee.

The SASC staff report includes some excellent historical material, treats thoughtfully selected subjects (e.g., civilian control, German general staff, etc.) and illuminates a number of problem areas that deserve examination. Nevertheless, I would argue that where the JCS is concerned it is flawed in three respects.

First, it builds an inbalanced case. While quoting extensively from critics of the system, it essentially ignores hundreds of issues the JCS successfully deal with annually and their extensive role in everyday operations and management of our global forces. Overall, the one-sided approach of the report conveys a picture of confusion and breakdown which I believe is misleading. Moreover, the report leaves the impression that the chiefs of service are unduly parochial, extremely self-serving, and that log-rolling dominates the JCS. Even in the short time I have been abroad, it is manifest to me that such a description does the JCS a disservice. I have never served with a more thoughtful and broad-minded group of senior officers. They are human, of course, and on occasion make mistakes, but all the organizations I have ever been associated with suffer from those imperfections. I would not quarrel with the conclusion that improvements can and should be made in the JCS organization. On the other hand, it is not necessary to distort the picture in order to make that case.

Second, this same study has given short shrift to the changes made in the last three years by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS to improve internal management, to encourage cross-service cooperation and to promote joint solutions to problems. The testimony of the four chiefs of service this week treated these steps in some detail, so I will not dwell on them. Suffice it to say, these recent improvements are especially pertinent for your deliberations and I would have preferred that the SASC report had emphasized them in its analysis.

Last and most disturbing, the principal recommendation of the report—to replace the JCS with a body of advisors divorced from both the operational and administrative worlds of the services—would add another layer to an already overloaded bureaucracy and its adoption would be, in my view, a serious mistake. I will have more to say on this question later.

The House Armed Services Committee report differs from the Senate staff effort in two important ways. First, it does not attempt to judge JCS performance over the last forty years—a matter on which honest people can genuinely disagree. Rather, it focuses attention on the needs of today and suggests that the JCS and the Joint Staff should be more detached from service interests, deal more objectively with some tough resource-related issues, and more further to integrate U.S. Armed Forces along lines envisioned in the National Security Act of 1947 and the Reorganization Act of 1958. Second, it does not propose to completely reorganize the Department of Defense as it now exists. Rather, the House report seeks further improvements in the JCS organization and recommends some shift in lines of authority within the JCS structure.

OWN ASSESSMENT

At this point I believe a few words about my own view of the JCS system are in order.

You are generally familiar with functions assigned to the JCS and the Joint Staff by public law and DOD directive—i.e., to serve as principal military advisors, prepare strategic, military, and logistics plans, and so on. But these crisp statements of function do not begin to describe real world demands placed upon the JCS system. To a great extent, these tasks cut across the entire spectrum of defense management, military preparedness, peacetime operations and war planning, with or without participation of our allies. They involve strategic concepts, threat assessments, force development, current military planning on a global scale, peacetime assignment of forces to the unified commands, joint reconnaissance activities, worldwide exercise schedules, security assistance requirements and priorities, overseas base negotiations, host nation support agreements, forces and options in support of diplomatic objectives, crisis management, counter-terrorism and a host of complex issues surrounding arms control initiatives and ventures. Given such a range of demands and achievements, I would argue that the JCS have served the Nation rather well.

At the same time I would readily admit that we should be seeking organizational improvements. Unquestionably, the global strategic and military environments are in flux. The worldwide sweep of our commitments, the burgeoning Soviet challenge, the complexity of our alliance network are taxing our ability to develop a resource-efficient and coherent strategy which will carry us into the future. Similarly, increasing constrained resources dictate that we get the maximum return on our investment. In military terms that means we must more and more operate jointly and make the plans and programs of the services more complementary. Complicating the picture is terrorism and low-level conflict in the Third World. Keeping pace with these developments is straining our capabilities.

In response, Secretary Weinberger, working with my predecessor, General Vessey, and the service chiefs, has for some time been seeking ways within the bounds of current legislation to improve defense organization and introduce more efficient procedures. The JCS view this challenge as a continuing one and you have had a succession of government witnesses testify that there is indeed room for further modest organizational changes. I readily concur with this assessment.

PHILOSOPHY

With this background and in the light of my own experience, I would like to shar some personal observations which condition or guide my approach to reorganization. These thoughts are not new but they seem to have a tendency to get lost as the debate intensifies.

The principle of civilian control is deeply rooted in our services from top to bottom. This is not just a product of carefully crafted rules, but of our society's mores, our educational institutions, our recruitment and training system, and our way of life. In the spate of recent reorganization studies I have seen no serious recommendations that would threaten civilian control.

Clearly national security is a complex and challenging business. The predominant reason (but by no means the only one) that defense organization does not always perform as desired, is that issues and choices facing the decision-makers are both diverse and thorny. This fact of life will not change no matter what organization we adopt.

When one addresses reorganization, he is essentially talking about redistributing power and this fact introduces a great deal of passion into the dialogue. One of the most difficult tasks your committee faces will be to separate emotional from intellectual arguments.

Where so many vested interests and threads come together, evolutionary steps are preferable to sharp and dramatic reform. If change is to be successfully implemented in a large and complex organization such as the Defense Department, it must be done in modest steps with at least a modicum of agreement among the competing elements.

Unintended and unpredictable consequences will inevitably attend every change. Moving in a deliberate rather than a precipitate fashion will allow managers to uncover and better deal with such consequences as they emerge.

The Joint Staff is directly dependent on contributions from all the service staffs and/or from the service chiefs themselves. Every joint operation depends in part on specialized knowledge or expertise resident in the services, not to mention the necessary equipment and forces. Organizational changes must honor this fundamental reality.

Similarly, no matter how much authority the Chairman has, he cannot know everything and he will of necessity be relying on others for assistance. No Chairman who takes his responsibilities seriously would function in any other way. Thus, no matter what changes are made, it is imperative that the Chairman's ties and two-way channels of communication with the chiefs of service be kept open. The balance of authority can be shifted somewhat, but the Chairman's effectiveness will always rest in large part on his ability to do business with the individual chiefs and services.

No matter what changes are made, it is vital to preserve the JCS channel for getting unvarnished military advice to national command authorities (NCA).

DETAILED PROPOSALS

Let me now move from the general to the specific. I intend to speak to those recommendations which impress me as the most important and to state my views briefly. If you desire, I will be happy to expand on my reasoning or to comment on other issues during the questioning period.

THE JCS SYSTEM

Overall, I believe that the JCS system is the best mechanism this Nation has for coordinating the preparations for and the conduct of modern warfare. It brings together, as no other system would, the views of service chiefs responsible for building forces (organizing, equipping, training and providing U.S. Armed Forces) and the advice of the unified commanders responsible for carrying out operational missions. It is also flexible enough to furnish a mechanism for the President to direct discrete military operations, as in counter-terrorism or other limited operations with a high political content, from Washington with direct advice and support from the JCS. Such flexibility is very important in today's dynamic climate.

If you have concluded from the thrust of these remarks that I would oppose replacing the JCS with a new body of advisors, such as the "Joint Military Advisory Council" recommended in the SASC staff report, you would be correct. I strongly believe that such a group would not be as effective as the current JCS in rendering national command authorities practical military advice, in influencing service programs to support the needs of the operational forces, or in assisting the Chairman to carry out his duties. I am aware, of course, that the "dual" responsibilities of the chiefs are on occasion difficult to fulfill, but I believe the strengths that derive from this arrangement on balance outweigh the demerits. As mentioned earlier, my own experience argues strongly for keeping the chiefs of service tied into the central mechanism.

MILITARY ADVICE TO NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

Under the existing rules and practices I do not feel particularly hampered in furnishing my personal advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. I believe there is merit, however, in designating the chairman as the principal advisor, so that there is no question about the Chairman's right to express his own views on military issues. At the same time, as emphasized earlier, it is important that the JCS right to render their collective advice on their own initiative as opposed to "on request" should be protected. In this regard I support requiring the Chairman to set forth the dissenting views of other chiefs if they do in fact disagree with the Chairman.

Some of the chiefs testified last week that they would like the Chairman to act as principal advisor "on behalf of" the JCS. I have no problem with this proposal.

MANAGEMENT OF THE JOINT STAFF

I join a commonly held view that the management of the Joint Staff needs more attention. With respect to the Joint Staff, I already have considerable authority. As Chairman, I set the agenda for the JCS, can force items forward whether there is agreement or not, and can task the Joint Staff to meet my own requirements. The one area that concerns me now is the control of the Staff's workload.

As others have noted, the Joint Staff handles thousands of issues annually, representing requests from many directions including the service chiefs, commanders of the unified commands, the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, OSD and the Congress. I know of no other civilian or military staff which receives taskings from so many sources.

The Chairman sees a few hundred of these papers as they move to the top of an agenda which he controls. But I am equally concerned about those other actions which may be diverting the Joint Staff from more important and relevant business. Thus, I strongly believe that the Chairman, assisted by the director, should be authorized to review and screen all taskings to the Joint Staff with discretionary authority to return low priority or ill-defined items to the originator. The chiefs and I have discussed this problem and I believe we can resolve it without legislative action.

No matter what management system we adopt, it is vital that any chief be permitted to table questions that he feels are important to our security and have them aired in the JCS. Thus, whatever authority you give me, I would move to see that such access for the chiefs is protected.

MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND

I tend to agree with those concerned about having the JCS as a corporate body in the military chain of command. DOD directive 5100.30 partially solves the committee problem by specifying that "the channel of communication for execution of the single integrated operational plan (SIOP) and other time-sensitive operations shall be from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the executing commanders." Additionally, I favor the chain of command running through the Chairman, as a standard practice, if the Secretary of Defense or President deem it desirable.

DEPUTY OR VICE CHAIRMAN

One proposal for strengthening the Chairman's position is a four-star deputy or Vice Chairman. Several variants have been discussed during the course of these hearings. I personally concur with promoting the director to four-stars and designating him as a "Vice Chairman." To me this is a logical step toward sharing the Chairman's duties thereby permitting him to manage his time better and strengthening management of the Joint Staff. I do, however, subscribe to the present arrangement where the chiefs of service act in the Chairman's stead during his absence from Washington and assume this responsibility for a set period. My short time in office has convinced me that both the services and the JCS benefit from the chiefs' experience as acting Chairman.

ROLE AND AUTHORITY OF THE CINC'S

Having just completed serving as a unified commander for two years in the Pacific, I am concerned with one other issue—the role and authority of the CINC's. I expressed myself in writing on this subject last year in response to queries from this committee. In essence it is my strong belief that the directives governing the CINC's place in the chain of command should be reassessed and their role somewhat strengthened. The JCS have discussed this issue and have already initiated a review of the governing document, unified action Armed Forces, colloquially known as JCS Pub 2. At this reading it appears we can achieve what needs to be done without legislation. In any event I would urge you not to act on this particular question until we have completed our assessment and reported the resulting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. We anticipate that this action will be completed in six months.

In this regard the House bill recommends that the Chairman be given responsibility to "supervise" the CINC's in addition to his current responsibilities. In a limited sense I do that now as the agent of the SECDEF. But I do see some merit in codifying this relationship, since it would dispel any confusion.

Mr. Chairman, these remarks cover my principal concerns and suggestions. Overall, I am deeply impressed by this committee's effort to come to grips with defense organizational issues which, to quote your staff report, have confounded some of the "most thoughtful, decisive, and experienced" minds we have. Your decision to broaden these hearings, with reference to work already accomplished by the House, has made it easier for me to survey the landscape of possibilities and to express my preference for the general direction of change. I can assure you that I and the chiefs collectively and individually are taking very seriously your efforts to improve the defense machinery. We have a vested interest in improving our ability to carry out our responsibilities, and are determined to work with you in this endeavor.

Senator **WARNER**. Thank you very much, Admiral.

The Senator from Georgia and I are of the opinion that we will follow a 5-minute round of questioning and will just keep going around for subsequent rounds. This will enable members to have a quicker access to questioning the witness.

The questions that have been raised in the previous hearings as they relate to your testimony cover a wide range. One is the recommendation that five stars be given to the Chairman of the JCS. Would you have an objective view on that?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I might have a view, but I don't know how objective it would be.

Senator WARNER. Well, knowing you for many years, you can achieve objectivity, I am sure.

Admiral CROWE. I refer back to General Marshall's reaction to that when he said he didn't see any necessity for it, and he would not run if nominated, though I am not sure that is correct.

I noted General Dougherty's suggestion last week. He connected this promotion to keeping the Chairman involved in some fashion so that they would be at the call of the Government.

Senator WARNER. May I also interject here another view which it seems to me is the more persuasive, though I am not indicating how I would vote on this issue. That is, it would give you status with the military individuals in other governments, in foreign governments, though I don't know how many there are.

Admiral CROWE. There are three that I recall. Great Britain has a rank that is equivalent to five stars, Egypt does, and I forget the third country. I will be frank with you. I do not think the promotion would have a great deal to do with how I do my business or whether it would facilitate my business. If it would, it is not obvious to me.

I would like to say a word about General Dougherty's suggestion, however. I have given some thought to it. I don't know that you would need a promotion to carry it out.

But I was impressed with the idea of some kind of status that keeps at least the former Chairmen on call with the Government—of course, they do this now—and this, to me, has some merit.

Also, in thinking this over, I think there would be some merit when Chairmen leave the post after their experience to have some kind of special status for them for a year at some war college or an educational institution where they could articulate their experiences, their views, et cetera, et cetera.

Senator WARNER. In other words, the rank itself you think is not of great consequence——

Admiral CROWE. Not to me, no, sir.

Senator WARNER. ——particularly in relationships with other officers in the Government.

Admiral CROWE. Certainly not with my fellow Chiefs.

Senator WARNER. But you see some value in the committee considering whether or not some status should be accorded to former Chairmen to enable them to continue to provide advice in a formalized basis to presidents and others?

Admiral CROWE. Certainly, for the little time I have thought about it, I think it has some merit.

If I might just elaborate on the other suggestion. For many years now I have regretted that we retire many senior officers—and my particular experience is with the Navy—who carry a great deal of expertise and knowledge with them and that we do not formalize it or gather it in any fashion. They go right into another job or disappear and that is the last we hear of them. I think they have a great deal to offer.

I hope the committee would consider something in this regard.

Senator **Warner**. Admiral, turning to your observation that as principal advisor to the President, you would report—and I think I quote you as I made a note of this—"on behalf of the JCS." Was that correct?

Admiral **Crowe**. That was a suggestion that the Chiefs have made this week in their testimony. Yes, sir.

Senator **Warner**. Now, in that context, would a Chairman feel obligated to report to the President split views or dissenting views within the JCS?

If so, should we formalize this in some way?

Admiral **Crowe**. I certainly would feel obligated to do so. I would not feel comfortable giving my advice if I knew the Chiefs disagreed and I did not communicate that.

Yes, I think there would be some merit in codifying that.

Senator **Warner**. In codifying a requirement that the Chairman, in reporting to the President, would give the views of possibly all members of the JCS, as there could be just one dissenting member there?

Admiral **Crowe**. Yes.

Senator **Warner**. There has been some work done in the House of Representatives to the effect that the services which now have special units, that these units ought to be consolidated under a special organization in the Department of Defense and pulled together under the head of a civilian.

Have you had opportunity to look at that? Should we include that in our study of the reorganization of the department?

Admiral **Crowe**. I have not had an opportunity to study in depth the recent proposal made in the House, though I have seen the newspaper articles and I actually talked for a few moments yesterday to Congressman Daniel.

Senator **Warner**. I am talking about the Delta Force, the Special Forces.

Admiral **Crowe**. I understand what you are talking about, Mr. Chairman.

Interestingly enough, in the few weeks that I have been here, one of the things that has happened to me is that I have already had a number of opportunities to be involved in counter-terrorist operations and some crises that involve forces such as that.

Coming back to this issue after having been away for a few years, I am extremely impressed with the progress we have made in building our capability. Despite some of the rhetoric we hear, we really have made a lot of progress.

Senator **Warner**. If I may make a suggestion, the subject is of considerable importance. I would suggest that you study it and then supplement your testimony today at a later time to the committee and give your views on these proposals that are now being assessed in that area.

Admiral **Crowe**. I will.

Mr. Chairman, if I could just say one thing about something I have had direct and immediate experience with in the last few days, our command control arrangements. We have learned from our past experience, and currently are very good, very flexible, and capable of managing those operations with the kind of control we need. I am not as concerned as others about the command and control arrangements. There may be some equipment problems, and I will be happy to submit something to you.

[The information referred to follows:]

COMMENT ON HOUSE PROPOSAL TO CONSOLIDATE SOF WITHIN DOD

As you may recall, in 1983 the JCS examined the command arrangements for special operations to determine if they were structured to provide the most responsive capability to effectively conduct joint and combined special operations in accordance with agreed doctrine. Problem areas were identified and options considered. The JCS concluded that establishing a separate JCS agency would best satisfy identified needs, and on 1 October 1983 they directed establishment of the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA), effective 1 January 1984.

During the two years that JSOA has been in existence, meaningful progress has been made toward enhancing the Nation's special operations capability. Although we have not yet attained what I consider the desired joint special operations capability, it is primarily the result of shortfalls in manpower (force structure) and hardware (quantity and quality) and not as a result of command and control shortcomings. These shortfalls have been identified and the services have included initiatives within their respective Service programs which will significantly correct them. Special operations command and control is also being examined. JSOA's organizational structure is now being reviewed, based on its two years of experience, to determine what changes need to be made to improve its capabilities. Manpower increases to the CINC special operations staffs have the highest priority and are now being worked with the services. I believe the present command and control arrangements for special operations are basically sound. There may be some fine tuning needed, which we are now examining, but the concept is good.

We have not yet received the House proposal, therefore an indept examination is not possible. However, according to unofficial information available, it appears that the proposal would consolidate service special operations forces under a "Defense Special Operations Agency" (DSOA) headed by a civilian official, much like the National Security Agency (NSA) is structured. I do not believe that such a proposal is a viable solution in the case of special operations.

In contrast to NSA, which provides technical intelligence support to the Nation, a DSOA would provide operational support in such special operations areas as unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, foreign internal defense, direct action missions, and intelligence (strategic and tactical) collection and reporting. These activities are indivisibly linked to conventional military operations in that they, in many cases, support conventional military operations and almost always require the support of conventional military operations to be effective. Without this mutual support, and the high degree of mutual planning and coordination required, special operations cannot be conducted successfully. Creating a DSOA that is not supervised by the JCS significantly increases the command and control deficiencies it would be designed to correct. Further, its establishment does not negate the need for the current JSOA to advise the JCS on special operations matters; it merely adds another layer to the special operations command and control structure, making special operations more complex and their success more difficult to attain.

We have made considerable progress since the President mandated the revitalization of special operations. There have been improvements in both force structure and command and control arrangements. We have a solid program to continue the progress in all SOF areas. Therefore, I do not accept that the establishment of a DSOA is necessary.

Senator **WARNER**. Senator Nunn.

Senator **NUNN**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just following up on Chairman Warner's questioning about the dissenting views or individual views of the Chiefs, it seems to me that perhaps there are three choices here. One is to have the Chairman simply speak as the principal military advisor. Another would be to have him speak on behalf of the Chiefs. A third would be for him to speak as the principal military advisor with the notification to the Secretary of Defense or the President or both when there are dissenting views and what those views are.

My question is between two and three. I think all of us want to make sure that dissenting views flow up. The question is the words "on behalf of." I notice that on page 13, you say that there is no question about the Chairman's right to express his own views. "I believe there is merit, however, in designating the Chairman as the principal advisor, so that there is no question about the Chairman's right to express his own views on military issues." Then you go down further and say, "Some of the Chiefs testified last week that they would like the Chairman to act as principal advisor 'on behalf of' the JCS."

If you put the words "on behalf of" in there, would that mean to you that you were going to be speaking the corporate view or would that mean you were going to be speaking your individual view?

Admiral CROWE. Well, clearly, Senator, the definition of "on behalf of" has to be made clear. I have discussed this in the tank with my compadres and I think the generally accepted version of that, and the one that I would subscribe to, is that I would have an obligation to inform the Chiefs what my views were and give them an opportunity to comment and keep them informed of what I had done. They would not have a veto on my views and I would not be obligated to necessarily give a corporate view. I would be obligated, if they had a dissenting view, to tell either the Secretary or the President that they had a dissenting view and ask him to look at it, or if the Chiefs wanted me to, I could represent their view.

Senator NUNN. Wouldn't it be better, instead of saying "on behalf of," since obviously that can mean different things to different people, to simply say what we mean, and that is the Chairman will be the principal military advisor, but when there are dissenting views, he should make those views known?

Wouldn't that be clear? I mean, everybody would know what we were talking about.

Admiral CROWE. I would certainly come down on the side of clarity.

Senator NUNN. When you say "on behalf of," it looks to me like you are just opening up the same kind of question we have had ongoing for many, many years, whether it is a corporate view, whether it is going to be the lowest common denominator type exercise, or whether it indeed is individual views.

I think you have a better chance of having more diverse views and more choices for the principal military commanders, the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense, when you clearly have the Chief speak for himself with the clear obligation to report dissenting views.

Would you disagree with that?

Admiral CROWE. Not necessarily, sir. I hark back, though, to the principles that I mentioned in my statement, that in some fashion I have to keep the channels open and those Chiefs have to have confidence in me as a representative when I do have to represent them, that I am straight-forward with them, and that I do not have a hidden agenda, and so forth. No matter how you word the legislation, that is probably the way I would conduct myself.

Senator **Nunn**. I agree with that. I think you have to make sure that their views are reported up. But that does not mean that you have to merge your views with theirs and come out with a joint position. It seems to me there is a definite distinction.

I would say the same thing on the question of managing the joint staff. It seems to me when you throw in the words "on behalf of," again, would you interpret that as being you are able to manage the staff, and if so, what does "on behalf of" mean?

Admiral **Crowe**. I think I can do it under those circumstances. The Chiefs concur with this problem, they think it does need attention, it needs firmer control, and I think they will give me that authority. That is the reason that in my statement I said that I did not believe that in this particular subject we needed legislation. I could, of course, live with the legislation. That is no problem.

Senator **Nunn**. Well, it seems to me that if we are ever going to clarify these things, we ought to clarify them now, and what we mean, we ought to say, and if we don't mean it, we shouldn't say it.

Admiral **Crowe**. Well, I do come down on behalf of clarity.

Senator **Nunn**. Secretary Weinberger said on December 2 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have initiated a review of JCS Publication 2, UNAAF, to be completed June 30, 1986. What are the principal issues you are going to focus on in that kind of review?

To me, this is almost equal to and maybe as important as the whole question of JCS, that is, what kind of authority does the unified commander have out there in the field vis-a-vis his components and vis-a-vis the services back home?

What is going to be the scope of that kind of review? I think this is enormously important.

Admiral **Crowe**. I would agree completely, Senator. It is enormously important. I think, sometimes in the hustle and bustle, in the push and pull about the JCS, it is neglected. But it is extremely important.

Of course, JCS Pub 2 is the governing document. It lays down the lines of authority and specifies how the unified commander will conduct wartime operations, peacetime exercises, et cetera, and delineates the constraints and the chain of command. Also, it sets up the dual chain where operational direction goes from the Secretary of Defense to the unified commander, but administrative and logistics support, military justice and personnel matters, et cetera, go through another chain through the service Secretaries and the Chiefs of services, to a component commander.

I think that all this should be reviewed.

As I said last year in my written answers to the queries from this committee, we get the work done in the Unified Commands, but primarily because the commanders have grown up in the system and understand its strengths and weaknesses and know how to work around it, and that there is a general consensus of view among the people who are making it go. But this does not mean it cannot be improved.

Now, there are two or three areas where I think we can look for improvement. Let me say, to begin with, that there always has been a lot written about the unified commander's participation in the resource side of the house. I believe that most unified commanders would concur that there have been tremendous improvements made in this regard in the last 3 years and that we are probably about where we should be, with participation in the DRB process, and with unified commander participation in the POM process. We have some improvements to make. But, given the amount of participation they want, and given the problem of staffing, et cetera, I think they are about where they want to be.

To go further, they would have to have more people, more staffing, more analytical help, and they don't want to do that.

On the operational side of the house, what the unified commander really wants is to leave the details and so forth with component commanders, but he does not want an important decision that is made in the logistics area or the training area that would impact upon his strategy or ability to fight to be made without his concurrence or his input.

This problem is a lot easier to describe than it is to solve. It is easy for me, as a unified commander, to say that we have to take care of this problem, but now I am going to have to eat my words and come back here next year to deal with a solution. It is tough.

We already have a lot of history behind us. We have to deal with Armed Forces already in place and to find an acceptable solution to that problem is tough. But I think it can be done.

Somehow or other, the unified commander has to be put into the chain with the service Chiefs and he has to have a voice.

Lastly, JCS Pub 2 in my view constrains the way the unified commander can fight or operate his forces. I think that should be assessed and looked at very closely.

Senator NUNN. With more flexibility?

Admiral CROWE. More flexibility.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. I would make just one observation.

Senator Nunn raises the importance of achieving clarity, as we define the responsibilities of the Chief in this reporting to the President.

I wonder if you might reflect further on it and amplify your testimony of today after you have had a chance to go back and reflect on my distinguished colleague's observations about seeking clarity. Also, include in your subsequent submission to the committee, your views on how a CINC can get his views up to the President through the Chairman.

Having been a CINC, and we are, I am certain, destined on this reorganization to upgrade the authority of the CINC, it seems to me that his views, likewise, should be communicated to the President.

Admiral CROWE. I agree with that, Mr. Chairman. I labor under the hope and the desire that, having had Unified Command experience, I will be conscientious in doing exactly that.

I notice that some of the legislation, at least the House legislation, suggests that the Chairman be the spokesman for and supervisor of the CINCs. My reading is that that is what they are trying to get at.

Senator WARNER. You are uniquely capable of addressing this point, and your testimony will have great weight with the committee. Bear in mind that we are trying to lay down a framework that will last for the generations.

Admiral Crowe. I understand that, sir.

Senator Warner. While we have in place today a Chairman in whom we have complete confidence to do all of these things, there may be a different personality in future years. That is when the statutory framework is so important.

Admiral Crowe. Well, clarity is a great objective. Of course, it is difficult to achieve, no matter how you engineer the words. One of the ways, of course, is to express the sense of what you have in mind in legislation, in your own discussions and your own hearings.

We study that very carefully. So, if you have questions about words and so forth, I would say what they mean in your own discussions.

Senator Nunn. I am very leary of the words "on behalf of."

Admiral Crowe. I detect that, Senator.

Senator Warner. And I think that both Senator Nunn and I would hope that you would reflect on this with your colleagues and give us a further submission on this.

Admiral Crowe. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

A. CINC Views/B. Clarify the Words "On Behalf Of"

A. The Secretary of Defense is the principal contact at the policymaking level for the operational commanders, and the access of the CINCs to the Secretary of Defense is not inhibited. The CINCs meet frequently with the Secretary, either at their command headquarters or in Washington. They provide the Secretary with written quarterly reports and have complete freedom, at any time, to correspond directly with the Secretary or speak directly with him. On day-to-day operational matters, the CINCs deal directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs, who keep the Secretary informed of operational command issues and requirements. In addition, Title 10 U.S.C. was recently amended to designate the Chairman of the JCS as spokesman for the combatant commanders on matters pertaining to operational requirements. Finally, it is normal procedure to seek CINC comments on matters which can impact on the combatant commands prior to consideration by the Joint Chiefs. This combination of mechanisms/producers is sound and serves the nation well.

B. The words, "on behalf of" in connection with proposals to strengthen the role of the Chairman, JCS, do not imply that the Chairman is in any way precluded from providing his own advice or only provides the corporate view of the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman is obligated to provide the best military advice possible, and this can include his own personal recommendations, the corporate views of the Joint Chiefs, and must include any dissenting opinions of a Chief. Acting "on behalf of" the Joint Chiefs does not provide the corporate body with a veto over the Chairman's actions. It means instead that, as time permits, I inform the Chiefs of my views and what action I intend to take, and provide them an opportunity to comment. When time does not permit, as in a crisis, I act on the basis of my knowledge of their views resulting from our day-to-day consultations and interactions, and inform them as soon as practical regarding what I have done.

Senator Warner. Senator Wilson.

Senator Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know that I share the concern that has been stated by my colleagues.

It seems to me, Admiral Crowe, that you have stated pretty clearly that, as a strong Chairman, you feel that you have adequate authority now, not only to direct the affairs of the staff, but also to voice separate advice when you find that you are not in agreement with the corporate advice that would be given by your brothers on the Joint Chiefs.

I think there is great merit in preserving the access—not necessarily literal, physical access—but the assurance that a dissenting view can reach both the Secretary of Defense and the President for that matter. If one of the Joint Chiefs does not agree, it seems to me that the best working arrangement, which apparently is what you are enjoying even this early in your tenure, is one where your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs enjoy confidence that, whether or not they agree, their dissenting view will reach both the Secretary and the President.

I commend you for that. I think that is both valuable and the most effective way to function.

Your comments on the Deputy I think are interesting, particularly in concert with your observation about your concern that the joint staff is tasked to do many things from many sources. In fact, you state that you don't know of any other staff that receives directives or requests for information from as many sources. You have indicated that you feel there is a very clear need to lighten their load so as to direct their attention to real priority concerns.

I quite agree with that.

It seems to me that we are probably among the chief offenders, and I can foresee the time when someone directing an inquiry from the congressional level will take offense if informed that his request for information is of a lower priority, human nature and egos being what they are.

Is it your idea that this four star Deputy Chairman would have a large role in terms of directing the efforts of the staff?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, it is, Senator.

On the other hand, I was very interested in your comments about the congressional queries.

I had breakfast yesterday with the House Armed Services Committee and they asked me a similar question. I told them that we are tasked from a number of external sources, and that when we get queries or comments or requests from the U.S. Congress, they get a high priority, no matter what they are. We get a lot of these requests, too.

I do not have figures at my fingertips, but we do get an awful lot of requests, Senator. They get a high priority, no matter what.

But if people in the Congress want us to think and do important things, they should concentrate their requests and their queries on important things.

That is the best way to get us to do what we should be doing. That is not always the case.

Senator WILSON. Well, I can only tell you, and it will be little consolation to you, that you are not the only one who experiences that. But it is precisely because of that point that I think your point is well taken.

I think you do have to have a mechanism. But you have indicated that you think that can be done without legislation, and I agree. In fact, I am not sure how legislation would help you greatly.

The other point that I find intriguing is your counseling us to be patient until such time as you have had an opportunity to, you used the word "codify," but I think what you really mean is formalize some structural changes so that the CINCs can function a good deal better than they do now. Given your perspective as CINCPAC, I think that is particulary interesting.

I have always suspected that it did not require legislation. And yet, we have encountered in the staff study, and I think there has been almost unanimous reaction both on this side of the rostrum and on that side, that perhaps the best work the staff has done is in regard to the Unified Command problems.

So I will look forward to your suggestion or to the recommendations that you do codify, to use your term.

I will only tell you that I think I speak for my colleagues when I say we have universally expressed concern about the problems that have surfaced in connection with the operation of these Unified Commands, because it seems, increasingly, that our ability to project force and to implement our policy is going to be through Unified Commands.

I would simply inquire whether you think that there are any particular impediments in your present capacity as the Chairman overseeing the implementation of any contingency plans.

Admiral CROWE. I have not detected that at this juncture, Senator.

It is awfully early in my tour to have had a great deal of experience with overseeing the contingency plans. But at this point, my answer would be no, I do not.

Senator WILSON [presiding]. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I am very much interested also in those recommendations that you say we should wait for on the commands. I am just wondering about the timetable you mentioned.

You said that the recommendations to the Secretary of Defense about the CINCs would be completed in 6 months.

Is it that the recommendations will be forwarded to the Secretary in 6 months, or that you expect the Secretary would make some decisions in 6 months?

Admiral CROWE. First of all, the figure 6 months is an estimate, Senator. Second, I don't know that I had nailed it down. I would suspect that we would have action by 6 months.

Senator LEVIN. From the Secretary?

Admiral CROWE. I would think so. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. I think that would be important to this committee.

Would it be possible to speed up that timetable?

Admiral CROWE. We will try.

Senator LEVIN. Would you let us know for the record whether you think that is a realistic possibility? Would you discuss that?

Admiral CROWE. All right, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

JCS PUB 2 TIMETABLE

On October 7, 1985, the Joint Chiefs initiated an action to conduct a comprehensive review of JCS Pub 2. On November 26, 1985, I informed all CINCs of the initiative and requested their macro views on the proposed revision by December 31, 1985. Initial strawman revision recommendations were submitted by OJCS and the services on December 20, 1985. The original schedule for the review calls for a draft revision to be prepared by February 15, 1986 for presentation to the JCS. This draft revision will be forwarded to all CINCs for review and comment. Including transit time, the CINC review period is scheduled for six weeks. As noted in a December 2, 1985 letter from the Secretary of Defense to Senator Goldwater, the revision of JCS Pub 2 is to be completed by June 30, 1986. The revision schedule is an ambitious one. Accelerating the schedule introduces the risk that work done rapidly will not be done well. Every effort will be made to expedite this action in accordance with your request. However, completion of the review by mid-February seems most unlikely.

Admiral CROWE. I do consider it a complex problem. The directives that disturbed me or concerned me the most when I was CINCPAC were not the legislation, they were departmental directives, mainly JCS Pub 2, and we are dealing with a number of Unified Commands here that are unique. To devise directives and language that is going to be useful across the board is difficult. I said earlier, describing the problem is much easier than deriving the solutions. And we are talking in this study about solutions.

Senator LEVIN. I think we are, too. We are hoping to act at some point early next year, as I understand it.

Admiral CROWE. I understand that, sir.

Senator LEVIN. I think we should know what your timetable is realistically on that.

The questions that I have relate to the chain of command issue.

As I understand the House bill, it authorizes the President or the Secretary of Defense to direct that the chain of command run through the Chairman to the CINCs.

Do the President or the Secretary of Defense not have that authority now?

Admiral CROWE. I believe he does have that authority now. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. So the House bill does not change the current authority, as you understand it, that the President has, relative to putting the Chiefs into the chain of command or the Chairman into the chain of command?

Admiral CROWE. Not the authority. I think the House bill would do it differently than we do now, as I recall.

Now the department directive is through the JCS, and the House bill would prescribe through the Chairman. I can check that, but I believe that is the distinction.

Senator LEVIN. All right.

You would prefer that if the President directs that the chain run through the Chairman and not through the Chiefs?

Admiral CROWE. I would.

Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. But the President has that authority now to have the chain run through the Chairman, does he not?

Admiral CROWE. I believe so. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. The current DOD directive on this says that the channel of communication for execution of the SIOP and other time-sensitive operations run from the Command Authority through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral CROWE. You see, there is an instance where they have chosen to do that.

Senator LEVIN. So that currently——

Admiral CROWE. You could do it.

Senator LEVIN. ——the chain of command on time-sensitive operations in the SIOP runs through the Chairman representing the Joint Chiefs, according to this.

Is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Now that is a departmental directive.

Senator LEVIN. Has that been done with presidential approval?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Has that created any problem, the words "representing the Joint Chiefs," in that particular usage?

Admiral CROWE. Not to my knowledge.

No, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Can you see where it might?

Admiral CROWE. Certainly in the experience I have had so far—and we have had some operational events—no, I don't believe it will.

Senator LEVIN. Can you see where it might have a problem, where you are in the chain of command, as Chairman, and this channel for execution of the SIOP runs through you, but you are representing the Joint Chiefs?

Can't you see where that could represent a problem?

Admiral CROWE. Well, it could. But, of course, the specific example you are citing has to do with time-sensitive situations, and matters where time is of the essence. It could cause a problem, but it will be after the event.

Senator LEVIN. In other words, you just wouldn't do the consulting until afterwards?

Admiral CROWE. You would have no choice. That is the reason, I assume, the primary rationale for the specific directive.

Senator LEVIN. So, as you understand this current directive, where it is time-sensitive, while it says that the Chairman represents the Joint Chiefs, as a matter of fact, the discussion and consultation would have to come after the action.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, and I don't think the Chiefs would object to that at all.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

My time is up.

Senator WILSON. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome you, Admiral, to the committee and express my appreciation for your comments.

In reviewing your testimony in terms of your assessment about the committee staff report, you draw at least some observation that the committee did not take into consideration the hundreds of issues the JCS successfully deal with annually and their extensive role in everyday operations and management of our global forces.

I think one of the things I am most concerned about and interested in is how the command structure is going to work in the cases where we are going to have either some conflict or potential conflict, or some very significant operational situation.

This, at least for me, is an area of prime concern.

I know that you are very worried about it, the layers of command in crisis. For example, as I understand it, there are eight layers of command between the President and the Marines in Beirut. I am interested in how you think the lines of command ought to work in times of crisis.

Would you address that question, whether it is in Beirut or the hostage crisis.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, in the 10 weeks I have been in my post we have had two counter-terrorist incidents. I consider these to be a different type of operation than normal hostilities and combat. I think, as I mentioned at one point in my statement, that we have profited from our past experience and now have a command arrangement that is flexible enough that those kinds of operations, with a high political content, can be done directly, without going through the layership, and that we can currently handle it that way.

Just in the short time I have been here I have developed more confidence that can handle those types of operations.

If you are talking about larger types of conflict, where we employ regular forces——

Senator KENNEDY. Well, for example, in terms of the changes, in the Beirut situation, how many layers of command would there be under the changed procedures?

Admiral CROWE. If you go through the regular chain, right down the boxes, I don't know the exact number, but it is quite a few.

We discussed just a few moments ago the opening up of JCS Pub 2, which prescribe the chain of command through the unified commanders.

One of the things I said I was most concerned about was the flexibility allowed to the unified commander to conduct his operations. Right now, that is fairly well prescribed in JSC Pub 2, and it is my contention, or at least it was my argument as the Commander in Chief, Pacific, that the unified commander should have more flexibility in setting up whatever chain of command he felt the event dictated. If he wanted a short one right to a carrier or if he wanted one right to the ground, he should have it.

We are reviewing that right now, and I hope we will reassess it in the next few weeks or months, and perhaps allay some of those concerns.

Now this has to do with the management of regular combat operations, where you would run through a unified commander.

On counter-terrorist incidents and things with a very short time fuse, a small operation with surgical precision and high political content, I think, whether we like it or not—"we" being the military—Washington has to keep control of those things. And we can do that, currently.

Senator KENNEDY. That Washington has to keep control of it.

Admiral CROWE. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator KENNEDY. That is obviously an interesting balance.

I am mindful of the description during the Cuban missile crisis, which I know you are no doubt familiar with, when the President was concerned about the various procedures of the Navy in implementing the blockade, and Secretary McNamara had the discussion with Admiral Anderson. You may be familiar with this in terms of the Graham T. Allison book, where you had both political and military considerations, and you obviously had at that time a President who was exercising the role of Commander in Chief, and yet there were enormously important political considerations as well.

On the one hand, as you just mentioned in response to a question, you want to be able to have that kind of dimension that will be able to express itself in terms of our national security interest, and in other circumstances you do not want to have it micro-managed.

I don't know what more you want to say in just elaborating your own view about how those forces come to play in terms of the kind of operations that you might foresee that might be short of a general kind of conflict, special kinds of operations, such as a Grenada rescue mission, or Beirut.

How do you see the structure of the command in those circumstances and the role of the civilian authority?

Admiral CROWE. In my lifetime in the military, obviously we have, I don't know what the word is, maybe I should say "matured," or we have changed our view of how military operations interface with and relate to political events, and so forth. Certainly my generation of commanders has been in that environment long enough now that we fully understand that there are political considerations for all such things.

I think it is instructive, for example, to look at Vietnam, and I am talking about it in a macro-sense. Those operations, particularly early in the game that were very political and where the President was concerned about escalation. et cetera, and the bombing of North Vietnam, were very carefully structured and tight control was kept over those operations.

But, as we became more and more committed in Vietnam itself, on the ground, I discovered that it could not be micro-managed. Even if we had the desire to do so, it could not be done. The authority flowed out and was delegated and ground operations were pretty well run on the scene. But, by then, the Government had discovered that the war was not going to escalate by itself, that it did not have the political sensitivity that other operations did, and that that was the only effective way it could be done.

I think that this experience is instructive for other things. If we escalate and get larger and larger commitments and we fight globally, then we are going to have to move a certain amount of decentralization. There is no other way you can do it.

On the other hand, we have a dichotomy here. The kind of thing that we face day to day here is not general hostilities, it is not large ground actions, but it is terrorist incidents, it is limited intensity conflict, it is the advice on the scene to friendly countries that are having difficulty with guerrillas and terrorists, et cetera, et cetera.

Those kinds of actions are small enough and of great interest to the entire country, and we have to have a different way of controlling those.

I do believe that the current system we have is adequate, although the military has come to that conclusion with some reluctance. The military is always for decentralization, the military is always for a clear chain of command. That is built into our souls.

But we have learned, sometimes the hard way, and I think we have now come to some flexibility in the system.

I could talk at some length about that, but particularly on the terrorism subject I would like to go into a closed session.

Senator **Kennedy**. My time is up.

Thank you.

Senator **Warner** [presiding]. Senator Cohen.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Crowe, many of the observers that we have had come before the committee to testify believe that one of the critical deficiencies we face in the Department of Defense is to improve the quality of the joint staff, both here in Washington and also in the field.

The committee staff report highlights this deficiency, and, as I indicated, many witnesses have also focused upon it, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who in 1982 had a report that was issued to him.

We also heard some concern expressed by one witness in particular, General McBride, and I would like to quote from his testimony.

He said, "This combination of lack of Washington staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of joint activities, and lack of formal preparations for the joint school system, coupled with very short tours without repetition, makes it very difficult for joint staff offices, no matter how capable, to deal effectively with their responsibilities. Thus, the Chairman and the Joint Chief of Staff, as a corporate body, are handicapped."

Could you comment on General McBride's observation?

Admiral **Crowe**. Senator, before I get to that specific comment, let me say that there have been a spate of books written, and we are constantly criticized and complained about by arm-chair strategists, at cetera, et cetera, about how we are rewarding in the services other things besides command, besides war-fighting capability, besides the man in the field.

What I am trying to demonstrate or illustrate is that we are constantly pushed and pulled here.

On the one hand, people say we do not stress, we do not emphasize fighting ability, we do not reward the man who is good in the field, we do not reward the man who has a good sense for ground operations or is an excellent flier, and so forth, but that we reward staff experience.

On the other hand, we are told that we don't have enough staff experience.

Senator **Cohen**. No, joint staff experience.

Admiral **Crowe**. I understand that, sir.

What I am saying is that there are many demands on our personnel system, and to create people who can operate in all of these environments very well is difficult.

Senator **Cohen**. Admiral, the critical point is that more and more operations in the future are going to require joint operations.

Admiral **Crowe**. I would agree completely.

Senator **Cohen**. There has been a serious question raised as to whether or not we are functioning effectively with the joint staff.

They point out, for example, that the normal tour of duty is about 24 months, which makes it an average of about a year. Not only do people move out every 2 years, they move out as a group. They come in as a group and they leave as a group.

Admiral GROWE. Well, that is sort of right.

Senator COHEN. Let me point this out.

Secretary Weinberger, for example, said that you have cured the turbulence problem in the Joint Staff. And yet, 9 out of the 12 top positions are new this year; there are new people in 9 of the 12. None of the people who were serving on the joint staff during the Grenada operation are there today.

Now maybe it does not make a difference.

I saw, for example, in the "Army Times," that there was a study that said that the integrated forces of the Soviet, British, West German, Israeli, and Canadian military organizations are better integrated and more efficient. There is a retired colonel, named Warner—I don't want to confuse that with Senator Warner—Warner also argues that officers on the general staff often make a career there or move on to key command and staff positions in the field and, therefore, the Soviet general staff has a continuity and corporate expertise unlike the American joint staff, where such staff assignments are not sought and are severely circumscribed by law in their allowed length.

So, across the board there seem to be these arm-chair specialists, as you call them, who have focused in, including former Secretaries of Defense and a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, saying that we have a serious problem with people coming in and moving on.

As a matter of fact, that report that was filed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said that most young officers view this as a kiss of death assignment; that they are not promoted as fast out of there and that they see this as a kiss of death to their upscale promotion.

So the question is what kind of incentive is there.

Admiral CROWE. I am very familiar with this, Senator. I grew up in that environment. You are not going to find a stronger advocate for joint experience than I. We don't have enough of it in our services. There is absolutely no question about that.

Let me say, in all candor, that this is not an easy problem to resolve. This is a different problem, though, than just staff turbulence by block, people coming in and out. That is always discomforting. But that would not matter so much if all the people who came in were capable jointly and had had a lot of joint experience, et cetera, et cetera. You could do a lot of shifting.

The problem is not that so much. The problem is whether we, within our services, reward joint duty sufficiently, whether we encourage joint experience, joint thinking, et cetera.

I went through a period in the military where, at least around me, we did not do that. It has improved, it is improving daily, but it has a long way to go.

It is a matter not so much of rules and regulations as it is of changing attitudes and the way people look at it.

Now, just recently, we have had some amazing things happen on the Joint Staff. We had a promotion list this year in the Army from major to lieutenant colonel where of those who were eligible on the Joint Staff, 100 percent made it.

That is unheard of.

We also had some similar experiences with the Air Force list.

But I say that the situation is improving, though we have a long way to go.

Senator Cohen. Last year, the Defense Authorization Act authorized the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to select the officers for the joint staff from lists that are submitted by the services. It further authorized the Chairman to specify the number of officers on the services list.

There is a specific congressional intent to empower the Chairman to have more than one choice in filling staff positions.

Has that law been implemented, as it was intended?

Admiral Crowe. We have done some things with it and we have used it. Incidentally, it is a significant piece of legislation, and it is going to play a rather critical role in improving the quality of the personnel on the Joint Staff.

It is an easy law to implement at the senior officer level because the people on the Joint Staff know all the senior officers and can select qualified individuals, and we have used it to do exactly that.

It is more difficult to work out a formal system that allows you to operate day to day for all your officer nominations for the Joint Staff with the personnel organizations of all three services.

Bear in mind, while we welcome and applaud this authority, we are working with a personnel system in each service that has many demands on it, going in all directions, et cetera, et cetera, and it is our desire and their desire, and I agree with this, that whatever system we work out not discombobulate the whole service system while we are improving the Joint Staff.

Senator Cohen. Are the services giving you multiple candidates?

Admiral Crowe. We are now just about to sign an agreement that will formalize this. I am not so sure that it is the last answer.

But let me say just in passing that since the legislation was passed, we are getting a higher quality nominee.

Senator Cohen. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Senator Warner. Sentor Bingaman.

Senator Bingaman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, let me ask a very general question. This whole issue of reorganization has been debated here in the committee and in a lot of places as to whether the system is broke and needs fixing or not broke. That is sort of the way the debate tends to revolve.

I think the real issue may come down to some testimony we received just recently which made the analogy to the private sector and indicated that major corporations in this country have in the last decade or two determined that it is appropriate to move a functional organizational system to a mission-oriented organizational structure, and that major reorganization of those private corporations has or is taking place.

General Motors is one example of this.

I guess there is general consensus, at least among some of the business leaders, that this has been an improvement.

One way to characterize the general thrust of this staff report is that it recommends that we do the same thing in the Department of Defense, that we try to move from a functional organizational structure to a mission-oriented organizational structure. Giving more strength to the CINCs is one example of that. Perhaps redoing the way we structure the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries is another example. There are a lot of examples.

I would be interested in whether you could tell us if you think that that move from a functional structure, which we really do have now, at least the way I see the Department of Defense, largely, to a greater emphasis on a mission-oriented structure as a good thing for the country to undertake. I think that is the real issue.

If we are going to have major reorganization, I see it as essentially adopting that same basic premise and trying to apply it to the Department of Defense as it has been applied in the private sector.

I would be interested in knowing whether you think that is a good thing for us to do.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, my general approach to the Secretary's obligations and so forth is that he should have the authority to pretty well organize the way he wants.

As to the philosophical problem that you are talking about, I can recall when I was on the Navy staff, we actually at one time hired civilian consultants to come in and look at our organization and see what they could do in terms of applying civilian principles to the way we did our business.

I must tell you that after a very long and extensive study, they threw up their hands and said there was no way that the government could do it like they did. There were several basic problems that were impossible to overcome.

Our complexity is greater. We have no profit and loss column. We do not have control over what we do. When we design a ship, before that ship can get under way, everybody in the U.S. Government has had a whack at it. We had the responsibility for designing it, but we had no authority to get it built that way.

They sort of threw up their hands and really concluded that we were probably organized generally as well as we could be.

That is just the Navy staff that I am talking about now, and not other organizations.

As I said in my statement, I really am not inclined toward a major reorganization. I think, even if you felt that was the way we should end up, it would be a mistake to jump right to an end like that.

I do feel that there is some strength in mission emphasis and that, even the way we are organized now functionally, you end up thinking in mission terms, whether you like it or not. You do studies in that way. You think about mission-oriented problems sometimes when it seems to lend itself to it.

Another dimension which worries me more, which we have touched on earlier today, is the dimension between larger war operations and peacetime operations. They are different.

I often hear the statement that we should be organized in peacetime the way we are going to fight so that there is not as much disruption when we shift to fighting. The statement has a sort of ring about it that is rather attractive and that makes a certain amount of sense. But I am not so sure in the real world that it makes sense because the way we conduct low-level operations and counter-terrorism operations and other things is not the way we are going to fight in larger operations. And I am not so sure it should be, because the requirements are different. We need the flexibility to do it differently.

I am not convinced that we have ever really acknowledged that problem and are organized in that fashion. We are creeping toward it and have made a lot of progress, just by generating flexibility.

But I would think that to change to just a mission organization would be very disruptive, and to do it in an organized fashion which we could accept, would take a long long time.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Admiral.

Admiral CROWE. Good morning, Senator.

Senator DIXON. I was very interested in the latter part of your testimony, concerning strengthening the unified commanders.

You had indicated in that part of your testimony that you would urge us not to act on this particular question until you have completed your assessment and reported the resulting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

But I take from your testimony that you feel very strongly that certain actions should be taken, although you suggest that perhaps they should not be taken legislatively, to strengthen the unified commanders.

Admiral CROWE. Well, when I was a unified commander, I did feel that way strongly. But, as I say, most of the things that I had some concerns about were not the legislation, but the implementation of DOD and JCS directives. The changes that I perhaps would have recommended when I was in the Pacific were in those documents. That is what we are looking at right now.

Now that may not meet the spirit that the Congress wants, and is the reason that I suggest you wait to see what we do, and if it does not, then you can act subsequently.

Senator DIXON. Some of us feel very strongly that the Congress probably should take some steps in this area. Without committing yourself to what your own views might be about whether it should be done administratively or by the Congress, could you suggest to me two or three things that you would consider fundamental in strengthening the unified commanders?

Admiral CROWE. There are three areas.

First of all, you hear a great deal of talk about unified commanders' ability to participate in and contribute to the budget process. I really think that has changed a great deal. Just while I was in the Pacific, the Secretary of Defense considerably enlarged the unified commanders' participation in the budget process.

The services, in turn, have reacted to bringing CINCs more into what we call the POM process. I believe, as I said earlier, that most of the unified commanders now agree that that has probably gone about as far as it could go without major staff expansions, which they do not want, and that they are relatively satisfied now with the input they are getting into it.

There will be some more refinements, but that problem seems to be in hand.

The second problem that I was concerned about and that we are looking at very seriously, is the dual chain of command that allows logistics, administration, military justice, personnel, and so forth to be taken care of in one chain, where the decisions made in that chain that impact on strategy and war-fighting whether or not the unified commander is sufficiently consulted or has a voice or a veto in those decisions.

It seems to me that he must be influential in those decisions.

The last area was in the operations themselves. I believe that perhaps now they are constrained in some fashion by these directives as to how they can set up their chain of command to operate forces.

I think they should have flexibility in that area. We will be looking at that in our review of JCS Pub 2.

Please bear in mind that I suspect that while I had certain views as a Pacific commander, now that I am back here looking at the problems centrally, I may find that I was not all-knowing out there in the Pacific and there are other considerations.

But the review is under way. I think it is important and I think there are ways the CINCs should be strengthened.

Senator Dixon. At the more personal level, Admiral, do you think there is any value in discussions that we have had around here concerning the unified commander's jurisdiction over immediate subordinates, the question of evaluation of them, and even the question of the right to court martial and things of that kind? Is any of that relative to strengthening the arm of the unified commander in his jurisdiction?

Admiral Crowe. I never felt that it was significant from my standpoint.

No, sir.

I know that some have expressed a concern about that and want that kind of authority. But I really think that could be taken care of internally.

Senator Dixon. One other question that you do not touch upon at all in your testimony comes to mind, and if you do not care to comment upon it for that reason, Admiral, I will understand.

Some of us think that more ought to be done about central purchasing power, acquisition and procurement power under the Secretary of Defense. Instead of really five different, separate systems now for acquisition, procurement, and things of that kind, we think there is a lot of duplication and things that could be avoided.

Is that a reasonable thing to consider or do you think it is not a problem?

Admiral Crowe. First of all, I really do not consider myself competent to address that. It seems to me reasonable to consider, but I am not a good witness on that, Senator.

Senator Dixon. Generally, I get the impression that what the House has done in this area was not all that shocking to you—strengthening the Chairman and things of that character. You don't like the idea that has been suggested by staff, but are you inclined to view what the House has done as an improvement?

Admiral Crowe. Certainly I think there are several things in the House bill that I would accept and that I would find an improvement.

Senator Dixon. I thank you, Admiral.

Senator W[illegible]er. The Chair is going to allocate out of his own schedule sufficient time to conclude the hearing and, therefore, I would defer to members of the committee whose schedules do not provide that flexibility.

We will now hear from Senator Exon, but then we will go into a second round of questions and, if it is agreeable with you, Senator Nunn, those members who have time urgencies should just indicate that to the Chair.

Senator NUNN. Fine.

Senator WARNER. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Admiral, let me join my colleagues in welcoming you here. We wish you well in your new and tremendously important position. I have heard nothing but good things about the job that you are doing over there.

Admiral CROWE. You didn't mention the name, Senator.

Senator EXON. No. I would rather not mention it. They did not want to be quoted, Admiral. [Laughter.]

Let's put to rest just an overall question on the Unified Command, as you view them.

Is the President's structure of seven unified and three specified commands strategically sound? Would you add, delete, or make any changes to that?

I am talking about the structure here.

Admiral CROWE. I understand.

I will be candid. I have not really thought about it in that framework. But at this juncture, no, I would not.

Senator EXON. There is a movement over on the House side to create, as I understand it, a new rapid deployment, Delta force, possibly appointing a new under secretary to head that up.

Where would you see that structure fitting into this seven unified and three specified commands?

Admiral CROWE. I think it would be very difficult to fit it in.

I am not familiar with the exact details of the proposal, but I think the deficiencies it is designed to correct we are well on the way to correcting; and particularly in the command and control area, I do not think it is necessary.

Now, in other terms, whether those special forces are getting the right priorities from the services, the equipment they need, et cetera, et cetera, I would have to look at. But I know that we have been relatively successful in a short period of time in building a considerable capability and in drawing together an awful lot of talent.

I just cannot accept that we would need that kind of organization.

Senator EXON. As I understand the procedure, it would take the different units, the Delta forces, the rapid deployment forces, and all of the forces that we now have separated, away from their present operations and create a new command. If that were done, which I understand you don't think is necessary, would it be for specified commands.

Can you tell me whether that is what is planned or not?

Admiral CROWE. I don't know, Senator.

I do think, instinctively, this is an excellent example of a suggestion that is designed to solve a problem but would have grave and unintended consequences, and that once we had done it, we would have to be very careful as to what we had started.

Senator EXON. Have you been in your new role long enough, Admiral, to form an opinion on my next question, which has to do with what role should the Chairman play in the budget process? I hear you play a key role in that. I suspect that this places quite extreme demands on your time.

I know, for one who has been in the field, that you would like to be out there, being of whatever help and assistance you could to people in the various commands out there.

Are you going to have difficulty in allocation of time with those two paramount pressures, along with all of your other duties, taking somewhere around 26 hours a day?

Admiral CROWE. The simple answer is yes, I am.

Obviously, in the last 2 or 3 years, the Chairman's role in this business has been expanded considerably. He now participates heavily in the DRBs, he has a separate organization called SPRAA, which is an analysis organization. It will be some time, I think, before we see the real results of SPRAA because you just do not create an organization and have it start turning out finished work that is relevant tomorrow. You have to build it. General Vessey has gone a long way in shaping that, so that it gives advice that is helpful. But I think it will really be some time before we see the true impact.

My instincts tell me that yes, this, again, is an area where the Deputy or the Vice, or the promotion of the Director, will impact on it.

Senator EXON. As long as we are talking about budgets, let me pose a question to you that is not directly the subject of the hearing this morning.

As you know, the Congress passed yesterday and the President is signing into law today the so-called Gramm-Rudman proposal. I have strong fears that that is going to cause some very hard choices within the military.

Have you given any report to the Secretary of Defense on that? Has he consulted with you?

I am saying this because I suspect that it would be wise for our committee to not wait until next March, when this hits us.

We had probably better be thinking right now about where we are going to make the savings that obviously will be necessary since that is not the law of the land.

Can you give us any specifics today on what your thinking is?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I cannot be too specific, Senator. I am not familiar with the exact impact that Gramm-Rudman is going to have.

I can tell you that the machinery is turning in the Pentagon, though, and that we are all moving rather rapidly to look at it.

The Secretary of Defense, of course, is very concerned. He and I were out of town last week, but the Chiefs were asked to advise on what turbulence it might do to them in a very quick way. We are now beginning to look at it in a methodical way. I am not sure what the specific impacts of the legislation will be. But it seems to me, just instinctively, that we are looking at turbulence in our programs and that we are going to have at least to draw out programs. We are going to have to make some very tough choices, and we will be impacted.

Senator EXON. I have just one last question.

Has the Secretary made any direct requests or set any timetables as to when he would like the services to report back as to their lowest priority items with regard to the reductions that are going to have to be made?

Admiral CROWE. I don't know if he has gone directly to the services, Senator, but I am sure they are all grinding.

Senator EXON. Has he talked with you in that regard?

Admiral CROWE. We talked yesterday somewhat.

Senator EXON. Did he set any timetable?

Admiral CROWE. No, he did not, sir.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

Members of the committee, are there some who desire to ask a question or two? If so, we will defer to you.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, during your brief tenure as Chairman, we have become involved in two counter-terrorist operations.

Were the operations directed by the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral CROWE. By the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs, yes, sir.

Senator COHEN. What was the role of the CINCs in those cases?

Admiral CROWE. In both cases, we were talking about the same CINC. We used him heavily for access, logistics support, liaison with the countries involved, and any units that needed to be changed to support, and so forth.

Senator COHEN. Was he in charge, as such, or was it really being controlled through the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral CROWE. I would like to stay very general, if I could, because I would like to go into closed session if we are really going to talk about the command set-up.

He was in charge of the logistics phase, so to speak, as we got into place, et cetera, et cetera. When it shifted over to actual operations, he was not in charge.

Senator COHEN. When it shifted over, he was not?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator COHEN. Well, the only question I have is whether there is any confusion in this whole chain of command when you get situations like this.

Senator Exon was talking about Dan Daniels' proposal in the House, and I think Representative Daniels has focused upon an important point.

Admiral CROWE. I do, too, and I agree with that, Senator.

Senator COHEN. Son Tay took us 6 months to prepare and so did the rescue mission in Iran. We cannot afford to wait 6 months to have that kind of operation be executed.

Admiral CROWE. I think we have learned a lot, and I have been impressed in the short time I have been here as to how far we have come.

We do business differently now, and I think we have quite a bit of flexibility in the system. Whether it is sufficient, I don't know.

Senator COHEN. I think the command and control issues are the most important.

Admiral CROWE. They certainly are, particularly in this kind of operation.

Senator COHEN. In the kind of operation that we had in Iran, there were so many different layers of command and control that people were arguing who was in charge. We were justifiably criticized on that score.

Admiral CROWE. We just simply cannot afford that.

Senator COHEN. I have one final point.

General Gorman testified a couple of years ago about his belief that we ought to reduce the number of officers who serve the services who are concerned with joint matters. Right now, as I guess the figures run, there are about 675 people working on joint matters for the services, nearly the total amount that we have in the joint staff itself. He recommended that we reduce the service staff that work on joint matters.

What would be your view on that?

Admiral CROWE. If memory serves me, I think the various Chiefs testified last week that the figure was smaller than that. Maybe I am incorrect.

I think it would be difficult to do. When I was on the Navy staff, for example, and was engaged in joint work as well, that was not solely what we did. We did a lot of things for the Chief of Naval Operations. Among others, we did his Joint Staff business, joint efforts, et cetera, and we had a pretty full platter outside of just joint work.

I don't know what the figure would be for people who do strictly joint work, but it must be much smaller. It would be difficult to implement a decision like that, I would think.

Senator COHEN. Is that just for the Navy, or for the other services as well?

Admiral CROWE. I cannot speak for the other services, Senator.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

That is all I have.

Senator WARNER. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, I believe you mentioned that you generally agreed with the House passed bill, or at least that you agreed with several parts of it.

Could you specify for us which parts you would take exception to or would not agree to?

Admiral CROWE. I don't know if I am that familiar with it off hand, Senator.

My memory tells me there are not very many things. We would change, perhaps some of the language. For example, I believe they had a different Deputy recommendation than the one I have suggested. That is probably the main item.

If I am correct, I believe that bill recommends a Deputy who would be senior to the service Chiefs and who would spell me when I am out of town, et cetera.

I have labored very hard over that recommendation.

Senator NUNN. The House bill provides that the Deputy really is position number two.

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator NUNN. And the Chiefs individually, I think unanimously, agree that they would disagree with that and would want the Deputy to be number six.

Admiral CROWE. I would disagree with that suggestion.

I say that I have labored very hard on it, and there are merits and demerits to all proposals. But in the time that I have been in the chairmanship, the Joint Staff, the JCS and the services themselves derive great benefit from the Chief serving as the Chairman. Really, I think in the final analysis it comes down to my desire to want to increase jointness, joint thinking, joint approaches, and, if you want jointness, this is a very, very heavy contributor to jointness.

Senator NUNN. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird testified yesterday that when he was Secretary of Defense, he found that taking the Director of the Joint Staff with him to critical meetings of the National Security Council, in the absence of the Chairman——

Admiral CROWE. Yes, I saw that testimony.

Senator NUNN.——it was much more effective because the Director of the joint staff knew much more about what was going on than the individual service Chiefs.

I just throw that out for you. I think we are going to have to consider this one carefully. But I must say that the overwhelming testimony other than the Chiefs is for making this individual number two. As a matter of fact, I had a former Director of the joint staff tell me emphatically, privately, last week that if you are going to simply name the individual as Vice Chairman and continue his duties essentially as Director, it would be just a farce. You would be just creating another star, and he was going to be in very bad shape. He said he would hate to be in the position of Vice Chairman and clearly number six. He would rather not have the honor.

He said that was a very dubious honor to bestow on anyone.

Admiral CROWE. I just don't think we could do that and leave it at that.

We must redefine his duties in a certain sense or otherwise he is not going to help me. That is the main thing I want.

I am very concerned about my time, and I am very concerned about the opportunity I have to think and do the kinds of things I ought to be doing.

We cannot do just what you describe, just promote the Director and let it go at that. His duties are going to have to be reshaped.

Senator NUNN. Well, clearly, if we went with the Chiefs on this one, when you are out of town, your Deputy would be reporting to someone else and not to you.

Admiral CROWE. That's correct, yes.

He would have to be reporting to the Acting Chairman, although he would still be in contact with me. Because of the communications and time differences and so forth, when I am out of town, I am usually in contact not with the Acting Chairman but with either my special assistant or the Director.

Senator NUNN. What does the number six man, who has the title of Vice Chairman, do if you are on the telephone with him from some base overseas and the Acting Chairman is telling him one thing and you are telling him wait, wait? What does he do then?

How do we handle that one?

Admiral CROWE. Well, my experience so far has been that, when the Chairman does get into a matter, the Acting Chairman says we will do what the Chairman says.

Senator NUNN. You would probably have to stay in touch with the Acting Chairman and this individual, then.

Admiral CROWE. If it were an important issue and we had this kind of disagreement, I would be in touch with the Acting Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Right.

Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further questions.

Admiral Crowe has been very constructive and very helpful, not just here this morning but in his role as the CINC out in the Pacific, when our whole effort was going forward last year.

He has been of immeasurable assistance to us. Although he takes exception to some of the staff report, I understand his overall approach has been enormously constructive and we thank him for it.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Senator from Georgia.

One note and then I will yield to Senator Levin.

Mr. Laird's quote yesterday—I went back and talked to him a little bit about the quote being that the Director knew more than the service Chiefs—that was not in any way to disparage a service Chief. It just was in recognition that the Director can devote full time to the joint staff.

Admiral CROWE. His quote surprised me.

Senator WARNER. In his capacity, he is right there, and the service Chief is scattered over a myriad of duties and responsibilities, and, as such, is not fully informed, not in the amount of the Director.

Admiral CROWE. Oh, I understood the thrust of his comment, although it did surprise me.

Senator WARNER. One further observation is that on page 17, when you spoke of the role and authority of the CINCs, you stated, and I quote, "The JCS have discussed this issue and have already initiated a review of the governing document, Unified Action Armed Forces, colloquially known as JCS Pub 2. At this reading it appears we can achieve what needs to be done without legislation. In any event, I would urge you not to act on this particular question until we have completed our assessment and reported the resulting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. We anticipate that this action will be completed in 6 months."

The Chairman of the committee and the distinguished Ranking Minority Member and I have talked about the schedule, and it is our hope to begin to work on a bill in February.

Admiral CROWE. I understand that, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Therefore, we have to accelerate maybe not the formal presentation to the Secretary of Defense but the pertinent parts of this to the committee well before that time.

Admiral CROWE. This may be an impractical request. We will do what we can to accelerate.

The reason I put it that way is I think the problem is not with the current law. The problem is whether our implementing directives carry out the spirit of the current law. If we can make changes that satisfy you in that regard, it would obviate legislative changes.

Senator WARNER. We will be addressing the issue of the CINCs and their role. As I said earlier, the disposition on the committee, as I can detect it, is to upgrade the authority of a CINC, and that may well require some statutory measures as well as report language. The benefit of your work and that of your colleagues will be very important.

Admiral CROWE. We will be happy to try to address that problem with language that would be supportive irrespective of what we did in the review.

Senator WARNER. Your staff then will coordinate with the committee staff to see that this material is provided to the committee?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I did have a similar concern on that. The Chairman assured us that he would get back to us on the record with a quicker timetable, if possible, because I surely support the Chair in this feeling, that we ought to have these recommendations before we act. They would be very useful to us, and we do hope to act before 6 months pass. At least that is our current timetable.

Senator WARNER. I think the observation that was made by the Chair is applicable to all entities that are interested in contributing to this important study in the Department of Defense.

So we are putting all on notice.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to get back to the chain of command issue. I am concerned about ambiguities that might be in that chain of command and feel strongly that this is the right time to clarify that chain to correct any such ambiguities.

Do you believe there are any ambiguities now in the chain of command?

Admiral CROWE. Are you talking in regard to the Commanders in Chief, the unified commanders?

Senator LEVIN. The role of the JCS or the Chairman in that chain of command.

Do you think there is any ambiguity at all as to that role, either from the perspective of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs or from the perspective of the CINC?

Does the CINC clearly know who to call in a crisis? Does he call the JCS or does he call the Secretary of Defense?

Admiral CROWE. I think you had some testimony last week on that that may have led you to that question.

There was never any doubt in my mind when I was a unified commander. When I had a problem, when I wanted to be represented in Washington, when I wanted to approach somebody in Washington, or to just generally vent my frustration, I called General Vessey. That is who I worked with. I felt, though, that I had a direct line to the Secretary of Defense. But as the agent of the Secretary of Defense, if I wanted to see or talk to the Secretary of Defense, the man I dealt with was General Vessey. I would tell General Vessey that I wanted to do that.

He would call me back and we would talk about it and work it out.

Senator LEVIN. I know that you wanted to do that. The question is is that the way the chain of command clearly is in a crisis?

If you are going for direction in a crisis, do you call the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral CROWE. I think they call the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

In the two instances I just finished with, there was no confusion, never any doubt. They did their work with me and I was in constant consultation with the Secretary of Defense.

Senator LEVIN. Let's assume under the House bill that the President does not run the chain of command through the Chairman. Under the House bill the President is authorized to do that, which means he may or may not do that. Let's assume he does not do that.

Under the House bill, the Chairman supervises the unified commanders. Does it make sense to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the supervisory responsibility over the joint commanders unless the chain of command runs through the Chairman?

Admiral CROWE. In my view, no it does not.

Senator LEVIN. So the House bill should be modified, at least in that regard, so that the supervisory authority over the joint commanders ought to be in existence if, and only if, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is also in the chain of command?

Admiral CROWE. Now I looked at the supervisory authority, at least that prescription which was laid down in that legislation, as a little different problem than just a chain of command problem. I looked at it as when we were dealing with the CINCs and their requests, for me to act as an advocate, which I do for the CINCs on many issues, not the least of which is the assignment of forces or the assignment of resources. I looked at the supervisory role as a recognition of a fact of life, and that is that a CINC does not have the whole picture, and while he can tell you what he wants—and I realized this when I was a CINC—somebody has to come back and say well, you know, Europe is also important and this is the best we can do for you, and I will advise the Secretary of Defense accordingly.

Senator LEVIN. Back to my question, though, would you agree that it would not make sense to give the Chairman supervisory authority over the CINCs unless the Chairman were also in the chain of command?

Admiral CROWE. My instincts tell me that that would work better, although I would say there is a dichotomy here. When you say "chain of command," I really talk about running operations and so forth rather than working out everyday problems. It would work better, I would assume, if the Chairman were in the chain of command, yes.

Senator LEVIN. To put it in as plain language as I can, is the Chairman now, on these time sensitive matters, in the chain of command?

Admiral CROWE. He is involved.

Senator LEVIN. The chain of command to me is clear, now.

Admiral CROWE. But this is one of the problems. The chain of command means different things to different people. Of course, to a military man, the "chain of command" usually means that he is in command. And I am not in command. The Secretary of Defense is in command.

Senator **Levin**. I understand that.

But the chain of command, the way it is now described, is the Chairman in the chain of command?

Admiral **Crowe**. The orders on operations and so forth, are—well, let's talk about what I do.

I go to the Secretary of Defense and I say we have a big problem here and we have to do so and so and I advise so and so. He may do it or he may not. He says all right, do so and so.

I go down and I write the military orders, or my people do. They get it into the machinery and it goes out from the JCS under the direction of and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator **Levin**. I understand that.

I am trying to get to the bottom line.

Admiral **Crowe**. Does that mean in the chain of command to you?

Senator **Levin**. Yes. Does it to you?

Admiral **Crowe**. Well, as I say, to a military man, the "chain of command" often means that he is in command, and I am not in command.

Senator **Levin**. So, in the military man's lingo, you are not in the chain of command.

Admiral **Crowe**. I guess I am in it, but I am not of it. I am just like the language says. That chain of command runs through me.

Senator **Levin**. But you are not in it in military terms?

Admiral **Crowe**. Well, I am not in command.

That is another question, incidentally, which has come up on this legislation in various places, whether I should be in the chain of command in that sense or not.

Senator **Levin**. My last question, Mr. Chairman, if there is another moment—I don't want to abuse the time privilege.

Senator **Warner**. I think the question is very important.

Let me try to rephrase it, and then I will yield back to Senator Levin.

By law, the Secretary of Defense can communicate directly with a CINC——

Admiral **Crowe**. Oh, yes.

Senator **Warner**.——and order an operation, and you could literally be left in your office tending to other duties. But, by custom——

Admiral **Crowe**. And by his own directive. This is in a directive sense.

Senator **Warner**.——by custom, and I go back to my own days as Secretary of the Navy, where I recall many times being in Mr. Laird's office when the Chairman would be there and Mr. Laird would sign those orders and hand it to the Chairman and the Chairman would then execute with the CINC. So I think, by custom, certainly with the three Secretaries of Defense that I served under——

Admiral **Crowe**. Well, it is even more than custom, Mr. Chairman. It is a DOD directive that he will go through the Chairman.

This does not preempt the Secretary, however. If the Secretary wants to make a call to the Commander in Chief in Europe, he will do it, and he has every right to do it.

Senator WARNER. So, by law, maybe you are not in the chain of command, but by DOD order and practice, you are.

Admiral CROWE. And I act for the JCS through whom the chain of command currently runs.

Senator WARNER. Does that clarify it at all?

Senator LEVIN. Well, I think that leaves ambiguity which we are all aware of and I think we ought to try to clear it up. You are either the messenger or the director of an order. If you are the messenger, that means the CINC, if he is in a critical situation and needs advice, is not going to ask the messenger for advice, he is going to ask the director for advice.

That, to me, leaves an ambiguity in crisis—not in ordinary times, obviously. I am not talking about ordinary times. I think these things work just great in ordinary times. But in crisis, with that ambiguity, if they are acting through you and you are the messenger instead of the originator of that directive, that means, logically to me, that they will call the Secretary of Defense.

If they have only one call to make and 1 minute to make it in, or 2 minutes, or 5 minutes, if I were out there, I wouldn't know what the hell to do. That is the worst situation for anybody to be in, I would think whether you have 5 minutes to make a decision or 1 minute to make a decision.

Let me move on to a slightly different issue.

Senator WARNER. Senator Levin, excuse me, but I think this is so important that we ought to allow the witness to address your observation because the observation is well taken.

Senator LEVIN. Oh, fine. Thank you.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I have addressed it, Mr. Chairman. Of course, as a military man, I would like to be in the chain of command in the military sense. But there are a lot of things in the world that I would like that are not particularly do-able at this time. I believe, for example, that what the House bill suggests I can live with, and that is very good.

Senator LEVIN. Your testimony on the problem of the dual responsibilities of the Chiefs is very helpful. You phrase it, as always, I find, in a careful, balanced, and thoughtful way. We are appreciative of that.

I take it, from what you say, quoting your testimony, that the "dual responsibilities of the Chiefs" are, on occasion, difficult to fulfill.

Admiral CROWE. Oh, yes. There is no question about that, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Would you give us an example or two of those occasions or types of occasion where it is difficult to fulfill the dual role? If you don't want to use a specific example, give us a generic type of example.

Admiral CROWE. I think one of the good examples is the following, and, incidentally, this is not a question that has come up since I have been here. Rather, it is a general subject.

When you start talking about strategic weapons, strategic deterrent, strategic command and control systems, et cetera, as you well know, these are concentrated in two services. Obviously the other two services are confronted with a situation where here we are talking about things of great national interest that have to do with the protection of the country, but if you put a certain amount of emphasis on that, obviously funds are going to flow or a whole chain of events is going to start, and there is every likelihood that it will draw away from the two services that are not participating in it.

Now I have seen a host of those kinds of discussions. Where strategic matters are concerned, I have seen some real statesman-like utterances and actions, although they know that this does not necessarily benefit their service directly.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I have just one more question. It may be a pretty broad and far-reaching one.

Should the Chairman, in your opinion, be a full member of the National Security Council? If not a full member, should it be mandatory that he attend every NSC meeting to insure that the military advice is available to the President during the NSC meetings?

Lastly, and directly related, what is your present status in this regard?

Admiral CROWE. Let me answer the last part of your question first, Senator.

I go to the NSC meetings. I find that very helpful, and I do have an opportunity to express views on matters that I feel my competence might contribute to. I like that arrangement very much and I do think it is helpful.

I do think the President should have the discretion as to who he wants there and does not want there.

I don't know anything that the legislation would give me that I do not have now.

At the same time—and I said this in my statement, and here my biases are coming out—I do feel strongly that it is important that in some fashion, whatever changes you make you should still make sure that unfettered military advice gets to the National Command Authorities and that the military cannot be intimidated in some way that it won't say the things it wants.

We have a built-in dilemma in the joint staff or in the JCS in that we are constantly being told by some people not to give political advice, that that is not our business, and when we give military advice, because it did not take into account political considerations, that it is not helpful.

So I am not quite sure what we are supposed to be doing officially.

What the Chiefs do, in fact, is try to consider all parameters of every question and hope that they have done it in such a fashion that it will be helpful to the Secretary of Defense.

But that little dilemma is constantly used against the Chiefs by people who, for purposes of their own, are trying to influence our advice one way or another.

Senator EXON. As I take it, then, Admiral, you are under instructions from the President and are called to every NSC meeting? Is that it?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir. I attend all NSC meetings.

Senator EXON. You attend all the meetings.

There is one last part to that.

Let's assume that Bud McFarlane, who is held in high regard on this committee, we like Bud very much, you had a chance to work with him. When you went to the National Security Council meetings, were you working, by and large, in conjunction with him, and would Bud McFarlane consult with you hours or a day before the meeting for any input and advice that he might have in preparation for briefing the President?

Admiral CROWE. Depending on the subject. He occasionally called on me when I did not want to be called on.

Yes, sir. Essentially the answer to your question is yes.

Senator EXON. For whatever it is worth, as one Senator speaking, I feel that there should be a wide range of authority for you, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to give whatever advice you think is important to the President, whether it is political or not. I recognize that some of the things we have talked about previously here, such as the situation in the Philippines today, is not just military, but is political also as it can have an effect on our military posture there.

Admiral CROWE. On that particular subject, the Philippines, I have had an opportunity to give my advice to the President.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Nunn, I would be glad to stay on if you have any questions at this time.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to yield back and forth.

I just want to ask a series of questions that hopefully could be answered with a yes or no, or with a reserved judgment if you don't want to comment on them right now.

These are suggestions that General Wickham made about the role of the Chairman.

I have eleven of them here, and what I would like to do, Admiral is to go through them and see if you generally concur or if you prefer to reserve judgment.

Admiral CROWE. Fine.

Senator WARNER. Let the record show that the Admiral has a list.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, I have a list, but I don't know whether or not it is identical.

Senator NUNN. Well, ours is sort of boiled down, so it may not be identical. But I will go down the list.

First he said to make the Chairman the principal military advisor.

Do you agree with that?

Admiral CROWE. I agree with that.

Senator NUNN. To give the Chairman statutory responsibility for joint training and military education?

Admiral CROWE. I certainly agree in principle with that. I am a little concerned about what that will involve in terms of staff help and time and actually implementing it.

But the Chairman already, of course, is very strongly into joint training, in terms of military schools and so forth, and in trying to enhance preparation for joint staff billets, et cetera.

Senator NUNN. I think here it would be a pretty broad delegation in that the Chairman would decide himself how far that would go.

Admiral CROWE. All right, sir. I would have no problem with that.

I think that it is needed and the Chairman does need more of a joint orientation to run it.

But there is another problem. When you get the fiat, it takes a long time to put it into practice effectively.

Senator NUNN. The third suggestion is to give the Chairman authority to develop joint doctrine.

Admiral CROWE. We are involved now in developing joint doctrine, but probably not in as organized and coherent a way as General Wickham has in mind. There is no question there is a crying need for joint doctrine. There is just no question about it.

Senator NUNN. So you would generally concur with that one?

Admiral CROWE. I would think so. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Fourth is to give the Chairman authority to formulate recommendations on strategic priorities, defense programs, and military budget.

Admiral CROWE. Well, we formulate those now, of course, recommendations on every one of those subjects—strategic priorities, defense programs and military budgets. The Chairman's entry into the programming side of the House has been a recent one, in the last few years, and how he does that and how effectively is still being evaluated.

I am not quite sure that I understand the recommendation completely because he is in on every one of those items now.

Senator NUNN. You could supplement that one, if you would like to, for the record. Maybe you could converse with him on that one, or on any of the others, for that matter, if you would like to.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

AUTHORITY TO FORMULATE RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRIORITIES, PROGRAMS, AND BUDGETS

In my capacity as CJCS, I am a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB), the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), and an attendee at SECDEF Performance Reviews, I currently have significant influence on strategic priorities, defense programs, and military budgets. I am able to present my individual views and the corporate views of the JCS at these fora. The enhanced role of the Chairman and CINCs in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) has increased the attention, given to operational requirements and joint and cross-Service programs in the development of the Defense Guidance and during the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process. In relationship to programming, the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) submitted to the SECDEF prior to 1 July each year provides the views of the JCS, taking into consideration the views of the CINCs, on the collective balance, capabilities, and risks of the composite Service POMs. This is a prelude to my active participation in the Summer Program Review process. In addition, I have an opportunity during budget formulation to express my opinions and views on issues I feel are important from a

JCS and CINC perspective. I personally meet with the SECDEF, DEPSECDEF, Service Secretaries, and Chiefs on these issues. Finally, the establishment of the Strategic Plans and Resources Analysis Agency in 1984 has created the staff capability in the OJCS to prepare independent assessments and recommendations to support my role and that of the JCS in resource related actions.

The Director of the Joint Staff is my representative on the Joint Requirements and Management Board. (JRMB). He meets with the four service Vice Chiefs of Staff at least monthly and more often as necessary to evaluate potential joint military requirements and to review potential joint programs to satisfy those requirements. The Secretariat of the JRMB is headed by the OJCS Director of Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency. The JRMB was chartered by the JCS in March 1984 and has been very active and successful in carrying out this charter.

I participate with the Chiefs, the CINCs, and Services in the formulation of military strategy, assignment of missions, and allocation of forces. We are supported by the OJCS under the Director, Joint Staff. I, and Chiefs as well, believe that our current authority is sufficient and see no need for additional legislation to accomplish the intent of this recommendation. It is being done already.

Senator NUNN. Fifth is to give the Chairman authority to specify procedures and to determine the task of the joint staff.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I am all for that.

Senator NUNN. Sixth is to remove the limits on size and tenure of the joint staff.

Admiral CROWE. I think I would agree with that, sir—not that we are unduly restrained now, because we have other devices. But I think to accord with practice, in fairness and honesty, yes, I would agree with that.

Senator NUNN. Seventh is to do away with the distinction between joint staff and other office of Joint Chief of Staff officers.

Admiral CROWE. I think you should, yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. That is a distinction without a difference, is it not?

Admiral CROWE. That's correct, yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Eight is to give the Chairman authority to administer a reduced scale personnel management system.

Admiral CROWE. I don't think I could concur with that, Senator.

I do concur with the second part—I prefer a joint skill identifier rather than a joint duty specialty. I would agree with that.

I do not concur with the proposals to have a whole body of officers that do nothing but joint duty, et cetera, et cetera.

One of our great strengths and where we derive our ability to deal with these issues is from across the spectrum of operational expertise in all the services. We need those people. I mean, that is our life blood.

Senator NUNN. So, you would word it, instead of being a joint specialist, identifying the skills of people who would perform well in that function?

Admiral CROWE. That's right.

In the Navy, we would call that a subspecialty, people who have had a lot of joint duty but who are still——

Senator NUNN. Primarily a service person.

Admiral CROWE. ——well, operationally oriented.

Senator NUNN. Along that line, before I get into the next one, let me ask you this about personnel.

House Resolution 3622 contains a provision that would direct a JCS Chairman to submit to the President his evaluation of the joint service of a military officer who has been recommended to the President for a three or four star grade. This proposal would seek to insure that nominees for such ranks have strong joint duty backgrounds and to provide an additional incentive for joint assignments and objective performance in them.

Do you agree that the JCS Chairman should submit evaluations of the joint service of three and four star nominees?

Admiral CROWE. On balance, yes, I do.

Now, some of those evaluations will be very thin gruel because he won't have had the joint experience and I won't have much to get my hands on. In other cases, though, he will have performed in joint billets, and so forth, and I think it is pertinent to promotion. I really do.

Senator WARNER. Let me interject something for a moment, if I may.

Senator NUNN. Sure.

Senator WARNER. You know, Admiral, you and I being sailors, we have to be careful that we work on the enhanced position of the Chairman, not everybody running from port to starboard, tilting the ship the other way.

Admiral CROWE. I understand.

Senator WARNER. You can't have so much work that you can't effectively perform what is regarded as your primary task, and that is to be a military advisor.

Admiral CROWE. I agree with that, Senator.

Now this particular proposal was the three and four star business. I think if he did any more than that, he couldn't do it.

Senator NUNN. That would be just too much detail and he could not keep up with it.

Admiral CROWE. Absolutely.

In the personnel business, what worries me about these personnel proposals is that is a big job and we just don't want to get into that.

Senator WARNER. I think the Senator's question is a good one. Referring to a previous witness's recommendations point out that we need from you additional testimony on the joint staff operation.

For example, when I was Secretary of the Navy, I will be candid, and this is no secret to you, we had our people down there and I wanted to hear and I wanted to know how that Navy position was being advocated——

Admiral CROWE. Absolutely. I understand that, Senator.

Senator NUNN. ——and, Captain, did you advocate it from a Navy point of view. You know the old story about the biography written by Robert E. Lee's aide de camp, called "The Unbiased History of the Civil War from the Southern Point of View."

[General laughter.]

That's what I wanted to know, how the Navy fared.

Admiral CROWE. You are being more candid than most witnesses have been, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. I am in the position now where I can. I am here.

We may as well put that on the table. How do you deal with these young officers going down there and the seniors of their respective services are looking over their shoulders? How well did they log-roll, advocate service rivalry and all of those things? You have to deal with that.

Then you come to the problem of the fitness reports, and you and I know that the Navy sort of prides itself as being tougher than the rest of the services and it doesn't put in as many superiors and excellents and so forth, and when those reports come back before the Promotions Board and so forth, we know how to evaluate them.

But down in the Joint Staff, we may have an Army colonel judging a Navy commander's performance.

Would you address that point.

Admiral CROWE. We have a way to guard against that now. We guard against that now with all services. When an officer's fitness report is filed, his superior makes out the fitness report, but then the report is reviewed by a senior officer in that service to see if it accords with everything and that he has not been done a disservice for some reason.

Senator WARNER. I think in response to Senator Nunn, you pointed out that, as far as establishing a joint duty career specialty, that would not be your recommendation.

Admiral CROWE. I just would not recommend that, sir.

I might say a word, Senator, on something you just mentioned, that there is a common view that Joint Staff duty, if it is not performed correctly, is held against an officer by an individual service.

Frankly, that has not been my experience.

What has been my experience—and this is disturbing, but it is a different slant—is that if a service does not consider joint duty prestigious, the officer does not get any credit for his work on the Joint Staff. It is not that when he returns to his service that he is either ostracized or hurt or damaged. It is that well, you have been away for 2 years and you have wasted 2 years and we are just not going to give you any credit for it.

Now that is changing. It has changed in my career. It has changed in the last 10 years markedly. But it is not changing as rapidly as some people would prefer, and not all the vestiges of it are gone. But it has changed.

I am optimistic that it is going to change more. I am optimistic that my appointment has done things for people who are in joint duty, because I have spent an awful lot of time in my life in joint duty.

Senator WARNER. You are ideally qualified to address these issues in your submission. But bear in mind that we are setting out a framework that should last for two or three decades, and we may not have a man with the breadth and depth of experience that you have.

Admiral CROWE. I understand that, sir.

Senator WARNER. We have to guard against slipping back to where we were before.

Senator, did you have anything further?

Senator NUNN. I think the last three items on this list he has already commented on. One is to create a Vice Chairman who would not outrank the JCS and would not substitute for the Chairman. I think the Admiral has already said that he agreed with that one.

Ten is to specify in statute that the channel of command runs through the Chairman. We have already had dialogue on that rather difficult subject, and any supplemental views on that one would be welcome, I am sure.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Eleven is to give the Chairman authority to supervise the unified commander's implementation of national command authority directives.

You may want to comment on that one, though I think I have the gist of your feeling on it.

Admiral CROWE. I'm sorry, Senator?

Senator NUNN. Eleven is to give the Chairman authority to supervise the unified commander's implementation of national command authority directives. This is another General Wickman proposal.

Admiral CROWE. That is an item or a provision in the House bill. I would think it would be helpful, not necessarily in changing the pattern of how I do business, but in clearing up any confusion.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Humphery.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have no questions.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Senator Nunn, does that complete your questioning?

Senator NUNN. Yes, it does.

Senator WARNER. Admiral, this has been a very, very profitable session. You have made some valuable contributions to this study, and I am hopeful that your further submissions will be forthcoming shortly, particularly the one on the CINCs. Please feel free to bring that in as early as possible.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Questions submitted for the hearing record follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

JOINT MILITARY ADVISORY COUNCIL

Senator DENTON. Admiral Crowe, we know that feasibility and readiness, logistics and training, the possibility of losses, must ultimately be important determinants of the success or failure of any operation. In that light, can you comment on the advantages or disadvantages of proposals to disestablish the JCS and allow the service Chiefs to return solely to Service concerns, particularly in the area of bringing to bear knowledge of service logistics and training upon the preparation of advice for the National Command Authority?

Admiral CROWE. I see no advantage to replacing the current Joint Chiefs of Staff system with a Joint Military Advisory Council, but see many disadvantages, primarily in the quality and timeliness of military advice for the National Command Authorities.

The military advice received by the President must be based upon the best available knowledge, experience and expertise in military matters and must present all feasible options from every viable military perspective. It should contain objective and thorough evaluation of the pros and cons of all options. The mechanism for developing and providing the advice should be structured in a manner which guarantees that decision making and policy formulation are actually (not just nominally) reserved to, and exercised by, the President.

I believe the current Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) structure is the best entity for providing such military advice to the President. As heads of their respective services, the JCS are the most knowledgeable of the special and particular capabilities and capacities, as well as the state of training and readiness, of the forces under their responsibility. Furthermore, the JCS system ensures the continuity between policy making and subsequent implementation that is essential to success, and it provides a sound balance between responsibility and accountability that would be absent in a group of advisors who possess merely advisory duties and function entirely outside the operational or resource structure.

The service Chiefs are able to perform the duties of head of a service while serving as a member of the Joint Chiefs. The Chiefs are obligated to give priority to the joint role and do so by delegating much of the day-to-day operation of their services to their Vice Chiefs. The alleged built-in "conflict of interest" of the dual-hatted role (with the perception that service parochialism receives greater loyalty) is rejected. Service interests and positions are put aside for what is in the Nation's best interest. The two jobs are interdependent and mutually supportive. Each role is measurably strengthened by the other. By having accountability for advice concerning the forces in the field, the Chiefs have authority and responsibility as members of the JCS that must be inseparable from the responsibility each executes as a service Chief. Any proposed system should be expected to demonstrate better balance of authority with appropriate accountability and responsibility.

Replacing the JCS with a Joint Military Advisory Council would dramatically compromise the quality of military advice and would have a net harmful impact on our national security. The President and the Secretary of Defense have found the advice provided by the JCS to be consistently timely, accurate, competent and innovative. I believe, therefore, that the basic concept of the JCS system should be maintained.

QUALITY OF JCS ADVICE AND DEPUTY, CJCS

Senator DENTON. Admiral Crowe, we have heard a great deal thus far in our hearings about the actual or, more often, alleged deficiencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, it sometimes seems as if our series of hearings is really focused upon a possible reorganization of that body.

In consequence, we have been relating possible needs for changes in organizational structures to mistakes and failures in operations in minor crises as well as in wartime. That may be the wrong rationale for change. For example, in Vietnam, the problems lay not with the military Services and the JCS but with the policies followed or advocated by the President, with Congress, and the media, the makers and manipulators rather than the executors of the policy.

Keeping in mind that there may well be a distinction between "routine" advice and advice that directly affects the conduct of large scale military operations in a war, or actions in a high visibility crisis, such as military action required in Lebanon, how would you evaluate the quality of advice provided to the National Command Authority by the JCS?

How could the advice be improved?

Would the creation of a Deputy Chairman, who might or might not be a senior to the service Chiefs, help?

Admiral CROWE. The current JCS system is capable of providing the most comprehensive, properly considered military advice possible. This advice is objective and thoroughly evaluated considering the pros and cons of all options and is structured to reserve the decision making and policy formulation to the Secretary of Defense and President. The JCS system ensures the continuity between policy making and subsequent implementation. It also provides a sound balance between responsibility and accountability. The President and Secretary of Defense have found the advice provided by the JCS to be consistently timely, accurate, competent and innovative.

A four star Vice Chairman, subordinate to the service Chiefs, would be helpful and would improve the Joint Staff's capabilities. The Vice Chairman's position would enhance the capability to review contingency planning, perform resource analysis, help formulate planning, programming and budgeting recommendations, and work with the CINCs' staffs on their resource priorities. Creation of the position of the Vice Chairman is a logical step to permit me to better allocate my time, and would also improve the operational efficiency of the Joint Staff, making it more responsive to national security requirements.

SASC STAFF REPORT LISTING OF DOD MISSIONS

Senator DENTON. Admiral Crowe, the Senate Committee Staff Report contains a listing of Department of Defense missions, and the subsequent analysis is based upon the evaluation of the ability to fulfill those missions. The missions defined are Nuclear Deterrence, Maritime Superiority, Power Projection Superiority, Defense of NATO Europe, Defense of East Asia, and Defense of Southwest Asia.

I do not recall having seen those missions stated as the missions of the department during my time in the Service or in official DOD documents since that time.

Are they familiar to you, and do you consider them an adequate or effective presentation of the mission of the Defense Department and the military services?

Admiral **Crowe**. The SASC staff report listing of Department of Defense missions is unfamiliar to me. The characterization contains a partial list of missions performed by the Department but is certainly not comprehensive. For example, defense of North America is certainly a high priority within the Department of Defense.

The specific missions which the Department of Defense performs vary in number, priority, and emphasis as foreign policy and strategic goals change. Missions are constantly revalidated and focused as we proceed through the cyclical planning process. In my view, the staff characterization is neither an adequate nor effective presentation of the missions which the Department performs.

JOINT EDUCATION

Senator **Denton**. Admiral Crowe, I share your concern and that of my colleagues for increased "jointness" among our officer corps. Some of the military schools, such as the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College provide joint training. I am familiar with the approach and its importance because of my command of the Armed Forces Staff College.

I have the impression, however, that the service schools and academies do not provide much training about the other Services or about joint planning and operations.

Could you give us your views about the amount of joint education and training currently found in our military schools, about the value of that training, and about ways that the quality and amount of such training could be increased, if you believe that it should be?

Admiral **Crowe**. I clearly recognize the value of and necessity for joint education and training, and the services have increased emphasis in this area. For example, the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC), which is our JCS vehicle for focusing on joint issues in military education, addressed joint planning and operations at their last meeting in September 1985. They noted that the senior service schools now devote a substantial portion of their core curriculum to joint subject matter. This includes such issues as the Joint Strategic Planning System, Joint Operation Planning System, studying former joint operations, (e.g., Grenada), planning campaigns, developing and deploying forces during crises, and wargaming. This provides the proper quantitative level on joint and combined issues. Appropriately, the next major emphasis in the near term for the Senior Service Schools should be on improving the quality and realism of joint planning, operations and wargaming. The MECC members indicated that officers at the Intermediate Service Schools need to be introduced to strategic thinking and operational art of war, although their primary focus should remain on the employment of forces on a tactical level. The MECC further noted that the current exchange of officers among Service schools is contributing to increased joint perspective. Summarizing, I believe that Service military schools are clearly aware of the importance of joint planning and operations and, though the amount of joint instruction they offer is about right, they are taking concerted steps to increase the quality and relevance of such instruction.

Senator **Warner**. The committee will stand in recess until 1:15, at which time we will meet in room 222, Russell Building, in executive session. We will reopen here in this room at 1:30 p.m., in an open session.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:15 p.m.]

REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1985

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open session pursuant to other business, at 2:45 p.m., in room SD G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner presiding.

Present: Senators Warner, Thurmond, Denton, Nunn, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Richard D. Finn, Jr. and James R. Locher, III, professional staff members; Collen M. Getz, research assistant; Barbara B. Brown and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; and Nancy Soderberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER, PRESIDING

Senator **Warner** [presiding]. Now, General, you have been most patient and we thank you.

You have appeared before us many times and in my brief period here in the Senate, I know of no one who has a higher degree of respect and competence before this committee than yourself.

This afternoon, the committee meets to hear testimony on the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense and the Congress.

This is the 10th in a series of hearings that the committee has held on these important topics.

The committee is privileged to receive testimony this afternoon from Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command.

General Rogers needs no introduction to this committee. He has appeared before the committee on numerous occasions, both in his current position and while he was serving as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

Taking advantage of General Rogers' position as a unified commander, the principal topic for this hearing is the unified command system.

The committee also is anxious to hear General Rogers' views on the Joint Chief of Staff system, the preparation and reward of military officers serving on joint duty assignments, and the adequacy of the current planning, programming and budgeting system.

Given General Rogers' appearance at the end of the series of these hearings, the committee has suggested and General Rogers has agreed that he will not make an opening statement.

We will proceed immediately to questions by members of the committee and this will enable committee members to focus on those issues not sufficiently clarified by previous testimony.

In answering questions, the committee requests that General Rogers provide his personal views, as well as whatever views he wishes, of course. General, they should certainly include your personal views. This is what the committee desires and is most important.

On behalf of the committee, I extend a warm welcome to our distinguished witness. We appreciate the time General Rogers has taken to appear before us and we look forward to hearing his testimony.

I would like at this time to yield to my distinguished colleague, Mr. Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I will put my entire statement in the record.

General Rogers has been before our committee many, many times. He is one of our finest people in uniform today and in my experience since I have been in the Senate. He has the unique perspective of having been service Chief and of now being a CINC. I don't know that we have any other individual with both those perspectives, in this order, at this point in time.

So his opinion here will be very, very valuable, as it always is, and we welcome him before this committee.

[The prepared statement of Senator Nunn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

Mr. Chairman, I am also delighted to welcome General Rogers. The committee is certain to greatly benefit from his testimony.

Mr. Chairman, the committee is addressing a wide range of important topics in this inquiry on defense organization. Of all these topics, I believe that correcting deficiencies in the unified commands is likely to be among the most important initiatives.

It is for this reason that General Rogers' appearance is so important. General Rogers has substantial experience with the present organizational arrangements for the unified commands. He will be able to assist the committee's consideration of various proposals to strengthen unity of command within the unified commands.

We are fortunate to have such a key witness at this time.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

Senator Nunn, if it is agreeable, we will follow the 5-minute rule and keep the questioning going among the members.

Is there anything you would like to say by way of a preliminary, General?

STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, USA, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General ROGERS. No, I don't think so, Mr. Chairman. I am here to respond to questions and I look forward to our discussions this afternoon, as I always have before this committee.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, sir.

During the course of the testimony received by the committee, a very distinguished witness suggested that the committee consider the option of designating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the one person in uniform in the United States with a five star rank. That rank would be accompanied by certain provisions in law which would enable the individual to remain on active duty, to remain in an advice and consent position to the President and the Secretary of Defense at such time as either desire to receive that advice.

One of the reasons, of course, was that the individual could more effectively perform his duties with respect to other nations, some nations having a rank commensurate to five stars.

Would you kindly comment on that concept.

General ROGERS. Well, I really don't think it makes any difference, Mr. Chairman.

There is one nation, the United Kingdom, that has a field marshall as the chief of defense in the NATO forum of the Chiefs of Defense meetings.

I personally believe that the five star rank has a historical value to it, and I would just as soon see it retained for when a man is the general of the Armies, general of the Air Force, admiral of the Navies, as we had in wartime. Should we ever again have a major conflagration, let those who bear the responsibilities at that time wear that rank.

I know that has been diluted somewhat by General Bradley, when he was appointed five stars subsequent to the war, at the time of being the first Chairman. But as far as the ability of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States to have his voice heard in international fora, there is no problem, even if he were to be a brigadier general.

Senator WARNER. That is quite clear and unequivocal.

General ROGERS. Well, it is to me, sir.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

General Rogers, on three occasions, the administration had requested funding for a CINC Readiness Fund. This was intended to provide unified commanders with a source of funds to meet unanticipated, unprogrammed, urgent, near-term readiness and warfighting requirements.

Is the CINC Readiness Fund needed?

General ROGERS. Well, we CINCs think so. We may be prejudiced, but it has given us an opportunity to buy off the shelf equipment that we needed in order to function more effectively. We are hopeful that the CINC fund will be restored for that purpose.

Of course, I, as a CINC, just can't go out and spend any amount of money that I want. It has to be controlled and is centrally through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as it should be.

Senator WARNER. What changes would you recommend in the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and in the JCS as a staff?

General ROGERS. Well, sir, I am making the assumption that the objective of this committee is to insure that it enhances both the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs. I have been led to believe the objective is to enhance significantly the authority of the Chairman and the CINCs so that we have a more effective organization, better advice to the civilian authorities, the ability to function in time of war or in time of crisis.

Senator WARNER. That is a correct assumption. But at the same time, we do not want any diminution in the concept tried, tested, and proven of civilian control. It is a careful balancing of those two things.

General ROGERS. I think the issue of civilian control, in my personal opinion, Mr. Chairman, has just been a red herring that has been dragged across the path in which direction this committee should move in order to raise an emotional issue which might affect the vote of some Members of Congress.

There is not going to be any man on white horseback in this country. The Commander-in-Chief has always been the President and he will always be. We in uniform fight to defend the fact that the Commander-in-Chief is the President. There will never be, in my opinion, any reason to fear that the military in this country is going to try to assume control over the civilians into whose hands that authority must repose.

With that as a little starter, Mr. Chairman, I do have some ideas.

If we have agreed as to the objective, then I think the Congress must do the following. I can break it out separately, if you like, into Chairman, JCS, and CINCs or I can combine the two. But if those are the objectives, to enhance significantly the authority of the CJCS and CINCs, let me list the things I think must be done by the Congress.

The first thing is to eliminate the service Secretaries.

Senator WARNER. I beg your pardon?

General ROGERS. The service Secretaries must be eliminated if, in fact, Congress' objective is as I understand it, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. I want to be sure of what you said. I missed your word. Did you say "limited?"

General ROGERS. I said "eliminated" the service Secretaries——

Senator WARNER. "Eliminate."

General ROGERS [continuing]. If you wish to do what you have indicated to me you wish to do. Let me go through the rest of those actions Congress must take.

I thought that might get your attention, sir.

Senator WARNER. Yes, indeed.

General ROGERS. I hope you will listen to the rest of my recommendations.

Senator WARNER. With greater attention than I had anticipated. [Laughter.]

General Rogers. Or, as an alternative, to make the service Secretaries deputies to the Secretary of Defense for the respective services.

When we get into a discussion of that issue, you must understand that for the last 6½ years, I have been in an international environment where nations do not have service Secretaries.

Senator Nunn. General, may I ask you for one little clarification, to ease Senator Warner's mind. You would not make that retroactive, would you?

General Rogers. Not on your life. [Laughter.]

Senator Levin. I thought you were going to be testifying in a more controversial way, General. [Laughter.]

General Rogers. Oh, no. Well, I don't think that is controversial in light of what the objective is.

The service POMs and budgets then would need to be integrated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with major input from the CINCs, and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presenting those integrated results to the Secretary of Defense. They would come through military channels.

I suggest that you place the Chairman in the chain of command. He will have to be there in wartime and he should be there in peacetime, in my opinion. Make him the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the NSC, and the President, taking into account the Chief's views when time permits—as he would—as he made up his mind what his advice should be. When time does not permit to discuss later with the JCS.

Have the joint staff work for the Chairman—I think that is one of the keys in this whole endeavor.

Provide for a Deputy Chairman of the JCS, senior to the service Chiefs, as I testified in 1983 before this committee. He would be the alter-ego to the Chairman, to include attending meetings for the Chairman when the latter is unavailable. We can discuss later perhaps my reasons for feeling that way, both as a Chief and as a CINC, and having sat for 4 years outside the door of the Chairman of the JCS as the executive to the Chairman, Maxwell Taylor and the first 2 years of General Wheeler.

To meet its objective, the Congress would have to make the law read something to this effect, "Military departments are responsible to man, organize, equip, train, and support forces for joint and combined war-fighting in accordance with requirements of the CINCs' operational plans."

Those are some of the major things that need to be done, in my opinion, if we are going to accomplish what you want.

Now you have had many witnesses here who have talked about the need to enhance the authority of the CINCs, to make that authority equal to their responsibility, to insure that there is a stronger linkage between the responsibilities of the CINCs for their operational plans and the resource and support responsibilities of the services.

But I have not seen much said to you as to how you do that. I think that making the law read as I have suggested, putting the Chairman in the chain of command, making the Chairman the integrator of the POMs and the budgets—Program Objective Memoranda and the budgets—with major input from the CINCs, and having a Deputy whom we in the field know is going to represent cross-service views are important steps to be taken. The only man in uniform in Washington today who can represent the cross-service views of the CINCs is the Chairman. When he goes, there is no one else left.

I can tell you that we CINCs get a little nervous out there when the Chairman is not here; the intensity of that feeling is often dependent on who is the Acting Chairman.

Looking at it from the Chiefs' point of view, I found that when I became the Acting Chairman, sometimes for a week, 10 days, or a month, and I was carrying water on both shoulders, I would slop some out of each bucket. I did not do either job satisfactorily.

Now I know that current Chiefs believe that there has been some considerable value from their having the opportunity to serve as Acting Chairman over a 3-month period while the Chairman is gone. I cannot speak for that. But, as a Chief, even as a colonel executive assistant to the Chairman, I felt that a true Deputy Chairman of the JCS was needed. So my feelings on this subject go back a considerable length of time.

I would add gratuitously, Mr. Chairman, that I would think the Chairman of the JCS himself would feel more confortable if he knew that, while gone, the tough issues could be brought before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not delayed until he returned. Second, that the cross-service views, as he knows them and believes in them, are being represented among the agencies within Washington by his representative.

Senator WARNER. At this juncture, General, I wonder if I might allow Senator Nunn to commence his questioning, and during the course of the questioning we can bring out your other points. We are trying to follow a time allocation today.

General ROGERS. Fine.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, this is so important, what General Rogers is saying, and he has started his answer, so why don't I just use my time to let him complete his answer.

General ROGERS. With respect to the Chairman, there is only one other of the key issues that I believe you have considered that I would mention. It is that the CJCS should not be charged with having a personnel management system for all joint duty throughout joint headquarters in the world.

First, I believe that would be unmanageable. Second, I believe there are other ways in the personnel area where we could, in fact, get the kind of recognition of joint service and the top drawer kinds of personnel to serve in the joint arena.

Further, with respect to the CINCs authority: if the law is not changed to show that military departments are responsible to organize, equip, and so on, those forces for joint combined war-fighting in accordance with the requirements of the CINCs' operational plans, and if the major CINC input to the Chairman is not to be as he integrates the service POMs and budgets, then, as a fallback position, I would ask, as I did in 1983, to institutionalize the current Defense Resource Board procedures, either through legislation—although that can be done by the Secretary of Defense—the CINCs appearances before the DRB, our participation in the drafting of the Defense Guidance, our providing an integrated priority list to the Defense Resource Board members and the component commanders, and direct coordination between CINCs and the services.

I won't go into the JCS Pub 2, United Acting Armed Forces, unless you wish.

As for the personnel actions related to joint service——

Senator WARNER. Before you leave the JCS Pub 2, this morning there was a consensus of the committee to the present Chairman, Admiral Crowe, that he expedite certain portions of that study so that this committee can have the benefit of those portions as we formulate a bill during the period, hopefully, of February, March, and April. At the present time, that study is reported back, I think, in June or July.

Is that right?

Senator NUNN. I believe it said 6 months.

Senator WARNER. Yes, 6 months, and we don't want to miss that. I want to stress that.

General ROGERS. Well, it is a fairly sizable document, written in fine print, front and back, and it is very important that it come out right. But I don't think there is much that needs to be changed in it, from where I sit.

One of the changes I would like to see made in it is this. Instead of unified commanders having the command through their component commanders, I would like for them to be given the option to do it when they thought that was the appropriate thing to do, or not to do it. I think in most instances we would continue to command through our component commanders because the chain of command functions not only from top-down, but from bottom-up. It is that advice from experienced individuals with good judgment that one depends upon.

So, to have that option would be helpful, but I am not sure that we would use it much.

Senator WARNER. On that point, this morning we addressed the issue of the advice of the CINCs and getting that advice to the President. The current Chairman assured us that he has and would continue to share with the President the advice of the various unified commanders, as well as members of the JCS, and particularly if that advice were in the form of, should we say, a dissenting opinion from his own or a majority of the JCS.

General ROGERS. I think that is more important from the standpoint of the JCS than it is from the CINCs. The reason I say that is we should not over-burden the Chairman of the JCS with a whole laundry list of dissenting opinions that may come up, to include those of the CINCs around the world. He should ask for our advice, as he does, and then incorporate it into his thinking as he formulates the advice he will provide to the President.

With respect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would cause me no problem certainly to retain the privilege of the individual members of the Joint Chiefs to go see the President on an issue of sufficient magnitude with which they disagreed with the position of the Chairman.

But the Chairman should be the primary military advisor.

Just as a general principal, if I could continue for a moment, the CINC should command any operation in his theater. Now it may come as a surprise to you that I would make a statement such as that, but there have been occasions in which operations within one's theater are commanded directly from Washington.

I do not think that is the most effective way in most instances because we have to provide the resources within the theater, and if an operation goes to hell in a hand-basket, the CINC will bear the responsibility for it. A CINC would sort of like to be in on the take-off as well as any crash landings that might occur.

I do not think that is unreasonable on our part.

On the personnel side, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe we should go the route of a joint duty career field any further than we already have within some of the services. Some services have a career field for strategists. They are very highly selected, good for joint staff duty. I would think that the joint duty skill identifier that services are developing would be adequate.

I think recurrent tours for successful—I underscore "successful"—joint service officers, is important, with a periodic return to the parent service.

I would strengthen the requirement for "successful" joint duty for promotion to flag rank. There may be a difference of opinion about an appropriate definition of "successful."

"Successful," for a person in the joint arena, is: "does this person in fact, keep foremost in his mind what is best for his Nation and not what is best for his service?"

A definition for "successful" joint duty which rests on how well did the person represent and sell his service's views while he was on joint duty would be entirely inappropriate.

I believe that, from the standpoint of promotion of those who have served "successfully" on joint duty—they being identified by a joint duty skill identifier and their effectiveness reports—there should be consideration given by the services to a disproportionately higher rate of promotion.

What we have to do is to make it attractive to serve in the joint arena. It is not attractive at the present time. It should be mandatory that CINCs be chosen from those who have had successful joint service duty and that Chiefs of Staff and Chairmen of the JCS should be selected from those who have had successful joint duty.

When the perception out there in the field is that due recognition is being given to successful joint duty, I think we will find some considerable attraction for such duty.

I have some other comments.

We should retain the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We should not have a Joint Military Advisory Council. You have had lots of testimony on that aspect of the staff's study.

With respect to the service Secretaries, I mention that in the context again of the following: if you want to accomplish the objective that you have set for yourself, I think certain things have to occur.

Now, I know the art of the possible, too. Failing the alternative of having the service Secretaries as Under Secretaries of Defense for the individual services, then I think we should, as a minimum, integrate the Secretariat staff with the military department staffs.

I tried to do this when I was Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel. In the 2 years I served in that position, I had three Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

In a meeting one day with one of them, I suggested to him: you come on down and take my office, bring a couple of people with you, and I will take my assistant's office and we will use the same staff and we'll save a lot of time and effort. Besides that, I told him he was stealing my best action officers anyway.

But the time had not yet come for an individual Assistant Secretary and an individual Deputy Chief to do that.

I would hope that we could combine the programming-budgeting process and have biennial budgets. In the first year the services and the Chairman, JCS, should testify to the adequacy of the budget, and the next year the CINCs and the services should testify as to how well the services were, in fact, supporting CINCs needs.

I have some other suggestions about micro-management and so on.

One of the key points, is if, we, in fact, give the Chairman of the JCS the function of integrating the POMs and the budgets, and if you get the CINCs more into the POM/budget system, we have to have some help. We have to have an adequate and appropriate PPBS staff capability out there in the field. Of course, the Chairman has to have the same.

Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND [presiding]. Senator Nunn, you may continue.

Senator NUNN. Well, I think my time probably has been used on that round of questioning.

Why don't I yield to the next in line. I am not sure who is next, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. The distinguished Senator from Alabama, Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. I will welcome General Rogers. I am sure my colleagues are full of the respect which he has engendered in the Congress.

I just want to state, because it is true, that I never have known of an officer who has enjoyed respect bordering on awe from officers with whom he has served more than in the case of General Rogers, and I share that personally. I know we can learn a great deal if we will but listen to this fine gentleman.

Sir, when you said that you thought the CINCs ought to come from joint duty and the Chiefs ought to come from joint duty, did you necessarily mean directly from? Would you want to qualify that in terms of almost everybody gets some kind of joint duty? Would you say that any kind of joint duty is okay for them to have qualified with?

General ROGERS. Well, that which is, in fact, real joint duty. There are two aspects to that. One, to be selected a flag officer, one should have a record of successful joint duty, as I suggested we define "successful." Second, it is from those who have served successfully as joint duty that are flag and general officers from whom CINCs should be selected and the Chairman and the Chiefs.

I would not go so far as to say that only CINCs should be selected to be Chairman. I don't think that is right. But I do think it is important that they have had successful joint duty.

Senator DENTON. Considering the high level commands you have been in over the years—well, you have been Deputy Chief of Staff for personnel, and that is 12 years ago—would it have occurred to you in the many things that you have been thinking about how we might improve the joint thinking? Other than by actually assigning people to joint staffs, is there anything we could do within the educational system? For example, there is the Army Command and Staff School, the Army War College. You can get officers of the other services into the War College. I don't know what is the status today, but they didn't teach you about the Army at the Naval War College, and yet I think they could have and maybe should have.

As you know, I was coming out of the Armed Forces Staff College, and that is all we did do. We got a very small percentage of the officers, and it just seems to me that there is an increment of availability within the curricula of the various schools at almost every level at which we could inject a bit more jointness so that we would not be ignorant, we would not have ignorance added to our bias, which comes from loyalty. At least that increment of bias and ignorance would be subtracted.

Is there anything that you can think of that we might do to improve things by educational addition of joint instruction?

General ROGERS. First, I would say we should be more diligent in where we assign those who have been to joint schools, such as the Armed Forces Staff College and the National Defense University, the Industrial College, to be sure that a person who has been to one of those schools gets joint duty. But there is a place, Senator, in my opinion, even though the curricula in those schools are very crowded, for additional instruction on joint service. I would say that, as a minimum, it should start at all staff college levels and not just at the Armed Forces Staff College, and be continued to the next senior level.

Senator DENTON. So there could be some kind of curriculum segment at each of the staff colleges and perhaps at each of the war colleges?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Maybe, say, what—10 percent or 5 percent?

General ROGERS. Oh, I would make it more than that. Just off the top of my head, I would be thinking in terms of something like 20 to 25 percent. That is going to be awfully difficult to do because of all the things that are crammed into the curricula, and oftentimes you have the desire to get a degree from a university (or some students do) that is offered at the same time.

So they are very busy and where the Commandants would cut, I am not sure. It varies, again, by who is in charge—not in charge at the school, but who is in charge within the service itself, whether or not there is going to be more or less of a joint aspect reflected in that school.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir. My time is up.

All of us like to say that we have to leave because we are on our way to the White House. I am to be photographed with the National March of Dimes Poster Child from Alabama.

General ROGERS. Congratulations.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Senator.

The distinguished Senator from Michigan.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join my colleagues in an expression of respect for you, General Rogers, and your integrity. You have a reputation for candor and bluntness and you have not done a thing today to diminish that reputation, I want you to know. We admire you for it.

You have indicated that on certain assumptions you would make certain recommendations, and you have repeated the assumptions quite clearly—assuming we want to increase jointness in the Joint Chiefs, and assuming we want to increase jointness in the power of the CINCs, this is how we might do it.

Would you recommend that we increase the jointness at the Joint Chiefs level?

General ROGERS. My assumption was related to enhancing the authority of the Chairman, Senator, and enhancing the authority of the Chiefs. I listed those things that in my opinion the Congress must do.

With respect to the question of the jointness of the Joint Chiefs——

Senator LEVIN. My question is do you share the assumption?

General ROGERS. I share the assumptions. I think your objective is correct. Yes, sir.

But I do not think the political art of the possible will permit you to fully achieve that objective, for reasons that became obvious as I went down my list, I think.

Senator LEVIN. Putting aside the political impediments, these are good goals, then?

General ROGERS. I think it would be very difficult to eliminate the service Secretaries. But, as I said, I am a captive of my experience from 6½ years in Western Europe, where the last one to move from having ministers of state for the various services, elected parliamentarians, members of the House of Commons, was the United Kingdom. The U.K. has found, despite the criticisms from the then-chiefs of staff, that that reorganization was in fact helpful in achieving the kind of objective that you all are looking for.

Senator LEVIN. Just so that we are clear, your testimony is based on assumptions and you share the desirability of those assumptions?

General ROGERS. I do.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

General ROGERS. Sir, may I just inject so that it is not lost on anybody here, that I have not yet said I recommend the elimination of the service Secretaries.

Senator LEVIN. But you have come pretty close.

General ROGERS. I am saying that if you wish to achieve the objectives—and I have agreed with those objectives—that has to be done, otherwise the channel for the POMs and the budget for going forward and the impact of their being integrated by the Chairman of the JCS will be lost. Thereby, you will not get the CINCs' participation in the resource allocation that I think all of us are looking for.

Senator LEVIN. Relative to the Joint Chiefs, I understand your testimony to be that we ought to have a Deputy Chairman who is number two in rank.

Do we expect the service Chiefs to represent their services or the good of the whole at the Joint Chiefs' meetings, when they are wearing their Joint Chief's hats? What is our expectation? What are they able to do?

General **Rogers**. We do expect them to lay aside their approach to their services and look at each area into which they delve from a standpoint of what is best for the Nation. I suspect that every group of Joint Chiefs has felt that they have been able to do that.

Certainly we thought we were able to do it when I was a member of the JCS some years ago, and I know this group of Chiefs does.

What happens, though, is that the problems, the issues, the differences, are all submerged in the very ponderous system that we have, in the flimsy, the buff, the green stages. I don't need to review that procedure for this group.

But that is where the differences are papered over and that is where tradeoffs are made, so that, when the paper comes to the Joint Chiefs, there is not much cause for difference in most instances.

This is why I found relatively few split papers. I also found that the language to which we would agree certainly would not stand scrutiny from a major in English literature and composition. Oftentimes there is sufficient ambiguity in it so that it meant everything to everybody.

Senator **Levin**. Do we expect too much, then, when we expect service Chiefs to lay aside their service interests at the Joint Chiefs level? Is it realistic to ask them to do that in every case?

General **Rogers**. I don't think we are expecting too much. I don't think you are going to get much more than you are getting right now.

I suspect that Admiral Crowe testified this morning that he was very comfortable when he became the Chairman to find that there were nonparochial views taken by his colleagues. So was I when I became a Chief. And much of it depends, Senator, upon the Chairman. If a Chairman says OK, we split the paper, but let's at least get two good positions going forward, the majority and the minority position, the Chiefs will split the paper and send it forward.

There have been other Chairmen—and my experience runs back in this instance to 1958—who would lock the door of the tank and not let them out until they had gotten language agreed so that there would never be a split paper.

So, much depends upon the individual Chairman. We should not lose sight of the fact that there are two types of actions that we are really talking about.

If you are talking about operational actions, you will find that the advice is crisp, you will find that it is timely, you will find that it is pointed, that it is germane, that it is understandable. I think anybody would be satisfied with that.

If you are talking about the more routine papers that have to be considered by the joint system and eventually some by the Joint Chiefs, that system is very ponderous, the language is not crisp, it does not move, even under pressure, as fast as one would like, and it does not give the kind of results that I think most Chiefs would be proud of.

Now I am speaking of back in my day.

Senator **Levin**. Why is that?

General ROGERS. It is because when the action is introduced into the joint staff, the first thing the action officers do is to go to their services and ask what is the service position. That is in the flimsy stage. It comes back, and then there are the meetings, and there are tradeoffs. The same thing occurs, or did occur—I am sure it still does—in the buff, when it reaches the colonel level, and then up in the green, when it reaches the operational deps level. By that time, most of the issues have been eliminated by tradeoffs, by finding that, "my Chief will accept this if your Chief will accept that." Or it is something like, "I am sure my Chief will accept that and I am assuming he will accept this." That goes on until you get to the Chiefs where differences have been submerged in the language and they all can agree on it.

Now I have found, from 1948, Senator, until 1979, that that was the case. If there has been major change in the functioning of the joint staff on that particular type of action, it has occurred within the last 6½ years, since I have been gone.

Senator LEVIN. If—is that what you said—if?

Senator ROGERS. Yes, sir, if. The current Chiefs would have to testify to that.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up.

Thank you.

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, we are glad to have you here.

General ROGERS. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I am very pleased to see you again.

I have just two brief questions.

The committee's staff study recommends that the stature of the unified commanders should be increased by making them more senior in order of rank than the service Chiefs. This recommendation is based upon the view that the responsibilities of the unified commanders are more important than those of the service Chiefs.

Do you believe that the unified commanders should be more senior in order of rank than the service Chiefs?

General ROGERS. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, as you know, unity of command has historically been an important principle of war. The staff study concludes that the Department of Defense has taken an ambivalent approach to the concept of unity of command.

The question is do you believe that the organizational arrangements for the unified commands fully apply the concept of unity of command?

General ROGERS. It does if it is permitted to function as it is laid out.

Where we CINCs have problems is when there are orders in operational matters given directly from Washington to elements of our component commands and we don't know about it. That varies by service. Some services have a greater proclivity of picking up the phone or the radio or what have you and sending directives right down to my operational commands at a fairly low level, thereby short-circuiting my headquarters. But it has not been unique with any one service.

I think I have—let me rephrase that. I would like to think that I have that aspect of my position, my assignment, under control. But one can never know.

So, what I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that if the system is permitted to function as laid out in the Unified Action Armed Forces without that kind of short-circuiting of the CINCs headquarters in operational matters, to me there are no major changes that need to be made to that JCS Pub 2.

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, do you believe that the concept of "in support of" forces, traditionally used by U.S. Naval Forces, is consistent with the concept of unity of command?

Senator ROGERS. Well, sir, it is not only used in the Navy lexicon. Just assume that some kind of contingency, not large, might arise today. We would expect to get a directive, orders for action to execute, from the President by the way of the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, the first paragraph of which reads, "The Secretary of Defense has directed that the following be done," and it would then designate a "supported" command and also the other "supporting" commanders.

That means something to us CINCs. If you are designated a "supported" commander, you know you are in charge of the operation, and all the other CINCs have to support you and you have to work very closely and coordinate with them to insure that they provide the support you need at the appropriate time.

That kind of language does not cause me any problem. In fact, I look for it right at the tag end of each of those kinds of directive messages, to find out who is in charge.

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, I have another conflict now. I must go and I will ask Senator Nunn to finish up this hearing.

I was just wondering this. You have had a vast experience at all levels of command. Do you feel you could give us a brief summary of your recommendations? You have given very splendid testimony and it has been exploratory. Could you give us a brief resume—and you can send it to us, you don't have to do it now—so that the members, who are so busy right now and have so much to read, can perhaps have it succinctly in one page or two. They probably would not be able to read 20 or 30 pages.

Could you do that?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. I think I have it reduced to two pages, and I will leave it for you when we finish the testimony.

Senator THURMOND. That will be fine.

[The information referred to follows:]

CINCEUR'S VIEW OF ACTIONS REQUIRED

1. Personnel Actions Related to Joint Services:

a. Joint Duty Skill Identifier but not Joint Duty career field.

b. Recurrent tours for successful joint service officers.

c. Periodic return to parent Service.

d. Strengthen requirement for successful joint duty for promotion to flag rank. (How define "successful"?)

e. Disproportionate selection rate for promotion boards for those officers with successful joint duty.

f. Choose CINCs from those with successful joint duty.

g. Choose CJCS/Chiefs from those with successful joint duty.

2. Re CJCS:

a. CJCS to integrate service POMs/budgets, with major input from CINCs, and submits integrated results to SECDEF.

b. Put in Chain of Command.

c. Principal Military Advisor, taking into account Chief's views if time permits.

d. Joint staff works for CJCS.

e. Have true Deputy CJCS (Senior to JCS/acting CJCS when CJCS gone/not dual hatted as DJS).

f. CJCS should not have a personnel management system for all joint duty.

3. Re CINCs:

a. To correct disconnect between CINCs' Contingency plans and Service force development plans, change law to read: "Military departments are responsible to man, organize, equip, train, and support forces for joint/combined warfighting in accordance with requirements of CINCs' operational plans."

b. Major CINC input to CJCS as latter integrates services POMs/budgets.

c. If 3a and 3b above not agreed, then institutionalize current DRB procedures: CINC appearances before DRB; CINC provide Integrated Priority List to DRB members and component commanders; direct coordination between CINCs and Services.

d. Re UNAAF, give CINCs option of how they want to exercise command during any contingency, i.e., through component commanders, or joint task force, or other means.

e. As general principle, CINC, and not NCA, should command any operation in his theater.

f. Tighten linkage between Services' resource/support responsibilities and CINC's operational responsibility.

4. Re OSD:

a. SECDEF organize OSD as he sees fit.

5. Other:

a. Retain JCS—no JMAC.

b. Eliminate Service Secretaries (Alternative have an Under SECDEF for each service).

c. Failing 5b, integrate Secretariat staffs with military department staffs, except Legislative Liaison and Public Affairs.

d. Combine programming/budgeting process.

e. Biennial budgets.

f. OSD senior staff comprised of long tenure professionals.

g. Eliminate (reduce) Congressional/OSD micromanagement of Services.

h. Provide CJCS and CINCs with adequate/appropriate PPBS Staff capability.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, and good luck to you.

General ROGERS. It's nice to see you again, sir.

Senator NUNN [presiding]. General Rogers, you mentioned strengthening the CINCs and you gave us your overall framework that would strengthen the Chairman and so forth. But if you were trying to strengthen the CINCs vis-a-vis the components, is there anything else specifically that you would do? You identified as one of the big problems having people in Washington basically issue operational orders that never even go through you and you are the commander.

How do you avoid that?

General ROGERS. Well, they issue directives.

It does become a little disturbing when one finds that someone in Washington has told the wing commander on an aircraft carrier to start his engines for an operation for which I bore the responsibility.

It did come as a bit of a concern to me to find those kinds of things happening, but that is not an isolated instance that I am talking about.

Senator NUNN. Then it happens frequently, do you mean?

General ROGERS. Well, it happened too much, until I met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and said "that as of this day, there will be no more reporting directly back to Washington by any element within my command on operational matters which does not go through European Command Headquarters, nor will there be any guidance, directive, or any other action with respect to operational matters going to my subordinate commanders in the theater without going through the European Command. I expect today that my commanders, if that should occur, will advise me that it has occurred."

I have had considerable loyalty from commanders in that regard, some of whom have been retired early, I think, as a consequence.

Those kinds of things bother me, Senator, because it is not only we who have to play by the rules of the game as CINCs, but so does Washington. I am not talking just about the Pentagon. There are many agencies in Washington, which, with the communications we have today, have the capability to reach way down.

Senator NUNN. Do you mean to say that some of your own people, your component commanders have been retired because they did not follow operational orders that circumvented the chain of command?

General ROGERS. It's hard for me to prove, Senator, but I think that had a part to play, because of their loyalty to their CINC.

All I am saying is Washington has to play the game as well as we in the field. You cannot have the authority of the CINC being circumvented in that manner when he bears the responsibility.

Senator NUNN. Are the Joint Chiefs backing you on this now?

General ROGERS. Yes, they do.

Senator NUNN. Does the Secretary of Defense back you on this?

General ROGERS. I did not have to raise it to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator NUNN. I assume that wasn't the problem, then.

General ROGERS. That was not the problem.

Senator NUNN. So there is nothing in legislation that you think will address that problem?

General ROGERS. No, sir. I would not want you to put it into legislation. We need to sort that out ourselves and learn how to play the game properly. But you see, you asked me the question, was there anything in the relationship with the CINCs, in the system, which caused problems, and that does cause a problem for some of us. But I am hopeful that I have that under control.

Senator NUNN. What is your personal assessment of the quality and usefulness of the joint strategic planning document as well as the defense guidance?

General ROGERS. We used to like to think that the JSPD had a part to play. It depends upon who receives it and whether or not they read it. I think you have had testimony here to indicate that there have been occasions in the past where that document and others did not receive much attention.

There is the joint program assessment memorandum (JPAM) which can assist in the development of guidance if it is written in a manner that can be assimilated and then become a part of that defense guidance. That is the joint strategic planning document that I am talking about.

On the JPAM, as you know, that is the Chiefs' assessment of the adequacy of the POMs. I think the assessment that the CINCs given on the adequacy of the POMs as far as their theater is concerned is equally as important. Let me give you some examples.

It causes concern in a CINCs mind to see new units being organized which will exacerbate problems we already have and have not solved—specifically the short-fall of combat service support personnel.

Now, if additional combat units are organized, that means additional combat service support personnel should also be organized.

I, as the CINCEUR, and it affects me as the SACEUR, am very concerned about that because we don't have sufficient combat service support forces to support our forward deployed forces in Europe at the present time. So the CINC must ask the question should we form new organizations that need additional combat service support when we do not have enough already?

It is because of the CINCs now having their voices heard on the assessment of POMs and budgets that those kind of issues now are being resolved. That is very helpful.

Another is air and sea lift, strategic lift so important to us in Europe for our reinforcements. This is another opportunity for us, as CINCs, to have our voices heard in the Defense Resources Board. It is very helpful. Sometimes the results are more gratifying than at other times after our voices have been heard, but at least we have our day in court.

Senator NUNN. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have described some confusion over the operational orders that were given to some of your components at one time which you have straightened out now with the Joint Chiefs presumably. Do you know whether any other CINCs had similar problems?

General ROGERS. I don't know, sir.

Senator LEVIN. You have not discussed that issue with other CINCs?

General ROGERS. No, sir. I have not.

Senator LEVIN. Relative to the chain of command between the CINC and the Secretary of Defense, is there any ambiguity in that chain of command now, either up to the Secretary of Defense or down from the Secretary of Defense to the CINC?

General ROGERS. There is some ambiguity and some confusion for those of us out in the field because we know that by Defense Department directive, the Joint Chiefs are the group through whom orders, directives, are sent to us. When we have problems with those directives or we have questions about them and so on, the next person in the chain of command above us is the Secretary of Defense. But we find it appropriate to solve our problems, get our questions answered and so on, either between the joint staff and our European Command staff or from the Deputy CINC or me talking to the Chairman and getting responses.

That is the way it generally works.

I would prefer to see, as I mentioned, the Chairman in the chain of command so that there is no confusion at all. I just happen to believe that, when a contingency arises in which there has to be considerable activity, that general guidance would come from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman and within that guidance the Secretary of Defense would let the Chairman do what is necessary in order to carry out the objective of the government. In fact, I would think that, under the pressure of the time of war, that is the way it would have to happen.

When one comes back to the staff, through staff channels, or when one comes back to the Chairman from the CINC or the D-CINC, the problem that we have is recognized very quickly and attention is directed to it and we get the answer very quickly. That is all part of the crisp response, timely responses, during operations of that kind.

Senator LEVIN. I am deeply troubled by that ambiguity, I must tell you, and the fact it is acknowledged so candidly by you is very helpful. Whether there is consensus on a solution is a different problem. But at least the fact that there is an ambiguity which really should be resolved somehow or other before we are in a situation where it does us harm I think is very, very useful indeed.

I would like to ask you about the authority of the CINCs.

You have given us some testimony today. I have tried to follow it and I think I have. But if I am duplicating anything forgive me. It is a critically important question.

Senator Warner indicated I believe earlier that we were told this morning by Admiral Crowe that we will be getting some recommendations in 6 months. We have urged him to expedite that so that we can have the benefit of those recommendations.

You have given us some recommendations I believe today as well, and perhaps you would be willing to expand on them in writing for the record. I would solicit the specifics, any additional specifics that you may have, if you would be willing to submit those to us.

General ROGERS. Sir, I think I have squeezed all the blood out of old Bernie's turnip that I can on this one. I will leave my summary document with you when I go.

Senator LEVIN. All right. Thank you.

Let me ask you one question which I do not believe you have addressed. It has to do with court martial authority.

Do you feel that the CINCs should have court martial jurisdiction over the component elements of your command?

General ROGERS. No, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Have you seen the Georgetown study relative to the power of the CINCs?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Do the comments which you are going to leave with us address the specific recommendations of the study?

General ROGERS. Not that study, No. sir.

I have based my position on both the staff study that was done for the committee and the House bill. I have related my position on the key issues of both of those with some additional suggestions. But it does not address specifically the Georgetown study.

Senator LEVIN. Because the Georgetown study is in such specific terms, I would then ask the staff if they would share this with you, if that is all right, Mr. Chairman, and then ask you to comment for the record on the specific recommendations of the Georgetown study, to the extent they do not overlap the comments that you have already made.

There would be some overlap, obviously, but I think there is also some new material in there and we would appreciate your comments on that.

Senator NUNN. Why don't we get staff to just address the new items that are not duplicative and put that in the form of a letter to General Rogers. That way you won't have to go through it all.

Senator LEVIN. That would be great.

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

[The Georgetown Study was not provided to General Rogers. No letter received.]

Senator LEVIN. Do I have time for one more question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Admiral Crowe this morning testified that he is aware, of course—I am now reading his testimony—that "the dual responsibilities of the Chiefs are, on occasion, difficult to fulfill." Previously, in response to my questions, you indicated that to a large extent the differences were worked out by tradeoff prior to the time the issues get to the Chiefs. But now I want to focus again on the Chiefs because the Chairman did indicate that he is aware that dual responsibilities of the Chiefs are, on occasion, difficult for them to fulfill. So there must be some problems which get to their level which are not resolved.

My question is this. In your experience, when those kinds of differences get to the level of the Chiefs and have not been previously resolved, are there occasions where the service interest is represented? Maybe to put it in a different way let me say that I start with a different assumption. Let me give you my assumption.

I assume, like the Congress represents the interests of states and districts, the service Chiefs represent the interests of their services. As a matter of fact, I want them to, to be perfectly blunt with you. I believe in advocacy. I think people ought to represent something and stand for something and the chips then kind of fall where they may and then you try to work it out.

But I assume that going into a meeting they are going to represent what they know best and what they are sworn by law to represent outside of that meeting, which is the interest of their service.

It is realistic to assume that as soon as they walk into a meeting of the Joint Chiefs, that the service Chiefs suddenly just throw off the hats of their service and just put on their national hat? Is that realistic? Assuming we want them to do that, is it realistic to assume that they can do it?

General ROGERS. It is difficult for them, as the Chairman commented, and particularly when a Chief has approved a certain position within his department and then goes to the Joint Chiefs and convinces himself that he should change that position in the national interest; he then has to go back to his staff. I have heard this on occasion with other Chiefs and with me. They will say why the old man caved in, you see; you have to massage his backbone; you have to make him more firm. As one Army Chief said, he got a note from a major passed to his Ops Deps, his lieutenant general who was sitting next to him in one of the Chiefs' meetings. The Ops Deps started to chuckle and the Chief leaned over to him and asked what's so funny. The Ops Deps said: "I got this note from the major. It says that if the Chief starts to give on such and such, fight him to the death." [Laughter.]

So it is difficult.

But again, I want to underscore the fact that much depends on the leadership that is exercised by the Chairman. I had two Chairmen when I was with the JCS. One took the position: All right, we don't agree, let's tell them where we don't agree and why. I had another one who said let's don't send up any split papers. You get better advice with the first case, even though you are abdicating your responsibility for the decision to OSD. But the advice is better in the first instance than it is in the second, in my opinion.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you again, General.

Senator **Nunn**. General, I have just a few more questions.

I think you have been very clear that you believe a Deputy Chairman should be the number two man. Is that right?

General **Rogers**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Nunn**. What would happen if we made him number six? The service Chiefs were unanimous in saying that he ought to be the number six man, we have a Deputy Chairman, but he would be junior to all the Chiefs. The reason they say that is they said they think it helps jointness for them to each serve for 3 months and that they can get a joint perspective by doing that.

How do you respond to that?

General **Rogers**. Well, I could not pass judgment on what they have said with respect to how it affects them. I just do not happen to believe that that kind of on-the-job training for Chiefs has that much impact. But that is just my personal opinion, as they have theirs.

If you make him number six, you are not changing anything, in my opinion.

Senator **Nunn**. You are just taking the Director of the joint staff and giving him some stars.

General **Rogers**. Or the assistant to the Chairman and giving him a fourth star and calling him the Vice Chairman of the JCS. I just do not think you are changing anything.

But I believe from three aspects it is important to have a Deputy, who is number two. One is from the Chief's aspect. From my experience, you cannot do both jobs at the same time and do them as credibly as you would if you did not have to do both at the same time, if they are as busy as they are, from my experience.

Second, from a CINCs viewpoint, we need somebody whom we know is going to give cross-service views, and not "wind testers," but somebody who is going to represent us in the agencies while the Chairman is gone.

The third aspect is that of the Chairman himself. I would just think if I put myself in his shoes—and he will have to speak for himself on this—that he would prefer to insure that his cross-service views that will be well-known to his Deputy, are, in fact, presented not just among the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their meetings, but in the other forums around Washington.

Sir, if one looks at all the things I have suggested be done, I think the three key issues as far as the Chairman is concerned are a number two Deputy, who would do the things we have described:

econd, putting the Chairman in the chain of command; and, third, having the joint staff work for him. He can reduce the ponderousness of the system. He can at least I think reduce one level of attention of those routine normal papers that I talked about. And, it enhances his position as being the man who, for the Secretary would run any operations that might arise.

I would suggest also, if I might, in this connection, that if you want to enhance the authority of the CINCs, you have to give them a greater voice in insuring that what the services do in the nonoperational area is coincident with what the CINCs need. That is why I suggested the change in the language of the law, to cause the services to raise the armies and train them and so on, having in view the CINCs operational requirements.

If you want us to get more into the allocation of resources, and, as I mentioned earlier, to enhance that linkage between services' responsibility for resources and support and the operational requirements of the CINCs, the only way I can figure to do that is to have the Chairman integrate the POMs and the budgets with major input from the CINCs, and then that integrated POM and budget to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense.

That is why my suggestion was in order to do that, consideration would have to be given to what role the service Secretary plays, there the options run from elimination to making the Under Secretaries or, as I mentioned, at least as a minimum combining the secretarial staff with the staff of the military departments.

That is what needs to be done if the CINCs are going to play a much greater role. Otherwise, the fall-back position, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion is to insure that the progress that has been made by this administration, by Secretary Weinberger, Jack Vessey and now Bill Crowe, is, in fact, formalized either in legislation—which is not necessary but which would insure that another administration will not change it—or institutionalize it, as Secretary Taft has directed be done within DOE. As I understand it, he has directed that it be institutionalized. In this way, the CINCs voice will at least be heard, even though it may just be "as galley slaves coming up for air," as one witness has descirbed it. At least our voice will be heard.

Senator NUNN. On the UNAAF or JCS Publication 2, you said that, by and large, it did not need much changing. Are there changes in it that you would point out need to be made?

General ROGERS. I think the one that I would like to see made is that which relates to how command will be exercised by unified commanders.

Senator NUNN. Is that the one which starts off "operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the service component commanders," and so forth?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Everything it gives in the first sentence it takes away in the third one, and muddles completely beyond interpretation in the fourth one. It looks to me like it is not interpretable.

General ROGERS. There is a statement in the UNAAF which says that unified commanders can organize joint task forces from forces of component commanders which would report directly to the unified commander. In fact, we used that in Lebanon later on—by this

I mean in 1984—to create a Lebanon Joint Task Force directly under European Command, which bypassed the normal chain of command. Under those conditions, since we were able to keep the chain of command fully informed, it caused no problem.

What I would like to have would be a little greater flexibility as to how I commanded, and not be directed, as that does direct me, through service component commanders.

Senator NUNN. So if you wanted to form a small unit that could be ready across service lines to go into action with bypassing the component commands, you would be able to do so?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Do you think that you cannot do so now, or is it just a matter of not being certain?

General ROGERS. To form the joint task force, as I indicated, we would have to come back here. I do not fault that because of the language. We should come back here to get that approved by the Secretary of Defense, as we did with the Lebanon Joint Task Force.

Senator NUNN. In other words, you would take this paragraph and rework it?

General ROGERS. I would rework that one. That is the only one that comes to mind at the moment, Mr. Chairman.

Let me make another point.

I have had no problem with service component commanders in my command. You see, they wear two hats, and it is unique with the theater to which I am assigned. The Commander-in-Chief U.S. Navy Europe is also the CINC south in the NATO chain, which I command in peacetime as SACEUR. The Commander-in-Chief U.S. Air Forces Europe is also the Commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe, which is a command in Allied Command Europe chain. The Commander-in-Chief U.S. Army Europe is also the Commander of Central Army Group, which is in the chain of command with me at the top as the SACEUR.

So, not only are the component commanders of mine in the U.S. European Command chain, but they also are subordinate commanders of mine in the Allied Command Europe peacetime and wartime chain of command.

Since I have been there, we meet every month, we work out our problems, we hammer out under the European troop strength ceiling for instance how we are going to stay under the ceiling, which units are going to be sent home, who is going to be affected. We hammer those out together, and we don't have any particular problems.

I want to underscore one other thing: the importance of getting the feedback from the chain of command, from seasoned, highly experienced commanders, whose judgments you value. You get that from your component commanders.

If tonight we had a contingency that I would have to draw on all component commanders' forces to deal with, we have the communications through the satellite communications system so that we can go down through the chain of command with a single transmission and anybody who disagrees with what we suggest can enter the net. So the passing of directives and guidance down moves quite rapidly. It is not as ponderous as one might imagine, when you see all of these levels and you think it has to go through all of them. But not on an operation—it does not work that way. It works much more efficiently than most people realize.

Senator NUNN. There is one other question I have.

Secretary Weinberger's letter of December 2 indicates that the Department of Defense would support a proposal authorizing the Secretary of Defense to use the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the Secretary's agent in supervising the unified and specified commanders.

Would this be a good idea?

What would be the relationships as you view that proposal?

General ROGERS. Well, I would prefer he be a commander in the chain of command, which would even be a stronger position for him.

I think if he were in the chain of command, his authority to supervise would be greater than under the language which you just read.

Senator NUNN. You are saying chain of command and not channel of command?

General ROGERS. Chain of command.

Senator NUNN. There have been several witnesses who testified that we ought to put the Chairman in the channel of command but not in the chain of command.

General ROGERS. He should be in the chain of command, sir, and I have believed that since 1958.

Senator NUNN. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Would that include the right to initiate orders?

General ROGERS. Yes, it would, instead of having that first paragraph say "the Secretary of Defense has directed." But no Chairman is going to go off on his own and issue orders to do something without talking to his boss.

As I visualize it, in a fast-moving situation, the Secretary of Defense, who is the agent of the Commander-in-Chief, would agree with the Chairman on a broad course of action. He would then let the Chairman implement that course without the Chairman having to go back to the Secretary of Defense to move every individual ship, or every individual unit, as has been testified by others is now the case. I know that it occurs under the current conditions.

If we organize ourselves in peacetime as we have to be in time of war and then adjust or modify for peacetime, if that is a principle, which happens to be one of mine, then I believe he should be in the chain of command.

Senator LEVIN. I only have one other question and it relates to your story about the component wing commander who got the direct operational order from Washington.

Was that a true incident?

General ROGERS. Sir, I would not have said it if it had not been.

Senator LEVIN. I wasn't sure if you were giving that as a hypothetical, that you would be upset if that happened. You are saying that actually happened?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. There was no hypothesis to that one.

Senator LEVIN. Well, that came as a shock to me. I'm sure it came as a shock to you, too.

General ROGERS. Well, one cannot do business that way if he bears the responsibility and his authority is being diluted by those in Washington, who fail to play the game as it should be.

Senator NUNN. Was the order carried out without going through you?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. But we got it under control before anything happened.

Senator NUNN. Before it was actually carried out, do you mean?

General ROGERS. No.

Senator NUNN. Do you mean that the order actually was carried out and then you found out about it?

General ROGERS. Well, the order was carried out, but it stopped at that point. Nothing further occurred after that.

But I add again, Senator, that I think this is under control. The Chiefs, after our meeting, have given me full support in that area. And, as far as I know, the headquarters at Stuttgart is not being short-circuited, either going down or going up.

Senator NUNN. How long has that been under control, General Rogers?

General ROGERS. Almost 2 years.

Senator LEVIN. You had better hurry back. [Laughter.]

Senator NUNN. Do you have anything else you would like to offer in the way of suggestions in this area this afternoon?

You have been very complete in giving your views, but I don't want to leave any of them on the table here.

General ROGERS. Well, I am suggesting that things be done which have not been suggested with respect to enhancing the authority of the CINCs because you have not had presented to you, in my opinion, anything which will enhance that authority. What you have been presented is rhetoric. But I have not seen, in reading the testimony, or at least the reports of the testimony, and in reading the prepared statements through this morning, anything that would, in fact, do what you want to do.

Senator NUNN. It seems to me that your two main suggestions along that line were that the operational plans of the CINCs be the basis or the foundation on which resources are planned back in Washington—by law, I assume.

General ROGERS. By law, that they be responsible to do all the things they are supposed to with the forces for joint combined warfighting in accordance with the CINCs' operational requirements. That gives the CINCs a much greater part to play and a much greater means to get our requirements fulfilled by services.

But, tied to that is the Chairman integrating the POMs and the budgets with major CINC input, and presenting that, then, to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator NUNN. Institutionalizing what you say is already the practice there?

General ROGERS. That is not the practice.

The Chairman of JCS does not integrate. The JPAM is pointed to as, in fact, being the integrator of the POMs. What it is is what it says. It is joint program assessment memorandum, and it is constructed by the Joint Chiefs. I am saying that the Chairman should do it himself, as the cross-service representative of the CINCs, and do it with major CINC input, and present it to the Secretary of Defense. And then, when I asked myself the question what then happens to the service Secretaries in all of this, I thought that some consideration had to be given to what role they really should play. I say, ad nauseum, that I do that against the backdrop of European nations who have gotten rid of that level of supervision, or that level of cognizance, and have moved to a more streamlined organization where you do, in fact, have some chiefs of defense who have directive authority. For example, the Chief of Defense of our allied nation can say to the Chief of the Air Staff: "You will not buy any more sophisticated third generation aircraft until you have purchased the ammunition, the air-to-air munitions, and the electronic communications equipment necessary to exploit the capability of the third generation aircraft you already have."

Senator NUNN. But that would make too much sense. [Laughter.]

General ROGERS. Well, I am not suggesting that we go that far. You know, it is the art of the possible.

Senator LEVIN. That's a radical proposal.

General ROGERS. I know it is. But it exists over there and it varies by nation.

Senator NUNN. Do you mean flying the world's most sophisticated aircraft with World War II munitions, huh. [Laughter.]

General ROGERS. Well, I have a major interest in that. As I have said to this committee before, one of our major deficiencies is in that area, air-to-air munitions.

Senator NUNN. I agree completely.

Senator LEVIN. May I thank the general for a refreshing afternoon, to use my staff's word back here, before I run off.

Thank you, general.

General ROGERS. Thank you, sir.

I hope I have the opportunity to come back again.

Senator LEVIN. In what sense do you mean?

General ROGERS. Oh, I will just leave it at that. [Laughter.]

Senator NUNN. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

General Rogers, let me welcome you here. You are one of our favorites because you talk straight from the shoulder and we appreciate that.

I apologize for not being here earlier. If you think you have problems over there in Europe, we have problems with agriculture right here in America, and I have been tied with that this afternoon. So I apologize for not being here from the beginning.

I think most of the key questions have been asked, but let me try one or two on you. If you have gone into this in any great detail, I can read the record and will not take your time.

In your opinion, is the present structure of the seven unified and three specified commands and their division of responsibilities strategically sound?

Would you add, delete, or make any changes in those organizations or their specific responsibilities?

General ROGERS. I can only speak from the unified command side with which I am familiar.

You are addressing yourself specifically to structure, then?

Senator EXON. Well, let me broaden it a little bit. I don't mean personnel.

Let me throw it open. What changes would you at least recommend that we consider from your vast background and experience in this whole area, if any? What changes, if any?

General Rogers. Well, I would think—I really don't want to answer this one in open session because it gets into unified command plans.

I think very careful consideration must be given, once again, to the unified command plan, more than just the usual review every year or two, to really decide whether or not that command plan divides up the world as it should to achieve the goals of this country.

I really would like to leave it at that, Senator, in open session.

Within a unified command and the organization of the unified command, I have no great problems with that today. When one talks about structure within the theater for operational requirements, I do have some difficulty, and that is what the services have provided in order for us to carry out our operational responsibilities. I do have some problem there.

I have discussed that a little earlier, sir.

But I do not have any major suggestions for change within the unified command plan. We talked about operational command and how you issue your operational command and directives. That is one change that I would like to see made in Pub 2. But that really does not address your question.

Senator Exon. General, thank you.

Are you familiar with the bill in the House of Representatives with regard to special operations forces and the possibility that serious consideration is being given to total restructuring of our special operation forces that I know you have a great deal to do with, to the extent that maybe we would be required to appoint a new Assistant Secretary that would head up these special operations, and we would pull the Delta and other special operations forces out of their present structure and place them under a new structure that supposedly would be in a position to respond more adequately to terrorists and other types of activities where we would normally apply special operations forces?

What is your view of that? Do you think it has any merit?

General Rogers. Well, it had merit, I would say, Senator, a few years ago. But personally I think that problem has been solved.

I do not think that that idea has merit today. I think we ought to leave it as it is.

We have a Joint Special Operations Command. I hope to visit them very shortly. They are a specialized command that we need with the dynamics of the environment in today's world. But that is more of a peacetime responsibility that they have to carry out, than a wartime responsibility.

I would not want anything done to affect what we already have implemented within the system, with a good command, organized under the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deal with these relatively small actions around the world, terrorist or what have you, in peacetime. I certainly would not want anything done that would impact on the area of how we would use our special operational forces, our special forces, some of which are committed to me as the SACEUR in time of war. I would not want to have to cut through additional levels of authority.

So, how do I come out on that: leave it like it is today.

Senator EXON. Is there anything you can tell us in open session about your involvement in the recent operation with regard to the Egyptian aircraft that was seized by terrorists?

There have been a lot of news stories about some of our forces being deployed in that general area.

Is there any comment you can make on that in open session?

General ROGERS. I would not like to get into it in open session, Senator. I think I had better leave it at that.

Senator EXON. That's good enough.

I have one last question.

How much involved are you, as one of our important commanders, in the budget-making process? I know that you have been here on many occasions and have given us many straight-forward answers to a lot of very difficult questions with regard to manpower, training, weaponry, and all those kinds of things. There was passed in the United States Senate yesterday the so-called Gramm-Rudman amendment which I am very fearful is going to be particularly devastating to our readiness forces. At least my experience has been—and correct me if you do not agree—that whenever we get into a budget tightening situation, procurement of the more exotic weapons seems to go right ahead and it is general readiness that generally suffers.

I guess what I am asking you is how much are you consulted with regard to these budget problems, and do you share my concern that we had better be on mark with regard to the basic readiness of our forces to withstand what I still believe sometimes might be a conventional attack of some kind by the Soviets or their surrogates, as opposed to our constant, legitimate, fear of a nuclear exchange?

General ROGERS. With respect to the CINCs involvement in the programming and budgetary process, over the last 3½ or 4 years, under this administration, we have had the opportunity to go to the Defense Resources Board and present our case. For me, it is usually to lay out my priorities to the Defense Resources Board so it can take them into account when the time comes that they have to make the final cut in the budget, so that they can look to see what is more important in the European theater over something else, as they put all the theaters together.

That is very important to us.

But it has been expanded so that we now provide to the Deputy Secretary of Defense an integrated priority list, which I work out—and I am sure the other CINCs do—with the component commanders. We list such and such as the most important, and then, right on down, in order of priority, we hammer out the list. And we relate it to service programs.

So, if the Defense Resources Board is thinking about cutting a particular service program if they will cross reference that with the CINCs priority, they will see that it is either high or low and will hopefully take that into account.

In fact, they do take that into account.

So, we do get into the programming and budgeting through our current relationship with the DRB. That is the system that one of your witnesses described, as I said, as the galley slaves having the opportunity to come up on the deck to get air. But it is really more than that.

With respect to the Gramm-Rudman legislation, I know only enough about it to be dangerous. I do know if the Defense Department and its seven-twelfths of that $20 billion divided by two, or $5.8 billion, has to be found in the 1986 budget, it is going to come either out of manpower, or operations and maintenance, or probably both to get it from outlays in 1986.

What does this mean? It means either we are going to have to cut structure and, therefore, reduce the capability we have, which you won't want to do, or keep the structure and reduce the personnel we have, because that is where we recapture 98 percent in the first year of the dollar that is spent. Once again we would then have the structure but, as one former Chief described it, we would end up having a hollow Armed Forces as a consequence.

Operations and maintenance funds—they are the guts of our business. We use other funds for our training, for our maintenance programs, for a whole series of things. It is really the guts of our business.

If the Congress wishes to have a major adverse impact upon what we consider in Allied Command Europe and in European Command as the number one priority after people, which is readiness and sustainability, why you can do so by cutting our operation and maintenance funds for which we can't find much of a constituency in the Congress. But, even if we had a constituency, if you have to make cuts in outlays the first year of FYDP, there are only a very few pools of money where you can pull it from.

Senator EXON. Have you been requested for any initial requests for budget reductions in anticipation of what Gramm-Rudman will do to the very things you have talked about, in the next 90 days or so?

General ROGERS. Not yet. But I would anticipate it. My Deputy in the U.S. European Command at Stuttgart 10 days or 2 weeks ago sent a message back related to our integrated priority lists that we had submitted, which was based upon the budget estimate at that time, asking that we be notified as soon as possible so that we could play a part in the changes that might have to come from a reduction in the 1986 budget and that of 1987.

The short answer is not yet, but we expect we will he able to.

Senator EXON. But it's coming.

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. I really hope that people like you will keep us advised here.

I think we had better start looking into that. I am in favor of making some sacrifice in even major programs to protect, as best we can, basic readiness.

I have one last question.

We have been encouraging our allies for many years to have real 3-percent increase annually in their defense budgets. Have there been any repercussions from any of them or thoughts of concern when we seem to be going in the opposite direction ourselves, as a result of Gramm-Rudman, all of a sudden?

General ROGERS. Well, a big sigh of relief that maybe the pressure will now be off them from the United States; and then a more critical judgment exercised later that it is going to impact upon the ability of the United States to spread its security umbrella into Western Europe.

A 3-percent increase can be skewed, as this country has skewed it on one or two occasions in the past.

In SHAPE, we try to judge nations by their performance, that is, we judge nations' performances by how well they meet the force goals that they have accepted, and what percentage of those force goals were force proposals that we had made to them.

Let me explain that because I think it is key to understand this when you judge U.S. allies, and judge the United States as well.

SHAPE makes force proposals to nations every 2 years. Those force proposals are what we believe are the minimum requirement for an acceptable risk within Allied Command Europe, when you put all the force proposals of all nations together. We work with the nations and they accept certain proposals as force goals.

Now, the United States accepts a very high percentage of our force proposals as force goals. In the past, up until now at least the United States has had in its defense program a very high percentage of those force goals which it is implementing. Therefore it gets very high marks for its performance.

Now, it will probably have to eliminate some of those force goals, I am afraid, as a consequence of Gramm-Rudman.

But, take another country which is very proud of increasing its budget every year by a real 3.5 percent. But, when you look at its record one finds it accepted only 43 percent of our force proposals as its force goals and it is only implementing something like 80 percent of those goals. When you factor them together, it ends up that only about 34 percent of the requirements we felt necessasry for acceptable risk are being implemented by that country.

So, 3.5 percent or 3 percent does not mean much as an input unless the output is toward the collective security of Western Europe. The United States is doing pretty well there, you see, even though it is not going to have a 3-percent annual real increase in defense expenditures; whereas this other country with 3.5 percent looks pretty lousy as far as output is concerned.

Senator NUNN. The other big factor there, if I may interject, is 3 percent of what. What is the base? If you start with a small base, 3 percent per year is totally inadequate.

We do have a very large base.

General ROGERS. Absolutely.

This country that I was describing has started at quite a low base.

Senator NUNN. One percent of the present base is, I think, about 3 or 3.5 percent of what the base 4 years ago would have been.

General ROGERS. Yes.

Senator EXON. I suppose also you have difficulty, when you start dealing with numbers and percentages, with the fact that some of those nations have conscription and therefore lower manpower costs than some of the others.

Is that true?

General ROGERS. Well, to this particular nation that would not apply. They have conscription, but the cost of their manpower is quite high, and they have a 40 hour week, which means you either have to give compensatory time for anything over 40 hours or you have to pay extra.

Senator EXON. Do they have a provision, General, that if we get into war, they eliminate the 40 hour week?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

We have every expectation that that will go by the boards.

Senator EXON. So that is the good news. [Laughter.]

General, thank you very much.

It is always a pleasure to have you here.

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, on behalf of the whole committee, thank you for being here.

General ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, you asked me if there were something I would like to add.

I don't know in which direction you are going in this committee, whether it is Jim Locher's direction, that of his study—and I just would express my admiration for the tremendous amount of work that was done to produce that study and call the attention of all of us to some salient features of our current system—or if you are going in the direction of H.R. 3622, the House bill.

Let me just tick off very quickly how I come out on the House bill if that is the direction this committee chooses to take.

I would put the C-JCS in the chain of command, by law, but not by direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense. He needs to be in the chain of command.

Second, I agree with having a Deputy C-JCS, as described in H.R. 3622, but I do not agree that he should be dual-hatted and also be the Director of the joint staff. He will end up not doing justice to either job. The Chairman can find plenty for him to do besides representing him at times of the Chairman's absense.

I would add to that the need to provide the CINCs appropriate staff support for the PPBS functions that we would hope they would carry out, even under today's conditions, when they meet with the Defense Resources Board.

Then I would put in the law the language I described about making the military departments responsible to organize, man, equip—and so on—forces which are designed to meet the CINCs operational requirements.

Sir, thank you for your courtesy.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

Are you going to be in town for a while or are you about to head back to Europe?

General ROGERS. I will be here until mid-week, next week, or rather, in and out of Washington.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TED KENNEDY

STREAMLINED CHAIN OF COMMAND WITHIN THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Senator KENNEDY. General Rogers, when U.S. military forces were deployed in or near Lebanon, there was some criticism of the numerous levels in the chain of command from the President to the deployed forces. Were there constraints that prevented you from employing a more streamlined chain of command within the U.S. European Command?

General ROGERS. JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, specifies the chain of command and is fully consistent with the concept of unified command.

However, this document provides the flexibility for CINCs to amend the chain of command, subject to approval of the JCS. Under its provisions, a Joint Task Force Lebanon, reporting directly to CINC USEUCOM, was formed in February 1984.

The original chain of command for U.S. forces in Lebanon was somewhat cumbersome. From Washington, the chain of command ran to U.S. European Command, the U.S. Naval Forces Europe, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the Battle Force Sixth Fleet commander, and the Marine force commander. However, what should not be overlooked is the fact that the chain of command not only carries out orders from above, it also provides advice up the chain. There is great value for decision makers to receive advice and recommendations based on the experience and judgment of the commanders in the chain of command. There would not be many instances in which the chain of command could be shortened without impacting the quality of advice.

WARTIME MEDICAL READINESS PLANNING IN U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Senator KENNEDY. The Long Commission raised serious questions about the adequacy of wartime medical readiness planning in the U.S. European Command. Secretary Weinberger's review revealed very serious deficiencies in joint service planning for wartime medical care. In fact, one study claims that if one hundred additional casualties after the Beirut bombing had occurred, the medical system might well have failed.

General Rogers, would you comment on these reports and indicate how one might address and ameliorate the problem of wartime medical readiness planning?

General ROGERS. Your question refers to reports that are almost two years old and that focused on conditioned existing at the time. Since then, much has been accomplished to improve medical readiness in the European Command.

I believe the response to the Beirut terrorist bombing on October 23, 1983, was effective and appropriate under the circumstances. As the Long Commission report stated, all of the injured who could have been saved were saved. Had there been additional wounded requiring medical attention, the necessary resources were available to provide the care needed.

Following that incident the European Command has taken significant steps to improve its medical capability to respond to terrorist attacks. The ability to handle mass casualty situations has been strengthened by the development and exercise of Army, Navy, and Air Force medical response teams with carefully selected deployable assets ready for instance use. More than fifty exercises and real world events in Europe during 1984 and 1985 have proven the capability of our medical professionals to quickly respond to crises.

In addition to the initiative taken for terrorist response, substantial progress has also been made in enhancing our wartime medical readiness planning. Our hospital bed capacity has increased from approximately 20,000 in 1983 to over 65,000 wartime beds today. These will meet our requirements for more than thirty days of conventional conflict, permitting us to care for ten out of ten casualties during this period. Furthermore, we have secured an agreement with the Military Airlift Command to deploy the CONUS-based fleet of C-9 aeromedical evacuation aircraft to support wartime casualty evacuation operations.

Senator NUNN. Good luck, and thank you.

General ROGERS. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

○